NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath |
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
1. Briefing Paper
Washington, October 1, 1962.
Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 14, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence. Top Secret. Prepared by Colonel John R. Wright, Jr., USA. A note on the source text indicates that it was prepared initially for a briefing given on September 28 and that material from the paper was included in the briefing given the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 1.
SUBJECT
Analysis of SAM Sites
1. The intelligence community has now identified and confirmed a total of 15 SA-2 SAM sites. From the location of these sites, a discernible pattern is developing:
a. In the Oriente Province, the identified sites (3) form a triangular pattern around the new military airfield at Holguin. This field is probably not yet operational, but soon could be. At the present time, there are no MIG-type aircraft stationed at this field. The MIGs believed to be assigned to the operational control of the Commander, Eastern Army, are stationed at the airfield at Camaguey, in the Central Army area. When Holguin becomes operational, these aircraft will probably be moved to that location. There are no SA-2 sites identified in the vicinity of Camaguey.
b. In the Central Army area, 4 SA-2 sites form a rectangular pattern around the military airfield near Santa Clara. This airfield has had MIGs for several months and is also the field upon which the first MIG 21 was identified.
c. In the Western Army area, there are 3 and possibly 4 SA-2 sites forming a liner pattern to provide defense for the military airfield at San Antonia de los Banos and coincidentally for the defense of the Havana-Mariel complex. San Antonio de los Banos is the headquarters for the Cuban revolutionary Air Force and the assembly point for all MIGs, except the MIG-21, which have previously been received in Cuba.
2. Further west in the Pinar del Rio Province a triangular pattern of 3 SA-2 sites cannot be connected with any significant military installation. The only known installation within this triangle are 2 underground facilities whose use and purpose are unknown. The only other military installation in this particular area is the military air base at San Julian near the western tip of Cuba. However, 1 of the 3 SA-2 sites is located at or very near this military airfield, a most unlikely spot to place SA-2s for the defense of this particular air base. Therefore, curiosity is immediately aroused to the purpose of this triangular pattern on the far western tip of Cuba.
3. In the north central portion of the Pinar del Rio Province is a large trapazoid-shaped restricted area controlled by the Soviet military personnel recently introduced into Cuba, measuring 15-20 miles on a side. There are no known military installations in this rough and sparsely populated area. According to reports from refugees arriving in Miami, all Cubans have been evacuated from this restricted area. The purpose of this restricted area is not currently known.
4. Information concerning the deployment of Soviet military personnel and "technicians" recently arriving in Cuba is derived from unevaluated refugee sources, however, an attempt has been made to plot all reported locations to determine whether there is any correlation between the location of Soviet personnel and missiles or missile activity. So far, the pattern indicates that there is a definite correlation, but significantly the greatest concentration of Soviet personnel, activity and camps is in the western end of the Island of Cuba. This would indicate a greater interest on the part of the Soviets in Pinar del Rio than in the other provinces.
5. A single unevaluated report states that the Soviet "SS-4 Shyster" missile may have been delivered to Cuba on or about 11 September. Some confusion is apparent in this report. The SS-4 missile is nicknamed "Sandal," while the "Shyster" carriers a designation of SS-3. This confusion was caused by the interrogators of the source using a recognition manual which designated the SS-4 as the Shyster. However, the description of the missiles reportedly observed by the source could have applied equally to either the Shyster or the Sandal. Both missiles have essentially the same outward appearance except that the Sandal is about 5 feet longer. In all other respects, including the missile carrier, the two appear identical. The source of this report stated that on 12 September he had personally seen some 20 such missiles in the vicinity of Campo Libertad, a small airfield on the western edge of Havana. While this report is still unconfirmed and there are no other reports concerning the presence of either SS-3 or SS-4 missiles, it is significant to note that by using the approximate center of the restricted area referred to above as a point of origin and with a radius of 1100 nm, the accepted range of the SS-4 missile, the arc includes the cities of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, Fort Worth-Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Mexico City, all of the capitals of the Central American nations, the Panama Canal, and the oil fields in Maricaibo, Venezuela. The presence of operational SS-4 missiles in this location would give the Soviets a great military asset.
2. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy
Washington, October 2, 1962.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 194. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text.
SUBJECT
Policy Toward Non-Bloc Ships in Cuban Trade
A. Recommended Action
1. The President should make a public statement dealing with this topic.
2. The President should close all U.S. ports to all ships of any country if any ship under the flag of that country hereafter carries arms to Cuba.
3. The President should direct that no government cargo shall be carried on a foreign flag ship if any ship of the same owners is used hereafter in Bloc-Cuba Trade.
4. The President should direct that no United States flag ship and no United States owned ship shall carry goods to or from Cuba.
5. Alternative I
The President should close all United States ports to any ship on a continuous voyage to or from Cuba.
Alternative II
The President should close all United States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage carried or carries to Cuba items on the COCOM list.
Alternative III
The President should close all United States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage carried or carries to Cuba items on the positive list under Regulation T-1.
Alternative IV
The President should close all United States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage was used or is being used in Bloc-Cuba trade.
6. The President should instruct the Secretary of State to explore every avenue to obtain cooperation from other countries in restricting the use of their ships in Bloc-Cuba trade.
B. Legal Authority
The President has all the necessary legal authority to carry out the above recommendations without new legislation. A small supplemental appropriation for the Department of Agriculture might have to be included in the budget to pay for shipping in U.S. bottoms.
C. Action Not Recommended
The President has adequate legal powers to adopt more restrictive policies than those recommended above. There has been some talk, for example, of closing U.S. ports to the ships of any country which permits its ships to go to Cuba. Others have mentioned the possibility of closing territorial waters of the U.S. to such ships, or denying them use of the Panama Canal.
These proposals are not recommended./1/
/1/Printed from an unsigned copy.
3. National Security Action Memorandum No. 194
Washington, October 2, 1962.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 194. Confidential; Sensitive.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
The Administrator, Maritime Commission
The Director, Agency for International Development
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The President, Commodity Credit Corporation
SUBJECT
Policy Toward Non-Bloc Ships in Cuban Trade (State memo of 10/2/62)/1/
/1/Document 2.
The President has approved the memorandum we/2/ discussed at the meeting this morning,/3/ including Alternative IV, under point 5. A group will be formed to do what is necessary to put these recommendations into effect./4/ Mr. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser of the State Department, will lead it. Will you arrange for your department to put an appropriate person in touch with Mr. Chayes?
/2/In some instances, departmental representatives were present representing their principals. [Footnote in the source text.]
/3/According to the President's Appointment Book, President Kennedy met with George Ball and Carl Kaysen for an off-the-record meeting at 11:12 a.m. The meeting lasted for 15 minutes and no other participants are listed. (Kennedy Library) A memorandum for the record prepared by Captain William D. Houser, USN, based upon a debriefing provided by Gilpatric following the meeting indicates, however, that Gilpatric and several other concerned officals also participated in the meeting. According to Gilpatric, the group recognized that "none of these or any other actions not adopted have any real substantive effect on cutting down Soviet Bloc trade with Cuba." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962, 000.1-092) George Ball discussed the President's decision on the afternoon of October 2 with Stevenson. Ball noted that the measures relating to trade with Cuba were "more for American public opinion" than for any practical effect they were expected to have on the availability of shipping to the Soviet Bloc for trade with Cuba. Nonetheless, he added, "the President felt strongly that we had to do something along this line" and that it would raise the cost to the Soviet Union of shipping arms and other supplies to Cuba. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62) See the Supplement.
/4/Telegram 457 to Paris, October 2, instructed Finletter to inform the other permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council, at their scheduled meeting on October 3, that the United States proposed to take the steps outlined in NSAM 194 within a week. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-262)
Carl Kaysen/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
4. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)
Washington, October 2, 1962.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 1962. Top Secret. The source text is undated, but a copy found ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 381 Jan-Oct, is dated October 2.
During my meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 1, 1962, the question arose as to the contingencies under which military action against Cuba may be necessary and toward which our military planning should be oriented. The following categories would appear to cover the likely possibilities:
(a) Soviet action against Western rights in Berlin calling for a Western response including among other actions a blockade of Communist or other shipping en route to Cuba.
(b) Evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of bloc offensive weapon systems on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors.
(c) An attack against the Guantanamo base, or against U.S. planes or vessels outside Cuban territorial air space or waters.
(d) A substantial popular uprising in Cuba, the leaders of which request assistance in recovering Cuban independence from the Castro Soviet puppet regime.
(e) Cuban armed assistance to subversion in other parts of the Western Hemisphere.
(f) A decision by the President that affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing U.S. national security.
May I have the views of the Chiefs as to the appropriateness of the above list of contingencies and answers to the following three sets of questions:
(a) The operational plans considered appropriate for each contingency.
(b) The preparatory actions which should now and progressively in the future be undertaken to improve U.S. readiness to execute these plans.
(c) The consequences of the actions on the availability of forces and on our logistics posture to deal with threats in other areas, i.e. Berlin, Southeast Asia, etc.
We can assume that the political objective in any of these contingencies may be either:
(a) the removal of the threat to U.S. security of Soviet weapon systems in Cuba, or
(b) the removal of the Castro regime and the securing in the island of a new regime responsive to Cuban national desires.
Inasmuch as the second objective is the more difficult objective and may be required if the first is to be permanently achieved, attention should be focused upon a capability to assure the second objective.
I have asked ISA to initiate discussion with State as to the political actions which should precede or accompany the various military actions being planned.
Robert S. McNamara
5. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
Washington, October 2, 1962.
Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Cuba, 1962. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text.
SUBJECT
Summary of Recent Soviet Military Assistance to Cuba/1/
/1/According to a February 21, 1963, letter sent by Ball to Congressman George H. Mahon, this memorandum was prepared at Ball's request to prepare him for his testimony on October 3 before the House Select Committee on Export Control. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Hearings Before the Committee on Export Controls) Ball noted in his letter to Mahon that, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, members of the committee had questioned the accuracy of the statements he had made with respect to the flow of Soviet military equipment and missiles to Cuba. He provided Mahon with a copy of the October 2 memorandum from Hilsman in order to demonstrate that his testimony was based upon the information available to him at the time. A copy of Ball's testimony before the Committee on Export Control is ibid.
Since July when the volume of Soviet military shipments to Cuba suddenly increased very substantially, 85 shiploads of various military items, supplies, and personnel have arrived. More ships are en route.
