Deputy Inspector General,
The Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 requires that the Department’s Performance and Accountability Report include a statement by the Inspector General that summarizes the most serious management and performance challenges facing the Department and briefly assesses the progress in addressing them. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) considers the most serious management and performance challenges for the Department to be in the following areas:
The Department must ensure that it implements sound business practices and management efficiencies in all procurement actions, and that the contracting and grants officer workforce is skilled, trained, and effective in administering billions in contract and grants dollars that bureaus and posts disburse annually.1 OIG is concerned that the Department’s primary acquisition organization, the Bureau of Administration’s Office of Acquisitions Management, continues to experience an increase in the number of procurement transactions processed and considerable growth in the dollar value of procurement actions issued without a corresponding increase in contracting personnel to handle the workload. Frequent turnover of contract support staff, especially overseas, has resulted in waste, a lack of adequate coordination, and a loss of institutional memory.
OIG identified several instances in which contract administration and oversight were not adequate, including overpayments to contractors. For example, the Department did not adequately manage the $1.26 billion contract for the Afghanistan Police Training Program.2 As a result, $172.4 million of funds provided by the Department of Defense (DoD) were not valid expenditures or in accordance with reimbursable agreements. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, poor contract monitoring resulted in increased costs and poor performance.3 In another case, a construction project in Tajikistan was not properly designed or monitored because the embassy staff did not have the technical knowledge to oversee the contractor’s performance. The result was incomplete and poorly constructed facilities that posed a safety hazard to embassy staff and did not meet required codes and guidelines.4 Overall, the anticipated cost of the Department’s multi-year plan to upgrade or build new overseas facilities is about $1 billion annually, and the Department must ensure contractors are properly chosen, work is properly conducted and monitored, and costs are contained.
In addition, OIG determined there is a pressing need to improve monitoring of grantee performance in the area of refugee grants for humanitarian assistance, protection of refugees, victims of conflict, and democracy building activities. State Department grants to non-governmental organizations for refugee and humanitarian programs have dramatically increased to more than $1 billion annually since FY 2010, and audits have revealed that grantees do not always adhere to grant agreement terms regarding deliverables and costs. The audit of one grant, valued at $50 million, revealed that the Department did not adequately monitor program performance and did not detect questionable charges, such as security costs of $21 million and the $700,000 purchase of vehicles without prior grant officer approval.5
Foreign assistance funding and the Department’s role in coordinating and managing assistance programs has grown as the government transitions to civilian-staffed missions in the Middle East region. The Department faces challenges in meeting this increased responsibility at current staffing levels.6 OIG reported that some assistance programs need closer monitoring to ensure performance goals are met and that management controls are in place and working, especially in conflict environments where security risks impede proper performance monitoring.
The U.S. Government’s foreign assistance budget totaled $34.8 billion in FY 2010. The Department’s and U.S. missions’ roles in coordinating and managing foreign assistance have grown considerably in recent years. The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) calls for strengthening the Department’s capacity to support development by directing chiefs of mission to focus more on development priorities, and assessing skills and building a training curriculum for Department personnel.
The Department’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F) is responsible for preparing an integrated State/USAID assistance budget and managing performance to deliver results. For the first time since the office was established in 2006, USAID will develop a budget proposal for FY 2013 for the programs it manages. OIG found the process has been somewhat disorderly in its early stages, presenting a risk of imposing redundant or conflicting requirements on State and USAID bureaus.7
In its embassy inspections, OIG has found that chiefs of mission, especially those with large assistance programs, need to provide more active leadership and coordination to ensure that assistance programs support strategic goals8 and complement each other. OIG identified duplication between agencies’ PEPFAR programs in South Africa.9 In Kabul, interagency tensions over policy and process contributed to poor internal communication and possible program failures with significant political fallout.10
OIG continues to find that some officers lack training to perform their oversight responsibilities, and that their responsibilities are not always clearly established with program bureaus.11 This situation results in uneven oversight. In some cases, performance evaluation is inadequate to assess program effectiveness.12 For example, in Colombia, OIG found that an emergency program for displaced persons and refugees that had been funded at $12-$20 million annually did not adequately take into account increasing host government funding, declining needs, and opportunities to redirect resources to more effective use.13
The Office of Management and Budget recently directed all Federal agencies to reduce waste and reorder priorities14 in support of high-level efforts to reduce the deficit. The Deputy Secretary and the Department’s 2010 QDDR also stress the importance of working smarter and better prioritizing work to produce results. Department planning guidance15 has gone further by referencing cost-cutting targets such as fully consolidating the State-USAID management platform, expanding regionalization of administrative services, and making more effective use of the financial management Post Support Unit.
