printable banner

U.S. Department of State - Great Seal

U.S. Department of State

Diplomacy in Action

49. Written exchange between Senator Richard Lugar and then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice


Share

Table of Contents

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR

RICHARD G. LUGAR

TAB SUBJECT

TAB - 1 Nunn-Lugar Liability Issues

TAB - 2 Congressional Conditions on Nunn-Lugar Assistance

TAB - 3 Budget

TAB - 4 Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction

TAB - 5 Law of the Sea

TAB - 6 Public Diplomacy

TAB - 7 Embassy Security

TAB - 8 Danger Pay

TAB - 9 Submission of Treaties

TAB - 10 NED and the Free Press

TAB - 11 Iraq

TAB - 12 Afghanistan

TAB - 13 Iran

TAB - 14 Saudi Arabia

TAB - 15 Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust

TAB - 16 Cuba

TAB - 17 Russia

TAB - 18 Ukraine

TAB - 19 Europe

TAB - 20 The Balkans

TAB - 21 President’s NDU Speech

TAB - 22 Arms Sales Policies: Countries, Agreements and Reviews

TAB - 23 RD 180 Licenses and Russian Ballistic Missile Proliferation

TAB - 24 State Department and Foreign Assistance

TAB - 25 Global Environmental Facility

TAB - 26 India-Pakistan Dialogue

TAB - 27 Korean Peninsula

TAB - 28 U.S.-China Relations

TAB - 29 Broader Latin America

TAB - 30 North America Border Security

TAB - 31 Venezuela


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Nunn-Lugar Liability Issues

From 1992 until 1999, the Nunn-Lugar program operated under the terms of the Umbrella Agreement negotiated in 1991-92. In 1999, the 1992 agreement expired. A re-negotiated Extension Protocol was signed by the United States and Russia in 1999, and has never been sent by Presidents Yeltsin or Putin to the Duma. President Putin and other Russian officials have at various times promised to send the Umbrella Agreement Extension Protocol to the Duma, but this has not happened.

Question #1-3:

Will you make ratification by the Duma of the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreement with the Russian Federation a priority matter, and ensure that the United States engages at the highest levels necessary to break this logjam?

Absent Duma approval, and should the Extension Protocol expire under provisional application, do you see any other means with which to remedy the liability problem with our Russian non-proliferation assistance programs?

Are the problems of liability peculiar only to nuclear non-proliferation assistance programs in Russia, or are they emerging in other non­proliferation programs such as chemical weapons destruction or biological weapons redirection efforts?

Answers:

If confirmed, I will continue to make Duma approval and Russian ratification of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement (as extended in 1999) a key priority and will seek to ensure the United States engages with Russia at the highest levels necessary to achieve this. Ratification would put ongoing CTR programs on a solid footing. It is our understanding, however, that CTR ratification will not resolve liability for any expanded or new nonproliferation assistance programs with Russia. We will want to resolve both ratification and these other matters in 2005, well before CTR comes up for extension again in 2006. The Administration is actively reviewing ways of breaking the liability logjam with Russia -- while protecting CTR programs -- to remove this impediment to plutonium disposition and other cooperation. If confirmed, I will make every effort to resolve these issues as soon as possible. On the other hand, ongoing CTR programs can continue absent Russian ratification of the CTR agreement, as they have since 1992 with no Duma approval or ratification. Those programs could also continue without Duma approval or ratification after the 2006 expiration date of the CTR agreement, if both sides agree again to extend that agreement provisionally in 2006.

Ongoing efforts under the CTR umbrella agreement or the International Science and Technology Centers Agreement (such as chemical weapons destruction and biological weapons redirection) have not been blocked by differences over the liability issue. But the liability issue has hindered progress on important projects outside CTR, most notably U.S. and G-8 efforts to convert excess Russian weapon-grade plutonium into forms not useable for weapons under the plutonium disposition program.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Congressional Conditions on Nunn-Lugar Assistance

Question #1:

What is the national security benefit of maintaining the CTR certification and waiver process in light of the fact that for every time Russia (or in some cases other states) have not met the conditions, the Administration has waived the conditions in the interests of US national security?

Answer:

The Department supports the legislation recently introduced by Senator Lugar to remove the certification requirements for assistance to Russia (or other states) under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs of the USG.

Failing passage of such legislation, we support permanent extension of the President’s authority to waive CTR certifications.

The fact that each year since 2002, Russia has benefited from waiver authority when certification could not be made demonstrates the over-riding importance to U.S. national security interests worldwide of the aid provided under CTR.

Since there is every reason to believe that CTR assistance will continue to be of vital importance to the U.S. national interest as long as it is needed, it makes great sense to recognize this reality by eliminating the certification requirements.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Congressional Conditions on Nunn-Lugar Assistance:

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuchye, Russia

Question # 2:

Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107) created six requirements for certification before construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) at Shchuchye, Russia, could continue. Four of the six requirements have now been met, but Russia still has not provided information “regarding the size of the chemical weapons stockpile of Russia.” More than three years after their enactment, do you believe the requirements of section 1308 of Public Law 107-107 have furthered US objectives with respect to securing and destroying chemical weapons at Shchuchye or with regard to Russian transparency under the Chemical Weapons Convention?

Answer:

The destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons at Shchuchye, in accordance with the verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), furthers the key U.S. national security objective of keeping weapons of mass destruction and related technologies out of the hands of terrorists or rogue states.

However, the United States maintains longstanding concerns regarding the completeness and accuracy of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile declaration. Despite Russia’s insistence that they do not possess any undeclared chemical weapons stocks, the United States continues to pressure Russia for clarification of our concerns, and an acceptable approach that will increase our confidence in this area as part of our regular expert level consultations. Experts and Senior Administration officials have pressed Russian officials for documentation into past activities, as well as short-notice visits to undeclared suspect Russian chemical weapons sites. Russian officials have told us that past documentation in this area no longer exists and that visits to undeclared suspect CW sites are not acceptable. However, the United States remains ready to review Russian proposals in attempt to resolve our concerns.

The existence of the conditions in Section 1308 provides some additional leverage on our continuing efforts to address our compliance concerns with Russia. The construction and use of a CWDF at Shchuchye is essential for the timely and irreversible destruction of Russia’s nerve agent

Despite slow progress and longstanding concerns regarding the completeness and accuracy of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile declaration, the United States will continue to pursue resolution of these concerns with Russia.

Senior Administration officials meet regularly with Russian counterparts and stress the importance of resolving these concerns in a timely manner, as well as remind counterparts that funding hinges on tangible progress.

The United States intends to continue to address this matter through a combination of gathering corroborating information, identifying an acceptable approach, encouraging Russian cooperation and transparency, and continuing bilateral expert consultations.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Budget – Strengthen Capacity

Question #1:

One of your most important tasks as Secretary of State will be to design and fight for a budget that reflects the challenges and difficulties that our foreign policy faces as we fight the war against terror. What are your plans to strengthen our civilian capacity in the same way we are strengthening our military capacity?

Answer:

Winning the war on terror remains our top foreign policy priority. With support from Congress, the Department has established a new Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction to provide a civilian capacity to respond to post-conflict situations and thwart the growth of terrorism. State Department budgets have also included resources to:

· increase diplomatic staffing on the front lines of the global fight, including additional security professionals;

· extend an on-going program of security upgrades to protect diplomatic facilities and personnel in the face of terrorism; and

· accelerate a capital construction program to replace facilities at high risk with secure new embassy compounds.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Budget – Cut Current Spending

Question #2:

There are reports that the White House is asking all agencies, other than Defense and Homeland Security, to prepare options for cutting current spending by 5%, with the intention of holding non-defense resources to 1% growth in FY 2006. Do you believe that the State Department should be included in such national security exemptions in a way similar to the Defense Department, Intelligence, and Homeland Security?

Answer:

The President, OMB, and Congress recognize the vital role that the State Department and International Affairs funding play in national security.

Discretionary belt-tightening has constrained State operations and Foreign Operations funding levels.

With supplemental funding, the Department has been able to meet U.S. foreign policy priorities.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Budget - Budget Pressures

Question #3:

The combination of previously announced spending commitments for international HIV/AIDS, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Middle East Peace Initiative is going to put tremendous pressure on the foreign affairs budget for ’06. Are you working now to make certain that these program increases can be accommodated without cutting into other important areas of a very tight budget? To what extent is the administration going to request funding for 150 account activities in the supplemental?

Answer:

Yes, I have been working very closely with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage and USAID Administrator Natsios on the FY 2006 foreign affairs budget request to ensure adequate funding is available to meet the President’s foreign policy objectives.

The three programs referenced are very important, but they cannot come at a price to other foreign policy priorities, including: support to our friends and allies that are standing steadfastly with us on the war on terrorism; nonproliferation programs that reduce and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related equipment, materials, and expertise; democracy, security and reconstruction commitments to the citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq; humanitarian and food assistance to the Sudan; development, health, disaster, famine, refugee and conflict victim’s assistance; counter-narcotics programs in the Andean Region and Afghanistan; and State Department programs and operations for engagement worldwide.

We do have significant foreign and State operations funding shortfalls in FY 2005 that can only be met through supplemental appropriations. Over the past two months, we have been working closely with OMB Director Bolten and Deputy Director Kaplan to identify those unfunded requirements. Once we have finalized our supplemental requirements with OMB, I would be pleased to brief the Committee on those needs.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Defense Science Board Study on Transition to and From Hostilities

Question #1:

In August 2004 the DSB concluded a study on “Transition to and from Hostilities”. The study included an analysis of the very substantial costs and manpower requirements for both the Department of State and Defense that are needed to achieve our objectives in stabilization and reconstruction operations, like our current activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The intent was to provide guidelines for matching our national foreign policy objectives with the resources that need to be devoted to accomplishing those objectives. What is your assessment of the gap between the Department of State’s current and near-term projected manpower and resources and the requirements revealed by the DSB study, and if you are confirmed what will you do to bridge that gap?

Answer:

The DSB study has provided a valuable analysis of the costs we already spend on reconstruction and stabilization and the level of resources required not only to provide assistance, but to manage that response, to prepare for it, to staff it, and to maintain it. It highlighted the need for additional resources for civilian agencies in both people and money.

We agree with the basic thrust of the resource recommendations in the DSB study: resources are needed both to lead, manage and implement stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to support programmatic activities that promote security and rule of law and create the conditions for democracy and market economics to take root. Some important resource requirements are not highlighted in the DSB study, particularly the cost of deploying civilian teams, when needed together with the military, to multiple locations in a country. We will review all these resource needs in State and other agencies in order to institutionalize a strong stabilization and reconstruction capability within the U.S. Government.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Defense Science Board Study on Transition to and From Hostilities

Question #2:

That same DSB study proposed a management regime aimed at even better planning, including preparation far in advance, for stabilization and reconstruction operations. The approach would orchestrate, not just coordinate, activities in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and other organs of government, taking into account not only legislated authorities but also realistic organizational capabilities. Do you agree with the proposed regime; if not, can you describe the specifics of a better alternative to accomplish comparable goals; and if you are confirmed what particular steps will you take to ensure even better planning for stabilization and reconstruction?

Answer:

We appreciate the DSB report’s analysis and agree with the need for a more coordinated approach between all agencies. The Administration has taken the decision to vest the responsibility for this coordination in the Department of State, which has the lead in foreign policy and which must manage our long-term interests overseas. Within the State Department, we have built an interagency team with USAID, CIA, and the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice and others to coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities for countries in transition from conflict and civil strife, to plan for potential conflicts, and to avert or mitigate conflict when we can. This interagency team for planning and for response management led by the Department of State will achieve the objectives of the study, provided that sufficient resources are made available to State and other agencies implementing programs overseas.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Office of the Coordinator For Reconstruction and Stabilization

Question #1:

How do you expect the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization to develop in the future? Can you describe a hypothetical situation where you and the President might turn to it and what you would expect from it, both in terms of planning and operations?

Answer:

Creating a strong USG stabilization and reconstruction capacity is an Administration national security priority. We appreciate the leadership Senators Lugar, Biden and Hagel and others in the Congress have shown on this issue.

S/CRS will not take over activities of partner organizations within the government, but will be value-added by: preparing contingency plans; building USG capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction; developing systems to pre-position people and money; conducting outreach to international partners and NGO’s aimed at strengthening global capacity; applying lessons learned and managing and integrating the USG response.

If it is determined that the technical capacities of S/CRS would be a value added in a certain situation, S/CRS will be asked to organize and manage, in conjunction with the relevant regional bureau at the State Department, a multi-agency response to a failing, failed or post-conflict state.

S/CRS would manage a response effort by --

· establishing an interagency task force

· proposing strategies to senior leadership

· working with international community to coordinate efforts

· mobilizing required personnel

· deploying personnel, equipment and other resources

· designing programs to respond to identified needs

· managing response efforts to meet identified goals

Our efforts will be focused on early response when assistance can have the most impact on the long-term prospects. Longer term management of these responses will be devolved to normal structures when long-term plans and budgets are in place.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Office of the Coordinator For Reconstruction and Stabilization: Budget

Question #2:

The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization is small and has a very modest budget. Will the administration be requesting substantial funding for the Office in the upcoming supplemental or in the `06 budget?

Answer:

The office currently has 35 staff from: State, USAID, Defense, Treasury and CIA. The Administration will recommend the resources necessary for the office to start meeting its mission.

We will need resources for management –from CJS appropriations – and for foreign assistance programs from Foreign Operations appropriations.

Experience has shown that we must have the capacity to manage 2-3 stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently. That means staff in Washington and the field to manage and deliver quality programs.

In advance of a specific crisis, the Department will need to have certain programs and funds already in place and have money available to deploy teams quickly and pay for security and logistics, while additional longer term funds are identified and sought.

Obviously we are in a difficult budget climate, but the Administration is committed to working with Congress to support this stabilization and reconstruction initiative as a national security priority.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction And Stabilization: Legislation

Question #3:

The Committee's bill, S2127, called for a new 250-person nation-building corps of civilians who can move quickly into a still hostile environment to provide public information, deliver emergency medical care, train police, rebuild schools, roads and airports, and reconstitute political processes. Do you share our view of the necessity for such an active duty civilian corps?

Answer:

We need the ability to send the right people into the field as well as to manage programs in Washington. To deploy people quickly and lead the coordination process in Washington, we need to have in place core staff who can plan, exercise, and train together. This will require additional staff and resources because the gaps we must fill cannot be met by rearranging existing personnel.

The model we have developed incorporates the core concepts you laid out in your bill for a civilian response corps. We need additional diplomatic personnel to underpin operations overseas and we need a corps of technical experts to design, deliver, and manage programs.

The complete solution requires a mixture of on-call rosters, permanent staff and pre-positioned contracts in order to assemble the teams needed in varying situations.

As we analyze the capacity we have and the gaps, we will work with the Congress to put in place the necessary authorities, mechanisms, and resources.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Ratification Efforts

Question #1:

The most recent Treaty Priority List submitted by the Administration to the Committee listed the Law of the Sea Convention as a treaty "for which there is an urgent need for Senate approval." How can we work together to make certain that the treaty is ratified on an urgent basis?

Answer:

The Administration strongly supports early Senate action on the Convention.

The Administration urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to again favorably report out the Convention and Implementing Agreement, with the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification as reported by the Committee last March.

The Administration will work closely with the Senate leadership to bring the Convention and Implementing Agreement to a floor vote early in the 109th Congress.

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Benefits for National Security

Question #2:

I was pleased to see in the U.S. Ocean Action Plan that he submitted to the Congress on December 17, the President states that "as a matter of national security, economic self-interest, and international leadership, the administration is strongly committed to U.S. accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." Can you cite specific benefits that accession will have for U.S. national security?

Answer:

Joining the Convention will advance the interests of the U.S. military.

As the world’s leading maritime power, the United States benefits more than any other nation from the navigation provisions of the Convention.

Those provisions, which establish international consensus on the extent of jurisdiction that States may exercise off their coasts, preserve and elaborate the rights of the U.S. military to use the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements.

They achieve this, among other things:

· by stabilizing the outer limit of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles;

· by setting forth the navigation regime of innocent passage for all ships in the territorial sea, through an exhaustive and objective list of activities that are inconsistent with innocent passage – an improvement over the subjective language in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone;

· by protecting the right of passage for all ships and aircraft, through, under, and over straits used for international navigation, as well as archipelagoes;

· by reaffirming the traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone and the high seas beyond; and

· by providing for the laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines.

U.S. Armed Forces rely on these navigation and overflight rights daily, and their protection is of paramount importance to U.S. national security.

We run the very real risk as a non-party of allowing the hard-fought and favorable national security provisions of the Convention to be eroded.

The choice is whether, in the face of increasing coastal State pressures to constrain freedom of navigation, the United States is in a better position to protect its interests from inside the treaty or outside. The answer to that question is clear.

We should be inside the treaty as soon as possible.

Becoming a party to the Convention would strengthen our ability to deflect potential proposals that would be inconsistent with U.S. national security interests, including those affecting freedom of navigation.

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Economic Benefits

Question #3:

Support for U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention has been expressed by U.S. companies and industry groups whose businesses depend on the oceans. These include the American Petroleum Institute, the U.S. Oil and Gas Association, the Chamber of Shipping of America, the U.S. Tuna Foundation, the American Chemistry Council, the National Oceans Industries Association, and the U.S. Council for International Business. Do you agree with these U.S. companies that acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention will advance U.S. economic interests and benefit American businesses?

Answer:

Yes. The United States, as the country with the longest coastline and the largest exclusive economic zone, will gain economic and resource benefits from the Convention:

· The Convention accords the coastal State sovereign rights over non-living resources, including oil and gas, found in the seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf.

· The Convention improves on the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, to which the United States is a party, in several ways:

§ by replacing the “exploitability” standard with an automatic continental shelf out to 200 nautical miles, regardless of geology;

§ by allowing for extension of the shelf beyond 200 miles if it meets certain geological criteria; and

§ by establishing an institution that can promote the legal certainty sought by U.S. companies concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf.

Concerning mineral resources beyond national jurisdiction, i.e., not subject to the sovereignty of the United States or any other country, the 1994 Agreement meets our goal of guaranteed access by U.S. industry on the basis of reasonable terms and conditions.

Joining the Convention would facilitate deep seabed mining activities of U.S. companies, which require legal certainty to carry out such activities in areas beyond U.S. jurisdiction.

The Convention also accords the coastal State sovereign rights over living marine resources, including fisheries, in its exclusive economic zone, i.e., out to 200 nautical miles from shore.

The Convention protects the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, whether military, commercial, or research.

In addition, the Convention establishes a legal framework for the protection and preservation of the marine environment from a variety of sources, including pollution from vessels, seabed activities, and ocean dumping.

The provisions effectively balance the interests of States in protecting the environment and natural resources with their interests in freedom of navigation and communication.

With the majority of American living in coastal areas, and U.S. coastal areas and EEZ generating vital economic activities, the United States has a strong interest in these aspects of the Convention.

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Military Operations

Question#4:

It is my understanding that it has been U.S. policy since President Reagan's 1983 Statement of Ocean Policy that the United States, including the U.S. military, will act in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention's provisions relating to the traditional uses of the oceans. Would acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention require the United States military to make any changes in its existing policies or procedures with respect to the use of the oceans to conduct military operations?

Answer:

No.

As the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 8, 2004, “I am convinced that joining the Law of the Sea Convention will have no adverse effect on our operations …, but rather, will support and enhance ongoing U.S. military operations, including continued prosecution of the global war on terrorism.”

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, testified before the House International Relations Committee on May 12, 2004, that the Navy “currently operate[s] – willingly because it is our national security interests – within the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention in every area related to navigation. We would never recommend an international commitment that would require us to get a permission slip – from anyone – to conduct our operations.”

Admiral Mullen concluded his oral statement by emphasizing, “Simply, the Convention does not require a permission slip or prohibit these activities; we would continue operating our military forces as we do today.”

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Question #5:

Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention would prevent the United States from taking action necessary to stop the transportation of weapons of mass destruction across the oceans. I note, however, that State Department Legal Adviser William Taft testified before the House International Relations Committee that "the Convention will not affect applicable maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials." Do you believe that acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention will in any way diminish the ability of the United States to take necessary action to prevent the transport of weapons of mass destruction?

Answer:

No.

The Convention’s navigation provisions derive from the 1958 law of the sea conventions, to which the United States is a party, and also reflect customary international law accepted by the United States.

As such, the Convention will not affect applicable maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction.

Like the 1958 conventions, the LOS Convention recognizes numerous legal bases for taking enforcement action against vessels and aircraft suspected of engaging in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:

· exclusive port and coastal State jurisdiction in internal waters and national airspace;

· coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and contiguous zone;

· exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas (which the flag State may, either by general agreement in advance or approval in response to a specific request, waive in favor of other States); and

· universal jurisdiction over stateless vessels.

Nothing in the Convention impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense (a point which is reaffirmed in the Resolution of Advice and Consent proposed in the last Congress).

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Proliferation Security Initiative

Question #6:

Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention would prevent or inhibit the United States from implementing the Proliferation Security Initiative. I note, however, that State Department Legal Adviser William Taft testified before our Committee that the PSI is consistent with the Law of the Sea Convention, and that the obligations under the Convention do not present any difficulties for successfully carrying out this important initiative. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark gave similar testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. I also note that all of the other countries that are partners with the United States in PSI are themselves parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. In your view, will acceding to the Convention inhibit the United States and its partners from successfully pursuing the PSI?

Answer:

No.

PSI requires participating countries to act consistent with national legal authorities and “relevant international law and frameworks,” which includes the law reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

The Convention’s navigation provisions derive from the 1958 law of the sea conventions, to which the United States is a party, and also reflect customary international law accepted by the United States.

As such, the Convention will not affect applicable maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials.

Like the 1958 conventions, the LOS Convention recognizes numerous legal bases for taking enforcement action against vessels and aircraft suspected of engaging in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:

· exclusive port and coastal State jurisdiction in internal waters and national airspace;

· coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and contiguous zone;

· exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas (which the flag State may, either by general agreement in advance or approval in response to a specific request, waive in favor of other States); and

· universal jurisdiction over stateless vessels.

Nothing in the Convention impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense (a point which is reaffirmed in the Resolution of Advice and Consent proposed in the last Congress).

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Role of the UN

Question #7:

Some commentators have asserted that the Law of the Sea Convention gives the United Nations the power to regulate the use of the oceans and that U.S. accession to the Convention would allow the United Nations to veto uses of the ocean by the United States, including by the U.S. military. It is my understanding that, under the Convention, the United Nations has no decision-making role with respect to any uses of the oceans. Please explain what role, if any, the United Nations would have in regulating uses of the oceans by the United States if the United States were to accede to the Law of the Sea Convention.

Answer:

The United Nations has no decision-making role under the Convention in regulating uses of the oceans by any State Party to the Convention.

Commentators who have made this assertion have argued that the International Seabed Authority (ISA) somehow has regulatory power over all activities in the oceans.

That is completely false. The authority of the ISA is limited to administering the exploration and exploitation of minerals in areas of deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, generally more than 200 miles from shore. The ISA has no other role and has no general regulatory authority over the uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation and oversight.

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Taxation by International Seabed Authority

Question #8:

Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention would involve giving the International Seabed Authority the power to impose taxes on U.S. citizens. State Department Legal Adviser William Taft has testified before Congress that the International Seabed Authority has no ability or authority to levy taxes. In your view, is there any basis for concern that U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention will result in U.S. citizens being subject to taxation by the International Seabed Authority?

Answer:

No. The Convention does not provide for or authorize taxation of individuals or corporations.

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Technology Transfer

Question #9:

Some commentators have asserted that the United States would be required to transfer sensitive technology, including technology with military applications, to developing countries if it acceded to the Law of the Sea Convention. It is my understanding, however, that provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention containing mandatory technology transfer requirements were eliminated by the 1994 Agreement addressing the Convention's deep seabed mining regime. Do you believe there is any reason for concern that acceding to the Convention would require the United States to transfer any technology to developing countries?

Answer:

No. Those commentators are simply wrong. No technology transfers are required by the Convention.

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: U.S. Sovereignty over Ocean Resources

Question #10:

Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention will involve ceding to the International Seabed Authority sovereignty currently enjoyed by the United States over ocean resources. It is my understanding, however, that the jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority addresses only mining of minerals in areas of the deep seabed beyond the jurisdiction of any country, and that the United States has never asserted sovereignty over such areas. Do you believe that acceding to the Convention would involve any surrender of existing United States claims to sovereignty over ocean resources?

Answer:

No. Such assertions are manifestly wrong. The United States has never claimed sovereignty over areas or resources of the deep seabed.

The Convention’s provisions on the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf preserve and expand U.S. sovereign rights over the living and non-living ocean resources located within, and with regard to the continental shelf beyond, 200 miles of our coastline.

Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Law of the Sea: Effect of 1994 Implementing Agreement

Question #11:

Some commentators have asserted that there is uncertainty as to the legal status of the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention, which addresses the Convention's deep seabed mining regime. I have received a letter from eight former Legal Advisers to the Department of State from both Republican and Democratic Administrations stating that the 1994 Agreement "has binding legal effect in its modification of the LOS Convention." Do you believe there is any basis for questioning the legal effect of the 1994 Agreement?

Answer:

No. The notion that the 1994 Agreement has no legal effect is just wrong.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Defense Science Board Recommendations

Question #1:

The Pentagon's Defense Science Board (DSB) recently proposed establishing at the NSC a new deputy

post to coordinate strategic communications and public diplomacy throughout the government. Is this a good idea?

Answer:

The DSB and other studies of public diplomacy and strategic communications over the past several years offer many good ideas for strengthening public diplomacy and strategic communication.

The Department has taken steps to improve strategic planning and coordination of public diplomacy. In particular, the Department has created a new office of strategic planning, resource management and program evaluation reporting to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

The Policy Coordinating Committee for Muslim outreach, chaired by the Department and NSC, is also providing a mechanism for coordinating strategic communication at the interagency level. All interested agencies participate in this PCC, which holds the potential for improving coordination of public diplomacy on issues beyond Muslim outreach.

I do not believe a new coordinating structure based outside the Department is necessary at this time.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Public Diplomacy – Budget Increases

Question #2:

ECA has finally seen its budget increase after suffering significant cuts in the 1990s. There has been a major shift in funding to programs aimed at the Middle East and Muslim world, at the expense of programs in Europe, the former Soviet Union, and other parts of the world. Do you believe that enough is being done to focus attention on the growing degree and shrillness of anti-Americanism in Europe, Latin America, and Asia?

Answer:

Combating terrorism and the apparent deterioration of the U.S. image abroad are global challenges that require a strategic approach to the use of exchange programs in every region of the world. The Department is committed to balancing the needs of all our regions to address U.S. foreign policy goals.

We are reaching out to publics in the Western Hemisphere, Asia-Pacific, Africa and Europe/Eurasia with the same focus on youth, young future leaders, decision makers and those who influence youth and public opinion in general, that we know is advancing our objectives in the Muslim world.

We are reinforcing our successful investments in democracy building and free market economies in all areas of the world – especially where our efforts are not yet firmly rooted or where forces are at work to turn back the clock, particularly in our own hemisphere and in Eurasia. Our political and economic adversaries use misperceptions about our goals, disagreements about our policies and a general sense of anti-Americanism to move their specific agendas forward around the world.

We know that exchanges present the best face of America, they work to convey to publics that we care about the future of their young people and education, they convey that we have common cause in basic shared vales, and they are “moving the needle” with individuals. Results consolidated from a number of program evaluations in 2003 show that 88% of exchange participants gained new knowledge/skills on key issues, and 89% of exchange participants gained a better understanding or more positive view of the United States.

25 percent of ECA’s budget currently goes to exchanges in the countries covered by the Bureaus of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; new programs and increases in traditional exchanges are effectively addressing these critical areas. We have moved some resources from Eurasia to do so, but have maintained robust programs in Eurasia aimed at youth, from high school through undergraduate and graduate level students. In all other regions, we have been able to keep exchange programs at roughly the FY 03 level. In all regions, we are focusing on our most important audiences.

Resources for exchanges, coupled with the effective programming provided by ECA, offer a strong antidote to anti-Americanism. The Department looks forward to working further with Congress to identify the appropriate level of resources for exchanges to meet the challenges we face in every part of the world.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Public Diplomacy – Guidance to U.S. Broadcasting

Question #3:

How do you view the State Department’s role in providing strategic guidance and greater coherence to U.S. broadcasting efforts? Should the Department play a stronger role? Does the current bureaucratic structure serve us well or could it be improved? For example, should the VOA be integrated into State?

Answer:

The State Department and BBG effectively coordinate U.S. international broadcasting efforts. As you know, the Secretary of State is a member of the Board of Governors, and his/her designee actively participates in Board meetings and deliberations.

The BBG also coordinates regularly with the regional bureaus and with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. As part of its annual language service review process, the BBG regularly receives briefings from the Department of State on matters of strategic guidance as a way to ensure that high priority languages are identified. The Department provides guidance and clears on VOA editorials on a daily basis, and when issues of difference arise, the BBG and Department work together to resolve them.

I believe that the current structure serves both the State Department and the BBG very effectively. It would be a mistake for VOA to be integrated into the State Department because it is important that the VOA be viewed by foreign audiences as separate from U.S. Government editorial control. VOA’s journalistic integrity and independence would be seriously compromised if VOA were to become part of the Department of State.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleeza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NED

Question #4:

In the 9/11 Commission legislation that Congress recently passed, my initiative to establish a free press institute at the NED was included. NED officials and other stakeholders in the media field have moved quickly to begin to make it a reality. They will be making a proposal to the State Department for $1 million for institute staff, the development of a strategic plan, and organizational meetings. Would you support this grant and expedite its approval?

Answer:

The State Department supports the work of the NED and will support the initiative to develop a free press institute. We would also support including the $1 million for free press staff as part of the grant for NED core funding that passes through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. We look forward to consultations on the development of a strategic plan and discussion of organizational efforts.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Embassy Security

Question #1:

Some agencies who will be required to contribute under the Capital Security-Cost Sharing Program have maintained that their financial participation is unwarranted or excessive. The Department of Defense has been particularly reluctant to participate. Are all the agencies now on board with this plan, including Defense?

Answer:

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447) makes clear that all Departments and agencies are to contribute their shares under the Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” “without offsets,” and “in advance.” The Department is directed not to build space for employees of any agency that fails to pay its full amount of funding required by cost-sharing.

OMB had already directed each agency to include its FY05 cost-sharing contribution in its FY05 budget. All agencies have been cooperating with the Department in determining their respective overseas staffing levels, and we anticipate that they will transfer the funds upon request. So far we have no indication that any agency will refuse to comply.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleeza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Danger Pay

Question #1:

The Committee has voted twice in favor of increasing danger pay for State Department employees who serve in hostile environments. Why has the administration not requested this benefit as part of its overall submission to the Congress?

Answer:

I appreciate your support for creating further incentives for employees to serve in hostile environments. The administration did not request the danger pay increase as part of its overall submission for FY 2004 or FY 2005 for budgetary reasons.

