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 Bureaus/Offices Reporting Directly to the Secretary > Deputy Secretary of State > Bureau of Resource Management > Releases on Resource Management > Performance and Accountability Reports and Agency Financial Reports > FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report > HTML Version, FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report > Strategic Goal 1: Regional Stability
Strategic Goal 1: Regional Stability - Performance Results for Performance Goal 2


FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report
Bureau of Resource Management
December 2003

VII. Performance Results

 

PERFORMANCE GOAL 2

Existing and emergent regional conflicts are contained or resolved

 

INITIATIVE/ PROGRAM (I/P) #3: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

Use a variety of diplomatic and foreign assistance tools to turn despair into hope.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #1: Number of African Armed Conflicts Resolved and Peace Support Missions Concluded
FY Results History 2000 Baseline:
Six armed conflicts ongoing.
Four peace support missions active.
2001 One conflict resolved (Ethiopia-Eritrea).
2002 Conflicts Resolved:
The war in Sierra Leone was effectively over and the peacekeeping mission was scaled down; peace-building activities continued using U.S. and other funding.
Peace Support Mission Concluded:
Program activities such as the West Africa Stabilization Program and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) ensured that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troop contributors are better able to meet the demands of peacekeeping operations.
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results

Conflicts Resolved:

  • Democratic Republic of Congo: Large-scale conflict resolved with inauguration of a transitional Government of National Unity in July 2003.
  • Burundi: Conflict partially resolved; fighting continues. Ceasefire reached with the largest rebel group, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD); implementation negotiations ongoing at year-end; prospects fair for agreement in FY 2004.
  • Liberia: The Liberian civil war deteriorated starting in May 2003. Peace talks began in Ghana in June 2003 and a comprehensive peace agreement was signed on 18 August. The U.S. provided nearly $26 million in logistics support to enable the deployment of ECOWAS peacekeeping forces.

Peace Support Missions Concluded:

  • Angola: Peace support mission withdrawn.
Target
  1. One conflict resolved (Burundi).
  2. One peace support mission withdrawn (Angola).
Rating On Target
Impact
  • Angola: Peace has been sustained for the first time since independence. The humanitarian crisis is on the way to resolution. Foreign investment and economic development are increasing. Preparations are underway for parliamentary and presidential elections projected for mid-2005. The vast majority of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been resettled. UNITA has been demilitarized and disarmed, and is transitioning to a political party.
  • Burundi: Civilians continue to face severe hardship due to continued fighting between Burundian military and rebel forces in several areas of the country. Significant economic devastation from the decade-long conflict is the major challenge to future peace and democratization efforts.
  • Democratic Republic of Congo: Optimism in country very high due to inauguration of the transitional government, end to major conflict, and indications that the situation in the east is improving. Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief approved by Paris Club, and African Growth and Opportunity Act eligibility extended to DRC by President Bush due to continued positive developments in implementation of both political and economic reforms.
  • Liberia: As a result of the U.S. assistance, peace is returning to Monrovia where the bulk of the Liberians live. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are starting to return although there remains much suffering in the countryside and some skirmishing continues.

 

I/P #4: INDO-PAK RELATIONS/KASHMIR

Indo-Pak tensions are reduced and stability is advanced in Kashmir.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #2: Status of Relations Between Pakistan and India on Kashmir
FY Results History 2000
  1. Continued military action by both sides along the line of control (LOC). Existing CBMs ignored.
  2. Pakistan providing materiel assistance and training to groups fighting in Kashmir.
  3. Poor channels of communication.
2001
  1. From November 2000 to May 2001, Indian offensive security force operations suspended; militant infiltration and attacks continued.
  2. Agra Summit broke down over communiqu? wording.
2002
  1. Major terrorist attacks brought India and Pakistan close to war, but U.S. and U.K. diplomatic intervention helped ease tensions, and Pakistan took actions against Kashmiri jihadist militants.
  2. India successfully held elections in Kashmir.
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results
  1. Infiltration continued throughout the year.
  2. Militant training camps and related infrastructures in Pakistan were not substantially disbanded although some were deactivated for periods over the summer. Militant groups in Pakistan have been and remain proscribed.
  3. Military forces on both sides returned to pre-crisis locations and readiness levels.
  4. India and Pakistan renewed diplomatic contact. Indian PM Vajpayee launched a major new peace initiative in April, which Pakistani PM Jamali welcomed. India and Pakistan returned High Commissioners, restored some transportation links, and engaged in numerous people to people ? including legislative ? exchanges. However, official talks have not started.
Target
  1. Infiltration is substantially reduced; number of terrorist attacks declines significantly from 2000-2002 average.
  2. Militant training camps and related infrastructures in Pakistan are substantially dismantled.
  3. Military forces on both sides return to pre-crisis locations and readiness levels.
  4. India and Pakistan resume diplomatic contact.
Rating Slightly Below Target
Impact Hopes raised by the April peace initiative and subsequent confidence building measures have been deflated by continued violence and infiltration, and failure to start official bilateral talks has dampened expectations. Without strong action to restore momentum, there is a serious risk of a slide back into crisis.