OIG inspections highlighted the importance of implementing these and other cost-saving measures—and the accompanying challenges. For example, consolidating the State-USAID management platform is a longstanding—and as yet unaccomplished—goal of the Under Secretary for Management. OIG has found some progress toward consolidation, but it continues to find redundant platforms, such as duplicative warehouses, motor pools, and furniture pools.16
The Office of Rightsizing was established, in part, to ensure missions were appropriately staffed, given the high cost of maintaining U.S. staff overseas—averaging $550,000 per person, per year. The Department will need to work closely with the Office of Rightsizing, the missions, and regional bureaus to ensure that staffing is appropriate. OIG recommended reducing U.S. staffing at five embassies and in one domestic bureau at17 considerable savings. Often, the political environment has changed or workload has declined, but corresponding staff levels have not been adjusted. A related issue involves whether the Department can eliminate some of the consulates and consular offices it maintains overseas and fold their functions into embassies or larger consulates general. In FY 2011, OIG identified potential savings of $18.8 million through formal recommendations to close or downsize consulate offices and agencies in Cameroon, Germany, Greece, and South Africa.18
Since 2003, GAO has identified real property management as a government-wide high-risk area, primarily because of the existence of excess and underutilized real properties. The Department manages an inventory of real properties with an estimated replacement value of $52 billion. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations identified 314 overseas properties as excess or underutilized, with a replacement value of more than $900 million. While political, legal, and local market obstacles hinder the sale of some of these properties, institutional obstacles such as resistance from chiefs of mission and underreporting of underutilized properties are also sometimes at fault. Over the last year, OIG identified more than $5 million in funds that could be put to better use through the sale of underutilized properties in South Africa and Sweden.19
OIG continues to find deficiencies in senior leadership in both overseas and domestic locations. On several recent inspections, OIG found that poor leadership resulted in reduced effectiveness, low morale, and costly personnel curtailments.20
In some cases, leaders spent too much time on outside activities at the expense of mission priorities. In other cases, confrontational leadership styles lowered morale and adversely impacted communication and coordination. In a survey of employees who served in high-threat locations such as Iraq and Afghanistan, 45 percent of respondents noted leadership shortcomings as a source of stress. Based on the number of leadership deficiencies identified over a four-year period, OIG provided memoranda to the Department’s Executive Secretary and the Under Secretary for Management recommending a feedback system to regularly assess post and bureau managers and correct deficiencies.21
The Department has taken steps to strengthen leadership and management. It created a working group to implement the QDDR goal of empowering and holding accountable chiefs of mission (COMs) as chief executive officers. The working group has identified the qualities and qualifications COMs and deputy chiefs of mission (DCMs) need for successful assignments, and it is in the process of incorporating these qualifications into the selection process. Other positive, but challenging objectives include enhancing the evaluation of COMs and strengthening assistant secretary oversight of COMs.
Although the Department received an unqualified opinion on its FY 2010 financial statements,22 the Independent Auditor identified significant internal control deficiencies related to property and equipment, financial reporting, accounts payable accruals, budgetary accounting, liabilities to international organizations, and information technology. The auditor also reported that during the financial statement audit, the Department did not provide the requested documentation in a timely manner, which should have been an integral component of the Department’s internal control structure.
