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 You are in: Bureaus/Offices Reporting Directly to the Secretary > Deputy Secretary of State > Former Deputy Secretaries of State > Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage > Remarks > 2004 

Interview on National Public Radio With Robert Siegel

Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary
Washington, DC
July 2, 2004

(10:55 a.m. EDT)

MR. SIEGEL: Welcome to the program, Deputy Secretary Armitage.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Sure.

MR. SIEGEL: Earlier this week, you said on NPR's Morning Edition that with the Department of State taking the lead now in Iraq, we, meaning State, will be the dominant voice. How is that voice going to be any different from the Pentagon's voice?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I was expressing an excess of enthusiasm. It's quite clear that things have changed. We are -- we, the United States is no long the sovereign in Iraq. Iraqis are. And we are just another embassy, however, an embassy which has a lot of resources behind it, certainly has a very close relationship with the U.S. military and the coalition forces. So we will have a very strong view to put forward to our Iraqi friends.

MR. SIEGEL: There is a contrary view expressed by an unfriendly Iraqi, a cleric who is speaking through the rebel Shiite Muqtada al-Sadr today at Friday prayers, said the multinational forces are the same as the occupation; for what, he asked, has changed but the name?

If he’s wrong, how do you convince Iraqis that something really has changed?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I don't think we'll ever convince 100 percent of the people in Iraq that things have changed, but if recent polls in Iraq are any indication, about 73 percent of them seem to support this new government as a sovereign government. I think we have to continue to make sure that the Iraqis are out front and the Iraqis are making decisions for Iraq. And I can assure you, Mr. Siegel, there’ll be times as we move forward where the Iraqi government will disagree with our own views and I think that will, in a way, help make the point that they are, indeed, sovereign.

MR. SIEGEL: And if it's an Iraqi matter, they will prevail because it's Iraq?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Oh, absolutely.

MR. SIEGEL: Do you look upon the U.S. troops that are now in Iraq as essentially an expeditionary force that will come home as soon as we can get them out, whether that's two or five or how many years; or are they like forces in Germany or Korea that fought a war but remain there in significant numbers to express defense commitments, to project a deterrent threat in the region?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, we've no desire to stay in the long, long term. We have a great desire to complete this mission successfully. The President has been quite clear: We'll complete this mission, we'll train up Iraqis, and when Iraqis turn to us and tell us that they are now able to manage their own security concerns, our military forces and our allied forces will leave.

MR. SIEGEL: You've been both a military man and a diplomat. What timeframe do you think that's going to be?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: First of all, no one has accused me of being a diplomat lately. (Laughter.)

MR. SIEGEL: People routinely accuse you of being a diplomat. (Laughter.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Alleged diplomat. (Laughter.) I can assure you, however, that no one can give you the timeframe and it would be bad business to do so. I can't predict when they'll be fully able to maintain their own security. We'll know it together and we won't stay a minute longer than is necessary.

MR. SIEGEL: There's a little bit of confusion right now within NATO about exactly what was agreed to by NATO leaders as to the NATO role in Iraq. The French President Chirac seems to think that it's vital that the NATO flag not fly in Iraq, that NATO is only in a coordinating role to coordinate the individual efforts of member nations.

As you understand it, did NATO authorize a collective NATO mission in Iraq?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: The details were left to be resolved, Mr. Siegel. What was -- happened in Istanbul at the NATO heads of state summit was in response to a letter that Prime Minister Allawi had sent to the Secretary General of NATO requesting technical assistance and training for Iraqi security forces. But I think I would describe it as, in general, a NATO agreement principle with the details to be worked out. And you're quite correct, the French have a contrary view and find themselves at loggerheads, not with the United States so much but with many of the other NATO countries.

MR. SIEGEL: I've heard at least one account, though, which says that other large NATO members -- Germany, for example -- are with France on this one.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I think German -- they may well end up there. I think they're kind of waiting and seeing. Other large NATO countries, like Britain and others, are with us. So we'll resolve these things. I think the important element here in NATO is the Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer seems to be quite keen on having a NATO role and I think that's a good basis on which to move forward.

MR. SIEGEL: How important is it to the U.S. that there be a formal, obvious NATO role in Iraq?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Oh, I think it would be a very good indicator to the Iraqis and to all in the area that NATO is betting on the fact that Iraq will be successful in this drive for democracy. So, in that regard, it'd be quite important.