In part the Soviet shipments have consisted of types of weapons previously delivered to the Cuban armed forces including more tanks, self-propelled guns and other ground force equipment. The major tonnage however has been devoted to supplying SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) together with all of the related gear and equipment necessary for their installation and operation. To date 15 SAM sites have been established in the island. We estimate the total may eventually reach 25.
In addition 3 (possibly 4) missile sites of a different type have been identified. These sites are similar to known coastal defense missile sites and are believed to accommodate Soviet anti-shipping missiles with a range of 20-35 miles. We expect that several more such sites will be installed.
Cuba is now estimated to have 60 older type MIG jet aircraft plus at least one advanced jet interceptor (MIG-21) recently received and probably several more in process of assembly. The MIG-21 is usually equipped with infrared air-to-air missiles. We estimate that the total of MIG-21s in Cuba may eventually reach 25-30.
Sixteen "Komar" class guided-missile patrol boats which carry two short range missiles (11-17 miles) were included in the new shipments.
About 4,500 Soviet military specialists have arrived including construction men and technicians.
If the SAM sites are to be operated solely by Cuban personnel six months to a year of training will be required.
There is a considerable amount of other new equipment which has not been precisely identified but it is believed to include a large quantity of electronic gear.
6. Editorial Note
The Foreign Ministers of the Latin American Republics met at the Department of State on October 2 and 3, 1962, at the invitation of Secretary of State Rusk to discuss matters of mutual concern, with a particular emphasis on the problems posed by Cuba. The invitation was extended on September 5 through the Latin American ambassadors in Washington. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 375) The Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela attended. The meetings were informal, without agenda or resolutions. Secretary Rusk opened the first session of the Foreign Ministers meeting at 10:30 a.m. on October 2 with a discussion of the threat posed to the Americas by communism; a threat, he stated, which was rapidly expanding with each shipload of modern weaponry that the Soviet Union sent to the base for Communist penetration it had established in Cuba. Rusk outlined the magnitude of the arms build-up taking place in Cuba and repeated the warnings President Kennedy had issued against the development of Cuba as a Soviet military base, or the introduction into Cuba of ground-to-ground ballistic missiles. He noted that there were to date no indications that the Soviet Union intended to violate those guidelines. Nonetheless, he argued that Soviet penetration of the hemisphere, and the aggressive use of Cuba as a focus for subversive activities posed serious problems, which he invited the Foreign Ministers to consider and address. (Memorandum of meeting, Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 330, Secretary's Memcons) See the Supplement. President Kennedy hosted a luncheon at the White House for the Foreign Ministers following the opening session. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) The Foreign Ministers met again on the afternoon of October 2 and twice on October 3. The tenor of the remarks by the other Foreign Ministers reflected general agreement with Rusk's emphasis on the need for hemispheric solidarity to face the perceived threat. (Memoranda of these three meetings are in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 330, Secretary's Memcons) See the Supplement.
In the final communique issued at the conclusion of the meetings on October 3, the Foreign Ministers reiterated the OAS conclusion that the Soviet Union's intervention in Cuba threatened the unity and democratic institutions of the Americas. They added that it was "desirable to intensify individual and collective surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic importance to the communist regime of Cuba, in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the Hemisphere." American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pages 391-393)
7. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy
Washington, October 4, 1962.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 10/1-10/14/62. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Presidential Interest in SA-2 Missile System and Contingency Planning for Cuba
1. In your memorandum of 21 September 1962,/1/ you noted an apparent lack of unanimity between General LeMay and Admiral Anderson with respect to aircraft losses that might occur in attacking an SA-2 site. You further requested assurance as to the currency of contingency planning for Cuba.
/1/See vol. X, Document 434.
2. I have discussed with General LeMay and Admiral Anderson their estimate of aircraft losses in attacking SA-2 missile sites. Admiral Anderson agrees with General LeMay's point that no losses would be suffered from the SA-2 missile since the attacking aircraft would fly below the effective minimum altitude of the SA-2. General LeMay shares Admiral Anderson's estimate that attacking aircraft might suffer some loss to antiaircraft artillery defenses of the SA-2 site. The National Intelligence Estimate/2/ credits the SA-2 missile system with a minimum effective altitude of 3000 feet due to inherent radar limitations.
/2/Reference is to SNIE 85-3-62; ibid., Document 433.
3. If antiaircraft artillery is employed in direct support of the missile site, losses may be expected. World War II and Korean experience, updated to reflect current antiaircraft artillery capabilities against modern aircraft, indicates that low level attack forces would incur some combat losses from antiaircraft artillery fire; however, numbers cannot be predicted accurately. There are currently no known antiaircraft artillery defenses of SA-2 sites in Cuba. Attack plans can be amended to take the antiaircraft weapons under fire during the attack if reconnaissance shows such defenses and if analysis shows such fire suppression necessary. Korean experience proved that such fire suppression was unnecessary when surprise could be achieved.
4. In my opinion and that of the Joint Chiefs, it is not necessary to build a model of an SA-2 site for training purposes. However, the aircraft revetment of the type found at Santa Clara and Camaguey is a more difficult target than the SA-2 site. Therefore, the Air Force has found it desirable to reproduce that type aircraft revetment to aid in the selection of weapons, method of delivery and to assist in training crews. The target was completed at Nellis AFB, Nevada, on 30 September 1962, at an approximate cost of $28,000. Initial tests indicate that the GAM 83, 20 mm cannon, and napalm is the most effective weapons mix against aircraft in such revetments.
5. I have taken steps to insure that our contingency plans for Cuba are kept up to date.
6. The Navy plans to attack SA-2 targets at low level using 4 divisions of A-4D's (4 aircraft per division) armed with 250#, 500#, and 2000# low drag bombs and napalm. All crews are proficient in the delivery techniques planned. Similarly, the Air Force plans primary use of napalm and 20 mm cannon delivered at low level, and crews are proficient. Both have made detailed target studies; target folders are in the hands of crews; and crews are familiar with their assigned targets. As new missile sites are located, they are picked up in the target and attack plans within a few hours of receipt of photographs./3/
/3/On October 5 General C.V. Clifton, the President's military aide, sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara in which he indicated that the President had "read with interest" McNamara's October 4 memorandum dealing with the SA-2 missile system in Cuba. Clifton noted: "He commented that he was sure you had had an opportunity to tell General Taylor of the contents of the memorandum." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 10/1-10/14/62)
Robert S. McNamara/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
8. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone
Washington, October 4, 1962.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Files, Job 80-B01676R, Box 17, Folder 12. Secret; Eyes Only. A memorandum for the record of this meeting, by Thomas A. Parrott, is ibid., Walter Elder Recop. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 111-113.
MEMORANDUM OF MONGOOSE MEETING HELD ONTHURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1962
Chaired by the Attorney General.
Attended by: Gilpatric, Johnson, General Taylor, General Carter, McCone, Scoville, General Lansdale and Colonel Steakley (part of the time).
The Attorney General reported on discussions with the President on Cuba; dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field, went on to stress that nothing was moving forward, commented that one effort attempted had failed, expressed general concern over developing situation.
General Lansdale reviewed operations, pointing out that no sabotage had been attempted and gave general impression that things were all right.
McCone then stated that phase one was principally intelligence gathering, organizing and training, that no sabotage was authorized, that one operation against a powerhouse had been contemplated but was discouraged by group, that he had called a meeting to review matters this morning and that he had observed a lack of forward motion due principally to "hesitancy" in government circles to engage in any activities which would involve attribution to the United States.
AG took sharp exception stating the Special Group had not withheld approval on any specified actions to his knowledge, but to the contrary had urged and insisted upon action by the Lansdale operating organization.
There followed a sharp exchange which finally was clarifying inasmuch as it resulted in a reaffirmation of a determination to move forward. In effect it seemed to be the consensus that phase two as approved on September 6, was now outmoded, that more dynamic action was indicated, that hesitancy about overflights must be reconsidered (this to be commented on later in this memorandum), that actions which could be attributed to indigenous Cubans would not be important or very effective, and that a very considerable amount of attribution and "noise" must be expected.
As a result, General Lansdale was instructed to give consideration to new and more dynamic approaches, the specific items of sabotage should be brought forward immediately and new ones conceived, that a plan for mining harbors should be developed and presented, and the possibility of capturing Castro forces for interrogation should be studied.
With respect to overflights, the NRO and Colonel Steakley were instructed to prepare and present to the Special Group on next Tuesday/1/ at a special meeting alternate recommendations for overflights. These to include the use of U-2s on complete sweeps (as contrasted with peripheral or limited missions), the use of firefly drones, the use of 101s or other reconnaissance planes on low level, intermediate level, and high level missions, and other possible reconnaissance operations.
/1/October 9; see Document 11.
Consideration was given to stating publicly that we propose to overfly Cuba in the interest of our own security and the security of the Western Hemisphere, and then to proceed even though doing so involved risk.
It was the consensus that we could not accept restrictions which would foreclose gaining all reasonable knowledge of military installations in Cuba.
During the meeting McCone reviewed the earlier meeting with General Lansdale, and pointed out to the group that this meeting clarified General Lansdale's authority over the entire Mongoose operation and that the CIA organization was responsive to his policy and operational guidance, and this was thoroughly understood.
Consideration was given to the existing guidelines and it was the consensus that the August 1st guidelines for phase two/2/ were inadequate and new guidelines must be considered.
/2/Apparent reference to the attachment to Document 362, vol. X.
John A. McCone/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
9. Memorandum of Discussion With the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, October 5, 1962, 5:15 p.m.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record. Secret. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 115-117.
1. McCone reviewed details of the Donovan negotiations, discussions with the President, Attorney General, Eisenhower, the decisions not to approach Congressional leadership, the discussion with Senator Javits, and the final report from Donovan. Bundy expressed general agreement.
2. At the October 4th meeting of the Special Group Mongoose/1/ was discussed in some detail as was the meeting with Carter, Lansdale, et al. in DCI's office on that day. McCone stated there was a feeling in CIA and Defense that the "activist policy" which founded the Mongoose operation was gone and that while no specific operational activities had been (refused) the amount of "noise"from minor incidents such as the sugar, the students firing on the Havana Hotel and other matters and the extreme caution expressed by State had led to this conclusion. More importantly, however, the decisions to restrict U-2 flights had placed the United States Intelligence Community in a position where it could not report with assurance the development of offensive capabilities in Cuba. McCone stated he felt it most probable that Soviet-Castro operations would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs. McCone stated he thought this a probability rather than a mere possibility. Bundy took issue stating that he felt the Soviets would not go that far, that he was satisfied that no offensive capability would be installed in Cuba because of its world-wide effects and therefore seemed relaxed over the fact that the Intelligence Community cannot produce hard information on this important subject. McCone said that Bundy's viewpoint was reflected by many in the Intelligence Community, perhaps a majority, but he just did not agree and furthermore did not think the United States could afford to take such a risk.
