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Diplomacy in Action

Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction


FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Highlights
Bureau of Resource Management
November 2006
Report
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STRATEGIC GOAL 4: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Reduce the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction to the United States, Our Allies, and Our Friends

 

I. Public Benefit

Photo showing U.S Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton voting on a UN Security Council resolution on the North Korea missile crisis, July 2006 in New York.

U.S Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton votes on a UN Security Council resolution on the North Korea missile crisis, July 2006 in New York. AP/Wide World

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials, technologies, and expertise is the preeminent challenge to American national security. Combating this threat is one of the highest priorities of the Department of State. The Department has undertaken a number of efforts to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction including: preventing proliferators from gaining access to sensitive technologies and expertise that could provide a short cut to weapons of mass destruction; working with our international partners to eliminate in a verifiable manner WMD and missile programs in North Korea, and ending Iran's nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities; enhancing the ability of allied governments to detect, disrupt and respond to terrorist use of nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons; and strengthening existing multilateral frameworks such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Supporting these efforts is a commitment to work with international partners to ensure that compliance is rigorous and enforced.

 

 

 

II. Performance Summary

The table below summarizes Department performance ratings for the Weapons of Mass Destruction strategic goal.

Strategic Goal Results Achieved for FY 2006
  Significantly Below Target Below Target On Target Above Target Significantly Above Target Totals
Number of Results 0 3 3 2 1 9
Percent of Total 0% 33% 33% 22% 11% 100%

 

III Resources Invested

 

Human Resources
(Direct Funded Positions)
Performance Goal FY 2005 FY 2006
Bilateral Measures 213 215
Multilateral Agreements and Nuclear Safety 219 222
Verification and Compliance 87 88
Total 519 525
Budget Authority
(Dollars in Millions)
Performance Goal FY 2005 FY 2006
Bilateral Measures $122 $189
Multilateral Agreements and Nuclear Safety $279 $209
Verification and Compliance $21 $35
Total $422 $433

 

IV. Performance Analysis

Performance Trends. For the past several years, the Department of State has demonstrated greater multilateral cooperation in the area of non-proliferation standards and treaties, and in addressing specific proliferation challenges. However, the continued development of nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North Korea provided a counterpoint to these positive multilateral developments.

Key Initiatives and Programs. The Department invested $196 million in FY 2006 in the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, export controls and border security assistance programs, the nonproliferation of WMD expertise, the U.S. voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and an international monitoring system for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

 

Bioterror Prepreparedness

Photo showing VaxGen lab technicians demonstrating the development of an anthrax vaccine, September 2006.The Department leads the U.S. Government's engagement with the G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group to protect against deliberate releases of infectious disease and enhance surveillance and response capabilities in the event of natural disease outbreaks. In the spring of 2006, the Department facilitated the participation of G-8 experts in a workshop led by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency on decontamination issues, leading to the dissemination of U.S. expertise on the matter. The Department is also facilitating a workshop for G-8 experts on forensic epidemiology - an emerging field that includes the coordination of public health and law enforcement expertise in responding to a real or potential threat of bioterrorism.


VaxGen lab technicians demonstrate the development of an anthrax vaccine, September 2006. AP/Wide World

 

V. FY 2006 Performance Results

 

INDICATOR: Extent to Which Iran, Syria, DPRK and Other Countries of Concern Are Denied WMD/Missiles and
Related Technology, Materials, Equipment and Expertise From Other Countries
Department of State seal Input
JUSTIFICATION: The inability of target countries to acquire WMD is a direct measure of how well U.S nonproliferation policies and programs are working.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target
  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) takes effective steps to redress Iranian safeguards concerns. Iran adopts and implements an Additional Protocol. No countries cooperate with Iran's nuclear program. International consensus that Iran should not possess enrichment or reprocessing facilities.
  • Iraq completely and verifiably disarms.
  • China fully implements and effectively enforces its nuclear and missile commitments, and effectively enforces WMD/missile-related export controls.
  • DPRK agrees to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons programs.
  • DPRK missile-related exports decrease.
  • 10% increase in interdictions of specific shipments involving programs of concern.
  • Libya continues to cooperate in promoting international nonproliferation norms.
Results
  • IAEA reported Iran's nuclear program to the UN Security Council (UNSC) February 2006. IAEA reported in August 2006 that Iran failed to comply with UNSCR 1696, which mandated Iranian suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.
  • All concerns related to Iraq's past possession of WMD have been resolved.
  • China's nonproliferation record has shown improvement over the past several years, but some Chinese entities continue to assist programs of proliferation concern, including in Iran and the DPRK.
  • Since November 2005, the DPRK has refused to return to the Six-Party Talks to find peaceful resolution to security concerns raised by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In October 2006, the DPRK conducted nuclear tests. With U.S. leadership, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1718 mandating sanctions on the DPRK in response.
  • DPRK continued to test ballistic missiles and export missile-related items.
  • U.S. worked successfully with Proliferation Security Initiative partners on two dozen separate occasions to prevent transfers of equipment and material to WMD and missile programs in countries of concern.
  • Libya continued its cooperation to promote nonproliferation norms.
Rating Below Target
Impact
Failing to meet our targets increases the possibility that countries or terrorists could acquire WMD. Failing to end Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs threatens global stability and security. U.S policies and programs have shown success in expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and on Iraq and Libya.
Reason for Shortfall
Iran and North Korea continue to refuse to be constructive partners in multilateral negotiations about ending their nuclear weapons programs. China did not take adequate action to implement fully its nuclear and mission nonproliferation commitments.
Steps to Improve
The Department will continue to work with the international community to get Iran to suspend all enrichment- and reprocessing-related activity, and is working on a UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran. The U.S. will work with international partners to ensure UNSCR 1718 is effectively implemented and continue to encourage the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. continues to urge China to strengthen its export control enforcement.

 

INDICATOR: Number of Countries That Have Developed and Instituted Valid Export Control Systems Meeting
International Standards
Department of State seal PART Output
JUSTIFICATION: A country's export, border, and strategic trade controls are the first line of defense in preventing proliferation of WMD materials, yet many countries do not have controls that meet international standards. The U.S. assists priority countries to control proliferation and meet international standards.
FY 2006 PERFORMANCE Target
Cumulatively, seven countries develop and institute export control system and practices that meet international standards.
Results
The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program graduated from U.S. assistance six more countries (Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) for a total of 11 countries.
Rating Significantly Above Target
Impact
Continued success in '"graduating" states from U.S. assistance means that the global nonproliferation effort is strengthened and resources are made available to assist other countries.

 

A Look to History: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Photo showing President Richard Nixon and Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev signing the Strategic Arms Limitation agreement at the Kremlin in May 1972.Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s resulted in agreements to limit strategic nuclear weapons. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, known as SALT I & II, took place in Helsinki, Vienna and Geneva. A delegation of officials from the Departments of State and Defense, the Intelligence Community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency represented the United States. The 1972 Interim Agreement limited the number of offensive intercontinental missiles allowed in each super power's arsenal. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty sharply limited missile defense systems in each country. President Jimmy Carter signed the SALT II agreement in 1979, but Congress never ratified SALT II. The arms negotiations continued in President Ronald Reagan's administration with the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.


President Richard Nixon and Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev sign the Strategic Arms Limitation agreement at the Kremlin in May 1972. AP/Wide World

 


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