U.S. Department of State

2000:

Russia:
Provided technology and assistance to Iran and India.

China:
Announced it would not assist other countries in developing ballistic missiles.

North Korea:
Negotiated about ending missile exports.

NIS Countries:
One (Ukraine) of twelve NIS countries enforced export controls.

South Asia:
Continued unilateral nuclear testing moratoria, restraints in nuclear and missile program, stronger export controls. Experts cooperated with India to improve export control regulation and mechanisms.

Middle East:
Iraq defied UN inspectors. Iran continued WMD development.

2001:

Russia:
Partially halted assistance to Iran.

China:
Implemented its 1997 nuclear commitment, but not its 2000 missile commitment.

North Korea:
Did not export nuclear material or technology, but continued to seek buyers for missile exports.

NIS Countries:
Marked increase in meeting export control standards and in interdicting WMD and related components.

South Asia:
Same as 2000.

Middle East:
Same as 2000.

Russia:
Exported technology; increased attention to Iran's WMD and missile programs.

China:
Implemented its 1997 nuclear commitment but not its 2000 missile commitment.

North Korea:
Accepted U.S. offer for talks, but continued to export missile-related items.

NIS Countries:
European countries developed export controls; some NIS countries moved towards controls.

Russia:
Maintained its cooperation with Iran's program, but expresses increasing concern as IAEA establishes Iranian safeguard violations. International consensus against supply to Iran remains in place.

China:
Continues to cooperate. Attention, however, has been given to other priorities that have arisen.

North Korea:
Not contributed to nuclear programs in other countries, but ballistic missile exports contribute to destabilizing already volatile regions of the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia.

Iran:
So long as it does not verifiably end its nuclear pursuits and fully implement IAEA Additional Protocol, UNSC takes action in support of IAEA requirements in Iran.

Wide international consensus that Iran should not possess enrichment or reprocessing. Iran's international political and economic isolation grows.

Russia/Iran:
Stops nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran. Strengthened export controls in Russia.

China:
Adheres to 1997 nuclear and 2000 missile commitments and effectively implements its export control regulations.

Libya:

Implementing commitments made to U.S./UK on WMD/missiles. Meeting new obligations under CWC and NPT Additional Protocol.

Iran:
Ceases cooperation on Bushehr reactor. Wide international consensus that Iran should not possess enrichment or reprocessing facilities until trust rebuilt. Iran begins to dismantle infrastructure; international inspectors verify dismantlement of infrastructure. Permanent, effective inspection protocols put in place. Iran denied WMD/missiles and related technology, materials, equipment and expertise from other countries (Widens Iran discussion from just Iran/Russia relationship)

China:
Fully implements its 1997 nuclear and 2000 missile commitments; effectively enforces its WMD/missile related export controls and addresses deficiencies in its export control system. China joins the Nuclear Suppliers group. U.S. will impose sanctions as warranted on Chinese entities engaged in activities of proliferation.

Libya:

Implementing commitments made to U.S./UK on WMD/missiles. Meeting new obligations under CWC and NPT Additional Protocol.

Middle East/Iraq:
Signs and fully implements an IAEA protocol.

2000:

U.S.-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition completed.

Progress made on Russian plutonium stockpile implementation and transparency issues.

Preparations for negotiations of U.S.-Russian plutonium-disposition multilateral framework are on track.

PPRA Amendment and fossil fuel implementing agreement concluded, awaiting Russian government approval to sign.

Russia decided to use the same design for mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility as in the U.S.; negotiations of a multilateral framework to support Russian plutonium disposition started and continued.

PPRA Amendment and replacement implementing agreement signed; access arrangements for U.S. personnel overseeing projects to construct/refurbish fossil fuel plants to replace production reactors signed; initial contracts signed and implementation underway. PPRA monitoring of shutdown reactors and weapon-grade plutonium in storage continue smoothly.

Negotiations continued on Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF).