/1/See Document 8.
3. Bundy then philosophized on Cuba stating that he felt that our policy was not clear, our objectives not determined and therefore our efforts were not productive. He discussed both the Mongoose operations and the Rostow "Track Two"./2/ Bundy was not critical of either or of the Lansdale operations. It was obvious that he was not in sympathy with a more active role such as those discussed at 5412 on Thursday/3/ as he felt none of them would bring Castro down nor would they particularly enhance U.S. position of world leadership. Bundy seemed inclined to support the Track Two idea and also inclined (though he was not specific) to play down the more active Lansdale operation. Bundy had not talked to Lansdale but obviously had received some of the "static" that is being passed around in Washington. (Before) McCone in reporting on the discussions at Thursday's 5412 meeting repeated the views of the President and expressed by the Attorney General it was agreed that the whole Government policy with reference to Cuba must be resolved promptly as basic to further actions on our part. In general, Bundy's views were that we should either make a judgment that we would have to go in militarily (which seemed to him intolerable) or alternatively we would have to learn to live with Castro, and his Cuba and adjust our policies accordingly.
/2/See Document 14.
/3/McCone is apparently referring to the Special Group (the successor of the 5412 Committee) meeting on October 4; see Document 8.
4. McCone then elaborated on his views of the evolution of Soviet-Castro military capability stating he felt defense was just phase one, phase two would be followed by various offensive capabilities and indeed the existing defensive capabilities such as the (MIG) 21s a very definite offensive capability against nearby American cities and installations. McCone stated that he thought that the establishment of a very expensive defensive mechanism could not be the ultimate objective of the Soviets or Castro and therefore the objective was (a) to establish an offensive base or (b) to insert sufficient Soviet specialists and military leaders to take Cuba away from Castro and establish it as a true Soviet controlled satellite. McCone stated that he felt there were only two courses open--one was to take military action at the appropriate time or secondly to pursue an effort to split Castro off from the Communists and for this reason he, McCone, had vigorously supported the Donovan mission as it is the only link that we have to the Castro hierarchy at the present time. Note in this connection it might be well to study the evolution of the Toure experience in Guinea when the Communists moved in and captured all elements of the Government and economy and forced Toure to expel the Ambassador and try to rectify the situation. There may be a parallel here.
5. McCone reviewed the Eisenhower discussions. Bundy read the memorandum covering these discussions./4/ Bundy stated that Adenauer did not express the concern of the U.S. policy reflected by Eisenhower and reported in the memorandum.
/4/Not further identified.
6. Bundy rejected the idea of regular NSC meetings stating that every President has to organize his Government as he desires and that the Eisenhower pattern was not necessarily adaptable to the Kennedy type of administration. McCone stated that if this is the case he intended to request occasional NSC meetings to review specific estimates or other intelligence situations and the next one would be a report and discussion of the estimate of Soviet air defense capabilities. Bundy agreed.
7. Bundy rejected the idea (calling) the several Special Groups 5412, CIA, Mongoose, and North Vietnam together feeling it was better to keep them separated. He also rejected the idea that the visiting commissions such as the Byroade Team and the Draper Team should report back to the Special Group (CI) feeling it was appropriate that they report to the President, (through) the Secretary of State, with consultation with the Special Group (CI). It was agreed that we would have a further discussion over the weekend.
John A. McCone/5/
Director
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.5
10. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Project Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)
Washington, October 8, 1962.
Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Ship
1. It is requested that you present the following proposal to the Special Group (Augmented) for policy approval.
2. Policy approval is requested to permit the sabotage of Cuban-owned vessels wherever and whenever secure access to them can be attained, normally this will be in non-Bloc ports. Attacks against the Cuban-owned ships must be considered essentially as attacks against targets of opportunity in the sense that in most cases there will be little advance information prior to the arrival of the ship in a non-Bloc port and the duration of the port call will be limited.
3. The following specific types of action are contemplated:
[13 paragraphs (40 lines of source text) not declassified]
6. It is necessary to submit the request for policy approval in a somewhat more general form than usual to permit us to take advantage of targets of opportunity as they occur. In most cases we will not have sufficient advance notice of the arrival of the ship or have sufficient access to the ship to permit the preparation and submission of detailed individual approval requests in advance. In every case where time and circumstance permit, specific proposals will be submitted to the Special Group (Augmented) for approval. Any case involving unusual operational or security risks will be submitted in advance for Special Group (Augmented) approval.
7. Later we will submit requests for policy approval of actions against other ships supplying Cuba.
William K. Harvey/1/
/1/Printed from a copy that indicates that Harvey signed the original.
11. Editorial Note
President Kennedy met with the members of the Special Group (Augmented) on October 9, 1962, to consider recommendations for a proposed U-2 reconnaissance flight over Cuba. The purpose of the flight was to obtain hard evidence concerning the development of suspected MRBM sites near recently established SA-2 emplacements, which suggested the development of concomitant ballistic missile sites. The President approved the recommendation for a U-2 flight, to be piloted by a Strategic Air Command pilot, or a military pilot attached to the Central Intelligence Agency. The recommendation for supporting low-level reconnaissance flights was deferred pending a review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, and the United States Intelligence Board concerning the necessity for such flights. The U-2 flight was expected to take only 12 minutes of flying time over Cuba at approximately 74,000 feet. It was noted during the course of the meeting that there were no indications as yet that the SA-2 antiaircraft emplacements had reached operational stage, although it had been nearly 2 months since their first installation. (Notes on a meeting with the President by Roswell L. Gilpatric; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba)
12. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone
Washington, October 11, 1962.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 123-125.
MEMORANDUM ON DONOVAN PROJECT
Meeting 10 Oct 62
Immediately after my discussion with the Cannon Committee (including Taber, Ford and Mahon), I went to the White House and explained to the President and McGeorge Bundy the positions taken by Ford and Mahon, as covered in separate memorandum prepared by Mr. Warner./1/ The President made the judgment that we should proceed with the negotiations, recognizing there would be some political consequences and criticisms, but he, the President, was willing to accept this as a fact.
/1/Not found. Although the source text indicates the meeting with the President took place on October 10 there is no record of it in the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
I then showed the President photographs of the crates which pre-sumably would carry, or were carrying, IL 28s, Soviet medium bombers, and were deck loaded on a ship which had arrived in Havana in the early days of October. The President requested that such information be withheld at least until after elections as if the information got into the press, a new and more violent Cuban issue would be injected into the campaign and this would seriously affect his independence of action.
McCone stated that these particular photographs could not be restricted as they had been disseminated to the Intelligence Community and several joint and specified commands, such as CINCLANT, SAC, NORAD, and others and would be reported in the CIA Bulletin on Thursday morning. The President then requested that the report be worded to indicate a probability rather than an actuality because in the final analysis we only saw crates, not the bombers themselves. DCI agreed. The President further requested that all future information be suppressed. DCI stated that this was extremely dangerous.
It was then agreed that future information would be disseminated to members of USIB, with appropriate instructions that only those responsible for giving the President advice be given the information. Furthermore, that within CIA circles a minimum number of experts be informed. McCone stated there was no problem in CIA, that it was secure. It was therefore agreed that the USIB members would be instructed to restrict the information to their personal offices and fully and currently inform the Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, the Service Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense. Similar restrictive action would be taken in State. Therefore all those involved in "giving advice to the President" would be fully informed. However operational divisions and the joint and specified commands would not be informed at this time, except at the direction of the above people who are receiving the information.
At this point the President mentioned that "we'll have to do something drastic about Cuba" and I am anxiously looking forward to the JCS operational plan which is to be presented to me next week.
McCone effected the above instructions by calling Mr. Cline, who was unavailable, and then Mr. Sheldon who agreed to prepare a procedure for review on Thursday morning.
McCone then called the Attorney General and advised him of his talk with the Cannon Committee. The Attorney General had no particular comment.
At six o'clock McCone received a report from Houston that Donovan had gone into a meeting at five o'clock. At eleven o'clock Houston reported the meeting was still in progress. At seven o'clock on Thursday morning Donovan still had no report.
At 11:15 General Eisenhower called McCone stating he was sorry a meeting could not be arranged, he was leaving very early the following morning for Gettysburg. McCone reported that negotiations were in progress and he also reported objections stated by several members of Congress. Eisenhower advised that the negotiations be pursued, indicating his support of it and furthermore stated that if the negotiations were satisfactorily concluded the complaints and objections would, in his words, disappear.
McCone told General Eisenhower there were some defendable evidences of shipments of twin-engined light jet bombers. Eisenhower responded the situation must be watched very carefully. Positive action might be indicated and then he said there had been two instances where action was warranted but had not been taken. Eisenhower did not elaborate; however, I know from previous discussions he feels that when Castro embraced Communism publicly and announced publicly his allegiance to Moscow, we had then a reason to act militarily and if we had chosen to so act, such action would have been defendable.
On Thursday/2/ morning McCone reported by telephone to Mr. Kennedy, reviewing the Eisenhower discussion and stating that he, McCone, was concerned over Donovan's safety in view of the rash of publicity, most particularly the Herald Tribune article, and that he had instructed that contact be made with Donovan and that if things were not proceeding satisfactorily and a conclusion to the negotiations along the lines agreed in sight, then Donovan should come out. The Attorney General stated that he had no concern over Donovan's personal safety, that "they will not do anything to him". McCone stated he was not so sure and that he therefore concluded to bring Donovan out unless things were going well.
/2/Apparently, Thursday, October 11.
With reference to the political implications, McCone recalled that he had told the President and the AG that he would take all, or his full share of responsibility, that he wished the AG to bear this in mind as the position taken in this respect by Mr. McCone in the first conversation after his return from Europe still stood. AG expressed appreciation for this statement.
John A. McCone/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
13. Memorandum From the Director for Operations of the Joint Staff (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)
S Washington, October 12, 1962.
ource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical File, Cuba, November 1962. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Political Actions/Military Actions Concerning Cuba
REFERENCE
SecDef Memo of 2 October 1962/1/
/1/Document 4.