MR. SIEGEL: I want to ask you about a couple of other areas of U.S. policy.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Sure.

MR. SIEGEL: Talks in Indonesia on North Korea. In those talks, the U.S. seems to have spelled out its position on the North Korean nuclear program in some detail. Could you clarify for us, does the U.S. now say that if North Korea were to freeze work on its nuclear program, that we then could see reason for aid to North Korea, if not from us, from Japan or South Korea, but some kind of aid for the North Koreans in exchange for a freeze?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Yes, we could, but that freeze would have to be on the road towards dismantlement. So, a freeze forever would not be sufficient. So I'll give you a qualified yes.

MR. SIEGEL: So you're saying a freeze as a first point, but in order for the aid to continue flowing, there would have to be progress toward dismantling or a commitment to dismantle?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, there were two -- Mr. Siegel, there were two types of aid. There were food aid, which the United States has been providing regularly, because we don't use food as a weapon and there is a humanitarian problem in North Korea. But the aid that is being considered in the six-party talks was fuel oil for energy. And you're correct, that would come from other nations, not from the United States. But we could consider this if a freeze is a first step.

MR. SIEGEL: Is Washington essentially back to where we began, at the handover from the Clinton to the Bush Administration? Back to where policy was then, where we're willing to see some kind of quid pro quo with the North Koreans and we don't regard that as blackmail by Pyongyang?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No. I think we're in a quite different place. We've made it quite clear, I think, to all concerned that we want complete, verifiable dismantlement. And one of the major differences from our predecessors is that the President has managed to have five states who have very high equities in the North Korean resolution on the same sheet of music and I think that's a significant diplomatic triumph for the President and that's a great difference from the past.

MR. SIEGEL: Making that a regional forum that discusses the North Korea problem?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Dead on.

MR. SIEGEL: I want to ask you about Darfur, the region in Sudan which the Secretary visited this week, where he spoke to us from, actually. Right after the Secretary's visit, we read today in The Washington Post that the Sudanese Government had actually moved an entire refugee camp. Is there anything that the United States can do apart from simply urge the Government of Sudan to constrain these militias, Arab militias that are attacking the people there? Anything we can do beyond, actually, the threat or use of force in Sudan?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, the Sudanese Government, first of all, at the urging of the United States and others, after 20 years, found the political will to end the North-South civil war. Using the momentum gained from that, we hope to be able to cajole, to urge the Sudanese Government to restrain the Jingaweit Arabs. And in that regard, the Secretary's trip to Darfur and his conversations in Khartoum laid out benchmarks that we'd like to see the Sudanese government reach.

And I think it had -- his trip had the subsidiary benefit of mobilizing a lot of international attention on the issue. We've had discussions in New York at the UN Security Council. Some of my colleagues have been up there today briefing on the situation and we want to bring all international pressure to bear and we think we can be successful getting Sudan to provide the proper security so the world can prevent a humanitarian disaster.

MR. SIEGEL: The French are just across the border in Chad, their forces there. Would you welcome a more active French role in addressing this problem?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We would welcome a more active role from all of the international community and I would certainly welcome those who have pledged assistance to Darfur and have not yet found the wherewithal to back it up to do so.

MR. SIEGEL: Just before leaving this point, the people who are reading and seeing what's happening in Darfur, the idea that we could get the Sudanese to stop the North-South civil war, the other conflict in Sudan, after 20 years, seems small solace. If this were to go on for another two or three years, it seems it could be absolutely devastating to the people there.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We don't want it to go on for another two or three months. It's become -- it could become devastating if we're not allowed to provide food and the medicines into the camps in a timely enough fashion to prevent disease. So we're not thinking in terms of years and years. The point I was making about resolving the situation after 20 years, it took two decades to resolve because it was so neuralgic. This is somewhat less neuralgic and we ought to be able to get the Sudanese Government to step up to their responsibilities.

MR. SIEGEL: Do we have enough leverage with the Sudanese to convince them of that?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Mr. Siegel, time will tell and it's not going to be much time.

MR. SIEGEL: This is an appropriate moment at which to stop. Secretary Armitage, thank you very much for your time.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Thank you, Mr. Siegel.

MR. SIEGEL: Richard Armitage, who is the Deputy Secretary of State, spoke to us from the State Department in Washington.

2004/743



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