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Diplomacy in Action

A Rebuttal to Sen. Kit Bond's November 18, 2010 Floor Speech in the U.S. Senate on the New START Treaty


Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
November 24, 2010

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Rebuttal points are included in blue

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong opposition to the administration’s New START Treaty. I do so after great deliberation and after initial disposition to support the treaty because of the generic importance of these types of treaties for our Nation. But with what I have learned from classified intelligence information, I cannot in good conscience support this treaty. I have written a classified letter summarizing my views that is available to all members in Senate security; I urge them to read it, even as I try now with a few unclassified comments to explain my position.

When the administration announced this new treaty, we were told that its goal was to reduce strategic nuclear forces in a manner that would make America safer and enhance nuclear stability. That goal may be admirable, but unfortunately, the deal the administration has struck with Moscow falls well short. Consequently, I believe the administration’s New START Treaty has been oversold and overhyped.

  • The Treaty will make the United States safer by placing mutual limits on strategic nuclear forces and enhancing nuclear stability and predictability. Making America safer and enhancing nuclear stability are critical national security goals and, as such, cannot be oversold or overhyped.

The first thing we must all understand about this treaty is that it forces the United States to reduce unilaterally our forces, such as missiles, bombers, and warheads, in order to meet treaty limits. On the other hand, the Russians will actually be allowed to increase their deployed forces because they currently fall below the treaty’s limits. This raises a crucial question: exactly what does the United States gain from this treaty in exchange for a one-sided reduction in our deployed forces?

The Secretary of Defense, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the New START Treaty, which allows the U.S. to retain a robust Triad while benefiting from critical data exchanges and on-site inspections that will improve transparency and stability.

The Treaty does not force the United States to reduce unilaterally. Rather, the Treaty imposes equal limits on both Parties.

  • Having a single, equal numerical limit ensures parity and enhances predictability for both sides; the United States does not want to engage in an arms race with the Russians, not because we could not win it, but because we seek a stabilizing relationship with the Russian Federation.
  • Perhaps even more important, such limits are designed not only to require that each side meets the limits, but also so that each side has an obligation not to exceed those limits while the Treaty is in force.
  • Through December 4, 2009, both the United States and Russia were limited to the equal reduction levels of the START Treaty.

Defenders of this treaty have argued, first, that the treaty places no limits on America’s plans for missile defense systems, and second, that our own military will have the flexibility to deploy our strategic forces, such as bombers, submarines, and missiles, in ways that best meet our security interests.

  • Both of these points are true. The Treaty will not prevent us from deploying the best missile defenses possible, as determined by our defense and military experts. The Treaty will provide great flexibility for the United States regarding how we deploy strategic offensive forces.
  • The United States can implement our nuclear strategy, including maintaining strategic deterrence and strengthening regional deterrence for Allies, at New START Treaty levels.

Unfortunately, these explanations simply do not stand up to scrutiny. The United States does not need a treaty with Russia, or any other country, to be free to pursue the missile defense system we need to keep America safe. The United States does not need a treaty to give us the flexibility to deploy our strategic forces as we wish.

  • The Treaty does not constrain our ability to deploy the best missile defenses possible.
  • It is true that we do not need a treaty to give us the flexibility to deploy our strategic forces as we wish. However, we do need a Treaty to limit Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and to provide effective verification of those forces. Without this Treaty, we will not have reliable knowledge of Russian strategic forces. This drives worst-case military planning – which is an expensive and potentially destabilizing approach that this nation should not accept.
  • Gaining the clear benefits of transparency under the Treaty while retaining the flexibility to determine our force structure is an added benefit. As General Chilton, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, has said, “Without New START, we would rapidly lose insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and activities, and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be more complex and more costly. Without such a regime, we would unfortunately be left to use worst-case analyses regarding our own force requirements.”

Interestingly, the administration’s justifications completely dismiss the unilateral statement Russia has made to this treaty that claims the right to withdraw if we expand our missile defenses. This Russian statement is pure and simple manipulation.

  • The Russian Federation’s unilateral statement is not agreed to by the United States. That statement also is not an integral part of the Treaty, and it is not legally binding.
  • The statement records Russia’s view that the Treaty may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States. The Russian Federation further noted its position that the “extraordinary events” that could justify withdrawal from the Treaty, pursuant to Article XIV, include a build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States that would threaten the strategic nuclear forces potential of the Russian Federation. The text of the Russian unilateral statement is as follows:

“The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Prague on April 8, 2010, may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America. Consequently, the extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty also include a build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation.”