1. In furtherance of our discussion of last evening concerning the project included in the reference, we are having a meeting at 1300 hours today of operational and logistical planners from CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE for the purpose of developing our responses to the contingencies and other matters requested by the SecDef.
2. Pending completion of the requirement given us by the SecDef, a general picture of each of our military contingency plans for Cuba is tabulated below as a basis for your initial discussions with State. On the other hand, it may be better to delay discussions with State until we have completed our part of the requirement and have submitted it to the SecDef and the JCS on Monday, 15 October.
a. Blockade Plan--employs 24 to 36 destroyers, a carrier task force, etc., which can marshal significant strength to blockade Cuba, both air and maritime.
b. Air Strike Plan--currently being revised, but employs between 450 and 500 aircraft. In the event of any execution of this plan steps would be taken to alert all forces allocated to the other assault plans.
c. Fast Reaction Assault Plan--employs both air-borne and amphibious assault with about 32,000 troops in initial phase, with balance of assault forces arriving in increments as they become available. Ultimately builds up to about 80,000 troops in Cuba around D+18 days.
d. Full-Scale Deliberate Assault Plan--employs simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault with around 49,000 troops engaged on D-Day, building to about 60,000 by D+5 days, and again to 80,000 by D+16 days.
3. For your consideration, following are some of the political actions which might be undertaken in connection with the implementation of one or more of the foregoing plans: final arrangements for the tactical use of Mayaguana Island in the Bahamas; perhaps a request for token participation by Latin American military forces; in the case of blockade, notification of "neutral" shipping and publication of U.S. intent; in all cases, possibly, the preliminary political arrangements attendant to a state of war; and, of course, coordination with international organizations, such as the OAS and the UN during the execution of military action.
F.T. Unger/2/
Major General, USA
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
14. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)
Washington, October 12, 1962.
Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hurwitch.
SUBJECT
Track Two
The following is the pertinent portion of Mr. Rostow's paper:/1/
/1/For text, see vol. X, Document 406.
"I believe we should consider the possibility of a Two-Track covert operation.
"Track One would consist of a heightened effort to move along the present Mongoose lines. The minimum objective here would be harassment: the maximum objective would be the triggering of a situation where there might be conflict at the top of the Cuban regime leading, hopefully, to its change or overthrow by some group within Cuba commanding arms.
"Track Two would consist of an effort to engage Cubans more deeply, both within Cuba and abroad, in efforts of their own liberation. This requires an operation with the following characteristics:
"a. Authentic Cuban leadership with a considerable range of freedom to implement ideas and to assume risk.
"b. Minimal U.S. direct participation: ideally, one truly wise U.S. adviser--available, but laying back; equipped to provide finance, but not monitoring every move; capable of earning their respect rather than commanding it by his control over money or equipment.
"c. Basing outside the United States.
"d. A link-up with the scattered and sporadic groups and operations now going forward of their own momentum in Cuba.
"e. A plan of operation which aims at the overthrow of Castro primarily from within rather than by invasion from without.
"f. A long enough time horizon to build the operation carefully and soundly.
"In suggesting that Track Two be studied--and sharply distinguished from Track One--I am, of course, wholly conscious of our failure of last year. But, as I read that failure in retrospect, its root lay in: U.S. bureaucratic domination; the lack of a Cuban political and organizational base; and a plan of operation that hinged on a type of overt invasion by a fixed date rather than the patient build-up of a true movement of national liberation. I'm sure it would be easy to argue that such a movement could not be generated against a Communist control system; that the Cuban refugees lack the capacity to play their part in such an enterprise with skill and minimal security; etc. And I am in no position to reply with confidence to such argument. On the other hand, Cuba is not located in Eastern Europe; and, presumably, some Cubans have learned something from last year's failure, too.
"On the balance, I am prepared to recommend that Track Two be sympathetically studied and that General Lansdale be asked to formulate a design for it."
The underlying philosophy is one which we have felt for some time merited exploration.
There is attached (Tab A) as you have requested, a paper describing the more important policy considerations bearing on this course of action.
Also attached (Tab B)/2/ is the ARA memorandum, previously forwarded to you, describing some of the political thinking which leads us to the conclusion that we should experiment with this course of action.
/2/Dated September 19; for text, see vol. X, Document 432.
Tab A
TRACK TWO
A program of "giving the Cubans their heads" in an effort to effect the downfall of the Castro regime from within involves embarking upon uncharted waters as far as the U.S. is concerned. Grandiose U.S. plans based upon a substantially unified exile community would be unrealistic. Nearly all Cuban exile leaders, of whatever political persuasion, are convinced that only overt U.S. military action can remove the Castro regime. While we could probably force a semblance of unity based upon the "downfall from within" thesis, despite the sharp political rivalry among the exile leaders, our purposes would not be served. While "accepting" our thesis, most of the waking hours of these exiles would be devoted to devising ways of involving the U.S. militarily, rather than building the internal base of opposition we seek. We could thereby lose initiative and control over the situation and find ourselves in an untenable position from the international, and, perhaps, domestic, standpoint.
If the above judgment is accepted, two alternatives are available. We could cooperate with all anti-Castro-Batista exile groups which we have reason to believe have following inside Cuba, or we could, on an experimental basis work with one such group. By cooperating with all such groups we run the serious risk of accentuating rivalries among the exile leaders which would be inevitably reflected within Cuba. Rather than achieving a broad base of political opposition within Cuba, we may only be instrumental in fomenting splinter groups. In attempting to administer such a program, the U.S. would probably find itself in the midst of the crossfire of exile politics, very likely satisfying no one inside or outside Cuba.
Working with one group, on an experimental basis, would provide us with experience which could guide our future thinking and at the same time probably prevent problems of unmanageable proportions. Selection of the right group is of paramount importance. Even then, if we saw no progress in Cuba, we could not be certain that the thesis was impractical or the selection of the group erroneous.
Of all the exile groups the only one which has publicly adopted the thesis of "downfall from within" is that known as JURE, formed in September 1962 by Manolo Ray and based in Puerto Rico. (Since Ray has some friends within the U.S. Government and is presently employed by the Puerto Rican Government, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the recent official interest in the "downfall from within" thesis has been generated by him.) Ray was former Minister of Public Works under Castro, broke with Castro and formed an important underground movement which has since been badly smashed by Castro. Ray is a nationalist and left of center. The political program of JURE is one with which the U.S. can live.
The other feasible possibility is the CRC with which we have had a long standing relationship. Apart from Dr. Miro and some of the organizations that form an integral part of the Council, the CRC is not a very effective organization for what we have in mind. Its background is associated with the Bay of Pigs and its outlook is essentially one of military action.
Advantages of working with JURE would appear to be:
1. A new organization which, as such, has no past relationship with the U.S.
2. Commitment to the "downfall from within" thesis.
3. Base outside the U.S.
4. Political ideology which may be attuned to the desires of the Cuban people.
5. Ray is experienced in underground activities and an independ-ent thinker.
Disadvantages of working with JURE are:
1. Little, if any, assets known within Cuba today.
2. Opposed by most of the established exile groups, particularly Dr. Miro.
3. Ray is a complex personality, sometimes difficult to handle.
On balance it is worth trying. Although we would try to maintain security, Dr. Miro may discover our assistance to Ray and resign. The CRC is useful to us, but its disappearance would be bearable.
If we embark upon these unchartered waters, and it is recommended that we do so, we must be prepared for increased noise level and press inquiry. We must be prepared for a comparatively high rate of loss, failures and cries of anguish from JURE for assistance we may not be able to give it. It is essential that we recognize this and not be permitted to be stampeded into regrettable public postures or actions. A further important consideration is that Track Two operations may compromise Track One operations. Coordination would be essential.
Another conflict arises from the President's desire that a Cuban Brigade be formed. While this would not necessarily be a serious conflict with the program envisaged, for there are probably enough exiles for both programs, it should be recognized that a number of young men qualified for infiltration activities will probably join the Brigade.
If we attempt our program on a large scale, or with more than one group, the immediately above-mentioned problems would multiply.
The program we would visualize is one of providing the selected exile group with funds, arms, sabotage equipment, transport and communications equipment for infiltration operations in order to build a political base of opposition inside Cuba. We would provide the best technical advice we could. Our role would essentially be that of advisors and purveyors of material goods--it would be the exile group's show. We would insist that hit and run raids or similar harassing activities that clearly originate from outside Cuba and do not reflect internal activity not be engaged in.
In sum, we should be cautious about grandiose schemes, a "major" U.S. effort, and deep commitments to the exiles. We should experiment in this new venture on a small scale with patience and tolerance for high noise levels and mistakes.
15. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to President Kennedy
Washington, October 13, 1962.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/10-1562. Secret. Drafted by Bowles on October 14.
REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13th, REGARDING CUBA AND OTHER SUBJECTS
A week ago Ambassador Dobrynin called my office to say that he understood I was leaving for Africa and would like to have our "long postponed luncheon" before my departure.
I met him at the U.S.S.R. Embassy on 16th Street at 1 p.m. on October 13th. With the exception of an occasional exchange of courtesies at diplomatic functions, this was the first time I had talked with him.
It was a frank, free-wheeling discussion, lasting more than an hour and a half. Dobrynin's manner was pleasant, with a show of reasonableness and concern about the current drift in Soviet-American relations.
At my first opportunity, I expressed deep disappointment that no more progress had been made in reducing tensions, and concern over the consequences of a further decline. I said that since I was speaking wholly unofficially, he should not attempt to read anything into my remarks. I would like to be utterly frank with him.
Almost immediately Dobrynin brought up the question of Cuba and expressed worry and surprise at the intensity of U.S. public reaction.
In response to his question as to why we attached such importance to a relatively small island, I outlined the history of U.S.-Cuban relations and drew a parallel to the situation in 1898, the presence of Spanish misrule, and the U.S. public agitation that abetted the outbreak of war.
When he protested that the Soviet presence in Cuba was no greater provocation than the U.S. presence in Turkey, I pointed out that the present Administration had inherited a status quo that had grown up since the war. In some areas the advantage in this status quo had been with us, in others with Moscow; in still others it was a stand-off.
Our presence in Greece and Turkey, for instance, represented our reaction to Stalin's military and political pressures against these two countries following the war. It had become part of a status quo which in all its complexity could safely be changed only by negotiation with reciprocal benefits to each side.
