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1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath |
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
226. Summary Record of the 32d-A Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, December 4, 1962, 5:30 p.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 25-32-A, 11/12/62-12/4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive.
Mr. Bundy reported that Kuznetsov was telling Ambassador Stevenson the numbers and ports out of which the IL-28 bombers were leaving./1/
/1/Transmitted in telegram 2105 from USUN, December 4. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams, 1962 (TS, exdis, etc.))
A revised overflight guidelines paper was presented./2/ The general principle is that there will be regular high-level overflights and low-level missions will be done only on specific request, as authorized by the President.
/2/November 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-30/62) Printed as approved as an attachment to Document 232.
There was a discussion of a Miami news story reporting the presence in Cuba of an armed Soviet division. In fact, there is merely a mechanized regiment which is part of four Soviet task forces in Cuba. It was decided that the Defense Department would release to the press factual information about the Soviet troops in Cuba.
The group agreed that a standstill posture should be maintained in New York until the Russians give us their latest draft declaration.
Mr. McCone reported that the CIA would engage in intense intelligence gathering in Cuba in the next four months, while avoiding provocation until we know whether the Russians are withdrawing their military forces or building them up.
Bromley Smith/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
227. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, December 5, 1962, 8 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-562. Top Secret. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House.
2140. Department pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba. McCloy and Stevenson believe it is very much in US interest, if possible, to bring US-Sov negots on Cuba to rapid and mutually acceptable conclusion./1/ They have growing impression that effects of victory in public mind are being gradually effaced by prolonged and inconclusive negotiation which gives impression we are still seeking vital objective we have not achieved. If public presumes this objective is on-site inspection, more and more importance will be attached to such inspection as negotiation continues. If and when we emerge from negotiation without achieving that objective, even though it may have been otherwise successful, we will risk seeming to have failed rather than to have succeeded.
/1/In a telephone conversation between Ball and Stevenson at 6:40 p.m., December 5, Stevenson informed Ball that after a long discussion with McCloy, "there is obviously a feeling in the White House, which is shared by the Secretary, which is quite adverse to Jack's [McCloy] views. (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba)
Second consideration which we have in mind is that there may be some substance in Kuznetsov's frequent reiteration of assertion that whether or not we agree on Cuban settlement will have most important effect on possibility of agreement in other fields. This may be bluff but there also may be element of sincerity in it and, if so, real effort on our part to reach prompt and agreed settlement could have substantial effect on Berlin, nuclear testing, etc.
We realize proposed Cuban SC declaration/2/ creates new, though not unforeseen complication and that either some way must be found to handle SC mtg harmoniously or alternative of separate declarations outside SC must be pursued.
/2/The text is in telegram 2104 from USUN, December 4. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963) See the Supplement.
In any case we think prompt determination should be reached as to what changes could be made in our draft declaration for use as soon as seems appropriate. We believe fol suggested changes largely verbal rather than substantive, would not in any sense jeopardize or weaken essential US positions. They might on other hand provide sufficient accommodation on some of points to which Sovs have most seriously objected so that latter could take amended declaration as basis for agreed settlement. If we put forward these amendments before receiving Sov draft declaration we would of course have to make clear that unacceptable Sov draft would necessitate withdrawal of our proposed declaration. However we are inclined to feel that more acceptable proposal on our part might produce less objectionable Sov draft and hence substantially reduce period of negotiation. In putting forward our amended draft we would certainly state unequivocally that it was as far as we could go and there was no use wasting time in attempting to negotiate our declaration further.
Our proposed amendments follow:
(1) Omit word "minimum" in second sentence para 6;
(2) In ninth para substitute for "other weapons capable of offensive use" more exact and less sweeping language which could not, as is case with present language, be applied to rifles and pistols. One possibility would be "other weapons of major offensive capability";
(3) In same para, for words "provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the hemisphere" substitute "provided Cuba does not attack (or commit aggression against) any nation of the Western Hemisphere";
(4) For penultimate para present draft substitute fol: "Pending such time as arrangements can be effected to provide the safeguards necessary to ensure that no such weapons systems are maintained or reintroduced into Cuba, the US will employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary." We have several other drafts for this para if the Dept finds above unsatisfactory.
(5) Since there can be no question that the Rio Pact remains in full effect and that our declaration in SC on this occasion does not and cannot impair it, there is some question whether it need be mentioned in declaration. Alternatively President in subsequent press conference might make statement along lines final para present draft declaration.
Stevenson
228. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
Washington, December 5, 1962, 5:30 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classificaiton marking.
McC: I feel very strongly we are losing ground by this delay, and I feel that what we ought to do . . . I think there is misconception as to what our position is, and it is very serious. People are getting crystallized on this on-site inspection business, and I just think we are not wise in telling Kuznetsov that "Look, there are certain things that we can agree to, and there are certain things we can't agree to". What I would do is tell him, in the first place he didn't like that word "minimum" inspection. Of course it doesn't mean anything; we can strike that out. Secondly, I would tell him that the words we used there in regard to "nuclear or other weapons capable of offensive use." He brought up the point of the pistol. If we can find something else to cover him on that. We aren't talking about every kind of weapon that is capable of offensive use. So that I would say we were ready to change. Furthermore, I am ready to strike out "the Rio Pact" in this thing, because the Rio Pact exists anyway, and the President could say it on the side. And of course, nothing he says in connection with this in any way irrigates from the obligations and rights of our existing treaties. I would say we do have to reserve our intent to use such methods as we feel are necessary by way of observation and verification pending the adoption of other means that are satisfactory to us, and that we can't give way on that, because if we say that we have no intent to invade and the next day we sent a U-2 over there, in some interpretations it is an invasion, an invasion of their aerial territory. So we just have to reserve the fact that our intent is to continue the ordinary precautions. Then on the word "threat" that Thompson introduced, I would go back to "attack" or "commit aggression" or something like that, because I do think that with "threat" security is rather illusory. You know, Castro could make a speech and could say we're off the hook then. I believe it is good tactics to tell him irrespective of his declaration. His declaration is going to be . . . if we don't get something in to indicate that we're compromising, there is still going to be the reputation of Cuba, and then there will be a wrangle. But if he thinks that we are really trying to meet him, I believe he will come part way. And we may very well wind this thing up with a something less than transigent wrangle on both our parts, which may very well prejudice Berlin, or something else.
(Ball left to meet with the Secretary and on return called McCloy back.)
GB: I undertook to talk with the Secretary briefly about this. His feeling, and this is I am sure the President's feeling, is that if we were really anxious on our part to close this thing up, what you are suggesting would be the thing to do it. But quite frankly the President doesn't want to close it up right now, unless it were closed completely on our own terms. What he would propose (and this has been cleared with the White House) to do would be send it up tonight.
McC: Don't tie our hands--don't tie our hands. Well maybe . . . I don't agree . . . what I'm telling you is that I think we can close it out, but we have a chance of closing it out on our terms if we do this. I think this dragging our feet is absolutely wrong. Now I can't say anything since this is the President's decision. I think we are petering away the victory, and I believe we have a reasonable chance by giving away nothing in this thing in consolidating the victory, and I'm not in doubt when I am saying that. I just think that you are getting them hardened up unnecessarily--at Geneva, on Berlin--and I don't think that's wise and I don't think that anything that I am suggesting that we give way . . . . we're not giving away anything when I strike out the word "minimum," or don't use the word "threat" . . .
GB: That's right.
McC: I do think we have to hold onto the word "intend" and would intend to hold onto those words, but I would also hope that we could put into the operating clauses that there is nothing here in any way interrogates our intention to use all the observation and clarification facilities we have.
I just don't believe we are giving away anything. But I do believe we are losing. And I am convinced we are losing. We are losing every day that goes by. I was at the Board meeting at Chase today. Everybody wanted to know what was going on here. Are we in another snarl? There is so much emphasis on the on-site inspection. If we don't get the on-site inspection, which we don't want, it's going to be thought around the country we're losing. Yet if we say that pending getting such an inspection as satisfies us we intend to use the facilities we already have. Everybody will applaud that. The world will applaud that.
GB: How would you envisage this thing. Let's suppose that you were to make those amendments. How would it work out with Kuznetsov. What could he do then?
McC: I would say to Kuznetsov, "Now, look, if you . . . we've come a long way here toward meeting you on this business. You've talked all these things. We've met you on two out of four of them. We can't give way on the intent business. But now if you say that you could acquiesce in this statement and give us a statement that doesn't cause a wrangle in the UN, if it represents a real consensus, then, I would say let's go to the UN together, file that thing," and then let the SC head--he has seen these documents and congratulates the heads of state which worked out a situation in averting the crisis, and go on our way rejoicing. We have some language up here--it doesn't amount to anything but that, and I think he would take it as being an indication that we were not trying to welch or to introduce new conditions and that we were holding out on one thing that Khrushchev is anxious to get. At the same time we don't give up a thing that is of any value to us.
GB: I am going to have to . . . Let me see what kind of an advocate I can be here. I've got to get this back up to the President; because right now the posture of this thing that has come back from the White House cleared out, and I am going to have to let it go tonight with the idea that before you act on them we can have another look at this. I will see if we can get the Committee together in the morning if we can.
McC: Now, I have spelled this all out to Ros./1/ He tells me he agrees with it. There is one thing I have asked him to do and that is to give me the right definition of the "introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use". We can change that language. But naturally we're not going to limit it to merely these weapons that he took out, but we can use some such word as "major offensive weapons" or something like. I do this purely on the conviction that I have that we are not gaining ground now--that I think if we do close it up on that basis the President has nothing to fear. And I think we may have a better atmos-phere for stuff that may be coming up in the future.
/1/Roswell Gilpatric.
GB: I'll get this thing cranked up here. I'll let it go tonight because I have no way of stopping it. Let's talk first thing in the morning. In the meantime, I'll get hold of the WH and see if we can set something up.
McC: I've got an [un]fortunate situation coming up Friday and Saturday. I've been postponing meetings with clients of mine for 60 days, so I just have do that then. And I have to testify in North Carolina on Monday. But you can reach me tonight or tomorrow.
GB: I'll get back to you one way or another.
McC: You talk to Gilpatric about it.
GB: You bet.
229. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, December 5, 1962.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret.
At the close of the Executive Committee Meeting last night,/1/ I raised the question of courses of action we should follow if the Cuban SAM sites are made operational and a U-2 is shot down. This question has been considered and the consensus seems to be that in such an eventuality, we will be obliged to take out the SAM site or perhaps several SAM sites. There appeared no difference of opinion among those in attendance at the meeting last night or previous meetings when I raised this question concerning the policy.
/1/See Document 226.