Any future administration initiative to increase danger pay would need to consider the additional funding required to finance the increase within overall budget constraints.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Submission of Treaties

Question #1:

The Administration did not submit to the Committee a Treaty Priority List during the 108th Congress. Does the Administration intend to submit a Treaty Priority List during the 109th Congress? If so, when does the Administration expect to submit the list?

Answer:

The Administration does intend to submit to the Committee a Treaty Priority List during the 109th Congress. The Administration recognizes that having such a list can assist the Committee in organizing its work. We will endeavor to submit a list as soon as possible after receiving the customary request from the Committee.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleeza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NED and Free Press

Question #1:

The President last year called for a doubling of the NED budget. We were successful in increasing the budget significantly in the omnibus legislation. I was able to have included in the intelligence reform bill language that embraced the concept of S. 2096. Do you agree that a free press institute funded through NED would be one good way of consolidating U.S. expertise, allowing for private contributions, and building a coordinated capacity to support free press in countries building democratic institutions?

Answer:

The Department of State recognizes and supports the importance of and the role of independent media in the development of open democracies. The establishment of a free press institute funded through NED would be one way to promote this objective and would add a fifth ‘core’ partner institute to complement NED’s work in other areas to promote democracy. We support the initiative to coordinate USG and private efforts to develop and encourage free press and believe that a free press institute could help mobilize private sector resources to build free press activities and support democratic institution building. We believe that USG efforts to promote free and independent media should also be coordinated with the important similar work being done by Internews, IREX and other nongovernmental organizations that support and share these universal human rights values. We would urge the funding of the free press institute to be treated as separate from existing media training and independent media support activities, and kept clearly distinct from public diplomacy initiatives.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Iraq Issues

Question #1:

Reports indicate General Casey and Ambassador Negroponte have established a close working relationship. There is a gap, however, between the military and civilian efforts in Iraq. The Department of State, which is responsible for executing U.S. assistance to Iraq, is dependent on the Department of Defense, which owns and controls transportation assets, controls the airspace and roads and is helping the Iraqis establish security. The U.S. military, for its part, does not have the statutory responsibility, mechanisms or resources to operate jointly with the State Department to provide reconstruction assistance. How can you ensure that there is an integrated, joint civilian-military operational capability for stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq?

Answer:

All agencies of the United States government recognize the importance and urgency of reconstructing and stabilizing Iraq. It is a prime mission for both our DoD and Department of State components in Iraq, and they are working together closely. We have developed a strong interagency process – at all levels – both in Washington and Iraq to ensure civilian-military coordination and cooperation.

The overall policy and operating relationship between the State and Defense Departments is set out in a series of documents, including NSPD 36, "Operation Plan (OPLAN) Sovereign Iraq," and three Memoranda of Understanding on support and security. These documents are the product of the joint State-DOD Interagency Transition Planning Team that closed down CPA and stood up Mission Baghdad. In practice, they are working well.

Embassy Baghdad (and DOD) participates through video teleconference in regular and frequent interagency meetings on Iraq – meetings of the National Security Council, Principals and Deputies Committees, and the Iraq Policy Operations Group. General Casey participates in meetings of the National Security Council.

On the ground in Iraq our reconstruction efforts are coordinated by a civilian-military interagency organization, the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), headed by Ambassador William Taylor. IRMO coordinates closely with the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a Pentagon-based organization responsible for implementing projects from the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund that Congress approved in 2003.

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), led by LTG David Petraeus, is responsible for the development of the Iraqi Armed Forces and Iraqi Security Forces. MNSTC-I works closely with MNF-I, and Embassy, and IRMO.

Rather than seeing a “gap” between civilian and military efforts, I see that at every level they are intertwined and integrated:

· State Department, USAID and PCO representatives at the Regional Embassy Offices in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla and Basra work closely with the military commands in those regions. Our State Embedded Teams are located within military commands in Tikrit, Ba’quba, Ramadi/Falluja, Najaf and Karbala, providing close State-military coordination.

· MNF-I officers are embedded in the offices of IRMO’s senior ministry consultants. MNF-I officers participate in the Mission’s Elections Security Cell.

· The military has changed its security mission in Iraq to ensure the protection of infrastructure under insurgent attack, and to provide security for the assistance materials IRMO imports for the reconstruction of the country.

· Military commanders have used their Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to fund reconstruction projects.

· 800 Civil Affairs personnel work on the ground, in every major American maneuver command, in coordination with civilian reconstruction officials. MNF-I’s Civil Affairs troops are supporting IRMO in Falluja resettlement and reconstruction.

· USAID and 1st Cavalry Division have partnered to provide services and employ youth in Baghdad; expanded to include PCO, this has been a model for reconstruction assistance in strategic cities such as Najaf, Samarra, Tal Afar and Falluja.

Carrying out reconstruction and securing the country are two parts of a single effort, and that is the way our people on the ground in Iraq see it – civilian and military alike. They understand that cooperating in such a difficult and dangerous environment is essential. They are doing a superb job.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Iraq Issues

Question #2:

When USAID advertised openings for 20 personnel in their Baghdad office, there were no applicants. They have managed through aggressive recruitment by Mr. Natsios to fill these openings, but mid-level experienced FSO's are still needed. How will you address the personnel shortfalls created by the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan? Do we need to offer tax-free war zone incentives for State Department personnel like we have done for the military? The Committee has supported increasing danger pay and would like to see an administration request to that effect. What other incentives are needed?

Answer:

USAID has done a tremendous job recruiting for Baghdad and Kabul, already filling all positions through October 2005. State, of course, has many more positions than USAID to fill at both posts. Despite the difficulties and dangers of service, Department of State employees have also been responsive for service at these sites, as well as in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and the remotely located positions throughout Iraq. This includes Civil Service as well as Foreign Service volunteers.

USAID has noted that issues like security and family concerns are more important determinative factors for recruitment than financial compensation, and the Department of State will continue to address these issues for all agencies under Chief of Mission authority.

We are exploring the possibility of requesting that the danger pay cap be raised. We support tax-free treatment of compensation for all civilian employees of the U.S Government serving in war-zones as a matter of equity for those sharing these exceptional risks with members of our armed forces, rather than as a recruiting tool.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Iraq Issues

Question #3:

This Committee has given great attention to the pace of reconstruction assistance, which has accelerated somewhat, but still remains slow. Effective reconstruction projects can make a great deal of difference in Iraq, yet U.S. assistance continues to be plagued by lack of coordination and duplication of efforts between the military and civilian organizations, bureaucratic processes, and above all, by a lack of security in Iraq. You have seen this from the NSC vantage point. Do you consider the pace of reconstruction too slow? Are we making progress? Do you plan another review and overhaul? What will you do differently?

Answer:

The pace of reconstruction is not moving as smoothly as we may have hoped; however, we are making progress, even in the face of an ongoing insurgency. Clearly, security remains the most serious issue affecting the pace of our reconstruction efforts. Despite the challenging environment, the U.S. continues to increase our reconstruction spending, and we have obligated nearly $13 billion of the over $20.9 billion that Congress has appropriated for Iraq reconstruction. Of this total, we have disbursed over $4.3 billion - $1.9 billion from the FY03 Supplemental (IRRF I) and $2.4 billion from the FY04 Supplemental (IRRF II) as of January 5th.

All agencies of the United States government recognize the importance and urgency of reconstruction and stabilizing Iraq. It is a primary goal of each civilian and military organization working in Iraq, and they are working together closely.

We continue to develop a strong interagency process – at all levels – both in Washington and Iraq to ensure civilian-military coordination and cooperation and to review and fine-tune our effort. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) located within our Embassy in Baghdad is working hard to coordinate reconstruction efforts among the implementing agencies “on the ground” in Iraq.

Rather than seeing a “gap” between civilian and military efforts, I see that at every level they are becoming more intertwined and integrated. For example: since early 2004, USAID and the 1st Cavalry Division have engaged in a partnership to provide essential services in Baghdad while generating employment for Iraqi youth. This partnership was expanded to include the PCO, and ultimately became the model for rapid reconstruction assistance in strategic cities such as Najaf, Samara, Tel Afar and Falluja.

Our reconstruction efforts have made significant progress in supporting our objectives in Iraq and in improving the lives of the Iraqi people.

Currently, over 133,000 Iraqis are employed in USG administered programs.

Despite recent and serious insurgent attacks on the oil infrastructure, the weekly average output during Dec. 27- Jan. 2 stood at 2.1 million barrels per day with exports earning Iraq more than $1.4 billion in hard currency each month.

We have added over 1800 MW generating capacity to the Iraqi power grid since the transition to Iraqi sovereignty and we will add more. Power is also more equitably distributed throughout the country than under Saddam, when electric power was diverted to Baghdad.

Iraq is experiencing power shortages now due to sabotage, fuel distribution problems, unscheduled outages and seasonal spike in demand. We are working with the Ministry of Electricity to increase available hours of power in the shortest possible time.

We continue to seek the most effective means of delivering assistance to Iraq. Last fall, Ambassador Negroponte, in close coordination with the Iraqi Interim Government, General Casey of MNF-I and LTG Petraeus of MNSTC-I, undertook a strategic review of the spending plan and suggested the reallocation of $3.46 billion in reconstruction assistance.

In an effort to disburse funds more quickly, PCO is proceeding with a pilot program to contract directly with the IIG Ministries, allowing them to implement and manage infrastructure projects which meet their most pressing priorities.

We are also using Iraqi firms to the greatest extent possible to put an “Iraqi face” on our reconstruction efforts.

As part of the ongoing assessment of spending priorities, our Embassy has recently identified an additional $457 million to reallocate to high-impact, rapid-action projects designed to stabilize and address the near-term needs of the electrical sector as well as to deliver quick-delivery essential services programs to the populations of 4 cities (Fallujah, Najaf, Samarra and Sadr City) living in post-battle environments.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Iraq Issues

Question #4:

The elections scheduled for January 30, 2005 are the first in a multi-year process. Will the Iraqi Election Commission (MCI) [presumably referring to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI)] have the credibility to monitor elections? Will the elections be judged fair if the Sunnis boycott or if we have to bypass three governorates? How are plans for the next two elections coming? Should we expect the security situation to improve after Iraqis vote?

Answer:

Over the past several months, the IECI has repeatedly demonstrated its independence and its dedication to ensuring that Iraq’s elections are substantially free and fair. The IECI is enlisting thousands of Iraqi election workers. Thousands more will serve as domestic election monitors and are being trained by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). A conference in Ottawa in December organized the International Mission for Iraq Elections (IMIE), an international effort that we support.

PM Allawi, President al Yawar, the IECI, and the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) have all called for full participation – by all Iraqi political, ethnic, and religious groups – in the January 30 elections. We support the Iraqi call for full participation and believe all Iraqis have a role to play in the future of Iraq, including Iraqi Sunnis.

The IECI, Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, and the Multinational Force-Iraq are working closely together to ensure security for the elections in all 18 governates. The IECI is also considering ways to ensure that voters in areas still plagued by security issues are able to participate in the election, even if they have not yet registered to vote.

The IECI is responsible for carrying out not only the January elections, but also the constitutional referendum scheduled for October and the elections for a constitutionally based government in December. We welcome Secretary General Annan’s statement that the UN stands ready, if asked, to help Iraqis as they draw up a new constitution and conduct a national referendum and further elections. The U.S. Government will provide support as requested by the Transitional Government of Iraq.

The January elections will mark a watershed moment in Iraq’s history, which should help the Iraqi Transitional Government battle those who seek to derail Iraq’s progress to full democracy. But we should not underestimate the commitment of these forces to deny Iraqis a stable, democratic, and prosperous future. As election day approaches, these elements will probably step up their attacks out of desperation that Iraq’s political transition is succeeding.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Afghanistan

Question #1:

A Congressional Notification arrived in December outlining a new Afghanistan counter-narcotics program costing $776.5 million in 2005. Given the exponential growth of poppy cultivation and drug production in Afghanistan in the past two years this amount may be justified, however, the entire Afghan appropriation for 2005 is only $980 million. Does this put other reconstruction in Afghanistan in jeopardy? How much funding for Afghanistan will be requested in the upcoming supplemental? What is the expected budget request for FY2006?

Answer:

a) The new Afghanistan counter-narcotics program does not put in jeopardy other reconstruction in Afghanistan, provided that supplemental funding is received to replenish the reprogrammed accounts in full prior to beginning of the third quarter. In preparing the reprogramming request every effort was made to minimize any delay or disruption in existing programs.

b) The President has not yet decided on the timing or content for a Supplemental.

c) Funds will be requested to continue the Afghanistan counter-narcotics program in FY 2006. However, the levels have not yet been finalized.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Afghanistan

Question #2:

The Congressional Notification indicates that $312.5 million is to be immediately reprogrammed from other critical accounts identified for Afghanistan. What programs will be affected by the reprogramming? Will these be replenished in the supplemental?

Answer:

1 - In preparing the reprogramming request every effort was made to avoid any delay or disruption to existing programs. No programs will be affected by the reprogramming, provided supplemental funding is approved.

2 - All reprogrammed funds will need to be replenished with the exception of the INCLE “Prior year De-obligated Funds” of $3,000,000.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Afghanistan

Question #3:

Why is 40 percent of the counter-narcotics budget being slated for eradication of only 10 percent of the crop, while only 15 percent is being budgeted for alternative livelihoods? Should more resources be spent to put courts, prisons, laws and greater opportunities for alternative livelihoods in place to prepare for a sustainable Afghan-driven eradication program?

Answer:

1- Eradication is one of the most crucial elements of a counter-narcotics program, and the objectives of the other elements will not be achieved without an eradication program. Most countries – the United Kingdom and the U.S. being the exceptions – decline to contribute to eradication programs for a variety of reasons. The eradication program is therefore a key U.S. value-added contribution to the overall effort. Considerable up-front capital investment in equipment and infrastructure constitutes the majority of the initial counter-narcotics spending.

2 - The proposed Afghanistan counter-narcotics initiative takes into account the willingness of other donors to contribute to law enforcement and criminal justice system development, alternative development, public information, and demand reduction programs. The counter-narcotics initiative will be coordinated with existing USG programs that provide support for the justice sector in Afghanistan, with the objective of a stable, peaceful Afghanistan with a legitimate central government respecting the rule of law .


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Afghanistan

Question #4:

There are consistent concerns that the funds identified for Afghanistan are not reaching the ground. What proportion of each dollar is going toward overhead? How can we improve the impact of every dollar and the timeliness of assistance? Is the head of the Afghan Inter-Agency Operations Group sufficiently authorized to ensure coordinated and efficient obligation of funds?

Answer:

1 - From FY 2001-2004, the U.S. provided over $4.5 billion for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. The size and diversity of our ambitious program precludes a simple answer to the proportional amount allocated towards overhead. Overhead costs vary by sector and project, and would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

2 - We believe the current inter-agency organizational model is sufficient to adequately monitor and track the impact of our spending and the timeliness of our assistance program to Afghanistan. Through the near-daily meetings of the Afghanistan Inter-agency Operation Group (AIOG), there continues to be close inter-agency collaboration on all funding issues and the Coordinator and other policy makers are periodically provided charts that track all U.S. obligations and available resources. These charts are designed to highlight efficiencies and expose bureaucratic bottlenecks. Progress toward specific sectoral objectives is also carefully tracked on a month-to-month basis through our Afghanistan “metrics” document.

3 - We believe the Coordinator for Afghanistan possesses sufficient authority to carry out the Administration’s priorities in Afghanistan.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Iran Issues

Question #1:

What should the U.S. do to encourage Iran to close its shared borders with Iraq? Who is coming across the border now? Are fighters sanctioned or supported by the Iranian government?

Answer:

We have made clear to Iran that we will oppose actions that undermine Iraq’s stability. Senior officials of the Iraqi Interim Government have publicly voiced their concerns about Iranian interference in Iraq. For example, there are reports that Iran provided funding, safe transit, and arms to insurgents and to Muqtada al-Sadr's forces. Iraq’s other neighbors have also expressed concern about Iran’s meddling in Iraq’s domestic political affairs. We share these concerns, and we will continue to work closely with the IIG to address all issues related to Iraq’s stability and security.

We urge the Iranian government to live up to its publicly stated policy of supporting the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of Iraq, and its commitment to combat the flow of terrorists across the Iraqi-Iranian border as stated in the November 23, 2004 regional conference on Iraq held at Sharm el-Sheikh.

Iran should also heed the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 to deny safe haven to those who plan, support, or commit terrorist acts and to affirmatively take steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts by providing early warning to other states by exchange of information. Details of Iranian involvement in Iraq are better described in a closed briefing.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Saudi Arabia Issues

Question #1:

How can US policy toward Saudi Arabia counter the growing anti-Americanism in some segments of the Saudi population and facilitate the Kingdom’s progress toward political, economic, and educational reforms, without undermining our close security and economic cooperation with the government?

Answer:

Our support for reform in Saudi Arabia is not incompatible with our close security and economic agenda with the Kingdom. In fact, we believe strongly that the Saudis must pursue reform as the best way to ensure that the shared security and economic interests of the US and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia grow stronger.

We are addressing anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia through two principal means. The first is our traditional public diplomacy effort, which includes Fulbright and carefully targeted International Visitors programs, other educational exchanges, and dissemination of US views via placements in the local media and through USG-sponsored Arabic language media.

The goal of these efforts is to ensure that private Saudi citizens—especially the young—have a clear and accurate understanding of the US and our policies. This is not easily accomplished in the era of sensationalist and popular Arab satellite channels which frequently seek to pander to the prejudices of their audience rather than inform them, but we are making headway.

In addition to getting accurate information about the US to a Saudi audience, we also are working with Saudi government and non-governmental organizations to address many of the fundamental frustrations that feed feelings of hatred towards the US.

The Saudis themselves have a reform agenda that includes holding first-ever municipal elections in the spring of 2005; developing a new school curriculum aimed at promoting greater tolerance; and continuing Crown Prince Abdullah’s ground-breaking series of national dialogues with religious leaders, intellectuals, young people and women on Saudi’s most sensitive issues. The Saudis are also taking significant steps to advance economic reform, and are currently in the process of negotiating their accession to WTO.

We support these initial efforts and are encouraging the Saudis to take additional steps, via our bilateral Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the G-8 sponsored Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), to provide a better future for their citizens, and to give all those citizens a greater voice in the decisions affecting their lives.

We share the view that meaningful reform must reflect the desires of the people of the region—it will only succeed if it is internally driven, not externally imposed, but we and others can and must help.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Greater ME 21st Century Trust Issues

Question #1:

What is your view of the Greater Middle East Trust idea contained in S. Res. 375?

Answer:

Promoting democratic change and fundamental political, economic, and educational reform in the countries of the broader Middle East must remain a vital U.S. goal. Increasing freedom and opportunity for people throughout this region will diminish the appeal of extremism and reduce the threat of terrorism.

We are already making progress through the dozens of impact-oriented reform programs launched under the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative and the G-8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. We are also coordinating closely with our G-8 and EU partners.

We appreciate the ideas that Members of Congress have proposed for increasing assistance and programs to support reform. Our goal is to structure U.S. efforts in a way that delivers effective, targeted assistance with appropriate management and coordination, addressing problems in different regions in constructive ways.

A “Greater ME 21st Century Trust” is a worthy ideas whose merits we would be happy to consider, but it would require a substantial increase in available appropriations for promoting reform and democracy in the region. The steady reduction in funding for MEPI over the past three fiscal years has strained our ability to advance U.S. reform efforts. It would be difficult to persuade other governments to contribute into a “Trust” unless we demonstrate U.S. resolve in this area.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Cuba

Question #1

I have received reports that officials of the U.S. Department of State, Treasury, and possibly the National Security Council are recommending administrative or regulatory clarification related to implementation of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, which would likely impact U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The reported revision of requirements applied to U.S. agricultural sales will be injurious to American farmers, and emphasize that the U.S. is not a reliable exporter. If accurate as reported, the proposed change would overturn Congressional intent to allow normal cash sales to Cuba as they are currently transacted. Dr. Rice, please provide background information on the genesis and status of this proposed change and how you expect it to affect agriculture sales to Cuba.

Answer:

U.S. agencies, including the Department of State, have met with concerned parties, including U.S. exporters and shipping companies, to hear directly their views about any potential change and its impact on their business.

There is an inter-agency process considering whether the regulations implementing the law should be clarified. However, no decision has been made, and thus no change has been made in U.S. policy concerning agricultural shipments to Cuba.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Russia

Question # 1:

How would you describe U.S.-Russia relations today? What are the main challenges to the relationship that you will need to address in the near future?

Answer:

In many areas, the relationship is more or less on the right track, but we have a ways to go to realize the full potential that both countries had hoped for. We have worked well together in some areas, notably on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. However, we have growing concerns about Russia’s reversal of many democratic reforms implemented in the 1990’s. We continue to raise our concerns as a friend who wants Russia to succeed as a strong, vibrant, democratic country.

The cold-war rhetoric and threat of global nuclear annihilation has been replaced by unprecedented U.S.-Russia counter-terrorism and nonproliferation cooperation. We now share actionable counterterrorism intelligence and are close to concluding a bilateral agreement on MANPADS.

Presidents Bush and Putin have a good, strong relationship that sets the right tone for moving forward on a broad range of initiatives. Recent joint successes include Iraqi debt forgiveness, space cooperation, and Afghanistan elections. The relationship’s resilience was shown on ABM withdrawal and NATO expansion to the Baltics, which many said would provoke a crisis in our relations and did not.

At the same time, significant challenges remain. We have some work to do to convince the Russians that geo-political and economic success is not a zero-sum game. Free, peaceful and prosperous Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and other neighbors are in Russia’s interest. This is not a 21st century Great Game.

Ten years on, Chechen war needs a political solution and an end to human rights abuses. We must also make clear that there is no excuse or justification for terrorism.

Russia needs to integrate more firmly into global institutions as appropriate. Russia can play a constructive role in Six-Party talks, on Iran, BMENA initiatives and as part of the Middle East Quartet. Recent backsliding on democracy and other human rights may begin to raise questions about the suitability of Russian participation in other international institutions.

To further this integration, Russia must show that it shares Western and international values, including a free judiciary and press, strong civil and governmental institutions, the rule of law, freedom of speech, assembly and religion.

Russia will likely continue to project “soft” power using its oil and gas resources and nuclear know-how. Unfortunately, the handling of the Yukos case poses serious questions about Russia’s respect for the rule of law, property rights, and openness to investment.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Russia

Question #2:

How is Russia cooperating with the United States in the Global War on Terror? What assistance is Russia providing to Afghanistan? Does the United States envisage a role for Russia in reconstruction activities in Iraq?

Answer:

President Putin was the first world leader to call the President to offer assistance in the wake of September 11.

Our two governments have a Counterterrorism Working Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State and his Russian counterpart, that facilitates operational cooperation and exchanges of information on a wide range of terrorism concerns. Among the priority issues addressed by this Working Group are intelligence and law enforcement, aviation security, WMD, MANPADS, and terrorist financing.

Russia is assisting the Afghan National Army with equipment and training. We expect Russian aid to Afghanistan may increase if continued progress is made on resolving the issue of Russian debt contracted by previous Afghan governments.

To contain the outflow of Afghan narcotics, we are encouraging Russia to work with us, the EU, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Tajiks to strengthen border security and interdiction, as well as to train and equip the Tajik Border Guard as Russian-led forces leave the Tajik-Afghan border by 2006.

Russia has considerable potential to assist in Iraq’s reconstruction, particularly in infrastructure development and the energy sector.

President Putin recently committed to reducing Iraq’s debt to Russia by about 93 percent, in accordance with its Paris Club obligations and additional commitments made by Paris Club members in November.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Russia

Question #3:

How could possible setbacks in democratization and respect for human rights in Russia affect U.S.-Russian relations? How might the United States respond to such developments?

Answer:

A stable, healthy, democratic Russia serves both U.S. and Russian interests, and will make Russia a more effective international partner.

Today’s Russia bears little resemblance to the country that emerged from the ashes of the USSR. Despite fits and starts, Russia has overall made progress towards a market-oriented democracy. Recent backsliding – particularly the dilution of judicial independence, state control over nationwide television and end of the direct regional elections – raises concerns for us. Actions surrounding the Yukos case undermine Russia’s commitment to the rule of law, transparency, respect for property rights and willingness to uphold the norms and values of a democratic market economy.

Based on these trends, during the certification process for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative, we decided this fall for the first time to not certify Russia on human rights grounds. We informed our Russian colleagues about this decision as well as Members of Congress (the President signed the waiver to ensure continued flow of CTR funds).

We must maintain good channels of communication at all levels of the Russian Government in order to effectively share our concerns about how negative trends in these areas could hurt our relationship. We speak to our Russian interlocutors as friends who want to see Russia become a strong, vibrant, democratic country – and friends speak frankly to each other.

We also need to maintain good ties with those individuals and groups in Russia that are advocating for democratic values and institutions. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to provide robust support for programs that strengthen the rule of law, help fight corruption, and defend democratic values, including respect for human rights, in Russia. Building a larger constituency base between our two countries and our two societies will redound to the benefit of our overall relationship.

In FY 2005, we plan to spend over $43 million for democracy programs in Russia – about a third more than we did in FY 2004. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure continued strong support for democratization and human rights in Russia.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Ukraine

Question #1:

What is your sense of the impact the Ukrainian elections will have on the future of democracy in the region?

Answer:

The fact that a democratic process prevailed and delivered a result that reflects the will of the people represents a stunning success for Ukraine.

It could have a major impact on the development of democracy in the region. It will signal to millions of people that democratic freedom is within reach and on the ascendance, and that citizens standing up peacefully for their political rights can make a difference. This will help bolster supporters of democracy, even as authoritarian governments in Belarus, Central Asia, and elsewhere in Eurasia crack down on pro-democracy civil society groups.

We will intensify our efforts to ensure that respect for democracy and human rights remains an integral component of our relationships. We will continue to emphasize that long-term stability, security, and prosperity arise when people enjoy freedom to participate in the civic life of their countries and fundamental human rights. We should bear in mind, however, that the conditions that made people's revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia a success -- especially a well- developed civil society -- do not exist everywhere in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, rulers in some of these countries are already drawing the wrong conclusion from the Orange Revolution and are bringing strong pressure to bear on pro-democracy NGOs.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Ukraine

Question #2:

The U.S. imposed sanctions on several top Ukrainian leaders. What is the current status of those actions?

Answer:

For months, we repeatedly and consistently warned Ukrainian officials of the high importance we place on the conduct of their presidential election process and voting day itself.

Most recently, in his November 18 letter to President Kuchma, President Bush wrote that a tarnished election would lead us to review our relations with Ukraine, and consider further steps against individuals engaging in fraud.

As we said during the campaign, any individual who has engaged in or benefited from corruption or interference in judicial or electoral processes should expect his visa application to be reviewed in light of Presidential Proclamation 7750 and all U.S. laws relating to visa eligibility. Pursuant to the Proclamation, we have denied the U.S. visa application of one prominent Ukrainian under Section 212(f) of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act for engaging in serious corrupt activity, including in the Ukrainian electoral campaign.

We continue to review the behavior of senior officials of the Kuchma/Yanukovych government and to consider whether further action may be in order in some cases.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Ukraine

Question #3:

What is the new president’s position on Ukraine’s troops in Iraq? What impact, if any, will Ukraine’s troop presence in Iraq have on your deliberations?

Answer:

The U.S. and our Multinational Force (MNF) partners are very grateful for Ukraine’s substantial troop contribution in Iraq. Ukraine has a 1,580-man troop contingent in Iraq – one of the largest in the MNF. Ukraine also has contributed peacekeepers in the Balkans, Africa, and Lebanon, and has provided support for Coalition operations in Afghanistan. These troops are making valuable contributions, and we have encouraged Ukraine to continue to support these operations.

During the presidential election campaign in Ukraine, both leading candidates said they would consider the possible withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Iraq. Since the circumstances of any withdrawal are hypothetical at this point, I cannot comment further on their implications.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Europe

Question #1:

How can we improve U.S.-European relations? In your view, can gaps between U.S. and European views regarding the role of multilateral institutions and the use of force be bridged?

Answer:

U.S-. European relations are already good despite sometimes very public disagreements over specific policy issues. The President has voiced his commitment to further strengthening the transatlantic relationship. His planned visit to Europe in February demonstrates the degree to which the Administration values the importance of strong partnership with Europe. Europeans have widely welcomed this visit and indicated a willingness to focus on how the U.S. and Europe can work together.

The U.S. consults with Europeans constantly through a variety of fora, bilaterally with virtually all European countries and multilaterally through such institutions as the UN, NATO and the EU. We often consult with our European friends and allies before taking positions in international meetings. We regularly discuss with European governments the need to ensure that multilateral institutions are effective in carrying out their work. These consultations cover the widest spectrum imaginable, ranging from democracy promotion in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East to combating HIV/AIDS, fighting terrorism, and promoting economic growth through free markets and competition.

We also engage a broad spectrum of European audiences in public fora in order to ensure that our policies are understood. There is no substitute for personal contact as we advocate our policies. It is important also to consider how to increase educational exchange with Europe.

Despite the perceptions of some Europeans, the U.S. and Europe have similar views in most situations regarding the use of force. The Balkans, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Haiti are all good examples of this.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Europe

Question #2:

What will be the Administration's priorities in NATO and for U.S.-EU relations over the next four years? How can Washington best encourage its NATO allies to strengthen enhanced military capabilities and develop mobile forces able to project power beyond Europe?

Answer:

·The U.S. seeks in the EU a healthy, reliable partner that can help us address the challenges of the 21st Century: building stable and secure democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan; preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons; fighting terrorism and WMD proliferation; promoting freedom, markets, social integration in the Broader Middle East; finding a lasting solution to the Israel/Palestine situation; and addressing lingering challenges in Eurasia and in Europe’s immediate neighborhood: Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Caucasus, the Balkans (especially Kosovo).

·On the economic side, we will seek to boost growth on both sides of the Atlantic, by promoting economic reform and innovation, enhancing our trade and investment relationship, and working jointly to speed global trade liberalization through the WTO. We will also seek to resolve all outstanding trade disputes.

·We welcome EU efforts to enhance its military capabilities and to create rapid response forces, as long as these efforts are consistent with Berlin Plus arrangements.

·NATO remains the essential forum for transatlantic security, and we will continue to implement the historic decisions made by NATO leaders at Istanbul last year: promote peace and stability in Afghanistan; train and equip Iraqi security forces; maintain security in Kosovo; and reach out to partners in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

·But NATO is only as strong as its capabilities. At Prague in 2002, NATO agreed on the need to improve Alliance capabilities to meet current and future threats and committed to acquiring the most needed capabilities, such as airlift, sealift, air refueling, and precision munitions. Progress has been made, but more work is needed. We will continue to urge Allies to meet these capability commitments.

·NATO is strengthening its ability to respond to contingencies quickly through the creation of the NATO Response Force, which is expected to reach full operational capability by 2006. We have been pleased to see Allies making substantial NRF troop contributions.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

The Balkans

Question #1:

How does the Administration plan to carry out its "Standards Before Status" Review policy on Kosovo by mid-2005? What process can be established to begin to address Kosovo's status? Should status be considered if Kosovo has not achieved progress on certain standards, such as security for the Serbian minority in Kosovo? What will be the U.S. role in this process?

