Remarks En Route to Washington, D.C.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: I didn't have notes until -- it took us ten minutes to set up, so I didn't know it was (inaudible.) I think we had a chance to talk about Rumbeck, right? You were there, so if you have any questions on that one, you can take notes. (Inaudible) talk about (inaudible.) I will say, sometimes I'll just put in some things to give you a little flavor of kind of the follow-up. I was pretty impressed that the CPMT mission that’s supposed to have (inaudible) because the UN wants to go in and handle it all by itself, though one of the issues that I will probably call Jan Pronk about -- the Secretary General's special representative -- at the timing of that transition and then we'd have to find some more money for that. But I thought that was a pretty good operation.

I think one sort of sense, coming out of (inaudible) is, you know, I think, you know, they're rather successful in getting the basic food supplies in. But we have to be alert to – needs can change before the rainy season. The rainy season is a blessing and a curse. They have a lot of drought and they want the rains, but when it comes time to bringing the food in, you know, it gets awful hard to get people to clear roads and then -- (Inaudible) with the NGO group and the sort of the camp managers, I was struck (inaudible) that over the course of about a year, a year and a half, been a massive expansion of NGO presence throughout Darfur and that's good. I mean, a lot of committed people are doing some important work. But you can also see they're tired. And I think they're concerned that people outside the camps keep them on the stream in terms of maintaining the support. So in that sense, the Oslo Conference that you visited was kind of a good thing. I think they see that there's -- you know, people aren't forgetting about there (inaudible) and driving home.

I think their major concern or their suggestion was the focus on security and for them, most of that meant the expansion of the AU force. And also, they said (inaudible) becomes permanent, so they were emphasizing the need to try to find a political solution.

One of the NGO representatives made a comment that I thought I'd share with you because I thought it was interesting. He said, "In the process of forming these camps, I was asked about whether they were able to maintain tribal cohesion, were they able to set them up in various tribal groups?" And he said they started to do that, but with the large numbers they couldn't continue it. And he said one of the side benefits is that people in different tribes that never had relations with one another now recognize, you know, you could be mixing among tribes and some sense of inter-communal relations.

I think you saw we had a small-- an opportunity to stop the -- sort of a woman's group that was making some pasta and, you know, one sense I had from that was under pretty difficult conditions, you really get a sense of the strength of the human spirit. These people were pretty energetic and they'd been there for awhile already when we got there. I always ask them about camp security, you know, both the inside and outside. As you've probably heard, there's a big concern about outside the camp, people having to go to get firewood and the danger of the women being raped. But there's also a concern inside the camp, about maintaining security.

Now, I was asked in (inaudible), too, because, you know, you saw some men around as we were coming in, but you kind of had a separation of men and women and he said that tends to be the way these tribal societies work under normal conditions. But being in a camp is probably particularly difficult for the men in the tribes, but their basic role will be to herd the animals, provide security. Well, they're not really herding animals. They're not really providing security. As difficult as it seems, you can see the women have a role: they're there providing food, they're taking care of the children and that kind -- just have a day-to-day existence providing water and food. But you have to have some concern about what happens in these societies for very long periods of time (inaudible), so there've been just suspended situation.

You know, given the nature of the existence, I think it's a real credit to the NGOs and our AID people and their (inaudible) conditions and seeing people, you know, develop the little private space, they have their donkeys. And while the conditions are obviously very crude, one also has to keep in mind the conditions that they come from, too. So I'm not saying this is a satisfactory arrangement, but it says something at least in this camp about the work that the humanitarian people have done. And they're even trying to set up some schools and education, which they might not even have in their village. And the Charge' was telling me that as you drove in, you saw the brickworks that were there that sort of -- that's obviously a major commercial enterprise for the town. But there's also -- it shows kind of the entrepreneurial spirit of people. There's active water being pumped into a can and so, people have started to make bricks (inaudible) they're trying to sell bricks for competition in the town.

I was particularly interested in meeting the African Union Forces. And you might have met -- because I tried to single them out -- is that there's a lieutenant colonel, a U.S. lieutenant colonel there who is actually a foreign service officer who's been called up. And he rode with us and he was a very intriguing guy. He'll actually be coming back to the African Bureau probably in May. His period will end and we'll be lucky to have him.

My sense, from what I heard about the AU force is -- from our colonel and others, you got a professional group there and it's actually a very useful development for the AU, since some of you, you know, covered this in years past and he had the Organization of African Unions -- you wouldn't have had these sort of capabilities here. And at least from what our guys told us too, is that it's a serious force, you know, even at the soldier level. But they have the challenge of creating what's called in the military world, combined operations. In other words, you're combining joint operations than you do at multiple services. Combined is where you deal with different countries. And you had Canadians there and you had Rwandans, you had Nigerians, you know, you had, sort of, others -- Kenya and (inaudible), too. And this takes training and support, so we were thinking of some things. There are actually some training facilities. NATO has one in (inaudible), the British have one in Kenya, whether it's (inaudible) we can offer some help on that.