However, as you said, the implementation of the "policy" was another matter and perhaps it would be more difficult to "seize the nettle" in such assumed circumstances than it is to agree among ourselves as to what should be done.
I continue to be disturbed over this situation as I feel that there is a strong possibility of such a confrontation as soon as the IL-28's are all removed. In this connection, I find it significant that Mr. Kuznetsov advised Governor Stevenson with regard to the number of IL-28's to be shipped on each of several ships, the ports and the dates of departure./2/ This seems to indicate to me that the Soviets are about to "drop the curtain" on one phase of the Cuban problem.
/2/See footnote 1, Document 226.
Other indications of their intentions have appeared recently. On Monday I gave you a note reporting (by Stevenson) Mikoyan's statements that "he had succeeded in maintaining a Socialist 'communist-controlled' state in Cuba." I also reported that we had detected a continual improvement in Soviet-controlled communications systems throughout the Island./3/
/3/See Document 224.
Today the Watch Committee reports more extensively on the communications developments and their report, which appears as an Annex to this week's Watch Committee statement, is attached./4/
/4/Not attached and not found.
I feel there is a very strong possibility that we will soon face a situation where the Soviets will first warn us against further overflights, indicate that their SAM sites are in operation, and if we persist will destroy one or more U-2's. Action by us of a type planned and mentioned last night could, therefore, involve a military operation against Soviet soldiers.
This therefore is quite possibly the situation that we will face. It will not be action against "Cuban forces" in disguise; it will be action against Soviet forces and this may possibly be announced to us in advance. I bring this up because I think the possibility must be given serious thought at this time and we might devise diplomatic moves which would either forestall such a confrontation or, alternatively, a pronouncement made now might so indicate our intentions that the confrontation will not occur.
John A. McCone/5/
Director
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates McCone signed the original.
230. Summary Record of the 33d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, December 6, 1962, 11 a.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 33-37, 12/5/62-12/17/62. Top Secret; Sensitive.
Director McCone reported that all IL-28 bombers had been located at Cuban ports or on ships leaving Cuba. He called attention to a buildup of the Soviet communications system in Cuba and referred to the existing SAM sites and to the Soviet air defense capability.
The President read extracts from an FBI report on Mikoyan's briefing of the Soviet delegation in New York/1/ and asked that it be circulated to all Executive Committee members./2/
/1/In McCone's account of this meeting, December 6, Rusk briefed the committee on Mikoyan's visit to Cuba. According to that account "Secretary Rusk reported that Mikoyan had stated he had extreme difficulty in Cuba, that Castro refused to see him for nine days, and when he threatened to leave, Castro immediately stated he was prepared to make an arrangement with the Chinese Communists. Rusk therefore felt the Soviets may be inclined to leave substantial forces in Cuba to forestall a ChiCom takeover." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A)
/2/The Federal Bureau of Investigation report, December 4, is attached to a December 6 memorandum from Smith to the members of the Executive Committee. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, NSC Executive Committee) See the Supplement.
Ambassador Stevenson reported on the most recent New York meeting with the Russians. He read the proposed changes in a draft declaration on the Cuban problem which we would make and recommended that we give to the Russians a draft, as revised in his telegram,/3/ before the Soviet delegation received its draft from Moscow. The purpose would be to end the discussion. If our draft was not accepted by the Russians, then we should return to our position of circulating our own original draft declaration to the Security Council. He urged that we focus on our paper rather than theirs. We cannot haggle too long lest the Russians get tougher on Cuba and insist on discussion of other issues. The U.S. has achieved a victory, i.e., the strategic weapons have been removed. The longer we prolong the negotiation over minor issues, the closer we come to appearing to have failed. Mr. McCloy said that we may be dissipating our victory. In addition, the Russians may accept a one-shot inspection scheme which we don't want but which would be difficult for us to oppose.
/3/Document 227.
The President said he agreed that we could vitiate our success by prolonging the New York negotiations, but as long as Castro is in power, many will think that our victory will be pale. Senator Russell had already said that we had made a mistake by not invading Cuba. We are committed to make some kind of an invasion pledge. Do we want an agreement in New York or do we not? If we do not, we should stick on our present position. We do not know whether such a negotiating position in New York would affect negotiations on other issues.
Mr. McCloy said we should stick on our statement about aerial reconnaissance, but he opposed on constitutional grounds any statement of a declaration of our intentions on invasion.
Secretary Rusk said we do not want an agreement for agreement's sake. We want only a good agreement. We should not chip away at our statement but wait until the Soviets produce theirs. We should stay with our present position. Prolonged negotiations in New York may appear as a failure, but if we give away our position in a declaration, we are failing.
The President commented that the hardening of the Soviet posture is not due to our action in Cuba.
Secretary Dillon said he thought disagreement in New York was certain, but Mr. McCloy said we might get an acceptable Soviet declaration, accompanied by a statement that our overflights were not acceptable.
The President asked what we would do if there was a civil war in Cuba. Would we go in only if invited? Secretary Rusk said we could not allow a Soviet takeover of Cuba similar to that which occurred in Hungary.
The President asked whether an agreement reached in New York would prevent us from taking action against Cuba if the Soviets moved in Berlin. He asked whether the Chinese Communists would come into Cuba if the Soviets phased out. Would we consider a Soviet submarine base as an offensive weapon? If many additional MIGs were sent to Cuba, would we consider these to be offensive weapons? He concluded by saying we should put in a revised draft declaration and tell the Russians they could take it or leave it. If they decide to leave it, we will rewrite our declaration entirely, taking a tough view.
Secretary McNamara said if we rewrite the declaration we should take a firmer stand on the no-invasion course so that we would not guarantee Castro sanctuary.
Mr. Bundy favored rewriting the declaration so that we could back away from a no-invasion guarantee. We could tell the Russians this was the last chance.
Ambassador Stevenson said we should be ready with a revised draft in the event the Russians rejected a new proposal.
There followed a discussion of whether we should tell the Latin American Ambassadors where the negotiations now stand. Ambassador Stevenson said all of them will leak to the press but even so we should brief them in New York. Secretary Rusk preferred to inform the OAS representatives here first, but preferred to hold off for a day or two. If the briefing is not given before Monday,/4/ it would be possible to do it with the OAS representatives here and the Latin American Ambassadors at the UN in New York.
/4/December 10.
The President suggested that we wait until tomorrow to see if we get an agreement from the Russians before we put out our statement. Mr. McCloy pointed out that there would be no time to get an agreement tomorrow. Secretary Rusk recommended that we do not put out our statement before we get the Russian draft because our statement would cause anxiety.
Mr. Murrow stated that if we are going to give up our demand for on-site inspection, then we should make a louder noise about aerial surveillance.
Ambassador Stevenson reported that the status of the proposal to create the nuclear-free zone in Latin America was in doubt because if we could not get the concurrence of all Latin American States we would have difficulty putting the proposal forward.
The President approved revised instructions to the New York team to cover the negotiation during the next few days./5/ (Copy of instructions attached.)/6/
/5/McGeorge Bundy prepared a brief 3-point record of action of this meeting on December 6. It noted McCone's intelligence briefing, the recommended revisions to the U.S. draft declaration, and the President's approval of those revisions. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62)
/6/Sent as telegram 1511 to USUN, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) See the Supplement.
Bromley Smith/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
231. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
Washington, December 6, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, ExCom Meetings, December 4, 1962. Top Secret; Sensitive.
We agreed that I would send you a summary of the informal comments made on the draft memorandum on "Future Policy toward Cuba"/1/ which was discussed in the Executive Committee on Tuesday, December 4th./2/
/1/The draft memorandum printed as an attachment was attached to a copy of this memorandum in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62.
/2/Discussion of the draft memorandum was not included in the summary record, see Document 226.
First, it was generally agreed that there should be a reorganization of our machinery for Cuban action. In particular, there seemed to be general support for the idea of an Office of Cuban Affairs which could be public and above board, and which might do a more effective job with free Cubans and others concerned with the hopes for post-Castro Cuba. You and I agreed after the meeting that you would explore the availability of a particularly well-qualified individual to head this office.
With respect to the draft memorandum itself, the following general comments were made:
1. The memorandum is correct in recommending that no general policy be approved or set in motion until the current discussions with the Soviets on Cuba have developed somewhat further.
2. The proposed action in the OAS should not be framed sharply until we know more clearly what kind of resolution is likely to obtain unanimous or nearly unanimous support. Our current posture in the OAS is so strong that we should not weaken it for marginal advantages.
3. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the draft statement seemed approximately correct; paragraph 7 needed further development in order to distinguish desirable from undesirable travel to Cuba; paragraph 8 should make it clearer that it is Cuban funds whose transfer needs to be surveyed and controlled if possible; paragraphs 9 and 10 need to be spelled out carefully in cooperation with the other agencies primarily concerned.
The covert annex was considered only very briefly, but the preliminary sense of the meeting was that covert activities should be concentrated upon improvement in the collection of intelligence for the immediate future, and that we should not plan early sabotage activities.
Other items in the covert annex were not properly considered.
McG. Bundy
Attachment/3/
Draft Memorandum for President Kennedy
/3/See footnote 1. Top Secret. Drafted on December 3, although no drafter is indicated.
SUBJECT
Future Policy toward Cuba
Policy
Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro regime and its replacement by one sharing the aims of the Free World. Our immediate objectives are to weaken the regime; frustrate its subversive intentions; further reduce its influence in the Hemisphere; and increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime (or split the regime off from the Bloc).
A policy of containing, undermining, discrediting and isolating the Castro regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic economic, psychological and other pressures will achieve these immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.
Courses of Action
The following overt/4/ courses of action should be undertaken:
/4/For the program of covert actions please see Annex A. [Footnote in the source text. A typed note in the margin of the source text reads: "This annex will be circulated to ExCom members at a meeting called to discuss the memo."]
1. OAS action: condemning the Castro regime for its duplicity; extending the trade embargo to all items except foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies; further limiting air and sea communications between the Hemisphere and Cuba; authorizing air and other surveillance; and warning Cuba against continued promotion of subversive and sabotage activities.
2. Establishment of Caribbean security arrangements through ministerial level meetings of the Caribbean countries for the purposes of reaching agreement on increasing the intensity of surveillance of coastal and international waters; increased surveillance and control of land boundaries; increased control over subversive activities within national boundaries; systematic exchange of intelligence information; and, development of procedures for coordination of military contingency planning for emergencies.
3. Application of the four-point shipping restrictions re Cuba.
4. Inclusion by NATO of Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.
5. Discussion of Free World industrial nations from shipping crucial spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
6. Persuasion of non-Bloc nations to limit their airlines service to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba.
7. Persuasion of Latin American nations to limit the travel of their nationals to Cuba and to intensify measures to prevent agents and groups of international communism from carrying on their subversive activities.