Multilateral framework and international financing for Russian PuD program plan completed.

Key elements of the M&I regime agreed bilaterally and consultations with IAEA begun.

Implementation of PPRA fully underway. Negotiations underway on international participation in PRA-related projects and on reduction of Russian plutonium production prior to shutdown of reactors.

Mayak FMSF contains at least several tons of plutonium under bilateral transparency.

Begin implementing PuD multilateral framework and international financing plan.

Conclude agreements with IAEA on M&I regime.

Continue implementing PPRA.

Begin implementing reduced plutonium production.

Implement Mayak FMSF transparency arrangements.

Obtain pledges of ninety-five percent of Global Partnership target, and twenty percent of actual spending commitments.

2000:

Engaged more than 30,000 scientists in peaceful civilian efforts.

Moved to support sustainable transition from weapons to civilian work.

Engaged cumulative total of 50,000 scientists, of whom about 26,000 were former WMD scientists.

Eight new U.S. industry partners recruited.

Three new technological applications brought to market, including Neurok TechSoft (linear differential equation solver), a laser-based fluorocarbon detector, and new computer animation technology.

U.S. private sector industry partners total over sixty.

Five new projects funded at three newly-engaged BW and CW institutes.

Three new U.S. industry partners recruited thus far, with partial year results for U.S. non-NP Partner funding at 14% of total project funding.

The BioIndustry Initiative has funded long-term commercialization and sustainability programs at large-scale biologic production facilities in Russia and Kazakhstan; has developed Russian Bioconsortium of former BW research and production facilities; has developed relationships with DOW Chemical and Eli Lilly.

1. Gain access to at least two new previously inaccessible BW and/or CW institutes in Russia/Eurasia via the Bio-Chem Redirect Program, and at least three new high-priority former WMD institute in member countries Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.

2. Increase level of U.S. private industry funding of joint science center projects to 12% of total project funding.

1. Gain access to at least two new previously inaccessible BW and/or CW institutes in Russia/Eurasia via the Bio-Chem Redirect Program, and at least four new high-priority former WMD institute in member countries Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.

2. Increase level of U.S. private industry funding of joint science center projects to 15% of total project funding.

3. Graduate 2-3 institutes or groups of scientists from NP/Science Center Program assistance. Identify candidates among chem and bio institutes for graduation in FY06.

4. Begin two new BII conversion and commercialization projects at priority BW production facilities. Fund two new BII projects on accelerated drug and vaccine research.

5. Initiate effort in Iraq to engage, redirect, retrain and/or re-employ former WMD scientists and engineers. Establish initial group of transition and training activities; develop database of available scientists/engineers; coordinate activities with other reconstructions efforts.

2000:

N/A

2001:

Baseline:

Based on President's May 1, 2001 speech at National Defense University, consultations began with allies on new U.S.-Russia strategic framework.

The UK agreed to support the upgrade of the early warning radar at Fylingdales; discussions with Denmark on upgrading the early warning radar in Greenland are progressing well. The U.S. and UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding missile defense cooperation in June 2003.

The U.S. is working with Germany and Italy on the Medium Extended Air Defense System.

The U.S. and Canada established a regular consultation mechanism and are exploring potential areas of joint cooperation.

At the November 2003 Summit, the U.S. obtained NATO agreement to study the feasibility of missile defenses to protect population and territory, and the U.S. continues to work closely with NATO on this.

The U.S. is working closely on missile defense with Japan, whose government has significantly increased its budget request for missile defense-related work.

The U.S. and Australia discussed Canberra's interest in missile defense and opportunities for cooperation.

The U.S. and India have discussed how India could conduct a missile defense requirements analysis.

All key allies and friends endorse the deployment of the limited U.S. missile defense system.

More allies/friends work with U.S. on missile defense-related projects, or some allies/friends undertake their own missile defense-related projects without the U.S.