The Kennedy Administration had hoped and expected that we could in fact negotiate a more rational set of relationships, easing the various danger points on a basis of reciprocal action to everyone's benefit.
However, in Cuba the U.S.S.R. had unilaterally altered this status quo by introducing a wholly new element. Our reaction, in these circumstances, should have been foreseeable.
Moreover, many U.S. students of Soviet affairs were soberly convinced that the U.S.S.R. had made this move deliberately to provoke a U.S. military response against Cuba on the theory that this would divert our energies from Berlin, and elsewhere, and enable Soviet spokesmen to charge us with aggression in the UN.
If this kind of thinking had in fact played a part in the Soviet analysis, it was extremely dangerous. If we did move into Cuba in response to some overt act or offensive build-up by the U.S.S.R., a global chain of events might be set in motion which could have catastrophic consequences.
For instance, the Soviets might then be tempted to take what they would term "counter-action" in Berlin and perhaps Turkey; and the United States, by that time in an extremely tense mood, would react with vigor.
The U.S.S.R., in turn, would feel pressed by the Chinese and other extremists to counter our moves, and we would be on our way together down the long slippery slide.
I asked Dobrynin if he had read The Guns of August./1/ He said "only a three-page summary."
/1/Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, New York, 1962.
I urged him to read at least the first few chapters in which he would see a pattern of politico-military action and counter-action that could be repeated in the next six months.
In July 1914, men of intelligence in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and England, all quite conscious of the forces which were feeding the approaching holocaust, found themselves enmeshed in internal pressures, commitments and precedents which left them powerless to avoid the inevitable. It would be the greatest folly in history if we were to repeat this insane process in the nuclear age.
Dobrynin asked me what, in the circumstances, I thought could be done in regard to Cuba. Stressing that I was speaking solely as an individual, I suggested three moves that the U.S.S.R. could sponsor to ease the situation.
1. Dobrynin should remind his government of President Kennedy's sharp distinction between defensive and offensive weapons in his recent statement. I was particularly concerned on this point because current reports indicated that Soviet shipments were in fact beginning to include weapons which had a clearly offensive capacity.
If this continued, it could produce--with the help of some incident perpetrated perhaps by individuals striving to provoke another "Remember the Maine" incident--the very conflict which the Administration is anxious to avoid. President Kennedy had committed himself to act under certain specific circumstances. This was a clear commitment, and the U.S.S.R. should not take it lightly.
2. From many reports, Castro now had ample defensive arms with which to protect himself from casual landings. The U.S.S.R. should tell him that under present circumstances no more arms will be shipped. The U.S.S.R. should then ask Castro himself to make a statement announcing that the defense of Cuba was assured and that no more arms were needed. Moscow could then inform us that no more arms would be shipped.
3. Castro should be asked by Moscow to state that he has no design on his neighbors, that his entire energies would henceforth be devoted to the economic development of Cuba, and that he sought only peaceful competition with other Latin American nations. His decision not to indulge in further subversion, propaganda, and expansion in neighboring Latin American countries would, of course, have to be confirmed by deeds. However, Soviet assurances on this point would serve to reduce some of the current tensions and give us all a breathing spell.
If some progress along these lines were not possible, I had deep forebodings about the weeks ahead.
To all of this Dobrynin appeared to listen intently. I believe he was impressed.
He answered that in spite of our worries, the U.S.S.R. was not shipping offensive weapons and well understood the dangers of doing so. Moreover, it was unreasonable for the U.S., as a major power, to expect a small, weak country such as Cuba to make such public concessions to U.S. public opinion even though both the U.S.S.R. and Cuba might accept all three points in principle.
Why, he asked repeatedly, do we get so excited about so small a nation? Although the U.S.S.R. could not let Cuba down, they had no desire to complicate the situation further. Was it not possible for us to negotiate a modus vivendi with Castro directly?
I commented that Cuba had initiated the current conflict. Indeed, in 1959 most Americans had strongly applauded Castro's revolution. If Dobrynin were misinformed about the types of weapons now arriving in Cuba, it would not be the first time in diplomatic history that this had occurred. As long as Soviet weapons flowed into Cuba and Cuban money was used to subvert Latin American countries which we were striving to assist into the 20th century, the situation would remain dangerously explosive.
I hoped that his government would see the danger and act accordingly to help ease the tensions.
Without directly responding to my remarks, Dobrynin referred to Max Frankel's story in the morning Times which cited agitation by various private agencies, Cuban and American, to provoke a "Maine incident" with the connivance of U.S. official groups. I replied that our government would have no part in such an operation, that we were genuinely worried, and that his government should view the situation with serious concern.
[Here follow 9 pages on other topics. The full text of the memorandum is printed in volume V.]
16. Editorial Note
On the morning of October 14, 1962, a U-2 aircraft, piloted by Air Force Major Richard D. Heyser, flew a reconnaissance mission over the western part of Cuba, flying from south to north. The 928 photographs obtained during the 6-minute flight over the island produced the first verified evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba. Analysis and interpretation of the photographs at the National Photographic Intelligence Center revealed that three medium-range ballistic missile sites were being developed near San Cristobal, in Pinar del Rio province. Photo analysts counted eight large MRBM transporters at the three locations and four erector launchers in tentative firing positions. Two further U-2 missions, flown on October 15 by pilots of the Strategic Air Command, revealed a fourth MRBM site near San Cristobal, and two intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were discovered at Guanajay. Photos also revealed 21 crates for Soviet IL-28 Beagle medium-range bomber aircraft at San Julian airfield. (Chronology of Air Force Actions During the Cuban Crisis, 14 October-30 October 1962; USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, pages 11-12)
At 8:30 p.m. on October 15 CIA Deputy Director Carter reported to McGeorge Bundy the hard evidence of the MRBM's, but the President's Special Assistant decided not to notify the President that evening. In a memorandum to the President, dated March 4, 1963, Bundy explained his reasons for this decision:
"1. This was very big news, and its validity would need to be demonstrated clearly to you and others before action could be taken. The blow-ups and other elements of such a presentation would not be ready before morning. I was satisfied that the word was going out quietly to those with an immediate need to know. The one obvious operational need was for more photography, and that was in hand.
"2. It was a hell of a secret, and it must remain one until you had a chance to deal with it. Thus everything should go on as nearly normally as possible, in particular there should be no hastily summoned meeting Monday night. Chip Bohlen and I, for example, should not leave a dinner at my house where there were knowledgeable foreign guests, and others, I knew, were in the same spot.
"3. On the other hand this was not something that could be dealt with on the phone except in the most limited and cryptic terms. What help would it be to you to give you this piece of news and then tell you nothing could be done about it till morning?
"4. Finally, I had heard that you were tired. You had had a strenuous campaign week end, returning from Niagara Falls and New York City at 1:40 Monday morning.
"5. So I decided that a quiet evening and a night of sleep were the best preparation you could have in the light of what would face you in the next days. I would, I think, decide the same again unless you tell me different." (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Cuba--Subjects Current)
Bundy prints this memorandum in Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, pages 684-685.
17. Editorial Note
On October 15, 1962, a major amphibious exercise was initiated in the southeastern United States and the Caribbean. The training exercise, which was code named PHIBRIGLEX-62, was scheduled for October 15-30. On October 15 more than 40 ships involved in the exercise were underway. The objective of the exercise was to conduct an amphibious assault on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. The stated intent of the assault was to overthrow the imaginary tyrant "Ortsac"--Castro spelled backwards. Approximately 20,000 naval personnel and 4,000 marines were involved in PHIBRIGLEX-62. The exercise was not suspended until October 20. The CINCLANT history of the missile crisis notes that "as early as about 10 October the National Military Command Center began inquiring informally of CINCLANT as to the nature and scope of PHIBRIGLEX-62. Without ever relating the exercise to the Cuban situation, there were indications of high-level interest in it." (CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis--1963, pages 2-3)
18. Transcript of a Meeting at the White House
Washington, October 16, 1962, 11:50 a.m.
Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Transcripts. No classification marking. The source text is a 35-page transcript of audiotape 28.1. Identifying footnotes in the source text are not included. For Taylor's draft account of this meeting, October 16, including a list of participants, and Carter's memorandum for the record, dictated on October 17, see the Supplement. Carter's memorandum is also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 145-147. McGeorge Bundy had informed the President about the U-2 photographs of the missile sites at 8:45 a.m. October 16, and Kennedy immediately called for a meeting of his principal advisers at 11:45.
[Here follows 7-1/2 pages of the transcript, which narrate the analysis of the U-2 photographs.]
JFK: Secretary Rusk?
Rusk: Yes. [Well?],/1/ Mr. President, this is a, of course, a [widely?] serious development. It's one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could, uh, carry this far. Uh, they, uh, seemed to be denying that they were going to establish bases of their own [in the same?] [words unintelligible] with a Soviet base, thus making it [essential to or essentially?] Cuban point of view. The Cubans couldn't [word unintelligible] with it anyhow, so. . . . Now, um, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that will eliminate this base. I don't think we [can?] sit still. The questioning becomes whether we do it by sudden, unannounced strike of some sort, or we, uh, build up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously about giving in, or, or even the Cubans themselves, uh, take some, take some action on this. The thing that I'm, of course, very conscious of is that there is no such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It's so [eminently or heavily?] involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places, that any action that we take, uh, will greatly increase the risks of direct action involving, uh, our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world. Um, so I think we, we have to think very hard about two major, uh, courses of action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we [make or think?], that is the, uh, overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that are involved doing that. I don't think this in itself would require an invasion of Cuba. I think that with or without such an invasion, in other words if we make it clear that, uh, what we're doing is eliminating this particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves are not moved to general war, we're simply doing what we said we would do if they took certain action. Uh, or we're going to decide that this is the time to eliminate the Cuban problem by actually eliminating the island.
/1/All brackets except those citing declassification excisions and unrelated material are in the source text.
The other would be, if we have a few days--from the military point of view, if we have the whole time--uh, then I would think that, uh, there would be another course of action, a combination of things that, uh, we might wish to consider. Um, first, uh, that we, uh, stimulate the OAS procedure immediately for prompt action to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact has been violated [and actually?] what acts should [we take or be taken?] in, under the terms of the Rio Pact. The OAS could constitute itself an organ of consultation promptly, although maybe, it may take two or three days to get, uh, instructions from governments and things of that sort. The OAS could, I suppose, at any moment, uh, take action to insist to the Cubans that an OAS inspection, uh, team be permitted to come and, itself, look directly at these sites, provide assurance[s?] to the hemisphere. That will undoubtedly be turned down, but it will be another step in building up the, uh, building a position.