8. Persuasion of appropriate OAS organs to study urgently the transfer of funds to the other American Republics for subversive purposes, the plan of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques; and to make recommendations to the member states regarding counter-measures.
9. Maintenance of currently enhanced VOA medium wave facilities beamed to Cuba and adoption by VOA of a more aggressive line toward Cuba.
10. Facilitation of Cuban exiles' entry into the United States Armed Forces for training, and formation of reserve units thereafter.
Timing
We should surface our program of isolating and weakening Cuba when it becomes clear that our discussions on Cuba with the Soviets are unlikely to be fruitful. Actions with respect to Cuba which may contribute substantially to creating a situation calling for United States military action should be withheld until the Soviet combat units have been removed from Cuba or efforts to persuade the USSR to remove them have failed.
Annex A/5/
Covert Courses of Action
/5/Top Secret. Drafted on December 1 although no drafter is indicated.
1. Support fully the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within, in order that they may: a) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, b) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime.
2. Continue to support the Cuban Revolutionary Council in its efforts to maintain a degree of order and unity in the Cuban exile community.
3. Assist selected Cuban exile groups to encourage the Cuban people to engage in minor acts of sabotage.
4. Utilize selected Cuban exiles to sabotage key Cuban installations in such a manner that the action can plausibly be attributed to Cubans in Cuba.
5. Sabotage Cuban cargo and shipping, and Bloc cargo and shipping to Cuba.
6. Encourage the defection of Cuban diplomats, officials and delegates abroad.
7. Continue to assist and guide Cuban exiles in their radio broadcasts to Cuba.
8. Encourage and assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters to Cuba.
9. Develop more fully a clandestine "Voice of Free Cuba" radio capability either in Cuba or from a submarine in international waters.
10. Develop more fully a capability for covertly intruding upon Cuban television broadcasts.
11. Unless future developments warrant change, emphasize the following themes in covert propaganda output: a) the need to return to the original aims of the Cuban revolution; b) the Castro regime's betrayal of these aims; and, c) Castro, as a pawn in the Soviet expansionist game, having subordinated Cuba's national interests to those of the USSR.
12. Assist, through subsidy if necessary, non-Bloc importers of
Cuban sugar to find alternative sources of supply.
232. National Security Action Memorandum No. 208
Washington, December 6, 1962.
//Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 208. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Information copies were sent to the other members of the Executive Committee.
TO
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Cuban Overflights
The President has approved the attached Guidelines for the Planning of the Cuban Overflights and would like to have an estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth, on the assumption that it is supplemented by energetic collection of information by all other available means.
McG. B.
Attachment
Washington, December 4, 1962.
GUIDELINES FOR THE PLANNING OF CUBAN OVERFLIGHTS
This memorandum indicates the kinds of information the United States Government now needs to obtain with respect to the situation in Cuba, from the point of view of overall policy.
1. The United States Government has a high priority need for evidence of the deployment of offensive weapons systems in Cuba.
2. The United States has a priority need for continuing and reliable information with respect to the general order of magnitude, deployment and state of readiness of Soviet military units and installations in Cuba.
3. The United States Government has a need for continued information on the general situation in Cuba--political, military, and economic--but it is assumed that overflight contributions to this end will be by-products of missions undertaken in fulfillment of the needs in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
4. The United States Government is prepared to use both low-level
and high-level reconnaissance, but it is desired that where practicable,
necessary intelligence be obtained by a regular schedule of high-level
flights, with low-level missions called for on the basis of specific
indications of a target of special interest.
233. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, December 6, 1962, 9 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House at 10:15 p.m. December 6.
2178. Department pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Re: Cuba. Reference: Deptel 1511./1/ In mtg with McCloy and Yost this evening Kuznetsov and Mendelevich, after commenting on preferred changes in US draft declaration, put forward new suggestion as fols: That two sides agree on very brief declarations which would be presented in SC, that SC adopt res concerning these declarations and that points which are not agreed between parties be made in separate statements either in SC or outside. Sovs presented drafts their short declaration and SC res, text of which being transmitted immediately fol tel./2/
/1/Telegram 1511 to USUN, December 6, 2:46 p.m., contained modifications to the draft U.S. statement on Cuba as approved at the NSC's Executive Committee on December 6, (see Document 230). (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) See the Supplement.
/2/Document 234.
At outset of mtg McCloy referred briefly to complications caused by Cuban declaration/3/ and probability acrimonious squabble in SC resulting therefrom. He then said in attempting to meet points in US draft declaration that Sovs had raised and to reach more or less agreed position we had some new language to propose. He emphasized however that, if Sov declaration which we had not received proves unacceptable, we would have to withdraw our new proposals and simply content ourselves with two separate statements drafted as we thought fit.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 227.
He then went over changes authorized first five numbered paras Deptel 1511. He also suggested that words "have not been fulfilled" at end first sentence para 6 might be changed to "have not been capable of fulfillment."
Sovs continued to object strongly to phrase "offensive weapons systems", claiming that it was as loose and as subject to expansion and misinterpretation as original phrase had been. Kuznetsov said it was definitely unacceptable. He insisted that weapons concerned were only those about which agreement had been reached in exchange of letters between Pres and Khrushchev.
McCloy replied that this was impossible since there are four types of missiles and of bombers as well as submarines, for example, which are clearly offensive weapons systems the introduction of which into Cuba would cause us gravest concern. It finally appeared Sovs might accept some language referring to other weapons "similar" or "comparable" to weapons agreed upon between Pres and Khrushchev, but they continued to maintain new US language was unacceptable.
As to overflights, while recognizing McCloy's statement that new text removed any implication Sovs are approving overflights, Kuznetsov nevertheless declared it maintains same idea and is not acceptable. US wants to get official justification to overfly. Moreover in connection with clause commencing "pending such time", he claimed US does not want any arrangements for international safeguards since it has turned down U Thant plan. He objected strongly to any reference to overflights in declaration and declared it was also unacceptable. McCloy countered with clear exposition why it was essential in US point of view that this reference be maintained.
As to proviso that "Cuba does not commit aggressive acts against any nation in the Western Hemisphere" Kuznetsov said this proviso is not in exchange of letters. McCloy replied Pres could not possibly say he would stand by if Cuba attacked another country with which we have a treaty obligating us to come to its defense. Kuznetsov replied Cuba has offered in protocol not to attack anyone else and that moreover threat is not from but against Cuba, citing Dec 4 attack on Cuban soil by boat containing exiles.
After inquiring whether we really had to put it in, Kuznetsov did not object seriously to new language in regard to US treaty rights.
Concluding discussion on changes in US draft Kuznetsov said that they had not removed main obstacles. McCloy thought we had sincerely tried to meet Sovs half way but that this is best we can do and if we cannot agree on this we must agree to disagree.
Kuznetsov thereupon put forward new suggestion reported in opening para this message. He proposed we make our declarations very brief and limit them to agreed points. All other points which either side feels it necessary to make could then be covered in separate statements either inside or outside UN.
He then went over US draft suggesting what might be omitted to make it acceptable to Sovs if we adopted suggestion of shorter form. These omissions were as fol: Two numbered paras quoted from Pres' letter of Oct 27; in next para reference only to medium and not intermediate-range missiles (it appears same Russian word applies to both these two); omit sentence concerning Sov military units and personnel; in next para omit whole of first sentence commencing "The undertakings in the President's letter"; in next sentence omit word "substantial"; in fol para omit words "to date"; in fol para omit two provisos so that pertinent portion would read "the US further gives assurances that it does not intend, as the President made clear" etc; omit whole of next para. He concluded he would consult about new language our final para.
Kuznetsov reiterated argument that new procedure he proposed would raise both sides of difficulties in reaching agreement which had emerged from discussion US draft. The points not agreed could be sure they were not "too odious". This procedure would also take care of Cuban declaration which he understood would not be agreed.
McCloy concluded by saying he was disappointed in response to our new proposals. He emphasized again that they were in any case dependent on our reaching agreement and would have to be withdrawn if there is no agreement. He pointed out we were going far in giving our assurance against invasion without any arrangements for on-site inspection. This of course further underlined necessity for overflights.
Also in conclusion Kuznetsov indicated that new Sov suggestion had been put forward by Khrushchev with view to making settlement easier for both sides. He thought however SC should adopt res and that mere consensus statement by Chairman would not be enough. It was important for peace of world that we go as far as possible in settlement of Cuban question and that parties therefore continue negotiations normalize situation. McCloy remarked again that we do not intend to negotiate with Castro in framework this transaction though of course would negotiate willingly with him if he showed signs of wishing to live in peace in this hemisphere. He noted however US and Sovs had achieved good momentum in these negotiations and urged it be maintained and carried forward to other problems. Kuznetsov agreed.
Yost
234. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, December 6, 1962, 9 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House at 10:29 p.m. December 6.
2179. Dept pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Re: Cuba. Fol is text of draft declaration and draft res referred to in ourtel 2178:/1/
/1/Document 233.
Draft declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Security Council
Being guided by the interests of strengthening peace throughout the world and seeking to conclude peaceful settlement of the dangerous crisis in the Caribbean according to an agreement achieved;
Taking into consideration that on November 20, 1962 the Government of the United States terminated all measures it introduced on October 23, 1962 regarding the ships bound for the Republic of Cuba;
Taking further into consideration the statement of the United States Government contained in its declaration of . . . 1962 to the effect that the United States will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba and that it is convinced that other countries of the Western Hemisphere will act likewise;
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states the following:
1. All weapons, regarding the dismantling and withdrawal of which from the Cuban territory an agreement was reached between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, have by this time been removed from the territory of Cuba and returned to the Soviet Union.
2. Such weapons shall not be introduced by the USSR in the territory of the Republic of Cuba.
3. The USSR Government proceeds from the premise that negotiations will continue between parties concerned on the questions connected with further normalization of the situation in the Caribbean with the purpose of working out mutually acceptable solutions.
The Security Council,
Expressing its approval of the understanding reached on the meas-ures for peaceful settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean in the negotiations between the parties concerned with the active participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
Takes note of the declarations of the sides dated . . . 1962;
Expresses its firm belief that the Governments of the USSR, of the United States and of the Republic of Cuba will strictly fulfill the assumed obligations;
Calls upon the parties concerned to continue negotiations with the purpose of working out mutually acceptable solutions to the questions related to further normalization of the situation in the Caribbean area.
Yost
235. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, December 7, 1962, 1 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-162. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House.