Moscow Treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003. Discussions on procedures for and scheduling of the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission began. The Department opened regular consultations on arms control with the Russian MFA at the Assistant Secretary level.

CGSS Working Groups on offensive strategic affairs and missile defense have met twice and three times, respectively. The U.S. and Russia began exchanging information on their plans for reductions under the Moscow Treaty. In February 2003, NATO and Russia agreed on a work plan that includes some nuclear CSBMs.

Discussions on START.

Implementation continued on a more positive basis than in previous years; meeting of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) took place in June and August 2003.

Understanding reached with Russia on, and implementation of, practical transparency and predictability efforts related to non-strategic nuclear warheads and to strategic activities beyond Moscow Treaty obligations.

Practical transparency and predictability efforts in the area of missile defense are identified with Russia.

U.S. and Russia define and initiate missile defense-related research and development projects.

NATO and Russia identify areas of potential agreement within the NATO framework about missile defense cooperation.

START Treaty implementation issues resolved.

U.S. and Russia begin full operations at the JDEC to exchange and monitor ballistic missile early warning data as part of the initiatives to improve strategic stability, and move toward a multilateralized operation.

Reductions under the Moscow Treaty proceed. Any implementation issues that arise are resolved.

Transparency exchanges concerning strategic and non-strategic arms implemented smoothly.

Implementation of voluntary and reciprocal transparency and predictability efforts vis-�-vis missile defense plans and programs.

Continue implementation of U.S.-Russian missile defense-related cooperation projects.

The JDEC is open and completely established, where U.S. and Russian military operators monitor side-by-side launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

U.S./NATO reach agreement within the NATO framework with Russia about long-term missile defense cooperation.

2000:

The 2000 Review Conference showed wide support for the NPT.

Forty-five countries have signed the IAEA safeguards protocol.

PrepCom I for the 2005 NPT RevCon concluded smoothly.

The IAEA took action on integrated safeguards and emphasized financial needs; nine more states signed, bringing the total to sixty-seven, of which, twenty-eight protocols have entered into force.

The IAEA Board approved a multi-year, $11.5 million a year program to address the prevention of, detection of and response to nuclear terrorism.

President Bush sent U.S. Additional Protocol to Senate for its advice and consent.

PrepCom II for the 2005 NPT Review Conference concluded successfully. Cuba and East Timor joined the treaty. The international community urged Iran to comply with the NPT and North Korea to reverse its position on NPT withdrawal.

Eleven more states signed an additional protocol, bringing the total to seventy-eight, thirty-seven of which have entered into force.

Voluntary contributions to the IAEA anti-nuclear terrorism program funding doubled in FY 2003.

IAEA successfully uses the first increase in the safeguards to meet critical safeguards needs, including more inspectors. States continue to provide support for IAEA program to counter nuclear terrorism.

Ten to 20 more states negotiate, sign, and implement the Additional Protocol.

New integrated safeguards system under the Additional Protocol in place in Japan and Canada

The IAEA continues to improve safeguards approaches to key nuclear facilities of concern.

At PrepCom III (2004) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), Parties table and discuss seriously recommendations for strengthening the NPT, particularly compliance with its nonproliferation obligations, safeguards, and export controls.

Senate provides advice and consent to U.S. Additional Protocol.

2005 NPT Review Conference reinforces value of Treaty; many parties support recommendations to strengthen compliance with nonproliferation obligations, including support for the Additional Protocol, export controls, and safeguards.

Additional states negotiate, sign and implement the Additional Protocol, including most NPT parties with major nuclear programs. Process for implementing U.S. Additional Protocol is well under way.

Additional safeguards funding and improved approach to implementation continue to strengthen safeguards system.

IAEA program to combat nuclear terrorism remains strong and continues to strengthen the security of nuclear and other radioactive material.

2000:

N/A

2001:

N/A

Baseline:

The IAEA met to discuss whether the CPPNM should be revised or strengthened. Experts made recommendations

The Experts Group recommended "well defined amendment" to CPPNM for consideration by the Drafting Group.

