BWC Review Conference: Looking Ahead

But even with effective implementation of the Work Program, there is still more work to be done. At the Sixth Review Conference, the United States circulated a working paper entitled "Confronting Noncompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention." I am not going to summarize every issue covered in that paper, but there were a number of actions that the United States described that individual States Parties can take, on a national basis, to increase our collective security and enhance compliance with the BWC. Some highlights include:

1. Call upon all BWC parties and signatories that have not done so to terminate their offensive biological weapons programs immediately and comply fully with their treaty obligations;
   
   
2. Submit Confidence Building Measures declarations to increase transparency and to demonstrate their commitment to the Convention;
   
   
3. Work with the WHO, the FAO, and the OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) to strengthen our collective health and agricultural systems. After all, having strong agricultural and public health sectors raises the level of our collective security, and can deter would-be violators from employing prohibited weapons; and
   
   
4. Develop, on a national basis, more rigorous methodologies for assessing and detecting noncompliance, as there is simply no catch-all method for verification that is appropriate for every treaty regime. We continue to discuss and consult with others to build the capacity in partner countries for this type of work.
   

Let me elaborate a little on those first two points. The United States has an established, rigorous process in place for evaluating countries' compliance with their arms control & nonproliferation treaties and commitments. The results of those evaluations are contained in the report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, which is required by law on an annual basis and forwarded to Congress by the Secretary of State on behalf of the President. We continue work to resolve many of the concerns that have been raised in the report, including through a series of robust bilateral dialogues with other States Parties.

Speaking of transparency, I understand that there have been 58 countries to date that have submitted Confidence Building Measures declarations under the BWC this year, which is a record number. But there are 159 States Parties! Many of these outliers have never submitted CBM declarations at any point in the past, despite repeated offers from the United States and others to provide technical assistance in completing the forms. So how can the Parties to the Convention profess to maintain standards of transparency and accountability which are fundamental to the Treaty itself, when fewer than half of States Parties submit CBMs each year? The status quo is not acceptable, and the United States continues to urge those countries that have not submitted their CBMs to do so without delay.

Let me also provide a couple of examples of areas in which we continue to work to develop more rigorous methodologies for assessing and detecting noncompliance. In the event of an allegation of use of biological or toxin weapons, the United States government has processes in place to conduct assessments, in an attempt to attribute the incident to its perpetrator. This means that we are responsible for ensuring that 1) an investigation occurs; 2) that data is collected and analyzed, and 3) that we are able to use that analysis to make an attribution determination and take appropriate actions. Let me give you three scenarios in which such investigations would take place:

• The first type would be an attack using a biological agent that occurs abroad, but directly affects U.S. citizens or interests.

• The second type of incident would be an attack using a biological agent that occurs abroad, but does not directly impact U.S. citizens or interests.

• The third type of incident would be a BW attack that occurs within the United States, but where the perpetrator is foreign.

For each scenario, an attribution assessment would enable the United States to make a determination as to whether a foreign State is engaged in prohibited biological weapons use, and therefore is not in compliance with its international agreements. We would also need to know if the actor was a terrorist organization so that an appropriate response can be determined. All three of these scenarios require strong coordination, timely investigation, and reliable data, to determine an appropriate response to the immediate incident and deter potential future attacks. The U.S. Government continues to work to put into place the necessary procedures and plans so that when an incident occurs, we will be able to respond appropriately and effectively, including through collaboration with other concerned governments, non-governmental organizations, and international bodies when necessary.

In order to do our job better, we have created a technology matrix and database of available and developing technologies that could target the BW problem across the lifecycle of a BW program - that is, from intent to development to production to use. If we suspect an agent has been used, we can match the appropriate technology with the requirements for sampling, detection, analysis and characterization. We are seeking a better understanding of what can be detected in order to identify elements of biological weapons development and production, and what technologies could be used to identify, characterize and attribute actual use events. And we continue to work to identify and encourage detection, using our national means and methods, that will give us the answers we need in a timely fashion and ensure the United States can respond effectively and appropriately.

We are also working closely with academic partners to better understand the genetic relationship of various pathogenic strains and how this might apply to detection capabilities and strategies. I strongly believe we need to have good databases of biological agent strains and specifically their natural geographic distribution, so that we can better track biological incidents and outbreaks. When biological agents are detected, the goal is to quickly and accurately trace their origin, in order to determine if they are endemic to a particular region, and who may have intentionally introduced them. We need this type of data to successfully monitor, recognize, and attribute biological weapons incidents. And we continue to need effective coordination to make this happen.

I am encouraged by the progress that has been made in the context of the BWC, thanks in no small part to your efforts, Mr. Ambassador; however, there is more work to be done. The United States, for its part, will remain vigilant against the threat of biological weapons use, and will continue to work to see that the Biological Weapons Convention serves as an effective norm against the specter of biological weapons. Again, I'd like to thank the organizers here at Wilton Park for the opportunity to be here today. Thank you.