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Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty


   
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Prepared by the U.S. Department of State
January 31, 2012

In response to Section (a) (10) of the December 22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent To Ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on April 8, 2010

UNCLASSIFIED

NEW START TREATY ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT

This report is submitted pursuant to Condition (10) of the December 22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty). The New START Treaty was signed in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011, upon exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Condition (10) of the New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification calls for the President to submit a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of each year beginning with January 31, 2012, providing:

(A) details on each Party’s reductions in strategic offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports, during the previous year;

(B) a certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian Federation;

(C) a certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or -

(i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; and

(ii) a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has taken with respect to each such case;

(D) an assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty's transparency mechanisms, including -

(i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded the collection of telemetric information; and

(ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information; and

(E) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the national security interests of the United States.

On November 2, 2011, the President delegated authority to submit the report to the Secretary of State. On December 14, 2011, the Secretary of State delegated this authority to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. This Report is divided into sections covering each of the items listed in Condition (10).

A. Details on each Party’s reductions in strategic offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports, during the previous year.

For details related to reductions of each Party’s strategic offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered into force and December 31, 2011, please see the classified version of this Report. Below are each Party’s aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms as of September 1, 2011.

NEW START TREATY

AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

(As of September 01, 2011, as drawn from the exchange of data by the Parties [1]

Category of Data

United States of America

Russian Federation

Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers

822

516

Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers

1790

1566

Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers

1043

871

The New START Treaty does not require annual reductions in strategic offensive arms. The Treaty obligates the Parties to reduce and limit their forces so that seven years after entry-into-force of the Treaty, that is, by February 5, 2018, each Party’s aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms must be at or below: 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers; and 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers.

B. Certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian Federation.

Based on the information available as of December 31, 2011, the United States certifies the Russian Federation to be in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty. While the United States has raised implementation-related questions with the Russian Federation through diplomatic channels and in the context of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), these discussions were ongoing as of December 31, 2011. The New START Treaty established the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to promote the objectives and implement the provisions of the Treaty. This forum consists of members from both the United States and Russian Federation. The BCC met two times in 2011 and has thus far fulfilled its role as a forum for resolving questions relating to implementation and compliance. For a detailed discussion of issues the United States has raised with the Russian Federation between entry-into-force of the Treaty and December 31, 2011, please see the classified version of this Report.

C. Certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or – (i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; and (ii) a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has taken with respect to each such case.

During the course of this reporting period (entry-into-force of the New START Treaty on February 5, 2011, through December 31, 2011) no conversion or elimination procedures have been adopted pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty or Part Three of the Protocol.

D. An assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty’s transparency mechanisms, including – (i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded the collection of telemetric information; and (ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information.

Article IX of the New START Treaty provides that telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity basis, by mutual agreement of the Parties. In accordance with Article IX and the Annex on Telemetric Information, the Parties shall begin the exchange of telemetric information after agreement has been reached within the framework of the BCC on the amount of telemetric information on ICBM and SLBM launches that each Party shall provide. On an annual basis, within 65 days of the beginning of the calendar year, within the framework of the BCC, the Parties shall discuss the issue of the exchange of telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, focusing on launches conducted in the previous calendar year. Following this discussion, the Parties shall take an agreed decision on the number of launches on which telemetric information will be exchanged. As a result, any telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs during the 2011 calendar year would not be exchanged until the 2012 calendar year. An assessment of telemetry exchange as a transparency mechanism will be provided in subsequent annual reports covering reporting periods in which telemetric information was exchanged.

E. An assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the national security interests of the United States.

The United States does not assess that there is a strategic imbalance between the United States and the Russian Federation. Both the United States and the Russian Federation currently maintain deployed strategic nuclear force levels that are below the limits of the expired START Treaty and of the Moscow Treaty that was superseded by the New START Treaty.

______________________________

Data in this fact sheet comes from the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty. It contains data declared to be current as of September 1, 2011. In accordance with the Treaty, data will be updated by the Parties no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six month period following entry into force of the Treaty.



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