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 Bureaus/Offices Reporting Directly to the Secretary > Deputy Secretary of State > Bureau of Resource Management > Releases on Resource Management > Performance and Accountability Reports and Agency Financial Reports > FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report > HTML Version, FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report > Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction - Performance Results for Performance Goal 2


FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report
Bureau of Resource Management
December 2003

PERFORMANCE GOAL 2

Strengthened multilateral WMD agreements and nuclear energy cooperation under appropriate conditions

 

I/P #4: STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NORMS

Global norms and standards are strengthened by raising standards and enforcing increased compliance.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #1 Status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
FY Results History 2000
  1. The 2000 Review Conference showed wide support for the NPT.
  2. Forty-five countries have signed the IAEA safeguards protocol.
2001 Fifty-two countries have signed the IAEA safeguards protocol.
2002
  1. Preparation Communications (PrepCom II) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference concluded smoothly.
  2. The IAEA took action on integrated safeguards and emphasized financial needs; nine more states signed, bringing the total to sixty-seven, of which, twenty-eight protocols have entered into force.
  3. The IAEA Board approved a multi-year program with a substantial increase in funding, to $11 million annually.
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results
  1. PrepCom II for the 2005 NPT Review Conferenceconcluded successfully. Cuba and East Timor joined the treaty. The international community urged Iran to comply with the NPT and North Korea to reverse its Position on NPT withdrawal.
  2. Eleven more states signed an Additional Protocol, bringing the total to seventy-eight, of which, thirty-seven protocols have entered into force.
  3. Voluntary contributions to the IAEA anti nuclear terrorism program funding doubled in FY 2003.
Target
  1. The NPT remains strong.
  2. The review process continues with no disruption. Several more states sign or bring into force the IAEA safeguards protocol.
  3. The IAEA anti-nuclear terrorism program receives adequate funding and expands assistance.
Rating On Target
Impact NPT standards against nuclear proliferation remain strong and violators are being pursued. IAEA safeguards gaining more political and financial support and countries are improving protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #2: Status of the Physical Protection Convention (CPPNM)
FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 N/A
2002

Baseline:

  1. The IAEA met to discuss whether the CPPNM should be revised or strengthened. Experts made recommendations.
  2. The Experts Group recommended ?well defined amendment? to CPPNM for consideration by the Drafting Group.
  3. The Drafting Group worked on recommendations for consideration by a revision conference.
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results After two meetings, the Drafting Group concluded its work without reaching consensus on a revision proposal, but did identify a set of possible amendments warranting consideration by States Parties as the basis for a proposal.
Target Conference approves a series of amendments to the Physical Protection Convention (CPPNM) to cover nuclear material in domestic use.
Rating Slightly Below Target
Impact Progress toward producing a consensus amendment impeded and conclusion of a successful amendment delayed. End result still expected to be achievable.

 

