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1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath |
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
201. Summary Record of the 29th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, November 21, 1962, 4 p.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 4:35 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. See the Supplement.
Under Secretary Ball reported that Russian representative Kuznetsov had told McCloy in New York that we were upping the ante by asking for assurances with respect to the SAM sites. Kuznetsov threatened to go back to Russia. McCloy wants to give the Russians something tonight. Three draft instructions, one written by McCloy, another by Stevenson, and a third by the State Department, were discussed./1/ The State draft was largely a restatement of the President's press conference statement. It made the point that we cannot ignore the necessity of ensuring the peace and security of the hemisphere. We must satisfy ourselves that no offensive weapons remain in Cuba. The burden is on Cuba, not the USSR, to ensure that we can do this. The State draft was described as an offering document.
/1/See footnote 5, Document 199.
Mr. Ball said that McCloy's view is that we got from the Russians more than we expected. Therefore, we should not put so much stress on ground inspection now that if we don't get it it is a defeat for us.
The President agreed that we could abandon insistence on ground inspection, but he felt that the proposed no-invasion assurances were too hard. He said our objective is to preserve our right to invade Cuba in the event of civil war, if there were guerrilla activities in other Latin American countries or if offensive weapons were reintroduced into Cuba. We do not want to build up Castro by means of a no-invasion guarantee. The pertinent sentence in the declaration which we would make to the UN Security Council was revised./2/
/2/For the draft declaration as sent to USUN, see Document 205.
The President left the meeting after approving an interim reply/3/ to the most recent message from Khrushchev./4/
/3/Document 202.
/4/Document 196.
Secretary McNamara said he would be recommending to the President an aerial reconnaissance plan for the next few weeks. Low-level flights would be authorized only with Presidential approval, but he doubted that many such flights would be necessary. High-level flights, two per day accumulatively but not more than five in any one day, would be recommended. Secretary McNamara said that in the coming days we are going to have insufficient information out of Cuba but we can live with this rather than risk having one of our planes shot down and then having to retaliate.
Bromley Smith/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
202. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev
Washington, November 21, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, 1962. Confidential. A draft with Bundy's handwritten revisions, also dated November 21, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I have been glad to get your letter of November 20,/1/ which arrived in good time yesterday. As you will have seen, I was able to announce the lifting of our quarantine promptly at my press conference, on the basis of your welcome assurance that the IL-28 bombers will be removed within a month.
/1/Document 196.
I am now instructing our negotiators in New York to move ahead promptly with proposals for a solution of the remaining elements in the Cuban problem. I do not wish to confuse the discussion by trying to state our present position in detail in this message, but I do want you to know that I continue to believe that it is important to settle this matter promptly and on reasonable terms, so that we may move on to other issues. I regret that you have been unable to persuade Mr. Castro to accept a suitable form of inspection or verification in Cuba, and that in consequence we must continue to rely upon our own means of information. But, as I said yesterday,/2/ there need be no fear of any invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course./3/
/2/In a statement at his press conference on November 20; see footnote 7, Document 196.
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
203. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
Washington, November 21, 1962, 8 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.
Ball: I had about an hour's talk with Jack McCloy and Adlai Stevenson in New York, and then Mac has also had a talk with McCloy. Stevenson is prepared to go along on a draft that we worked out over the phone./1/ Jack has still got some reservations, and he wants to think it over overnight and then talk again in the morning. He wants to get out of it any reservation with regard to our right to overfly or protect ourselves, and I think that we really can't do it.
/1/See the attachment which was then sent to USUN in Document 205.
President: What does he feel about the overflights?
Ball: He has a feeling that actually we shouldn't insist on any kind of reservation of that kind; that we tell them orally we are going to have to do it, but that we don't put anything in any document because he thinks this doesn't give them enough, and that if we want to close this thing up we have to give them something.
President: He doesn't think we can rest on what I said yesterday?
Ball: No, he doesn't. He thinks we've got to go substantially beyond that. It is really a question of where we start in this thing and where we come out. My own feeling is that we probably ought to start with something not much different from what we arrived at tonight, and Stevenson himself agreed to that. I think Jack will in the morning, but he wanted to think it over a little further. Now I have some language which I worked out with Stevenson and which McCloy, although he doesn't buy it completely, just to give you the trend of it (they were both on the telephone), it would run like this: (attached) The main crux of the argument is this business whether to include some such phrase as "and the US is in position to be satisfied on these points" which is really a reservation of our right to overfly which it seems to me is essential if we are not going to get ourselves in a position where we may lose a U-2 and not be still feeling committed in the eyes of the world to a non-invasion guaranty, which I don't think we can be.
President: Well, could you put "if the US" part at the beginning?
Ball: As it was worked out with them it would be "Provided no nuclear weapons or other weapon systems capable of offensive use".
President: Well, could you you say "Provided the US is assured that".
Ball: You see, if you say "is assured" then the interpretation is that this means that the Russians have given them this assurance. What I propose to say was "Provided no nuclear weapons".
President: Yes, the only question in my mind is whether your statement really is too limiting to us. What about now if there is a simple war in Cuba?
Ball: Well, we take that out by saying "this does not alter any of the rights or obligations of the US set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty." The Rio Pact would give us the right to move in.
President: Would it?
Ball: I think by interpretation that we would be justified in doing it.
President: Well, we would [do] it any way if we have to.
Ball: Yes. That's the position I think we would have to take.
President: And we would probably get two-thirds of the OAS anyway.
Ball: Oh, I think so, yes. So that that is our real protection on that. But the problem with McCloy is that he just doesn't want any reference to the fact that we're protecting the right to overfly as a condition to the non-invasion assurance, and I really think we have to have it. So that he is going to think it over overnight and the idea is that we talk the first thing in the morning. If it is necessary I will then go up. Stevenson is rather opposed to my coming up. He thinks there are too many people in NY anyway. But we would like to get something in the Russian hands say toward noon tomorrow.
President: What do they say is the hurry up there?
Ball: It's just that I think the Russians want to clean this thing up. It is a nagging business as far as Khrushchev is concerned in that he would like to get it behind him. I do think there is some value in not letting it drag out too long because I think the American people are never happy with a long, drawn-out negotiation, and that gives the newspapers a chance to build up all the suspicions and doubts, etc.
President: Yes. The only thing is, I say, we don't want to get . . . the wording of that is going to be important to us in the next two years. McCloy, you know, doesn't quite have that problem, which we have.
Ball: No, this wording is about what we came out with. It is only altered slightly from what we came out with this afternoon.
President: There's nothing . . . you seemed to have more "whereases" in the meeting this afternoon.
Ball: No, I tell you, the only difference is that instead of saying "if and so long as" we say "provided"--that's not really anything. And when we say "and the US is in position to be satisfied" what we have said before was "and the US and the other states of the hemisphere are in position to be fully satisfied"--but that's not a significant change.
President: Let me ask you this, George. Is there any way we can make this appear to be more routine than it is?
Ball: Well, the reason we have written it this way, of course, is to bury it and to make it appear as subsidiary as possible.
President: Yes. What about putting some "of courses" in there some place?
Ball: Well, we can do that.
President: Read the whole thing again.
Ball: (Reads)
President: I think that is all right.
Ball: I think it protects us adequately, and I think this is certainly where we ought to put it up to them and simply say to the Russians "Now, look, if have another way of giving this assurance through some kind of UN presence it is up to you to come forward with it."
President: Let's take two or three hypothetical cases. Suppose they pour a lot of conventional stuff in there. I suppose we can always blockade though, can't we.
Ball: Sure.
President: Suppose they shoot down some of our planes and use the SAM-sites . . . .
Ball: Well, if they shoot down our planes, then you see under the language we have here, then we would say the whole deal is off, because they have frustrated us from being in position to be satisfied.
President: Right. OK. Now if they reserve the right that they could in Guatemala?
Ball: Then we would go into the OAS under the Rio Pact.
President: I see--and what does that say?
Ball: It gives freedom of action because it is based on the assumption that a presence outside the western hemisphere is incompatible with the American system, you see. By reserving our rights under the Rio Pact, it really permits us to do pretty much what we please.
President: All we would really need is two-thirds.
Ball: That is right.
President: Well, anyway, if we caught them red-handed, we could do it anyway.
Ball: I would think so.
President: Now, when is McCloy going to see Kuznetsov?
Ball: The idea was that he and I would talk first thing in the morning. Then I would check back with Mac. If he will go along with this draft, then he will deliver this draft to the Russians by noon.
President: I think we can't go much further than this.
Ball: Well, I think what we can say is that this is the best we can possibly do for you. Now, the fact is that there is a reservation of our right to be satisfied. If you can produce it in any other way, we will be glad to look at it. If it is a UN presence or something, well let's discuss it. But we've got to have this.
President: I think you ought to say that constitutionally the President cannot make a comment that cuts across the Rio Pact.
Ball: That's right. I agree. I'll tell them that.
President: I think you can use that if they try to throw that at him. I think you might get up a background sheet some time so that if we get assaulted we can show all the examples of where we can move.
Ball: All right, we'll do that in the morning.
President: Let me know if they finally buy it. No, if they change it let me know; if not, that's all right.
Ball: If I can get McCloy and Stevenson to agree with this in the morning I won't bother you.
President: Fine. That's all right.
Attachment/2/
DRAFT ASSURANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION
Provided no nuclear weapons or/3/ weapon systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points; and provided Cuba does not invade or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. This declaration/4/ does not alter any of the rights or obligations/5/ set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Pact.
/2/No classification marking. A note in Ball's handwriting indicated that this was agreed to by Stevenson, read to the President at 8 p.m., and McCloy would provide an answer on the morning of November 22.
/3/Ball wrote and added the word "other" at this point.
/4/Ball added the following phrase at this point: "is made on the representation of the Soviet Union here in the Security Council and".
/5/Ball added at this point, "of the United States."
204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, November 21, 1962, 9:49 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56261/11-2162. Top Secret; Sensitive; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sisco and Cleveland; cleared with the Executive Committee and Ball, and approved by Cleveland.
1338. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations.
I. Basic Assumptions
1. The loose ends still remaining unfulfilled in original understanding between President and Khrushchev are these: On Soviet side, on-site UN-supervised verification of removal of offensive weapons, and longer-term safeguards against their reintroduction. On our side, formal assurances against invasion of Cuba.
2. Recent indications from Soviets make clear their intention: to disengage militarily from Cuba, but to stick to their story that they have saved the Castro regime from US invasion. Our interest lies in speeding the disengagement process, while avoiding the kind of commitment that unduly ties our hands in dealing with the Castro regime while it lasts.
3. On verification and safeguards,
(a) The Soviets have given no indication that they are prepared to press Castro regime as hard as would be necessary to get Cubans to agree to any acceptable inspection system;
(b) Cubans have consistently been adamant in objecting to ground inspection of any kind, and have rejected several progressively softer proposals by SYG on verification;
(c) Both Soviets and Cubans have stressed need for reciprocal arrangements involving inspection of other Caribbean areas, probably including US, as price for inspection of Cuba.
4. Therefore it is not going to be possible in the short run to get a UN system of short-term verification or long-term safeguards on offensive weapons in the Caribbean.
5. Assuming (which is not wholly clear) that it would be possible to develop a satisfactory arrangement for adequate long-term safeguards on basis of mutuality in the Caribbean area, it is not to our interest to have the Soviets involved in creating, sponsoring, or administering such safeguards.