In FY 2010, the Department made progress improving controls for several of the deficiencies, especially property and equipment. However, the Department acknowledged that additional work is needed to improve internal controls. The Department plans to build on the progress made during FY 2010 to address the deficiencies. For instance, it plans to expand its initiative for monitoring its IT infrastructure on an almost real-time basis to other components, such as firewalls and routers. To capture and maintain accurate and useful financial data, and ensure that the information is available in a timely manner, the Department plans to upgrade certain technology platforms and expand the availability of management reports from the primary accounting systems. The Department also plans to strengthen its financial management analytic capabilities. The Department is working to improve its process to estimate overseas and domestic accounts payable and establish a process for intra-governmental accounts payable. In addition, the Department is addressing weaknesses related to unliquidated obligations, including distributing aging reports to users.
The Department continues its efforts to meet the requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002; however, it faces challenges in implementing a fully effective information security management program. During the FY 2011 FISMA evaluation, OIG determined that the Department has not documented policy and procedures to identify baseline controls in support of information technology systems. Specifically, the Department has not implemented the requirements of the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) or effectively implemented a Plan of Actions and Milestones (POA&M) process to meet FISMA and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements.
A common issue encountered in recent OIG inspections has been a lack of consistent application of Department-approved and/or industry standard systems development life cycle (SDLC) management methodologies. The Department has defined a methodology called Managing State Projects, but does not mandate its use. Development efforts are, however, required to use a methodology that includes the same basic control gates (requirements definition, approval, end user acceptance testing, etc.) as Managing State Projects. Over the last 18 months, OIG inspections have detailed systems development activities that do not follow any standard methodology. For example, the Office of Consular Systems and Technology did not consistently standardize and enforce the SDLC process; roles and responsibilities were not clear, and key business units were not involved throughout the process.23
The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F Bureau) inspection24 identified serious lapses in documentation with respect to the FACTS25 application—an Exhibit 300 system and one of the Department’s 14 major applications. The inspection of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs26 found a lack of SDLC methodology in their extensive SharePoint development activities. Not employing a standard and repeatable methodology in systems development activities often results in important steps being overlooked, such as testing to ensure that new applications do not interfere with the existing operating environment, deliver what customers expect, and do not introduce security vulnerabilities. In the Department’s enterprise environment, it is also important to maintain control over enterprise-level changes to systems configurations when conducting development activities. During the inspections of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security – Countermeasures (DS/C) and F Bureau, as well as the Compliance Follow-up Review (CFR) of the Office of Overseas Buildings Operations, OIG found many significant development activities occurring without adequate coordination.
The U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan will transition from military-led to civilian-led operations in December 2011 and 2014, respectively. As a result, the Department is assuming unprecedented roles and responsibilities that present both programmatic and personnel risks. Recent OIG reviews in Baghdad and Kabul27 have highlighted the need for enhanced ongoing attention during transition. Funding levels for both operations and programs require constant oversight in dangerous environments. OIG found a lack of institutional memory due to personnel rotations, and divergent business cultures. The Department must ensure that it has the capabilities and resources to ensure the safety of personnel. OIG found that at the program level, security risks in conflict environments impede performance monitoring during site visits. Often, monitoring cannot be conducted, which increases the risk of waste and fraud.
The transition from a military- to a civilian-led mission in Iraq is a complex undertaking, with extensive requirements for staff, funding, and organization—all taking place in an environment that remains violent and unpredictable. Mortar and rocket attacks on the embassy compound, roadside bombings, and insurgent attacks against Government of Iraq (GOI) facilities and officials remain common. Under these conditions, planning and coordination are essential to ensure a smooth and successful turnover and assumption of responsibilities by the Department. And, only months remain28 until the Department takes full responsibility from DoD.