The Drafting Group worked on recommendations for consideration by a revision conference.

2000:
A total of 133 States Parties.

The United States began implementing U.S. industry obligations.

Discussions with Russia on CW destruction moribund.

2001:
A total of 144 States Parties.

The U.S. fully implemented its industry obligations, including hosting 16 inspections of U.S. industry facilities conducted.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) budget problems continued.

Some destruction of Russian chemical weapons began.

Four States Parties (Nauru, Uganda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Samoa) were added to the CWC, and two other states (Libya and Thailand) voiced intent to join.

The United States fully implemented CWC industry obligations by meeting all declaration and reporting requirements, hosting eight industry inspections, and successfully resolving issues from five previous inspections.

Three of the six Congressional conditions for granting authority for U.S financial assistance for Russian stockpile destruction have been resolved; limited progress was made on the other three conditions; Congress granted the President waiver authority. As a result of intense Department efforts, significant international financial assistance was provided.

In the summer of 2002, the United States succeeded in bringing about a change in the leadership of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and called for voluntary donations to resolve the immediate OPCW financial crisis. The United States made a
$2 million voluntary contribution, and sought and obtained agreement of the States Parties for a ten percent increase in the 2003 OPCW budget.

A total of 156 States Parties.

The first Russian destruction facility started operations in December 2002, and Russia met its revised deadline of destroying 400 agent tons by April 24, 2003. Construction of a second destruction facility has begun.

OPCW has significantly recovered from the financial and administrative crisis it faced a year ago. The new Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat has undertaken necessary management and financial reforms. Inspections, a key operation for the OPCW, have increased by over 15 percent, while the budget increase has been held to less than 10 percent, indicating an increase in efficiency, as well. Inspections have also been retargeted to focus better on potential chemical weapons (CW) threats.

156 CWC States Parties.

OPCW well managed and adequately funded. Full inspection program

Construction continues on a second CW destruction facility in Russia.

157 States Parties

OPCW management and financial reforms show results: inspection program expands in terms of number of sites inspected and number of countries inspected to 230 sites inspected in 57 countries

Completion of destruction operations at first Russian facility (Gorniy), second destruction facility to be completed by 12/31/05; and construction begins on a third facility.

2000:
The States Parties continued work on the BWC Protocol.

The United States worked with the Ad Hoc Group Chairman to fix deficiencies in the BWC Protocol.

2001:
The States Parties continued work on the BWC Protocol.

The United States rejected the flawed BWC Protocol because it would harm the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and undermine U.S. security.

States Parties agreed at the November 2002 Review Conference to a work program based on U.S. proposals.

At the August 2003 experts meeting, at least 25 states reported that national legislation, mirroring U.S. laws to control the BW threat, was already in place. The 80 states participating agreed that such legislation was an important element of their measures to improve biosecurity, evidence of implementation was more fragmentary. However, at least 20 States Parties acknowledged the validity of the U.S. approach and indicated that they had at least begun an awareness-raising program in their countries.

At the November 2003 meeting of States Parties, the U.S. got an agreed pledge that all Parties will work to implement and enforce appropriate safeguards in their respective countries.

2000:
Several reactor closures agreed to in NIS and other Eastern European countries.

Negotiations held on nuclear waste framework agreement.

2001:
Several NIS plants closed.

G-7 adopted the goal of pressuring Russia to close unsafe reactors.

Positive results achieved in Eastern Europe: e.g., Lithuania and Armenia; Bulgaria shut down two of its four high-risk reactors (Kozloduy).

Liability agreement reached with Russia allowing U.S. participation in waste cleanup; implementing agreements negotiated.

Ignalina (Lithuania) initiates closure procedures for Unit 1 and plans for the closure of Unit 2.

Russia is working on a comprehensive plan for de-commissioning of some of its reactors. Began a comprehensive plan for addressing nuclear waste issues.