6. Absence of inspection arrangements, while leaving part of original deal unfulfilled, does provide rationale for (a) continued US photographic reconnaissance over Cuba, operating under existing OAS resolution, and (b) the tough conditions on our non-invasion assurances.
II. Long Stall vs Rapid Wrap-up
1. On this analysis, that we will not be able to get satisfactory arrangements on verification and safeguards, we face two alternatives:
(a) to continue negotiations for an indefinite period, insisting on Soviet compliance with our full position that there should be UN verification of their withdrawal of offensive weapons as well as "suitable safeguards" against their reintroduction into Cuba;
(b) to close out this phase of the negotiations immediately on the basis of the steps the Soviet Union has taken and will promise to take, adapting our undertakings to reflect the absence so far of meaningful UN inspection arrangements.
2. There are distinct advantages to closing out this phase of the negotiations with the Soviets without delay. The Soviets would have the opportunity to disengage themselves from major military involvement in Cuba. We would be enabled to deal with Cuba largely as a Hemispheric problem and to consider next steps on long-range safeguards in a Caribbean Latin American context, without the intrusion of the Soviet Union. This would permit us to seek progress with the Soviet Union on wider subjects, such as nuclear testing, Berlin, disarmament and the election of the Secretary General.
III. Toward a Security Council Meeting
1. To accomplish a speedy wrap-up of current phase of negotiations, Soviets evidently have in mind a Security Council meeting at which agreed declarations would be made by the US and the USSR, a report would be made by SYG, and an agreed summation would be made by Chairman or in simple procedural resolution adopted by the Council. Soviets are not insisting on a formal protocol, nor do they seem to be insisting that Cubans be parties to this accord at this stage.
2. The United States is quite prepared to work toward such a wrap-up meeting of Security Council. In view of the non-fulfillment of important aspects of the original understanding, we cannot and should not declare the understanding fulfilled. However, we can adopt a procedure which enables a "line to be drawn under" the US-Soviet crisis over Cuba, while leaving open questions that must be sorted out with Cuba in hemispheric context over longer span of time.
3. In the course of negotiations during this next phase, we would have to make clear, both to Soviets and to general public, that Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding was never properly fulfilled, and the absence of on-site verification and of longer-term safeguards against reintroduction makes it necessary for OAS to retain full freedom of action as regards aerial surveillance and other means of keeping a close eye on Cuban behavior and any evidence of renewed Soviet intrusion into Hemisphere. We would continue to remind world that declaration of intention must be independently checked in a world still so full of international mistrust, which has just been treated to a classic example of large-scale duplicity. However, until after SC meeting we would avoid making our intentions on continued air surveillance manifest in a form or forum that would require Soviets to raise the issue of violation of Cuban air space.
4. In the circumstances we will have to place conditions on our non-invasion assurance which are justified by absence of Cuban cooperation with the United Nations and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Soviets to induce the Cubans to cooperate. This will leave the door open for regional arrangements for longer-term safeguards if Cubans cooperate, and for continued OAS air surveillance of Cuba, and military response to any Cuban aggression, if they do not.
IV. Scenario in the Security Council
Within this framework we would favor a Security Council meeting during next week at which the following steps would be taken:
1. The Secretary-General would report on the steps he has taken, and in particular his series of unsuccessful efforts to secure Cuban agreement to UN on-site inspection to verify withdrawal and dismantling of offensive weapons and to safeguard against future reintroduction.
2. The Soviet Union would make a declaration indicating steps it has taken pursuant to the US-USSR understanding and containing assurances that all missiles and nuclear components have been removed, that the IL-28's would come out within four weeks, that military units and personnel intended for the protection of these weapons systems will be removed in time, and that no offensive weapons would be reintroduced in Cuba in the future.
3. The United States would make a parallel declaration: (Being sent USUN in septel)/1/
/1/Document 205.
(a) taking note of the Soviet assurances cited above;
(b) indicating that we have lifted the quarantine;
(c) stating our non-invasion assurances, contingent on Cuban behavior.
4. These declarations would be noted by the Security Council President in a "summation" which would have to be agreed ahead of time. Alternatively a brief procedural resolution noting the declaration might be less difficult to achieve than getting UAR to agree to an acceptable summation. If a resolution is used, it should contain no substantive elements and should establish no continuing machinery.
Rusk
205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, November 21, 1962, 9:50 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2162. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Cleveland, Sisco, and Ball; cleared by Ball; and approved by Cleveland.
1339. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations. Following is draft U.S. declaration in Security Council referred to in previous telegram:/1/
/1/Document 204.
In letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962,/2/ firm undertakings were made regarding the settlement of the Cuban crisis.
/2/See Documents 95, 102, and 104.
These undertakings were stated in President Kennedy's letter of October 27, and quoted in the Acting Secretary General's letter of October 28, along the following lines:
(1) The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
(2) The United States would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The President also expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.
The United States notes the statement made by the Soviet Union that all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons and components have been removed from Cuba, that all IL-28 bomber aircraft will be removed by December 20th, and that all sites for medium range and intermediate range missiles have been dismantled. It notes also that the USSR has stated its intention to withdraw all military units and personnel placed there for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems. The United States notes further the statements of the USSR that no weapons capable of offensive use will be introduced into Cuba in the future. We welcome these statements and assurances.
The undertakings in the President's letter of October 27, that the United Nations would be enabled to verify the removal of missiles and bombers and the destruction of sites, and that United Nations safeguards would be agreed upon to ensure against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use, have not been fulfilled. A minimum inspection procedure was, however, arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which United States naval vessels have verified that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried out a number of missiles which the USSR had certified to the United States as having been in Cuba. The Soviet Union has also agreed to similar verification of the imminent withdrawal of all IL-28 bomber aircraft.
In the absence of Cuban agreement to United Nations verification and safeguards, the nations of the Organization of American States have no choice but to continue to be alert through their own resources to any possibility that offensive weapons systems remain or are reintroduced into Cuba.
In consideration of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date, the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, has been lifted on November 20, 1962.
Provided no nuclear weapons or weapons systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points, and provided Cuba does not invade or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. This declaration is made on the representation of the Soviet Union here in the Security Council and does not alter any of the rights or obligations set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Pact.
Rusk
206. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy
Moscow, November 22, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is an unofficial translation. The Russian text is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.
Dear Mr. President, I have received your message./1/ I express great satisfaction. I fully trust the statement made in that message too that the United States confirms its commitment not to invade Cuba which you also confirmed in your statement at the news conference.
/1/Document 202.
In my confidential messages to you I have already laid down our understanding of the questions and of those steps which are needed to normalize the situation in the Caribbean area after the great and dangerous tension we and you have lived through.
No less important questions are facing us now, that must be solved to avoid recurrence of the situation which has just been eliminated through our mutual efforts.
You say that I was not able to convince Prime-Minister Fidel Castro about something. In general you are partly right. But it should be taken into consideration that Cuba is a young republic the Cuban leaders being very able and devoted to their people are however young, expansive people--Spaniards in a word, to use it far from pejorative sense. But one should understand the position they are in as the leaders of Cuba. The Republic of Cuba is a small country having for its neighbor a big and powerful state--the United States of America, a state which has been unfriendly to her since the first day the Cuban revolution was born. Moreover, one should not forget either that there was an invasion of Cuba.
That is what has to be taken into consideration in order to correctly assess and understand the situation and, if you wish,the state of mind of the leaders of Cuba. I even think that Prime-Minister Fidel Castro may have looked upon some questions with a great sense of understanding but he probably also correlated his steps with the feelings of the Cuban people who are taken by a great patriotic upsurge and desire to defend their independence. The Cuban people and their desire are worthy of respect.
Of course, you and we have a different appraisal of the Cuban revolution and of the events which developed around Cuba and of the position of the Cuban leaders. But this is another matter. The different appraisal must not after all prevent us from finding agreed solutions in the interests of peace. That is what the peaceful coexistence is. One should treat both sides with understanding and take into account the actual state of things--in this case the situation in Cuba which has chosen the way for its development in accordance with the will of its people.
We have been doing with understanding and patience everything that was needed and that was within our power to ensure the achievement of agreement on the elimination of the remnants of the crisis. A great work has been done in Cuba on our instructions by our representative, my first deputy A.I. Mikoyan. Incidentally, he will come back soon because we have given him appropriate instructions to this effect.
I understood your message in a sense that you yourself regard with understanding the difficulties that still remain. I would wish that we having accomplished the main thing, having given relief to the world public and having given orders to the armed forces contributing to the normalization of the situation--and we gave such order at once as soon as we learned that analogous steps were taken on your side--that we would take speedy measures to complete the settlement of the questions that would crown all our efforts.
It would be necessary that appropriate instructions be also given to your representative, Mr. McCloy for whom we and I personally, after my meeting with him in Pitsunde last year have respect, despite the fact that he, as I told him half seriously and half-jokingly, is a representative of Wall Street. True, he tried to convince me that Wall Street was not so terrible a thing as I imagined. He even promised when I happen to be in New York to take me to Wall Street to try to convince me that this is so. I do not lose hope that one fine day Mr. McCloy will fulfil his promise, that is, will take me to Wall Street. But this generally, as you understand, is just a digression.
As for us, in connection with the completion of the questions which have not been completed yet, we on our part have already given instructions to Kuznetsov regarding proposals to that effect which, as far as I know, have already been forwarded to the attention of your representatives in New York. We consider these proposals to be constructive, and we were guided by a desire to facilitate the completion of our agreement.
Now I would like to express the following wish: it would be extremely useful if while working on the proposals no steps are made on your part that would be pin-pricks for the other participants in the negotiations and that would create hooks capable of causing scratches to national pride and prestige of these other participants. The main thing has been achieved indeed and at the final stage it would be necessary to create good, reliable relations so that, relying on common sense, on reason and on the understanding of all the responsibility that lies upon you and us, to reach a final solution on a firm reasonable basis and thus to create conditions for a good, stable situation in the Caribbean area.
In this message of mine I do not raise any questions of substance since the questions that must be completed are known to you. Let us then make a joint effort to complete the remaining questions as well. This may serve as a good omen for both our sides in working out an approach for the solution of other not less important questions that we face. After all the question that you and we are struggling with is, though important, but a particular one. Meanwhile there are questions the solution of which is extremely important for destinies of peace and they must be solved in order to really stabilize the situation and secure lasting peace on earth.
Sincerely yours,
N. Khrushchev/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, November 23, 1962, 9:43 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2362. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Ball, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Ball.
1359. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations./1/
/1/Ball and Bundy discussed these instructions on November 11 at 3:30 p.m. Bundy told Ball that "the President is prepared to fall back from this but he does not see any reason not to try it out. The President asked Bundy, and Bundy gave him assurances, on the point whether we thought McCloy had it clear in his mind that we don't want to haggle it to a dead end up there [United Nations]; that we would do anything [something?] else. He [the President] even suggested an exchange of private messages with the Chairman. Bundy told him he did not think the Secretary [Rusk] was ready to recommend this. Ball said he would be against anything that can't be published. Bundy agreed this was something to be careful of." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, November 23; ibid., Ball Files; Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba)
You should see Kuznetsov promptly to discuss next steps in effecting understanding of October 27 and 28. You should begin by emphasizing our desire that this be wound up very promptly, a desire Chairman Khrushchev evidently shares. Ways and means of ending matter should be governed by this requirement.