Answer:

We remain committed to a secure, stable and multiethnic Kosovo that is fully integrated into Europe. Resolving the issue of Kosovo's status will be a major step in achieving the President's vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

The eight international standards for Kosovo cover everything from security to rule of law to the economy. Their achievement will benefit the people of Kosovo no matter what its future status. Kosovo has made some progress on the standards, but much work remains.

The head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, Soren Jessen-Petersen, recently identified a number of key indicators that Kosovo should focus on in the lead up to the mid-2005 review. These are standards primarily designed to ensure the protection and rights of Kosovo's minority communities, notably the Serbs. Achievement of these key standards, while ensuring there is no major outbreak of violence, would help pave the way for a positive review.

At the same time, we are encouraging work to decentralize the administration of Kosovo, which would give Serb communities a greater voice in education, health care and possibly even justice issues, in municipalities where they have a large presence.

We are actively engaged with the Contact Group – where we join the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the EU – as well as with the UN, in assessing Kosovo's progress on the standards and in considering the possibility of launching status discussions. We are also actively engaging Belgrade to ensure that Serbia has a voice, but not a veto, in this process.

The United States will be an active player in the mid-2005 review and in any status discussions that may be launched. However, Kosovo's future, and that of its neighbors, is as a part of Europe. We will expect our Allies and friends in the European Union to take a leading role in this process.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

The Balkans

Question #2:

Following examples in Macedonia and Bosnia, should peacekeeping duties in Kosovo be turned over from NATO to the European Union? Should the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) be reformed or restructured?

Answer:

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 has governed the administration of Kosovo since the end of NATO air campaign against the Milosevic regime in 1999. Under 1244, UNMIK was established as the civil administration for Kosovo and a NATO-led KFOR provides security. We are committed to both institutions.

The administration remains committed to the President's "in together, out together" pledge but we seek to "hasten the day" when Kosovo will be stable enough to stand without a NATO mission. While it is possible that either or both missions could change as part of discussions on Kosovo's status, it is premature to speculate on what direction those discussions might take.

At their December meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to maintain a "robust KFOR" and to consider changes to its composition only as a result of an improved security situation on the ground. Soren Jessen-Petersen, appointed by Kofi Annan to lead UNMIK last August, and his American deputy, Larry Rossin, have brought a new dynamism to the mission that has greatly improved its effectiveness.

We will continue to work with UNMIK, the UN Secretariat in New York, and other partners, such as the EU, to ensure that the mission is structured effectively and operating smoothly, particularly in the run-up to the mid-2005 review and possible launch of discussions on Kosovo's future status.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

The Balkans

Question#3:

Despite episodes of cooperation, Belgrade’s lack of compliance with its commitments regarding the ICTY has held up Serbia and Montenegro’s efforts to become more closely integrated into the EU and NATO. U.S. bilateral assistance has also been curtailed. What is the way forward on this issue?

Answer:

The United States remains strongly committed to supporting the work of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and its efforts to bring to justice those most responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. The United States and our allies have made clear that upholding international obligations to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia remains the most serious obstacle to Serbia and Montenegro’s further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace.

We have called on all authorities in Serbia, especially Prime Minister Kostunica as head of the government, to issue clear and unambiguous orders for cooperation with the Tribunal, including the immediate apprehension and transfer to The Hague of Ratko Mladic, the three indicted generals living openly in Belgrade and all other fugitives hiding in the country.

We want to see Serbia succeed. We want to help Serbia and Montenegro integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures to create a Europe whole, free and at peace. We look forward to working with leaders in the state union and the Serbian Republic on a variety of issues in the coming months. The U.S. is ready and eager to broaden and deepen our relationship with Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia. But the way forward will depend on Belgrade’s actions to meet its international obligations. Serbia and Montenegro already faces consequences from its record of non-cooperation, including the suspension of some U.S. assistance.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar
Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice
January 18 & 19, 2005

President Bush's NDU Speech – IAEA Proposals

Last February, President Bush made several important proposals concerning the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

IAEA Proposals. The President made three proposals with regard to strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). First, he proposed that all states should sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, and that signing of the Additional Protocol should be a condition for countries seeking equipment for their civilian nuclear programs by next year. Second, he proposed that the IAEA Board of Governors create a special committee on safeguards and verification. And, third, he proposed that no state under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to serve or continue serving on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee.

Question #1:

What is the status of each of these proposals?

Answer:

Additional Protocol (AP)

We are actively engaged in a number of efforts to promote universal acceptance of the safeguards agreements mandated under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the related Additional Protocols. For the past several months we have been engaged with other G-8 partners in diplomatic approaches to a variety of states that have not yet concluded one or both of these agreements.

We are also actively engaged in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in advocating signature of the AP as a condition of supply for transfers of nuclear trigger list items and technology. A subsequent British/Austrian proposal would require AP implementation rather than only signature as a condition of nuclear supply by the end of 2005. This is attracting broad support in the NSG, although a few states are reluctant to move ahead. We will continue to press for approval of the British/Austrian version of the President's proposal.

Special Committee

There is substantial support for the President's proposal to establish a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to focus intensively on safeguards. At last year's summits, G-8 and EU leaders agreed to work together to establish such a special committee, which would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened safeguards and verification. These leaders also agreed that the special committee should be made up of member states that are in compliance with their NPT and IAEA commitments.

We have circulated a proposal for the mandate of this special committee to members of the IAEA Board of Governors, and expect the Board of Governors to take this up in the coming year.

Board Membership

The President's proposal that states under investigation for proliferation violations should not be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or the proposed special committee was based on the principle that those actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules. We have achieved broad support for this principle.

G-8 and EU leaders agreed that countries under investigation for non-technical violations of their nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations should elect not to participate in decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors or the special committee regarding their own cases.

We are working to have this principle accepted by the Board of Governors. We will also work to persuade each of the regional groups not to put forward as candidates for Board of Governors membership states that are under investigation.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar
Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice
January 18 & 19, 2005

President Bush's NDU Speech – IAEA Proposals

Question #2:

What is the current status of all U.S. diplomatic efforts to achieve universal adoption of the Additional Protocol?

Answer:

We have long pressed for universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, and are working actively with G-8 and EU leaders to achieve that goal. We are also urging those states that have not yet done so to conclude promptly the safeguards agreement required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In particular, G-8 Foreign Ministers, led by Secretary Powell, agreed to write to their counterparts worldwide and urge them to take the necessary steps.

We have also supported the IAEA's global outreach efforts. We will continue this work and use our actions on the U.S. Additional Protocol to demonstrate our commitment to strong IAEA safeguards.

·I would like to thank the Senate and the members of this Committee for your prompt action in consenting to ratification of the U.S. Protocol. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on the passage of implementing legislation.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

IAEA Referral of Cases of Noncompliance

Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA states that the Board of Governors, in cases of non-compliance, "shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred" and "[t]he Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations."

This language, however, appears to have been ignored given that no action was taken by the United Nations on the IAEA's report North Korean noncompliance in 2002 and we remained stalled in Vienna on Iran. Some experts believe that reporting to the UNSC is a formula for inaction and, therefore, risks undermining the NPT.

Question #1:

What do you think we should do to correct the impression that referral to the UNSC might result in inaction at the UN thereby undermining the NPT, starting with the case of North Korea?

Answer:

Reporting of noncompliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is an important tool in enforcement of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We should not shrink from its use. In the case of North Korea, reporting to the Security Council has placed pressure on the North Korean regime to address the international community’s concerns regarding its violations of the NPT.

While a report of noncompliance does not mandate any particular UNSC response, the action alone makes an important statement. Reporting noncompliance to the UNSC places the issue on the agenda of the international body with the legal authority to address threats to international peace and security. A demonstrated willingness by the IAEA Board of Governors to report noncompliance to the UNSC can itself lead to positive movement on remedying noncompliance even before the IAEA Board of Governors votes on a decision to report noncompliance. Moreover, the Board of Governors has a responsibility to all NPT parties to safeguard their security and to place these matters before the UNSC. The Board of Governors cannot shy from its duty under the IAEA Statute simply because it fears “inaction” by the UNSC.

While the UNSC may not always pursue the action we would want in response to a report of safeguards noncompliance from the IAEA Board of Governors, having the weight of the UNSC behind the IAEA Board of Governors could be useful. This is the case even when immediate action by the UNSC is not feasible (or perhaps even desirable) under the circumstances of a particular case.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

IAEA Referral of Cases of Noncompliance

Question # 2:

Do you believe that any nation should be allowed to withdraw from the NPT after violating it and not be held responsible for its violations?

Answer:

No. Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should not be treated as an escape clause for Parties that violate the NPT.

Arms control and nonproliferation treaties typically have withdrawal clauses stating that a Party, in exercising “its national sovereignty,” shall have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it believes that circumstances “jeopardizing its supreme interests” justifying that action. Article X of the NPT contains such a provision. However, if an NPT party exercises its right to withdraw when it is in violation of the NPT, withdrawal does not excuse those violations. In some cases, a party may be held responsible for violations that preceded its withdrawal from the NPT. Moreover, the United Nations Security Council and/or Parties to the NPT, may find it necessary to take action against the withdrawing party based on legal authorities separate from the NPT, even though the state is no longer Party to the NPT.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

IAEA Referral of Cases of Noncompliance

Question # 3:

As Secretary of State, how will you work to make sure that IAEA referral of noncompliance to the UNSC will no longer result in inaction at the United Nations?

Answer:

If confirmed as Secretary of State, I will work to ensure that any future International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors’ report of noncompliance with IAEA safeguards agreements to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is handled in the most effective way possible.

Every case of noncompliance is unique, and there is no one remedy. In some cases, such as the one involving Romania in 1992, it may not be necessary for the UNSC to take action other than noting that the noncompliance occurred and has been remedied. Even in cases not already resolved, there also may be no immediate need for punitive action. For example, it may be enough initially for the UNSC to provide support to actions being taken by the IAEA to resolve the noncompliance. In the toughest cases, those in which the violating state refuses to meet its obligations, sanctions may indeed be required to help compel the necessary compliance.

The gravity of noncompliance with the NPT must be addressed and in a manner that ensures that noncompliance does not weaken the NPT or cause Parties to reassess their security calculations.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NPT 2005 Review Conference

Many experts have called for re-examination of the "atoms for peace" philosophy that appears to sit at the heart of the NPT. Sometimes called "the nuclear bargain," this thinking states that guarantees to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy ought to be provided to any state forswearing nuclear weapons under the NPT. Thus, states such as Iran argue that they have a "right" to fuel-cycle activity under the NPT that could lead to a nuclear weapon. The plain terms of the NPT, though, seem to suggest that a NNWS can only obtain the benefits of the nuclear bargain under Article IV so long as they are in conformity with their obligations under Article II.

Question #1:

Do you believe that the NPT contains a right to fuel-cycle activities, notably reprocessing of spent fuel and enrichment of fresh fuel?

Answer:

No, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does not create a right to engage in fuel-cycle activities. States have a right to develop nuclear energy as a matter of national sovereignty. However, non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) parties to the NPT – such as Iran – have undertaken a legal obligation to pursue only a peaceful nuclear program, in conformity with the nonproliferation obligations in NPT Article II and, by extension, the safeguards obligations in NPT Article III.

Iran’s claims that its extensive, covert fuel-cycle activities, including enrichment and reprocessing, are for peaceful, non-weapons purposes are belied by the fact that they were not pursued in conformity with Iran’s Article III commitment, nor, we believe, were they in conformity with Article II. The only credible explanation for Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing programs is that Iran is vigorously pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. For nearly two decades, Iran procured technology for and developed these programs in secret and in violation of the NPT. It deceived the IAEA. Iran’s small and nascent nuclear research and power programs cannot justify its expensive and troublesome nuclear program. In short, Iran cannot credibly argue that the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes extends to its program of developing enrichment and reprocessing for clear weapons purposes.

There is no need to reconsider the atoms for peace “bargain” of the NPT. There is an adequate nuclear fuel supply and compliant NPT parties are receiving ample external assistance for their peaceful programs. Currently there is no need for new states to establish reprocessing or enrichment capacity.

Parties do need to address the challenge posed by noncompliance with NPT nonproliferation obligations and ensure that parties pursue peaceful programs in ways fully consistent with the NPT’s core nonproliferation obligations. Given the nature of the technology, the recent record of parties pursuing this technology, and the adequacy of the nuclear fuel supply, NPT parties that currently do not have fully functioning reprocessing and enrichment plants should not pursue these technologies. In keeping with the President’s February 2004 initiative, we are seeking to persuade other supplier states not to supply such technologies to those parties that do not possess fully functioning plants, but rather to ensure fuel supply at a reasonable price. In the meantime, we should deal promptly with NPT violators that seek these technologies, particularly in the pursuit of nuclear weapons.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NPT 2005 Review Conference

Question #2:

Are the challenges posed by the fuel cycle the only challenges for the NPT, or are there other areas in which the United States might focus attention during the 2005 Review Conference?

Answer:

The fuel cycle is only one part of a broader challenge faced by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its parties: non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) noncompliance with NPT nonproliferation obligations. Our principal focus at the Review Conference (RevCon) will be on this challenge, and we will cite Iran and the DPRK as the most pressing examples. We will urge others to recognize the gravity of noncompliance, press all parties to insist on full compliance by all parties, and more to strengthen collective tools against proliferation.

In the last two decades four states--the DPRK, Iran, Iraq, and Libya--have violated their NPT nonproliferation obligations in an effort to produce nuclear weapons. These violations threaten the security of all NPT parties. Two of these cases remain unresolved: the DPRK and Iran. The RevCon can provide vital political support to efforts such as the Six-Party Talks to resolve these cases. The RevCon can reaffirm the NPT’s contribution to international security, the need for strict compliance with all of its provisions, the need for parties to address promptly and firmly cases of noncompliance, and the need to strengthen the NPT to avert future cases of noncompliance.

In addition to noncompliance, the RevCon should also consider the threat to international security posed by non-state actor interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and non-state actor involvement in trafficking in nuclear materials, technology, and equipment. We will pursue support for the President’s February 11, 2004 NDU proposals to address these challenges from noncompliance and non-state actors. In addition to restraint on enrichment and reprocessing, other key tools are the NPT Additional Protocol, the Proliferation Security Initiative, implementation of UNSCR 1540, and expansion of the G-8 Global Partnership. We will of course be prepared to address the full range of issues we anticipate will be discussed at the RevCon.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NPT 2005 Review Conference

Question #3:

Do you believe that the NPT continues to serve the interests of the international community, or has it been permanently weakened given the events in Iran, North Korea or even South Korea to the point of making it irrelevant?

Answer:

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to be of fundamental importance to the interests of the international community. The NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and is vital to the national security of its parties. It sets the standards by which we define nuclear proliferation as a common security threat and provides essential mechanisms to respond to that threat.

The challenge posed by non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations is unquestionably serious, particularly those posed by the unresolved cases of the DPRK and Iran. However, the proper response to these challenges is to strengthen international resolve to compel compliance, not to devalue the Treaty itself.

The vast majority of NPT parties comply with their obligations. Four states relinquished nuclear weapons and adhered to the Treaty as NNWS; others relinquished serious nuclear weapons ambitions to do the same. As many as 35 to 40 NPT NNWS have the technological capability to pursue nuclear weapons but do not because they perceive their security interests better protected by a strong NPT. The key challenge for the United States and all responsible NPT parties is to ensure that this equation does not change. Parties must address current cases of noncompliance and work to prevent future cases. Parties must ensure that noncompliance does not weaken the NPT or cause parties to reassess their security calculations. As part of this effort, the United States will urge others to recognize the gravity of noncompliance, press all parties to insist on full compliance by all other parties, and move to strengthen collective tools against nonproliferation.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Nuclear Suppliers Group Proposals

The President also proposed that members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should refuse to sell uranium enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.

Question #1:

Neither the thirteenth nor fourteenth NSG Plenary meetings (at Pusan, South Korea and Goteborg, Sweden) adopted the President's proposals. Does the Administration intend to continue advocating for these ideas in the NSG?

Answer:

We introduced the President's February 2004 proposal for blocking the further spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology (ENR) into the NSG's Consultative Group (CG) meeting in March and pursued it in the May Goteborg Plenary and in the October 2004 Consultative Group Meeting. (FYI - The 13th NSG Plenary in Pusan referred to in the question took place in May 2003, nine months before the President's speech.) The proposal was also discussed in G-8 meetings during that period. The proposal met heavy opposition, with most NSG and G-8 members characterizing it as discriminatory or inconsistent with Article IV of the NPT. Nevertheless, we have continued to press for the President's original proposal at the NSG and in the G-8. Other members have suggested instead establishing criteria by which to judge potential ENR transfers. But the criteria we saw were weak, and Iran could have claimed to satisfy them. Some of our friends are now trying to strengthen those criteria in ways that would permanently block Iran from being eligible for ENR transfers. We are continuing to argue for the President's proposal, but given the need to strengthen controls against ENR transfers, we may have to consider whether a sufficiently tough criteria-based approach would be acceptable as an interim measure.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NSG Proposals

Question # 2:

As I noted in correspondence with the Administration last April, China's entry into the NSG was preceded by its sale to Pakistan of two reactors. How do you assess China's record with regard to nuclear non-proliferation? Are you in any way concerned with China's ability to both control nuclear technology exported to it from the United States or other countries as well as enforce necessary export controls over dual-use nuclear commerce?

Answer:

President Clinton's 1997 certification to the Congress that China "is not assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear weapon state, either directly or indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the material and components for such devices" remains valid. China has shown that it is serious in wanting to improve and strengthen implementation of its nuclear export control laws and regulations, including strengthening its ability to enforce nuclear export controls.

For example, in September 2003, China intercepted a shipment of chemicals that could have been used in North Korea's nuclear program. Chinese officials repeatedly have emphasized China's opposition to nuclear weapons proliferation and support for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts, including enhancing the effectiveness of the NPT, strengthening IAEA safeguards, and encouraging wider acceptance of the Additional Protocol. In fact, China was the first nuclear weapon state to bring an Additional Protocol into force. China has supported efforts to enhance physical protection of nuclear material and strengthen international and national export controls. China has cited its establishment of a comprehensive legal system for nuclear, chemical, biological and missile export controls in accordance with international treaties and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines. At the May 2004 NSG Plenary, China announced it was adopting dual-use catchall provisions and full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply.

However, vigilance is clearly required in the area of dual-use nuclear commerce where Chinese enforcement against illicit transfers to countries of concern remains inadequate. To that end, we have repeatedly raised with China the need for rigorous enforcement of its export controls to prevent such transfers, and interdict transhipments. Problems persist in Chinese export control implementation, enforcement and transparency. Exports by Chinese entities to sensitive countries continue to be of concern and U.S. statutory sanctions continue to be applied against Chinese companies, including sanctions for exports to Iran, pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. To encourage China's movement in the right direction on export controls, we held two export control talks with China in 2004, with specific emphasis on implementation of nuclear export controls. These talks open possibilities for additional U.S.-China technical cooperation on enhancing nuclear export controls.


Questions for Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

ITAR Waivers for the United Kingdom and Australia

Former Secretary of State Powell wrote to me shortly after I introduced legislation in 2003 regarding agreements the Administration negotiated with Australia and the United Kingdom to gain exemptions from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR, 22 CFR 120-130). Former Secretary Powell called my language “a prudent measure of legislative relief that will allow these agreements to come into force.”

On October 28,2004, President Bush signed H.R. 4200, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375). I am very concerned with language appearing in section 1225, “Bilateral Exchanges and Trade in Defense Articles and Defense Services Between the United States and the United Kingdom of Australia.” The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 did not provide the exceptions I sought, and, in fact, enactment of its provisions made many question the need for future efforts to obtain statutory exceptions for the exemption agreements with the United Kingdom and Australia. The language of section 1225(b) of Public Law 108-375 states: “ the Secretary of State shall ensure that any license application submitted for the export of defense articles or defense services to Australia or the United Kingdom is expeditiously processed by the Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, without referral to any other Federal department or agency, except where the item is classified or exceptional circumstances apply.

Question # 1:

Does the Administration, and do you, support the agreements with the governments of Australia and the United Kingdom, as negotiated?

Answer:

I support strongly allowing most categories of unclassified defense items to be exported to two of our closest allies without a license, advancing interoperability and defense cooperation with the UK and Australia.

Only the British and Australian governments, and a limited number of companies that the United States selects, would be authorized to receive U.S.-origin defense items under the waivers.

I am aware of the fact that our efforts in this area are stalled, and, if confirmed, will review the situation promptly.


Questions for Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

ITAR Waivers for the United Kingdom and Australia

Question # 2:

Do you envision any effort on the part of the Administration or yourself to renegotiate either of these agreements, in whole or in part?

Answer:

These agreements are the product of years of serious negotiation with the British and Australian governments and require them to enact new export control laws, regulations, and practices to better protect U.S. defense technology. Those improved measures are very much in our interest.

The British and Australian companies that will would be authorized to receive certain categories of U.S. defense items without a license will would also have to make new commitments, including to their own governments, to protect U.S. defense items.

I know that our efforts to implement these agreements have been stalled, and, if confirmed, will review the situation promptly.


Questions for Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

ITAR Waivers for the United Kingdom and Australia

Question # 3:

With regard to section 1225, do you agree with me that this language could harm our government's ability to provide necessary and complete interagency review of munitions license applications because of the inclusion of the phrase "without referral to any other Federal department or agency?”

Answer:

The State Department agrees with the general point that defense export licenses for our British and Australian allies should be processed as quickly as possible. However, it is not clear how the goal of responsible defense export controls was advanced by a law restricting the ability of licensing officers to seek input from agencies other than DOD. For example, most licenses related to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have been referred to an interagency committee (Missile Technology Export Control committee, MTEC), which includes Commerce, and NASA as well as DoD. In other cases we have seen fit to consult law enforcement or intelligence agencies.

We think a better approach would be to approve the ITAR waiver agreements with these governments, which would allow certain unclassified exports to proceed without any license under controlled conditions, and to permit licensing officers to determine when and to which agencies cases need to be referred for input. Now, with more sensitive defense exports meriting case-by-case approval, our licensing officers will only refer an application to an agency other than DoD if they believe it has an interest or expertise that should be taken into as an “exception” to normal practice.


Questions for Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NSPD-19 and Regulatory Issues

On November 21, 2002, the White House announced details of a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-19) examining many aspects of U.S. defense trade controls law and policy.

Question # 1:

What is your understanding of the status of the Administration’s promulgation of policies I understood to be contained in NSPD-19 or when President Bush might sign it?

Answer:

State, Defense, and Commerce concluded their review of defense trade issues and held consultations with Congressional staff several months ago.

I believe the measures developed by the agencies are prudent and useful. The Administration is considering next steps.


Questions for Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NSPD-19 and Regulatory Issues

Question # 2:

What do you understand to be the specific regulatory changes associated with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the ITAR, 22 CFR 120-130) on which some of NSPD-19 bears, and what specific changes to the ITAR would you envision being necessary as a result of President Bush's potential signature of NSPD-19? Would any part of NSPD-19 require amendments to the Arms Export Control Act?

Answer:

Some of the measures recommended by the interagency review would require changes to the ITAR, but pending a Presidential decision specific regulatory changes have not been drafted. The only recommendation that would require a change to the AECA would be raising the Sec. 36 thresholds for Congressional notification. Once the President makes a decision, the Administration will consult with the SFRC and the HIRC.


Questions for Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NSPD-19 and Regulatory Issues

Question #3:

What are the specific problems created by the current regulatory environment under the ITAR for allied interoperability, controls on U.S. defense articles, services and technical data once they are exported, and the 21st century defense industrial global marketplace?

Answer:

The ITAR has served its primary objective, which is to ensure that exports of U.S defense articles and services support U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, and to keep such articles and services out of the hands of potential adversaries. The licensing process can be cumbersome; many improvements have now been made. But we need to pay attention to how we manage 60,000 license applications valued at nearly $100 billion in proposed exports each year. Overregulation can harm our ability to control sensitive goods and support legitimate coalition and alliance efforts.

Coalition operations in the Global War on Terrorism have reinforced the importance of ensuring that our friends and allies have timely access to U.S. defense technology in order to fight effectively alongside our forces against our common enemies. In addition, rapid advances in defense technologies and changes in the U.S. and foreign defense industries require us to look for ways to make our laws, regulations, and procedures as timely and effective as possible in advancing our objectives.

That is why the President tasked the Executive Branch agencies in NSPD-19 to review how we control defense exports.


Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NSPD-19 and Regulatory Issues

Question # 4:

Will you continue to respect the long-standing practice of pre-notification of commercial arms sales to Congress under section 36 (c) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2276(c))?

Answer:

The Executive Branch has a strong interest in ensuring U.S. arms transfers enjoy the benefit of congressional oversight. We will continue to comply with the Congressional notification requirements of Sec. 36 of the AECA.

If confirmed, I intend to work with the Congress to ensure that the oversight process promotes effective consultation so that we may better understand the Members’ perspectives in our management of this important defense export function.


Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

NSPD-19 and Regulatory Issues

Question # 5:

There were multiple changes to the United States Munitions List (the USML, 22 CFR Part 121) in both 2003 and 2004. Do you envision any additional changes in 2005, either as a part of the NSPD-19 process or other Administration reviews of the USML? If so, which USML categories might be amended?

Answer:

Considerable effort has gone into reviewing the USML since 2001. Of the 21 categories in the Munitions List, 10 have been revised and published in the Federal Register. Eight additional categories are completed, near completion or being reviewed by State, Commerce, and DOD. So I expect there will be additional changes in the near future. Most of the changes to date have been clarifications of existing coverage to ensure exporters have a clear understanding of what is subject to ITAR control. Four energetic (e.g., explosive) materials and three chemical agents have been removed from the USML (and put under Commerce control) after careful review established that they have a predominant civil application.

As required by law, removals from the USML will be notified to the Congress.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan—Arms Sales and Policy Linkages

In November 2004, the State Department notified Congress of three Foreign Military Sales (FMS) sales to Pakistan under 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, “the Act”, (22 USC 2776(b)). The three sales had not received, by long-standing and well-established practice, the pre-clearance of the majority and minority sides of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These sales to Pakistan were notified without resolution of many issues and questions surrounding arms sales to Pakistan during pre-consultations on these cases.

Question #1:

1.If you are confirmed to the position of Secretary, your Department will coordinate FMS with the Defense Department. Will you respect the long-standing practice of pre-notification of FMS to this Committee?

Answer:

We will continue to comply with the Congressional notification requirements contained in the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act.

The Executive Branch has a strong interest in ensuring that U.S. arms transfers enjoy Congressional support. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I intend to work with Congress to ensure that these objectives are met.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan-Arms Sales and Policy Linkages

Question #2:

What is the Administration's overall policy with respect to arms sales, government or commercial, to South Asia?

Answer:

The U.S. Government’s overall policy for the conduct of arms sales, government or commercial, is governed by the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. These legislative parameters are codified by the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy with the Department of State having been given statutory oversight for arms transfers and military export programs. Conventional arms sales are a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy, designed and implemented to serve U.S. foreign policy and national security requirements. To this end, defense trade with the countries of South Asia is consistent with existing conventional arms transfer policy.

With the lifting of sanctions against India and Pakistan in 2002, the Department has applied the CAT policy with rigor and deliberation to all countries of South Asia. Arms sales, particularly commercial licenses, have increased significantly over the past three years. The Department applies the rigor required of the CAT policy to all arms sales in order to ensure U.S. national security interests are being served and that regional stability factors are duly weighed. Utilization of Foreign Military Sales (government-to-government arms sales) has not yet reached its potential. Increased Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Pakistan, and continuity of message to the Government of India will help achieve greater reliance on government-to-government arms sales in the coming years.

We are mindful of the importance of not fueling a potentially destabilizing arms race between India and Pakistan. That said, both countries have legitimate defense needs. U.S. defense sales are a means of helping them address those needs in a way that is consistent with our foreign policy objectives.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan-Arms Sales and Policy Linkages

Question # 3:

I have read many reports with respect to the potential sale to Pakistan of FMS under F-16’s. Should the sale, particularly if it is financed by the U.S. taxpayer, be conditioned on greater access by U.S. officials to A.Q. Khan and increased efforts by the Pakistan Government to counter all forms of terrorism emanating from its territory, especially given the potential regional repercussions of such a sale?

Answer:

Pakistan sent the U.S. government a Letter of Request for 18 Block 50 F-16 aircraft in July 2004. Although the Pakistanis have repeatedly asked us for an answer, we have yet to respond. The Administration has not made a final decision on Pakistan’s request.

Since July, Pakistan has made substantial progress in the war on terror, has acted decisively to shut down A.Q. Khan’s proliferation activities, and has pursued peace with India. The GoP has raised the issue of F-16s with us on a number of occasions. It is a conversation we will continue to have. If confirmed, I will of course be available to address questions of this kind with the committee, perhaps in a closed session.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan-Arms Sales and Policy Linkages

Question # 4:

4.Public press reports indicate that Pakistan and Iran have completed a formal defense cooperation agreement. Does such cooperation increase any concerns you may have with respect to Pakistan's ability to keep sensitive U.S. arms and technology out of the hands of state sponsors of terror, namely Iran?

Answer:

Pakistan and Iran share a common border and maintain correct relations. The Administration is aware of discussions and agreements between Pakistan and Iran on defense-related matters.

In August 2004, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that Iran’s DefMin Ali Shamkhani and GoP acting DefMin Haid Nawaz Khan signed an MOU expanding defense ties and setting up a joint commission for defense cooperation. It remains unclear whether the August visit and subsequent MOU will lead to a significant increase in Pakistani-Iranian defense trade.

We have expressed our concerns about this issue to the Government of Pakistan on multiple occasions. On August 19, 2004, the South Asia Bureau stressed to officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense the comprehensiveness of USG law and policy on diversions of U.S.-licensed equipment and technology to third parties and access by third parties to the equipment and technology. The Assistant Secretary of the Political-Military Bureau reinforced these points with MFA officials in Islamabad at the end of August.

In our discussions, we have made clear the potential implications for U.S.-Pakistan relations of defense-related cooperation between Pakistan and Iran. Subsequently, those discussions were relayed to your staffs. It is also worth noting that Iran has also pursued closer defense ties with India simultaneously, even engaging in joint naval maneuvers. Iran is looking for allies to break out of its strategic isolation and Pakistan is one of several countries with which Iran is engaged. We will continue to monitor this issue. If confirmed, I will of course be available to address questions of this kind with the committee, perhaps in a closed session.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan-Arms Sales and Policy Linkages

Question # 5:

Do you know of any past cases of transfers from Pakistan to other countries of U.S. defense items which could result in sanctions for illegal transfers of lethal military equipment (LME)?

Answer:

Any discussion on this topic will have to be classified. If confirmed, I will of course be available to address questions of this kind with the committee, perhaps in a closed session.


Questions for Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

RD-180: Goals and Policy

Commercial space launch vehicle cooperation with Russian entities has been seen as a means of preventing the diversion of ballistic missile technical knowledge and equipment to rogue states such as Iran or North Korea and achieving a domestic production capability for advanced and unique Russian systems.