  • Article XIV establishes the right of each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, to withdraw from the New START Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interest. In its statement, the Russian Federation has identified, as one such extraordinary event, a build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation. This latter qualification is very important, as it makes clear that the Russian Federation has not identified any build-up in missile defenses as constituting an extraordinary event that would jeopardize its supreme interests, but only a build-up that would threaten the Russian strategic nuclear force potential.
  • As the United States has said many times, and in conversations with Russia, we are not pursuing and do not seek in the future a missile defense capability that threatens the strategic nuclear forces of Russia. Such a capability would be cost-prohibitive and technologically infeasible.
  • The United States also made a unilateral statement associated with the New START Treaty, which makes clear that our missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia, and that we will continue to improve our missile defense capabilities:

“The United States of America takes note of the Statement on Missile Defense by the Russian Federation. The United States missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. The United States missile defense systems would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional threats. The United States intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions.”

  • The withdrawal clause in Article XIV contains language identical to the withdrawal provisions in many arms control agreements, including the START Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The withdrawal provision is self-judging in that each Party may decide when extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Accordingly, the Russian unilateral statement merely records that the circumstances described in its statement could, in its view, justify such a decision on its part. It does not express a legal right or obligation, nor does it change any of the legal rights or obligations of the Parties under the Treaty.

At some point down the road, our Nation will need to expand its missile defenses. Because of this unilateral statement, however, the reaction from some in the administration or in Congress will be to reject any expansion lest we upset the Russians and cause them to pull out of this new Treaty. The Russians surely are counting on this reaction. Yet in all the rhetoric in support of this treaty, I have not heard any reasonable explanation for why we would give Russia this lever to use against our legitimate and necessary right to defend ourselves against ballistic missile attack.

  • Through its statements, testimonies, and budget, this administration has been clear in its commitment to develop and deploy the most effective missile defenses possible, including all four phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to European missile defense. In fact, the Administration requested approximately $9.9 billion for missile defenses for this fiscal year, a $700 million increase from the prior year.
  • We are already expanding both theater missile defense under the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe, and also continue to improve our defense of the Homeland, for example by completing construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greeley, Alaska to the originally planned configuration of 14 operationally-capable silos.
  • As an historical matter, the Soviet Union made a similar unilateral statement regarding its possible withdrawal from the START Treaty. In that statement, the Soviet Union noted that the START Treaty was “effective and viable” only under conditions of compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and that the “extraordinary events” in the withdrawal provision included either party’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. When the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, however, the Russian Federation (as a successor state to the Soviet Union) did not withdraw from the START Treaty.

For several months, we have listened to the administration’s claims that New START will make America more secure by strengthening nuclear stability. In the “Show Me” State, where I come from, and I suspect throughout the rest of the country, claims like this need to be backed up by facts. But if we cannot verify that the Russians are complying with each of the treaty’s three central limits, then we have no way of knowing whether we are more secure or not.

  • This treaty can be effectively verified.
  • The Administration’s verifiability assessment concluded: “The combination of improved U.S. understanding of Russian strategic forces resulting from the implementation of the START Treaty, U.S. NTM capabilities, the New START Treaty’s verification provisions, and a favorable posture for deterring cheating or breakout, results in a New START Treaty that is effectively verifiable.”
  • As Secretary Gates stated in a letter to the Senate: “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and I assess that Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or breakout under New START, due to both the New START verification regime and the inherent survivability and flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic force structure.”
  • As DNI Clapper said recently, referring to the New START Treaty: "I think the earlier, the sooner, the better. You know, my thing is: From an intelligence perspective only, are we better off with it or without it? We're better off with it."

The Select Committee on Intelligence has been looking at this issue closely over the past several months. As the vice chairman of this committee, I have reviewed the key intelligence on our ability to monitor this treaty and heard from our intelligence professionals. There is no doubt in my mind that the United States cannot reliably verify the treaty’s 1,550 limit on deployed warheads.

As an initial hurdle, the ten annual warhead inspections allowed under the treaty permit us to sample only 2 to 3 percent of the total Russian force. Further, under New START, unlike its predecessor, any given missile can have any number of warheads loaded on it. So even if the Russians fully cooperated in every inspection, these inspections cannot provide conclusive evidence of whether the Russians are complying with the warhead limit.

Let’s take an example: say that the United States found a missile that was loaded with more warheads than the Russians declared. While this would be a faulty and suspicious declaration by Russia, we could not necessarily infer from it that they had violated the 1,550 warhead limit—especially because the Russians could always make some excuse for a faulty declaration.