I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro, perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through, uh, his representative at the U.N. Uh, I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador would be the best, the better channel to get to Castro [apart?] privately and tell him that, uh, this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is being victimized here, and that, uh, the Soviets are preparing Cuba for destruction or betrayal.
You saw the Times story yesterday morning that high Soviet officials were saying, "We'll trade Cuba for Berlin." This ought to be brought to Castro's attention. It ought to be said to Castro that, uh, uh, this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable. The time has now come when he must take the interests of the Cuban people, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union, prevent this missile base from becoming operational.
And I think there are certain military, um, uh, actions that we could, we might well want to take straight away. First, to, uh, to call up, uh, highly selective units [no more than?] 150,000. Unless we feel that it's better, more desirable to go to a general national emergency so that we have complete freedom of action. If we announce, at the time that we announce this development--and I think we do have to announce this development some time this week--uh, we announce that, uh, we are conducting a surveillance of Cuba, over Cuba, and we will enforce our right to do so. We reject the mission of secrecy in this hemisphere in any matters of this sort. We, we reinforce our forces in Guantanamo. We reinforce our forces in the southeastern part of the United States--whatever is necessary from the military point of view to be able to give, to deliver an overwhelming strike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And, uh, also to take care of any, uh, MIGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami or at the United States. Build up heavy forces, uh, if those are not already in position.
That, uh, we then would move openly and vigorously into the, into the guerrilla field, and, uh, create maximum confusion on the island. [You know?] won't be too squeemish at this point about the overtness, covert [counter?] [word unintelligible] of what is being done.
We review our attitude on, an alternative Cuban government. We get Miro Cardona and his group in, Manuel Rey and his group, and see if they won't get together on a progressive junta. Uh, that would pretty well combine all principal elements, other than the Batista group, as the leaders of Cuba. And, uh, have them, give them more of a status, whether we proceed to full recognition or not is something else, but get, get the Cuban elements highly organized on this matter.
I think also that we need a few days, um, to alert our other allies, for consultation with NATO. I'll assume that we can move on this line at the same time to interrupt all air traffic from free world countries going into Cuba, insist to the Mexicans, the Dutch, that they stop their planes from coming in. Tell the British, who, and anyone else who's involved at this point, that, uh, if they're interested in peace, they've got to stop their ships from Cuban trade at this point. Uh, in other words, isolate Cuba completely without at this particular moment a, uh, a forceful blockade.
I think it would be important to use the, uh, consider, uh, calling in General Eisenhower, giving him a full briefing before a public announcement is made as to the situation and the [forcible?] action which you might determine upon.
But I think that, by and large, there are, there are these two broad alternatives: one, the quick strike; the other, to alert our allies and Mr. Khrushchev that there is utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that, uh . . . Mr. Khrushchev may not himself really understand that or believe that at this point. I think we'll be facing a situation that could well lead to general war; that we have an obligation to do what has to be done but do it in a way that gives, uh, everybody a chance to, uh, put the [word unintelligible] down before it gets too hard. Those are my, my reactions of this morning, Mr. President. I naturally need to think about this very hard for the next several hours, uh, what I and what my colleagues at the State Department can do about it.
McNamara: Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this situation I want to comment upon, and, in relation to them, I would like to outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General Taylor to expand upon them.
But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we ought to accept as, uh, foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the time these missile sites become operational. I'm not prepared to say when that will be, but I think it is extremely important that our talk and our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because, if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can state we can knock them out before they can be launched; and if they're launched there is almost certain to be, uh, chaos in part of the east coast or the area, uh, in a radius of six hundred to a thousand miles from Cuba.
Uh, secondly, I, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must be directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites plus the airfields plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields but hidden by that time plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now, this is a fairly extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites; and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least in the hundreds, more likely in the low thousands, say two or three thousand. It seems to me these two propositions, uh, should underlie our, our discussion.
Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out and what may be some of the consequences? Uh, we could carry out an air strike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an air strike within, within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the chiefs would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days, but we are prepared for that quickly. The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initial day, if necessary. Uh, presumably there would be some political discussions taking place either just before the air strike or both before and during. In any event, we would be prepared, following the air strike, for an air, invasion, both by air and by sea. Approximately seven days after the start of the air strike, that would be possible if the political environment made it desirable or necessary at that time. [Fine?] Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be some degree of mobilization. Uh, I would think of the mobilization coming not before the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat following, say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase, and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency.
Now, this is very sketchily the military, uh, capabilities, and I think you may wish to hear General Taylor, uh, outline his choice.
Speaker?: Almost too [words unintelligible] to Cuba.
Speaker?: Yes.
Taylor: Uh, we're impressed, Mr. President, with the great importance of getting a, a strike with all the benefit of surprise, uh, which would mean ideally that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground where we can take them out. Uh, that, that desire runs counter to the strong point the Secretary made if the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could, becomes operational. Uh, practically, I think the, our knowledge of the timing of the readiness is going to be so, so, uh, difficult that we'll never have the, the exact permanent, uh, the perfect timing. What we'd like to do is to look at this new photography, I think--and take any additional--and try to get the, the layout of the targets in as near an optimum, uh, position as possible, and then take 'em out without any warning whatsoever. That does not preclude, I don't think, Mr. Secretary, some of the things you've been talking about. It's a little hard to say in terms of time how much I'm discussing. But we must do a good job the first time we go in there, uh, pushing a 100 percent just as far, as closely as we can with our, with our strike. I'm having all the responsible planners in this afternoon, Mr. President, at four o'clock, to talk this out with 'em and get their best judgment.
I would also mention among the, the military actions we should take that once we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible, we should, should prevent any more coming in, which means a naval blockade. So I suppose that all . . . . And also a reinforcement of Guantanamo and evacuation of dependents. So, really, the, in point of time, I'm, I'm thinking in terms of three phases.
One, a, an initial pause of some sort while we get completely ready and get, get the right posture on the part of the target, so we can do the best job. Then, virtually concurrently, an air strike against, as the Secretary said, missiles, airfields, uh, unclear sites that we know of. At the same time, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantanamo and evacuate the dependents. I'd then start this continuous reconnaissance, the list that you had, continue over Cuba.
Then, then the decision can be made as we, as we're mobilizing, uh, with the air strike as to whether we invade or not. I think that's the hardest question militarily in the whole business--one which we should look at very closely before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.
Rusk: There are st-, one or two things, Mr. President, uh. Gromyko asked to see you Thursday. Uh, it may be of some interest to know what he says about this, if he says anything. He may be bringing a message on this subject. Uh, but that. . . . I just want to remind you that you are seeing him and that may be relevant to this [topic?]. I might say incidentally, sir, that you delay anything else you have to do at this point.
Secondly, I don't believe, myself, that the critical question is whether you get a particular missile before it goes off because if they shoot those missiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Union has got quite a different decision to make. If they, if they shoot those missiles, want to shoot 'em off before they get knocked out by aircraft. . . . So, I'm not sure that this is, uh, necessarily the precise [critical?] element, Bob.
McNamara: Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our time should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don't know what kinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don't know what kinds of control they have over the warheads.
Rusk: Yes, [words unintelligible] . . .
McNamara: If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that that launcher was capable of launching that warhead, I would . . . . Frankly, I would strongly urge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because I think the danger to this country in relation to the gain that would accrue with the excessive [time?]. . . . This is why I suggest that if we're talking about an air attack, I believe we should consider it only on the assumption that we can carry if off before these become operational.
JFK: What is the, uh, advant- . . . . Must be some major reason for the Russians to, uh, set this up as a . . . . Must be that they're not satisfied with their ICBMs. What'd be the reason that they would, uh . . . .
Taylor: What it'd give 'em is primary, it makes the launching base, uh, for short range missiles against the United States to supplement their rather [deceptive?] ICBM system, for example. There's one reason.
JFK: Of course, I don't see how we could prevent further ones from coming in by submarine.
Taylor: Well, I think that that thing is all over . . .
JFK: I mean if we let 'em blockade the thing, they come in by submarine.
McNamara: Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in, quite frankly, is to say you'll take them out the moment they come in. You'll take them out and you'll carry on open surveillance and you'll have a policy to take them out if they come in. I think it's really rather unrealistic to think that we could carry out an air attack of the kind we're talking about. We're talking about an air attack of several hundred sorties because we don't know where these airplanes are.
Bundy: Are you absolutely clear of your premise that an air strike must go to the whole air complex?
McNamara: Well, we are, Mac . . .
Bundy: . . . air complex? [Appears to be a repeat of the words above.]
McNamara: . . . because we are fearful of these MIG 21s. We don't know where they are. We don't know what they're capable of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, you must assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft. Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you must assume that those aircraft have high explosive potential. We have a serious air defense problem. We're not prepared to report to you exactly, uh, what the Cuban air force is capable of; but I think we must assume that the Cuban air force is definitely capable of penetrating, in small numbers, our coastal air defense by coming in low over the water. And I would think that we would not dare go in against the missile sites, knock those out leaving intact Castro's air force, and run the risk that he would use part or all of that air force against our coastal areas--either with or without nuclear weapons. It would be a, a very heavy price to pay in U.S. lives for the, the damage we did to Cuba.
Rusk: Still, about why the Soviets are doing this, um, Mr. McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that, uh, uh, he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don't really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that, uh, he has to live under fear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that. Um. . . .
JFK: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?
Taylor?: We have Jupiter missiles . . .
Bundy?: Yeah. We have how many?
McNamara?: About fifteen, I believe it is.
Bundy?: I think that's right. I think that's right.
Speaker?: [Words unintelligible]
Rusk: But then there are also delivery vehicles that are, could easily . . .
McNamara: Aircraft.
Rusk: . . . be moved through the air, aircraft and so forth.
Speaker?: Route 'em through Turkey.
Rusk: Um, and that Mr. McCone expresses the view that Khrushchev may feel that it's important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles, and he's doing that to sort of balance that, uh, that political, psychological [plank?]. I think also that, uh, Berlin is, uh, very much involved in this. Um, for the first time, I'm beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin. We've [hardly?] talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to, uh, keep our eye on that element. But, uh, they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to Berlin. In other words like the Suez-Hungary combination. If they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world would be confused and they would have, uh, what they would consider to be justification for making a move somewhere else. But, uh, I must say I don't really see the rationality of, uh, the Soviets pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country.