I/P #5: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Support the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, the global treaty outlawing the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of chemical weapons.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #3: Status of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
FY Results History 2000
  1. A total of 133 States Parties.
  2. The United States began implementing U.S. industry obligations.
  3. Discussions with Russia on chemical weapons (CW) destruction moribund.
2001
  1. 1. A total of 144 States Parties.
  2. The United States fully implemented its industry obligations; sixteen inspections of U.S. industry facilities conducted.
  3. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) budget problems continued.
  4. Some destruction of Russian chemical weapons begun.
2002
  1. Four States Parties were added to the CWC, and Libya and Thailand voiced intent to join.
  2. The United States fully implemented CWC industry obligations by meeting all declaration and reporting requirements, hosting eight industry inspections, and successfully resolving issues from five previous inspections.
  3. Three of the six Congressional conditions for granting authority for U.S financial assistance for Russian stockpile destruction were resolved; limited progress was made on the other three conditions; Congress granted the President waiver authority. As a result of intense Department efforts, significant international financial assistance was provided.
  4. In the summer of 2002, the United States succeeded in bringing about a change in the leadership of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and called for voluntary donations to resolve the immediate OPCW financial crisis. The United States made a $2 million voluntary contribution, and sought and obtained agreement of the States Parties for a ten percent increase in the 2003 OPCW budget.
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results
  1. A total of 156 States Parties.
  2. The first Russian destruction facility started operations in December 2002, and Russia met its revised deadline of destroying 400 agent tons by April 2003. Construction of a second destruction facility has begun.
  3. OPCW has significantly recovered from the financial and administrative crisis it faced a year ago. The new Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat has undertaken necessary management and financial reforms. Inspections, a key operation for the OPCW, have increased by over 15 percent, while the budget increase has been held to less than 10 percent, indicating an increase in efficiency as well. Inspections have also been retargeted to focus better on potential chemical weapons threats.
Target
  1. A total of 150 States Parties.
  2. One CW destruction facility in Russia begins operations.
  3. OPCW under good management and conducting full inspection program.
Rating Above Target
Impact
  • OPCW is nearing the point where it is able to carry out its full responsibilities regarding implementation of the CWC. When working efficiently and effectively, the CWC regime will not only ensure the destruction of current CW stockpiles, but will also contribute significantly to the goal of reducing the proliferation of chemical weapons
  • A year ago, the OPCW was cash broke and unable to even carry out the full schedule of inspections. The U.S. took the lead in demanding urgent and basic reforms, beginning with the replacement of the Director-General. Other States Parties followed the U.S. lead.
  • Reporting by the OPCW to member states has also improved, providing the U.S. better insight into worldwide chemical activities and thus a better opportunity to spot potential proliferation activity near its outset.

 

I/P #6: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Support the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) banning the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of biological weapons (BW).

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #4: Number of States Parties who Incorporate U.S. Proposals in Their National Approaches to Controlling the Biological Weapons Threat
FY Results History 2000
  1. The States Parties continued work on the BWC Protocol.
  2. The United Sates worked with the Ad Hoc Group Chairman to fix deficiencies in the BWC Protocol.
2001
  1. The States Parties continued work on the BWC Protocol.
  2. The United States rejected the flawed BWC Protocol because it would harm the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and undermine U.S. security.
2002 USG developed alternative package of effective measures to strengthen the BWC and began discussions with other BWC States Parties.
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results
  1. States Parties agreed at the November 2002 Review Conference to a work program based on U.S. proposals.
  2. At the August 2003 experts meeting, at least 25 states reported that national legislation, mirroring U.S. laws to control the BW threat, was already in place. The 80 states participating agreed that such legislation was an important element of their obligations as BWC States Parties. While all participants agreed on the importance of measures to improve biosecurity, evidence of implementation was more fragmentary. However, at least 20 States Parties acknowledged the validity of the U.S. approach and indicated they had at least begun an awareness-raising program in their countries.
  3. At the November 2003 meeting of States Parties, the U.S. got an agreed pledge that all Parties will work to implement and enforce appropriate safeguards in their respective countries.
Target U.S. alternative proposals incorporated by 18-20 BWC States Parties in their national approaches to control the BW threat.
Rating On Target
Impact
  • Traditional inspection regimes are not effective in determining compliance with bans on biological weapons. The U.S. therefore devised alternative ways to improve BWC implementation, focusing on coordinating and expanding national implementation. Some countries do not have adequate laws to prohibit or control the handling of biological pathogens that could easily be transformed into biological weapons, and many do not have adequate security for handling such pathogens.
  • The agreement by States Parties on the importance and potential impact of the measures suggested by the U.S. constitutes a major political victory. The attitude toward the U.S. ? that the U.S. was trying to undercut or even abolish the BWC itself ? has largely abated, and countries now appear willing to work on the basis of the U.S. program.
  • The next BWC Review Conference in 2006 will enable the Department to determine whether there has been a significant improvement in the situation.

