|STRATEGIC GOAL 5: INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND DRUGS|
Minimize the impact of international crime and illegal drugs on the United States and its citizens
A man detained in connection with a ton of confiscated marijuana, cocaine and heroin sits behind a police line in Panama City, Panama, August 2005. AP/Wide World Photo
Americans face growing security threats, both at home and abroad, from international terrorist networks and their allies in the illegal drug trade and international criminal enterprises. The events of 9/11 and their aftermath highlighted the close connections and overlap among international terrorists, drug traffickers, and transnational criminals. All three groups jeopardize peace and freedom, undermine the rule of law, menace local and regional stability, and threaten the U.S. and its friends and allies. To meet these challenges, the Department supports a robust and comprehensive range of public-private, bilateral, regional, and global initiatives and assistance programs to build up the law enforcement capabilities of foreign governments to help stop these threats before they reach U.S. soil. The Department works with other U.S. Government agencies and foreign governments to break up drug trafficking and other international crime groups, disrupt their operations, arrest and imprison their leaders, and seize their assets. It also provides small farmers in drug producing areas the means to abandon illicit crop production permanently by developing viable economic alternatives and improving social conditions of farm families. The Department works with foreign governments to set international anti-crime standards, close off safe-havens to criminal groups, pool skills and resources, and improve cross-border cooperation. Finally, to help strengthen law enforcement in key countries and areas emerging from a state of violent conflict, the Department also provides American civilian police and other justice sector experts to UN, regional, or other peacekeeping operations to establish or rebuild democratic and professional police forces and rule of law in those areas.
The table below shows the performance rating distribution of the FY 2005 results for the International Crime and Drugs strategic goal.
|Significantly Below Target||Below Target||On Target||Above Target||Significantly Above Target||Totals|
|Number of Results||0||4||4||4||0||12|
|Percent of Total||0%||33%||33%||33%||0%||100%|
Performance Trends. There are two trends in the Department's efforts to fight international crime and drugs. First, law enforcement training and anticorruption activities operate somewhat effectively both at the output level (e.g., the number of officials trained at International Law Enforcement Academies), and at the outcome level (greater professionalization of the Mexican justice system, for example). Second, returns from supply-side counterdrug measures are diminishing. Indicators for both cultivation and production of illicit drugs suggest that, perhaps due to U.S. and host country successes in eradicating drug crops, criminals have found new ways to circumvent aerial spraying and other methods. However, the Department's efforts contributed to the reduction of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.
Outcome-level Results. The Department made progress toward improving the capacity of foreign law enforcement agencies to respond to international crime. Increased training and pay for foreign officers as well as greater cooperation with the U.S. through international anticorruption and anti-crime agreements contributed to this outcome. Programs in these areas performed at or above target in FY 2005.
Results Significantly Above or Below Target. Although no results were rated significantly above or below target, the Department undoubtedly faces challenges in combating the illicit drug production in South America. The Department must continue to work in close partnership with host governments, other U.S. Government agencies, and international organizations.
Resources Invested. The Department continued to invest in the battle against international crime and drugs in FY 2005. In particular, funding for the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account increased from approximately $460 million in FY 2004 to $946 million in FY 2005.
The indicators below are representative of the Department's priorities and overall performance for this Strategic Goal. The FY 2005 PAR contains all indicators with detailed performance information.
|Foreign Cultivation of Coca in Hectares|
|Target||Total Coca: 132,000.|
|Results||Aerial herbicidal spray operations have been stepped up and are well above the 2004 rate; 122,000 hectares had been sprayed for the first half of calendar year 2005 versus 130,000 for the entire (calendar) year of 2004. At this point, data is pending; however, based on the limited amount of reporting received at this time, it is unlikely that the targets for lower coca cultivation will be met.|
|Impact||If final results indicate lessened effectiveness of coca eradication, the impact could be a greater supply of cocaine production.|
|Reason for Shortfall||Recent successes may be driving coca cultivation into places where it is more difficult to detect, such as deeper into the jungle. Higher-yielding and herbicide-resistant varieties of coca may also be emerging.|
|Steps to Improve||Eradication efforts may focus on manual removal of coca plants. Pacification efforts are crucial to this process, since elimination teams would need access to farms, most of which are in guerilla or paramilitary-occupied territories.|
|Seizures of Cocaine, Measured in Metric Tons, from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru |
|Target||125 metric tons.|
|Results||Based on preliminary reporting, seizures are running ahead of the 2004 record year and are up significantly in some countries, such as Ecuador. Final data will be available in February 2006.|
|Impact||The increased number of seizures in some ways compensates for higher cultivation and production rates of cocaine. The net effect is to restrict supply of cocaine available for trafficking to the U.S.|
|Cultivation of Illicit Opium Poppy in Hectares in Afghanistan|
|Results||UN figures, which were released in September, indicated a 21% drop in opium poppy cultivation over the UN estimates for 2004. This suggests a cultivation level below the FY 2005 target, possibly 160,000 hectares. Final figures will be available December 2005.|
|Impact||Lower cultivation of illicit opium will result in less indigenous opium poppy available for heroin production inside Afghanistan.|
|Status of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) |
List of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT)
|Target||FATF removes all but three countries designated as NCCTs prior to 2003.|
|Results||FATF removed three countries from list in February 2005; three countries remain on list.|
|Impact||Three countries improved their anti-money laundering rules, regulations, and practices sufficiently to be removed from the FATF list. Myanmar, Nauru and Nigeria improved their anti-money laundering regimes, but not enough to meet FATF standards. A strengthened global anti-money laundering regime helps the Department disrupt the activities of criminal organizations and improve the capabilities of host country law enforcement and judicial systems.|
Andean Counterdrug Initiative
The U.S. investment in the Andean Counterdrug Initiative to combat narco-terrorism in South America is paying important political, security and economic dividends. This is particularly apparent in Colombia, which faced a frontal assault by major narco-terrorist organizations in the 1990s. Today, the World Bank lists Colombia as one of the world's ten most attractive investment climates. For the first time ever, the Colombian Government has established a security presence in all of the country's municipalities (equivalent to county seats), including many previously dominated by narco-terrorist groups. Civil violence—terrorist attacks, kidnapping, and homicides—has dropped dramatically over the past two years. Our most steadfast ally in the fight against illicit drugs, the Colombian Government extradited more than 250 drug traffickers to the U.S. over the past two years, including the leader of the infamous Cali Cartel.
Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, left, talks with Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe during a meeting at the presidential palace in Bogota, Colombia, July 2005. AP/Wide World Photo