Bundy: It's important, I think, to recognize that they did make this decision, as far as our estimates now go, in early summer, and, this has been happening since August. Their TASS statement of September 12, which the experts, I think, attribute very strongly to Khrushchev himself, is all mixed up on this point. It has a rather explicit statement, "The harmless military equipment sent to Cuba designed exclusively for defense, defensive purposes. The President of the United States and the American military, the military of any country know what means of defense are. How can these means threaten United States?"
Now there, it's very hard to reconcile that with what has happened. The rest, as the Secretary says, has many comparisons between Cuba and Italy, Turkey and Japan. We have other evidence that Khrushchev is, honestly believes, or, or at least affects to believe that we have nuclear weapons in, in Japan, that combination, [word unintelligible] . . .
Rusk: Gromyko stated that in his press conference the other day, too.
Bundy: Yeah. They may mean Okinawa.
Speaker?: Right.
McNamara: It's not likely, but it's conceivable the nuclear warheads for these launchers are not yet on Cuban soil.
Bundy: Now that seems to me that's . . . . It's perfectly possible that this, that they are in that sense a bluff. That doesn't make them any less offensive to us . . .
McNamara: No.
Bundy: . . . because we can't have proof about it.
McNamara: No, but it does possibly indicate a different course of action . . .
Bundy: Yeah.
McNamara: . . . and therefore, while I'm not suggesting how we should handle this, I think this is one of the most important actions we should take: to ascertain the location of the nuclear warheads for these missiles. Later in the discussion we can revert back to this. There are several alternative ways of approaching it.
JFK: Doug, do you have any . . . .
Dillon: No. The only thing I'd, would say is that, uh, this alternative course of, of warning, getting, uh, public opinion, uh, OAS action and telling people in NATO and everything like that, would appear to me to have the danger of, uh, getting us wide out in the open and forcing the Russians to, uh, Soviets to take a, a position that if anything was done, uh, they would, uh, have to retaliate. Whereas, uh, a, a quick action, uh, with a statement at the same time saying this is all there is to it, might give them a chance to, uh, back off and not do anything. Meanwhile, I think that the chance of getting through this thing without a Russian reaction is greater under a quick, uh, strike than, uh, building the whole thing up to a, a climax then going through. . . . [It will be a lot of debate on it?]
Rusk: That is, of course, a possibility, but, uh. . . .
Bundy: The difficulties--I, I share the Secretary of the Treasury's feeling a little bit--the difficulties of organizing the OAS and NATO; the amount of noise we would get from our allies saying that, uh, they can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can't we; uh, the division in the alliance; the certainty that the Germans would feel that we were jeopardizing Berlin because of our concern over Cuba. The prospect of that pattern is not an appetizing one . . .
Rusk: Yes, but you see . . .
Bundy: . . . [Words unintelligible]
Rusk: . . . uh, uh, everything turns crucially on what happens.
Bundy: I agree, Mr. Secretary.
Rusk: And if we go with the quick strike, then, in fact, they do back it up, then you've exposed all of your allies [word unintelligible], ourselves to all these great dangers without . . .
Bundy: You get all these noises again.
Rusk: . . . without, uh, the slightest consultation or, or warning or preparation.
JFK: But, of course, warning them, uh, it seems to me, is warning everybody. And I, I, obviously you can't sort of announce that in four days from now you're going to take them out. They may announce within three days they're going to have warheads on 'em; if we come and attack, they're going to fire them. Then what'll, what'll we do? Then we don't take 'em out. Of course, we then announce, well, if they do that, then we're going to attack with nuclear weapons.
Dillon: Yes, sir, that's the question that nobody, I didn't understand, nobody had mentioned, is whether this s-, uh, "take-out," this mission, uh, was [word unintelligible] to deal with . . .
Speaker?: I don't know.
Dillon: . . . high explosives?
Speaker?: High explosives, yes.
JFK: How effective can the take-out be, do they think?
Taylor?: It'll never be a 100 percent, Mr. President, we know. Uh, we hope to take out a vast majority in the first strike, but this is not just one thing, one strike, one day, but continuous air attack for whenever necessary, whenever we di-, discover a target.
Bundy: They're now talking about taking out the air force as well. . . .
Speaker?: I [could tell you that in the staff?].
Speaker?: [Words unintelligible]
Bundy: I do raise again the question whether, uh, whether we [words unintelligible] the problem, military problem, but there is, I would think, a substantial political advantage in limiting the strike in surgical terms to the thing that is in fact the cause of action.
McNamara?: I suggest, Mr. President, that if you're involved in several hundred strikes, this is what you would--and against airfields--this is what you would do, pre-invade. And, uh, it would be very difficult to convince anybody that this was not a pre-invasion strike. I think also once you get this volume of attack that public opinion reaction, uh, to this, as distinct from the reaction to an invasion, uh, there's [word unintelligible] little difference. And, uh, from both standpoints, it would seem to me that if you're talking about a, a general air attack program, you might as well think about whether we can eradicate the whole problem by an invasion just as simply with as little chance of reaction.
Taylor: Well, I would think we would have, should be in a position to invade at any time if we so desired. Hence that, uh, in this preliminary, we should be, uh, it's all bonus if we are indeed taking out weapons [word unintelligible] . . .
JFK: Well, let's say we just take out the missile bases, then, uh, they have some more there. Obviously they can get 'em in by submarine and so on, I don't know whether you, you just can't keep high strikes on.
Taylor: I suspect, Mr. President, we'd have to take out the surface-to-air missiles in order to get in, to get in, take some of them out. Maybe [words unintelligible].
JFK: How long will, do we estimate this will remain secure, this, uh, information, uh, people have it?
Bundy: In terms of the tightness of our intelligence control, Mr. President, I think we are in unusually and fortunately good position. We set up a, uh, new security classification governing precisely the field of offensive capability in Cuba just five days ago, four days ago, under General Carter. That, uh, limits this, uh, to people who have an immediate, operational necessity in intelligence terms to work on the data and the people who have . . .
JFK: How many would that be, about?
Bundy: Oh, that will be a very large number, but that's not generally where leaks come from. Uh, the more [important?] limitation is that only officers with the policy responsibility for advice directly to you'll receive this . . .
JFK: How many would get it over in the Defense Department, General, with your meeting this afternoon?
Taylor: Well, I was going to mention that. We'd have to ask for relaxation of the ground rules, uh, that, that Mac has just enunciated, so that I can, uh, give it to the senior commanders who are involved in the plans.
JFK: Would that be about fifty?
Taylor: By then. . . . No, sir. I would say that, uh, within, at this stage ten more.
McNamara: Well, Mr. President, I, I think, to be realistic, we should assume that this will become fairly widely known, if not in the newspapers, at least by political representatives of both parties within--I would, I'm just picking a figure--I'd say a week.
[Several speakers speak at once and none of the words are intelligible.]
McNamara: And I say that because we have, we have taken action already that is raising questions in people's minds. Normally, when a U-2 comes back, we duplicate the films. The duplicated copies go to a series of commands. A copy goes to SAC. A copy goes to CINCLANT. A copy goes to CIA. And normally, uh, the photo interpreters and the, and the operational officers in these commands are looking forward to these. We have stopped all that, and this, this type of information is going on throughout the department. And I, I doubt very much that we can keep this out of the hands of, uh, of members of Congress, for example, for more than a week.
Rusk: Well, Senator Keating has already, in effect, announced it on the floor of the Senate.
Bundy: Senator Keating said this on the floor of the Senate on the tenth of October . . .
Rusk: [That's correct?]
Bundy: . . . "Construction has begun on at least a half-dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles."
Rusk: Well, that's, that's the way that [words unintelligible]. I think we can count on announcing it not later than Thursday or Friday of this week.
Taylor?: There is a refugee who's a major source of intelligence on this, of course, who has described one of these missiles in terms which we can recognize, who is now in this country.
JFK: Is he the one who's giving Keating his stuff?
Taylor?: We don't know.
Bundy: My question, Mr. President, is whether as a matter of, uh, tactics we ought not to interview Senator Keating and check out his data. Seems to me that that ought to be done in a routine sort of way by an open officer of the intelligence agency.
Speaker?: I think that's [right?].
JFK: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice President?
Johnson: I agree with Mac that that ought to be done. I think that, uh, we're committed at any time that we feel that there's a build up that in any way endangers to take whatever action we must take to assure our security. I would think the Secretary's evaluation of this thing being around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one, I would think it'd take a week to do it. Maybe a little before then.
I would, uh, like to hear what the responsible commanders have to say this afternoon. I think the question with the base is whether we take it out or whether we talk about it, and, uh, both, either alternative is a very distressing one, but of the two, I would take it out.
JFK: Well, uh, the, uh . . .
Johnson: Assuming these commanders felt that way. I'm fearful if we . . . . I spent the weekend with the ambassadors of the Organization of American States. I think this organization is fine, but I don't think, I don't rely on 'em much for any strength in anything like this. And, I, the fact that we're talking about our other allies, uh, I take the position that Mr. Bundy says, We ought to be living all these years with [words unintelligible] get your blood pressure up. But the fact is the country's blood pressure is up and they are fearful, and they're insecure, and we're getting divided, and, uh, I don't think that, uh . . . . I take this little State Department Bulletin that you sent out to all the congressmen. One, one of the points you make--that any time the build up endangers or threatens our security in any way, we're going to do whatever must be done immediately to protect our own security. And when you say that, why the, give unanimous support. People are really concerned about this, in my opinion. Uh, I think we have to be prudent and cautious, talk to the commanders and see what they say, what they're . . . . [I'm] not much for circularizing it over the Hill or our allies, even though I realize it's a breach of faith. It's the one not to confer with them. We're not going to get much help out of them.
Bundy: There is an intermediate position. There are perhaps two or three of our principal allies or heads of government we could communicate, at least on a 24-hour notice basis. Certainly ease, ease the . . .
Johnson: [Take a large?] [words unintelligible] [to?] stop the planes, stop the ships, stop the submarines and everything else from [sending?]. Just not going to permit it. And then stop them from coming in.
Speaker?: Yeah.
JFK: Uh, eh, well, this, which . . . . What you're really talking about are two or three different, uh, [tense?] operations. One is the strike just on this, these three bases. One, the second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on anything else connected with, uh, missiles. Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launching a blockade, which requires really the, uh, the, uh, third and which is a larger step. And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the, uh, degree of consultation. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Speaker?: Um.