You should present SC scenario contained Deptel 1338,/2/ give Kuznetsov our draft declaration (revised text of final paragraphs in next message),/3/ and explain it to him as the most we can do--and more than was originally promised--in the light of Cuban refusal to permit UN verification or safeguards. You should request prompt study and response. At the same time you should indicate that we do not want a long and fruitless haggle in the UN over differences which undoubtedly exist between what they would like and what we would like, particularly since some of these differences may wither away over time if things go well. Such a haggle is not in their interest either. If our statement is one which they could not live with in UN, we believe a satisfactory wind-up can be obtained by use of a Presidential statement, as in last press conference, which Soviets can readily interpret as promised assurance against invasion. We note with interest Chairman's last message/4/ which does indeed interpret President's last press conference in this way.
/2/Document 204.
/3/Document 208.
/4/Document 206.
You should emphasize that there is in fact no present danger of invasion of Cuba, but that we cannot be put in position of giving a blanket guarantee to a man who has refused to cooperate with UN to fulfill understanding of October 27 and 28.
If Kuznetsov's initial response is cool, you may wish to press the point that exchanges between President and Chairman show no such Soviet position and that it may be helpful for Kuznetsov and perhaps Mikoyan to see President in Washington early next week so that negotiations in New York will not get out of phase with promising exchanges between Washington and Moscow.
If Kuznetsov presses Caribbean inspection scheme you should express readiness to discuss this point and point out again that any inspection of US would require inspection of USSR. We anticipate that these matters can well be discussed at Geneva in connection with negotiation on surprise attack. This is obviously a complex problem going well beyond initial understanding and requiring long discussion. Therefore we should not hold up all exchanges of assurances pending such an agreement but should promptly do the best we can in the light of Castro's position and move on to other issues. We of course have confidence in your ability to persuade Kuznetsov that our draft declaration is an ideal solution.
Rusk
208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, November 23, 1962, 9:40 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2362. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by U. Alexis Johnson.
1360. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations. Revise last two sentences of seventh paragraph of US Declaration (Deptel 1339)/1/ to read:
/1/Document 205.
"A minimum inspection procedure was, however, arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which United States naval vessels have received substantial verification that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried away the number of missiles which the USSR had certified to the United States as having been in Cuba. The Soviet Union has also agreed to similar form of verification of the impending withdrawal of all IL-28 bomber aircraft introduced into Cuba."
In place of last three paragraphs, substitute following:
"In view of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date:
the United States on its part, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962; and the United States further gives assurance that,
provided no nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at his press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.
This statement is made on the understanding that by reason of the refusal of Cuba to permit arrangements contemplated to assure the carrying out and continuation of the commitments in regard to the maintenance and introduction of such weapon systems in Cuba, the United States will, until such time as such arrangements can be effected, continue to employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary.
The undertakings started herein do not alter or impair the rights and obligations contained in the United Nations Charter or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, to both of which the United States is a party."
Rusk
209. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy
Washington, November 24, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62. No classification marking. A note on the memorandum indicates that this was part of the President's weekend reading, November 25.
I talked to Jack McCloy about his conversation with General Eisenhower and have done the attached memorandum as a result. He was in the country without a stenographer, so I said I would do it. I have sent him a copy and have asked him to make any amendment or correction so that the record will be accurate.
I have also taken the precaution of sending a copy of the draft declaration to John McCone over CIA wires to his retreat in the Caribbean./1/ I do not think he will raise objections, but I do think it is as well to have him signed on. The overtones of McCloy's report suggest that McCone may be in even closer touch with General Eisenhower than I, at least, have supposed.
/1/In this message, November 24, Bundy told McCone, who was on vacation in the Caribbean, that "we believe it [the U.S. draft declaration] fully safeguards U.S. position especially by its incorporation of Rio Treaty, but in light of your personal note to me, I would like you to have it in time to comment if you wish." Bundy also told McCone that McCloy had talked to Eisenhower "who fully supports plan to wind up negotiations in a way which fully protects overflights and intelligence resources, since he shares McCloy's view that UN inspection is both impractical and undesirable." (Ibid.)/1/
McG. B.
Attachment/2/
Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy
Washington, November 24, 1962.
/2/Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Proposed Declaration on Cuba
I talked to Mr. McCloy about the language of the proposed declaration on Cuba and he agrees to stick with the wording which you approved yesterday on the first round./3/ When we have the first Soviet reaction we can see whether any alteration is desirable.
/3/See Documents 207 and 208.
Mr. McCloy also told me that he had had an entirely satisfactory conversation with General Eisenhower and that General Eisenhower seemed to share McCloy's view that we have a victory in hand and should now wind the matter up promptly. General Eisenhower also agreed that U.S. overflights and intelligence collection were a much better means of reassurance than some undefined UN inspection, and he expressed the view that he had been worried that we might get tied on too hard to this kind of thing. He said that the declaration McCloy was planning to negotiate might meet with some criticism in the country but that he, General Eisenhower, would not only not criticize it, but would support it. He suggested that Mr. McCloy might want to check the proposed language with John McCone, and Mr. McCloy later tried to do so but found that McCone was not available. Mr. McCloy told General Eisenhower that he had the feeling that McCone would not really be satisfied with anything short of an invasion of Cuba. General Eisenhower said that he himself had no such view, but thought McCone might have useful comments.
General Eisenhower did remark that a solution of this kind would still leave us with the Castro problem, but Mr. McCloy and he agreed that nonetheless this seemed the best course available right now. Mr. McCloy reported that General Eisenhower plainly shared his view that a quick wind-up of the immediate negotiations was highly desirable.
McG. B.
210. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, November 25, 1962, 11 a.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2562. Top Secret; Priority.
1941. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for the Secretary. Cuba--Meeting McCloy/Kuznetsov, Sat 24 Nov 62. Long session with Kuznetsov and Mendelevich this evening. No one else present. Dinner at McCloy's New York apartment.
First McCloy paraphrased instructions, emphasizing desire for prompt windup and real efforts which had been made to present Kuznetsov with draft declaration carrying out spirit of October 27/28 letters, despite fact full compliance not possible due largely Cuban recalcitrance. Also suggested possibility avoiding long wrangle at UN by Presidential declaration if this seemed more compatible with their interests. First read and then delivered him our draft.
Kuznetsov immediately replied he was disappointed in it as it did not contain any suggestion of thinking which he felt we should have been prompted to include as result of great Soviet concessions, etc./1/ Nothing in document embodied matters that Chairman had brought up in correspondence with President such as stabilization and normalization of conditions in Caribbean. Then went through the paragraphs of the protocol for our reaction.
/1/According to telegram 1942 from USUN, November 25, Yost reported that on the morning of November 25 Kuznetnov telephoned McCloy and stated "that he had slept badly last night and liked U.S. draft even less this morning than he had last evening." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
When McCloy asked Kuznetsov specifically what he had in mind, Kuznetsov then referred to paragraphs in his protocol which are mainly rehash of Castro conditions. McCloy simply said they were out. Kuznetsov argued at some length but McCloy thought rather perfunctorily on this point. Kuznetsov seemed seek some comments from us on willingness discuss outstanding issues with Cubans. McCloy replied that we always prepared discuss things with Cuba if they wanted but no such conditions could be part of this transaction. Believe may hear again on this after Mikoyan arrives but believe it only matter of record.
Next Kuznetsov objected to long statement of Soviet concessions sounding as if Soviets compelled to treat for ignoble peace. McCloy replied simply evidenced clear effort put things right with no inference of indignity involved. Moreover showed U.S. moved substantially from original position, particularly in abandoning quarantine before all conditions met. Really statesmanlike document.
These preliminaries. Kuznetsov's real objection was to overflight reservation, stating this simply put us back to where we had started from. Referred to our same old insistence on-site inspection, which should now be discarded in light of their display of good faith. They had felt that if they agreed to take out their military units all further need for overflight would have passed. This clause defeats Kuznetsov's hopes for rapid settlement and did not know how to put his failure on this to his government.
McCloy replied this was cardinal issue with us. Overflights our only reliable means checking compliance. Even they not complete. Overflights which pinpointed missile bases played large part in avoiding war. Inconceivable abandon them without thorough verification on ground though we prepared to seek more satisfactory method verification. We not asking him agree to overflights. Simply stating in all honesty we intended reserve this precaution and wanted world know our commitments made in light of this fact, etc.
Kuznetsov stated whole paper would have to be sent to his government. Was certain they probably have number comments but sure overflight paragraph considered unsatisfactory and objectionable. Complained about references to unfulfilled obligations of Soviet Union. McCloy agreed use phrase "had not been capable of fulfillment" in place of language of draft. Kuznetsov also stated withdrawal military units not part of original agreement.
McCloy admitted this arguable but at any rate was to their as well as our interest to have it stated. Indicated this might not be point of issue if we agreed on other things and so long as they got military units out soon as possible. Overflights however were essential and fundamental element of our position. Kuznetsov kept coming back to this clause, pointing out its difficulties for them. Suggested we accept what he called latest U Thant proposal which had some element reciprocity in it so Castro would have basis for giving us some on-site inspection.
McCloy said we had not agreed to U Thant proposals and no inspection U.S could be made without inspection USSR. Any proposal take time to work out even if acceptable. Thing was to get on with declaration and move on to other important matters.
Further talk by Kuznetsov about U.S. not doing its share to which McCloy made usual reactions. Declaration not easy for U.S. local and hemispheric objections to thought U.S. providing sanctuary for Castro subversion of continent. We had made deal and prepared to live up to it and adopt all reasonable compromises necessary. This declaration gave Khrushchev all and more than he had asked for. Conditions were clear and overflight paragraph though understandably difficult for them was necessary for us and essential for us to make it clear.
Finally Kuznetsov almost pleaded with McCloy to take out this overflight clause, stating that we could made some reservation outside UN./2/ McCloy told him he had no authority modify it and personally did not see how position adequately covered unless we did state understanding on this in UN, pointing out they did not have to agree to it. Kuznetsov strongly requested U.S. give some further thought to this clause. In essence he kept asking us to find a way to maintain our position without rubbing their noses in it.
/2/In telegram 1992 from USUN, November 28, Stevenson corrected the following two sentences to read: "McCloy told Kuznetsov he had no authority modify it and personally did not see how we could fail to make this clear in any statement we made in UN or elsewhere regarding invasions, since we could not risk being charged with bad faith in regard to assurances against invasion if in fact we did employ these overflight facilities and had said nothing publicly about it. McCloy pointed out that the Soviets did not necessarily have to agree explicitly with our statement regarding overflights and could make such reservations with respect to this point as they might desire." (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2862)
Then talked of procedure. McCloy made clear U.S. not refusing go to UN, but were merely suggesting some alternative. In so doing insisted U.S. would not sign any protocol or agreement such as Sovs had in mind but would make declaration on basis of their declaration with thought SYG would note declaration had been made, perhaps congratulating leaders involved for statesmanship in avoiding disaster, and no more. Kuznetsov seemed feel no resolution of SC other than noting declarations necessary. McCloy repeated possible advantages declaration outside SC but gathered Kuznetsov inclined toward UN record and anxious confirm U.S. not refusing UN record./3/
/3/According to telegram 1953 from New York, November 26, McCloy, Stevenson, and Yost saw U.N. Secretary General U Thant and brought him up to date on the conversation with Kuznetsov. They also gave U Thant a copy of the U.S. draft declaration and reported that his reaction was "good." (Ibid., 737.56361/11-2662) See the Supplement.