As the U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) draw down, the Department will need to be self-sufficient and replace functions and operations once provided by the military. Additionally, the Department will be responsible for securing locations that will include several sites in the International Zone, consulates in Erbil and Basra, embassy branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul, and several sites throughout Iraq to support International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and Office of Security Cooperation programs. The total U.S. presence in Iraq after departure of the U.S. military is estimated to grow to 17,000.29 In its budget request for FY 2012, the Department requested $5.2 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations for Iraq—or 12 percent of the Department’s total discretionary budget.30
Transition from a military- to a civilian-led presence is following two separate but distinct tracks. First and foremost is the establishment of a long-term diplomatic presence leading to normalizing the bilateral relationship in economics, culture, diplomacy, and security; the internal stability of Iraq, and increased stability in the region.31 Second, the Department will provide the infrastructure necessary for the Department’s long-term diplomatic mission. The Department will be responsible for staffing, building, and supporting these posts. The tasks are daunting and numerous—providing facilities, security, life and medical support, information technology, and transportation for the entire Iraq Mission, including the Embassy and constituent locations.
Embassy Baghdad, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and the Bureau of Resource Management are finalizing program and operational planning, and have made substantial progress establishing embassy branch offices and consulates and other support facilities. The Department is continuing to develop detailed cost estimates for completing the transition to a civilian-led mission in Iraq, which includes construction and procurements; and future funding requirements to sustain programs and operations, including police training, the Office of Security Cooperation, provincial posts, security, air transportation, medical care, and facility requirements.
The Department faces a number of challenges to support and sustain the civilian presence in Afghanistan as the U.S. military withdraws from Afghanistan. These challenges include the increased costs associated with the assumption of DoD security duties; the costs of opening two new consulates; the need for housing and office space for the increased civilian personnel; and the proposal to standardize pay and benefits for additional civilian personnel from all agencies involved. The cost to the government for the civilian increase is nearly $2 billion, of which the Department’s share is approximately 80 percent.
As in Iraq, the Department will face increased costs in Afghanistan to include clearing travel routes, recovering killed and wounded personnel, recovering damaged vehicles and downed aircraft, and monitoring private security contractors. The Department also will have an unprecedented “critical need for logistical and life support.”32
A legislative proposal to standardize personnel policies for civilians deployed to certain locations, including Afghanistan, will likely result in increased costs for civilian agencies. Civilians deployed to Afghanistan are compensated under different pay systems, which results in different overtime pay determined by the employee’s pay system and grade/band level.33 Additionally, rest breaks and leave, which vary between civilian agencies, result in different costs from agency to agency. If pay and incentive policies are standardized, as recently proposed, the Department would require all agencies deploying personnel to Afghanistan to provide the same allowances and benefits as State Department employees on duty in combat zones. Because the Department supports the costs of other U.S. agencies’ deploying civilian personnel to Afghanistan, the Department would absorb these increases.
The Department modified plans for the development of two temporary consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif to accommodate an increase in personnel due to the civilian increased presence. If permanent facilties are established, State would have to pay for supplies and services, including food, motor pools, vehicle repair, air traffic control at the airport, crash and rescue, medical evacuation, and hospital services, among many others, which would likely constitute a significant cost increase.
The Department has begun planning “in earnest” over the past six months to address the costs of supporting the civilian presence in Afghanistan.34 However, uncertainty over the Department’s budget, and that of other civilian agencies, makes planning difficult. The emphasis on reducing the Federal deficit increases the likelihood that spending will be reduced in coming years. Officials at partner agencies participating in the increased civilian presence are considering scaling back or even discontinuing operations.
A number of key policy decisions have not yet been made, including exactly when the civilian presence in Afghanistan will peak, how large it will be at its high point, and when and how quickly the number of civilians deployed to Afghanistan will decrease. These factors will bear upon the Department’s future budget requests.