2183. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Re: Cuba. While new Soviet texts need important revisions, we believe basic idea of short agreed declarations by US and USSR in SC plus fuller unagreed statements, either in SC or outside, has much to commend it. We do not believe, however, we should agree to Cuba making an agreed declaration (as Soviet position implies) since this would complicate negotiations greatly and provide status as third party which we have refused for good reasons so far. Cuba would of course make unagreed statement on same basis as US and USSR. We should ask USSR to provide US copy in advance to assure it will not be too obnoxious.
This procedure would meet objective of closing up transaction on relatively harmonious note, and thus maintaining momentum for possible subsequent agreements on other subjects, while at same time giving us freedom of action to say what needs be said on matters which are not agreed. Since Cubans, and, we suspect, Soviets, will be making their unagreed statements in SC rather than outside, US should be prepared to do likewise.
What would seem to us at first reading to be most important to correct in Soviet draft declaration would be (1) too narrow definition of weapons which will not be reintroduced, and (2) indications that "parties concerned", including both Soviets and Cuba, will continue negots for "normalizing" situation in Caribbean and (3) lack ref to Khrushchev-Kennedy letters. Second observation applies a fortiori to last para Soviet draft res.
We would much prefer end SC exercise with consensus statement by SC Pres, though Soviets have so far insisted this is not enough. Believe we should argue this point, possibly being willing concede to res in last analysis, trading this for satisfactory substance.
If we accept short declaration idea, we could presumably relegate to our separate unagreed statement in SC some of points to which Sovs object, such as references to overflights and Sov military personnel. However others, such as provisos attached to non-invasion assurance, as well as ref to treaty obligations, would have to be retained in our agreed declaration.
We are preparing redrafts of US and USSR agreed declarations, US unilateral statement, and consensus statement and will forward them later today./1/
/1/Document 237.
Stevenson
236. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)
Washington, December 7, 1962, 1:54 p.m.
//Source: Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office Files, Secretary of Defense's Cable Files, Cuba, December 1962. Top Secret. Repeated to the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Commander of the Air Forces, Atlantic, and Commander of Army, Atlantic.
7742. Ref: CINCLANT message DTG 021702Z Nov 62./1/
/1/This telegram, not found, was apparently a request for planning for the use of nuclear weapons.
1. The JCS concur that planning should proceed for employment of nuclear weapons for limited war operations in the Cuban area.
2. In developing these plans the application of force must be selective and discriminating in relation to the objective to be achieved. Collateral damage to nonmilitary facilities and population casualties will be held to a minimum consistent with military necessity.
3. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
4. In view of the above, the recommendations contained in paragraph
3 of reference message are approved for planning purposes. Request
the JCS be advised promptly of any case where these limitations
with respect to weapon yield or height of burst prevent the accomplishment
of the military objectives.
237. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, December 7, 1962, 8 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-762. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House at 8:35 p.m. December 7 and to principal officers of the Executive Committee.
2189. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba.
1. Following are preliminary (A) US draft declaration, (B) revised Sov declaration, (C) elements of supplementary US statement including essentially sections taken out of present text US declaration, and (D) draft consensus statement by SC Pres in accordance mytel 2183./1/
/1/Document 235.
2. In its proposal of last night USSR is in effect asking us to agree that they have now fulfilled all of their undertakings therefore that US assurance should be categorical, and to maximize future obligation of US through SC res that would transform our assurance into decision of SC.
3. To achieve these purposes they suppress references to exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev in preference for references to subsequent agreements worked out in negotiations, thus eliminating all reference in their statement to verification; they also seek to revise our declaration to imply that verification has been complied with. They also are seeking to write Cuba into picture as much as possible, including support for future negotiations on "normalization" of Caribbean. Sov draft res, by approving declarations, but with no notice taken of supplemental statements would leave us in difficult future situation on overflights, Sov military personnel in Cuba and other problems.
4. It seems to us our objective should continue to be to draw line under current crisis but only on contingent basis, and retain statement in our declaration that USSR has not fulfilled all undertakings which is justification for our continued overflights and for qualifications we place on no invasion assurance. For same reason we should keep SC action to minimum possible. Draft consensus statement we have prepared therefore is only expression of attitude of SC and not of approval or decision.
5. We have also deleted references in Sov declaration and in res to continued negotiations to normalize situation in Caribbean. We have done this on assumption USSR means Castro's five points and that negotiations on political settlement in Caribbean is unacceptable either with Russians or with Cubans. In light size and sophistication Sov military presence, which apparently will continue in Cuba even after present crisis is settled, however, we may want to consider whether further negotiations of some sort around this issue might be foreshadowed. If so some appropriate wording might go into our "statement".
(A) US draft declaration
In letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962,/2/ firm undertakings were made regarding the settlement of the Cuban crisis.
/2/See Documents 95, 102, and 104.
In connection therewith the United States notes the declaration of the Soviet Union today that all weapons, on which agreement was reached in accordance with the undertaking, have been removed from Cuba and returned to the Soviet Union and that the sites have been dismantled. The United States notes further the declaration of the USSR that no weapons of this nature, that is, offensive weapons systems, will be introduced by the USSR in the territory of the Republic of Cuba. We welcome these assurances.
While the undertakings that the United Nations would be enabled to verify the removal of missiles and bombers and the destruction of sites and that suitable United Nations safeguards would be agreed upon to ensure against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use have not been capable of being fulfilled, a procedure was arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which the United States has verified that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried away the number of missiles and IL-28 bombers which the USSR certified as having been in Cuba.
In view of the substantial steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union in implementation of the undertakings and in the hope that a termination of the present crisis will lead toward progress on other issues:
The United States on its part, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, and the United States further gives assurance that, provided no nuclear weapons and no offensive weapons systems are present in or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not commit aggressive acts against any nation of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at this press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.
The undertakings stated herein do not alter or impair the rights and obligations under all existing treaties to which the United States is a party.
(B) Revised Soviet declaration
Being guided by the interests of strengthening peace throughout the world and seeking to conclude peaceful settlement of the dangerous crisis in the Caribbean according to undertakings reached in letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev on October 28, 1962;
Taking into consideration that on November 20, 1962 the Government of the United States suspended the quarantine it introduced on October 23, 1962 regarding the ships bound for the Republic of Cuba;
Taking further into consideration the statement of the United States Government as contained in its declaration of (blank) 1962 to the effect that the United States will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba;
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states the following:
1. All weapons regarding the dismantling and withdrawal of which from Cuba agreement was reached in accordance with the undertakings between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, have, with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, by this time been removed from Cuba and returned to the Soviet Union, and all the sites dismantled.
2. Weapons of this nature shall not in the future be introduced by the USSR into Cuba.
(C) Elements of supplementary US statement
The undertakings to which this declaration refers were stated in President Kennedy's letter of October 27 along the following lines:
1. The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
2. The United States would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(A) to remove promptly the quarantine measure now in effect, and (B) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The President also expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.
In addition to the removal of those weapons systems capable of offensive use to which I have already referred, the US takes note of the stated intention of the USSR to withdraw all military units and personnel placed in Cuba for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems.
The United States regrets that the undertakings for United Nations verification of the removal of missiles and bombers and destruction of sites, and for suitable United Nations safeguards against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use have not been capable of being fulfilled. In the absence of such fulfillment the United States will employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary to ensure that no such weapons are present or introduced into Cuba.
We earnestly trust that this session of the Security Council marks the achievement of a peaceful solution of the crisis caused by the introduction of offensive weapons systems into Cuba, and that the door to a solution of other outstanding problems might now be opened.
[The United States will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall one day be truly free.]/3/
/3/Brackets in the source text.
(Other elements might have to be added after we see Soviet and Cuban statements. Last para suggested on assumption their statements would necessitate it.)
(D) Draft consensus statement
The President and the Security Council:
Members will have taken note of the declaration and statements made by the representatives of the United States of America, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with respect to the Cuban crisis which gave rise to the Security Council meeting of October 23, 1962, as well as the statements of the Secretary General, and by members of the Council and Cuba.
I am confident that all members of the Council will join me in an expression of satisfaction that the crisis the world has recently faced in the Caribbean has been terminated through direct negotiations with the active participation of the Secretary General, and of earnest hope that the door is now open to the solution of other outstanding problems.
Stevenson
238. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
Washington, December 8, 1962, 11 a.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 242, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.
G: My reaction to this latest set of messages from New York/1/ has not been one of immediately going along with it.
/1/Apparent reference to Documents 235 and 237.
GB: No, I think it is terrible. It seems to me they have gone directly contrary to what we agreed at the Ex Com meeting also. As a matter of fact, there is a message in from the President to that effect--which Brom Smith was going to pass on to you./2/
/2/No written record of this message has been found.
G: He called me.
GB: He had already drawn up over here, even before we got these messages down, some instructions/3/ which attempted, based on our conversation with McCloy, that said in effect since the Soviet Union is taking this line which means watering down what we feel are essential reservations and trying to get them out in a way where they wouldn't be nearly effective that we just can't buy this and that a move ought to be made now to fold this up as quickly as possible on a basis of unagreed statements, preferably filed with the Security Council. There are really three possibilities: (1) is unagreed statements filed with the Security Council; (2) a meeting of the SC in which these statements would be made orally; and (3) nothing done in the SC but simply to go back to a press statement and reaffirmation. Of those three the first is the one we would strongly support.
/3/Apparent reference to a draft telegram to USUN, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) See the Supplement.
G: I would also choose in that order.
GB: What we think is the meeting of the SC is not a good idea. I would take one and three against two, because the meeting of the SC would almost certainly mean the Cubans would come in and it would be out of control. I would propose to try to get out this afternoon to the Ex-Com some suggested draft instructions in the hope that those could be the subject for the discussion at the meeting Monday afternoon./4/ Stevenson is coming down for the meeting because he is going to a concert in Washington that night. I don't think McCloy will be here; but I think we just have to go ahead.
/4/See Document 241.
G: There is no doubt about it all. I was rather surprised, because I thought Jack was so clear that no matter what happened to put in the proviso about overflights and that if we couldn't make any progress with the Soviets on restatement with the changes he had in mind, we would go on other basis. I know he is getting impatient and wants to get back into law practice.
GB: I can well understand his feeling, and I think he would like to feel he had folded the thing up now. Any normal good workman would in a situation like this.
G: Sure. We all like to draw lines under things, but this is one where I don't think we're doing any good for ourselves.
GB: I agree. And this is the line which Dean [Rusk] and I are prepared to take, and if it meets with your and Bob's [McNamara] approval, then we will try to circulate something so that you will get it Monday morning./5/
/5/See Document 239.
G: I am sure from a conversation with Bob that he agrees with
me. Bob is leaving Monday night and will be there Monday afternoon.
239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, December 8, 1962, 7:23 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/12-862. Top Secret. Drafted and approved by Cleveland.