Until 2004, the State Department had continued licensed cooperation with NPO-Energomash for co-production of the RD-180 engine under a contract with United Technologies Corporation. Pratt and Whitney and Lockheed Martin on a limited basis. In 2004, the Department submitted four licenses to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, three of which, (DTC 018-04, 019-04 and 020-04) were authorizations that extended the validity of these licenses beyond the annual duration under which they had been previously notified. A subsequent authorization DTC 086-04, was received by the Committee in the later part of 2004. All of these licenses were approved on the understanding that the goal of these arrangements was to achieve a U.S. production capability for the RD-180 and prevent proliferation of this technology. Yet, Russian ballistic missile proliferation appears to have continued, as the Central Intelligence Agency’s most recent Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, notes.

Question # 1:

What is your understanding of U.S. goals and policy with respect to licenses for the RD-180, both with regard to a timeframe for domestic U.S. production and whether this licensing arrangement has, in fact, served U.S. non-proliferation concerns in Russia?


Answer:

Industry-to-industry contact can be an effective nonproliferation tool. We have repeatedly made the point to Russia that it is important that the Russian aerospace industry not assist missile programs in problem countries if it wants to enjoy the benefits of space cooperation with the United States. Export arrangements for the RD-180 program have been scrutinized at the highest levels of the Department to ensure that the progress of the program has been in line with our nonproliferation objectives.

According to United Technologies, the current contract phase will allow for the building of critical engine components and establishment of a capability to produce such systems in the United States. It is currently estimated that a co-production facility in the United States will be completed in 2007.


Questions for Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

RD-180: Goals and Policy

Question #2:

How do you assess Russia's ballistic missile proliferation, both with regard to steps the Russian Government has undertaken to prevent such proliferation and its failures to prevent it (as can be inferred from the latest CIA report to Congress)?

Answer:

We continue to have concerns about the Iranian missile program and its efforts to acquire missile technology from Russian sources.

We use every opportunity to make our concerns known to the Russian Government, to urge Russia to cut-off the flow of sensitive items to Iran, and continue to use the leverage afforded by U.S. space launch cooperation to seek better Russian controls.

As a result, Russia has taken some steps to address the problem of Russian supply to Iran's missile program, including implementation of strengthened export control laws and enforcement.

But we remain concerned that Russia has not done enough to thwart Iranian missile-related procurement. Russia’s enforcement efforts remain inadequate, and the Iranian missile program continues to have access to missile-related technologies from Russian entities.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleeza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Museum Project

Question #1:

The Department has set aside a space and promised to provide staff and security if private funds are raised for exhibits for the planned national museum of American diplomacy. What is the status of this project? Will it be completed during your tenure?

Answer:

The Department shares with the Congress, the White House and other Federal institutions a commitment to make the work of our government more accessible to the American people. As with the Capitol Visitor Center, the Department’s Visitor Center and Museum of American Diplomacy will provide an engaging place where citizens can come to learn how diplomacy was crucial in shaping our nation and how the work of the Department affects the lives of all Americans every day. Only an informed public will lend us their full support.

Working closely with our non-profit partner, the Foreign Affairs Museum Council, the Department has laid the groundwork for this project by creating a design concept that will draw visitors to the Department; finalizing a fundraising strategy that will ensure adequate private sector support; and creating an office, the United States Diplomacy Center, to oversee and manage the project. The Foreign Affairs Museum Council will assist in raising $25 million in private funds for design and fabrication of the exhibitions and has already raised over $1.2 million to support the design effort. If Department funding is provided and fundraising is successful, the project could be completed during my tenure, if confirmed by the Senate.

This project began as a Department exhibit, expanding to its future 18,000-square-foot location within the Harry S Truman Building as its potential as a public resource was realized. The three immediate preceding Secretaries of State have supported the project and all living former Secretaries of State are Honorary Directors of the Foreign Affairs Museum Council. The Chairman of the Board of Directors is Senator Charles McC. Mathias and Ambassador Stephen Low serves as President. Senator Sarbanes is also on the Board of Directors.

The Visitor Center and Museum of American Diplomacy will operate in conjunction with an adjacent, publicly accessible conference center and auditorium at the Department’s 21st Street entrance. Together, the two will provide programs and events that enhance the Department’s public outreach efforts.

The United States Diplomacy Center is working closely with the Bureaus of Administration and Diplomatic Security to address safety and security concerns. Visitors to the centers will pass through an exterior security pavilion with x-ray and magnetometer screening devices. Both centers will be outside the security hard line.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Global Environment Facility

Question #1:

Since 1994, the United States has been part of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The GEF has committed $4.2 billion in grants, and leveraged $11 billion in additional financing for

14

more than 1,000 sustainable development projects in 160 countries. The U.S. is behind in its dues by $139.8 million. Our dues for FY05 are $177 million.

Is the Administration committed to supporting the GEF, correcting our arrears, and paying our dues this year on time?

Answer:

The United States remains committed to supporting the GEF. The U.S. is the largest contributor to this important fund, whose projects have resulted in significant environmental and development benefits in over 160 countries.

The United States pledged $107.5 million per year for each of the four years of the 2003-2006 GEF replenishment period, in exchange for the GEF adopting specific reforms, including the adoption of a performance allocation system, by the end of the replenishment period. We volunteered to seek an additional $70 million if the reforms were in place by November 2004, which unfortunately did not occur. In addition, we committed to seek additional contributions to pay off earlier U.S. arrears during this same period.

We intend to continue meetingwill continue to work with the Congress to ensure that the GEF successfully meets its objectives under the 3rd replenishment agreement, particularly those concerning performance and transparency. Although the Administration sought a total of $153 million in arrears in fiscal years 2003 to 2005, Congress only provided $65 million over these three years. So it is clear that our core replenishment pledge, but expect it will take longer to pay off arrears than had beenoriginally anticipated.

Over the past three years, the United States has actively pressed for significant improvements in the GEF’s operations. As part of the 2003-2006 replenishment deal, the GEF agreed to establish a transparent performance-based allocation system to ensure effective use of assistance funds.

While some very real improvements have been made in the GEF as a result of U.S. initiatives, we are concerned that this performance-based allocation program has not yet been put in place. The progress made in implementing this program could be a factor in decisions on future U.S. contributions.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

India-Pakistan Dialogue

Question #1:

The U.S. has played an important role over the last two years in getting India and Pakistan back to the negotiating table. How can the U.S. most effectively use the strong ties we have developed with both sides to encourage further progress on the India-Pakistan dialogue?

Answer:

We welcome the positive developments in relations between India and Pakistan. The agreement last January to resume a wide ranging dialogue, with the objective of reaching a peaceful settlement on all bilateral issues including Kashmir, was a real breakthrough. The efforts that have been made by both governments since then to move the Composite Dialogue forward are encouraging.

The conflict between India and Pakistan has deep roots. Ultimately, it will be up to both countries to resolve their differences. They must make the determination to accept the dictates of geography and recognize that there is no alternative to getting along with their neighbor. The decision to enter into a dialogue and their success in sustaining it throughout 2004 is testament to the fact that a desire for peace is growing in both nations. Our aim is to develop strong, separate relationships with India and Pakistan. I think we are succeeding, and we were able to put those good relationships to use during our efforts to reduce tensions in the region when they have flared during the last few years.

U.S. efforts to encourage the Indo-Pak peace process – some public, some private – are centered on nudging both countries to sustain dialogue and positive engagement. While we strongly support the dialogue process, we do not see ourselves as mediators or taking a direct role. We stand ready to provide any assistance requested by both sides.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan: Cutting Off Support for Kashmiri Militancy

Question # 2:

U.S. officials in the past have said that we cannot push the Musharraf government too hard on the issue of cutting support to Kashmiri militants because of the myriad other issues on our agenda with Pakistan and out of concern that we might contribute to destabilizing his regime by asking him take on too many vested interest at once. However, many of the Pakistan-based militants training to fight in Kashmir have links to international terrorists, including those that target U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. How do we plan to work with the Musharraf government to ensure all official support (financing, training, and other) to Pakistan-based militancy is halted?

Answer:

The U.S. Government is concerned about the activities of Kashmiri militant groups. We have repeatedly made clear to the Pakistani Government that it must continue its efforts to close all Kashmiri militant training camps and halt all militant infiltration across Kashmir’s Line of Control (LOC). The Pakistani Government has formally banned several major extremist organizations, including Kashmiri militant groups, and has prohibited donations to these groups. We look forward to working with Pakistan and the international community at large to intensify the effort to cut off money flows to these groups.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan: Support for President Musharraf

Question #3:

The U.S. has taken a fairly neutral position on the issue of Musharraf maintaining his dual role as President and Chief of Army Staff, leading many U.S. observers, as well as Pakistanis, to criticize U.S. policy as being too “Musharraf-centric.” How do you react to this criticism? How can we continue to encourage real progress on democracy in Pakistan over the next few years?

Answer:

The U.S. Government is committed to a long-term relationship with Pakistan that goes beyond individuals.

Pakistan’s transition to a sustainable democracy with strong democratic institutions is among our top policy goals in Pakistan. We regularly impress upon our interlocutors in the Pakistani Government the need to continue to make progress on democratization, including holding free and fair multi-party elections in 2007, as scheduled.

The U.S. Government is assisting Pakistan’s own democratization efforts through USG-funded programs aimed at making Pakistani democracy more participatory, representative, and accountable. This includes strengthening national and provincial legislatures, political parties, NGO’s, and independent media.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

North Korea

Question #1:

North Korea continues to insist on a "security guarantee" from the United States. Under what conditions is such a guarantee possible, and how would it be structured?

Answer:

The proposal that we tabled at the last round of Six-Party Talks, in June 2004, included the provision of a multilateral security assurance if the North were to commit to dismantle its nuclear programs in a permanent, transparent and thorough manner, subject to effective verification, and begin taking the steps we outlined in our proposal to commence the dismantlement process.

As we told the North in our proposal, upon acceptance of the DPRK’s initial declaration of its nuclear programs, and while it verifiably undertakes the initial dismantlement steps outlined in our proposal, the parties would provide provisional multilateral security assurances, which would become more enduring as the process proceeded. These would include assurances that no party had any intention to invade or attack another, as well as a commitment on the part of all parties to respect the territorial integrity of others.

We have made clear to North Korea and all of the members of the Six-Party process that the U.S. will not provide a bilateral security assurance to the North. As North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a multilateral concern, the U.S. will participate in only a multilateral security assurance. President Bush has, however, made clear that the United States has no intention of invading or attacking North Korea.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

U.S. -China Relations

Question #1:

Several East Asian leaders have expressed frustration to Committee Members over what they view as mixed messages from the Executive branch on the cross-Strait issue involving China and Taiwan. Could you explain our nation's "One-China" policy? Is it your understanding President Bush intends to continue this approach? Under what circumstances would the U.S. come to the assistance of Taiwan in case of attack?

Answer:

President Bush remains committed to our One-China Policy based on the three Joint Communiqués and on the Taiwan Relations Act.

Our establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. We oppose unilateral moves by either side to change the status quo.

To this end, we make available to Taiwan arms of a defensive character, and we maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

We consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, to be a threat to the peace and of grave concern to the United States.

The President will promptly inform the Congress of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan. The President and the Congress would then decide on appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.


Question from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

U.S. – China Relations

Question #2:

During your visit to Beijing in July 2004, what areas of agreement and disagreement did you find concerning U.S. and PRC information on North Korean nuclear weapon programs? Has China shared any information on Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan’s nuclear sales? How might China be more helpful in using its “considerable influence with North Korea?”

Answer:

We have briefed our Six-Party partners on our assessment of North Korea's nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment program. The evidence we have supports that assessment.

We continue to have close consultations with all of our Six-Party partners, including China, on the nuclear issue. Our allies and other partners in the Six-Party talks share our concerns about North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons.

·As coordinator and host of the Six-Party talks, China has been active in all aspects of the Talks, including working groups and formal plenary discussions, as well as during the intervals between plenary sessions. We have encouraged China to be an active participant, and not just a mediator in the Six-Party talks.

We also told China that they must work harder at convincing North Korea's Kim Chong-il that North Korea must return to the Six-Party talks and must commit to the dismantlement of their entire nuclear program, to include their uranium enrichment program -- which North Korea continues to deny having

·There is a concerted, worldwide investigation into the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. China supports the international community’s efforts to shut down the network.


Question from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

U.S. – China Relations

Question #3:

China is rapidly accelerating its diplomatic and business ties to Southeast Asia. Whether to locate necessary resources to meet growing energy demands or to increase cooperation in agricultural trade and economic development, China is aggressively reaching out to ASEAN. Recently agreement was reached to pursue the China - ASEAN Free Trade Zone. How will such economic ties impact U.S. security and trade interests in the region?

Answer:

China’s outreach to ASEAN has indeed accelerated in recent years. The outreach takes the primary form of economic engagement, a fact that has political and strategic implications for the United States. Nevertheless, the United States continues to be a major player in the economy of the Asia-Pacific region, and U.S. ties with ASEAN are strong and growing stronger.

China’s recent outreach has included the November 2004 "early tariff reduction agreement" between China and ASEAN countries, which will begin reducing duties in mid-2005, prior to the projected 2010 conclusion of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.

Countries in Asia increasingly view Beijing as a positive economic force in the region. For example, Beijing pledged more than $20 million to support work in agriculture, information technology, education and Mekong River Basin Development under the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Because final processing of goods has generally migrated to China in recent years, ASEAN enjoys a significant trade surplus with China.

Nonetheless, the strength of the U.S. economy means we will remain a top trading partner for most Asian nations. China’s free trade agreements with other Asian economies are unlikely to dramatically reduce that dominance. The United States has over $120 billion in trade annually with ASEAN countries. Over time, development in China and other Asian countries might enable them to compete more aggressively with us in high-tech and service sectors. We will work hard to ensure that competition with China and other rising economies takes place within the context of a rules-based system. We are working to strengthen U.S.-ASEAN relations through the President's Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, which focuses on improving trade ties, and the ASEAN Cooperation Plan, which supports cooperative programs, including in the economic area.

More broadly, we will continue strong economic engagement in Asia, working with our long-term partners, South Korea and Japan, and strengthening regional fora such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Broader Latin America

Question #1:

How would you define success with Latin America at the end of your tenure?

Answer:

Thirty-three of our thirty-four neighbors in the Western Hemisphere enjoy the benefits of democratic government. Most share a commitment to free market principles.

One of the key goals of the Bush Administration is consolidation of democratic rule in our hemisphere. Hopefully, that will include a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba in the near future.

The Administration’s strategy for the Western Hemisphere is built on secure borders and commitments to democracy, free markets and economic integration. True success will be the extension of economic opportunity to all citizens of the Western Hemisphere, working to liberate millions more from the tyranny of poverty, inadequate education and crime.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Broader Latin America

Question #2:

How can we best reverse negative public opinion in the region toward the United States? Do we need a change in our policies toward the region or is it a problem of communication?

Answer:

Press reports to the contrary, mid-2004 polls show the U.S. is well respected in most countries in the region. Majorities in 12 of 17 countries polled hold a good image of the United States. Majorities of two-thirds or more in 13 countries see good ties between their country and the United States. Citizens of Central America, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru hold the most positive opinions of the U.S. Six in ten Mexicans have a positive image of the U.S., and two-thirds assess bilateral relations as good.

We will build on these good relations by expanding our outreach efforts, including educational, press, and economic exchanges, throughout the hemisphere. We will continue to counter negative claims by the Cuban and Venezuelan governments and highlight the USG's sustained efforts to improve the lives of millions in the hemisphere.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Broader Latin America

Question #3:

Could you list in order of importance challenges facing U.S. interests in the region?

Answer:

Our challenges in the Western Hemisphere include:

· Securing our borders by developing capacity for governments to exercise effective sovereignty and provide basic security over their territories.

· Strengthening democratic institutions by promoting representative, constitutional government as the only legitimate form of political organization in our hemisphere.

· Ensuring economic opportunity by bringing economic benefits to all, not just the rich or powerful.

· Investing in people by fomenting policies and programs to allow all citizens a “share” of prosperity and quality of life.

President Bush’s strategy and vision for the hemisphere provides the roadmap for responding to these challenges and achieving full implementation of the economic and social reforms needed to deliver the benefits of democracy to all citizens of this hemisphere.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

North American Border Security

Question #1:

What progress has been made in implementing "Smart Border Declaration" agreements with Canada and with Mexico? What other policies are being implemented to improve hemispheric border security? What will you do during your tenure to gain improved cooperation with Mexico and Canada on border security?

Answer:

The Smart Border Partnership Action Plans continue to be the framework for United States border security cooperation with Canada and Mexico.

The United States is pleased with Mexican and Canadian cooperation under these Plans. Through Congressional authorization, we have provided assistance to Mexico to strengthen border controls, such as:

· 13 state-of-the-art inspection (VACIS) systems in Mexican customs facilities, and mobile X-Ray inspection units in some Mexican cities.

· Expansion of a secure electronic network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection lanes.

· Training for over 350 Mexican officials on border safety issues.

If I am confirmed, I will continue our collaborative efforts under existing plans while seeking opportunities for new initiatives to further border security in hemisphere.

Unilateral United States programs, such as US-VISIT and passport requirements for American citizens, further improve hemispheric security.

Beyond our collaboration with Mexico and Canada on contiguous border security, we work in multilateral fora, including the Organization of American States Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), and with regional partners. Examples of such cooperation include:

· President Bush’s Third Border Initiative to focus attention, including security upgrades, on our border with the nations of the Caribbean Basin.

· In Central America, the United States supports a variety of anti-smuggling initiatives, including the Container Freight Tracking System.

· Our on-going “3+1” Counterterrorism Dialogue with Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina has made significant steps to enhance border security and build counterterrorism finance capacity in that region.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

North American Border Security

Question #2:

Though the “Smart Border” declarations with Mexico and Canada further enhance the security of the borders and the flow of commerce, these agreements are largely dependent on current government-to-government relations. There is no legal framework within which to implement these agreements. Under your leadership, what will the Department do to create an institutional framework to deal with hemispheric border security? Given that Guatemala is the southern border to the NAFTA space, should Guatemala be included?

Answer:

Agreements, letters of intent, statements of mutual understanding, and other arrangements that have been developed in the past several years shape our security cooperation with Mexico and Canada.

With Canada, the Smart Border Accord is the framework. The Canadian Preclearance Act provides authority for U.S. border inspectors working in Canada. In Mexico, the 22-Point Border Partnership Action Plan, signed in 2002, provides a framework. Letters of agreement with Mexico have been negotiated for the use of Congressionally-authorized funds to improve border security.

The U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission, which has met annually for 23 years, includes cabinet-level bi-national discussion of border security and cooperation.

The U.S.-Canada Cross-Border Crime Forum provides similar opportunity for senior officials of our countries to review security efforts.

The United States has a multifaceted law enforcement program with Guatemala, including enhancement of border ports of entry. The work is part of a larger Central American regional program to improve border controls. The Government of Mexico actively cooperates with the Government of Guatemala to combat smuggling and other threats along the Mexico/Guatemala border.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Venezuela

Question #1:

Has the Administration drawn up contingency plans in the event of another suspension of oil exports from Venezuela? Should arrangements be made with other regional oil producers to replace a Venezuelan shortfall? What other contingency plans should be made?

Answer:

·The United States and Venezuela have traditionally enjoyed a strong, mutually beneficial energy relationship. Venezuela is among the largest suppliers of petroleum to the United States. The United States is the single largest destination for Venezuelan oil.

·We strongly believe this energy relationship remains in the national interests of both countries.

As outlined in our National Energy Policy, we are constantly working to enhance our energy security through promoting increasing diversity of global energy suppliers. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is part of our contingency planning process, and we have an on-going dialogue with oil producing countries around the world.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Venezuela

Question #2:

How can the United States press for Venezuelan adherence to democratic standards without appearing to interfere in Venezuelan affairs?

Answer:

Pressing for adherence to democratic standards is not interference in the internal affairs of another country. It is the right thing to do. As a signatory to the Inter-American Democratic Charter and other instruments, Venezuela must honor its commitments to uphold democracy, human rights and the rule of law. We are increasingly concerned about the continued deterioration of democratic institutions – unchecked concentration of power in the executive, politicization of the judiciary and increased threats to basic democratic and civil rights.

We are working with our hemispheric and international partners and the Organization of American States to help strengthen democracy in Venezuela. We continue to press the Venezuelan government to honor its constitutional and international commitments to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Additionally, we continue to engage civil society and democratic nations that share our values and concerns.

In August 2002, the United States Agency for International Development established the “Venezuela Confidence Building Initiative” to strengthen the country’s fragile democratic institutions by working with independent organizations to facilitate and enhance dialogue and support constitutional processes. We will continue to look for ways to enhance our support to democratic institutions in Venezuela and elsewhere. Support for democracy is a cornerstone of President Bush’s foreign policy.


Questions from Senator Richard G. Lugar

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Venezuela

Question #3:

Currently the level of our direct engagement with the Venezuelan government is through our ambassador in Caracas. Do you intend to elevate this level of contact?

Answer:

Our two countries traditionally have enjoyed close, friendly relations based on shared democratic values. We lament this historic relationship has deteriorated due to the actions and rhetoric of the Government of Venezuela (GOV).

Our relations are conducted in Caracas through our Ambassador and in Washington between the Department of State and the Venezuelan ambassador to the United States. In June, we accepted a GOV proposal for a bilateral working group. Although the GOV informed us of the intention to send two special representatives to Washington to explore the idea, the Venezuelan government never followed through.

Our Ambassador has been in Caracas for nearly five months and has only been granted a handful of meetings with Venezuelan officials in Caracas. Regrettably, the actions of the Government of Venezuela do not appear to indicate a desire to improve bilateral relations.

Question from Senator George Voinovich

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Question #3:

OSCE Budget for Anti-Semitism: In addition to action at home, I believe that the United States has made important strides in efforts to combat growing anti-Semitism under the leadership of the President and Secretary of State Colin Powell. Much of this work has been done through our interaction with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). While the OSCE has made impressive commitments, it is essential that the OSCE dedicate necessary resources to effectively and thoroughly carry out the job that it has been asked to do. What action is the U.S. government taking to ensure that the OSCE has the necessary resources -- both in terms of funding and human capital -- to follow through on commitments to combat anti-Semitism? How does the existing OSCE budget crisis, due to Russia's objections, impact the OSCE's funding for the fight against anti-Semitism?

Answer:

We share your views on the OSCE’s landmark efforts to combat anti-Semitism. Last year, the U.S. led efforts to appoint the OSCE’s first special representative on anti-Semitism and to convene the OSCE’s first anti-Semitism conference in Berlin. That conference, attended by over 100 U.S. non-governmental organizations, 4 Members of Congress and Secretary Powell, raised the profile of the grave problem presented by anti-Semitism.

The task before us is to work to implement the practical measures agreed at Berlin to combat anti-Semitism, specifically to get the new OSCE Program on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination fully functioning. The U.S. took the lead last year by donating $221,000 to the OSCE to get the new Program on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination off the ground. With those funds, the OSCE hired personnel, began surveys of nations’ hate crimes laws and Holocaust education programs, and started a database of best practices for preventing and combating anti-Semitic violence and other hate-crimes.

More voluntary contributions will be needed to fund the work of the special representative on Anti-Semitism appointed in December 2004. The OSCE’s Tolerance and Non-Discrimination program also has an ambitious agenda, including the development of a model curriculum for training law enforcement officials to deal with hate crimes. The U.S. plans to contribute funds to these efforts and to urge other countries to join in doing so.

The OSCE’s failure to approve a budget for 2005 is a serious problem, which the U.S. is working with Europe and Russia to try to resolve. Until a solution can be found, the OSCE Secretary General has committed to fund the OSCE, including its work on anti-Semitism, at the full 2004 level. The Program on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination, which was new in 2004 and therefore not part of the budget, will be funded by voluntary contributions from the U.S. and other like-minded OSCE states until a new budget is passed which will include regular funding for it.

P:\01-21-05 QFR from Senator George Voinovich.doc

Drafted: EUR/RPM: Heather Troutman x6-7291

Doc: S Confirmation Hearing/Questions for the Record/SFRC

Voinovich #3

Cleared: EUR/FO:RBradtke - ok

EUR/RPM:Drussell –ok

EUR/RPM:Gholtz -ok

EUR/OHI:SCupic - ok

DRL:WSilverman - info

D:EYoung - ok

P:SBanks - ok

S/P:Kdonfried - ok

H:JBoris - ok

Questions from Senator George Voinovich

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Kosovo

Question #5:

As we have discussed, I remain deeply concerned with the situation in Kosovo, particularly following the violence that erupted last March. There are major challenges that remain in order to fully enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and there is still much work to be done to rebuild the homes and churches destroyed in March and to ensure that those persons displaced from their homes and communities are able to return. My concerns were also compounded following the selection of Ramush Haradinaj – believed to be under investigation by The Hague – to serve as Prime Minister of Kosovo. Given the state of affairs at present, I believe it is premature to discuss final status for Kosovo.

What is your vision for the future of U.S. engagement in Kosovo? Will the Administration continue to support a U.S. military presence within NATO in Kosovo until such time that no such peacekeeping force is needed? Is there any consideration being given to turning over security to the European Union, as is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

What are your plans and priorities for the Standards Review process by mid-year? Do our European allies and Russian within the contact Group share our priorities? Will the review process be conducted at the United Nations?

What progress has been made on the removal of national caveats for NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo?

Answer:

We remain committed to a secure, stable and multiethnic Kosovo that is fully integrated into Europe. Resolving the issue of Kosovo's status will be a major step in achieving the President's vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 has governed the administration of Kosovo since the end of NATO air campaign against the Milosevic regime in 1999. UNSCR 1244 established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to provide the civil administration for Kosovo and a NATO-led protection force (KFOR) to provide for security. The United States supports and in recent months has worked to strengthen UNMIK’s and KFOR’s ability to carry out their mandates.

The administration remains committed to the President's “in together, out together” pledge, but we seek to “hasten the day” when Kosovo will be stable enough to stand without a NATO security presence. While it is possible that either or both the UN and NATO missions could change as part of discussions on Kosovo's status, it is premature to speculate on what direction those discussions might take.

Since the violence in Kosovo last March, a significant number of national caveats affecting KFOR’s ability to respond to and contain civil unrest have been removed. At their December meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to maintain a "robust KFOR" and to consider changes to its composition only as a result of an improved security situation on the ground.

The key to Kosovo’s future lies in implementing the eight internationally endorsed standards, which cover areas ranging from security and rule of law to the economy. Progress toward their achievement will benefit the people of Kosovo no matter what Kosovo’s future status.

Along with our partners in the Contact Group, the United States looks forward to a mid-2005 comprehensive review of Kosovo’s progress in implementing the standards – a policy endorsed by the UN Security Council in December 2003. A positive review – the precise modalities of the review have yet to be worked out – will lead to the start of a process to address Kosovo’s future status. The United States will be an active player in the review and in any status process that follows. As we move toward the mid-2005 review, we are also actively engaging Belgrade to ensure that Serbia’s legitimate interests in the process, including in the status of Kosovo’s ethnic Serb community, are taken into full account. While the outcome of the review and the status process remains open, we are certain that Kosovo's future, and that of its neighbors, is as a part of Europe. As we move ahead on Kosovo, we look forward to working closely with our Allies and friends in the European Union, who we expect to take a leading role in this process.

The head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, Soren Jessen-Petersen, recently identified a number of key indicators that Kosovo should focus on in the lead up to the mid-2005 review. These are standards primarily designed to ensure the protection and rights of Kosovo's minority communities, notably the Serbs. At the same time, we are encouraging work to decentralize the administration of Kosovo, which would give Serb and other minority communities a greater voice in education, health care and possibly even police and justice issues, in municipalities where they have a large presence.


Drafted EUR/SCE: Michael Bosshart, x6-7729

Cleared: EUR: DKStephens

EUR/SCE:Cenglish ok

EUR/ERA:Kvolker ok

EUR/RPM:PPlunkett ok

IO/UNP:JStruble ok

IO/PHO:Lmalenas ok

D:EYoung ok

P:Sbanks ok

H:Jboris ok

Question from Senator George Voinovich

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Question 4:

Transitional Crime and Corruption

In our foreign policy, it is crucial that the United Sates work to combat transnational crime and corruption, which serve to undermine efforts to promote democratic reform and the rule of law in many countries abroad. This effort involves many different federal agencies—the State Department, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, among others. How is the United States government organized to combat transnational crime? Which agency of our federal government takes the lead role? In other words, who is our “orchestra leader” in this effort?

Answer:

The National Security Council is the ultimate “orchestra leader” when it comes to coordinating the efforts of the many U.S. government agencies that are involved in combating transnational crime that has both foreign and domestic dimensions. This role is underscored by the recent creation of the NSC-chaired Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Organized Crime, which will examine the transnational crime threat, develop appropriate policies, and monitor implementation. This PCC will complement and augment the work of other PCCs, such as those addressing terrorism and narcotics, which include important international law enforcement aspects. The State Department includes combating transnational organized crime among its strategic goals and has the important responsibility of leading foreign policy efforts and coordinating training and technical assistance to combat this threat. In the State Department, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has the lead on international crime and law enforcement issues. INL, along with State regional bureaus and functional bureaus in related areas, works with the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, and their various law enforcement organizations to ensure that their foreign law enforcement operations conform to U.S. policy and are appropriately coordinated within the U.S. government and with the host nation. Embassy country teams in the most relevant countries have law enforcement working groups, typically chaired by the ambassador or his or her deputy, to ensure on the ground, in-country operational, policy, and assistance coordination where implementation is most critical.


Drafted by: INL/C:Speterson, x64380, 1/24/05

Approved by: INL:Sschrage (ok)

Cleared by: INL/PC:Jwhite (ok)

H:Kgatz (ok)

P:Bhunt (ok)

D:Acatanzano (ok)

S/P:Winboden (ok)

G:Jmiotke (ok)

NSC:Mbrooks (ok)

Document: PetersonS/Word/QFR-Rice confirmation hearing

Question from Senator George Voinovich

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Management

Question:

During the past four years, the State Department has made progress in implementing the President’s Management Agenda. What steps will you take to ensure that the Department continually improves its performance to meet the President’s goal of ensuring that the resources entrusted to the federal government are well managed and wisely used? Under your leadership, who will be primarily responsible for managing the Department of State on a day-to-day basis? To your knowledge, has there been a comprehensive review of the operations of the department, including its performance planning, human capital, information technology, financial management and physical infrastructure? What are the department’s requirements in these areas in terms of additional resources and flexibilities, either administrative or legislative? What can this committee do to assist you in this regard?

Answer:

I am pleased that, if confirmed, I will be taking over the State Department after four years in which, with Congressional support, close attention has been paid to management issues and there is a strong record to show for it. Let me assure you that continually improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department will be a priority under my leadership. The Department has achieved measurable progress in implementing the President’s Management Agenda and is, in fact, in the top tier of the 26 PMA agencies after three and a half years of extensive review by OMB of its human capital, information technology, financial management, and budget and planning programs. State is one of only a handful of agencies having reached green for status on four of the five PMA initiatives. I do not want any backsliding on these scores and the performance they represent.