 

I/P #5: PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION

Military assistance, including Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), is a key instrument in the realization of U.S. regional stability goals.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #3: Number of U.S. Peacekeeping Operation (PKO)-Trained Countries That Participate in International PKO
FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 Baseline: 17
2002 18
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results

28

  • Twenty eight of the twenty-nine countries that have received U.S. Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) funding have subsequently participated in international peacekeeping operations.
Target 20
Rating Significantly Above Target
Impact
  • The pool of quality force contributions is increased, offering greater latitude to the UN and U.S., when seeking participants in global peacekeeping operations.

Examples of participation include,

  • Thailand, an EIPC recipient that had no peacekeeping history or interest in 1999, has become one of the leading Asiatic peacekeeping nations, having established a permanent training center and heavily supported UN operations in East Timor.
  • Jordan, an EIPC recipient, has become a leader in the Middle East supporting global peacekeeping, and has committed substantial national resources to establish and build a new peacekeeping training center.
Other Issues Reason for Significantly Exceeding Performance Target: From 2001 to the present there has been a significant global increase in the demand for peacekeepers, not only for new and existing UN-sponosored missions, but for non-UN international peace support operations sponsored by coalitions and lead-nations. In 2002 and 2003, the U.S. provided PKO training to more new countries than had been anticipated when this performance target was first established, and countries provided with assistance were more actively sought out to participate in the range of operations on-going.

 

I/P #6: RESTRICT ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (ACW) TRANSFERS

The transfer of advanced conventional arms to states of concern is constrained.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #4: Effectiveness of Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Control Lists
FY Results History 2000 Control levels/parameters for some WA items are too high. Because some technologies are available globally, they are effectively uncontrolled. U.S. insistence on retaining those control levels has created problems with allies and threatens to undermine the WA as an arms control regime.
2001
  1. Agreement in the WA to add reporting on two new sub-categories of military vehicles.
  2. Within the WA, Russia alone continues to oppose mandatory reporting for small arms and light weapons, Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), and warships down to 150 tons.
2002
  1. No new categories were added to WA control lists, but progress was made in this multi-year effort.
  2. Within the WA, Russia alone continues to oppose mandatory reporting for small arms and light weapons, MANPADS, and warships down to 150 tons.
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results

Within WA control lists, certain categories of weapons are being expanded, some widely available (and thus uncontrollable); dual-use items were dropped, and MANPADS has made considerable progress with energetic cooperation from Russia, the UK, and other countries.

Over the past ten years, the value of shipments of conventional weapons to state sponsors of terrorism has fallen by nine-tenths, and illicit shipments to other destinations also have fallen. Tools include bilateral demarches and intelligence liaison, strengthening of norms in the Wassenaar Arrangement and other international fora, sanctions, law enforcement, and (potentially) direct interdiction. Results have been better than expected, especially since Iraq is no longer importing conventional weapons.

Target
  1. Prompt reporting of arms transfers on the Wassenaar Arrangement Information System (WAIS). Reporting of denials of arms transfers, and notification before undercutting a previous dual-use denial.
  2. Have 122 states participate in the UN Register of Conventional Arms Transfers.
  3. Sharing of ?best practices? papers on effective export control practices within the WA.
Rating On Target
Impact Fewer illicit transfers of conventional weapons mean fewer and less deadly conflicts, and thus greater security for the United States.

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