Protecting people, facilities, and information continues to be one of the Department’s highest priorities. Of greatest concern in the protection of people and facilities are areas in armed conflict or rated critical for the terrorist threat. These include countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, but also new areas of concern, including Mexico and Yemen. The Diplomatic Security Training Center prioritized training for Department personnel assigned to those locations, and personnel may not depart for those assignments until they have completed mandatory high-threat personal protection courses.
Increased staffing in Embassies Baghdad and Kabul, coupled with the transition to a post-conflict, Department-led U.S. Government presence, has led DS to deploy various high-tech countermeasures. Recently adopted countermeasures include unmanned aerial vehicles for static and route reconnaissance and use of the counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) system to provide advance warning of incoming munitions. Managing security programs in areas of armed conflict and critical threat posts is an ongoing Department challenge.35
The increasing number of non-Department personnel assigned to sensitive positions overseas has resulted in an expansion of secure office space at U.S. overseas missions. Worldwide, controlled access areas (CAA) and core areas are being added and expanded. Department security requirements specify the construction and operation of such areas, and require that they be inspected by DS technicians on varying schedules to ensure that national security information is not being compromised. According to DS, there is a backlog of such DS inspections due to a shortage of technicians. The Department’s challenge is to balance the need for new CAA space and core areas at U.S. overseas missions against its ability to protect the sensitive information contained in these areas.36
The Department’s consular officers who adjudicate visa and passport applications are the first line of defense in border security. They also provide services to and are responsible for the safety and security of Americans travelling or residing abroad. U.S. visas and passports are some of the most coveted travel documents in the world. The Department recognizes its responsibility to ensure that these documents are secure and that adjudicating officials have the best information available to detect and prevent fraud.37
While the Department must continue to provide secure documents, sound adjudications, and excellent services to U.S. citizens abroad, it must do so in the face of increasing demand for consular services. Several countries are hosting more Americans who travel for various reasons and also have more of their citizens seeking visas to travel to the United States. OIG noted the need to centralize and standardize work as much as possible and to ensure strong leadership to manage increasingly complex operations.38 Technology is an important component to promote security and handle an increasing workload. OIG has identified failures to follow industry-wide standards for developing new technologies.39 Another key challenge is to manage and ensure the same quality of services at smaller posts, which was the subject of several OIG recommendations.40
With tighter budgets likely, public diplomacy officers must think more strategically about how best to use their resources to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics in support of U.S. strategic objectives. The Foreign Service Institute’s Public Diplomacy Training Division created a strategic planning course in 2010, and revised and updated the curriculum in 2011. So far, however, only a limited number of public diplomacy practitioners have had the opportunity to take the full course, though strategic planning modules are a part of the tradecraft courses for public affairs officers, information officers, cultural affairs offices and senior locally-engaged staff. In recent years, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has taken steps to correct the situation, developing a global strategic framework, mandating that posts develop a separate public diplomacy goal paper as part of the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan, and providing better guidance on measuring progress toward achieving goals. Sessions on strategic planning are now a regular part of the global and regional conferences held for public affairs officers. OIG has found, however, that more needs to be done.41
A second challenge is finding the right balance between legitimate security concerns and the need to proactively engage foreign publics. Over the past decade, security considerations have increasingly restricted public access to U.S. embassies, and new embassy compounds are being constructed in locations not easily accessible to the people public diplomacy officers need to reach.42 Security issues, coupled with financial constraints, also have made it more difficult for public diplomacy staffs to travel outside the capital to regularly engage important audiences. Posts have responded in various ways, for example, by creating alternative venues like American Corners that are hosted in and staffed by local institutions. To make American Corners and other newer venues effective, there should be a regular American presence and a defined plan for using the space to engage, inform, and influence host-country audiences.43
Public diplomacy officers are relying more heavily on Web sites and on social media. Some posts have done an extraordinary job in employing social media. But these outreach platforms, especially those intended to be interactive, require a great deal of staff time and resources. Many posts establish Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Flickr sites, but cannot keep them up-to-date with fresh, interesting content.44 Effective use of social media often requires more training than officers and staff have received and more time than they have available.45 Posts must balance the demands of the official mission Web site and its social media sites and determine how best to reach the key audiences.