Kuznetsov repeated would in due course give us their draft and their comments on our draft. Then we discuss both together, but Kuznetsov sure overflight clause unsatisfactory. Kuznetsov did not object specifically to use of word "intend" but Mendelevich picked it up. McCloy argued that constitutionally this best way for us handle it and Kuznetsov did not carry argument further. McCloy believes it will come up again when we receive their full comments as will "threat to peace and security" phrase. McCloy senses Sovs want declaration badly but overflight clause is bone in throat.
McCloy suggested that at appropriate time it might be well for Kuznetsov see President, perhaps with Mikoyan. Left that Kuznetsov would not get in touch with McCloy at least until Monday, that Mikoyan due back on Monday but Kuznetsov did not know for how long a stay. Kuznetsov said he would very much appreciate opportunity of paying respects to President at appropriate time.
Yost
211. Message From the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, November 25, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62. Top Secret. A covering note to Bundy indicates that this message was received from McCone, who was on vacation in the Caribbean, at 10:45 a.m., November 25.
Pass to Bundy immediate. Believe the proposed declaration/1/ satisfactorily meets condition for continuing surveillance of Cuba in the absence of latter's agreement for U.N. inspection. Therefore feel such a declaration should not disturb those who view the total Castro problem as most serious. If this declaration acceptable to USSR then door should be open to informal discussion with Kuznetsov as to future of SAM installations which we know are now under Soviet control. Same applies to large amounts sophisticated ground equipment and missile launching boats. Assume references to OAS Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance would give us necessary latitude for action if Soviets replace Castro and his regime with their own people thus producing a true satellite from where the Soviets could effectively operate against established governments in Latin America.
/1/See Documents 205 and 208.
212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, November 26, 1962, 9:28 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2662. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson and with Rusk in substance, and approved by Cleveland.
1379. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: New York Negotiations (urtels 1941, 1942, 1943)./1/ Following amplifies and supplements Secretary's conversation with McCloy today:
/1/Document 210 and footnote 1 thereto. Telegram 1943 from USUN, November 26, in which the Mission suggested it was important to review U Thant's report on Cuba before he submitted it to the Security Council, is in Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2662)
1. We understand from reftels and Stevenson telecon that Soviets have expressed reservations or queries on four points:
(a) they have asked reason for reference to Acting Secretary General's letter of October 28/2/ (purpose is to underscore international character of undertakings);
/2/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 446-447.
(b) reference to fact that Soviet undertakings unfulfilled;
(c) recapitulation of Soviet "concessions" taken pursuant to Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence; and
(d) inclusion of our overflight reservation. We understand further you preparing some textual changes for our consideration.
2. While concurring in your acceptance of phrase "had not been capable of fulfillment," we strongly believe that at your meeting with Mikoyan tonight you should continue to press Soviets on basis Deptel 1359/3/ and urtel 1941. Mikoyan has well deserved reputation of being hardest bargainer in Kremlin's stable of tough negotiators. We should not consider any textual changes at least until Soviets have received a considered reaction from Moscow to our declaration, and we have been presented with draft of Soviet declaration. We assume that for bargaining purposes at least Soviets will submit draft declaration which includes some or all of Castro's demands and other unacceptable elements drawn from their protocol.
/3/Document 207.
3. Suggest following points might be stressed with Mikoyan:
(a) We prepared for prompt wind-up in Security Council;
(b) Draft declaration is most we can do--and more than was originally promised--in light of Cuban refusal to permit UN verification or safeguards. Alternatively, we prepared to substitute Presidential press statement of November 20;/4/
/4/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830-838.
(c) Soviet protocol categorically unacceptable;
(d) Question of discussing outstanding issues with Cuba is outside framework US-USSR transaction pursuant to Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence;
(e) In absence of agreement on UN verification, reservation re use our own resources to check compliance absolutely essential. We not seeking to humiliate Soviets nor asking them to formally agree to our overflights; we are merely making a frank statement of our intentions lest some dangerous miscalculation should occur; and
(f) U Thant proposal unacceptable and no inspection of US could be made without inspection USSR.
4. Hope you can probe Mikoyan re his talks in Havana.
5. Re urtel 1943, we believe it important that US have opportunity to review SYG report before it submitted to SC. We are concerned, for example, that he might include proposal he made to us on Caribbean security zone which he gave to Soviets, although it was unacceptable to us. Believe Yost should discuss this with Narasimhan with view making appropriate arrangements./5/
/5/The Mission reported that U Thant told one of their members that he did not contemplate any report on Cuba to the Security Council at this time. (Telegram 1972 from USUN, November 27; Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2162)
Rusk
213. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk
Washington, November 28, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Cleveland, copies sent to Thompson, Tyler, Martin, and McGeorge Bundy.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Mr. McCloy on Cuba
Mr. McCloy called in at 2:15 p.m. to summarize the results of the meeting which he and Ambassadors Stevenson and Yost had just completed with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich.
We will have a Niact cable here,/1/ probably before the end of the day, so I will summarize here only the highlights:
/1/Telegram 1991 from USUN, November 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2862) See the Supplement. There is also a 21-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting in USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1A October/November meetings.
1. Mikoyan did almost all of the talking. He was clearly influenced by commitments to Castro to make a strong case on Castro's behalf; he also seemed to be motivated by the burden Cuba represents to the USSR. These two motivations produced many references to the "normalization" of relations with Cuba.
2. Mikoyan said our declaration was unsatisfactory, and represented a retreat from correspondences between the President and Khrushchev. He particularly objected to making the non-invasion assurances an intention rather than an unequivocal commitment as it seemed to be in the President's letter of October 27th. Mikoyan also jumped on our overflights and objected to US subversive activities in Cuba.
3. Mikoyan went back to the idea of a protocol signed by all three countries, and seemed to attach a good deal of significance to Cuba being one of the signatories. He would like to have a resolution, not merely a collection of unilateral declarations, in the Security Council.
4. Mikoyan's plea for Castro's conditions seemed more determined and comprehensive than in any of the Kuznetsov-McCloy discussions. Mr. McCloy's guess is that this is still pro forma, but it was spelled out at great length and will undoubtedly be spelled out once again for the President. Mikoyan repeatedly came back to the difficulties in which Castro would find himself, if the situation in the Caribbean could not be "normalized". "Normalization" of the Caribbean was, Mikoyan said, implied in all of the exchanges between the President and Khrushchev.
5. On inspection, the emphasis was on reciprocity, and Mikoyan lectured the American group on the importance of not being obstinate on this point. "Some note of reciprocity should be in the picture, and then we would not have any trouble with Castro on getting international inspection in Cuba". Mikoyan did not address himself to the US gambit that inspection in the United States would require inspection in the Soviet Union, even though this gambit was used again on this occasion. The Soviets mentioned Puerto Rico specifically, but the American negotiators said flatly that the inspection of any part of the United States was not in the cards, as a matter of reciprocity with Cuba alone. On reciprocity inspection, they referred to the "U Thant" proposal. Cuba, Mikoyan said, could not possibly accept a "one-sided inspection"; he said he had told Castro that his (Castro's) position was right on this point.
6. Mikoyan mentioned Guantanamo, indicating he did not expect us to withdraw right away but thought it would be reasonable for us to set a time at which we would begin to negotiate about withdrawal.
7. Mikoyan pressed hard on the U.S. commitment to bring the other members of the Western Hemisphere into line. The U.S. representative emphasized that it came with bad grace from the Soviets to put any emphasis on this point, since they hadn't even been able to bring into line the one Western Hemisphere country with whom they presumably had especially friendly relations.
8. Mikoyan objected to the reference in our declaration to the Rio Pact. He said he had read the Rio Pact (Mr. McCloy got the impression that perhaps he had read it for the first time) and did not like it. The Americans said that it was absolutely necessary to refer to the Rio Pact, since it was the basic document of Western Hemisphere security and we owed it to our co-signers to make clear that we were not, in our arrangements with the Soviets, watering down our commitments under the Rio Pact.
9. There was no detailed discussion of our draft declaration as such; Mikoyan said he would leave that to the negotiators. The Americans did indicate that we were not wedded to the reference in the declaration to U Thant; but no other concessions were made.
10. A tentative date was made for Friday to continue the discussion.
Mr. McCloy's prediction is that Mikoyan will rehearse for the President the Soviet position on the non-invasion pledge, on overflights, and on the need for a reciprocal form of inspection, and that it will not be possible to make any final arrangements with the Soviets in the course of Mikoyan's short visit to Washington. It is, indeed, not clear that Mikoyan expects to wrap this up personally, in which case they might look forward to a somewhat longer negotiation than we had previously assumed they wanted.
Mr. McCloy's suggestion is that the President make clear to Mikoyan:
a. That there is a considerable record of conciliation and perform-ance on both sides, and that the Soviets should not take this moment to turn unreasonable just because they are having difficulty with the unreasonable Mr. Castro.
b. We can't think of giving up overflights, which everybody in the Hemisphere now knows have played such an important role in maintaining the security of the Hemisphere.
c. That the kind of non-invasion statement that is contained in our draft declaration is really the most that the President can constitutionally do, especially in the absence of the arrangements for verification and safeguards that were agreed to in the correspondence between the President and Khrushchev.
d. That it would be useful on both sides to wind the matter up quickly and with maximum good will, without trying to make a bargain out of every word. The Cuban problem will remain; if the Cubans want to normalize relations we are ready and willing to talk with them about it.
On the basis of today's conversation, it does not appear that
there will be a quick wrap-up of the matter in the present negotiating
framework. We will want to consider the possible alternative of
sawing off the negotiations unilaterally if the Soviets stick
to their intention to draw the Cubans into the windup arrangements.
214. Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency
[document number not declassified]
Washington, November 28, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba. Top Secret; [distribution indicator not declassified].
SUBJECT
Phasing of the Soviet Military Deployment to Cuba
1. With benefit of hindsight, we have examined the timing of movements of various types of Soviet units to Cuba. We now believe that the primary purpose of the deployment of ground and surface-to-air units was to defend Cuba as a whole as a strategic base. From our preliminary analysis, we also conclude that there was some apparent relationship in time between the deployment of these units and the MRBM and IRBM units. In other words, the MRBM and IRBM units at least had priority for protection. It should be noted that our dates are approximate and the time-span overall is quite short.
2. The Cuban operation began with the movement of SAM regiments and armored groups. Altogether, 24 SAM battalions and four armored groups were involved. The deployment of the SAM battalions began with their departure from the USSR in mid-July and continued through August. The deployment of the armored groups began in late July and continued through the first weeks of September.
3. The timing of arrival and the subsequent positioning of these units appear to have been phased with the closely following deployment of MRBM and IRBM units. (See table and map/1/) SAM units and armored groups were first deployed to western Cuba, including the ports of Havana and Matanzas; construction of SAM sites began in early August, while the armor arrived at its site about the middle of the month. The initial deployment of MRBM and IRBM units was also to western Cuba (San Cristobal and Guanajay), with construction equipment arrivals beginning in mid-August for the IRBM sites, and in mid-September for the missile equipment associated with the MRBM units. Construction at those sites began about two weeks later.
