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Diplomacy in Action

118. JCIC policy statement re Trident SLBMs (June 1, 2006)


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October 26, 2006

Statement of Policy by the United States of America
Concerning Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in
Liners and Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes
During Data Update Inspections

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to inspection of Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during data update inspections.

Based on the demonstrations provided by the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading tube, the United States of America expects that, during all future data

update inspections at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, Washington, hereinafter referred to as the Silverdale Submarine Base, and Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia, hereinafter referred to as the Kings Bay Submarine Base, inspection teams will use the

Trident Reference Aid in conjunction with the indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25 and the viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for a Trident I and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner or loading tube.

The United States of America understands that the inspecting Party will, as a matter of policy, request that the inspected Party remove a Trident II SLBM from its loading tube no more than once each year.

The United States of America notes that safety and security requirements, and time constraints during data update inspections at Silverdale Submarine Base and Kings Bay Submarine Base do not permit advance opening of all the access hatches that were opened during the relevant June 2000 demonstration on all liners and loading tubes containing an SLBM.

As a practical approach to confirming the type of Trident I SLBM in its liner and Trident II SLBM in its loading tube during future inspections, the United States of America will use the following procedures:

At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a data update inspection at the Silverdale Submarine Base or Kings Bay Submarine Base, the inspection team will at its choice designate any two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list of all missiles in liners or loading tubes located at the inspected facility as provided by the in-country escort.

These two designated liners or loading tubes will have the same access hatches removed as were removed from the liners or loading tubes in the June 2000 demonstrations.

For all other Trident I SLBMs in liners and located at the inspected facility, at least one access hatch at the missile's rear support and one umbilical connector access hatch will be removed by the time the missile is presented for inspection.

For all other Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes and located at the inspected facility, for purposes of using the Reference Aid at least one access hatch from each end of the loading tube will be removed by the time the missile is presented for inspection.

In addition, the inspection team may request the same access hatches be removed as were removed for the relevant June 2000 demonstration from any missiles in liners or loading tubes at the inspected facility and encountered during the course of the inspection. The inspected Party will respond to any such requests to remove these same access hatches from other liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, as inspection timelines permit, but will not deviate from its established safety and security requirements.

Training models of missiles in liners or loading tubes will be identified by inspectors only through visual observation of the external and functional differences of these models of missiles recorded in JCIC Joint Statement 8, using the photographs included in the Trident Reference Aid.

The United States of America will be prepared to implement the above procedures during each data update inspection that is conducted at the Silverdale Submarine Base or Kings Bay Submarine Base 30 days after all Parties exchange statements of policy on this matter.

The United States of America notes that this statement of policy, and the statements of policy made by the other Parties on this matter, will enter into force 30 days after completion of the first data update inspection that is conducted at the Silverdale Submarine Base or Kings Bay Submarine Base after all Parties exchange statements of policy on this matter, provided that, during those 30 days, no Party raises questions through diplomatic channels that: 1) were recorded in the report for that inspection; 2) addressed the inability of inspectors to confirm missile type using the procedures contained in this statement; and, 3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection.

The United States of America reaffirms that the use of the Trident Reference Aid, the indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol in no way will impinge on the inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident SLBM from its liner or loading tube if the inspection team is unable to confirm the missile type by viewing and measuring the missile in its liner or loading tube in conjunction with these procedures.



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