1 The Department estimates that it disburses approximately $18 billion annually in contracts and grants according to the Bureau of Administration’s FY 2013 Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan, June 9, 2011, page 2. (back to text)
2 DoD and DOS Need Better Procedures to Monitor and Expend DoD Funds for the Afghan National Police Training Program (AUD/CG-11-30). (back to text)
3 PAE Operations & Maintenance (O&M) Support at Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan (MERO-I-11-05); PAE O&M Support for INL’s Counternarcotics Compounds in Afghanistan (MERO-I-11-02); DynCorp O&M Support at Camp Falcon in Kabul, Afghanistan (MERO-I-11-12). (back to text)
4 Limited-Scope Review: Design & Construction of a Recreation Center at Embassy Dushanbe, Tajikistan (MERO-I-11-04). (back to text)
5 Improved Oversight Needed for State Department Grants to the International Republican Institute (SIGIR 10-22). (back to text)
6 The Bureau of PRM’s Internally Displaced Persons Program in Pakistan (MERO-I-11-01); Performance Evaluation of Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) Infrastructure Construction Projects in the West Bank (MERO-I-11-03); Training and Logistical Support for PASF - Performance Evaluation (MERO-I-11-09); PRM’s Reintegration Assistance Program for Refugees Returning to Afghanistan (MERO-I-11-10). (back to text)
7 Inspection of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (ISP-I-11-57). (back to text)
8 Inspections of: Exercise of COM Authority in Managing the PEPFAR Program Overseas (ISP-I-10-01) and Embassy Cairo, Egypt (ISP-I-10-02A). (back to text)
9 Inspection of Embassy Pretoria, South Africa and Constituent Posts (ISP-I-11-42A). (back to text)
10 Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan (ISP-C-11-53A). (back to text)
11 Inspections of embassies: Amman, Jordan (ISP-I-10-35A); Ankara, Turkey (ISP-I-11-55A); Bangkok and Consulate General Chiang Mai, Thailand (ISP-I-11-03A); Conakry, Guinea (ISP-I-11-44A); Jakarta, Indonesia and Constituent Posts (ISP-I-11-24A); New Delhi, India and Constituent Posts (ISP-I-11-39A); Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (ISP-I-11-40A); and Seoul, Republic of Korea (ISP-I-11-55A). (back to text)
12 Inspections of: the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Office of Middle East Partnership Initiative (ISP-I-10-76); and Embassy Chisinau, Moldova (ISP-I-10-40A). (back to text)
13 Inspection of Embassy Bogotá, Colombia (ISP-I-11-41A). (back to text)
14 Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Guidance (OMB M-11-30). (back to text)
15 State 038907, dated April 22, 2011. (back to text)
16 Inspections of embassies: Cairo (ISP-I-10-02A), New Delhi (ISP-I-11-39A), Lilongwe (ISP-I-10-60A), and Pretoria (ISP-I-11-42A). (back to text)
17 Inspections of embassies: Warsaw (ISP-I-11-64A), Hong Kong (ISP-I-10-78A), Athens (ISP-I-11-15A), Santo Domingo (ISP-I-11-40A), Pretoria (ISP-I-11-42A), and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (ISP-I-11-49A). (back to text)
18 Inspections of embassies: Yaoundé, Cameroon (ISP-I-11-45A); Berlin, Germany (ISP-I-11-65A); Athens, Greece (ISP-I-11-15A); and Pretoria, South Africa, and Constituent Posts (ISP-I-11-42A). (back to text)
19 Inspections of embassies: Pretoria, South Africa, and Constituent Posts (ISP-I-11-42A) and Stockholm, Sweden (ISP-I-11-30A). (back to text)
20 Inspections of embassies: Luxembourg (ISP-I-11-17A), Bangkok (ISP-I-11-03A), Valletta (ISP-I-11-16A), and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Consular Systems and Technology (ISP-I-11-51). (back to text)
21 Implementation of a Process to Assess and Improve Leadership and Management of Department of State Posts and Bureaus (ISP-I-10-68). (back to text)