The Department has, working with OMB, successfully implemented the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), a series of questions that evaluates programs across agencies. The Bureau of Resource Management recently won the prestigious President's Quality Award for innovation and success in integrating OMB's PART into the Department's overall strategic and performance management processes and achieving some of the highest scores for PART government-wide. The award is one of only seven from a pool of 61 nominations made by the 26 PMA agencies. Moreover, in reforming its budget process, the Department consolidated strategic planning and budget operations in the new Bureau of Resource Management and closely linked budget decisions to program performance, including annual Senior Reviews of the budgets and programs of each bureau chaired by the Deputy Secretary. Assistant secretaries present their Bureau Performance Plans and define priorities, discuss upcoming challenges, and provide a justification for resource requests. My Deputy and my Under Secretary for Management will play key management leadership roles in the Department while I am Secretary.

As I said during the hearings and want to reiterate, the Department’s management will be of direct interest and importance to me as Secretary. Obtaining adequate resources will continue to be extremely important. With your support and that of the committee and other members of Congress, the Department has established a strong foundation in the areas associated with information technology, human capital, financial management, and improved infrastructure and security. In these dynamic times there will likely be areas where additional resources or authorities will be required, and I assure you that I will work with the Committee to ensure that the Department can respond both quickly and appropriately.

I am attaching the Department of State’s Results Report, which was part of the briefing materials I received as I prepared for these hearings and sets forth much of this management record up to August of last year.


QFR for Senator George Voinovich – 1. Management

Drafted by: M/P - Douglas Wertman 202-647-2554

Clearances: M/P – Jay Anania - ok

M – Richard Shinnick - ok

H – Susan Edmondson - ok

RM – Chris Burnham - ok

Questions from Senator George Voinovich

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Anti-Semitism

Question #2:

Last October, the President signed into law the Global Anti-Semitism Review Act. In addition to reporting requirements, the law requires the State Department to create a new office to monitor and combat anti-Semitism. When will this office be established? Who will lead the office?

Answer:

The early establishment of this office is a high priority for me and the Department. The Department has already commenced the process of identifying positions needed to carry out this function. Personnel decisions will be made in the very near future.


Drafted by: EUR/OHI:John P. Becker ext. 78047

Cleared: EUR/FO:GDavies

EUR/OHI:Gmattson ok

DRL/EX:Nhoward (info)

EUR/EX:Wmozur ok

H:Jboris (info)

Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Iran

Question #1a-c:

The United Kingdom, France and Germany ‑ known as the EU‑3 ‑ have been engaged in negotiations with Iran to explore the chances of getting Iran to extend indefinitely its suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and to drop its program to construct a heavy water‑moderated research reactor that could be used for plutonium production. Many believe that such an agreement cannot be achieved unless the United States becomes part of the solution, so that Iran could receive security and other benefits that only the United States can provide in return for giving up its nuclear weapons ambitions.

a) Do you believe the EU‑3 effort can succeed, and if so, what role should the United States play? What specific benefits might the United States put on the table? If you believe the EU‑3 effort is likely to fail, what alternatives do you suggest for U.S. policy?

b) The Administration has called on the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for its nuclear activities. What specific action do you believe the Security Council should take? Have you developed any plans for a phased initiation of sanctions? Can anything short of sanctions on Iran's sale of oil get Tehran's attention?

c) Russia plays a critical role as chief supplier of nuclear technology and fuel to Iran and has also been one of Iran's advocates at the IAEA. How will you convince Russia to join the U.S. and EU effort to terminate Iran's fuel cycle program?

Answer:

a) Whether or not the EU-3 initiative can succeed depends on whether or not Iran is willing to step away from its nuclear weapons ambitions. So far, we have seen no indication that Tehran is willing to do so. The United States shares with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the EU3), with the rest of the EU, and with many others on the IAEA Board of Governors and in the international community, strong concerns about Iran's long record of clandestine nuclear activities and Iran's systematic violation for almost two decades of its NPT-required IAEA Safeguards Agreement. We share with the EU3 and others the view that Iran must permanently and verifiably end all of its efforts to develop fissile material production if it hopes to build international confidence that it has abandoned the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. It is our understanding that the EU3's goal in its ongoing dialogue with Iran is to secure Iranian agreement to such full cessation of its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle pursuits.

However, we have seen no evidence suggesting Iran's leadership has made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program, and we remain skeptical of Iran's intentions to implement fully the terms of its November 14, 2004 suspension agreement with the EU3. Indeed, Iran's leaders have publicly admitted that they have no intention of ending their enrichment program, and Iran most recently followed-through on its stated intention by rushing to convert 37 tons of natural uranium yellowcake at the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. The United States government is not a party to the EU3's ongoing dialogue with Iran. We believe that additional bilateral and multilateral pressure, including reporting Iran's noncompliance to the UN Security Council, will be required to persuade Iran's leadership to end its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle pursuits. We will continue to consult with our friends and allies toward this end.

b) Once the IAEA Board of Governors reports Iran's safeguards noncompliance to the UN Security Council (UNSC), as is required under the IAEA Statute, we believe there will be a range of options available to the Council. The UNSC has the legal authority to require Iran, for example, to stop its dangerous, unnecessary pursuit of the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. We believe that the Council's initial response need not be the imposition of sanctions or other punitive measures, but rather it could be to reinforce the investigations being undertaken by the IAEA; they could also require that Iran cooperate more fully with the IAEA and comply immediately with all IAEA Board resolutions. Only if Iran chose to defy the UNSC, as it has defied the IAEA Board's resolutions in 2003 and 2004, would it be necessary for the UNSC to consider further measures within its authority. We continue to consult other Council members regarding how the UNSC might address Iran's nuclear activities, which we consider to be a growing threat to international peace and security. We believe that UNSC involvement on this issue would help change the Iranian leadership's calculations regarding the costs to Iran of continuing to pursue its nuclear weapons program.

c) The United States has for several years raised the Iran nuclear issue actively and at high levels with Russia, and we will continue to do so. We have engaged Russia both bilaterally and multilaterally, including at the IAEA Board and within the G-8. Russia has already joined us in calling on Iran to accept and implement a full moratorium on all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle efforts. We believe Russia shares our profound concerns at the prospect of a nuclear weapons-capable Iran, and Russia agrees with us that the international community must do all it can to prevent Iran from acquiring that capability.


Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Sudan

The comprehensive peace agreement between Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) is a welcome development. But the conflict in Darfur – where the Administration has determined that Khartoum has engaged in genocide – continues. Security in the region has become increasingly unstable, and humanitarian workers have been killed, prompting suspension of assistance to some areas of Darfur.

Question #1:

a. What steps do you plan to undertake to help end the genocide in Darfur and to bring the perpetrators to justice? Will you support the designation of another high level Special Envoy to Sudan? Does the Administration plan to provide significant financial aid to the government of Sudan even if the government’s genocidal policies in Darfur continue?

b. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) needs support. It has an approved troop level of 3500 African soldiers, but only 1,056 have been deployed. There are only 12 permanent staff people working on the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) at the AU headquarters. What is your evaluation of the organizational capacity at the AU headquarters to support the mission in Darfur? What actions do you plan to take and what types of assistance will you suggest the United States provide to make sure that the AU headquarters has the personnel and the resources necessary to successfully manage and support the mission in Sudan?

Answer:

We strongly support the African Union peacekeeping mission and the African Union-led Abuja process to bring peace to Darfur. The January 9 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement provides an opportunity to end the violence in Darfur. We have made clear to the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement that, as partners for peace, they must work together to end the violence and atrocities in Darfur. We have also indicated that normalization of relations and increased assistance can only take place if Sudan is at peace, with the peace accord being implemented throughout the country. We are working closely with the European Union, the African Union, and other interested countries to ensure that pressure is brought to bear to end the violence in Darfur, including through the UNSC.

At the urging of the United States, the UN Security Council asked the Secretary General to appoint a Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate whether acts of genocide have occurred in Darfur and to recommend options for accountability. The COI is expected to complete its findings and recommendations by January 25. We are awaiting its report and will act appropriately on its recommendations.

The United States, in cooperation with the international community, is committed to assisting the people of Sudan to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We do not, however, contemplate direct assistance to the current government of Sudan. Normalization of relations with the new Government of Sudan, reexamination of existing sanctions, and our assistance with reconstruction and development will occur on a step-by-step basis as the North-South agreement is implemented and as the crisis in Darfur is resolved and atrocities there are brought to a halt. The Secretary of State has appointed former Acting Assistant Secretary Charles Snyder as Senior U.S. Representative on Sudan. We will give full consideration to all options to strengthen our ability to press for implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement and to achieve peace and security for the people of Darfur.

The management capacity of the African Union in Addis Ababa and in El Fasher is limited in terms of requisite personnel and adequate training. The AU has acknowledged this and has undertaken a process to hire a large number of personnel to fill empty positions. In addition, on December 31 the African Union officially requested that Western donors provide at least 16 specialists to assist with operations and planning, logistics, procurement, engineering and legal advice for AMIS in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El Fasher. The U.S. Government will provide personnel for this effort and is working closely with the other partners to respond quickly and effectively to the African Union request for assistance. In addition, the United States has expedited the process of setting up force and sector headquarters sites throughout Darfur. This effort, undertaken by contractor PAE and proceeding apace, will place the AU in a better position to extend its operations. The United States will continue to assess and encourage the AU in its next operational steps through active involvement of its embassies in Addis and Khartoum.

As of January 10 2005, with the ongoing deployment of Nigerian personnel, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is comprised of 1264 personnel. The mission is expected to expand further with the deployment of additional military observers and civilian police and military units from Senegal, South Africa, and Kenya in the ensuing days.


Questions from Senator Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Democratic Republic of Congo

The war in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been the direct or indirect cause of death for an estimated 3.8 million people over the past six years. The fragile peace that exists is threatening to unravel.

Question #2:

What diplomatic efforts do you believe are necessary to help bring about a lasting peace in DRC? Do you plan to increase the level of humanitarian aid the Unites States is directing towards DRC? What specific actions will you take in response to allegations of sexual exploitation of civilians by the United Nations peacekeepers in eastern DRC?

Answer:

The United States has been fully engaged in diplomatic efforts to reduce violence, support the transition process, and improve relations between DRC and its neighbors. The United States supports, and will continue to support, the UN mission in DRC as it undertakes its multidimensional mandate there. On the international level, we will continue our effort to promote cooperation among DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to address the security challenges posed by armed groups in the Eastern DRC. As members of the International Committee to Support the Transition, we will participate actively in supporting and advising the Transition Government’s leadership as they work toward elections in 2005. Our assistance programs will promote accountable institutions and reforming Congo’s economy, to reduce threats to human rights. We are also exploring possible methods of reducing ethnic tensions in the country, particularly eastern DRC.

USAID is providing humanitarian assistance via training and technical assistance services to more than 200 community groups. USAID programs are aimed at improving knowledge on basic life skills, providing vocational training, and funding labor intensive infrastructural rehabilitation projects and creating wage-earning opportunities for ex-combatants and the civilian population. USAID is also supporting the media to improve public awareness of the transition and electoral processes.

Sexual exploitation by any person is abhorrent. Sexual exploitation perpetrated by UN Peacekeepers is especially repulsive. There have been grave allegations of misconduct and sexual exploitation involving UN peacekeeping personnel in the DRC. The UN has sent a mission to DRC, led by the Jordanian Permanent Representative to the UN, to investigate the allegations of sexual misconduct. The U.S. welcomes this investigation. We support the Special Representative of the Secretary General Swing’s zero tolerance policy on such abuse by peacekeepers and have discussed our concerns that MONUC troops strictly adhere to that policy. We expect the UN troop contributing countries, and member states to investigate all such alleged misconduct in a full and transparent manner, and to take appropriate disciplinary action.


Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condeleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Arms Control Reorganization

Question #1:

We understand that Secretary Powell intends to propose the merger of the Bureau for Arms Control (AC) with the Bureau for Nonproliferation (NP), and to notify Congress of this action just before your nomination hearing. Such a reorganization would clearly constitute a reprogramming request under current law, and you would be responsible, if confirmed promptly after the hearings, both for obtaining the assent of congressional committees and for implementing the reorganization.

a) Do you support the merger of the AC and NP bureaus? If so, why?

Answer:

I support the merger of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus as part of the Bush Administration’s strategy to fine tune the State Department’s international security units to better address the challenges of the post-9/11 world. This merger recommendation by the Department of State Inspector General was endorsed by Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton.

If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the AC/NP merger best utilizes these bureaus’ talented officers while improving efficiency. A State Department task force headed by Human Resources experts has been working on the reorganization since last September. I have been briefed on their work and I believe that new bureau will be an asset to U.S. foreign policy.

Question:

b) How would the AC and NP bureaus be merged without sending the world a message (whether intentionally or not) that the Administration is renouncing Arms Control as a tool of U.S. foreign policy?

Answer:

Per the recommendations of the State IG Inspection Reports of the AC and NP bureaus, this is a merger of equals. The Bush Administration will remain committed to pressing all states to honor their arms control treaty obligations through the new bureau, especially the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Question:

c) How would the AC and NP bureaus be merged without diverting the attention of the Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation from the difficult, day-to-day world-wide diplomacy involved in stemming sales of suspect materials and technology around the world to the more glamorous world of international treaty negotiations?

Answer:

The State Department panel overseeing the AC-NP merger has worked to devise a structure for the new bureau that provides adequate coverage for all of its responsibilities. Like the current AC and NP bureaus, the merged bureau will retain special representatives and ambassadors who are responsible for treaty negotiations.

Question:

d) Will you commit to close consultation with this committee as you move forward with any reorganization?

Answer:

We will stay in close contact with Congress about this reorganization and welcome this committee’s questions and comments on it.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

China

In your October 2000 article in Foreign Affairs, you wrote:

Even if there is an argument for economic integration with Beijing, China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia Pacific region…China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the ‘strategic partner’ the Clinton Administration once called it. Add to this China’s record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, and the security problem is obvious. China will do what it can to enhance its position whether by stealing nuclear secrets or by trying to intimidate Taiwan.”

In an op-ed published on October 24, 2003 in the Wall Street Journal, you wrote:

“Not long ago, many would have argued that the U.S. could not energize its alliance with Japan and expect a constructive and cooperative relationship with China at the same time – let alone a crucial Chinese role in confronting the North Korean nuclear threat. Yet that is exactly what President Bush has done. China’s longer-term future is yet to be written and that future must include full protection of the human rights of the Chinese people. Nevertheless, the patterns of cooperation we are building today on North Korea, countertorrism and combating proliferation will stand us in good stead as we work with other partners in the Asia-Pacific region to help China play the constructive and central role in world affairs its people deserve.”

You went on to argue that U.S. policy toward China should “promote China’s internal transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions.”

Question #1:

a) Do you currently believe that China is our “strategic competitor” or is our relationship “constructive and cooperative?” Is China’s future role in world affairs likely to be “constructive and central,” as you assert in the Wall Street Journal or is China an irredentist power and a security problem that must be contained using a web of U.S. alliances as you argue in the Foreign Affairs article?

b) What do you believe should be our major objectives in our relationship with China and how do you believe we should achieve them?

Answer:

Following the successful resolution of the EP-3 incident and, later, the 9/11 attack on the U.S., both the U.S. and PRC have been working to achieve a constructive, cooperative and candid relationship. For the most part – whether in working as a key member of the Six-Party Talks, in supporting the Global War on Terrorism, or participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq - China’s efforts have been constructive. As a member of the P-5 at the United Nations, a leading player in regional Asia-Pacific Institutions like APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and as a country which can yet play a significant role in moving the Doha Round of Talks, China’s cooperation with the United States remains central to the success of many of America’s global and regional efforts.

Yet even as we welcome the more active and positive role in the international community that China can play, we recognize that there are still many areas on which we do not see eye-to-eye with China. Among those areas where we expect to continue to have differences – and where we will not hesitate to continue to express our views and work for change - are human rights, nonproliferation, trade, the PRC’s military modernization and its cross-Strait policy.

We will continue the President’s engagement policy, cooperating where we can, making known our principled concerns when we must. Broadly put, our major objective vis-à-vis China must be seen in the context of how well we meet our obligations to our allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific region.

We will work through established regional institutions like APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum, through international organizations like the United Nations, and in global negotiating rounds such as the Doha Round to encourage China’s development in such a way that it is better integrated into the rules-based international community and shows greater freedom domestically for its citizens.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

China and Nonproliferation

You wrote in the Wall Street Journal in October 2003 that China has shown a “pattern of cooperation” in combating proliferation, yet the Bush Administration sanctioned Chinese firms 37 times from June 21, 2001 through September 2003. The Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance said on July 24, 2003 that Chinese “entities are involved in too many sensitive transfers for the problem merely to be one of imperfect enforcement.” The State Department has repeatedly sanctioned Chinese firms since the Fall of 2003, most recently imposing sanctions on four more Chinese firms in November 2004.

Question #2:

a) Why did you praise China for a “pattern of cooperation” weeks after the State Department announced new sanctions on Chinese firms and complained about a pattern of violations? Has China’s proliferation conduct improved since October 2003?

b) What will you do as Secretary of State to end China’s continuing pattern of proliferation of WMD technologies to countries such as Iran and North Korea?

Answer:

Cooperating with the Chinese government on non-proliferation issues while sanctioning Chinese companies for actions taken which are in violation of our nonproliferation laws, including the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, are not mutually exclusive actions. They are part of our overall effort to get China to play a more responsible role on non-proliferation. In the past 15 years, China has taken substantial steps to strengthen its nonproliferation policies, joining the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, adhering to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, joining the Biological Weapons Convention, signing and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and agreeing to work with the international community to ban production of fissile nuclear weapons material.

In 2002 the PRC promulgated a series of regulations restricting the export of missiles and missile-related technology; subsequently, the PRC promulgated regulations on dual-use chemical and biological items and technologies and joined with us in the Container Security Initiative. In December 2003, China incorporated these existing measures into a new comprehensive system of export control regulations that include counterterrorism and regional stability considerations in licensing decisions. I might note that these measures were implemented as we have been increasing the use of sanctions against China and others. The point is that one shouldn't assume that sanctions and cooperative measures are inconsistent. In fact, they are two sides of the same coin, and Chinese nonproliferation cooperation improved after we imposed sanctions on Chinese entities that had apparently not gotten the message. More recently, China has been working closely with the U.S. and other nations in the Six-Party Talks to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program.

We will continue our extensive efforts to persuade China to effectively control exports, including the imposition of sanctions when warranted or when required by U.S. law. Through continuing dialogue and steps to impose costs upon proliferant entities where problems arise, we look forward to seeing China’s pattern of cooperation improve even more in the future. In particular, we hope that China will improve implementation of export controls to the point that Chinese companies no longer engage in transfers that lead to the imposition of U.S. sanctions.


Question from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleeza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

China

According to the most recent State Department's Human Rights report, China's human rights record remains "poor," and China "...continued to commit numerous and serious abuses. Although legal reforms continued, there was backsliding on key human rights issues during the year...." Moreover, "The Government used the international war on terror as a justification for cracking down harshly on suspected Uighur separatists expressing peaceful political dissent and on independent Muslim religious leaders."

Question #3:

What will you do to advance human rights in China?

Answer:

In 2004, serious human rights abuses continued in China, including torture, and mistreatment of prisoners, incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. Authorities were quick to suppress religious, political or social groups that they perceived as threatening to government authority or national stability. Those seeking to exercise fundamental freedoms were often detained on state secret charges.

The Chinese Government did take some steps to address a number of these abuses, issuing new regulations or reforms related to the interrogation of detainees, fighting corruption, extending social security, providing legal aid, and passing a law prohibiting discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS. They have also added an amendment to their constitution to protect human rights.

However, it remains unclear to what extent these reforms will be implemented and the impact they will have on the lives of average Chinese citizens. We will, of course, continue to press for implementation. It is not enough for reforms to be on the books.

The Administration - the President, Ambassador Randt and I, among others - have made increasing respect for international human rights, religious freedom, promoting rule of law, and good governance - in China and elsewhere - a top priority. China has signed on to a number of international human rights obligations. We want to see those obligations met, and we remain committed to working with China until the time when it brings its human rights practices into compliance with international human rights standards.

We raise human rights concerns and specific cases with PRC officials on a regular basis, at all levels, here in Washington, in China, and elsewhere, and we will continue to do so. We are also committed to promoting legal reform and judicial independence, transparency, public participation in government and fostering the civil society. For example, last year we programmed $13.5 million to promote these goals. We will use any channel - bilateral, regional or global - to enhance the human rights and political freedoms of the people of China.

In November, expert-level discussions on human rights restarted when Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Elizabeth Dugan met with her counterparts in Beijing. We held a second meeting with the Chinese here in Washington on January 6 to discuss how to move toward our objective of restarting a formal, results-based Human Rights Dialogue. We have stated that there are no preconditions to resuming talks, however, we still need to resolve broader issues that we have previously discussed in the last round of the bilateral Dialogue in December 2002.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

China

In your Foreign Affairs article you wrote: "The longstanding U.S. commitment to a 'one-China' policy that leaves to a future date the resolution of the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is wise." And you strongly criticized the Clinton Administration for articulating a policy of "three no's" during the President's trip to China. Specifically, President Clinton said, "I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or 'two China's, or 'one Taiwan, one China,' and we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement."

The Bush Administration has not only adopted the "three no's" position you criticized, but gone a major step further, arguing that Taiwan does not currently enjoy sovereignty and rejecting a final outcome that might lead to Taiwan independence, both steps that no U.S. Administration had ever taken before. On October 25, 2004, Secretary Powell said in Hong Kong: "Both sides should show restraint, not taken any unilateral actions, look for ways of improving dialogue across the Straits and move forward toward that day when we will see a peaceful unification," adding, "There is only one China. Taiwan is not independent… It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that remains our policy, our firm policy."

Question #4:

a) Does the United States have a position on whether Taiwan enjoys sovereignty? If so, what is that position? Is Taiwan part of China?

b) Was Secretary Powell wrong to rule out Taiwan independence as a possible future for Taiwan?

c) Will you continue to argue that Taiwan and China should be reunified and that Taiwan does not enjoy sovereignty?


Answer:

Our policy of long standing has not changed. We do not support Taiwan independence, and we oppose attempts by either side to unilaterally alter the status quo. American policy toward Taiwan is governed by our One-China Policy, the three Joint Communiqués, and the Taiwan Relations Act.

Additionally, we have reaffirmed our commitment to uphold the Six Assurances to Taiwan originally conveyed by President Reagan, including the assurance that the United States will not alter its position on the sovereignty of Taiwan, which is that it is a matter to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

We have long maintained that differences between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are matters to be resolved peacefully by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, absent the threat or use of force, and in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Indonesia – Timika Murders

No suspect has yet been brought to justice for murder of two U.S. citizens in Timika in August 2002. Initial reports, by both Indonesian police and the State Department, implicated the Indonesian military in the attack. In June, however, Attorney General Ashcroft shifted the blame to an alternate suspect, and downplayed a possible connection to the Indonesian military (TNI). In the meantime, the suspect remains at large, well documented ties between him and the TNI remain unexplored in official accounts of the case, and there appears to be no effort under way to advance the investigation.

Question #1 (a):

Do you believe the FBI’s investigation exonerates the TNI, or do you believe more investigation needs to be done? If more needs to be done, what do you intend to do to persuade the Indonesians to cooperate?

Answer:

The arrest and prosecution of Anthonius Wamang, who was indicted by the FBI for the murder of two American citizens, is one of our top priorities. Although the investigation is not complete, the FBI has uncovered no evidence indicating TNI involvement in the Timika murders.

We know President Yudhoyono understands the importance of this matter to the United States and trust that the Government of Indonesia will take the appropriate actions to achieve justice in this case.


Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Indonesia – Timika Murders

No suspect has yet been brought to justice for murder of two U.S. citizens in Timika in August 2002. Initial reports, by both Indonesian police and the State Department, implicated the Indonesian military in the attack. In June, however, Attorney General Ashcroft shifted the blame to an alternate suspect, and downplayed a possible connection to the Indonesian military (TNI). In the meantime, the suspect remains at large, well documented ties between him and the TNI remain unexplored in official accounts of the case, and there appears to be no effort under way to advance the investigation.

Question 1 (b):

If the case remains stalled—with no suspect in jail, no investigation actively probing alleged ties to TNI, no plans for any movement in the future—would you support a resumption of IMET training to the Indonesian military

Answer:

IMET for Indonesia is in the US interest. In FY05, we have allocated $600,000 in IMET funds (includes E-IMET) for Indonesia. The aim of IMET is to strengthen the professionalism of military officers, especially with respect to the norms of democratic civil-military relations such as transparency, civilian supremacy, public accountability, and respect for human rights. The GOI has demonstrated cooperation as required. We are currently evaluating whether to issue the required determination.

Question from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

North Korea

In your Foreign Affairs article of October 2000, “Promoting the National Interest,” you wrote the following:

“The regime of Kim Jong Il is so opaque that it is difficult to know its motivations, other than that they are malign…Like East Germany, North Korea is the evil twin of a successful regime just across its border. It must fear its eventual demise from the sheer power and pull of South Korea. Pyongyang, too, has little to gain and everything to lose from engagement in the international economy.”

Question # 1:

a) Do you have a better sense of North Korea’s motivations today than you did in October 2000? What are the major objectives of North Korea’s government? How can the United States most effectively promote change in North Korea?

b) Do you still believe that North Korea “has little to gain and everything to lose from engagement in the international economy?” If so, what makes you think that North Korea can be persuaded to follow the “Libya model,” advocated by the Bush Administration? How do you explain North Korea’s eager pursuit of diplomatic normalization and economic integration with its neighbors? If not, what has changed your mind?

Answer:

a) The Bush Administration has put forward proposals and a mechanism -- the Six Party Talks -- that can address North Korean perceptions that it has little to gain from engagement.

The DPRK leadership’s fundamental objective is ensuring its survival. It does not appear at this point to have made the strategic decision to negotiate in earnest on giving up its nuclear weapons ambitions and, by addressing the concerns of the international community, to vastly improve the lives of its people, enhance its own security, normalize its relations with the U.S. and others, and raise its stature in the world.

North Korea’s rhetoric notwithstanding, the U.S. leadership has said repeatedly that we have no intention of attacking or invading the DPRK, and that we have no hostile intent towards the DPRK. If the DPRK is prepared to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions, the U.S. remains ready, as we sought to convey in the third round of the Six-Party Talks in June, to work in the context of the talks to resolve the issues between us.

I stand by my points in my Foreign Affairs article regarding the DPRK’s fear of engagement with the world. The point I was trying to make is that the DPRK leadership faces a dilemma in this regard. It needs to deal with the nation’s serious economic problems in order to sustain the regime, but it also appears to fear economic reform and opening that could threaten its political control. This dilemma has produced a patchwork of policies, including limited wage and price reforms, the net result of which appears to have been inflation, unemployment, and other economic and social problems. The key point now is that the DPRK leadership has an opportunity to improve the lives of the North Korean people, and bring the DPRK into the international community, by making a strategic decision to dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner, subject to international verification. The United States will continue to work seriously within the Six-Party process, and with our allies around the world, so that North Korea fully understands what it must do to meet the concerns of the international community, and what the international community is prepared to do in return.

b) Should North Korea make the right strategic choice, it could benefit enormously from engagement with the international community. The Asia-Pacific region now accounts for roughly 25% of world production and of world trade. Democracy too is vibrant throughout the region. We would welcome DPRK policies that would allow it to participate fully in the growing prosperity of the region, by creating the environment needed to successfully pursue trade, aid, and foreign investment.

The U.S. has discussed with DPRK officials Libya’s decision to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the measures the international community took in response. The Libya case should give North Korea the understanding that it could, by dismantling its nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner, subject to international verification, move towards normalization of its external relations and integration into the international economy. It is also a clear demonstration that the path North Korea has been on is a dead end; Libya has renounced trade in military goods and services, key North Korean exports, with countries of proliferation concern, such as North Korea. Whether or not one refers to this as the “Libya model,” this is the North Korean regime’s best chance of escaping international isolation and saving its own people.

The DPRK is clearly seeking to secure economic and political benefits from its neighbors and the United States – but to gain those benefits, it must address the concerns of the world community.


Question from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

North Korea

You and other senior members of the Administration have repeatedly said that it would be “unacceptable” for North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons.

Question #2:

a) What is the current assessment of the United States government with respect to North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile?

b) What do you mean when you say it is “unacceptable” for North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons? What does your statement commit the United States to do if negotiations continue to be unavailing? Do you believe the United States has a viable military option to eliminate North Korea weapons?

Answer:

a) The U.S. assessed that the DPRK had one, possibly two nuclear weapons by the mid-1990s from the plutonium it extracted from its 5 MW-e reactor in Yongbyon before it was frozen in 1994. Beginning in 2003, the DPRK has several times stated publicly it has completed reprocessing of the 8,000 spent fuel rods which had been stored at Yongbyon. If that is the case, it could have produced enough fissile material for several additional nuclear weapons. We also have evidence that the DPRK is pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program that has the potential to add to its stockpile of fissile material that could be used for weapons production.

b) The U.S., the ROK, Japan, China and Russia at the first round of Six-Party Talks, in August 2003, told North Korea very clearly in plenary session that they would not accept North Korea’s possessing nuclear arms.

President Bush has repeatedly made it clear that he seeks a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue. The Six-Party process provides the best framework for discussions on issues of concern to all the parties. During those discussions, we also can and do sit down one-on-one with any of the parties, including the North Koreans. Meanwhile, we have continued contact with North Korea through the DPRK UN Mission in New York, although this is not a negotiating channel. We continue to work with our friends and allies to encourage North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. No one, including the North Koreans, benefits from delay and we have made that clear to them.

While no President would take any option off the table when dealing with matters of national security, we are working with our partners to ensure a successful resolution, though diplomacy, of our concerns regarding the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions.

Question from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

North Korea

On September 8, 2003, you were interviewed by radio personality Sean Hannity about the North Korean nuclear crisis. You said that President Bush’s decision not to hold direct talks with North Korea, in contrast to the Clinton Administration approach, had already begun producing results: “Because the president refused to sit down bilaterally with the North Koreans, like everybody was saying that he should do…we’ve got the Chinese, the Russians, the South Koreans, the Japanese at the table, and the North Koreans are completely isolated.” You added that Administration’s approach had produced, “a great diplomatic victory,” and contended that leaders in Pyongyang “…now know that they have no way back into the international system unless the dismantle their nuclear program.”

At the time you made those remarks, North Korea had recently completed reprocessing the spent fuel from its Yongbyon reactor, yielding sufficient fissile material, according to the IAEA, to produce an additional 4-8 nuclear weapons. Since you made those remarks, North Korea has continued to expand its nuclear weapons capacity and to develop delivery systems. Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan regularly make public statements that betray their frustration with U.S. policy, and China, while hosting the 6-party talks and encouraging North Korea to participate in those talks, has done little to press North Korea to actually reach an agreement. The United States finally laid down a reasonable proposal last summer, but it has never sent a high-ranking envoy to lead our negotiations or given our representatives negotiating room.