Russia's nuclear waste plan finalized. International community funds special projects to help with Russian nuclear waste. Liability resolved so U.S. if it chooses can participate outside of CTR.

Progress toward closure of key plants in the former Eastern BlocIgnalina Unit 1 in Lithuania shuts down. Closure of Unit 2 anticipated in 2009. Armenia offers firm date for closure of its plant.

2000:
N/A

2001:
N/A

Baseline:

Moscow Treaty Verifiability Report completed.

U.S. positions on verification requirements developed.

Transparency measures for the Moscow Treaty developed.

Prepared assessment of the elements of the verifiable dismantlement of North Korean nuclear weapons capability.

Prepared assessment of the elements of a ban on North Korean indigenous and export programs for ballistic missiles.

The Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty in June 2003. Began implementation of Moscow Treaty through its Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC).

Considered role of transparency measures in terms of the BIC.

Integrated verification concepts into USG deliberations and negotiations toward verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear program, including preparation of core interagency building blocks.

North Korea agrees to verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear program.

Implementation of improved PPRA verification measures.

Fully integrate verification concepts into USG deliberations and into negotiations toward a verifiable constriction or dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program

Integrate verification concepts into USG deliberations toward the definition of a verification regime.

Maintain effectively verifiable START Re-entry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (RVOSI) Regime. Integrate results of START Treaty inspections, notifications, national monitoring activities, and cooperative programs to enhance confidence in the implementation of the Moscow Treaty.

Continue dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Implement verifiable compliance measures related to North Korea's agreement to halt missile technology transfers

Verification measures implemented in the constriction or dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program.

Implementation of improved verification measures (PPRA).

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) basic verification measures agreed to.

Effective implementation of the Moscow Treaty through the BIC.

IAEA utilizes its resources to detect undeclared activities and to address concerns about Non-Nuclear Weapon States suspected of weapon activities.

Ensure that IAEA Technology Cooperation projects are not used as covers for technology to be diverted into covert production or development of nuclear materials or weapons.

IAEA further shifts its resources to detect undeclared activities and to address concerns about Non-Nuclear Weapon States suspected of weapon activities.

Work with IAEA to ensure that noncompliance concerns are formally used in judging the applicability of Technology Cooperation projects.

2000:
N/A                           

2001:
N/A

Proliferation Behavior Reviewed - In preparing and improving the Annual Noncompliance Report, the Department is better positioned to promote compliance enforcement through compliance diplomacy and sanctions.

Non-Proliferation Arms Control Compliance & Enforcement - Sought clarification and resolution of U.S. compliance concerns related to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) through visits conducted under Article IX of the CWC. Bilateral compliance consultations were also conducted. We also worked with Congress to enforce Russian compliance with the CWC.

Start Treaty - In August 2003, the Department held consultations with Russia's representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the unclassified version of the Noncompliance Report for the year 2002. In September 2003, A/S for Verification and Compliance sent a follow-up letter to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Department of Security Affairs and Disarmament, reiterating the earlier explanation from the consultations that the law requiring the President to submit the Noncompliance Report to Congress was changed to require more specificity in the upcoming Report. In response to a subsequent request from the Russian MFA, a copy of the law containing the requirements for submitting the Report to Congress was delivered to the Russian MFA on September 26. Russia has yet to provide official comments in response to the consultations.

Sanctions - During 2003, the Department imposed sanctions on entities for transferring items that could contribute to WMD and delivery system programs as well as lethal military equipment sales. For example, in May 2003, the Department placed export and import ban sanctions on the Chinese entity NORINCO

Coordinating U.S. efforts to assist Libya in ensuring and verifying the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction and MTCR class missile program.

Proliferation behavior identified to allow for timely USG response to noncompliant and sanctionable activity.