JFK: Just have to [words unintelligible] and do it. Probably ought to tell them, though, the night before.
RFK: Mr. President.
JFK: Yes.
RFK: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I would say that, uh, you're dropping bombs all over Cuba if you do the second, uh, air, the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all their missiles. You're covering most of Cuba. You're going to kill an awful lot of people, and, uh, we're going to take an awful lot of heat on it . . .
Speaker?: Yeah.
RFK: . . . and, uh, and then, uh, you know, the heat, you're going to announce the reason that you're doing it is because, uh, they're sending in these kind of missiles. Well, I would think it's almost incumbent upon the Russians, then, to say, Well, we're going to send them in again, and if you do it again, we're going to do, we're going to do the same thing to Turkey, or We're going to do the same thing to Iran.
[Here follow 5 pages of discussion of which targets might be attacked.]
JFK: I think we ought to, what we ought to do is, is, uh, after this meeting this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these various, uh, proposals. In the meanwhile, we'll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is needed from the flights, and, in addition, we will . . . . I don't think we got much time on these missiles. They may be . . . . So it may be that we just have to, we can't wait two weeks while we're getting ready to, to roll. Maybe just have to just take them out, and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be where we end up. I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to. . . . Because that's what we're going to do anyway. We're certainly going to do number one; we're going to take out these, uh, missiles. Uh, the questions will be whether, which, what I would describe as number two, which would be a general air strike. That we're not ready to say, but we should be in preparation for it. The third is the, is the, uh, the general invasion. At least we're going to do number one, so it seems to me that we don't have to wait very long. We, we ought to be making those preparations.
Bundy: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have definitely decided against a political track. I, myself, think we ought . . .
Taylor?: Well, we'll have . . .
Bundy: . . . to work out a contingency on that.
Taylor?: We, we'll develop both tracks.
JFK: [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We ought to just decide who we talk to and how long ahead and how many people, really, in the government. There's going to be a difference between those who know that--this will leak out in the next few days--there are these, uh, uh, bases, until we say or the Pentagon or State won't be harsh. We've already said it on the [words unintelligible]. So we, let's say, we've got two or three days.
Bundy: Well, let's play it, shall we play it still harder and, uh, simply say that there's no evidence and that we have to . . .
JFK: We ought to stick the battle till we want to do something.
Bundy: . . . [words unintelligible] the alliance [words unintelligible].
JFK: Otherwise we give ourselves away, so let's . . .
Bundy: May I make one other cover plan suggestion . . .
JFK: Yes.
Bundy: . . . Mr. President? There will be meetings in the White House. I think the best we can do is to keep the people with a specific Latin American business black and describe the rest as "intensive budget review sessions," but I haven't been able to think of any other . . .
JFK: Nobody, it seems to me, in the State Department. I discussed the matter with, uh, Bohlen of the Soviet bloc and told him he could talk to Thompson. So that's those two. It seems to me that there's no one else in the State Department that ought to be talked to about it . . .
Speaker?: [Words unintelligible] in the department.
JFK: . . . in any level at all, and, uh, until we know a little more. And then, as I say, in Defense we've got to keep it as tight as possible . . .
Speaker?: [Words unintelligible]
JFK: . . . particularly what we're going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people know about what's there, but what we're going to do about it really ought to be, you know, the tightest of all because otherwise we botch it up.
McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back this afternoon prepared to, to answer three questions. First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very important . . .
Speaker?: Very important point.
McNamara: . . . question at the moment. We ought to try to decide today either yes or no.
JFK: By "surface our" . . .
McNamara: I mean should we state publicly . . .
JFK?: Oh.
McNamara: . . . that, that you have stated we will, we'll act to take out any offensive weapons. In order to be certain as to whether there are or are not offensive weapons, we are scheduling U-2 flights or other surveillance . . .
Carter?: What's the [skull number, commissar?]. [Laughs]
McNamara: . . . or reconnaissance flights to, uh, to obtain this information. We'll make the information, uh, public.
JFK: There may not be one. All right, why not?
McNamara: This is one question. A second question is: Should we precede the military action with political action? If so, on what, uh, timing? I would think the answer's almost certainly, yes. And I wouldn't, I would think particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that if these are to be done, they must be scheduled in terms of time very, very carefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very, very precise series of, of contacts with him, and indications of what we'll do at certain times following that. And, thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regarding the, the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think . . .
JFK: How long would it take to get 'em organized.
McNamara: E-, e-, exactly. We'll be prepared . . .
JFK: In other words, how many days from tomorrow morning would it . . . . How many mornings from tomorrow morning would it take to get the, to take out just these missile [sites] . . .
[Here follow the last 6 pages, which include a discussion of who should be informed and when the next meeting should take place.]
19. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, October 16, 1962.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Files, Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Helms. Another memorandum for the record of this meeting, drafted by Parrott, is ibid. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 153-154.
SUBJECT
Mongoose Meeting with the Attorney General
1. At 2:30 this afternoon, the Attorney General convened in his office a meeting on Operation Mongoose consisting of General Lansdale and Colonel Patchell, General Johnson of the Joint Staff, Robert Hurwitch of State (vice Ed Martin who was unable to attend), Hewson Ryan of USIA, and the undersigned.
2. The Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Operation Mongoose. He pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the weekly meetings of top officials on this problem and again noted the small accomplishments despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal appointment by the President a year ago. The Attorney General then stated that in view of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation Mongoose more personal attention. In order to do this, he will hold a meeting every morning at 0930 with the Mongoose operational representatives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwitch, Ryan, and General Johnson).
3. The Attorney General spoke favorably of the sabotage paper which had been presented by General Carter this morning to the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)./1/ He obviously did not like the earlier memorandum, since he felt it showed no "push" in getting on with the acts of sabotage.
/1/Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Files, Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop.) See the Supplement.
4. When asked for my comments, I stated that we were prepared to get on with the new action program and that we would execute it aggressively. I pointed out, however, that the objective of Operation Mongoose would have to be determined at some point since the Cubans with whom we have to work were seeking a reason for risking their lives in these operations. I related my conversation with the young Cuban from the DRE who pointed out that they were willing to commit their people only on operations which they regarded as sensible. I defined "sensible" in Cuban terminology these days as meaning an action which would contribute to the liberation of their country, another way of saying that the United States, perhaps in conjunction with other Latin countries, would bail them out militarily. My point was specifically echoed by Hewson Ryan. The Attorney General's rejoinder was a plea for new ideas of things that could be done against Cuba. In passing, he made reference to the change in atmosphere in the United States Government during the last twenty-four hours, and asked some questions about the percentage of Cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime if the country were invaded.
5. The meeting concluded with the reaffirmation by the Attorney General of his desire to hold a meeting each day, beginning tomorrow. He said that these meetings might later be changed to every other day when and if he finds a daily get-together is not necessary. The meetings are to last no more than one-half hour.
RH
Deputy Director (Plans)
20. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State
Moscow, October 16, 1962, 7 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 2:35 p.m. October 16.
978. Policy. Khrushchev-Kohler--Part III--Cuba./1/
/1/Parts I, II, and IV of Kohler's conversation with Khrushchev on October 15, transmitted in telegrams 973, 974, and 979 from Moscow, October 16, are in volume V; Part V, transmitted in telegram 981 from Moscow, October 16, is in vol. XV, pp. 359-362.
Khrushchev said he wanted to express his disappointment at one thing that adds fuel to fire of the cold war, namely, that US now is trying to stop Soviet airplanes from flying to Cuba. After I interjected confirmation, he said they regard this as unfriendly act. This is not wartime. We should be developing trade and culture between our countries. He could not understand why we were acting this way. Perhaps we were frightened and our leaders' nerves were bad. If we were going to start a war, then he could understand it. US was boycotting trade with Cuba and appealing to all countries to stop their ships from going there. US is great country with population 183 million, while Cuba has only seven million. Could it really be that US was afraid of Cuba? Who would believe that Cuba was a nightmare for US? It was too small; even if it wanted to gobble up US, it couldn't. (There followed some good-natured byplay about census figures.) Khrushchev said that what US was doing complicated life of simple people and did not simplify it. Result was to make Cuban people go hungry. What did US want? To start war? If not, what was happening? "Are you too afraid? Do you want to commit suicide?" When last war started in USSR, on third or fourth day, a certain General came to him, where he was serving as member of military council of front, and said everything was lost, just as in France. General said command must be changed. General went to sleep that night and next morning came into peasant hut in which Khrushchev was staying and shot himself. He was a coward, lost his self-control, and let his nerves dominate his mind. Had US become a coward? Such people end by shooting themselves. Did US want to commit suicide? Is this the state in which American imperialism now finds itself?
I said I should of course report his remarks to President. At Vienna, President had spoken very frankly to him about Cuba. Chairman was misinterpreting Castro regime. Not only US, but all Western Hemisphere countries, feel Castro has let Cuban people down. US and other Western Hemisphere states are not going to help Cuba. We are certainly not afraid of them but we don't intend to help them. Of course, we have different views than Chairman about situation. Speaking as frankly as he had, I felt I must add that size of Soviet shipments to Cuba has increased feeling in US on this problem.
Khrushchev said we must be responsible, since our countries are great powers. We cannot demand that other countries live as we like or there would be war. US has bases in countries neighboring USSR, such as Turkey, as well as in Greece, Italy, France, West Germany and Pakistan. But USSR does not attack these countries. If US thinks it has right to do as it likes about Cuba, why hasn't USSR right to do as it likes about these countries? If we acted that way, might would make right. UN Charter would lose its force. That would be policy of banditry. Cuba is small; US is big. "You are so afraid of Cuba, you almost lost your pants." US is located in Western Hemisphere; what is it doing in Eastern Hemisphere? USSR does not recognize right of US to be everywhere in world and to rule everywhere. It was one thing when US was very powerful, but now there is a force as great as yours. We will never agree to your capitalistic way of thinking. Our policy is, let us live in peace. Let us have our socialism and you can have your capitalism. Let's respect internal affairs of other countries and not interfere with life of other countries. Take, for example, Shah of Iran, whom we don't like. But we have no intention of attacking him. Or take Afghanistan, country with monarchical government. Its King recently visited me here and I entertained him. He is a nice fellow. We have good relations with him and this is the way it should be.
I said I took note of Chairman's remarks. President has made it clear we are not going to interfere in Cuba by force. But we are not going to help Cuba, which does not mean we intend to interfere there.
Khrushch