22 Independent Auditor’s Report on the U.S. Department of State 2010 and 2009 Financial Statements (AUD/FM-11-03). (back to text)
23 Inspection of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Consular Systems and Technology (ISP-I-11-51). (back to text)
24 Inspection of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (ISP-I-11-57). (back to text)
25 FACTS is a data repository and a powerful research tool and report generator. (back to text)
26 Inspection of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (ISP-I-11-22). (back to text)
27 Compliance Follow-up Reviews of: Embassy Baghdad, Iraq (ISP-C-11-08A); Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan (ISP-C-11-53A); and the Inspection of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (ISP-I-11-49A). (back to text)
28 U.S. Military forces are scheduled to leave Iraq December 31, 2011, and all diplomatic activities and functions will fall under Embassy Baghdad - Chief of Mission. (back to text)
29 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report: Iraq – The Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian Led Effort, January, 2011. On October 12, 2011, the Under Secretary for Management updated the number to 16,009. (back to text)
30 President’s FY 2012 Budget; pages 119 and 140. (back to text)
31 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report: Iraq – The Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian Led Effort, January, 2011. (back to text)
32 The U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly $2 Billion, and State Should Continue to Strengthen Its Management and Oversight of the Funds Transferred to Other Agencies; Joint Audit with Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction (AUD/SI-11-45 and SIGAR Audit-11-17). (back to text)
33 Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide Timely and Accurate Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Federal Civilians, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO-09-562). (back to text)
34 The U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly $2 Billion, and State Should Continue to Strengthen Its Management and Oversight of the Funds Transferred to Other Agencies; Joint Audit with Special IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction (AUD/SI-11-45 and SIGAR Audit-11-17). (back to text)
35 Classified Annex to the Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Kabul (ISP-S-11-53A) and Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Baghdad (ISP-C-11-08A). (back to text)
36 ALDAC 11 State 55583, dated June 6, 2011, Subject: Revised SCIF Guidance for RSOs, RDSEs ESCs/ESOs, and Tenant Agencies. (back to text)
37 Bureau of Consular Affairs Strategic and Resource Plan, FY 2013. (back to text)
38 Inspections of embassies: New Delhi, India and Constituent Posts (ISP-I-11-39A); Embassy Mexico City, Mexico (ISP-I-09-21A); and Standards, Training and Funding for Consular Country Coordinators (ISP-I-10-73). (back to text)
39 Inspection of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Consular Systems and Technology (ISP-I-11-51). (back to text)
40 Inspection of the Regional Consular Officer and Consular Management Assistance Team Programs (ISP-I-11-18). (back to text)
41 Inspections of embassies: Dhaka (ISP-I-10-82A), The Hague (ISP-I-11-23A), Luxembourg (ISP-I-11-17A), New Delhi (ISP-I-11-39A), Abu Dhabi (ISP-I-10-62A), and Ulaanbaatar (ISP-I-11-58A). (back to text)
42 Inspections of embassies: Athens (ISP-I-11-15A), Gaborone (ISP-I-11-43A), Pretoria (ISP-I-11-42A), Dhaka (ISP-I-10-82A), and Valletta (ISP-I-11-16A). (back to text)
43 Ibid. See also inspection of Embassy Jakarta (ISP-I-11-24A), Rome (ISP-I-10-59A), and Yaoundé (ISP-I-11-45A). (back to text)
44 Inspection of embassies: Valletta (ISP-I-11-16A) and Helsinki (ISP-I-11-67A). (back to text)
45 Ibid. (back to text)