Question #3:

a) What concrete accomplishments have been produced by the Six Party talks?

b) What will you do to re-energize the talks that are currently suspended? Will you press for real negotiations, with a respected U.S. representative who is given reasonable latitude to explore the possibility of getting North Korea to back down from its nuclear weapons ambitions?

c) How will you convince China to take a more proactive role in the talks—not just hosting them, but also pressuring North Korea to move toward a settlement?

Answer:

a) The Six-Party Talks have created the multilateral forum in Northeast Asia to deal with a hard security issue. Experts of the region welcome this as something that had been missing from the regional architecture for decades. The Six-Party Talks create a multilateral consultative mechanism among the key powers that will determine the region’s future in an important respect. Given the history of the region, this is no small accomplishment. On North Korea, the Six-Party Talks provide the forum in which a unified message can be presented to North Korea that nuclear weapons do not make them more secure, but rather less secure. At the Third Round of talks in June, the U.S. tabled a comprehensive proposal to achieve a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. The ROK presented a proposal as well. For its part, the DPRK made a proposal for what it describes as the first step toward full denuclearization – a freeze of its nuclear weapons-related programs in exchange for “rewards” from the other parties. Some of the parties have offered fuel aid to the DPRK, if there were a comprehensive and verifiable halt of its nuclear programs as a first step toward complete nuclear disarmament. The parties have had discussions on the modalities of possible multilateral security assurances. Diplomatic contacts among the Six Parties are continuing. We met with the North Koreans in New York twice late last year, and made clear we remain ready to resume the talks at an early date, without preconditions, and urged their return to the table. We have also met with our partners in the talks, in Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing. All of us agree that the Six-Party Talks are the way forward. What is needed now is a strategic decision by Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions and to negotiate in earnest. We are working together with the other parties to bring the DPRK to understand that that is in its own self-interest.

b) We believe that the ball is in North Korea’s court to return to talks. We want them to return, and we are coordinating closely with the other parties, so that the DPRK understands it must return to the table for serious negotiation. U.S. officials twice late last year met with the DPRK counterparts. We told the DPRK officials that we remain ready to resume the Six-Party Talks at an early date, that we want to resolve the nuclear issue through peaceful diplomatic means, and that we are prepared to listen seriously to their proposals. We would not have put forward our June proposal if we were not interested in a serious discussion.

c) China has been an important partner in the Six-Party Talks and plays an important role in these talks. China cannot be satisfied, however, with limiting its role to diplomatic host and intermediary; it must be willing to take a proactive stance in persuading the North to end its nuclear weapons programs.

We share with China many – though not all – common concerns and goals, including the determination to see a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. We of course have urged and will continue to urge China to maximize the influence it can bring to bear to achieve our shared goal. Chinese leaders including President Hu Jintao have raised their concern over the DPRK nuclear programs on numerous occasions in both Beijing and Pyongyang. Coordination on the Six-Party Talks has been a regular agenda item in meetings with the Chinese held by the President and the Secretary of State.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Question #1:

Does the United States believe that another High Representative should be appointed after Lord Ashdown’s term of office expires?

Answer:

The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina has played an indispensable role in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords. While Bosnian government institutions are increasingly assuming responsibility for their own affairs, the country continues to face formidable challenges to build effective institutions, to strengthen the rule of law, to reform its economy and to transform its defense, intelligence and police structures. A decision on whether to continue the Office of the High Representative after Lord Ashdown leaves office in November 2005 will be based on an ongoing assessment of the progress in these areas, which are essential for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s long-term sustainability and regional stability.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Question #2:

Does the United States believe that any parts of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords should be revised? If so, what process should be used?

Answer:

The USG remains committed to full implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Tremendous progress has been made towards implementing the provisions of the agreement. The security situation is stable, major post-war reconstruction is complete, and approximately a million refugees and displaced persons have returned to their pre-war homes.

Of course, Dayton is not perfect; it was a result of compromises made among the ethnic groups to end a horrific war. The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was written in such a way to balance the interests of the ethnic groups. This has resulted in inefficiencies in the size and structure of government throughout the country. We are working closely with the Office of the High Representative, other members of the international community, and the Bosnians to address these issues within the context of Dayton by strengthening state-level institutions and urging the Bosnian authorities to eliminate wasteful and duplicative governmental structures.

Dayton provides a process by which the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina can alter their constitution if they wish to do so. We have encouraged them to utilize this process, but made clear that the international community will not reopen Dayton


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Question #3:

Please summarize the functions that the U.S. military forces remaining in Eagle Base in Tuzla will carry out. Please summarize the division of responsibilities between the European Union peacekeeping force, which is the successor to SFOR, and the new NATO office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, are new plans being developed for apprehending individuals indicted for war crimes, such as Radovan Karadzic?

Answer:

In December, NATO ended its nine-year stabilization force peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO’s role in Bosnia was to stop a war and enforce a peace, and that mission was successfully completed. To help Bosnia and Herzegovina continue on the path toward integration into European institutions, the European Union began a military operation in Bosnia in early December to perform the main peace stabilization role and NATO agreed to maintain a residual military presence in Bosnia. The role of the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo is to provide advice on defense reform, continue efforts to locate and apprehend war crimes indictees, and work with local authorities to ensure that Bosnia does not become a haven for terrorists.

Both the EU operation and the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo serve as legal successors to the NATO stabilization force. The EU military operation is closely coordinating with the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo under the Berlin Plus arrangements that give the EU access to NATO military planning and assets for EU operations. Over time, we expect the EU operation to shift from a military mission to one with a greater law enforcement focus.

U.S. forces remaining at Camp Eagle in Tuzla will help carry out the operational supporting tasks of the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo. The United States remains committed to seeing war crimes indictees such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic arrested and transferred to The Hague to face justice as soon as possible. However, the primary responsibility for apprehending war crimes indictees remains with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly with the Republika Srpska entity that has failed to arrest a single war crimes indictee in the nine years since the signing of the Dayton peace accords. NATO provides specialized assistance to support local efforts, and this assistance will continue.

To hold the Republika Srpska accountable for failing to fully cooperate with international obligations, the U.S. and the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown have instituted a range of measures against the Republika Srpska government, including removing dozens of officials and freezing the assets of individuals and companies that have provided support to fugitives. The United States has also imposed travel restrictions on Republika Srpska officials who have failed to take action against war crimes fugitives.

.
Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Central Asia

Question #1:

Over the past four years, the governments of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have all displayed a lack of concern for human rights and democratic norms. In many cases, these values are less respected today than at any point since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Will you make democratization and human rights in these states a high priority? What specific benchmarks do you have for measuring progress in this area?

Answer:

Democratization and human rights in Central Asia have been, and will continue to be, a high priority for this administration. Since their independence, the U.S. has consistently encouraged these countries to meet internationally recognized standards of human rights. Our policy is based on the fact that long-term stability and security in the region depends on these countries developing government institutions that are based on the rule of law, the protection of human rights and democratic norms.

The high priority we accord these issues is reflected in our close and continuous engagement at the highest levels with host governments on human rights and democracy. The Department and our embassies are in constant touch with international and indigenous non-governmental organizations, and high-level representations to host governments on behalf of these NGOs and the work that they are doing—often with U.S. funding—is a regular feature of our bilateral relationships. The large number of democracy and human rights assistance programs also indicates the high priority of human rights and democratization in our policy objectives. All the Central Asian governments are well aware that promotion of democratization and human rights is a cornerstone of our policy in the region.

Using generally accepted international standards and norms of human rights as our baseline, we tailor our engagement to help and encourage each Central Asian country to uphold its international commitments. For example, every year, the State Department formally reviews human rights and democratization performance through the annual Human Rights Report, the Supporting Human Rights and Democracy strategy report, the International Religious Freedom and Trafficking in Persons reports, and certification or determination procedures required under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and a number of sections of the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act.

Applying the benchmarks of internationally recognized human rights standards has led us to take specific actions highlighting a country’s non-performance, such as the recently-passed U.N. resolution condemning Turkmenistan’s human rights record, which the United States co-sponsored. We have also censored Uzbekistan for its lack of progress in human rights by denying certification under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and Foreign Operations Appropriation Act. We remain in continual dialogue with Kazakhstan regarding the need to fully meet the human dimension commitments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in order for us to support its bid to be the OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 2009. And upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are opportunities for the United States to press these governments to meet their international obligations for free and fair elections.

Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleeza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Kosovo

Question #1:

If the UN policy of “standards before status” on Kosovo, which the United States had supported, has been discarded or revised, what is the Administration’s current policy on “Final Status Negotiations?”

Answer:

We remain committed to a secure, stable and multiethnic Kosovo that is fully integrated into Europe. Resolving the issue of Kosovo's status will be a major step in achieving the President's vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

The UN “standards before status” policy for Kosovo has been complemented by a policy, endorsed by the UN Security Council in late 2003, whereby Kosovo’s progress in implementing the standards will be the subject of a comprehensive review in mid-2005. A positive review will enable us to proceed to a process to determine Kosovo’s future status. The eight international standards for Kosovo cover everything from security to rule of law to the economy. Their achievement will benefit the people of Kosovo no matter what its future status. Kosovo has made some progress on the standards, but much work remains.

The head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, Soren Jessen-Petersen, recently identified a number of key indicators that Kosovo should focus on in the lead up to the mid-2005 review. These are standards primarily designed to ensure the protection and rights of Kosovo's minority communities, notably the Serbs. Achievement of these key standards, while ensuring there is no major outbreak of violence, would help pave the way for a positive review.

At the same time, we are encouraging work to decentralize the administration of Kosovo, which would give Serb communities a greater voice in education, health care and possibly even police and justice issues, in municipalities where they have a large presence.

We are actively engaged with the Contact Group – where we join the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the EU – as well as with the UN, in assessing Kosovo's progress on the standards and in considering the possibility of launching status discussions. We are also actively engaging Belgrade to ensure that Serbia has a voice, but not a veto, in this process.

The United States will be an active player in the mid-2005 comprehensive review and in any status discussions that may be launched. However, Kosovo's future, and that of its neighbors, is as a part of Europe. We will expect our Allies and friends in the European Union to take a leading role in this process.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Kosovo

Question #2:

What is the United States doing to prevent a reoccurrence of the violence that erupted in March 2004? If renewed violence were to occur, how would that affect the timetable for final status negotiations?

Answer:

The violence that broke out in Kosovo in March of last year was clearly a setback to Kosovo’s development into a democratic society respecting the rights of all its citizens that can become part of Europe. Under Secretary Grossman visited the region later that month to call for those responsible for the violence to be held accountable, and to identify ways to prevent a recurrence.

NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) have undertaken considerable planning and coordination, in conjunction with the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and local institutions, to strengthen the international community’s capacity to detect and manage any further large-scale violence, while enhancing local ownership of security issues.

We are encouraging work by the PISG and UNMIK to reform local government in a way that would give Serb communities in municipalities where they have a large presence a greater voice in education and health care, and possibly law enforcement and justice issues as well.

Since the violence, the Contact Group, spurred by the United States, has met in Pristina approximately every six weeks to urge Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) to repair the damage to homes and churches and to restore relations between the communities of Kosovo. There has been some progress. Much of the damage to residences has been repaired, but nearly half of those displaced during the violence have yet to return to their homes. Local as well as international prosecutors have opened cases against more than 300 suspects accused of involvement in the violence, with more than 80 convictions as of late last year. Relations between the communities in Kosovo were slowly being restored. However, the boycott by Kosovo Serb voters of the October 23 elections for the Kosovo Assembly, and the refusal thus far of Kosovo Serb parties that did participate to take their ministerial posts and Assembly seats, has halted this process for now.

According to a policy initiated by the United States and the Contact Group and endorsed by the UN Security Council in December 2003, there will be a comprehensive review of Kosovo’s progress in implementing the internationally-endorsed standards in mid-2005. A positive review will lead to discussion to determine Kosovo’s future status. A recurrence of violence in Kosovo on the scale of March would make a positive review, and hence a beginning of status discussions for Kosovo, more difficult. We have made that point to Kosovo’s political leaders.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Serbia and Montenegro: State Union

Question #1:

If either party in the Serbia and Montenegro State Union avails itself of its treaty-guaranteed right to hold a referendum on abrogation of the union, would the United States support such a decision, even if the European Union objected?

Answer:

The United States supports the Belgrade Agreement that created the State Union, including its provisions allowing for the parties to revisit the structure of the union in the future. The U.S. will support a structure for the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro as long as it is agreed upon through a peaceful, democratic process between both republics. Regardless of the decision of Serbia and Montenegro on the future form of their relationship, the U.S. supports the integration of Serbia and Montenegro into Euro-Atlantic structures as part of a Europe whole, free and at peace once Serbia and Montenegro fully cooperates with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Serbia and Montenegro

Question #2

Does the United States have an opinion on the possible damming of Montenegro’s Tara Canyon, a move which many ecologists consider disastrous? Has the United States communicated its opinion to the government of Montenegro? If not, does it plan to?

Answer:

We have not taken a position on whether the proposed dam, to be located on the Drina River in Bosnia and Herzegovina downstream of the Tara Canyon in Montenegro, should be built.

We do, however, continue to urge the Government of Montenegro to ensure that it and its partners take into consideration those concerns raised by the citizens of Montenegro, and by interested international organizations such as UNESCO, in coming to a decision on the project.

The Government of Montenegro has informed us it will not move forward with the project prior to an upcoming review by a panel of international experts.

Any decision should carefully weigh and balance the economic, energy, and environmental needs of the country.

We have also recommended to the government of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina that a thorough study be done on the environmental impact of the hydropower project for which the dam is being built.

Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Western Europe

Relations between the United States and long-time allies like France and Germany have suffered in recent years, particularly during the diplomatic disputes about Iraq. It has been reported that, after the war, you said we should “punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia.”

Question #1:

Were you accurately quoted? If so, do you stand by that comment? If not, do you believe it is important to strengthen the relationship with France and Germany and what do you intend to do to promote that objective?

Answer:

Despite past disagreement on Iraq policy, we are working closely with the French and German governments to promote democracy and stability in Iraq. France and Germany approved the NATO training mission in Iraq, although their nationals do not participate.

France and Germany’s decision to support 80% Iraqi debt forgiveness at the Paris Club was a major contribution to stabilizing the Interim Iraqi Government. Germany also assists Iraqi stabilization efforts through a large-scale training program for Iraqi police and military in the neighboring United Arab Emirates. France is talking to the Iraqi government about the possibility of offering police training for Iraqi security forces.

The question of how to help stabilize Iraq after the upcoming elections will certainly be a topic of conversation when President Chirac visits President Bush in Washington in the next few months, an invitation extended by the President in order to show the emphasis he places on strong relations with France.

As the President’s upcoming visit to Germany in February demonstrates, we are committed to strengthening bilateral relations with Germany

Question from Senator Joseph Bidden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Foreign Assistance: Tsunami Relief

Question #1:

The President has pledged $350 million in disaster relief for the countries affected by the tsunami in south and southeast Asia. I applaud the Administration’s efforts. Yet the money pledged represents most of the funding the Congress appropriated in the Disaster Relief and Famine Assistance account for FY 2005.

- Will you recommend to the President that he request supplemental funds from Congress to replenish the money that has been channeled towards this relief effort? If not, from where will the money to respond to other emergencies this fiscal year come?

Answer:

Yes. I will support a request for supplemental funds to replenish/reimburse those accounts which have been tapped to provide immediate tsunami relief.


Question from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Foreign Assistance - Post-tsunami Trafficking in Persons

Children affected by the tsunami. The executive director of UNICEF has stated her concerns that orphans and other children made vulnerable by the effects of the tsunami may be trafficked to other parts of Asia or elsewhere. International NGOs have already reported incidents of children being smuggled out of Aceh by criminal networks. The Indonesian government has banned children under 16 years of age from leaving Aceh unless accompanied by their parents.

Question #2:

What specific actions is the U.S. government taking to make sure that vulnerable groups such as children are not exploited — through trafficking or other types of abuse — in the wake of the disaster?

Answer:

The State Department has taken and continues to take significant action to make the prevention of human trafficking integral to our disaster relief planning and actions in post-tsunami regions of Asia. The steps we have taken, in conjunction with our interagency partners, include the following:

· Our embassies and USAID missions in the region are engaging with governments and NGOs on Trafficking in Persons (TIP) and looking into the veracity of reports of TIP following the tsunami.

· We are urging governments to take extra precautions at borders and at airports for children traveling with people who may not be their parents.

· We have requested NGOs and other anti-slavery partners around the world to take safety precautions such as warning vulnerable people of TIP schemes; training and monitoring of temporary relief workers; and registering and securing people at IDP camps and shelters.

· We have conducted extensive media outreach to alert governments, NGOs, and others of the danger of TIP in post-disaster regions.

· We are in contact with NGOs on the ground such as UNICEF, World Vision, International Justice Mission, and IOM to get concrete information on trafficking in the affected countries and to determine if special TIP-related projects are needed.

Although we have not independently confirmed TIP cases following the disaster, we are focusing on prevention to ensure that TIP does not become more widespread in the weeks and months ahead.

Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Question #3:

The Global HIV/AIDS Strategy document notes that the United States government will support “policy decisions that are evidence-based.” The evidence is that HIV infection is growing most rapidly in adolescent girls in sub-Saharan Africa. Many adolescent girls in Africa are married by age 18. Sexual abuse within marriage affects up to one-third of women in these countries. The so-called ABC’s – abstinence, be faithful and condoms – require the cooperation of a husband or partner who may not be willing to employ those prevention methods. There are those who believe that educating men is the answer to that problem.

In addition to educating men, what concrete steps and programs will you direct the Global Coordinator to take and implement to help provide women and girls for whom the “ABC’s” are not effective with the means to protect themselves from HIV infection?

Answer:

We need to support girls and women specifically in our HIV/AIDS programs and we are. Evidence from Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia shows violence against women is both a cause and consequence of rising rates of HIV infection. Many women fall victims to rape and sexual coercion or are subjected to violence from their husbands and relatives when they become HIV positive. The Emergency Plan is working closely with local governments, other donors and local communities to develop programs that effectively reduce stigma, protect women from sexual violence, and build family and community support to address behaviors and norms that contribute to women’s vulnerability to HIV infection.

The Emergency Plan employs specific strategies to address these important gender differences through:

1. Promoting healthy norms and behaviors including:

o Mobilizing communities to address attitudes, values and behaviors that increase vulnerability to HIV such as cross generational and casual sex.

o Supporting the adoption of social and community norms that support delaying sex until marriage and that denounce cross-generational sex; transactional sex; and rape, incest, and other forced sexual activity.

o Working with religious and traditional leaders to address and publicize risks of early sexuality, multiple partners, and cross-generational sex.

o Supporting policy change to ensuring the importance of inheritance rights of women

2. Reinforcing the important role of parents and other protective factors including:

o Through holding parenting education workshops to improve communication between parents and youth.

o Organizing special joint school and community events for parents and youth.

o Building a cadre of trained volunteers to provide mentoring where parental and other adult supervision is lacking.

o Promoting skills-based HIV education especially for youth and women.

o Providing social support including basic necessities such as nutrition, financial assistance, legal aid, housing, and permanency planning.

3. Addressing sexual coercion and exploitation of young people including:

o Supporting workplace programs to provide information on preventing sexual violence.

o Supporting school-based programs for boys about preventing sexual violence.

o Working with governments and local NGOs to eliminate gender inequality in the civil and criminal code.

o Training health care providers, teachers, and peer educators to identify, counsel and refer young victims of sexual abuse for other health services.

4. Continuing to support a comprehensive program for discovering, developing, testing and evaluating microbicides for HIV prevention that reduces the need for male cooperation.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: HIV/AIDS

Question #4:

The World Health Organization’s Global Sector Strategy for HIV/AIDS indicates that existing family planning programs “provide a clear entry point for the delivery of HIV/AIDS interventions.” Over the past three decades, governments have invested heavily in reproductive health services, reaching women who are now at the center of the HIV pandemic.

In light of this, will you advocate that PEPFAR funds support existing family planning infrastructure as an entry point for HIV prevention? Will you advocate funding the Commodities Fund at USAID with the PEPFAR money given the importance of condoms as a way to prevent HIV infection?

Answer:

Among the activities authorized by the US Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003 are the integration of prevention programs into existing health and counseling infrastructures. As such, to the extent possible, existing health care delivery systems are used to implement critical preventions such as promoting the ABC approach: “Abstain, Be Faithful, and Where Appropriate, Use Condoms.” Existing systems further provide an opportunity for prevention via HIV counseling and testing and the implementation of measures to thwart mother-to-child transmission of HIV.

PEPFAR will continue to support the purchase of condoms to prevent HIV among targeted populations in the 15 focus countries. In implementing the ABC approach, focus countries which determine the need to invest in the purchase of condoms do so using Emergency Plan funds generally through the Commodity Fund. For example, in FY05 Tanzania has allocated $1.2M for the purchasing and distribution of condoms among high risk groups, especially discordant couples.

Question from Senator Joseph Bidden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Foreign Assistance: Tsunami Relief

The President has pledged $350 million in disaster relief for the countries affected by the tsunami in South and Southeast Asia. I applaud the Administration’s efforts. Yet the money pledged represents most of the funding the Congress appropriated in the Disaster Relief and Famine Assistance account for FY 2005.

Question #1:

Will you recommend to the President that he request supplemental funds from Congress to replenish the money that has been channeled towards this relief effort? If not, from where will the money to respond to other emergencies this fiscal year come?

Answer:

Yes. I will support a request for supplemental funds to replenish/reimburse those accounts which have been tapped to provide immediate tsunami relief.

Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Latin America - Demobilization of Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia

Question #1:

What are your views on the program of demobilization of illegal armed groups in Colombia? To what degree should accountability for past crimes be an objective in any demobilization program? To what degree should provisions such as disclosure of information, return of illegal assets, and reparations be a priority for inclusion in the demobilization program?

Answer:

The United States supports a demobilization that serves the goal of peace with justice in Colombia. A credible peace process can help end the violence in Colombia and achieve an enduring peace. We will continue to work with and assist the Government of Colombia to ensure that its process includes the rapid disarmament and demobilization of illegal armed groups, justice and reparation for victims, and legal accountability for the perpetrators of atrocities, narcotics trafficking, and other major crimes.

The GOC recognizes the need to establish a legal framework to hold accountable former AUC members guilty of major crimes and settle questions about disclosure of information, return of illegal assets, and reparations. The GOC is calling an extraordinary congressional session in February 2005 to debate drafts of governing legislation, the “Law of Justice and Reparations,” which require perpetrators of major crimes to cooperate with the authorities and call for – among other things – mandatory jail time, confessions, and reparations to victims. All drafts include provisions for the return of illegal assets.

While peace in Colombia is ultimately up to the Colombians, the U.S. and other nations’ support to the process will be critical to Colombia’s continued success against terrorism. We are studying the possibility of providing U.S. support to the reintegration phase and are reviewing this possibility in close consultations with the Congress. Any U.S. support would only be provided consistent with U.S. law and policy. The United States will not drop its requests for the extradition of any Colombians, including United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia leaders, who have been indicted in the U.S. or may be indicted in the future.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Latin America - Democracy in Latin America

Question #2:

A UN Development Program report issued last year found that support for democracy in Latin America is relatively low, and that nearly half of Latin Americans would support an authoritarian government that resolved their economic problems.

-What should we be doing to support the democratic process in the

hemisphere over the next two decades?

Answer:

Even though 33 of the 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere are democracies, many people in the region have yet to enjoy the full benefits of a democratic government and an improving economy. Today, the key challenge is to consolidate democratic rule, extend economic opportunity to all citizens of the Western Hemisphere, and confront corruption and crime.

We have a policy in place which guides all elements of USG programs in Latin America and the Caribbean as they work to to assist partner governments in making the strategic leap to actually delivering the benefits of democracy and economic growth to all people. Our challenge is to make democracy in the region work better to serve every citizen. We will encourage our partners to invest in people so that their citizens can claim their fair share of economic opportunity. To tackle poverty and hunger, our partners must use the resources generated by economic growth to promote local and national dialogue between civil society to make sustained and responsive social and productive investments in critical areas such as healthcare, nutrition, and basic sanitation.

Because corruption robs governments of essential funds for development and has such a cancerous effect on democracy, we will also continue to strengthen anti-corruption programs in the Hemisphere.

Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

FMCT

In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to negotiate, in the words of the Shannon mandate, “a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” In September 2004, after a lengthy review, the United States declared in Geneva its view that effective verification of an FMCT is not achievable.

Question #5

a) If confirmed, will you push for negotiation of an FMCT without any verification provisions whatsoever, or might it be possible to agree on some measures that would be imperfect, but would not harm our national security?

b) Will you call for revising the Shannon mandate (which could well be difficult to achieve because the Conference on Disarmament operates on the basis of consensus), or will the Administration be willing to begin negotiations under the Shannon mandate, while adhering to its stand that verification measures might do more harm than good?

Answer:

The United States announced the results of its review of FMCT in July, reaffirming our commitment to negotiation in the CD of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. Noting that the United States has not produced fissile material for such purposes for over 15 years, our announcement also reaffirmed the U.S. moratorium on such production. At the same time, we noted our serious concerns that effective verification of an FMCT is not realistically achievable.

Because of these concerns, which we described in more detail at the end of August, we have told other interested states that including in the negotiators’ mandate an a priori requirement that an FMCT be effectively verifiable would only set an unrealistic standard, making success impossible and blocking prospects for an agreement. Constructing an ineffective set of “verification” provisions could give false confidence about states’ compliance with their obligations, while the difficulty of negotiating them would slow agreement on the basic FMCT prohibition. That legal prohibition on producing fissile material for weapons, the central element of any FMCT, would add an important further barrier to nuclear proliferation, one applying to both current and potential nuclear powers. To delay this achievement while arguing at length over provisions that would at best still not provide effective verification and at worst possibly damage other U.S. interests (e.g., risking disclosure of proliferation sensitive or national security information) is, in our view, counterproductive.

We have not made agreement on this view a condition for moving forward, but do not wish to reaffirm a position on verification we believe incorrect. We hope to achieve consensus in Geneva that negotiations on an FMCT should begin without any imposed prejudgment.

Question from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Nonproliferation (Global Pathogen Surveillance Act)

Since 2001, I have introduced legislation to authorize the State Department to lead an inter­agency effort to help other countries improve their pathogen surveillance capabilities – with particular emphasis on giving them the ability to spot an outbreak that might be man‑made and to call in international resources to promptly investigate and respond to such an outbreak. The Senate passed that bill in 2002, and it was a title in the State Department authorization bills reported out by this Committee in 2003 and 2004. In a world where natural diseases like SARS and avian flu threaten to cause world‑wide epidemics, and where biotechnology gives our enemies increased ability to create “designer” diseases for use against us, don’t we need a major program to build up the world’s defenses against biological terrorism?

Question #4:

A. Will you work with us to see that the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act is enacted?

B. Do you agree that the State Department should take the lead in this area, or do you favor leaving that to the Departments of HHS or Defense?

Answer:

We believe that the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act will indeed help strengthen developing countries’ abilities to identify and track pathogens that could be indicators of dangerous disease outbreaks – either naturally-occurring or deliberately-released. Improved disease surveillance and communication among nations are critical defenses against both bioterrorism and natural outbreaks. We look forward to working with you in support of the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act.

We believe that improving monitoring and reporting on infectious disease outbreaks globally sits at the very intersection of foreign policy, health, and national security concerns. As such, we agree that the Department of State should lead the activities articulated in the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act. The Department is already working to better coordinate and integrate the multiple U.S. initiatives on disease surveillance internationally, collaborating with the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, Homeland Security, Agriculture, and other federal agencies.

One of the true “nightmare” scenarios – of a bioterrorist attack or a naturally-occurring disease – involves a contagious biological agent moving swiftly through a crowded urban area of a densely populated developing nation. Thus, we believe that it is critical to increase efforts to strengthen the public health and scientific infrastructure necessary to identify and quickly respond to infectious disease outbreaks – and that the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act will provide valuable support in these efforts.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Non-Proliferation

Although the Administration has voiced support for threat reduction and non-proliferation assistance programs in the states of the former Soviet Union, these programs have suffered from recurrent crises and have too often failed to achieve the speed or universality of coverage that was envisioned for them.

Question #1

a) The issues of access to Russian sites and contractor liability protections have stalled new efforts in the MPC&A and plutonium disposition programs. Why have the U.S. and Russian bureaucracies been unable to make progress on these issues?

b) Will you urge President Bush to engage directly, intensively, and in a sustained manner with President Putin to agree on solutions and give clear direction to the bureaucrats? Alternatively, would you recommend a new mechanism to develop U.S. Russian inter-agency decisions on these programs?

Answer:

The Administration strongly supports cooperative threat reduction efforts with Russia and will continue to work hard to resolve the challenges of liability and access to sensitive nuclear facilities.

On liability, if confirmed I will continue to make Duma approval and Russian ratification of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement (as extended in 1999) a key priority and will seek to ensure the United States engages with Russia at the highest levels necessary to achieve this. Ratification would put ongoing CTR programs on a solid footing.

It is our understanding, however, that CTR ratification will not resolve liability for any expanded or new nonproliferation assistance programs with Russia. This includes some elements of the MPCA program, as well as U.S. and G-8 efforts to convert excess Russian weapon-grade plutonium into forms not useable for weapons under the plutonium disposition program. The liability issue has hindered progress on these important projects. The Administration is actively reviewing ways of breaking the liability logjam with Russia -- while protecting CTR programs -- to remove this impediment to plutonium disposition and other cooperation. If confirmed, I will make every effort to resolve these issues as soon as possible.

On the issue of access to sensitive Russian nuclear facilities, we are continuing our efforts to address this effort with Moscow. We and the Russians have developed special procedures to provide access to these sensitive facilities and protect their nuclear secrets but have not been able to agree to implement them at some key remaining facilities. We have also provided unprecedented access to Russian officials to U.S. nuclear facilities to demonstrate openness and show them how we too are grappling with how to improve nuclear security. We will continue to press senior Russian officials on these issues to ensure that the security at all such nuclear facilities is increased to prevent terrorist access to these weapons.

We will want to resolve both CTR umbrella agreement ratification and these other matters in 2005, well before CTR comes up for extension again in 2006.

Question:

c) We have programs to secure and reduce Russian stockpiles of fissile material or to repatriate highly enriched uranium or spent nuclear reactor fuel from countries where it is poorly secured, but these programs appear to move at a glacial pace. At the rate we are going, it could take another eight years or more to safeguard all the third-country highly enriched uranium. What will you do to significantly reduce that potential vulnerability to nuclear terrorism?

Answer:

State has been working closely with the Department of Energy (DOE) since the early 1990s to minimize use, storage and transfers of HEU worldwide.

Last year Secretary of Energy Abraham announced a consolidation and acceleration of these programs under the new Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). This fast paced program will accelerate U.S. efforts to minimize the use, more securely store, and transfer HEU worldwide.

State also actively supports the recent extension of NNSA’s Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program, a program that will allow the continued return of U.S origin spent HEU fuel and encourage the conversion of many more research reactors.

State has worked closely with NNSA to acclerate the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program, which has already achieved six shipments of fresh HEU fuel to Russia and will soon achieve the first spent fuel shipments from Uzbekistan. The State NNSA partnership has been instrumental in the success of all of these HEU programs, and our cooperation will continue until we reach our ultimate goal, which is to promptly eliminate the use of HEU in civil nuclear activities worldwide.

