Panel Discussions on the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
January 26, 2012
Minutes from the Meeting
Mr. Mallin is currently serving as the Director of Strategic Planning at the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security at the National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy. He previously served at the Department of Energy as the Director of Global Security Engagement and Cooperation, working to engage international scientists, engineers, and technicians currently or previously involved with weapons of mass destruction research in peaceful commercial pursuits through the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program. Previously, Mr. Mallin worked as the Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Foundation of International Peace, and served as an ambassador at the Carnegie Foundation as well.
Global Partnership (GP) projects are successful.
1. Raising awareness is important. Developing codes of conduct and getting the community energized on issues of border security, nuclear security and other relevant issues and programs is vital to the success of the GP. For example, Bonnie Jenkins has a done a very good job of engaging new countries and their scientists in the area of scientist engagement.
Our framework for work within the GP needs to be modified. Understanding countries needs, finding ways to connect with them and taking into account different cultural contexts and security concerns is important. COEs and security support centers are great tools as they look at these important questions of culture and security. In addition, the sustainability of our GP work can be assured through COEs.
Scientist engagement is most challenging in terms of funding. Scientists have a common language and cross cultural connections, however, building a security culture in various scientific communities remains a challenge.
Ms. Nergard is currently the Deputy Director General, Head of Russia, Eurasia and Regional cooperation at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She has held previous security-related positions within Norway’s MFA, including Head (Deputy Director General) of the Security Policy Section, and as the First Secretary of Norway’s Delegation to NATO. Additionally, Ms. Nergard served as the Deputy Head of Mission at the Norwegian Embassy in Ankara. Prior to joining the MFA, Ms. Nergard worked as an Advisor on Financial Markets and Stability for Norges Bank, and has previous international economics and finance experience.
The EU committed 1 B Euros to the Global Partnership particularly in the areas of nuclear safety and scientist redirection.
Russia put priority on chemical weapons destruction, the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction approach and focused on huge projects, where huge dollars amounts were dedicated before projects were put into play. Russia’s biggest priorities were redirection of scientists and nuclear security/safety issues.
The landscape has rapidly changed since 2002. New threat reduction issues are about nuclear waste management, emergency preparedness, and bio-security.
The EU serves as a great nexus between security and development.
The threat has changed from WMD to CBRN. 100 Million Euros have been dedicated to this issue but it has been a slow process. While facilities have been built to contain the CBRN threat, we have been unable to find human resources to fill the buildings.
Security engagement can be a long process, especially since we are moving from bilateral engagement of the past (Russia only) to multilateral engagement.
Scientist Re-engagement “was” a high-level priority:
1. Lessons learned are important, and we ought to give deference to priorities—we have helped in establishing border security systems, re-engaging scientists and securing nuclear energy facilities.
2. We shouldn’t get too obsessed with lessons from the past (FSU). That paradigm doesn’t work in today’s landscape; the threats are different and dynamic. The GP’s scientific community focus has since evolved.
Bruno Dupré, a lawyer by training, is currently working for the European Diplomatic Service within the Conflict Prevention and Security Policy Department. Before that he held different positions as the Head of the Disarmament Bureau for the Strategic Affairs Directorate (Mindef. Paris), Political Advisor on Armaments in NATO (Brussels), Industrial Cooperation Attache at the French Embassy in Washington and Legal Counsel for the Defense Procurement Agency in Paris. He holds a Ph. D. in law and a master's of administration from the Kennedy School of Government. He is also co-founder of Negotiators of the World (NOW), an ESSEC/Iréné program on negotiation and mediation in post conflict situations.
Soft power is very important in getting things done. Soft power is the new mantra, and words like synergy, coordination, communication, enforcing gender issues, corruption and team building should be our objectives. Coalitions change every day and dialogue is important. One needs to focus on diplomacy and soft power in moving the GP agenda forward.