I also got a briefing -- kind of a paper briefing because they didn't have time in expanding the police operations, which is a good idea. They've got some police in the camps, but they want to expand the numbers considerably, which would help deal with some of the internal security questions, because those aid workers leave at night. They need the security so there's no question on who's there in the evenings. And part of the purpose of the AU military expansion would be also to protect the police in case they're not heavily armed forces. And there will be decisions later this month by the African Union about the expansion or it looks like that's well on track, as I hope it is and as I think I mentioned. While we were here, Secretary Rice met with Konare who is the chair of the AU and he was talking about some cooperation with NATO and then the U.S., which is a good sign, I think.

They did mention the appreciation for past U.S. support. What they're really looking for is logistics. So, this is a test we handled with some sensitivity. But the African Union is proud of its role. It's proud of what it's doing there and there's always sensitivities when you (inaudible) foreign forces, but they appreciate the logistics. A key staff will be bringing -- you got to put these people in quarters. You got to house them and that's being done by a private contractor (inaudible). That's one of the reasons….

This will just give you a little sense of kind of how one does this. These are kind of sort of my follow-up notes, okay, for some things to track, some things I want more information on, sort of monitoring the requests that I made to the Government of Sudan, things with Garang, GSS, AU support, some other follow-up items, some contacts that we'll have with (inaudible), and I found out that King Abdullah of Jordan seems to have a relationship with Khartoum so I'll be there in May and some follow-up. But this gives you a little feel of kind of, you know, the rough checklist follow-up. But to kind of condense it, here are some, maybe six or seven takeaways.

The North-South accord is a very important development and it's the best prospect we have for trying to improve the situation not only between North and South but the whole country. So we want to keep pressing the implementation. Now, the signs of all the parties is they want to move towards implementation, but if we can get that in place by the summer, first, it's a model for the other conflicts, they can sort of see what can happen in terms of resolution of disputes, financial support; second, it gets Garang in the government, which I think will be a positive factor; third, we also have to strengthen the southern Sudanese government, which was that was about, you know, Rumbek, kind of get that going.

And, frankly, I learned some things about the deployments of the militias in the South too, and, you know, I was struck -- I saw a map, I guess you guys didn't see it -- by the CPMT guys of the deployment of the forces. And they're all scattered, I mean, and so, on the one hand, that's good because they're supposed to eventually form joint units, but you can also see where it creates possibilities for tension as this moves forward.

So first is the North-South accord. The second is, you know, focus on the near-term humanitarian needs so as to keep these people going while the other pieces move forward. And I've mentioned the relation to that with the rains. And, you know, I come away with a sense that while there's been some very important efforts made in basic humanitarian support, you can see these people are near the edge of existence. It doesn't take much for this system, you know, to move down a level and there aren’t many more levels to move down. And, you know, so we have to be alert to, depending on climactic conditions and other things, about sort of risks of (inaudible).

Third, the critical role of the AU expansion and the capabilities, and this is going to have a lot of efforts of diplomacy with the AU and the follow-up to see what we do, whether with NATO or other partners.

Fourth, continuing to press the government. So I think this was useful in terms of delivering messages face to face, giving them a sense of prospects but also things of expectations. So with our mission, you know, I want to make sure we track those items and I'll probably have some follow-up calls where I'll sort of press on these points. And particularly, as I gain more information on the militia, this is a point I want to try to again hone in on because that's the real -- that's the real combustible factor here in Darfur as we're going forward. Because I do think the sense I've gotten is that since the start of the year the government has pulled back. You don't have the government fighting. And as you see, they pulled back some of their air capabilities. But depending on who the militia are fighting for, there could just be someone else substituting in the conflict.

And then five, the Darfur peace process. So, you know, whether it be the NGOs or anybody else, we've got to create the context again for some peaceful resolution in Darfur. I need to learn more about the rebels, which part I hope Mike and some of our other sources will be able to bring to us. Some of you had some discussions with the role of the tribal leaders in this process and that's another issue we're going to be trying to explore. And there's some groups that have done some very important mediation in the past. One is this Catholic lay persons group, Sanaa GDO (ph) that has done some work. President Chisano, a former president of Mozambique. So we're trying to get some of the right players in there.

And then -- where am I at? -- sixth, we've got to -- we're going to have to look at our mission in Khartoum because you can see we've stood that up from not much of anything and as this activity list continues you can see, you know, you've got some people who you have got a lot of respect for. They're trying to make things happen under difficult conditions. We'll see what added support we give to them.