/1/The map is not printed.
4. The second section of the SAM and armored group deployment was to central Cuba, where the units were in place during the first week in September. The second group of MRBM and IRBM units also went to central Cuba (Sagua La Grande and Remedios), with equipment arriving at the sites in the last two weeks of September.
5. A third group of SAM sites and an armored unit were established in eastern Cuba toward the end of September. Finally, a fourth increment of SAM units was deployed two to three weeks later to fill in gaps, thereby providing full coverage of the island.
6. Three of the four Soviet armored groups known to be in Cuba were positioned where they could give rapid ground protection to IRBM and MRBM sites. The fourth was located at Holguin, an IL-28 base within the third group of SAM sites.
7. It should be noted that the deliberately phased west-to-east sequence is consistent with the orderly military development of a base in the presence of the enemy. The detected deployment of strategic missile units, however, was asymmetric. We have found no evidence to suggest that additional units were programmed, except for the missing IRBM site at Remedios, but we are reexamining available evidence to see if any indications can be found of preliminary work for such installations.
8. We are not able to determine whether the USSR intended to establish a submarine base. We do know that four Soviet "F" class long range conventional submarines, which left Northern Fleet bases about 1 October, were in waters south of Bermuda by about 22 October. (They remained outside the quarantine line and finally returned to base in November.) [7 lines of source text not declassified]
Date: 25-31 July
Western Cuba: Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in western Cuban ports.
Central Cuba:
Eastern Cuba:
Date: 1-5 August
Western Cuba: Construction begins on SAM sites at Matanzas, Havana, Mariel, Bahia Honda, Santa Lucia, San Julian, & La Coloma.
Central Cuba:
Eastern Cuba:
Date: 5-10 August
Western Cuba:
Central Cuba:
Eastern Cuba:
Date: 10-15 August
Western Cuba:
Central Cuba:
Eastern Cuba:
Date: 15-20 August
Western Cuba: Soviet armored groups arrive at Santiago de las Vegas and Artemisa.
Central Cuba: Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in central Cuban ports.
Eastern Cuba:
Date: 20-25 August
Western Cuba:
Central Cuba: Construction begins on SAM site at Cienfuegos.
Eastern Cuba:
Date: 25-31 August
Western Cuba:
Central Cuba:
Eastern Cuba:
Date:1-5 September
Western Cuba: Construction begins on Guanajay IRBM sites.
Central Cuba: Construction begins on SAM sites at Sagua la Grande, Caibarien, & Sancti Spiritus.
Eastern Cuba:
Date: 5-10 September
Western Cuba:
Central Cuba: Soviet armored group arrives at Remedios.
Eastern Cuba:
Date: 10-15 September
Western Cuba:
Central Cuba:
Eastern Cuba:
Date:15-20 September
Western Cuba: Construction begins at San Cristobal MRBM sites.
Central Cuba: Construction begins at Remedios IRBM site.
Eastern Cuba: Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in eastern Cuban ports. Soviet armored group arrives at Holguin.
Date: 20-25 September
Western Cuba:
Central Cuba:
Eastern Cuba: Construction begins on SAM sites at Los Angeles; Chaparra and Jiguani.
Date: 25-30 September
Western Cuba:
Central Cuba: Construction begins at Sagua la Grande MRBM sites.
Eastern Cuba: Construction begins on SAM sites at Manati, Senado, and Manzanillo.
Note: Construction of the remaining SAM sites, which apparently
were considered less vital than those listed above to the protection
of offensive missile bases in Cuba, began in late September or
early October. Work probably began on the SAM site at Siguanea
on the Isle of Pines in the last week of September and on the
sites at Esmeralda, Chambas, Maldonado, Santiago de Cuba, Ciego
de Avila, and Deleite during the first half of October.
215. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara
JCSM-955-62
Washington, November 28, 1962.
//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Readiness Posture Requirements (U)
1. Following the announcement made by the President on 20 November 1962 with regard to the lifting of the maritime quarantine of Cuba in response to the Soviet agreement to remove the IL-28s from Cuba within a period of about 30 days, we are entering a new phase of the Cuban situation.
2. The new phase has been highlighted by the termination of the 1/8 airborne alert; the return of B-47 aircraft to home bases, except for those in Florida; authorization for the commands to return to DEFCON 5 status except where specific situations dictate otherwise; the release of the Air Force Reserve Troop Carrier units; and the authority for the return to normal operations of US naval ships and air squadrons associated with the maritime quarantine. All other forces, however, are being maintained at high readiness, and military forces are capable of reacting on a 12-hour basis for CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 and a 7-day basis for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, except that necessary shipping has not been accumulated.
3. In this new situation, we must recognize the need for high- and low-level aerial reconnaissance over Cuba and over Soviet shipping in order to ascertain whether the Soviet commitments are in fact fulfilled. At the same time, we must recognize the maintenance needs of our forces and the personnel hardships which high alert levels have imposed.
4. In recognition of these facts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the following alert posture criteria to be appropriate at this time, with further reduction to normal pre-Cuba posture prior to Christmas contingent on actual Soviet withdrawal of IL-28 aircraft from Cuba:
a. Overflight reconnaissance:
(1) High-Level: Alert posture which will permit an average of two U-2 flights per day in any 10-day period and not more than a maximum of five U-2 flights on any one day.
(2) Low-Level: Four aircraft on 12-hour alert and eight aircraft on 24-hour alert, and similar readiness for all aircraft which support the foregoing reconnaissance missions (i.e., Fighter escort, CAP, SAR, ELINT, etc.).
[5 paragraphs (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
g. Air Defense: Resume normal posture except for those units which may be needed to increase the air defense of the Southeastern United States on a permanent basis. Long-term air defense needs for this region are under study.
h. Strategic Forces: Maintenance of normal alert levels.
5. Relaxation of readiness posture to the foregoing levels will permit the following actions to be taken at this time:
a. CINCLANT and component headquarters: CINCLANT and the component commanders will maintain the presently activated communications net. CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT headquarters elements can be returned to home stations except for reduced staffs maintained at Homestead.
b. Air forces: The reaction times provided permit the return of all units, less those required for conduct of and combat support to reconnaissance missions, to home bases and resumption of normal training. War reserve materiel and selected support and control personnel will remain at Florida bases.
c. Marine forces: All West Coast units less 3d LAAM Battalion will be returned to home stations at once. The FMF Atlantic units which are presently part of the recent Guantanamo defense augmentation will remain as presently deployed with a goal of returning these units to home stations by 20 December 1962. 5th MEB shipping should be utilized insofar as practicable in returning the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, to the West Coast.
d. Army forces: All Army units can be returned to home stations except those required to meet the provisions of subparagraph 5a above, and the 159th Boat Battalion, which will remain temporarily at Fort Lauderdale pending completion of studies to determine a suitable location that will enable it to meet the required reaction time.
e. Navy forces: One CVA Group will be retained temporarily in the Guantanamo sea area to support the defense of Guantanamo until 20 December 1962. A Carrier Task Group will be retained in the Norfolk-Mayport area against the possible requirement for sighting Soviet ships departing Cuba ports with IL-28 aircraft and to support possible airstrikes under CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62.
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
(1) COMSTS should be given authority to recall transports without completion of voyages in process when the decision is made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62.
(2) COMSTS should be given authority to requisition ships when the decision is made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62.
(3) The recommissioning of the 11 LSTs should be continued. However, they need not be fully manned.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to review the situation on a continuing basis in order to determine whether the criteria of paragraph 4, above, should be relaxed to permit a continuing phase-down to an approximately normal posture by about 20 December 1962. Should continued phase-down be warranted, the remaining units can be returned to home stations, and dependents can begin to be returned to Guantanamo prior to Christmas.
7. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following program of action:
a. An immediate reduction should be effected to the readiness levels reflected in paragraph 4, above, proceeding at a rate commensurate with optimum administrative efficiency.
b. A reassessment of the situation should be conducted on a continuing basis in order to ascertain whether IL-28 withdrawal warrants continued relaxation to approximately normal readiness levels prior to Christmas.
8. Your approval of the foregoing program is requested as a basis for further action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff./1/
/1/In a memorandum to Taylor, November 28, McNamara concurred with the recommendations in this memorandum, but suggested that "the limitation on U-2 flights over Cuba be 'an average of two per day, cumulative from November 21, with the understanding that no more than five U-2 flights would be scheduled for any single day.'" (Ibid.)
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor
ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff
216. Summary Record of the 31st Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, November 29, 1962, 10 a.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting lasted until 10:52 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. See the Supplement.
The attached tentative agenda/1/ was followed.
/1/Not attached. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Series, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A)
Director McCone reviewed the remaining Soviet military presence in Cuba, including MIGs, SAM sites, Komar ships, Frogs and coastal defense missiles.
There followed a discussion of reports appearing in the press quoting Cuban refugees on the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. The President asked again how we can control such reports and how we can deal with them publicly. He asked that further efforts be made with news media to relate the refugee reports to the hard evidence available to us. Mr. Helms and Mr. Salinger were to be asked to see if some system could be worked out to deal with this problem.
Secretary Rusk summarized the Mikoyan/McCloy talks in New York./2/ He recommended that in his talk with Mikoyan/3/ the President reaffirm our current position on Cuba, that he not raise the subject of Berlin, that he call attention to the situation in Laos, and stress the importance of reaching agreement on the nuclear test ban.
/2/See Document 213.
/3/See Document 218.
The President commented that the Russians won't take out their ground forces until we give a no-invasion assurance. It is better for us to have the Soviet units in Cuba than to give a formal no-invasion assurance.
Secretary Rusk said that the Soviet troops were there not to defend Cuba but to guard the Soviet strategic missiles. The Russians may decide to keep their troops there to control Castro. So long as the Soviet forces are there, we must be suspicious about what weapons are on the island and what weapons might be introduced.
Secretary McNamara raised the question of overflights and recommended that in general low-level flights should only be flown when necessary to clarify high-level pictures revealing suspicious activity. He said that high-level photography was very good and there was no need at present to fly low for several days. We should avoid escalation until the IL-28s are out and until Mikoyan has left New York. There are five types of wicked looking Soviet defensive missiles and the presence in Cuba of probably one thousand of such missiles undoubtedly gave rise to some of the refugee reports. These missiles are certainly being stored in warehouses and caves.
General Taylor and Secretary Rusk agreed that no low-level flights were necessary for a few days, but thereafter suspicious sites should be photographed at low level. The longer we wait to fly low level the harder it will be to do so.
The Attorney General called attention to the reference in the Khrushchev letter to the cave rumors./4/ He thought this point should be raised with Mikoyan in connection with verification problems.
/4/Document 196.
The President asked the State Department to prepare a plan which would keep the heat on Castro and bolster other regimes in the Caribbean. A recommendation should also be made as to when the plan should be implemented. Assistant Secretary Martin replied that the State Department had a plan but was holding off implementing it until Mikoyan leaves New York. He recommended implementation of the plan be delayed as long as Soviet bombers and Soviet personnel are moving out of Cuba.
The President called attention to the Knabel post mortem of the Cuban crisis and another by Daniels of Reader's Digest. He mentioned Senator Keating's line, i.e., he has details of Soviet offensive missiles being hidden in Cuba which the Government does not have.
The importance of limiting discussion of the Cuban crisis was reemphasized by the President who reminded the group that press contacts should be strictly restricted to authorized White House sources.