  • The deployment of undeclared warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs, whether under the START Treaty or the New START Treaty, would raise serious concerns regarding Russian compliance and intentions, especially if there were a pattern of “faulty declarations.”
  • New START Treaty verification measures are designed to provide each Party confidence that the other is upholding its obligations, while also being simpler, less operationally disruptive, and less costly to implement than START verification measures. Some of these provisions were developed with the concerns and perspective of the U.S. Department of Defense in mind.
  • We worked to develop measures unique to the requirements of this treaty, in particular on-site inspection procedures that will allow the United States to confirm the actual number of re-entry vehicles (warheads) on each designated Russian ICBM and SLBM. This verification task and inspection right did not exist under START.
  • Over time, the information we receive regarding actual warhead loadings on Russia’s deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers, and the opportunities we will have to confirm that information, will provide us a much more detailed picture than we were able to obtain from the START verification regime of Russian practices with regard to the loading of nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the armaments loading of deployed heavy bombers.
  • National Technical Means (NTM) of verification, notifications, the comprehensive data base, use of unique identifiers on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber, and on-site inspections will enable us to observe and evaluate Russian activities, and help to ensure the effective verification of the New START Treaty. However, NTM alone cannot verify this Treaty or give us adequate insight into Russian strategic forces [the Administration would be happy to share the intelligence community assessment of this to interested Senators].
  • Without the New START Treaty, we will have no on-site verification measures in place and our understanding of Russian missile and bomber forces will diminish over time. The risk of misunderstanding and worst-case military planning will increase, which are both destabilizing and expensive outcomes.

Compounding this verification gap is the current structure of the treaty’s warhead limits which would allow Russia to prepare legally to add very large numbers of warheads to its forces in excess of the treaty’s limit. For example, the Russians could deploy a missile with only one warhead, but legally flight-test it with six warheads to gain confidence in the increased capability—a practice they could not employ under the original START. The Russians could then store the five extra warheads for each such missile nearby, ready to mate them to the missile on a moment’s notice. All of this would be legal.

  • The United States will be able to rapidly respond to any Russian cheating or breakout by increasing the alert levels of SSBNs and bombers, and by uploading warheads on our current force of SLBMs, bombers, and ICBMs.
  • This would offset any conceivable political benefits Russia may believe it would gain through any temporary numerical advantage.
  • This would also deter any future Russian leaders from cheating or breakout from the Treaty, should they ever have such an inclination.

Further, unlike START, this new treaty places no limit on the number of nondeployed missiles, so the Russians legally could store spare missiles to be mated with the spare warheads. This potential for Russia to “break-out” of the treaty in a short period of time—perhaps without adequate warning to the United States—may undermine the very nuclear stability this administration claims this treaty provides.

  • With the single exception of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, START placed no limits on the number of non-deployed missiles. Both treaties, New START and START, do limit where non-deployed missiles may be located.
  • The central limit of 800 on the total number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers adequately caps this “breakout” concern.

Arguably, it also means that, despite the opportunities to cheat, it may be even easier for Russia to circumvent legally the limits of this treaty. That does not sound to me like a great bargain for the United States.

Because the details on verification and breakout of this treaty are classified, I have prepared a full classified assessment that is available to any Senator for review. The key points, however, are not classified and I believe the Senate and the American public need to understand them fully.

  • The Administration’s verifiability assessment concluded: “The New START Treaty’s verification regime will provide each side confidence that the other is upholding its obligations, while also being simpler and less costly to implement than the original START Treaty. This is possible due to U.S. national technical means (NTM), the New START Treaty’s verification provisions, our analytical capabilities, and because the Treaty builds on the knowledge of each other’s strategic nuclear forces and practices gained from 15 years of implementing the START Treaty.”

Common sense suggests that the worse a treaty partner’s arms control compliance record with existing and past treaties, the stronger verification must be for any new treaties. So, exactly what is Russia’s record? According to the official State Department reports on arms control compliance, published by this administration and the previous administration, the Russians have previously violated, or are still violating, important provisions of most of the key arms control treaties to which they have been a party, including the original START, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and Open Skies. I recommend that my colleagues review the classified versions of these reports before any further Senate action is taken on this treaty.

  • The Russian Federation complied with START’s strategic offensive arms central limits for the 15-year term of the START Treaty.
  • As might be expected under a verification regime with the breadth and complexity of the START Treaty, a small number of long-standing compliance issues - both from the U.S. and Russian perspectives - remained unresolved at the time the START Treaty expired on December 4, 2009. These issues, in part, reflected the different interpretations of the Parties regarding how to implement the complex inspection and verification provisions of the Treaty.

Despite Russia’s poor compliance record, the administration has decided that we will rely primarily on good Russian cooperation to verify New START’s key 1,550 limit on deployed warheads. This brings to mind the famous adage: fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.