 

I/P #7: PROMOTE SAFE NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Global nuclear cooperation under the highest nonproliferation and safety standards is promoted.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #5: Unsafe Reactor Closures and Nuclear Waste Improvements
FY Results History 2000
  1. Several reactor closures agreed to in NIS and other Eastern European countries.
  2. Negotiations held on nuclear waste framework agreement.
2001
  1. Several NIS plants closed.
  2. G-7 adopted the goal of pressuring Russia to close unsafe reactors.
2002
  1. Positive results achieved in Eastern Europe: e.g., Lithuania and Armenia; Bulgaria shut down two of its four high-risk reactors.
  2. Liability agreement reached with Russia allowing U.S. participation in waste cleanup; implementing agreements negotiated.
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results
  1. Ignalina initiates closure procedures for Unit 1 and plans for closure of Unit 2.
  2. Russia is working on a comprehensive plan for de-commissioning of some of its reactors. Begins a comprehensive plan for addressing nuclear waste issues.
Target
  1. Closure of key plants in the former Eastern Bloc.
  2. G-7 and Russia agree to new reactor closure agenda; the international community funds programs to deal with Russian nuclear waste problems.
Rating Above Target
Impact Steps completed that will lead to the elimination of proliferation material in the former Eastern Bloc, thus keeping them out of the hands of terrorists and dangerous countries.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #6: Extension of Benefits of Nuclear Cooperation to U.S. Partners and Implementation of Provisions of Existing Cooperation Agreements
FY Results History 2000
  1. The United States had nuclear cooperation agreements with the IAEA, EU, and twenty-five other nations.
  2. New nuclear technology transfers to China stalled.
  3. The United States conducted regular consultations on protection of U.S.-supplied nuclear material.
  4. The United States reached necessary agreements on security arrangements for transfer from Europe to Japan.
  5. Generation of innovative reactor designs began well.
2001
  1. U.S.-China discussions made substantial progress.
  2. Generation IV International Forum (GIF) successfully drafted/approved.
  3. No significant issues about security of U.S.-origin nuclear materials.
  4. United States continued as reliable partner in nuclear cooperation.
2002
  1. U.S.-China Agreement for Cooperation implemented successfully.
  2. U.S.-China discussions on ?retransfer consents? concluded, but agreement not yet in force.
  3. GIF developed list of new technologies for international development and continued as a leading forum for international cooperation in advanced reactor development for safety, sustainability, and proliferation resistance.
  4. No security problems arose with U.S.-origin nuclear material.
  5. United States continued as reliable partner in nuclear cooperation.
  6. Agreement extended with Morocco, but not with Indonesia.
  7. Other agreements remained in force.
FY 2003
Data		 2003 Results
  1. U.S.-China concluded agreement on re-transfer consents.
  2. Nuclear committee with Argentina established. Very successful first meeting held.
  3. Committees with South Africa and Brazil remain under active discussion.
  4. GIF moves forward on developing joint research proposals. The Department of Energy agrees to facilitate by R&D agreements with foreign partners.
  5. U.S. continued active participation in international forums.
  6. Continued contributions to the IAEA TC fund ? along with in-kind contributions.
Target
  • Peaceful nuclear cooperation with China proceeds smoothly.
  • GIF proceeds as a viable forum for reactor cooperation.
  • No security problems arise from U.S.-origin nuclear material; other cooperation programs proceed normally.
Rating On Target
Impact The U.S. continues to show itself as a leader in the quest for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Moreover, the U.S. needs to be a reliable supplier for both the economic benefit of continuing this important component of our exports and for the nonproliferation benefit of ?staying in the game?. The U.S. cannot talk to others about supply rules if it cannot guarantee that it will conduct supply under the regime that is negotiated.

 

Secretary Powell met with Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in January 2003, to discuss IAEA inspections in Iraq, Iran's nuclear development, and North Korea's withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Department of State Photo

 Photo showing Secretary Powell meeting with Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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