Bromley Smith/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
217. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, November 29, 1962, 10 a.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1962-31 December 1963. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone.
SUBJECT
Executive Committee of NSC Meeting--10:00 a.m.--29 November
All Present
McCone reported on the Cuban Memorandum of November 29, reading from the attached summary;/1/ on the memorandum "Phasing of the Soviet Military Deployment to Cuba"/2/ reading from the attached pages 2 and 2a; and the report "Deployment and Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles and Other Significant Weapons in Cuba",/3/ reading from memos [paragraphs] 3a, 3b and 3c; and made reference to the memorandum on "Soviet Policy in the Aftermath of the Cuban Crisis"; and the memorandum covering the background and character of Mikoyan./4/
/1/Reference is to SC No. 11211/63, "The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, Information as of 060029 November 1962," November 29. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba) No summary was found attached. See the Supplement.
/2/Document 214.
/3/Not found.
/4/Neither document has been found.
The President questioned DCI at length concerning the publicity, particularly the article in the New York Mirror and the CBS broadcast by Oxley, both of which indicated that offensive missiles were known to be stored in Cuba. DCI emphasized in discussion that it was quite impossible to prove that offensive missiles had not been in caves, however all intelligence of every kind--photographic, agent reports, refugee reports, etc.--convinced DCI that this was most improbable. DCI and McNamara both commented on the various types of missiles remaining in Cuba and stated that without doubt some of them are in caves.
Rusk reported on the Mikoyan attitude as covered by the attached memo addressed to the Secretary of State/5/ and indicated that State felt that Mikoyan would take about the same position with the President in the afternoon. McNamara requested Committee authorization of two high-level flights per day. He requested no low-level flights. Taylor agreed. Rusk argued for low-level, principally for political reasons and fear that failure to fly would give Castro an opportunity for propaganda. McNamara indicated that the COMOR paper passed by USIB on November 21st/6/ demanded excessive coverage in the light of conditions which have developed in the last week or ten days. Bundy proposed to write a memorandum expressing the Committee's requirements for reconnaissance and then the DCI would use this as a directive to the COMOR Committee and USIB for guidance in developing a new reconnaissance program designed to meet Executive Committee needs.
/5/Apparent reference to the last document cited in the first paragraph.
/6/Not found.
Action: DCI suggested to General Carter that CIA study this problem and develop a draft of an Executive Committee Directive and a reconnaissance program which would meet the directive and submit both to me for discussion by Bundy and others.
The President requested a development of a long range plan for Cuba. He spoke in terms of 6 months or a year. State indicated that such papers had been prepared and would be put in form for submission to the Executive Committee.
The President then brought up the question of publicity and various articles which are being written on the Cuban episode, referring particularly to an article in Reader's Digest by Mr. Daniels and in Look Magazine by Mr. Knebel. Apparently both of these writers, particularly Daniels, is following the Keating line that considerable volume of information was in the hands of the Administration prior to October 22nd and that the Administration refused to accept positive information on offensive missiles. There followed a discussion of the over-flight policies in Cuba and an emphatic denial was expressed by various members of the Executive Committee that any flight requested by CIA or NRO during September had been denied. DCI took issue with these statements, stating that it was his understanding that the Administration wished Cuban over-flights program to avoid the possibility of a "U-2 incident". This caused CIA and COMOR Committee to program September flights so that planes would not be engaged by operational SAM sites. McCone stated that this was, in his opinion, an error as those responsible for planning reconnaissance should have insisted upon over-flying areas protected by SAMs in order to determine what was going on. He stated this was not done during September and, indeed, was not finally agreed upon until after a rather heated discussion at Special Group meeting on October 4th which was followed by a further meeting on October 9th, at which time the October 14th flight was authorized. DCI stated that he had had some trouble defending our September program before the Killian Board and sharp questioning by Mr. Clark Clifford had brought out the difficulty of explaining the lapse of 40 days in programming an aerial photography which would produce a complete mosaic of Cuba.
It was decided that all press contact with feature writers should be confined to Mr. Bundy and the Attorney General and that our respective organizations should be advised not to discuss any details of Administration activity in August, September and October with such feature writers. A memorandum is being circulated in CIA to this effect.
The President left the meeting.
There followed a brief discussion of the Mongoose program. DCI stated he felt future activity should be restricted to intelligence gathering but this should be carried on in a most intense manner and that CIA was prepared to present an operational plan which would involve refugee interrogation at Opa Laka, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and elsewhere, and an intense program with infiltrated agents, the use of Cuban in-place defectors and very active operation with third country liaison. It was decided that Mr. Helms should present this program at the earliest moment and DCI was asked to call the meeting.
DCI also stated that the form of Mongoose organization should be modified and this was agreed, but no new organization form was discussed.
John A. McCone/7/
Director
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
218. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, November 29, 1962, 4:40-7:55 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, S/S Presidential Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 66 D 149. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Edmund S. Glenn of Language Services and approved by the White House on December 13. The time of the meeting is from the President's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) The Department of State prepared a briefing paper with seven attachments for the President in anticipation of this conversation. (Department of State, S/S Presidential Memoranda of Conversation Files: Lot 66 D 149)
SUBJECT
Cuba
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Mr. E.S. Glenn, LS
Miss N. Kushnir, LS
U.S.S.R.
Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Mr. Yuriy N. Vino-Gradov, Soviet Delegation to XVII General Assembly (Interpreter)
Mr. Igor D. Bubnov, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy
After a few brief remarks about lung cancer, the President asked Mr. Mikoyan how he had enjoyed his stay in Cuba.
Mr. Mikoyan said that he enjoyed his stay very much. The weather was ideal and nature beautiful. This was the second visit of Mr. Mikoyan to Cuba. He finds the Cubans a most interesting people. The brothers Castro, Fidel and Raoul, are also very interesting. There is also an older brother who was at one time against the Cuban revolution but who now approves of it. As a matter of fact, he told his brother Fidel that if he had known how history would develop he would have joined the revolutionary cause sooner. The Castro family were large land owners. Fidel and Raoul gave away their holdings a long time ago. The older brother gave up his holdings only recently. Their mother has retained one-half of her holdings to pursue the family tradition but has given up the other half. At the time of the first visit of Mr. Mikoyan, Fidel Castro was not yet a Marxist and the flag under which he waged his revolution was that of liberalism. He became a Marxist more recently under the influence of the wishes and thoughts ot the Cuban people.
The President asked Mr. Mikoyan when Castro became a Marxist.
Mr. Mikoyan said that it was one or two years ago. Raoul Castro, Che Guevara, and the eldest Castro brother [?]/1/ were Marxists already before the revolution. Not so Fidel, who was moved towards Marxism by the play of the revolution itself. Mr. Mikoyan said that the same thing would happen in regard to "you also". Perhaps not the President personally but later on.
/1/All brackets are in the source text.
The President said that Mr. Mikoyan obviously believes that it will happen to the President's brothers.
Mr. Mikoyan said that he spent two days traveling through Cuba. He admires greatly the liveliness of the Cuban people and the progress accomplished in Cuban agriculture. He saw a ranch with many lakes, 120,000 ducks and much cattle. Castro is doing a lot personally to mechanize agriculture and he is personally known by most of the farmers. Mr. Mikoyan saw Canadian milking machinery. He also saw a national cattle breeding farm with 12,000 cattle and 65 pure-bred bulls. Within five years this farm expects to increase the cattle herd to 70,000. Mr. Mikoyan also saw rural schools; one of these has 1,000 students fully supported by the government and expects within three years to increase the number of students to 20,000. All told, more schools were built in three years in Cuba than had been built during the 50 year period before Castro. There are in Cuba 70,000 students fully supported by the government and the enthusiasm of Cuban youth is impressive. The mansions of capitalists who have left Cuba--which the Cuban Government permits them to do--have been made into youth hostels. During the recent events the militia has been mobilized though on an entirely voluntary basis. The places of the men on the jobs were taken by the women who managed to fulfill their work quotas in all cases. Mr. Mikoyan was most impressed by all those young women at work.
The President said that now he understood why Mr. Mikoyan had liked his travels in Cuba.
Mikoyan said that indeed his visit to Cuba reminded him of his youth when he also was working for the cause of the revolution. He also made speeches at several universities and felt that the students greatly distrusted the United States. He must admit that they have some reasons for such an attitude. Since, however, it is expected that the exchange of correspondence between Chairman Khrushchev and President is to be registered with the United Nations, it is possible that the fears of the young Cubans will be calmed by the very fact of such a recording of this memorable correspondence.
The President said that the relations between the United States and Cuba are bad. What Mr. Mikoyan said about Cuban internal developments may be quite interesting; however, this is not the part of Cuban events which is of primary concern to us. What we are concerned with is the use of Cuba as a springboard for subversion, meaning both Soviet subversion and Castro's own efforts in that direction. There is no reason why statements that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba should not go on record. Yet this is hardly necessary since it is obvious that the United States could have invaded Cuba any number of times beginning with April 1960 but did not do so. This should suffice to make United States intentions clear. As a matter of fact, only recently the President was speaking against those Americans who suggested an invasion of Cuba. Thus, once again the attitude of the United States was clear. However, beginning in July the Soviets have sent over 100 ships loaded with arms and military materiel to Cuba. While this was going on the President, trusting official statements by the Soviet Union, continued to affirm that there was no danger to the United States from an arms build-up in Cuba. This had led to very serious political difficulties on all levels. It is difficult for the President to say at the present moment that the situation with Cuba is in any way satisfactory, since it is not known what will happen next month or what the Chinese will do. Maybe the Chinese Communists will start an arms build-up in Cuba in January, or maybe the Soviet Union itself will start again such a build-up. After all, what the Soviets did once they could do again and no one could blame a certain feeling of mistrust on the part of the United States after what had happened.
Mr. Mikoyan stated that what the President had said presents an extremely serious matter. Yet the Soviet Union does not deserve any reproach. No one can believe that the arms build-up in Cuba was offensive and intended against the United States. It had, in fact, been decided as early as June, by Chairman Khrushchev and his colleagues, of whom Mr. Mikoyan was one, that the United States would be told about the arms build-up, in every detail, by the Soviet Union at an appropriate moment. First it was intended to communicate with the United States Government on a confidential basis and then to make an announcement to the press. Of course, this was something which the Soviet Union was not obligated to do since after all, the United States does not inform the Soviet Union of its military moves. As for the purpose of the military build-up, it was obviously not offensive; no military man and not even a civilian could ever believe that rockets in Cuba could be necessary or even useful for an attack against the United States. The decision had been made to inform the United States after the elections so as to avoid influencing in any way the political campaign in the United States. The President himself certainly would not want to have the elections influenced by Soviet moves. Of course on the 22nd of October no intimation of the build-up was made by the Soviet Union but even if a disclosure had not taken place the Soviet Union would have brought the entire build-up to the attention of the United States on November 8th or 10th, immediately after the elections.
The President said that the problem was not due to the fact that the Soviet Union did not make a statement to the United States about the arms build-up--as it obviously has the right to proceed with any such measures without announcing them to the United States--but on the contrary that the Soviet Union had made a statement according to which no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba or were going to be sent there.