COEs are a great idea. There is however pressure from our superiors to move faster in implementing projects. It usually takes time, almost two years to develop prototypes before we implement the physical center of excellence. Of the 19 COE projects, 10 are empty. It takes time to train the human personnel who will be manning the COEs.
Ludy Suryantoro is an international relations and political affairs specialist. He is responsible for the external relations activities of the Health Security and Environment Cluster, including donor relations, resource mobilization and partnerships. Issues covered by Mr Suryantoro are: multisectoral collaboration for global health security, antimicrobial resistance, hepatitis, pandemic preparedness and response (both for H5N1 and H1N1), health-security interface, epidemic readiness and response (yellow fever and meningitis), human-animal-ecosystem interface (a joint collaboration between WHO, FAO and OIE), the Emerging Pandemic Threats initiative, strengthening the implementation of the International Health Regulations and response to outbreaks (e.g. dengue and chemical spills). Over the years, Mr Suryantoro has substantially contributed to major resource mobilization activities for the HSE Cluster, such as the response to H5N1 from 2005 to 2009 and the response to H1N1, which resulted in the establishment of WHO’s first Public Health Emergency Fund. Mr Suryantoro is has a background in international relations and diplomacy, political affairs, trade and global development. He has more than 15 years of experience in the field of programme management, strategic negotiation, external relations and public-private partnerships.
Congratulations to Bonnie Jenkins for conducting the workshop. We would need to look toward a multi-sectoral approach in discussing health security issues—focusing towards whole of society. The public sector is looking at the World Economic Forum as a way to engage CEOs—how could we phase our response to the dynamic health security concerns, how can we guard our economy? How can innovation and technology minimize risk?
Public health specialists are scientifically driven. The public sector is looking at long term sustainability. To achieve global health security we need to work together, a cross fertilization of the scientific community with the business community.
Investing in public health will protect our economy. Accelerating IHRs(International Health Regulations) is important. We need to work with Ministries. We have shared values and shared vulnerabilities.
Dr. Khammar Mrabit
Dr. Mrabit is the Director for the Office of Nuclear Security at the International Atomic Energy Association, responsible for planning and implementing the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and related programs. Prior to this position, Dr. Mrabit headed the Safety and Security Coordination Section at IAEA, and also led the Regulatory Infrastructure and Transport Safety Section in the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. In total, he has been with IAEA since 1986. He has previous experience with the French Operating Organization and Moroccan Ministry of Energy and Mines, and has accumulated more than 28 years in the fields of radiation and nuclear safety and security. He holds a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from the University of Strasbourg, and engineering degrees in nuclear and reactor physics from the National Institute of Nuclear Sciences and Techniques and National School of Physics in France.
Nuclear terrorism is a challenging threat to nuclear security. We need to find effective means to preventing terrorists from malicious acts.
Nuclear terrorism doesn’t stop at national borders. The threat is global and the challenge is global.
One needs to consider in the international legal network what a binding and nonbinding incident is.
The UNSC and UNGA are legally binding instruments that drive countries toward physical protection of nuclear materials.
The global security network does not enjoy international agreement. Only 106 states out of 190 states follow the accepted codes of conduct.
Based on the Nuclear Security Plan guidelines, from 2010-2013, States need to focus on prevention and detection of unauthorized access of nuclear facilities.
The aim is to develop a comprehensive platform and universalisation of international guidelines.
The key would be to avoid advisory services to all member states.
Assessing nuclear power restoration for countries is important. We also need to assess gaps and work on rectifying them.
Human resource development is also an important challenge. We need to reach out to universities and make sure that the young generations are up to speed with the new threats that face us today.
We are unable to maintain the demand for education and training in nuclear security, the risks are high and we have very few young people signing up to fill nuclear security jobs.
IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security has experts that have done 100 peer reviews to look at the infrastructural issues and have made recommendations informing the IAEA about the gap in filling nuclear security jobs.