MISUN 22. Eyes only Stevenson, McCloy and Yost from Cleveland. Following is draft instruction, approved by George Ball, which is being circulated this weekend for consideration by NSC Executive Committee Monday afternoon:
"For Stevenson and McCloy.
1. We have carefully studied report of your meeting with Kuznetsov Dec 6 (urtel 2178),/1/ text suggested Soviet draft declaration and resolution (urtel 2179),/2/ and your suggestions in urtel 2189./3/
/1/Document 233.
/2/Document 234.
/3/Document 237.
2. It emerges clearly that Soviets will not agree to procedure in Security Council which would associate them in any way with our determination continue overflights in absence acceptable international verification arrangements to assure against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Numerous Soviet objections to our declaration, unacceptable Cuban declaration, and Soviet rejection our final position on US declaration all attest to this.
3. We believe there is no further advantage to us in attempting reach for 'agreed' statements by further modification of our position, or by prolonging further an essentially sterile negotiating process. Soviet tactics seem clearly designed to obtain formal US and Security Council acceptance of concept that Khrushchev has fully discharged his obligations under agreement reached in exchange of letters with President October 27, which of course he has not. In addition Soviets obviously hope to squeeze out one more drop of blood from us in form of elaboration of non-invasion guarantee.
4. As far as we are concerned, the bargain on Cuba has already been struck on the basis defined in the President's November 20 press conference statement. In return for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles and IL-28's, we have lifted the quarantine. We have also made the declaration of non-invasion in President's press conference of November 20. We do not intend to go any further on substance without acceptable safeguards arrangements assuring compliance with Soviet promise not to reintroduce offensive weapons systems into Cuba, which have not been obtained and may be unobtainable.
5. Proposal (urtel 2189) to have Security Council meeting at which agreed material would be expressed in agreed statements, and disagreed material would be expressed separately in disagreed statements, does not appear to be an exit from this box. If differentiation between two kinds of declarations, agreed and disagreed, is designed to be a matter of substance--that is, if agreed declarations thereby acquire more standing than the disagreed declarations--then it would obviously be very bad from US standpoint to declare our intention to continue air surveillance in a manner which accords it only second-class dignity. If, on other hand, the split into two different kinds of declarations is intended to be merely matter of form, then there is no point in having two different kinds of declarations.
6. Accordingly, you should seek meeting with Kuznetsov with a view to settling on one of the following procedures for wrap-up. Procedures are listed in order of strong preference:
(a) Unagreed statements are filed by US and USSR with SYG, who will distribute them to members of SC for information.
(b) Unagreed statements are made by US and USSR separately in whatever public manner they choose. (Ours would be at a Presidential press conference or in statement issued by White House.)
(c) Meeting of SC at which unagreed statements are made by US and USSR.
7. In none of these cases should a Cuban declaration be a part of the scenario. Disadvantage of SC meeting is that it would be impossible not to seat Cuba or to permit Cuban Representative to be heard, presumably at length, on all sorts of matters that are not germane to understanding between the President and Khrushchev. If SC route were taken, Soviets would have to agree at minimum not to take up cudgels on behalf Cuba. This would enable Cuban speech to be made, but not other member of SC would comment on it and it would not be regarded as part of IR-USSR discussion.
8. One tactical question remains: If we are sufficiently sure Soviets would turn down proposal in urtel 2189, it has been suggested that it be given to Soviets on take-it-or-leave-it basis, in order to demonstrate that reasonable terms for agreed declarations are not obtainable. But since we would not ourselves want to get into the double-declaration procedure for reasons outlined above, we do not believe it is desirable to make the offer."
Rusk
240. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone
Washington, December 10, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III. Secret.
We should soon reach a decision regarding the use of Cuban exiles in broadcasts beamed to Cuba. The following is suggested for your consideration.
On the assumption that United States policy toward Cuba will continue to be one of exerting economic pressures and making Soviet support as expensive as possible, it is recommended that Cuban exile broadcasts urging economic sabotage and passive resistance could play a valuable role. This recommendation also assumes that CIA can exercise a certain guidance and control over these broadcasts.
The following considerations would be involved in such a program:
1. The Cuban individuals and groups doing the speaking should be carefully selected for their reputation and credibility with the people in Cuba. Students should do the speaking to students; labor leaders to labor, teachers to teachers, etc.
2. The Cuban audience should be urged to act with care and cautioned against open rebellion. The program would be based upon work slowdowns, purposeful inefficiency, purposeful waste, and relatively safe forms of sabotage. Specific examples of the activities urged would be putting glass and nails on the highways, leaving water running in public buildings, putting sand in machinery, wasting electricity, taking sick leave from work, damaging sugar stalks during the harvest, etc.
3. The program would be strictly attributable to the Cuban exiles with no open participation by USIA or other government agencies. If real results were achieved, the Voice of America could report these as evidence of opposition to the Castro regime through interviews with refugees and extracts from letters.
The advantages of such a program would be: 1) it would lend direct support to the U.S. economic pressures; 2) provide the Cuban exile community, now straining at the bit in inactivity, an outlet for their energies with a potential for real accomplishment; and 3) give the opposition inside Cuba a purposeful line of action not tied to open revolt./1/
/1/In a December 11 memorandum to Murrow, McCone replied that in light of the discussion at the Executive Committee meeting (see Documents 241 and 242) the CIA would resume non-attributable Cuban exile radio broadcasts on or about December 14. (Kennedy Library National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III)
Edward R. Murrow
241. Summary Record of the 34th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, December 10, 1962, 5:40 p.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 33-37, 12/4/62-12/17/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 7:12 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)
There was a general discussion on how to bring the New York negotiations on Cuba to an acceptable conclusion. Two papers were circulated--a UN plan and a Washington plan./1/
/1/Apparently a reference to Documents 234 and 239.
Ambassador Stevenson reported that the Soviet proposals had been put in at the same time as ours. He handed to the President a paper listing the advantages and disadvantages of several courses of action./2/ He urged that a Security Council session be called so that the Security Council could be put on notice by means of an unagreed U.S. statement of our intention to overfly Cuba.
/2/Not found.
Mr. McCloy said that there was not much difference in the procedural recommendations but he preferred we try to get one statement agreed with the Russians and disagreed statements from both the U.S. and the USSR. He felt it was better to give one agreed statement and then file our own views in a separate document.
The President said the key part of any statement is the no-invasion assurance. If we could put in no more than a reference to the November 20th press conference statement, this would be acceptable.
Secretary Rusk suggested that both sides make a full statement in the Security Council, revealing their differences, and then introduce a separate paper containing agreed sentences.
Under Secretary Ball argued that we were not anxious to end the Cuban affair because the Cuban problem will continue to be with us. The Soviet military presence remains in Cuba.
Ambassador Thompson argued for a prompt agreement in New York. He thought an agreement would make it easier for Khrushchev to remove the remaining Soviet troops.
Secretary Rusk noted that all we were doing was ending the offensive weapons phase of the problem. The Cuban problem is still with us.
The President asked why we had to take the overflights problem into the Security Council. Mr. McCloy replied that we must cover our no-invasion pledge by stating the exception, i.e., our continuance of overflights. Secretary Rusk noted that the Rio Treaty makes our overflights legal, as spelled out in the OAS Resolution.
Ambassador Stevenson predicted that the Russians would reject our statement, but we should go back to them again and discuss it. Mr. McCloy agreed. If the Russians again rejected our position, then we could go the route of filing separate statements.
Secretary Rusk said it was important to us in Latin America and for our domestic public to get out our full statement. Once we have done this the Soviets could point out what they disagree with.
Ambassador Stevenson read the statement which the Security Council President hoped we and the Russians could accept./3/ The President called attention to the implication that the Cuban crisis was over. He preferred more general language. Mr. Bundy said that if the Soviet presence in Cuba was important to us, we do not want to draw a line under the crisis. How can we give no-invasion assurances if the Soviet miliary presence remains in Cuba? The President said we do not want to have the Soviets restating our no-invasion statement. Ambassador Stevenson reviewed his position again, calling attention to his telegram and noting that the Soviets expect to conclude the Cuban negotiations in the UN.
/3/U Thant's statement has not been found.
Secretary Rusk said we should be careful not to paper over our disagreement. Our agreement with the Russians is not real. Mr. Ball noted that if a Security Council meeting were held, the Cubans would be given a chance to voice their complaints.
The President favored Secretary Rusk's plan. We should try to get our statement out. We and the Russians could file disagreed statements. We should avoid a Security Council meeting and we should abandon any attempt to get a consensus in the Security Council because this would be misleading.
Secretary Rusk said that others might try to force us into the Security Council, but they might not if they know we will be unable to agree with the Russians. We might tell Kuznetsov that no agreed statement was possible.
Mr. McCloy said that we cannot throw out entirely Kuznetsov's plan. He urged that we try again to get an agreement with the Russians.
The President said our best position is to go for separate statements filing it with the UN, but without a Security Council meeting. The least desirable position is a Security Council meeting. We could live with agreed/disagreed statements without a Council meeting.
Secretary Rusk suggested that we do not break up the negotiations this week during the plenary session of the Communist Presidium in Moscow. Mr. McCloy hoped that we could record an agreement and Ambassador Stevenson said that if we told the Russians we could not agree on a statement with them, the Russians would not want a Security Council meeting. He said we could create a mood of trying to reach an agreement.
The President expressed his concern that the OAS States and the domestic public opinion, including Congressional opinion, will exert great pressure on the Government in the next few months. We must not go too far down the line of no-invasion assurances. We may have a showdown with the Russians later. We will be going no place on Berlin. Thus, there may be a difference of view among those in New York thinking of the UN climate and those in Washington who are looking at our overall relations with the Russians.
Mr. McCloy said the negotiations in New York would have an effect on worldwide problems.
There followed further discussion of what our position should be in New York. Ambassador Stevenson summarized his view again and Secretary Rusk made clear that our position was to discuss our proposal as well as theirs. The President concluded the discussion by saying we could discuss the Russian plan but we should keep the negotiations out of the Security Council.
In response to a request by Mr. Murrow, the President authorized CIA, in coordination with USIA on policy matters, to resume broadcasts by Cuban refugees on transmitters under Agency contract. Such broadcasts had been forbidden during the earlier phase of the missile crisis./4/
/4/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting stating that there was discussion on how to bring the negotiations in New York to an acceptable conclusion and a decision by the President to resume broadcasts by Cuban refugees to Cuba. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62) See the Supplement.
Bromley Smith/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
242. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, December 10, 1962, 5:30 p.m.
//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Executive Committee Meeting--10 Dec 1962--5:30 p.m.