  • The administration has judged that this Treaty is effectively verifiable.
  • The DNI has stated categorically that we “are better off with this Treaty than without it.”
  • National Technical Means (NTM) of verification, notifications, the comprehensive data base, use of unique identifiers on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber, and on-site inspections will enable us to observe and evaluate Russian activities related to the Treaty, and help to ensure the effective verification of the New START Treaty.

One of the persistent Russian arms control violations of the original START was its illegal obstruction of U.S. on-site inspections of warheads on certain types of missiles. The only reason these Russian violations did not prevent us from verifying START’s warhead limits was because START limited the capability to deploy warheads through a “counting rule” that could be verified primarily with our own intelligence satellites. Unfortunately, New START has discarded this critical counting rule, designed to work hand-in-glove with our satellites, in favor of reliance on no more than ten sample inspections a year—again, just 2 to 3 percent of Russia’s force.

  • START did not limit the “capability to deploy warheads” through the counting rule; it attributed a fixed number of warheads to each type of delivery vehicle.
  • A number of U.S. and Russian ICBMs and SLBMs had the capability to carry more warheads than were attributed under START. Some, such as the Trident D-5 SLBM, were downloaded to carry fewer than they were attributed under START.
  • The warhead counting provision provided for in the New START Treaty allows the United States to preserve a strategic Triad under the Treaty’s lower limits. Counting actual warheads, rather than using START’s attribution counting rule, enables the United States to retain most of the Minuteman III ICBMs and Trident II/D-5 SLBMs in its inventory while providing the right to view the actual number of reentry vehicles loaded on Russian strategic delivery systems during inspection.
  • Over time, the information we receive regarding actual warhead loadings on Russia’s deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers, and the opportunities we will have to confirm that information, will provide us a much more detailed picture than we were able to obtain from the START verification regime of Russian practices with regard to the loading of nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the armaments loading of deployed heavy bombers.

The warhead limit in New START is calculated from the actual number of warheads loaded on a missile, and unlike START, this new treaty permits any missile to have any number of warheads loaded on it. But no satellite can tell us how many warheads are loaded on missiles.

  • And, under START no satellite could tell us whether a missile had more warheads loaded on it than its attributed limit.

Therefore, if this treaty is ratified, we will have to rely primarily on on-site inspections to verify actual warhead loadings the very same kind of inspections that the Russians violated in START. If the Russians continue their poor compliance record and obstruct our warhead inspections under New START, the consequences will be much more serious and will substantially degrade verification.

  • As under START, any obstruction of warhead inspection procedures under New START would raise serious concerns.
  • The New START Treaty warhead (reentry vehicle) inspection procedures were specifically designed to ensure an effective inspection regime, including the counting of actual warhead loadings and the confirmation that reentry vehicles emplaced on a front section of a missile that are declared to be non-nuclear are, in fact, non-nuclear.
  • U.S. and Russian negotiators worked together to incorporate lessons learned from START, and better define the provisions regarding the use of covers during warhead (reentry vehicle) inspections to improve both parties’ ability to verify the actual number of warheads deployed by the other party.

The administration is surely aware of these verification and breakout problems as there is no shortage of verification gimmicks in this treaty. But not even all of them together permit us to verify reliably the treaty’s warhead limit. So how have treaty enthusiasts responded to these problems?

First, they discard the military significance of possible Russian cheating. Our own State Department’s verification assessment states that:

any Russian cheating under the Treaty would have little if any effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S. strategic forces. In particular, the survivability and response capabilities of [U.S.] strategic submarines and heavy bombers would be unaffected by even large-scale cheating.

  • Any act by the Russian Federation to violate its obligations under the New START Treaty, and/or to deceive the United States in its effort to verify Russian compliance with the New START Treaty, would be considered extremely serious.
  • The military significance of any discovered cheating scenario would have to be assessed in terms of its potential military and political impact in the context of the broader international security environment at the time the cheating was occurring.
  • As Secretary Gates stated in a letter to the Senate: “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and I assess that Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or breakout under New START, due to both the New START verification regime and the inherent survivability and flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic force structure.”

This is not exactly a ringing endorsement. I think it is pretty clear that a large-scale breakout would have a seismic impact from a geopolitical perspective. It would escalate tensions between the superpowers and lead to extreme strategic instability. Even more fundamentally, the State Department statement raises a pivotal question: If no level of Russian cheating under New START is deemed militarily significant, then what is the value of this treaty in the first place?