To further reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism we are working to substantially improve the ability of the United States to prevent nuclear terrorism through an effort to build a national capability to protect nuclear and radiological material, detect illicit attempts to divert it to terrorists and proliferant states, disrupt nuclear and radiological attacks by terrorists, and convict nuclear smugglers. This ongoing effort will systematically increase U.S. capabilities to work with other states to protect their fissile material, ensure that it is not diverted, detect such diversions, use their security organs to disrupt illicit nuclear transfers, and use their law enforcement tools to apprehend and imprison nuclear smugglers. To aid in this effort we have launched an effort to reach out to states with a nuclear smuggling problem and bring to bear existing U.S. programs to increase their capabilities in these areas, as required under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. We also coordinate interagency operations to prevent nuclear terrorism and support counter terrorist operations to break-up terrorist operations.


Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Nonproliferation

Question #2:

The United States has several very useful programs to help former Soviet weapons of mass destruction scientists find new careers in more socially useful areas. These programs include the International Science and Technology Centers, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, Chem/Bio Redirect, Nuclear Cities Initiative, and the Cooperative Research and Development Foundation (which is independent of the U.S. Government, but receives State Department funds). These programs have been so successful that some of them are being used as models for similar efforts to redirect Iraqi and Libyan scientists. But the programs have rarely received budget increases from this Administration, although Congress has sometimes increased their funding. Will you seek greater funds for these programs?

Answer:

We have developed a strategic framework for Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Expertise (NWMDE) that is relevant to both mature programs in Russia and Eurasia and nascent programs in Iraq and Libya. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) will allow us to exploit unanticipated opportunities in Iraq and Libya in FY 2005. In FY 2006, we plan to sustain our engagement of former Soviet, Iraqi and Libyan WMD scientists within the Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise budget line.

Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 &19, 2005

Non-Proliferation

The United States took a "principled stand" last year that nobody should be elected to a third term as IAEA Director General. No other country seems to have agreed with that stand, however, perhaps because previous IAEA Directors General have routinely served more than two terms. Nobody has filed to even challenge Dr. ElBaradei for that post, so it would appear that he will be re-elected.

Question #3

What does the United States gain by persisting in its opposition to Dr. ElBaradei's re-election, which is probably seen by other countries as based more on personal pique than on principle? Will you continue that approach in our non-proliferation policy, or will you inject more practicality into our policy?

Answer:

For many years the United States and other major donors to the UN system have expressed the view that the heads of UN organizations serve only two terms. This is not a new approach and we reminded Dr. ElBaradei of this view at the beginning of his second term as IAEA Director General. From the U.S. perspective, Dr. ElBaradei has served with distinction. However we do see merit in predictable turnover at senior levels in international organizations that a two-term policy provides. If I am confirmed, I will look carefully at the views of other governments and take them into consideration as well as discuss this with other members of the IAEA Board as we move ahead.

Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 &19, 2005

NPT Review Conference

In May 2005, the States Party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons will gather in New York for a five‑year review of the Treaty. The 2000 Review Conference seemed poised for failure, with many countries focused on proliferation on the subcontinent, the seemingly slow progress on reductions by the five nuclear weapon states, and the typical effort by Middle East nations to draw attention to Israel's nuclear program. After lengthy negotiations, however, a consensus resolution was agreed. If the results of the 2004 Preparatory Committee meeting are any indication, this year's Review Conference promises to be equally, if not more, contentious and will require high‑level, careful and focused U.S. leadership to prevent further erosion to the nonproliferation regime. Secretaries Christopher and Albright led the U.S. delegations to the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, respectively.

Question #6:

a) Will you lead the U.S. delegation at the May review conference?

b) What are we doing now to ensure that the NPT Review Conference

is successful?

Answer:

a) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the foundation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and is vital to U.S. and international security interests. Review conferences are important benchmarks in the life of the NPT. The 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) promises to be particularly important, given the many challenges the Treaty faces. Our principal focus at the RevCon will be on nonproliferation noncompliance, citing Iran and North Korea as current challenges. We will urge others to recognize the gravity of noncompliance with the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations, press all states to insist on full compliance by all Parties, and move to strengthen collective tools against proliferation.

If I am confirmed, I plan to remain closely involved as the Administration completes its preparations for the RevCon. While the Administration has not yet determined who will head the United States Delegation in New York, you may be certain that the President’s eventual designee will enjoy his full confidence and provide the necessary leadership to promote effectively the nonproliferation objectives of the United States at the RevCon.

b) The U.S. aim for the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) is an outcome that strengthens the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Our priority is the challenge to the NPT posed by non-nuclear-weapon state noncompliance with their NPT nonproliferation obligations. The RevCon can reaffirm the NPT’s contribution to international security, the need for strict compliance with all its provisions, the need for parties promptly and firmly to address cases of noncompliance, and the need to strengthen the Treaty to avert future cases of noncompliance. The proposals to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime that the President outlined in his address to the National Defense University (NDU) last February will be at the core of the initiatives that the United States will pursue at the RevCon.

In addition to noncompliance, the RevCon should also consider the threat to international security posed by non-state actor interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and non-state actor involvement in trafficking in nuclear materials, technology, and equipment. We will pursue support for the President’s NDU proposals to address these challenges from noncompliance and proliferation involving non-state actors. Among the key tools in addition to restraint on enrichment and reprocessing are the universality of the Additional Protocol, aggressive pursuit of the Proliferation Security Initiative, implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and expansion of the Global Partnership.

In the spirit of promoting full compliance with all of the provisions of the Treaty, the United States also intends to demonstrate its strong record of achievement in nuclear disarmament efforts in conjunction with NPT Article VI.

The State Department leads a strong interagency team, which meets regularly to discuss, refine, and determine ways to advance these NPT policy positions at the upcoming RevCon. The United States routinely consults before, during, and after each review process meeting with key NPT Parties, particularly U.S. allies, with the leadership of the various Preparatory Committee meetings and RevCons, with officials in the UN Secretariat, and with the relevant non-governmental organizations. United States officials also conduct frequent travel abroad to consult with foreign governments, and to represent the United States at international workshops, conferences, and seminars to advance U.S. policy positions and learn the policy priorities of other NPT Parties.


Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Proliferation Security Initiative

Several countries have joined the Proliferation Security Initiative, there have been many meetings and exercises, and the United States has signed boarding agreements with some major seafaring nations. But thus far there has been no interdiction that we know of that was clearly a PSI operation.

Question #7:

a) What real-world interdiction capability does PSI give us, what are its operational objectives, and how will we know if it has been successful and worth the effort?

b) What do you plan to do, if confirmed, to further the PSI?

Answer:

A) An important measure of PSI’s success is the foundation it provides for states to work together. Over sixty countries support the PSI and dozens have participated in or observed PSI exercises. PSI is succeeding because of the international consensus that WMD proliferation is a threat to global peace and security. PSI is also succeeding because it is based on practical actions that make maximum use of each country’s strength in countering proliferation. The real-world capability consists of partnerships being forged, contacts being made, and operational readiness established, all of which helps create a lasting basis for cooperative action against proliferation.

The PSI Operational Experts have overseen fourteen interdiction training exercises and currently have 15 sea, air, and land exercises scheduled for 2005/6 with additional regional exercises in the planning stages. These have significantly improved the interoperability of PSI participants and contribute directly to our ability to work cooperatively to interdict shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials at sea. PSI exercises also send a strong deterrent signal to those who would engage in proliferation trafficking because they could be stopped, caught and held responsible for their activities. These operational gains and deterrent benefits are already worth the effort.

B) In 2005, we will work to build on our successes. We will seek to put smooth, effective communication and operational procedures in place to interdict shipments and we will seek to use them; we will learn more about how proliferators behave; we will devise new strategies to shut down this deadly trade; and we will reach out to industry to intensify cooperation. In all, we will make it far more difficult and costly for those who engage in WMD trafficking to continue their dangerous work.

Question from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Public Diplomacy – Decline in Support for U.S. Foreign Policy

Public opinion polls abroad reflect a significant decline in support for the United States and U.S. foreign policy. For example, the “Global Attitudes Survey” in March 2004 by the Pew organization found that the percentage of people that had favorable views of the United States were just 37% in France and 38% in Germany, and much lower percentages in key countries with Islamic majorities, such as Jordan (5%), Pakistan (21%) and Turkey (30%). In the same survey, Osama bin Laden had higher favorability ratings in Pakistan (65%) and Jordan (55%).

Question #1:

To what do you attribute this decline in support for the United States in foreign countries and the significant support for bin Laden in some key Muslim countries?

Answer:

Although polling can be useful in providing insights into some aspects of public opinion, it is easy to put too much stock in polls. Even polls which gain the most attention as apparently revealing a very negative picture of America’s standing abroad show a much more complex picture with many positive aspects when we dig more deeply into the details.

America’s standing in the eyes of the world is, of course, important. We must do all we can through active public diplomacy to ensure that our policies and actions are understood and that we build sustainable relationships of mutual understanding with people and institutions in other countries.

Our goal is not popularity per se but increased understanding of American values, policies and initiatives to help create an international environment receptive to U.S. interests.

Public diplomacy is not the answer to all negative views others may hold of America. Our military, cultural and economic power, our pre-eminent position in the world can create negative reactions. In some cases, policies which we pursue as necessary for our national interest, are unpopular. We cannot forego necessary policies for the sake of international public opinion, but we can extend every effort to create understanding and acceptance if not active support.

Any support for Osama bin Ladin is disturbing in that it indicates a great lack of understanding of the threat he poses to international stability and security. One of the primary challenges for public diplomacy is to break the myth of Osama bin Ladin where it exists and support the voices of tolerance opposed to the regressive fanaticism Osama bin Ladin represents.


Question from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Public Diplomacy – Measuring PD Efforts

Question #2:

What measures do you think are necessary to improve U.S. public diplomacy efforts?

Answer:

We must improve coordination of public diplomacy strategy and activities within the Department and interagency. Within State, the Under Secretary must serve as a full advisor to the Secretary on all aspects of foreign policy, ensuring that all policy initiatives have a strategic communications component and that public diplomacy resources are deployed in support of those policy objectives. This is done now; we can do better.

We must strengthen the position of the Under Secretary. In particular, we must strengthen the effective relationship between the Under Secretary and our embassies and consulates, which shape and carry out public diplomacy for maximum impact in the field.

We have interagency mechanisms which can be used to strengthen public diplomacy. In particular the Policy Coordinating Committee process can be developed more fully in the public diplomacy context.

We must transform the conduct of diplomacy by demonstrating through action and awareness that every major strategy, policy or diplomatic initiative must have public support in order to succeed. This requires better institutional understanding of the promise of public diplomacy within the Department and foreign affairs community, promoted through vigorous outreach on the part of public diplomacy practitioners, from the Under Secretary on down.

To communicate with a skeptical world, the United States must exploit its technological edge and vastly expand its international media presence. It must build on successful exchange programs and expand face-to-face contact. Certainly greater cooperation and coordination with private sector outreach efforts will extend the reach of the American people, but we cannot rely on the private sector to carry the government's policy messages.

Additionally, public diplomacy must continue to develop meaningful methods of evaluating its performance. This will require the development of honest performance indicators, the proliferation of a culture of measurement among public diplomacy practitioners, and the professional staff to analyze results.


Question from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Public Diplomacy – Role of DoD

There have been press reports that the Department of Defense is seeking to take a leading role within the government on public diplomacy, and undertaking disinformation campaigns abroad (e.g., “Pentagon Weighs Use of Deception in Broad Arena,” The New York Times, Dec. 13, 2004).

Question #3:

a) Do you believe that the State Department should have the lead role in this area? Should the Defense Department have a significant role in this area?

b) Should the Department of Defense – outside the context of the battlefield – engage in disinformation campaigns?

Answer:

a) The State Department is charged with conducting the foreign relations of the United States, and public diplomacy falls squarely within this responsibility. The White House, through the Office of Global Communications, coordinates delivery of the President’s message across the federal government. With a continued, consistent presence worldwide and an already established infrastructure through our missions abroad, the Department of State is best equipped to advise on how to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics most effectively. We have a broad range of tested programs to do so, as well as a corps of creative public diplomacy professionals who are not afraid to innovate. State has strengthened its capacity to lead by establishing an office of policy, planning, and resources under the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Other departments and agencies, including DOD, also make valuable contributions to public diplomacy. An example is the high-visibility role played by the U.S. military in delivering relief to the victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami. State and the NSC co-chair a policy coordinating committee on Muslim World Outreach that includes Defense and several other agencies in an effective process of collaboration, an interagency model that can be applied to other tasks. Since shortly after 9/11, State has maintained a working-level fusion team, with DOD participation that manages State-DOD collaboration on strategic communication on a daily basis.

State is open to good ideas wherever they come from, and ready to work with all agencies to improve U.S. public diplomacy.

b) Truth is our greatest public affairs weapon and the Department of State will not ever seek to influence the media or others with lies or half-truths. I would argue strenuously against others in the U.S. Government using disinformation tactics. Deliberate deceptions and falsehoods can seriously undermine the credibility of the U.S. Government and irreparably harm our foreign policy and our national security. The credibility of the United States is too valuable an asset to risk for a momentary advantage.


Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Afghanistan - Warlords

Much of Afghanistan remains dominated by regional warlords. Many (if not all) have been supported by U.S. military and civilian authorities in the past, and continue to be supported by U.S. authorities today.

Question #1:

a) Is disbanding warlord militias an Administration objective? Is the Administration prepared to sever all ties with warlords (such as Hajji Ali in Jalalabad, among many others) who currently receive active support from various U.S. government sources?

b) Does the Administration plan a significant acceleration of the DDR program (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) to break the power of the warlords?

Answer:

In 2001, the U.S. military worked closely with regional leaders against the Taliban regime. After the Taliban’s defeat, the U.S. government recognized the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA), which has since become the Government of Afghanistan. The Afghan central government has the full support of the U.S. We believe that President Karzai and the Government of Afghanistan have made important progress in consolidating authority over the entire nation. The successful, nationwide presidential election was just one example of broad recognition of central government authority by the Afghan people.

a) The successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of warlord militias remains a top priority for the Administration. We have supported the Government of Afghanistan’s strategy of ensuring central government authority and removing from positions of power those who oppose it. For example, President Karzai peacefully removed Hazrat Ali from his command of the 1st Corps and reappointed him to a less influential role as the police chief of the Nangarhar province. The President also removed Fahim Khan from the vice-presidential ticket and his position as Minister of Defense. All of this transpired peacefully, and with full U.S. support. The Administration also supports the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) DDR program, led by the Japanese, which promotes cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan in encouraging warlords to relinquish their weapons and participate in the political process. This strategy has been highly successful; several top warlords (such as Ismael Khan and Abdul Rashid Dostum) have chosen to cultivate political careers.

b) The disarmament and demobilization components of the DDR program will be completed by June 2005, and all former militia members will complete the reintegration process by summer 2006. The DDR program has been highly successful. Of the estimated 48,000-militia members, the DDR program has disarmed approximately 32,000 to date. The U.S. also supports the Afghan government’s efforts to disarm and unofficial combatants as well. Several hundred unofficial militia combatants have participated in disarmament and reintegration programs.

Questions from Senator Joseph Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Afghanistan - Security

Over the past two years, security in Afghanistan has not materially improved. In 2004, more Coalition and Afghan soldiers, and more humanitarian aid workers, were killed than in any of the previous two years. Reconstruction efforts have been seriously hindered by the upsurge in attacks on NGO workers.

Question #2:

a) When does the Administration expect security to improve sufficiently to permit NGOs to resume full-scale reconstruction and relief efforts throughout the country?

b) U.S. troops are still not tasked with the mission of providing security to most of the country outside the south and southeast. In the run-up to the forthcoming parliamentary election, will U.S. troops be tasked with this mission?

Answer:

a) Coalition and Afghan efforts have dramatically weakened the Taliban as a fighting force. There are indications that some Taliban members are interested in participating in a reconciliation program promoted by President Karzai, which will further reduce the Taliban’s ability to disrupt the lives of the Afghan people. In addition, the Afghan National Army is deployed in many areas throughout the country and Afghan troops have been operating alongside U.S. forces in the south and southeast of the country. As the security situation improves, we will work to encourage NGOs to increase their activities throughout the country.

b) As was done successfully with the October 2004 presidential election, the U.S. will coordinate with the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and NATO-ISAF forces to provide security for the parliamentary elections. NATO has committed to provide additional troops to its ISAF mission for the election period.

Question from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Afghanistan - Reconstruction Assistance

In April 2002, President Bush promised a reconstruction commitment to Afghanistan comparable to the Marshall Plan. To date, this commitment remains unmet: the sums allocated for reconstruction in 2001-2004 amount to less than $4 billion, while the country’s basic reconstruction needs over the next seven years are estimated by the World Bank to be at least $27.5 billion.

Question #3:

Are you content with the sums allocated, and with the pace of reconstruction in Afghanistan? Do you plan to review this issue and propose changes?

Answer:

We are satisfied with both the amount of U.S. assistance provided to Afghanistan as well as the pace of our reconstruction efforts, and appreciate the Congress’ continuing support for our efforts to assist the Afghan people. As you know, Afghanistan is in the midst of a historic transition, and the U.S. has been a leader in making it all possible. In just over three years, extraordinary progress on political, security, and reconstruction fronts has been achieved, in large part due to the generosity of our assistance program, which from FY 2001 through FY 2004 has topped over $4.5 billion, by far the largest of any international donor.

A direct by-product of U.S. leadership has been the strong commitment and staying power shown by the international community toward Afghanistan’s reconstruction. To date, donor pledges have reflected widespread confidence in Afghanistan’s future, recently reinforced by successful presidential elections. Nowhere was this more evident than at the last donor gathering, held in Berlin, Germany in April 2004. In Berlin, donors pledged $4.5 billion for Afghan FY 1383 (runs March 2004 - March 2005), actually exceeding the GOA’s budgetary requirements for that fiscal year. In addition, the three-year figure pledged by donors in Berlin amounted to $8.2 billion, or 69% of the GOA's three-year target of $11.9 billion. The $8.2 billion raised in Berlin significantly exceeded the total amount raised at the first Afghan donor conference in Tokyo in January 2002 ($4.5 billion total). The U.S. is working with the GOA and other donors to ensure follow-through on pledges.

In FY 2005, Afghanistan will continue to be a top priority for U.S. national security, both as a linchpin for regional stability in South Asia and a central focus of the Global War on Terror. Total USG funding levels for Afghanistan’s reconstruction in FY 2005 are estimated to be at least $1.6 billion, which includes a foreign operations appropriation of $980 million, plus various spending authorities available to the Department of Defense for security-related reconstruction projects, such as the Afghan National Army and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

The Afghanistan Interagency Operation Group (AIOG), in conjunction with our Mission in Kabul, is constantly re-evaluating the efficacy of our assistance program to Afghanistan and will continue to do so in FY 2005.


Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

India

Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP): The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative, which President Bush and then-Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced in January 2004, has generated considerable hopes, but thus far little real progress.

Question # 1:

(a) Is it possible to grant India the access to U.S. technology it desires without violating U.S. obligations under the NPT and membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group?

(b) If the Administration is hampered by existing legislation, what specific laws would need to be changed, and does the Administration plan to seek these changes?

(c) Is NSSP intended to include possible militarization of space beyond ABM technology? Is cooperation envisioned in such areas as anti-satellite weaponry?

Answer:

(a) We believe our Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) with India is making progress as an initiative to increase bilateral cooperation in the civil nuclear, civil space and high technology areas and increase discussion on strategic stability issues, including missile defense. Nothing in the NSSP entails changes to U.S. nonproliferation obligations, including under the NPT and our commitments as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India desires to expand its civilian nuclear power sector to meet its growing energy needs. The Indian government has expressed interest in a greater degree of cooperation with the U.S. on nuclear safety, including access to controlled technology, than the NSSP contemplates. India is seeking some U.S. technology and equipment that is NSG controlled, and therefore the provision of such technology and equipment would be inconsistent with the NSG Guidelines.

(b) The Administration is not hampered by existing legislation in carrying out its current policies toward India in this area. We have no plans to pursue changes to U.S. law at this time given the implications for our broader nonproliferation efforts and our NSG commitments.

(c) The answer to both questions is no.


Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan - AQ Khan Nuclear Ring

President Bush has touted the exposure of the proliferation ring run by Pakistan’s chief nuclear scientists, AQ Khan, as a great victory. To date, however, the extent of the network remains unknown, and AQ Khan received a full pardon from President Musharraf for his crimes. He has not even been questioned by US or IAEA officials.

Question #1:

a) Do you believe AQ Khan’s proliferation ring operated without the knowledge or tacit support of ranking members of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment?

b) It has been a year since the leadership of the Committee was briefed on these sensitive issues. Will you update the Committee on this issue soon, and periodically thereafter?

Answer:

We believe that Pakistan takes seriously its commitment to dismantle the A.Q. Khan network and ensure that Pakistan will not be a source for proliferation in the future. The United States does not need direct access to A.Q. Khan in order to obtain information about his dealings. Pakistan is conducting its own investigation into the A.Q. Khan network and is sharing information from that investigation with us.

We value the assurances given by President Musharraf that the Government of Pakistan was not participating in any kind of nuclear proliferation activity.

We want to keep the leadership informed and are happy to consider, in consultation with other relevant agencies, your request for additional information.

Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan - Democratization

There has been no official protest of Gen. Musharraf’s decision to remain as Chief of Army Staff while serving as President of Pakistan, which reversed an earlier pledge he made to relinquish the position.

Question #2:

What is the Administration’s view of this decision? What do you think will be the implications of this decision, and the Administration’s lack of public criticism of it to date, for the Administration’s pro-democracy policies in the Muslim world?

Answer:

Democratization is a key focus of USG assistance for Pakistan. The U.S. believes it is in Pakistan’s long-term interest to continue its transition to a fully functioning democracy. President Musharraf has spoken clearly of the need to transform Pakistan into a prosperous, modern state and leading voice of moderation in the Islamic world, and we support his commitment to this effort.

At the same time, we are committed to a long-term relationship with Pakistan that goes beyond individuals. We regularly impress upon our GOP interlocutors the need to continue to make progress on democratization, including holding free and fair multi-party elections in 2007, as scheduled. As democracy involves more than elections, we also want to see Pakistan strengthen its institutions, particularly its judiciary and Parliament, enabling political parties and opposition leaders to operate freely, and increasing transparency. We also encourage Parliament’s ongoing debate on discriminatory legislation that affects women and religious minorities.

We assist Pakistan’s democratization efforts through USG-funded assistance programs aimed at making Pakistani democracy more participatory, representative, and accountable. This includes strengthening national and provincial legislatures, political parties, NGO’s, and independent media. In FY 2004 alone, USAID obligated $11.2 million to assist national and provincial legislatures, build civil society, and aid local governments, while the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) has allocated $1.4 million to strengthen independent media, promote the rule of law, and educate human rights activists. State intends to provide support for Pakistan’s 2005 local elections.

Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan – F-16s

In September 2004, Pakistani Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat stated that the Administration had committed to deliver new F-16s shortly after the U.S. Elections.

Question #3:

a) Does the Administration plan to resume sales of F-16s to Pakistan? If a sale of such symbolic value were to be made, what does Administration hope to gain in return?

b) If the Administration intends to resume transfers of F-16s, will it engage in meaningful consultation with Congress prior to making such a decision?

Answer:

The GOP formally requested the sale of F-16’s in July 2004 and has raised this issue with us on several occasions. Since their first request for F-16’s, Pakistan has made substantial progress in the war on terror, has acted decisively to shut down A.Q. Khan’s proliferation activities, and has pursued peace with India. We will closely examine the impact on regional stability and America’s long term national interest and consult with Congress prior to any action being taken.


Questions from Senator Joseph R. Biden

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Pakistan - Counterterrorism

While the Pakistani government has been an important ally against Al Qaeda, this commitment is not shared by all members of the nation’s ISI intelligence agency. Various CIA and U.S. military officials have expressed disappointment at the lack of cooperation from ISI in operations in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where Osama bin Laden and other top Al Qaeda leaders are believed to be hiding.

Question #4:

a) Do you believe the ISI is cooperating fully in the battle against the Taliban (as opposed to Al Qaeda)?

b) Are you content with the Pakistani government’s decision to permit terrorist groups like Jaish-e Muhammad and Lashkar-e Taeba to maintain their structure with only cosmetic changes in name and leadership?

Answer:

The GOP is working with us to ensure that Pakistani territory is not used for attacks on the U.S. or Afghanistan. With our assistance, the GOP has constructed new observation posts along its border with Afghanistan and has conducted several military campaigns against foreign miltants -- including al-Qaida and Taliban and other allied groups -- in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Pak-Afghan border. These operations have resulted in the death or arrest of many Taliban and Al Qaeda sympathizers, and they are continuing. Pakistani forces have suffered significant casualties.

As for Jaish-e Muhammad and Lashkar-e Taeba, groups involved primarily in the Kashmir insurgency, the U.S. has repeatedly urged the Pakistani government to stop all infiltration across the Line of Control and to dismantle the infrastructure these groups maintain in Pakistan, and GOP has made some progress, though much remains. We will continue to do so.

Questions for the Record Submitted to

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by

Senator Blanche Lincoln (#1)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 18 & 19, 2005

Question:

Please describe your knowledge and current status of the case of Heidi Al-Omary, an American citizen who was abducted to Saudi Arabia by her non-custodial, Saudi-born father in 1997 in violation of U.S. law and a valid custody order.

Answer:

Heidi Al-Omary is the tragic victim of a case of international parental child abduction. Although abducted in 1997, she was not located in Saudi Arabia until 1999. The State Department has conducted visits to check on Heidi’s welfare on six occasions, most recently in December 2004. Heidi’s mother, Margaret McClain, succeeded in visiting her briefly in July 2002, following considerable negotiations between the U.S. Consulate in Dhahran, supported by Saudi officials, and the father. Ms. McClain’s second and most recent visit was in May 2003, when she spent five days with Heidi.

While we appreciate the Saudi Government’s assistance in making these visits possible, we nonetheless continue to make clear to the Saudi government that our ultimate goal is Heidi’s return to the United States. The Saudis have created an interministerial commission to work with the Department towards solutions to the problem of abducted and illegally retained children, including Heidi Al-Omary, and we continue to push at every level for action.

Ms. McClain intends to visit her daughter in the summer of 2005 and is working closely with the Office of Children’s Issues to coordinate possible financial assistance with the Saudi government. The U.S. Consulate in Dhahran has sent a report on its most recent December 2004 visit with Heidi to the Office of Children’s Issues, which has relayed the information to Ms. McClain.

Drafted: CA/OCS/CI:Joan Cristini x 6-9165

Doc: S/OCSDOCS/CI/Saudi Arabia/QFR’s Secstate- Designate Rice Jan 05, 01-26-2005

Cleared: CA:MHarty ok

CA:DBSmith ok

CA/OCS:CBarry ok

CA/OCS:AMoore ok

CA/OCS/CI:MBernier-Toth ok

CA/OCS/CI:GKeiser ok

CA/OCS/ACS/NESA:VLopatkiewicz ok

NEA/ARPI:DWhiddon ok

CA/P:DStaeben ok

H:JWalsh ok

D:RRyu ok

P:JDeHart ok

S/P:Ebarks-Ruggles ok

M:RMaxwell ok

M/P:MCoffey ok

Questions for the Record Submitted to

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by

Senator Blanche Lincoln (#2)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 18 & 19, 2005

Question:

If you are confirmed as Secretary of State, what specific steps are you prepared to take to secure the return of Heidi Al-Omary to her rightful home in the United States? Please include a time-line.

Answer:

If confirmed by the Senate, I will press for the return of abducted and wrongfully retained children using every lawful means available at every possible level. I will ensure that our Embassy in Riyadh continues to work closely with the Saudi Interministerial Commission to communicate our concerns, explore solutions, and push for action. I will see that the Office of Children’s Issues continues to work closely with its counterparts in the Saudi Embassy to articulate the urgency of our interests and assist with fashioning resolutions to these problems. Department officials have been speaking with and meeting regularly with Saudi Embassy officials to press for the return of Heidi Al-Omary and other children that are victims of international child abduction in Saudi Arabia. We intend to meet these officials on a regular basis until all the cases are resolved.

Drafted: CA/OCS/CI:Joan Cristini x 6-9165

Doc: S/OCSDOCS/CI/Saudi Arabia/QFR’s Secstate- Designate Rice Jan 05, 01-26-2005

Cleared: CA:MHarty ok

CA:DBSmith ok

CA/OCS:CBarry ok

CA/OCS:AMoore ok

CA/OCS/CI:MBernier-Toth ok

CA/OCS/CI:GKeiser ok

CA/OCS/ACS/NESA:VLopatkiewicz ok

NEA/ARPI:DWhiddon ok

CA/P:DStaeben ok

H:JWalsh ok

D:RRyu ok

P:JDeHart ok

S/P:Ebarks-Ruggles ok

M:RMaxwell ok

M/P:MCoffey ok

Questions for the Record Submitted to

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by

Senator Blanche Lincoln (#3)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 18 & 19, 2005

Question:

Will you raise the case of Heidi Al-Omary and other child abduction cases with Saudi officials at the earliest opportunity during your tenure in office if you are confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Secretary of State?

Answer:

Yes. There is no higher priority for the Department of State than the protection of American citizens abroad, especially our youngest citizens like Heidi Al-Omary.

Drafted: CA/OCS/CI:Joan Cristini x 6-9165

Doc: S/OCSDOCS/CI/Saudi Arabia/QFR’s Secstate- Designate Rice Jan 05, 01-26-2005

Cleared: CA:MHarty ok

CA:DBSmith ok

CA/OCS:CBarry ok

CA/OCS:AMoore ok

CA/OCS/CI:MBernier-Toth ok

CA/OCS/CI:GKeiser ok

CA/OCS/ACS/NESA:VLopatkiewicz ok

NEA/ARPI:DWhiddon ok

CA/P:DStaeben ok

H:JWalsh ok

D:RRyu ok

P:JDeHart ok

S/P:Ebarks-Ruggles ok

M:RMaxwell ok

M/P:MCoffey ok

Questions for the Record Submitted to

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by

Senator Blanche Lincoln (#4)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 18 & 19, 2005

Question:

Do you believe female American citizens who have been abducted to a country like Saudi Arabia are at particular risk since under Saudi law and custom women have very limited autonomy and may never have an opportunity to leave the country – even as adults?

Answer:

When any American citizen is kept from returning to their home country or wrongfully detained in another country, the trauma to the person (male or female) is immediate and compounded each day. Over the years, the Department of State has worked to ensure the free travel of American citizens and continues working with the government of Saudi Arabia toward formalizing an agreement ensuring the freedom of travel to adult female American citizens residing in Saudi Arabia. Our position is that any adult wrongfully prevented from departing a country should be allowed to depart. We have long recognized the particular risk for children or adults under Saudi law. These cases are often difficult to resolve once the person has left from the United States to a country whose judicial system, cultural traditions, and family law are radically different from our own. We will continue to explore the viability of bilateral consular arrangements that could improve freedom of travel for adult American women.