We trained 10,000 people from 100 states on high-level policy issues including detection, promotion of nuclear security culture, etc. The framework must include education and training. Nuclear security requires reliable and responsible personnel.
International cooperation and global response are important—coordination is key.
We will be organizing a nuclear security conference in June 2013, especially to highlight the role of international collaboration.
Krzysztof Paturej is the Director of the Office of Special Projects in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ Technical Secretariat. In this position, he is responsible for coordinating OPCW policies on disarmament, WMD nonproliferation and global efforts against terrorism, relations and programmes with stakeholders and international partners, and aids in the development of the OPCW policies on prevention of and preparedness for misuse of toxic chemicals and chemical safety and security. Prior to this position, Mr. Paturej was Head of Division on Nonproliferation within the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is also a former national coordinator of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and Senior Representative of Poland to the G8 Global Partnership 2003-2005. Additionally, Mr. Paturej was the Representative of Poland to the OPCW from 1997-2000 and served as the Chairman of the OPCW Executive Council and Chairman of the IX Conference of States Parties to the OPCW in 2004 – 2005.
One must develop and integrate the global security framework with the development of NCB (nuclear, chemical, biological) technologies.
We need to revisit convergence of government and industry and S&T academic fields.
We need to provide proposals on how to respond to current global challenges and threats and improve our rules of monitoring.
GP’s job is to recommend and advise the best course of action. We do not “implement” implementation if what governments are meant to do.
GP should be a venue of collaboration.
Effective mechanisms need to be built for better capacity building.
1540 is a global framework for nonproliferation loopholes. States have the obligation to translate individual legislation.
Mr. Thomas reported to INTERPOL in January 2012 as a Seconded Officer from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where he served for 23 years with the most recent position of Supervisory Special Agent in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. Mr. Thomas currently serves as the INTERPOL CBRNE Programme Manager in the Public Safety & Terrorism Branch at the INTERPOL General Secretariat in Lyon, France. Mr. Thomas coordinated a trilateral meeting between the Ministers of Interior for the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan on cross-border and security issues which was moderated by the Director of the FBI, representing the U.S. Government. Mr. Thomas’ efforts included addressing cross-border proliferation of precursor chemicals and components utilized in Improvised Explosive Device attacks. Mr. Thomas coordinated Threat Management Conferences, in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior, for senior Pakistani personnel in multiple services to enhance interagency threat management capabilities at the national level with the integration of the security and law enforcement apparatus down to the local level. Prior to joining the FBI, Mr. Thomas had military service and was a police officer. He holds a master of arts in diplomacy with a concentration in international conflict management from Norwich University in Northfield, Vermont, as well as a bachelor of arts in corporate security and an associate of applied science in law enforcement technology.
INTERPOL’s tactical principle is that when we are engaged with an adversary, you need a 2:1 ratio of law enforcement in order to fully subvert the adversary.
Partners are key to law enforcement work. Current gap is that law enforcement does not have the right set of tools and experts. Technology expertise, expertise in science, human and animal health is lacking and needs to be addressed.
It is important to converge the health and technology communities.
To address CBRN issues, INTERPOL’s resources are as following:
1. Bioterrorism unit
2. Radiological/nuclear unit
3. Chemical/explosives/conventional weapons unit
Law enforcement has to be prepared to deal with overall CBRN threats. We have to be able to look at response capability across the spectrum.
A prevention approach is our goal. We need to work towards engaging, pursuing and minimizing an attack. We also need to conduct ourselves in a legally defensive way, and we cannotdo it after the fact.
Tripwires, countermeasures, and defensive postures forge a planned attack.
INTERPOL has a good history of collaboration.
Collaboration with academia is vital. Call for academic papers and infusion of fresh thought and academic perspective helps us with our planning. We need to get rid of insularity.
A CBRN issue requires a coordinated international response.
WHO should work with countries and support them in response to outbreaks.
A Central reference lab is a great idea. It helps in recruiting international support towards alleviating regional bio-security problems.