And then the seventh part, which you were kind of asking, is that the Congress is so involved with this, you know, I will have to, first by phone calls, I've offered already briefings in the two weeks that I'm home or else maybe a hearing in May, to kind of (a) keep the support going on the financial side where we want to try to have it with the supplemental and then I'll be testifying before Jim Kolbe's Subcommittee on Appropriations also about our 2006 budget.

And also trying to explain to them the situation as we see it because we need their support. They also are -- some of them are deeply engaged in the issue. Some of them, like Frank Wolf has been, you know, a very strong activist on this and I -- he was my appropriator at USTR so I've known him for four years. He's a very sort of strong-willed individual on these topics.

So that gives you a little sense of the follow-up.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: Diplomatically, I want to say it's their decision, but it appears that people are planning as if the decisions will be made in the -- there are sort of two groups that have to meet, Security Commission and some other ministerial (inaudible) later this month. Okay? That's the decision point. Then they have to get commitments from different countries but I've gotten the sense that the Rwandans and Nigerians and maybe South Africans and others are willing to put in some additional numbers.

Then they've got to work out the planning operation, you know, how they get people from Point A to Point B, how they set up the facilities for these guys. You know, and that goes back to the contractor. And our colonel told me that he said, you know, from the moment they say "go" it'll still probably take, you know, five to six weeks to get the facilities built up and then the people, then you've got to get the people in. So, you know, this is something that, you know, if you even think in comparison terms the UN peacekeeping operation, the 10,000-person in the South, starting to stand up in April, they hope to get it up to the 9,000 level limit by about November and completed by December. Well, the AU has had sort of less backing on that so, frankly, you know, I don't know how quickly it will get set up but I'd like to get it -- if they decide to do it, I'd like to get it stood up as quickly as possible.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: But they're already planning. I mean, for example, I asked the general, the Nigerian general who commands -- he's a very serious officer. He commanded their ECOWAS mission before. You know, I said, okay, what would you do with the troops? And they've already got, you know, plans for allocations of, you know, where they'd have, like company by company and platoons that would guard each of the camps and things like that and a mobile reserve. So they're planning.

QUESTION: Isn't part of the issue not only the size of the troop force but the mandate they have to actually deal with incidents?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: That was a question that was asked by the combined mission which was an AU-UN-US-EU mission that did an assessment, and the conclusion was that they really didn't need an expanded mandate but they would adjust sort of the priorities within the current mandate. And, you know, I think they see their mission from the start as when they are in place they seem to be able to stop the conflict, at least the type of conflict that we have now, which would -- so, in other words, in an environment where you don't have government offensives or major offenses by the rebels and you're dealing primarily with militias and banditry, their presence -- everyone I talked to acknowledged -- plays a critical role. Okay?

Now, that doesn't mean in every circumstance and, you know, it stops (inaudible) but it would do the job that needs to get done. And therefore what they need to do is be in more places, add different mobility, and a good example is probably on the intelligence side. Gaining intelligence about, for example, possible attacks on villages so they can get there first. So there was a question in this village that was attacked, the -- I forget the exact name -- that, you know, whether they were alerted and they said that there were some impositions to get there, but I think probably, you know, everybody learned a lesson from that, I hope, in terms of (inaudible). But the bigger lesson is what can you do to get better intelligence.

QUESTION: One of the AU people we were speaking to while you were in your meeting said, well, when I asked the question about the mandate, he said, well, the first big step is to get the troops, then (inaudible) the mandate, but you seem to be saying --

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: Again, I mean, I've read in the paper on this they came back and they said, you know, I actually had it somewhere in my documents -- they just sort of adjusted the terms of it. And I read it and it looked, you know, fine for those purposes. So, you know, they're not going to be -- they're not doing combat operations. Okay? It's a peacekeeping operation. It's not a peacemaking operation.

QUESTION: When you went to the camp and you saw that a lot of these people are building mud brick structures, there's a school, they're starting (inaudible) street, a lot of people (inaudible) hope to send these people even if the warfare ended don't have a lot of incentive to go home. They're getting free food. If you look at the way people live in Rumbek it's not a whole lot better. So there seems to be a concern among some that these camps are just not going to go away.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: I think that that's an issue worth considering. Okay? I mean, the good perspective on that is that through the efforts of AID and a lot of NGOs they've actually created conditions, you know, aside from the security issue -- and that's a big issue -- that, you know, are comparable to what they might have had in villages. But this is no scientific test. I asked people about going home and I wouldn't underestimate people's ties to the land. I think if they have an opportunity to go back, you know, in their own region, their own lands, and it's safe, I think they'll want to do so.