All Present plus Stevenson and McCloy
McCone covered most recent intelligence, indicating no developments, intense study of photography was continuing and then reported on the telegram covering the interview with Ricardo Nunez (IN 32394),/1/ reading and emphasizing the underlined portions. McCone then pointed out to the Committee that Guantanamo involved 7,000 officers and enlisted men, replacement value of $400 million whereas in current estimates the Soviets had 12,000 officers, enlisted men and technicians and equipment valued in excess of a billion and it appeared very logical to answer the arguments about Guantanamo by emphasizing that the real occupier and the real military threat to Cuba is the Soviets, not the U.S. Note: We should consider ways and means of playing this up on radio and further news media.
/1/Not further identified.
There followed a long discussion which involved a sharp difference between Rusk, Ball, Johnson and Martin on one hand and Stevenson and McCloy on the other as to negotiating procedures to be followed in attempting to reach a sign-off arrangement with Kuznetsov. Stevenson and McCloy wished to take our statement and the Soviets' and attempt to draft a statement in which the areas of agreement were pointed out, and in a second chapter, the areas of disagreement would be set forth. The consensus was that this would be a wrong procedure; that it would down-grade the importance of on-site inspection and continued aerial inspection and it would be misunderstood by the public and Latin American states and therefore was undesirable. The President expressed himself as favoring a presentation of our position with a unilateral presentation by the Soviets with their position (there was some indication that an attempt would be made to reach agreement on these two statements in advance of their publication), and let the Secretary General or the public reach their own conclusions as to where the areas of agreement and disagreement lie. At the end of almost two hours of discussion the disagreement seemed to prevail and, although attempts were made to reconcile the differing opinion, it was my conclusion that in the actual execution of the agreement or the talks with Kuznetsov in the next couple of days there will evolve a procedure favored by Stevenson and McCloy and opposed by the Secretary of State.
Mr. Murrow brought up the question of resuming the clandestine radio broadcasts which had been sponsored by CIA and carried on by the Cuban refugee community. He pointed out to the President that these efforts had been "stood down" following the October 22nd speech and during the complicated negotiations. He strongly recommended that they be reinstituted. The President and the Executive Committee approved and instructed CIA to reinstitute the broadcasts or to permit the Cuban refugee groups to go right ahead. Action: CIA should act upon this question at once and should report to me as to the actions taken so that I in turn can report to the President.
Note: In the evening at the White House I discussed the meeting with the President and the Attorney General. Both were amused by the argument but obviously somewhat disturbed that such a difference should be brought before the Executive Committee. Undoubtedly the President "heard" Stevenson because of recent publicity. I continue to be concerned over the danger of placing undue reliance on photography. We seem to be drifting into a frame of mind that high-level photography is all we need, that it will show everything that must be seen, that it is preferable to on-site inspection, that really on-site inspection is undesirable because it would be impartially conducted and the institution of it would automatically end over-flights and that there is little to be gained from low over-flights.
I wish General Carter and appropriate members of the staff to consider this very seriously and to discuss it at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NRO to be sure that we are not becoming overly dependent upon aerial photography and so run the risk of making a serious error. I would like this taken up at once and reported back not later than Monday, December 17th. Also I would like to personally discuss this with the Joint Chiefs and the President prior to leaving for the West Coast on December 21st.
John A. McCone/2/
Director
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Washington, December 11, 1962, 7:59 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by McGeorge Bundy.
1593. Eyes Only Stevenson and McCloy.
1. We have carefully studied report of your meeting with Kuznetsov Dec. 6 (urtel 2178),/1/ text suggested Soviet draft declaration and resolution (urtel 2179),/2/ and your suggestions in urtel 2189./3/
/1/Document 233.
/2/Document 234.
/3/Document 237.
2. You are authorized to seek the agreement of Kuznetsov to the following text of a joint report to be made to the SYG:
"As a result of the exchange of communications between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers on October 27-28 arising out of the recent Cuban crisis, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union wish to make the following report to the Secretary General of the United Nations:
The Soviet Union has stated that it has dismantled all missiles in Cuba which it caused to be erected or was in the course of erecting for the purpose of launching nuclear missiles from Cuba and has removed from Cuba all such missiles which it introduced into Cuba, as well as all the components of such missiles and their launching apparatus. The Soviet Union, in cooperation with the United States, arranged a procedure whereby substantial verification was afforded the United States of the fact that 42 missiles, which the Soviet Union declared was the total number of such missiles introduced into Cuba, have in fact been removed from that island.
The Soviet Union likewise has stated that it has removed 42 IL-28 bombers from Cuba, that being the total of such bombers which the Soviet Union states it introduced into Cuba, and the Soviet Union has made possible a similar means of identification by the United States of the fact that 42 such bombers were in fact removed.
The Soviet Union has also stated that it has removed all nuclear weapons which it previously introduced into Cuba, as well as the components of such weapons.
In connection with the removal of the above-mentioned missiles, bombers, and nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has stated that it will not reintroduce into Cuba those or other weapons systems of a similar or comparable offensive character. The United States has, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine which it imposed around the island of Cuba on October 24, 1962. This has been done upon the basis of the statements and acts of the Soviet Union above referred to./4/
/4/In telegram 2291 from USUN, December 12, the Mission reported it made several drafting changes in the preceding paragraphs in the interests of shortening the text before submitting it to Kuznetsov. The changes did not affect the substance. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1262) See the Supplement.
It was contemplated by the above mentioned exchange of letters between the President and the Chairman that there would be created an effective system of international inspection on the island of Cuba so as to verify the dismantling of the sites and the removal of the above-mentioned weapons, as well as to provide safeguards against the further maintenance and introduction of such weapons in Cuba. Apart from the verification procedures above mentioned, it has not been possible thus far to effect an international verification system on the ground, particularly one such as would provide the safeguards against the future maintenance and introduction of such weapons in the island of Cuba.
The President of the United States has stated in his press conference of November 20 that it was not the intention of the United States to invade Cuba provided all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in future, and provided Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.
The President of the United States reaffirms his previous statement in this regard and repeats his assurances that the United States has no intention either to invade or support an invasion of Cuba on the above conditions. In reaffirming the President's statement and the assurances referred to above, the United States wishes to make it clear, however, that, pending the installation of an adequate system of international or other effective verification on the island of Cuba to insure against the maintenance and reintroduction of such weapons and weapons systems into Cuba, it intends to employ all necessary means of observation and verification of its own in order to insure against this eventuality.
The Soviet Union, believing that it has substantially complied with the spirit of the exchange of communications between the President and the Chairman above referred to, believes that any further inspection, observation or verification is unnecessary and unjustified, but with this position the United States cannot agree.
Nothing herein contained in any way affects the rights and obligations of any treaty or existing agreements to which either the United States of America or the Soviet Union is a party.
The President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union express the hope that the action taken by the United States and the Soviet Union following the above mentioned exchange of communications to avert the threat of war arising from the Cuban situation will lead to further constructive negotiations between the two countries to adjust the differences existing between them and generally to lessen the tensions which might induce further danger of war."
3. It is hoped that, in negotiating this, it would be possible for you to obtain affirmation, even though not expressed in the above text, of the Soviet intention to remove all Soviet military units from Cuba.
4. This supersedes draft instructions contained Deptel 1580./5/
/5/Telegram 1580 to USUN not seen by the President, authorized Stevenson and McCloy, as a negotiating tactic, to discuss the Soviet proposal for unagreed statements incorporated into a single document with equal status. It informed the mission the United States could not agree to a Security Council resolution and would prefer to avoid a consensus statement, and that Stevenson and McCloy should not agree to a consensus statement without further instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662)
Ball
244. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy
Moscow, December 11, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. III-C, 11/28/62-12/30/62. No classification marking, but the Department of State classified the message Top Secret and Eyes Only. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163) A note on the source text indicated that copies were sent to Ball, Thompson, Robert Kennedy, and U Alexis Johnson. This document was sent to the Soviet Embassy at 2:15 Moscow time, December 10. (Problems of Communism, Special Edition, Spring 1992, p. 60)
Dear Mr. President, It would seem that you and we have come now to a final stage in the elimination of tension around Cuba. Our relations are already entering now their formal course since all those means placed by us on the Cuban territory which you considered offensive are withdrawn and you ascertained that to which effect a statement was already made by your side.
That is good. We appreciate that you just as we approached not dogmatically the solution of the question of eliminating the tension which evolved and this enabled us under existing conditions to find also a more flexible form of verification of the withdrawal of the above mentioned means. Understanding and flexibility displayed by you in this matter are highly appreciated by us though our criticism of American imperialism remains in force because that conflict was indeed created by the policy of the United States with regard to Cuba.
More resolute steps should be taken now to move towards finalizing the elimination of this tension, i.e. you on your part should clearly confirm at the U.N. as you did at your press conference and in your messages to me the pledge of non-invasion of Cuba by the United States and your allies having removed reservations which are being introduced now into the U.S. draft declaration in the Security Council and our representatives in New York should come to terms with regard to an agreed wording in the declarations of both powers of the commitments undertaken by them.
I believe that you already had an opportunity to familiarize yourself with the text proposed by us/1/ of a brief declaration of the Soviet Government in which the Soviet Union's main commitments resulting from the exchange of messages between us are formulated. We proceed from the assumption that an analogous brief declaration should be made by the U.S. Government and that the main U.S. commitments resulting from the exchange of messages will also be fixed in it. Have a look, Mr. President, at this proposal submitted by us through your representatives in New York.
/1/See Document 234.
But notwithstanding what the agreement on the concrete texts of our declarations at this concluding stage will be, anyway the basic goal has been achieved and tension removed. I will tell you frankly that we have removed our means from Cuba relying on your assurance that the United States and its allies will not invade Cuba. Those means really had the purpose of defending the sovereignty of Cuba and therefore after your assurance they lost their purpose. We hope and we would like to believe--I spoke of that publicly too, as you know--that you will adhere to the commitments which you have taken, as strictly as we do with regard to our commitments. We, Mr. President, have already fulfilled our commitments concerning the removal of our missiles and IL-28 planes from Cuba and we did it even ahead of time. It is obvious that fulfillment by you of your commitments cannot be as clearly demonstrated as it was done by us since your commitments are of a long-term nature. But it is important to fulfill them and to do everything so that no doubts are sown from the very start that they will not be fulfilled. I already told you at one time that our friends especially those of them who regard us with certain lack of understanding are trying to convince us that imperialism cannot be trusted, that is that you cannot be trusted, as a representative of such capitalist state as the United States of America.
It goes without saying that you and I have different understanding of these questions. I shall not go into details as to what my understanding is because in this regard you and I cannot have common opinion since we are people representing different political poles. But there are things that require common understanding on both sides and such common understanding is possible and even necessary. This is what I would like to tell you about.