Brief allies, friends and key nonaligned states regarding noncompliant behavior, increasing their awareness of and sharpening their responses to curtail/modify noncompliant activities.

Pursue open source information upon which to base more rigorous unclassified compliance assessments for use in compliance diplomacy.

CWC:

Clarify and seek resolution of U.S. compliance concerns. Visits under Article IX of the CWC will be proposed to clarify and resolve compliance issues. Bilateral compliance consultations will be conducted.

BWC:

Continue coordination of U.S. efforts to assist Libya in ensuring and verifying the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction and MTCR class missile programs.

Foster international support for inducing compliant behavior, resulting in increased compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments.

Other nations briefed on U.S. noncompliance concerns.

Conduct Noncompliance consultations in capitals and at multilateral fora, e.g. NATO, ASEAN, OAS, identifying most serious noncompliance issues that remain to be resolved.

Work with nations to ensure that multilateral export arrangements and individual export laws are commensurate with global nonproliferation goals

CWC:

Noncompliance issues identified with 16 states parties of concern and most noncompliance issues, resolved. Bilateral discussions held with 5 highest priority countries of concern and site visits conducted with top two States Parties of concern regarding CWC noncompliance issues, including those related to declarations, ambiguous CW and industrial activities. Multiple initial and follow-up demarches delivered which identify and seek resolution of U.S. noncompliance concerns, including those related to declarations and ambiguous industrial activities.

Similar targets established for BWC, NPT, and MTCR as described above for CWC.

2000:                        
N/A

2001:
N/A

Verification Technology R&D and intelligence assets coordinated and supported.

The Department provided $400,000 to initiate a Program Office and to advocate funding the replacement for the COBRA JUDY radar (operated by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community), critical for verification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and for missile proliferation assessments.

State co-chaired the interagency Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG), which acts as a central Coordinator for verification technology and identifies shortfalls in funding for critical arms control and nonproliferation R&D projects. The Department finalized the biennial NPAC TWG Report. State assisted in sponsoring major symposia on Biological Weapons Detectors, Nuclear Explosion Detection, Chemical Weapons Detectors, and Unattended Radiation Sensors.

USG did not seek funding from Congress for the V Fund, but Department identified projects and funded key intelligence programs using Department funds, important for verification of agreements and for ascertaining WMD-related activities.

The annual Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG) Conference was postponed due to the war in Iraq.

Participated in over 20 USG intelligence groups that monitor and assess weapons and proliferation activities.

Directed appropriate action related to sensors and other assets in support of arms control and nonproliferation objectives.

With the assistance of other USG agencies and departments, the Department began compiling data related to the assessment of allegations of chemical and biological weapons use.

2000:
U.S.-Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) Agreement Amendment Protocol signed by the Secretary in January 2000.

Study of architecture for Government-to-Government Communications Links (GGCL) replacement system began (the current system is operational only until 2005).

START partners (former Soviet nuclear states) considered completed U.S. proposal for replacement of current Government-to-Government Communications Links (GGCL) system.

Integrated Notification Application (INA), designed to support CFE, Open Skies and VC 1999 notification exchange was being tested; OSCE Network Phase II Migration was on track.

GGCL preliminary modernization authorized by START partners in the summer of 2003.

INA became operational.

Network migration completed, with startup of Internet-based Virtual Private Network (VPN). All Network members successfully migrated.

Coordination of international testing of accepted GGCL replacement architecture design.

INA fully functional with installation by all Network members. The three former notification-processing applications, CFE NoFES (Notification Front End System), Vienna Document '99 Word macros, and Open Skies NoFES, are discontinued.

More non-connected OSCE Network states have joined the Network. The reduced communications costs of the VPN are realized.

Timely communications in support of U.S. and foreign compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments.

Final international testing of replacement system successful; integrated system brought online, maintaining 99% reliability in communications.

INA software automation enables NRRC to process increased notification traffic with '03-level staffing.

All OSCE states are electronically connected to the Network.