Mr. Mikoyan said that obviously the two speakers had a different interpretation of the recent events. The fact remains that the purpose of the arms build-up in Cuba was defensive and not offensive. They were sent there to defend the island against invasion and for no other purpose. There were some 40 medium and intermediate-range missiles. It is silly to believe that those missiles emplaced in Cuba could be needed for an attack against the United States. After all, there exist other missiles with a much longer range--so long a range in fact that they cannot be tested within the territory of the Soviet Union and must be shot into the sea. The United States Government knows very well how far into the sea they are falling.
On the other hand, the President had spoken in his exchange with Chairman Khrushchev of a United States pledge of non-invasion. Nothing more need to be said. Now, when the United States is making this pledge conditional on the conduct of Cuba it is departing from its previous position.
Mr. Mikoyan said he was reminded of conversations he had with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. He had asked Secretary Dulles whether the latter thought the Soviet Union wished to attack the United States. Secretary Dulles had replied that he did not think that the Government of the Soviet Union in power at that time wanted to attack. Secretary Dulles then asked Mr. Mikoyan whether the latter thought that the United States wanted to attack the Soviet Union. Mr. Mikoyan replied that he did not think so but that he had some doubts in the matter. If the United States did not want to attack the Soviet Union why did it ring the Soviet territory with bases and continue a cold-war policy? Now the United States says that the Soviet tried to establish an offensive base in Cuba. Mr. Mikoyan would like to ask once more whether the President thinks that the Soviet Union wishes to attack the United States.
The President said that he did not know what may have been the reasons of the Soviet Government to establish the base. The fact is that it was established.
Cuba was not threatened by the United States. At the end of September and throughout October the President attacked those people in the United States who spoke in favor of an aggressive policy towards Cuba. There were no indications whatsoever at the time when, in June, Mr. Mikoyan said a decision had been taken by the Soviet Union, that any aggressive moves by the United States were contemplated. Had the question been addressed to the President by Chairman Khrushchev at that time, the President would have been glad to say then as he says now that no invasion of Cuba is intended.
An invasion of Cuba is not a solution to the Cuban problem. We do not live now in the early days of the Twentieth Century. The United States has obligations extending throughout the world. It is true that there are refugees from Cuba who annoy Mr. Castro but there is no policy on the part of the United States Government to invade Cuba. Unquestionably, as able a man as the Soviet Ambassador in the United States must have been aware of that.
As for Soviet intentions, maybe war was not an aim of the Soviet Union but it seems that a policy of threat may well have been the objective. Mr. Mikoyan said that a statement about the build-up would have been made in November. At that time the missiles would have already been fully emplaced. What would have been the posture of the United States Government which had publicly affirmed its trust in the statements of Soviet leaders?
The entire episode cannot be interpreted in any other way than as a major attack against the present Administration and the Government of the United States.
The question is now how the lack of understanding between the two governments can be transformed into mutual understanding. Already in the recent past in the question of Laos and then again in that of Cuba, the two countries have come very close to the edge of the abyss. The question is now what about the future? How many more such near escapes or such situations of dire danger will happen during the next decade because the two governments do not understand one another?
Mr. Mikoyan said that he would first speak about the President's concluding remarks. After that he would reply to the President's earlier statements. In regard to the President's concluding remarks he wished to say that he fully agrees that agreement is necessary for peace and that lack of agreement between the two great Powers may well lead to disaster. As to the President's first remarks, he must emphasize that the Soviet move into Cuba had for a purpose only defense and deterrence. The Soviet Union acted in order to facilitate an agreement leading to peace. After all, it is well known that counter-revolutionary gangs were being trained in camps in the United States and on the territories of other countries of the Western Hemisphere allied with the United States. There was much war-like talk in the United States. Mr. Nixon spoke in favor of an invasion of Cuba, so did Pentagon generals. Under such circumstances, there was good reason to prepare deterrents and defense. It is quite clear that such was the purpose of the Soviet Union, which was going to inform the United States that what it intended through the build-up in Cuba was the defense of that island and not an aggression against the United States. After all, the Soviet Union has more than enough long-range missiles emplaced on its own territory to need anything else. Forty-two missiles are something insignificant for offense and therefore it is clear that they were meant for defense. Moreover, these missiles remained in the hands of the Soviet military and could not have been used without signal authorization from Moscow. Mr. Mikoyan would like to mention to the President in confidence that there exists Soviet legislation which makes it illegal to place nuclear or thermonuclear weapons under non-Soviet control. Mr. Mikoyan also feels that the threat of war is not Cuba but the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and therefore misunderstandings and threats must be eliminated from those relations. Mr. Mikoyan remembers a conversation with that very wise man, Secretary Cordell Hull, back in 1936. At that time, Secretary Hull had said that German fascism and Japanese militarism were preparing for war. Only the United States and the Soviet Union were in a position to defend peace. The situation at that time was already what it is at the present. Both countries have terrible weapons and therefore both have an overwhelming responsibility before the entire world. An understanding and agreement between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy must be obtained in order to prevent war. This means, first of all, that the Cuban affair must be brought to a final conclusion and then that the other "knots" of the international situation must be "untied".
The President said that he did not know what exactly Mr. Nixon had said. In fact, Mr. Nixon had said many things throughout his career. What is clear is that during the period to which Mr. Mikoyan alluded Mr. Nixon was not in a policy making position. As for Pentagon generals, they are under the control of the Administration and there certainly had been no statements on their part calling for aggression. Once again, if the United States had wanted to invade Cuba it could have done so much earlier. There were no United States forces at the time of the hopeless attempt at landing made by Cuban patriots. There were no statements by any people in positions of responsibility in the United States which might have led to the belief that an invasion was being contemplated. The problem in fact is not Cuba, the problem is the attitude of the Soviet Government. Of course, it is clear that the United States Government has very little liking for the present Government of Cuba. This, however, does not mean an intent to invade them. After all, the Soviet Government does not like the present Government of Albania. This does not mean that the Soviet Union will invade Albania, as in such a case as well as in that of a hypothetical invasion of Cuba, international consequences could be very grave. The President stated that he is not, however, so terribly interested in Mr. Castro. What he is interested in, once again, is the attitude of the Soviet Government. How is it possible to go through the coming decade if we are, as in the past, to move from crisis to crisis. The President hopes that some day the Soviet Government will understand that its main duty should be the defense of the interests of the Soviet Union and not pushing the world from one small crisis to another one at the risk of catastrophe which would engulf everything.
Mr. Mikoyan said that Chairman Khrushchev shared the President's opinion that an understanding between the two governments is necessary for peace. Therefore, all the points of disagreement have to be taken one by one and resolved. Both countries must work for peace. The first step should be a final resolution of the Cuban affair--as the President himself said. Much was done in that direction, but unfortunately, no final situation has been yet achieved. This is because the US Government's attitude is not as helpful as it should be.
Once the Cuban crisis is resolved, the next steps might well be a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact organization and NATO, the cessation of nuclear tests, disarmament, and Berlin.
As the President himself has noted, the fact that the Cuban crisis has been largely resolved proves the necessity of talks and negotiations between the two governments. As the President has communicated it to Chairman Khrushchev, negotiations should not stop short of a final solution.
The exchange of correspondence between the two heads of state provides a basis for such a solution. A good way to carry it out would be to place this exchange of correspondence within an agreed protocol. Such a draft protocol, which would also include the position of the Cuban Government, was drafted by the Soviets. Unfortunately, the American representatives refused to accept it.
Another procedure might consist in drafting three declarations, by the United States, Soviet and Cuban Governments, to be agreed upon in New York and then, as a second step, placed before the Security Council for its approval.
The President asked whether Mr. Mikoyan meant an approval by the Security Council or a recording of the declarations with the Secretary General. One of these procedures would require a vote by the Security Council. This, as well as the inclusion of a Cuban declaration, would make the entire procedure impossible to accept. After all, the United States representative in the Security Council cannot be expected to vote in favor of Mr. Castro's declaration. What is important may be achieved simply by declarations agreed upon by the Soviet and United States Governments, which would then be registered with the Secretary General. As for the Cubans, let them do or not do whatever they wish.
Mr. Mikoyan said that after all, the Cuban question is on the agenda of the United Nations and, therefore, must be discussed there. What would be important is that an agreement be obtained between the two Governments before a discussion in the Security Council. The latter, however, cannot be avoided, and the lack of an agreement would amount to keeping alive an international dispute. The two countries, therefore, should come forward with an agreed position. As for such points which are not agreed, they might be the object of separate statements.
The President said that the Cuban Government must be left out of the negotiations. The problem now may be whether there would be agreement on one or two separate declarations.
Mr. Mikoyan said that there should be two declarations, one by each Government, however, that the texts should be agreed upon by the two Governments. The Security Council could then approve those two declarations and could call on the two Governments to resolve the remaining points of difference. What is necessary is a preliminary agreement by the two Governments on the texts of two declarations.
The President said that he understood that Soviet representatives did not like the American draft.
Mr. Mikoyan said that the President guessed correctly the opinion of the Soviet Government.
The President said that Soviet missiles have been removed from Cuba and that he expects that the Soviet bombers will likewise be taken out. He also hopes that the same thing will apply to the other military units and weapons covered by his correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev.
Mr. Mikoyan said that what Mr. Khrushchev has promised to do has either been done or is being done. No other weapons, however, beyond those covered by the correspondence, will be removed.
[An unclarity in translation seems to have led to a temporary misunderstanding. The President was apparently referring to "units servicing or guarding the missile force". Mr. Mikoyan seems to have believed that the President's remarks applied also to military materiel beyond those specifically "service or guard" units.]
The President said that the Agreement covered missiles, bombers, and in due course, other units destined to service or guard the strategic offensive weapons. There is, of course, in Cuba, other military materiel about which, however, the President was not speaking.
Mr. Mikoyan said that the correspondence between the two heads of State is clear on that point. Unfortunately the United States draft declaration also contains a condition which applies to its non-invasion pledge. The condition in question is that the pledge applies only if Cuba abstains from any action which may be considered subversive or of a nature to undermine the governments of others of the Western Hemisphere. Otherwise the non-invasion guarantee is withdrawn. This conditional clause gives to the United States the right to judge the actions of another government and in fact to invade Cuba as it pleases. Mr. Castro has rightly asked "Who has given to the United States the right to invade or not invade Cuba, depending on its own wishes and furthermore to demand guarantees from the Cuban Government?"
The President said that it is Mr. Castro who is asking for guarantees and not the United States.
Mr. Mikoyan said that Mr. Castro was right in saying that no one gave the United States the right to invade or abstain from invasion according to its own interpretation of Cuban actions. Mr. Castro's declaration of the 28th is quite reasonable./2/ What he wants is a bilateral guarantee. According to the United States, Cuba must not undertake subversive action, but the United States and its Allies are free to undertake such actions. Castro's demand that the agreement cut both ways is reasonable and in agreement with international law. Likewise, his demands for the liquidation of an economic blockade, the abstention from piratical acts, especially by ships belonging to Cuban counter-revolutionaries but based in United States ports and in particular Miami, are reasonable. So is his wish for a normalization of relations between the two countries. The only controversial point is that of the Guantanamo Base. Even there, however, Mr. Castro does not ask for the immediate elimination of the Base but only for the opening of negotiations to determine the time when it would be surrendered.
/2/Reference is to the September 27 message from Castro to U Thant; for an extract of the text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 439-440.