Within a short period of time we and you have lived through a rather acute crisis. The acuteness of it was that we and you were already prepared to fight and this would lead to a thermonuclear war. Yes, to a thermonuclear world war with all its dreadful consequences. We took it into account and, being convinced that mankind would never forgive the statesmen who would not exhaust all possibilities to prevent catastrophe, agreed to a compromise although we understood--and we state it now--that your claims had no grounds whatsoever, had no legal basis and represented a manifestation of sheer arbitrariness in international affairs. We agreed to a compromise because our main purpose was to extend a helping hand to the Cuban people in order to exclude the possibility of invasion of Cuba so that Cuba could exist and develop as a free sovereign state. This is our main purpose today, it remains to be our main purpose for tomorrow and we did not and do not pursue any other purposes.
Therefore, Mr. President, everything--the stability in this area and not only in this area but in the entire world--depends on how you will now fulfill the commitments taken by you. Furthermore, it will be now a sort of litmus paper, an indicator whether it is possible to trust if similar difficulties arise in other geographical areas. I think you will agree that if our arrangement for settling the Cuban crisis fails it will undermine a possibility for manoeuvre which you and we would resort to for elimination of danger, a possibility for compromise in the future if similar difficulties arise in other areas of the world, and they really can arise. We attach great significance to all this, and subsequent development will depend on you as President and on the U.S. Government.
We believe that the guarantees for non-invasion of Cuba given by you will be maintained and not only in the period of your stay in the White House, that, to use an expression, goes without saying. We believe that you will be able to receive a mandate at the next election too, that is that you will be the U.S. President for six years, which would appeal to us. At our times, six years in world politics is a long period of time and during that period we could create good conditions for peaceful coexist-ence on earth and this would be highly appreciated by the peoples of our countries as well as by all other peoples.
Therefore, Mr. President, I would like to express a wish that you follow the right way, as we do, in appraising the situation. Now it is of special importance to provide for the possibility of an exchange of opinion through confidential channels which you and I have set up and which we use. But the confidential nature of our personal relations will depend on whether you fulfill--as we did--the commitments taken by you and give instructions to your representatives in New York to formalize these commitments in appropriate documents. This is needed in order that all the peoples be sure that tension in the Caribbean is a matter of yesterday and that now normal conditions have been really created in the world. And for this it is necessary to fix the assumed commitments in the documents of both sides and register them with the United Nations.
You, Mr. President, do not want to agree with the five conditions put forward by Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba Fidel Castro./2/ But, indeed, these five principles correspond fully to the provisions of the United Nations Charter which is a legal basis for the relations among states, a sort of foundation for securing peace and peaceful coexistence. I will tell you frankly that such position of yours is surprising. Maybe you have some difficulties. But, Mr. President, we who occupy such responsible position in the world and who are endowed with high trust, have to overcome those difficulties. The peoples will appreciate that because for them it means insuring lasting peace on earth.
In Prime Minister Castro's letter to U Thant, October 28; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Document, 1962, pp. 447-448. 2
I would like to express to you my disapproval of certain things. We read now various articles by your columnists and correspondents and we are concerned that in those articles they are widely commenting on the confidential exchange of opinion and it is being done by the people who as it would seem have no relation to confidential channels set up between us. Judging by the contents of these articles it is clear that their authors are well informed and we get an impression that this is not a result of an accidental leak of the confidential information but a result of benevolence for those people into whose hands gets the information they make public. This evidently is done for the purpose of informing the public in a one-sided way.
Frankly speaking, if we use the confidential communications this way, it will be far from facilitating confidence in those channels. You yourself realize that if your side begins to act in the way that our exchange of opinion by way of confidential channels will leak through fingers these channels will cease to be of use and may even cause harm. But this is up to you. If you consider that those channels have outlived themselves and are of no use any longer, then we also will draw appropriate conclusions in this respect. I tell you this straightforwardly and I would like to know your opinion on this matter. I have been denouncing American imperialism. But on the other hand I consider it useful for us to continue to maintain the possibility of confidential exchange of opinion because a minimum of personal trust is necessary for leading statesmen of both countries and this corresponds to the interests of our countries and peoples, to the interests of peace all over the world.
Let us, Mr. President, eliminate promptly the consequences of the Cuban crisis and get down to solving other questions, and we have them in number. [Here follows portions of the letter dealing with the test ban and the German question; for text, see volume VI, Document 83.]
Please, excuse me for my straightforwardness and frankness but I believe as before that a frank and straightforward exchange of opinion is needed to avoid the worst.
Please, convey to your wife and your whole family wishes of good health from myself, my wife and my entire family./3/
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
245. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, December 12, 1962, 8 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1262. Top Secret. Priority.
2292. Dept pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Cuba. Fol is report of three-hour mtg this afternoon Stevenson, McCloy and Yost with Kuznetsov, Mendelevich and Counselor of Sov Emb in Washington./1/
/1/According to a 16-page memorandum of conversation, the meeting took place at the Soviet delegation headquarters and lasted from 2:30 to 5:45 p.m. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1B December/January Meetings) Passed to the White House at 9:30 p.m. December 12.
Our impression was that Sovs firmly rejected single joint document on grounds (1) that it contains certain elements, particularly provisos on our no-invasion assurance and reference to overflights, to which they cannot in any form lend their name, and (2) that Cubans would not be participants in this declaration. Sovs continued to express strong preference for SC mtg to terminate affair but we had feeling that this position not unshakable and that they might ultimately agree to filing separate declarations with SYG.
Stevenson opened meeting by saying that he thought it was in interest of both sides to reach maximum possible agreement and to demonstrate to public that we are doing so. To this end it seemed preferable to us, after further consideration, to present single agreed declaration signed by both parties than separate declarations. It also seemed decidedly preferable to us to submit such declaration to SYG for transmittal to SC Pres rather than to present declarations at SC mtg. It seemed to us inevitable that latter would result in controversy and recriminations and would tend to destroy the effects of partial agreements which we had reached.
McCloy continued by saying that he had just discussed problem thoroughly with President and Secretary and that it is President's desire to end this affair by stressing note of agreement rather than of disagreement. Therefore we have drawn up single document in which agreements and disagreements are equally frankly stated though fact that there is but one document strengthens impression of overall agreement. If there were too many documents, one or two Sov, one or two US and a Cuban, chance of misinterpretation and confusion in public mind would be great. He too stressed dangers involved in SC meeting which we might not be able to control and in which Cubans as well as some SC members would become involved in acrimonious controversy.
McCloy pointed out following major points omitted from Sov draft declaration which we felt must be included: (1) Indication agreement between President and Khrushchev on verification and future safeguards have not been fulfilled, (2) provisos attached to our non-invasion assurance, and (3) our determination to apply own means of verification pending agreement on international arrangements. He also rejected implication in Sov drafts that we are entering into an agreement with Cubans to normalize our relations with them. He then went over draft joint declaration transmitted Deptel 1593 modified as indicated ourtel 2291,/2/ emphasizing that, while this draft based on instructions from Washington, it is informal document prepared here and was passed to Sovs at this time as illustrative rather than final text.
/2/See Document 243 and footnote 4 thereto.
McCloy emphasized President's strong feeling that agreed and disagreed elements of our position must have same status and adduced this as further reason for single, joint document or at least single document on each side. He said Cubans could of course file separate declaration if they wished and, if it were not too provocative, we might not have to reply. If there should however be SC meeting in which Cubans spoke there would almost certainly be LA and probably US replies, Sovs would support Cuba, whole history of Cuban crisis would be rehashed and atmosphere of agreement would be destroyed.
In conclusion McCloy made two points (1) that we would wish to include in joint declaration before it was finally approved paragraph in regard to withdrawal Sov military units, and (2) that if we cannot agree on joint declaration and have to file separate declarations we would probably wish to go back in some cases to language used in our earlier drafts.
Kuznetsov replied that he would of course report our new proposal to his govt but that he was convinced idea of single document would not be acceptable. You have your problems, he said, but you should also take ours into account. If there is joint declaration without Cuba, this will not be understood. If there is to be joint declaration it must be on behalf of all three govts. Stevenson and McCloy interjected that this would be entirely unacceptable to US.
Kuznetsov continued by stating that, though our joint draft contained some changes in wording and some new paragraphs, it still contains many points with which Soviet Union does not agree. It would be impossible for Sovs to put their signature on this document since our viewpoints on certain elements differ radically. He claimed sentence commending "it was contemplated by the above-mentioned exchange of letters" was inaccurate insofar as Sovs concerned since Khrushchev in his letter of Oct 27 had made on-site inspection dependent on Cuban agreement. This point had been made many times, Kuznetsov said, issue is closed and he hopes we will not have to come back to it. As to verification for future, Soviet Union is not opposed provided obligations are reciprocal and has therefore supported U Thant plan for inspection throughout Caribbean. Kuznetsov also repeated at length his objections to provisos attached to non-invasion assurance, claiming that they would give us excuse for violating this assurance whenever we desired. As to overflights, he said Sov Union cannot agree to statement of this kind being presented to SC for approval in Soviet Union's name. He claimed paragraph in which it is stated that Sov Union believes any further inspection, observation or verification unnecessary and unjustified does not represent Sov position.
Kuznetsov then returned to Sov draft declaration and resolution submitted to us Dec 6/3/ and asked why these were not acceptable. There would be agreement, he said, on short drafts and supplementary disagreed statements could be shown by each side to other in order to minimize SC debate. His govt feels it more expedient that declarations be presented to SC rather than to SYG since subject was raised with SC at beginning of crisis. He was disturbed at McCloy's statement that, if we cannot agree on joint declaration, US will go back to earlier and worse wording in separate declarations. He urged negotiations be carried on sincerely and on the basis of the greatest possible degree of mutual agreement. Our two countries face many important international problems on solution of which destiny of peace depends and manner in which we deal with Cuban problem will affect solution of all others. President and Khrushchev have shown wisdom and patience in solution of this dangerous crisis and it is most important it be wound up in same spirit.
/3/See Document 234.
Stevenson went over again advantages of joint declaration over single declaration and of filing with SYG rather than of presenting to SC. If we should go to SC he foresaw great difficulty of working out res acceptable to both sides and suggested consensus statement would be decidedly preferable.
Kuznetsov reiterated his objection to joint declaration and argued in favor of two separate declarations as closely agreed as possible. He agreed to consider again whether SC meeting or more filing of declarations with SYG would be preferable.
McCloy emphasized Sovs had no need to worry about US not fulfilling its obligations. It would certainly do so and that was why it was insisting on citing them fully and clearly. It was impossible for US to give assurance against invasion without provisos which we had included. As to going back to earlier language in case there is no agreement on this document he pointed out he had been authorized to modify our language in some cases in order to obtain agreement, but that if no agreement were reached and separate disagreed declarations were filed, he had previously made it clear we would feel free to revert to some of our earlier language.