Second, treaty proponents attempt to draw a parallel to the “Moscow” arms control treaty, signed by President Bush and approved 95-0 by the Senate. They argue that this treaty has the same kind of warhead verification difficulties as New START, therefore critics of New START are applying a double-standard. This argument fails on two counts: the first being that the Moscow arms control treaty was placed on top of the verification measures already in effect for START; and second, that the United States had decided unilaterally to move to the limits imposed in the Moscow treaty, whether or not Russia reduced to them. This is simply not the case for New START. Clearly, the two treaties are not comparable from a verification standpoint.

  • The Moscow Treaty has no independent verification regime; now that START has expired, there is no verification for the Moscow Treaty. Moreover, the limits of the Moscow Treaty are effective for one day only: December 31, 2012, after which the Treaty will expire.
  • The parties never agreed on how to count warheads against the Moscow Treaty limit, and this lack of a definition, and the Treaty right to change the definition used by each country at any time prior to December 31, 2012 of what is limited by Treaty, makes it essentially impossible to verify.
  • Acceptable ranges for the New START Treaty limits were determined prior to negotiations with Russia as part of the analysis conducted during the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

The administration also argues that our ability to monitor Russian forces will be greater with the new treaty than without it. As a general proposition, this is true. In actuality, however, the extent of the treaty’s monitoring benefits could be insignificant or only modest in some important respects. This disparity between generalization and reality is explained more in my classified paper.

  • Not only is it true as a general proposition that our ability to monitor Russian forces will be greater with the new treaty than without it, it is true in actuality.
  • DNI Clapper has made this clear in his testimony before the Senate.
  • There is a significant advantage to having extensive regular data exchange and timely notifications of data changes, as well as the ability to confirm that information through 18 short-notice inspections annually of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces over having no data exchange and no inspections, which would be the case without the New START Treaty.

The bottom line is this: if the chief benefit of this treaty is that we will know more about what Russia is doing with its nuclear forces, then the same benefit could have been achieved with a much more modest confidence-building protocol, one which would not require unilateral U.S. force reductions, give Russia a vote on our missile defenses, or present impossible verification problems.

  • The United States simply could not achieve the insights into Russian forces provided by the Treaty absent the Treaty’s detailed verification provisions, nor could the United States and Russia achieve the predictability and stability afforded by the Treaty absent a legally binding mechanism that is effectively verifiable.
  • The Treaty does not require unilateral reductions, give Russia a vote on our missile defenses, or present impossible verification problems.

The administration claims that New START is indispensible to reap the “Reset” benefits with Russia. If a fatally flawed arms control agreement is the price of admission to the Reset game, our Nation is better off if we sit this one out.

  • As can be seen from our comments above, we strongly disagree with the statement that the agreement is “fatally flawed.” Senior Defense and Intelligence officials have testified that the United States is better off with the New START Treaty than without it; that it provides a sound mechanism for a predictability and stability with respect to U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces; and that it is effectively verifiable.
  • These conclusions are supported by every former Secretary of State and Defense and National Security Advisor from both Democratic and Republican administrations called upon by the Senate to testify regarding the New START Treaty. A rejection of the Treaty could lead to Russia reducing its cooperation on issues vital to U.S. security, such as Afghanistan, Iran, and nonproliferation, to name just a few.

Similarly, any suggestion by treaty advocates that rejecting the treaty weakens the “good” Russian leader, Medvedev, and strengthens the “bad” Russian leader, Putin, should be met with healthy skepticism. Now is not the time to fall for a “good cop—bad cop” act from Moscow.

  • The Treaty is in the U.S. national security interest. We are not doing it as a “favor” to Russia.

In many cases, concerns about particular treaties can be solved during the ratification process. I respect my colleagues who are attempting to do so with this treaty. Unfortunately, New START suffers from fundamental flaws that no amount of tinkering around the edges can fix. I believe the better course for our nation, and for global stability, is to put this treaty aside and replace it with a better one.

  • This approach spells delay: delay in resuming verification measures, especially data exchanges and inspections on the ground in the Russian Federation; and delay in proceeding with further reductions in non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons.
  • Now that the NATO alliance has completed the review of its strategic concept, such negotiations can be planned. The Chairman of the Russian Duma Defense Committee has publicly stated that Moscow is studying options for tactical nuclear arms reductions. Such negotiations will be virtually impossible without ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty.

The United States needs, and we in the Senate should demand, a treaty that can be reliably verified by our own intelligence assets without relying on Russia’s good graces, not one that requires unilateral reductions or gives Russia a vote on our strategic defenses. I urge my colleagues to reject anything less and to take a strong stand for America’s defense and America’s future.

  • This Treaty is in our national security interest as our top military and national security leaders have testified. It constrains U.S. and Russian forces equally and does not give Russia a vote on our missile defenses.
  • The Senate should provide its advice and consent to ratification as soon as possible.



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