The President agreed that the actions of Cuban students shooting at Cuba from small boats are against United States legislation. Such actions are unimportant and only the sporadic exploits of publicity seekers. The United States Government is against such actions. The United States Government is not training any Cuban forces for action against Cuba and neither are such forces trained on the territories of the other nations of the Western Hemisphere. The important point is that of a non-invasion policy by the United States. The President said that he is repeating here and now that it is not the intention of the United States Government to invade Cuba.
It is, however, much more difficult to put such a statement in an official document without surrounding it with the necessary guarantees. After all, Mr. Mikoyan himself had stated to the press that the actions of the Soviet Government had "tied the hands of the Imperialists". Regardless of how the word "imperialists" might apply, the President cannot expect to tie the hands of the United States regardless of any situation which might arise. The declaration does not apply only to the present. It applies also to the future, at least to the next two or six years depending on the wishes of the American electorate. In the meantime, many things may happen. What will the Chinese Communists do? What if three years from now the Soviet Union decided to reintroduce offensive weapons into Cuba?
The President is stating once again that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba. Any official written document, however, must be so drafted as to recognize the international responsibilities of the United States.
After all, we can neither forget or disregard the fact that Castro is not a friend of this country.
Yet the most important thing has been achieved: the Soviet Union knows that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba and the United States knows that the Soviets have removed missiles from Cuba. This is the gist of the agreement between the two Heads of State.
The problem now is that of formal statements. Here difficulties arise. After all, no control has been allowed, as requested by the United States and agreed upon in the exchange of correspondence. In consequence the United States is forced to carry on the overflights against which the Soviet Union and Castro are protesting.
Another solution might perhaps be suggested to these two points: if no international control is possible, the United States must, as it said, find out about the situation through its own facilities. The only thing that can be done is to make United States surveillance as unobtrusive as possible. After all, the lack of international control places the United States Government in an exceedingly difficult position, as it makes it almost impossible for it to reply to charges which are being made that there are still Soviet missiles in Cuba.
The President showed Mr. Mikoyan a press clipping containing a statement that there are Soviet missiles hidden in Cuban caves.
Mr. Mikoyan reiterated that the agreement between the two Chiefs of State in regard to weapons has been reached and is being carried out accordingly. However, articles in the United States press and the attitude of United States military constitute an obstacle to the final resolution of the crisis. Now the United States is stating that it intends to continue its overflights of Cuban territory. This is a source of a legitimate irritation on the part of the Cubans. After all, the United States has aerial cameras which make it possible to photograph Cuba from outside Cuban airspace. In spite of that the United States insists on violating Cuban airspace. This is not acceptable.
The President said that there are no such cameras; the angle at which photographs can be taken from outside the three-mile limit makes the photographs untrustworthy. The United States, however, endeavors to keep its overflights inconspicuous by carrying them out at high altitude and avoiding low altitude flights.
Mr. Mikoyan said that low altitude overflights are blatant hooliganism. High altitude overflights are also hooliganism but less blatant. Castro is right when he says that he will have to deal with such overflights by his own means.
The President said that this is not a question of great concern to the United States.
Mr. Mikoyan stated that such overflights violate the principles of the United Nations and Cuban sovereignty. Any country would protest against a state of affairs which hurts the legitimate pride and self-esteem of the Cubans. Castro has agreed to control. He only insists that such a control apply to all the parties concerned and not be strictly onesided. What makes the situation more difficult is the insistence of the United States to place a statement on this matter in the declaration. Trying to find out about facts by using one's own facilities is against international law but might be ignored; however, statement to that effect in a declaration does violate international law and cannot be accepted. Furthermore, the statement in the declaration that a non-invasion pledge is conditional on Cuba's abstention from subversive activities cannot be reconciled with international law as it in fact gives to the United States the right to determine by itself whether an invasion should take place. If there are any measures to be taken for the control of the subversion, they should apply equally to Cuba, to the other Caribbean nations and to the United States.
The President quoted the text of the proposed draft stating that "provided no nuclear weapons or weapons systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points, and provided Cuba does not involve or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba."/3/
/3/The quote is from Document 208.
Mr. Mikoyan said that it might not be impossible to express the fact that no nuclear weapons should be emplaced in Cuba, though not in the language of the present United States draft. In this draft it is said that Cuba might "support" the invasion of other countries. What is the precise meaning of the word "to support"?
The President said that he understands Mr. Mikoyan's concern on the latter point. His own concern should also be understood: the guarantee in question ties the hands of the United States for a period of years. If nothing were said beyond the point of the exclusion of offensive missiles and nuclear weapons from Cuba, that would mean that Castro would be free to do anything else he chose to do, and that the United States would be prevented from reacting against it. The President does not intend to give such a license to Castro. He is ready to state that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba; the problem is, however, that of avoiding giving Castro a blank check for a number of actions against which retaliation would be prevented by the declaration. This is why the clause in question was included. It is not because we want to invade Cuba. If Castro wants peace, that is fine, because that is what the United States wants and what the United States is saying. If he keeps peace we shall not invade Cuba, regardless of what Mr. Castro does within the borders of his country. This is their business.
Mr. Mikoyan said that the United States declaration means that the United States intends to control the actions of the Government of Cuba. What Castro wants is simply that if there is to be control it should be multilateral. His position is fully in agreement with the spirit of the exchange of letters between the two Chiefs of State. On the contrary the President said that Castro is an enemy of the United States and that the United States is going to terminate its blockade only under certain conditions. This means that the United States is moving back from the position agreed upon in the exchange of correspondence. It means that the United States is to be free to continue its anti-Cuban policies but that Castro would be prevented from doing anything without the permission of the United States.
Multilateral control can be accepted, but a situation according to which one government would be in a position to judge the actions of another government is not acceptable.
Furthermore, the fact that the United States has responsibilities under the Rio Treaty does not need to be included, as this is of no concern to the Soviet Union and, furthermore, as the United States and its Allies have pushed Cuba out of the Rio Treaty organization.
The President said that Mr. Mikoyan had accused the United States of retreating from the position expressed in the exchange of correspond-ence. This is not so. It is on the contrary, the Soviet Union which is moving back from its position, as the correspondence specified inspection by the United Nations and that no such inspection was allowed. Mr. Mikoyan had said that the declaration should not contain any suggestion that one government might judge the actions of another. However, some safeguards are necessary since otherwise the hands of the United States would be tied even while the policy of the Soviet Union would be free to change.
Nothing was said in the exchange of correspondence about any control of American territory. Now, however, Mr. Mikoyan suggests that the United States as well as Cuba submit to control, while no control would be exercised over the territory of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union proposes that the declaration be placed before the Security Council by a simple expression of Soviet will, and describes a state of affairs depending entirely on Soviet intentions. This cannot be accepted by the United States. The United States Government was misled once and it intends to make certain that it will not be misled again.
The United States does not intend to invade Cuba and is ready to make that known. It must, however, insist on (1) a minimum of control, and (2) the expression of its obligations under the Rio Treaty. The Rio Treaty has been ratified by the United States Senate and is a part of United States legislation to which the President himself is subject. It cannot be ignored in a binding document.
If the Soviet Union prefers it, however, it may be possible to make the United States intent known in a way which would be quite clear though not imply the same legal complications, for example, through a statement by the President, let us say, a press conference. In fact, the President has already made a statement of this kind at his last press conference. If, however, an official declaration is called for it must include references to all the aspects of the problem.
Thus there is a choice between either an official declaration, the precise language of which could be worked out between Messrs. McCloy, Stevenson and Kuznetsov, or a simply verbal statement by the President at a press conference.
If the first alternate is chosen it would have to contain references to the Rio Treaty, of which the United States continues to be a member, and a clause referring to the possibility of the United States satisfying itself that Cuba and the Soviet Union are respecting their side of the bargain; a lack of such a clause would cause an uncontrollable uproar in the United States and throughout the Western Hemisphere.
The other solution might be a simple statement by the President that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba, with the hope that Castro will not undertake any provocative action and that the Soviet Union does not reintroduce a military threat into the Western Hemisphere. If Mr. Castro wishes to carry on the activities described by Mr. Mikoyan such as the education of Cuban children and the mechanization of Cuban agriculture, well and fine. All we ask is that he does not cause any trouble outside of his own borders.
If there is to be an official declaration its language can be worked out in New York by the representatives of the two countries but it will have to contain clear references to the absence of offensive weapons from Cuba, to the control of such absence, and to some guarantees to the defense. The only other possibility is an informal statement.
Mr. Mikoyan asked if the President's statement at a press conference would be instead of or in addition to the formal declarations.
The President said that if no agreement can be reached on formal declarations, then it might be possible for him to clarify the position of the United States by means of a statement at a press conference express-ing the spirit of the exchange of correspondence between the two Heads of State. As a matter of fact, already at his last press conference the President had said that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba and that the same applied to the other nations of the Western Hemisphere. The President also expressed part of what he thinks about Mr. Castro, but this is not the same thing as an invasion. Thus a lot of progress was accomplished on the most difficult and important elements of the crisis. Let us hope that progress will be possible also on its remaining formal aspect through agreed declarations registered with the United Nations. If not, the President is ready to make an adequate statement at a press conference. Thus again there are two possibilities. Either agreed statements registered with the United Nations or a unilateral statement by the President at his press conference. Mr. Khrushchev, of course, can also wish to make a statement in either case. A statement by the United States or a statement agreeing with the United States will have to contain references to control and to the Rio Treaty.
There are, in fact, three possibilities: either agreement within the United Nations or disagreement and debate within the United Nations, if the Soviet Government so wishes; or again something which may or may not be satisfactory, that is to say a simple statement at a press conference. At that the two Governments could perhaps pass on to the other problems such as that of disarmament. In the meantime, the Cuban affair might be permitted to cool off and the President hopes that it will remain cool for a long time.
Mr. Mikoyan said that, in fact, what the President wants is merely to cool off a burning situation, while keeping the fire alive, whereas the Soviet Government wants to put the fire out for good before passing on to other questions.
The President said that the interpretations of the two participants in the conversation obviously differ.
Mr. Mikoyan suggested that if agreement could be obtained on a part of the items to be included in the declarations, such declarations could be registered officially with the United Nations. Any points on which there would be no agreement would then be the object of the statements outside of the United Nations. What should be included in the declarations is what was included in the exchange of correspondence. Other items, such as the Rio Treaty, could be left outside.
The President said that he wished to make it quite clear for the record that the United States is not moving back from any position agreed to in the correspondence.
The President quoted from the exchange of correspondence to the effect that the removal of missiles and other strategic weapons and military units would proceed under the control of the United Nations. This was not done. If the Soviet Union can manage to abide by the exchange of correspondence to the letter, then the United States will abide by that exchange to the letter. If not, the President can only act in the best way the situation permits.
Mr. Mikoyan stated that the Soviet Union fully abides by the exchange of correspondence. It had allowed inspection as the owner of the missiles and other weapons. The permission of the government on the soil of which the missiles were placed still remained necessary, and this is something over which the Soviet Union has no control. This is what was said in Chairman Khrushchev's letters of October 27 and 28. The only differences between the two letters being that all mention of Turkey was deleted from the October 28 letter. Thus the Soviets did everything which was incumbent upon them. Secretary General U Thant was kept informed of what the Soviets were doing. On the other hand the Soviet Government appreciates that the United States Government has agreed to verify the removal of missiles by means other than those specified in the exchange of letters. These means are, however, fully satisfact