There was some discussion of the phrase "those or other weapons systems of a similar or comparable and offensive character". Kuznetsov wished to substitute "those or similar weapons". He objected particularly to the word "offensive". McCloy said he would consider whether the word "offensive" could be dropped leaving the words "similar or comparable" but said he could make no commitment on this score. McCloy also referred at some length to dangers of aggressive acts by Castro, recent Che Guevara interview in London Daily Worker/4/ which underlined necessity for second of our provisos on non-invasion assurances.
/4/In this interview on December 4 Che Guevera promised subversion in the rest of Latin America based on and inspired by the Cuban model. (Telegram 1531 from London, December 7; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-762)
Meeting concluded with further expanded discussion of procedures in which it once more appeared clear Sovs would not accept single declaration but would press at least for two declarations as closely agreed as possible.
Sovs continued to express preference for SC meeting but were less strong on this point. US side made it clear that if there were SC mtg it could only end in consensus statement more or less along lines of that proposal shown to them. Kuznetsov quoted Khrushchev's statement at today's Supreme Soviet mtg in favor of rapid conclusion of negotiations and sealing the agreement under authority of UN.
Meeting concluded with understanding that Soviets would get in touch with us when they had obtained Moscow reaction to our latest proposals.
Stevenson
246. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)
Washington, December 14, 1962, 12:30 p.m.
//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.
McCone said that the negotiation of Donovan seems to be coming to a head. The President wants the Attorney General to go down because he now has commitments to cover the Castro list. McCone further said that this raises a problem of how to get down there because there is no transportation. McCone suggested, last night, that his Sanchez, head of the Family Committee, call Beratta, a close adviser of Castro's--that woman who has been described in various reports as being his advisor, his secretary or his mistress--can arrange for him to come down. McCone said that if he comes down, they would allow him in and then we would have him charter a Pan American plane and fly down there. McCone doesn't know how this will work out, but it is about the only way to do it. Ball agreed.
McCone said that he thinks this should be done rather overtly; last time it was done very secretly, and Ball had no objection to it being done overtly. McCone said the reason he thinks it ought to be done overtly is because there is no government involvement here. The second thing is that we have been freezing the three Cuban defectors, and there have been some very significant reports. He said that Hilsman has them.
McCone said that an appraisal of Soviet intentions had been made
which he would like Ball to take a look at. McCone thinks that
some place along the line, they are either going to take a shot
at one of our birds or threaten to do so. It might be that we
might be able to prevent it by some kind of a leak or statement
at Ball's level or at the President's level that we have to carry
this on and if they take a shot at one of those birds, we are
going to have to take such action as is appropriate. Ball said
that that is not a bad idea. McCone asked if Ball would give a
little thought to it.
247. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev
Washington, December 14, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I was glad to have your message of December 11/1/ and to know that you believe, as we do, that we have come to the final stage of the Cuban affair between us, the settlement of which will have significance for our future relations and for our ability to overcome other difficulties. I wish to thank you for your expression of appreciation of the understanding and flexibility we have tried to display.
/1/Document 244.
I have followed with close attention the negotiations on the final settlement of the Cuban question between your representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, and our representatives, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy, in New York. In these negotiations we have tried to understand your position and I am glad to note that Mr. Kuznetsov has also shown effort to understand our problems. It is clearly in the interest of both sides that we reach agreement on how finally to dispose of the Cuban crisis. To this end, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy presented on Wednesday a new draft of a joint statement which by now has certainly reached you./2/ I wish to assure you that it is our purpose to end this affair as simply and clearly as possible.
/2/See Document 243.
You refer to the importance of my statements on an invasion of Cuba and of our intention to fulfill them, so that no doubts are sown from the very start. I have already stated my position publicly in my press conference on November 20th, and I am glad that this statement appears to have your understanding; we have never wanted to be driven by the acts of others into war in Cuba. The other side of the coin, however, is that we do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not reintroduced, and that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel confident that Cuba will not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already have your own assurance about the offensive weapons. So I myself should suppose that you could accept our position--but it is probably better to leave final discussion of these matters to our representatives in New York. I quite agree with you that the larger part of the crisis has now been ended and we should not permit others to stand in the way of promptly settling the rest without further acrimony.
With regard to your reference to the confidential channels set up between us, I can assure you that I value them. I have not concealed from you that it was a serious disappointment to me that dangerously misleading information should have come through these channels before the recent crisis. You may also wish to know that by an accident or misunderstanding one of your diplomats appears to have used a representative of a private television network as a channel to us. This is always unwise in our country, where the members of the press often insist on printing at some later time what they may learn privately.
Because our systems are so different, you may not be fully familiar with the practices of the American press. The competition for news in this country is fierce. A number of the competitors are not great admirers of my Administration, and perhaps an even larger number are not wholly friendly to yours. Here in Washington we have 1200 reporters accredited to the White House alone, and thousands more in other assignments. Not one of them is accountable to this government for what he reports. It would be a great mistake to think that what appears in newspapers and magazines necessarily has anything to do with the policy and purpose of this government. I am glad to say that I have some friends among newspapermen, but no spokesmen.
But let me emphasize again that we do indeed value these confidential channels. I entirely share your view that some trust is necessary for leading statesmen of our two countries; I believe that it is important to build the area of trust wherever possible. I shall of course continue to hold and to express my convictions about the relative merits of our systems of government, and I will not be surprised if you do the same.
In particular, we have been very glad to have opportunities for private exchanges with and through Mr. Bolshakov, and I am sorry to learn that he is returning to Moscow. It is our impression that he has made a real effort to improve communications and understanding between our two governments, and we shall miss him very much.
I appreciate your writing me so frankly, and in return I have tried to be as straightforward, for I agree with you that only through such frank exchanges can we better understand our respective points of view. Partly for this reason I refrained in my last press conference from commenting on certain aspects of your speech before the Supreme Soviet with which you realize, of course, we could not agree.
We also are hopeful that once the Cuban crisis is behind us, we shall be able to tackle the other problems confronting us and to find the path to their solution.
[Here follow 2 paragraphs on the test ban and the German question; for text, see volume VI, pages 231-233.]
Thank you for your expressions of good wishes to me and my family, and let me in turn send you and your wife and family our personal good wishes for the coming year./3/
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
248. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, December 15, 1962.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 208. Top Secret.
This memorandum is in reference to NSAM #208 dated December 6 transmitting a memorandum entitled "Guide lines for the planning of Cuban overflights",/1/ and requesting "An estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth . . ."
/1/Document 232.
On December 6, I wrote to you/2/ stating that I was of the opinion that two regularly scheduled U-2 missions per day would reasonably satisfy the requirements, with the understanding that postponed flights, because of weather, would be flown when weather permitted, and with the further understanding that low-level flights would be requested if considered necessary because of a special interest in targets or protracted postponement of the high level missions.
/2/Not found.
With reference to the assumption expressed in NSAM #208 that an energetic program for the collection of information by all other available means would be used to supplement photography, the United States Intelligence Board has considered these carefully.
I can report to you that:
(a) CIA is increasing its effort in a variety of ways, including an expanded use of agents, legal travellers, refugee interrogations both in this country and in other countries, and through liaison arrangements with third countries. In addition, CIA is prepared to endeavor to insert additional intelligence collecting teams as soon as policy decisions are reached in this respect.
(b) NSA will continue an intensive program in the SIGINT field which has during recent weeks added materially to all other intelligence.
(c) The United States Intelligence Board has also considered ways for more energetic utilization of resources available in the military serv-ices, most particularly the Army and the Navy, and will take such actions as might be appropriate to increase their unilateral activities without duplicating the activities of CIA.
I think the combination of the photography and other measures can give us a reasonably satisfactory body of intelligence. However, it will not, in my opinion, be totally satisfactory nor as dependable as an arrangement for well organized on-site inspection, which is politically not attainable at the present time.
John A. McCone
249. Summary Record of the 36th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Washington, December 17, 1962, 10 a.m.
//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 12:28 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)
Director McCone presented intelligence summaries on Cuba and on the Congo.
The President sent instructions to Mr. McCloy in New York to remind the Russians of our often repeated statement that if any U.S. planes are attacked over Cuba we will retaliate./1/ The instructions grew out of a discussion of whether the President, at his next press conference, should make public our position to retaliate if our reconnaissance planes were attacked. The repeated warning is to be done as a reminder of our position, not as if we were making a new point.
/1/See Document 252. McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting. The actions relating to the discussion of Cuba indicated that McCone presented a current intelligence summary and the President asked Rusk to instruct McCloy to remind the representatives of the Soviet Union in New York that if U.S. planes were attacked over Cuba, the United States would retaliate. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62)
The President commented on the rise in the price of sugar which is benefiting Cuba. He asked whether there was anything that could be done about this but was told that the price was set by the world market and was not easily affected./2/
/2/The CIA sent OCI No. 3622/62, December 16, "Rising World Sugar Prices and the Effect on Cuba," to the White House on December 20. The conclusions of the memorandum were that sugar market was tight and Cuba would benefit economically. (Ibid., Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III) See the Supplement.
Secretary Rusk summarized his recent meeting with the NATO Council in Paris. He said the NATO powers expressed great satisfaction with the way the Cuban missile crisis had been handled. De Gaulle had the same view.
With respect to NATO problems, Secretary Rusk said he had stressed the need for increased European continental forces. NATO is marking time on organization problems and on nuclear questions pending the completion of the Common Market negotiations. The NATO meeting was so placid that reporters had to resort to sensationalized stories.
Returning to Cuba, Secretary Rusk said there was no sense of urgency. The Russians apparently want more time prior to deciding what to do in New York. We appeared to be heading toward separate statements on the Cuban crisis.
The remainder of the meeting was taken up with the discussion of a Congo plan and policy recommendations of the Subcommittee on South Asia.
Bromley Smith/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
250. Editorial Note
The 37th meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council was held at 3:45 p.m., December 17, 1962. According to Bromley Smith's summary record:
"At the conclusion of the meeting there was a discussion of the U.S. statement which was to be released if it is decided to make separate and disagreed U.S./USSR statement on Cuba to the UN."
"Ambassador Stevenson handed to the President a draft of the proposed statement. The President received it, saying that he would make a decision later in that day."
McGeorge Bundy's record of action of the meeting states:
"A U.S. statement for use in the event it is decided to make separate and disagreed U.S. and USSR statements on Cuba to the UN Secretary General was revised and agreed upon." (Both December 17; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62)
The draft statement discussed and approved at the Executive Committee was sent to the Mission at the United Nations; see Document 251.
[end of document]
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