Remember, you've got different peoples here. Some are traditional herders and one of the challenges would be, you know, a lot of them lost their cattle. So this goes back to the question for some of the men, you know, how do they see their role in life and existence. Can they get additional cattle and start again? That is why, actually, even when I was talking to Vice President Taha he talked about compensation for people. Now, we'll have to see. But again, he talked about land (inaudible) issues, which are quite important. And then there's others that are obviously kind of more agricultural. And I think, you know, if conditions are right people will want to go back. You have a little bit of a test in what's happening in South Sudan now where you're starting to see -- again, the term is internally displaced people as opposed to refugees. People have used the term a little interchangeably. Refugees are when they cross the line to another country. But -- yeah, I know, I'm just -- but so, you know, what you've seen is IDPs start to return to the South.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: Can I just -- I think what the point is is that -- where I'd add emphasis is the longer you stay and wait then the more you have to break with the land. So, you know, we're about ready to enter a rainy season so, frankly, these people are going to be here for a while because they'd have to go back, they'd have to go back before the rainy season. And so in terms of timeframes, you know, you want to be optimistic. If you get the North-South accord this year, you try to create this peace process, you get these people more secure, you take care of their basic needs, and you hope you can start to create the conditions next year to go home.

QUESTION: One more? (Inaudible.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: I'd say that's a question mark. But I have a strong inclination that they were behind the formation and therefore they bear a responsibility, and because they are the government of the country they have a responsibility to deal with people who are, you know, engaging in violent acts on their territory. Okay? So but as I think I mentioned to you when we were in Khartoum, we asked some of the Darfurians living in Khartoum if the government pressures the militia, what's the chance some of the militia may go over to the other side? They said, "Yeah, they may." So I hope -- I've got some questions myself I'm trying to get answered on that kind of the state of these forces, but I don't want to give away the source of the problem because one person who I talked to I kind of -- who I respect and trust at least gave me their assessment of this attack on the village and sense that it was revealed some coordination and planning and so that's not bandits. Okay? Now, whether they are people who have developed their own capabilities, that's hard to tell. But I think, you know, we need to hold the government responsible and where they feel they can't, then we've got to get the AU to play every role that they can. And then we also have to work on the rebels, too.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK: You mentioned it to me. You were talking. No, but I was -- you mentioned that you kind of have the names of those players. I'd be interested in getting those to try to follow up.

(INTERVIEW CUTS ABRUPTLY)

the things that I asked of the government was to expedite the customs and any of the movement of PAE's logistics support, so we can get these people in more quickly.

Now, another item of follow-up is that for us to give support, we need to know what their plans are for bringing in troops and what time. And we have to nail down whether that's going to be at Addis Ababa, which is the headquarters of the AU, and I think that will be the case, or whether or it'll be done here.

I asked the general about that. He said he'd provided his planning -- plan to Addis because that will be -- we got to get a contact point to connect with, whether it's NATO or U.S. or EU or others. Because obviously, one of my takeaways on the security situation and I'll come back to this is whatever we can do to get their numbers up as soon as possible is very important.

Now, I tried to ask some questions about the militia and, you know, to me, there's still a lot of unanswered questions about how you can best stop them or pull them back or disarm. Obviously, one step is to press the government. I did that in Khartoum, but I did that courteously but firmly with the governor as well. And I referenced the fact that I knew he had to care about his people and therefore he needed to support what the African Union was doing. And I mentioned this incident that was in south Darfur recently and referenced the fact that we have photos from satellites about what's going on in this (inaudible).

And so to say to him, you know, "I know what's going on, I see what's happening." And then I referenced the fact that the eyes of the world are on Darfur. The UN has taken actions on accountability. The people will be held accountable. So it's very important that we have the follow-through, so it was trying to get their incentive system to give as much support as they can.

I also want to learn more about the nature of the militias. Part of this is that you're investigating their origins, in part, through their arms, you know, their coordination and (inaudible) and, you know, as John Garang said, there is a history of Sudan using militias as the part of a counterinsurgency strategy. Now I don't know for sure whether the government is still behind this or whether it unleashed something that it now has a hard time reeling back, whether there's different people in the government in different roles. Under any circumstance, you know, it's our position that they've got to be responsible as sovereign powers in their country for these forces and, where they can’t, they need to help the AU to be able to provide that support.

Now, there's another side to this story, which is the role of the rebels. Because some of these attacks that you're seeing, like this attack on this one village, that is a village that was associated recently with the rebels in that part of the region. And so it was important, going back to what I explained, I was trying to do with Garang, that Garang was telling the rebel groups, "Do not mistake the UN actions for a sign that someone's going to tumble the government down," because that could actually fuel these guys into taking further their action.

And Mike, you know, who's the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary you met, he's actually staying. He wanted to visit another refugee camp so we could take a look another one. And he is actually going to meet.

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