Drafted: CA/OCS/CI:Joan Cristini x 6-9165

Doc: S/OCSDOCS/CI/Saudi Arabia/QFR’s Secstate- Designate Rice Jan 05, 01-26-2005

Cleared: CA:MHarty ok

CA:DBSmith ok

CA/OCS:CBarry ok

CA/OCS:AMoore ok

CA/OCS/CI:MBernier-Toth ok

CA/OCS/CI:GKeiser ok

CA/OCS/ACS/NESA:VLopatkiewicz ok

NEA/ARPI:DWhiddon ok

CA/P:DStaeben ok

H:JWalsh ok

D:RRyu ok

P:JDeHart ok

S/P:Ebarks-Ruggles ok

M:RMaxwell ok

M/P:MCoffey ok

Questions for the Record Submitted to

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by

Senator Blanche Lincoln (#5)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 18 & 19, 2005

Question:

Will you make the return of American citizens who are the victim of international abduction a priority if you are confirmed as Secretary of State?

Answer:

Yes. The Department of State is committed to seeking the return of abducted and wrongfully retained children to their habitual residence in the United States through lawful means.

Drafted: CA/OCS/CI:Joan Cristini x 6-9165

Doc: S/OCSDOCS/CI/Saudi Arabia/QFR’s Secstate- Designate Rice Jan 05, 01-26-2005

Cleared: CA:MHarty ok

CA:DBSmith ok

CA/OCS:CBarry ok

CA/OCS:AMoore ok

CA/OCS/CI:MBernier-Toth ok

CA/OCS/CI:GKeiser ok

CA/OCS/ACS/NESA:VLopatkiewicz ok

NEA/ARPI:DWhiddon ok

CA/P:DStaeben ok

H:JWalsh ok

D:RRyu ok

P:JDeHart ok

S/P:Ebarks-Ruggles ok

M:RMaxwell ok

M/P:MCoffey ok

Questions for the Record Submitted to

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice by

Senator Blanche Lincoln (#6)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 18 & 19, 2005

Question:

Will you commit to me that you will keep me and Ms. McClain informed of your efforts to secure the release of my constituent, Heidi Al-Omary, if you are confirmed by the U.S. Senate?

Answer:

Yes, I will be pleased to keep you informed.

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR

BILL NELSON

TAB SUBJECT

1. Haiti

2. Colombia

3. Latin America

4. Russia

5. North Korea

6. Afghanistan

7. Iraq


Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Haiti

Question#1:

Haiti remains a country teetering on the edge of disaster. A small contingent of peacekeeping troops is all that prevents Haiti from once again descending into chaos. Bearing this in mind, why is the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti still undermanned seven months after its initial authorization by the UN Security Council? Haiti is short 1,910 military personnel out of a total authorization of 6,700 and 352 short of a total authorization of 1,622 for civilian police. In other words, the military personnel is only at 70% strength and civilian police only stand at 78%. Do you find this acceptable? What are the specific steps that will be taken to rectify this situation, recruiting the necessary forces and ensuring that they are effectively supported on the ground?

Answer:

The UN Stabilization Force in Haiti (MINUSTAH) now has 6,334 of the 6,700 troops and 1,398 of the 1,622 civilian police authorized by the Security Council. We continue to work with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ensure that additional and appropriate police and troop personnel are assigned to Haiti.

The Brazilian-led UN Mission has begun to establish a presence in the hardest-hit areas of Port au Prince. Security remains a major challenge and we fully support the UN in its job of providing security and training and vetting new and existing HNP so the Haitians can take responsibility for their own security. To that end, we have provided 25 US CIVPOL to the MINUSTAH mission, and are providing over $6 million in bilateral support to build the capacity of the HNP.


Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Haiti

Question #2:

What specific countries were contacted by our government to encourage their participation in this mission? Are you satisfied that the U.S. has contacted an appropriate number of countries to encourage and support their participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti?

Answer:

The United Nations has the primary responsibility to request that Member States contribute forces and personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Working closely with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the U.S. separately contacted Jordan, Brazil, Argentina, Nepal, Uruguay, Canada, France, Italy, Chile, Peru, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador, the Philippines, and Paraguay to encourage their participation in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

We are satisfied that we contacted the appropriate number of countries that we believed would participate. MINUSTAH’s force level is now close to the maximum authorized strength of 6,700.


Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Haiti

Question #3:

The tragic storms and subsequent flooding in Gonaives resulted in a terrible loss of life and subsequent dislocation for many Haitians. What was the U.S. commitment to supporting the rehabilitation of these communities? What is our current commitment? Are you satisfied with results that have been achieved in recuperating these communities?

Answer:

We have made $46 million in assistance, including $38 million from the supplemental appropriation, available for the rehabilitation of areas affected by flooding during Tropical Storm Jeanne. We greatly appreciate the bipartisan support we received from Congress to assist the Haitian people recover from this disaster.

We have signed contracts for rehabilitation of irrigation systems, hillside stabilization, road repair, and other infrastructure projects. Over 5,000 Haitians are employed by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in a clean-up program that has removed 15,300 cubic meters of mud from the city of Gonaives. Food is being provided to approximately 80,000 people and we have repaired ten pumps that are being used for irrigation and drinking water. Silt is being removed from the primary canals to further increase water availability and ten tons of bean seeds have been distributed to farmers.

We have made a long-term commitment to the affected area and are focused not only on repairing the damage, but the environmental causes for the flooding.


Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Haiti

Question #4:

What is the goal of U.S. policy towards Haiti? I suggest that it is long-term support to establish a stable democratic government that guarantees the security and economic well-being of its people. But U.S. policy over the last several years was a series of fits and starts, which has not fostered the profound changes that can be achieved through a deep and steadfast commitment. What are the specific steps as Secretary of State that you will take to ensure that we create a stable and safe Haiti?

Answer:

Our goals in Haiti are to give the Haitian people the tools they need to create a democratic government, stable institutions and a viable economy. To achieve this, we and the international community are first working to stabilize the security situation. This is accomplished through the UN Stabilization Mission, which along with the Haitian National Police has primary responsibility for security, and through the promotion of economic growth and the development of sound political institutions. Elections this fall will be vital to the establishment of a democratic government that, with broad popular support, can build on the momentum of the Interim Government to address the vast social and economic challenges Haiti faces. One of the lessons learned from prior interventions in Haiti is the need to proceed steadily and for the long haul, which we and the UN are prepared to do.

Haitians face serious and daunting challenges to establishing a viable democracy and the rule of law. Haitians are the first to concede their history has been too often characterized by violence, authoritarianism and criminality. Former President Aristide’s administration sadly followed that model. The Interim Government of Haiti has begun the process of establishing the rule of law to give the Haitian people the quality government they deserve. Aristide’s lawful resignation and departure opens the door for this in the first time in a decade.

The job of building Haitian democracy is up to Haitians themselves, but the U.S. and the international community can and will help them build viable institutions and institute good governance.


Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleeza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Haiti

Question #5:

Why has the Administration not come out in support of the HERO act introduced by my colleague Senator DeWine? This legislation provides Haiti with economic advantages that would attract industry and create jobs for the Haitian people. We must restore a sense of hope to the Haitian people. This legislation offers only the first small step in that direction. But it appears that the Administration is not even committed to this step, casting our overall commitment into question.

Answer:

We strongly support the people of Haiti. We continue our efforts to help the Interim Government to fashion a more prosperous economy that produces quality jobs for its people. Clearly, Haiti’s economic development is in the U.S. interest. Creating jobs and economic opportunity in Haiti will make Haitians less dependent on foreign assistance for survival. It will help deter illegal migration and provide alternatives to drug smuggling as a source of income. It will increase the government’s revenue base and the country’s overall stability.

The United States has taken broad steps to assist Haiti, including a pledge of $230 million at the World Bank Donors’ Conference, which included $22 million to support economic growth and job creation. The textile sector seems to offer the greatest opportunity to produce new jobs relatively quickly. We must take care, however, to ensure that American workers do not suffer negative consequences as we work to help Haiti. While the Senate passed the HERO legislation in the last Congress that would have granted new textile benefits to Haiti, the House took no action. If confirmed, I want to work with the Congress to fashion legislation that will find the right balance between job growth in Haiti and maintaining jobs here at home.

Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Colombia

Question #1:

Please provide an update on the status of the three American hostages, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell, held by the FARC in Colombia. How regularly are their families contacted and updated on the situation? I want to ensure that you will personally raise this issue at every opportunity with the Colombian government to make certain that these men are brought home safely and as soon as possible.

Answer:

In Colombia, there is no higher priority for the United States Government than the safe return of Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell, whose captivity will reach two years on February 13, 2005.

Our continued efforts to locate the hostages include employing all assets of national power: diplomatic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, military, and public diplomacy. In Washington, Miami, and Bogotá, dedicated U.S. Government officials are working daily to bring them home.

We are working closely with the Colombian government and other governments. We have and will continue to raise this issue at the highest levels. President Bush and President Uribe most recently discussed the situation during their Cartagena meeting in November 2004. Ambassador Wood is in frequent contact with President Uribe and his cabinet about the three Americans. The Government of Colombia is providing the fullest cooperation possible.

The Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs (State/CA) has been the principal point of contact with the hostages’ families on behalf of the U.S. Government since February 2003. An officer in the Consular Bureau’s Directorate of Overseas Citizen Services calls family members every week to keep them updated. The State Department hosted each family for a day of briefings from interagency representatives in February, March and April 2004, as part of our continuing efforts to keep them informed, respond to their questions and concerns personally, and remain in close touch with them. The Department is preparing to hold another round of meetings soon. The Department of Justice and FBI have also had direct contact with the families.

You have my commitment that the State Department and I will continue to utilize every opportunity to secure the safe return of Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes as soon as possible.


Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Latin America

Question #1:

In Latin America there are troubling trends in both security and democracy. We see frightening movements of Al Qaida and other international terrorist organizations that indicate an expansion of their operations in Latin America. We also see democratically-elected leaders govern in undemocratic ways, while others are too weak to govern properly and in some cases are forced to resign because they are ineffective. How do we balance these critical but sometimes competing interests? We must tread carefully to ensure that we do not jeopardize our interests in strengthening democracy as we work to secure these countries from the threats of international terrorism.

Answer:

Enhancing security and promoting democracy go hand-in-hand. Our efforts to strengthen the rule of law and provide equal access to justice are essential not only to enhance security and deepen democracy, but also to ensure that all citizens of the Hemisphere benefit from the fruits of democracy and economic development. Around the world, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and other transnational criminals pose a threat to democracy, and they flourish where the rule of law is weak. We will continue to support justice and law enforcement programs that create the environment necessary for democracy to thrive. At the same time, we will help our partners develop the capacity to deny the use of their territory and infrastructure to terrorists, assist them in protecting critical infrastructure such as the Panama Canal, and strengthen regional mechanisms that address terrorism.

Multilaterally, we will support OAS efforts to both strengthen democracy and build effective counter-terrorism capacities, focused on increased border and financial controls, transportation security (aviation and ports), and cyber-security. In pursuing our goals, we will diligently promote adherence to the principles of democracy, including respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms.


Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Latin America

Question #2:

President Bush made the Western Hemisphere one of his top priorities at the beginning of his first administration. After September 11, his attention naturally refocused to other areas of the world. After three years, we have seen the troubling results of turning our backs too strongly on this region. Latin America continues to face difficult issues of security drug trafficking, poverty, disease, and instability. As Secretary of State, how will you make Latin America again a priority?

Answer:

While events elsewhere in the world have demanded increased attention and resources, President Bush has continued to recognize the strong economic, political, security, and cultural ties that inexorably link together the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Our policy toward the Western Hemisphere focuses on bolstering security, strengthening democracy, promoting prosperity and investing in people – working within a multilateral framework.

We will have two unique opportunities in 2005 to reinforce and demonstrate the high priority that we place on the Hemisphere: the U.S.-hosted General Assembly of the Organization of American States scheduled for June in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida and the November Summit of the Americas in Argentina.

Building on the recent successes in the Hemisphere and the strong bipartisan support in Congress for our policies in the region, we will continue to focus our efforts on reducing drug production and trafficking, combating poverty, and confronting instability in the region. Our successes in Colombia, from counterterrorism operations and coca eradication to alternative development, highlight how U.S. support can make a critical difference.

In a similar vein, the U.S. has committed to improve health and reduce infectious diseases through the Global AIDS Initiative and the Summit of the Americas process. Our free trade initiatives, including trade capacity building, are eliminating trade barriers, opening new markets, and committing countries to modern trading rules. These efforts demonstrate the importance the U.S. places on such an important region.


Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 and 19, 2005

Russia

Question #1:

The situation in Russia becomes more troubling every day. President Putin appears determined to dismantle the democratic institutions that were created in Russia over the past decade. I am troubled that the Administration has not taken a more vocal stand in criticizing President Putin’s actions. As a student of Russia, you must be troubled by this situation. As Secretary of State how will you approach this problem?

Answer:

U.S. support for democracy in Russia is in our strategic interest, as we believe it is in Russia’s. We also believe that a stable, healthy, democratic Russia will make a stronger partner internationally. We must first recognize that the Russia of today bears little resemblance to the Russia that emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union. Much progress has been made in its path towards a market-oriented democracy.

However, progress has not been even, and recent trends show considerable backsliding. We must continue to maintain open channels with counterparts at all levels of the Government of Russia so that we can share with them our questions and concerns about how negative trends in these areas will have a detrimental impact on our relationship. We must also continue to maintain close relations with those individuals and groups in Russia that are advocating for democratic values and institutions. We must continue to provide robust support for programs that strengthen the rule of law, help fight corruption, and defend democratic values in Russia. We must continue to support linkages between American and Russian institutions and individuals that focus on these issues. In FY 2005, we plan to spend over $43 million for democracy programs in Russia – about a third more than we did in FY 2004. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress to ensure continued strong support for democratization in Russia.


Question from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

North Korea

Question #1:

What have we accomplished with our North Korea Policy over the past four years? Kim Jong Il remains in power and his people continue to suffer an arduous daily existence. We believe that he increased the number of nuclear weapons in his arsenal and the six-party talks occur in fits and starts. Keeping in mind the events of the past four years, how are we going to alter this policy moving forward?

Answer:

We believe the approach the Administration is pursuing can lead to a resolution of our concerns, but it will require further hard work and some -- but not unlimited -- patience and perserverance.

North Korea has for decades pursued a nuclear weapons program, which threatens the entire East Asia region and the integrity of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The President has repeatedly made it clear he seeks a peaceful diplomatic resolution to the North Korea nuclear issue. The United States has adhered to three basic principles to achieve that outcome. First, we seek the dismantlement of all DPRK nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner, subject to international verification. We cannot accept another partial solution that fails to deal with the entirety of the problem, allowing North Korea to threaten others continually with a revival of its nuclear program. Second, because North Korea’s nuclear weapons threaten the international community, multilateral diplomacy is the best approach to resolving the issue. Third, we will not reward North Korea for coming back into compliance with its international obligations.

In April 2003, we held a round of trilateral discussions in Beijing, with China and the DPRK. We made clear future talks would need to include the ROK and Japan, and we welcomed the participation of Russia as well.

The Six-Party Talks were launched in August 2003, with China as host. The five parties all told North Korea very clearly in plenary session that they will not accept North Korea’s possessing nuclear arms.

At the Second Round of talks, in February 2004, the parties agreed to regularize the talks, and to establish a working group to set issues up for resolution at the plenary meetings. The ROK offered fuel aid to the DPRK, if there were a comprehensive and verifiable halt of its nuclear programs as a first step toward complete nuclear dismantlement, and other non-U.S. parties subsequently expressed a willingness to do so as well. Also subsequent to the Second Round of talks, two sessions of the Working Group were held, running two to three days each.

Questions from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18-19, 2005

Afghanistan

Question #1:

The growing and pervasive threat of drug trafficking to the security and stability of Afghanistan is frightening and dangerous. We have ignored this problem for far too long and allowed the illicit opium economy to re-develop across the country. I am concerned that any reaction at this point will be a case of too little too late, particularly with such a small presence of American troops who are already focused on the task of capturing OBL and other Al Qaeda leaders. I noticed that the majority of the money being used for anti-narcotics programs in Afghanistan is from accounts controlled by the State Department. How will you effectively coordinate with DOD to ensure that these funds are spent properly and effectively? How will we effectively fight the cultivation of opium poppies without alienating the Afghan people, threatening support for their nascent government?

Answer:

We have an important opportunity to leverage USG resources to support President Karzai’s determination to rid Afghanistan of the scourge of illicit narcotics. Working closely together in Kabul, all USG agencies are focused on ensuring a coordinated, cost-effective and successful counter-narcotics effort. An Embassy Interagency Planning Group (EIPG), reporting to the Ambassador, facilitates coordination. General Barno, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, maintains an office with dedicated staff at Embassy Kabul that is literally steps from the Ambassador’s office.

The Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) is responsible for implementing the eradication component of the USG’s five-part counternarcotics plan in Afghanistan, and plays a substantial role in coordinating and/or implementing the other four parts: public information, alternative livelihoods, law enforcement, and interdiction.

INL officers in Washington and Kabul work closely with the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies that are involved in Afghan counternarcotics, including USAID, Department of Agriculture, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Department of Justice, through regular discussions and communications. In Washington, substantial interagency coordination occurs through the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group (AIOG), which meets several times a week. It is co-chaired by the State Department's Afghanistan Coordinator and an NSC senior staff member, and includes Defense and other interagency representatives. There are also periodic interagency meetings at more senior levels in Washington.

The Afghan Government understands that a nation based on the cultivation of opium poppy is not sustainable. As one of his first acts following his election, President Karzai made a dramatic call for the elimination of the illicit narcotics trade in Afghanistan, calling it a direct threat to the development of a stable, democratic society that respects human rights and the rule of law. We believe that the Afghan people and their government understand the need to address this problem quickly.

One of the key parts of our counternarcotics plan is an aggressive alternative livelihoods program, which will provide Afghans with short- and long-term sources of income to encourage their movement out of the poppy economy. Through employment, business and infrastructure creation, Afghans in affected areas will receive short-term cash for work as well as longer-term opportunities to produce, process, and sell marketable crops other than poppy. Alternative livelihoods programs will also assist the central government in working through its provincial ministry representatives and governors to bring legitimate government services to the major poppy-producing provinces.

Another component of our plan is a robust public information campaign in Afghanistan. Posters and radio messages in local languages are already informing the Afghan public of the danger and immorality of narcotics cultivation and trafficking, and President Karzai has been speaking out forcefully against the drug trade.

The Department looks forward to continued close consultation and cooperation with Congress as we support the Afghan Government’s fight against poppies. We appreciate your continued support for the resources necessary to implement programs for all parts of our counternarcotics plan.


Question from Senator Bill Nelson

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Iraq

Question #1:

From time to time there are whispers that the Iranian presence in Iraq is pervasive. What are your views on the role of the Iranians in Iraq? How widespread is their presence and how effective can they be in securing an Iraqi government they can influence? Without diplomatic relations with Iran, how effective can we be at competing with their wider influence?

Answer:

Senior officials of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) have publicly voiced their concerns about Iranian interference in Iraq. For example, there are reports that Iran provided funding, safe transit, and arms to insurgents and to Muqtada al-Sadr's forces. Iraq’s other neighbors have also expressed concern about Iran’s meddling in Iraq’s domestic political affairs. We share these concerns, and we will continue to work closely with the IIG and its elected successor to address all issues related to Iraq’s stability and security.

We have also made clear to Iran that we will oppose actions that undermine Iraq’s stability. Our policy remains that we are willing to engage with Iran on specific issues of mutual concern, in an appropriate manner, if and when the President determines it is in our interest to do so. Iraq is clearly one of those issues.

I believe details of Iranian involvement in Iraq are better described in a closed briefing.

Questions from Senator Russell Feingold

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleeza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Africa – Charles Taylor

Former Liberian President Charles Taylor continues to reside in Nigeria, despite the fact that he is wanted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity. As I understand it, it is the policy of the United States to support the Special Court.

Question #2:

How will you work with the Nigerians, the Liberians, the Sierra Leonians and the Court itself to resolve this issue and ensure that Charles Taylor is held accountable for his crimes?

Answer:

We strongly support the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and its efforts to bring to justice those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law. Ensuring accountability for these crimes will also contribute to reconciliation and to the restoration of peace in Sierra Leone and the region.

The Administration and the Congress share a common goal of seeing Charles Taylor held accountable. Taylor must appear before the Special Court for Sierra Leone and face the charges pending against him.

We are exploring appropriate ways to ensure that Taylor be held accountable and we are working with all interested parties on how to pursue justice for Taylor.

The United States is in frequent contact with the Governments of Nigeria and Liberia on the issue of Charles Taylor. We have made clear to President Olusegun Obasanjo, Liberian Chairman Gyude Bryant and others

that our mutual goal must be for Charles Taylor to appear before the Special Court for Sierra Leone and face the charges pending against him. At the same time, we continue to urge Nigeria at the highest levels to take steps to further contain and confine Taylor and eliminate his ability to endanger the peace both of our nations have worked so hard to establish.


Questions from Senator Russell Feingold

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Human Resources Requirements in Africa

Question #4:

After 12 years on the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I have traveled widely enough to know that understaffed embassies in Africa are more the norm than the exception. We have wonderful, capable, deeply committed Foreign Service officers working in Africa. I admire them and I am deeply grateful for their service. But they are too few in number – particularly when it comes to seasoned, expert people. Tiny embassy staffs are trying to cover huge, complex countries – too often without adequate effort or capacity to get out of the capital city. We have no permanent presence in northern Nigeria or eastern Congo, despite the fact that the stability of whole swathes of the continent can hinge on events in those areas. We have no permanent presence in Zanzibar or in Mombassa. We need more people on the ground. The 9/11 Commission points to parts of Africa, including the Horn and to West Africa as areas deserving of special focus. What steps are you prepared to take to match our personnel resources to our needs?

Answer:

Engagement with Africa is very high among President Bush’s foreign policy objectives, from resolving conflict in Sudan and the Great Lakes to fighting terrorism in the Horn and limiting spread of HIV/AIDS under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). We are promoting democracy, expanding trade and investment opportunities, and strengthening health care, environmental protection, and efforts against trafficking in arms, drugs, and people. We also face substantial new staffing requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan, and a number of other high priorities.

With the significant hardships faced by our employees who serve in Africa, we continue to face challenges in meeting staffing needs, and the Department is making progress.

Through the Department’s recent hiring efforts, we created 135 additional positions in our 48 posts in the Bureau of African Affairs* in FY 2002 to 2004, including those for consular and diplomatic security personnel, bringing the total number of State Dept. Foreign Service positions at the 48 African posts to 893 (an 18% increase). Even with the new positions, small to medium sized African posts often have little staffing depth and must be augmented by temporary personnel to cover gaps when staff members transfer or take annual leave. Additional positions are necessary to add depth and address future challenges, including expanding staffing at our Embassy in Khartoum and establishing positions for a new post in the South of Sudan.

The difficult living conditions at most African posts make them a challenge to staff. Given the security situation, three posts in Africa currently do not allow any family members at post and another three allow only adult dependents, making the one or two year tours there particularly difficult for employees who also being asked to staff other “unaccompanied” posts such as Baghdad and Kabul. Many of the African posts are among the hardest to fill because of concerns about security, health, education, and other hardship conditions. Thirty of forty-eight posts in the Bureau of African Affairs receive the highest hardship rating of 25 percent. Many of these places long ago hit the 25 percent ceiling for hardship differential (the compensation employees receive for the extraordinary hardship conditions at post). Due to the pay cut that non-senior Foreign Service employees take when serving overseas from the loss of locality pay, employees in many places like Abuja, East Timor, Guinea, and the Congo receive only 9% more pay than their colleagues in Washington (since their 25% hardship differential is off set by 16% locality pay in Washington), hardly a significant monetary incentive to serve there.

We are in the process of formulating career development plans, which will include both incentives and requirements for hardship service to ensure staffing at our most difficult posts.

Questions from Senator Russell Feingold

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Non-Proliferation

Question #3:

Developments in Iran have exposed problems in the Non Proliferation Treaty regime that need to be addressed. Some have suggested that the U.S. work with others to reform the NPT, so that countries cannot legally go right to the brink of producing a nuclear weapon, making it a bit late for enforcement action once they finally do cross the line. Some have also proposed changing the regime so that countries that reject inspections or withdraw from the NPT without addressing previous infractions must dismantle their nuclear capabilities to come back into the fold, and one could achieve agreement that nations which the IAEA cannot find to be in full compliance should no longer receive any nuclear assistance from others. What is your view of such proposed reforms? Are you satisfied that the U.S. can effectively work with other members of the international community to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions under the current nonproliferation regime?

Answer:

President Bush and other world leaders have recognized the problems you mentioned and work is under way in several fora to address them. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is being tested as never before. Without stronger measures, confidence in the security benefits of the NPT could erode.

Certainly, the Additional Protocol is essential in verifying compliance, as it allows the International Atomic Energy Agency greater access to sites and to information and can give the international community more warning time. But of course much more is needed. Efforts to limit enrichment and reprocessing technology are critical or we could see more countries like Iran that exploit and violate the NPT to advance their nuclear weapons potential. Stronger export controls and the Proliferation Security Initiative can help to halt or interdict clandestine nuclear commerce.

Violations of the NPT and withdrawal from the Treaty to acquire nuclear weapons and avoid its consequences are serious threats to the NPT and should, at the very least, result in a cutoff of nuclear assistance to the state in question. The elimination of nuclear weapons programs in these states should be pursued relentlessly. These states must see that they face a dim future, including a reduction in their security, unless they abandon their nuclear weapon ambitions.

We will continue to work with our friends and allies – and the entire international community -- to persuade Iran, in particular, to make the right choice, and to vigorously pursue the reforms necessary to improve enforcement of the NPT.

Question from Senator Russell Feingold

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

North Korea

Question #1:

The last four years of U.S. policy toward North Korea have failed to address the threat posed by a nuclear-armed and potentially a proliferating North Korea. Is this Administration prepared to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea? If not, what changes in policy will you pursue?

Answer:

All of the parties to the Six-Party Talks have agreed on the objective – a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. And the five parties at the first Plenary, in August 2003, all told North Korea very clearly that they will not accept North Korea’s possessing nuclear arms.

We believe the Six-Party process offers the best opportunity to resolve this issue through peaceful, multilateral diplomacy.

The U.S. is working within that process to achieve the dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner, subject to effective verification.

We have repeatedly made clear to the DPRK that the Six-Party forum is the way to end its international isolation, and that we and other parties are prepared to take corresponding measures as the DPRK dismantles its nuclear programs in an effectively verifiable manner.

We met in New York in November and December with the North Korean Permanent Representative to the United Nations to make clear that we are ready to resume talks at an early date and without preconditions.

Our partners in the Six-Party Talks – Japan, the Republic of Korea, China and Russia – are also urging the DPRK to rejoin and participate seriously in the talks. We remain in close contact with them on this issue.

As the President has stated, the Six-Party process is the way forward. We and our Six-Party partners are keeping the focus on getting the talks going again, so that we can make real progress on the agreed objective. At the next round of talks, we will be prepared to give a detailed presentation on the proposal we tabled at the talks in June, and to respond to questions the DPRK may have as well as to raise concerns we have about their proposal.

Question from Senator Russell Feingold

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

North Korea

Question #1:

The last four years of U.S. policy toward North Korea have failed to address the threat posed by a nuclear-armed and potentially a proliferating North Korea. Is this Administration prepared to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea? If not, what changes in policy will you pursue?

Answer:

All of the parties to the Six-Party Talks have agreed on the objective – a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. And the five parties at the first Plenary, in August 2003, all told North Korea very clearly that they will not accept North Korea’s possessing nuclear arms.

We believe the Six-Party process offers the best opportunity to resolve this issue through peaceful, multilateral diplomacy.

The U.S. is working within that process to achieve the dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner, subject to effective verification.

We have repeatedly made clear to the DPRK that the Six-Party forum is the way to end its international isolation, and that we and other parties are prepared to take corresponding measures as the DPRK dismantles its nuclear programs in an effectively verifiable manner.

We met in New York in November and December with the North Korean Permanent Representative to the United Nations to make clear that we are ready to resume talks at an early date and without preconditions.

Our partners in the Six-Party Talks – Japan, the Republic of Korea, China and Russia – are also urging the DPRK to rejoin and participate seriously in the talks. We remain in close contact with them on this issue.

As the President has stated, the Six-Party process is the way forward. We and our Six-Party partners are keeping the focus on getting the talks going again, so that we can make real progress on the agreed objective. At the next round of talks, we will be prepared to give a detailed presentation on the proposal we tabled at the talks in June, and to respond to questions the DPRK may have as well as to raise concerns we have about their proposal.

Questions from Senator Russ Feingold

Nomination Hearing for Dr. Condoleezza Rice

January 18 & 19, 2005

Democratic Republic of Congo

Over 3.5 million people are thought to have died from war related causes in recent years in DRC. Countless others have been victims of brutal assaults and continue to live in fear. Yet despite the horrifying human costs of the conflict, despite the questionable efficacy and astronomically expensive nature of the peacekeeping mission on the ground, and despite the fact that the future of Congo has serious implications for the future of many African countries, the Administration has not made stabilizing central Africa a priority.

Question #5:

What steps will you take as Secretary of State to help create a context in which MONUC can succeed and the Congolese people can realistically hope for a better future?

Answer:

MONUC remains one of the primary tools to achieve peace and stability in DRC. The United States will continue to work with the UN, specifically Special Representative Swing, to ensure maximum effectiveness of MONUC’s activities within its current mandate and within the current authorized troop ceiling of 16,700. The United States, in coordination with the UN Security Council, will discuss how to assist MONUC to meet fully and completely the various parts of its mandate, specifically the issue of support for DRC government efforts to disarm, demobilize and repatriate or resettle “negative forces” in eastern Congo.

Drafted: CA/OCS/CI:Joan Cristini x 6-9165

Doc: S/OCSDOCS/CI/Saudi Arabia/QFR’s Secstate- Designate Rice Jan 05, 01-26-2005

Cleared: CA:MHarty ok

CA:DBSmith ok

CA/OCS:CBarry ok

CA/OCS:AMoore ok

CA/OCS/CI:MBernier-Toth ok

CA/OCS/CI:GKeiser ok

CA/OCS/ACS/NESA:VLopatkiewicz ok

NEA/ARPI:DWhiddon ok

CA/P:DStaeben ok

H:JWalsh ok

D:RRyu ok

P:JDeHart ok

S/P:Ebarks-Ruggles ok

M:RMaxwell ok

M/P:MCoffey ok



* Note that all figures regarding positions and posts in Africa do not include those for Egypt, Tunisa, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, which are part of the Department’s Bureau of Near East Affairs, not the Bureau of African Affairs.



Back to Top
Sign-in

Do you already have an account on one of these sites? Click the logo to sign in and create your own customized State Department page. Want to learn more? Check out our FAQ!

OpenID is a service that allows you to sign in to many different websites using a single identity. Find out more about OpenID and how to get an OpenID-enabled account.