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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, December 17, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Incoming Telegram (TS, exdis, etc.) 1962. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

1677. Following is approved text of statement US would make in event Soviets prefer two separate statements rather than one joint statement that includes both agreed and disagreed points. This text reflects changes suggested by McCloy to Cleveland December 16/1/ and changes agreed with Stevenson in Washington December 17./2/ While this text can be used with Soviets at your discretion, we assume next move is still up to Kuznetsov, whose reaction to December 12 draft of joint statement/3/ we still await.

/1/No record of those suggestions were found.

/2/See Document 249.

/3/See Document 243.

Begin text

As a result of the exchange of communications between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers on October 27-28, 1962, arising out of the recent Cuban crisis, the Representative of the United States wishes to make the following report to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

The United States takes note of the statement of the USSR that it has dismantled all of the missile sites and that it has removed from Cuba all of the missiles, all of the IL-28 bombers, and all nuclear weapons, missile components, and launching apparatus. It also takes note of the statement of the USSR that it will not reintroduce into Cuba those or other weapons systems of similar or comparable character. The United States also notes that in connection with the removal of the above-mentioned weapons, the Soviet Union has stated its intention to withdraw all military units and personnel placed in Cuba for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems.

The United States wishes to inform the Secretary General that on the basis of such statements and acts the United States on November 20, 1962 lifted the quarantine which it had imposed around the Island of Cuba on October 24, 1962.

It was contemplated by the above-mentioned exchange of letters between the President and the Chairman that there would be created an effective system of international inspection in Cuba to verify the dismantling of the missile sites and the removal of the weapons, and to provide suitable safeguards against the further maintenance and introduction of such weapons in Cuba.

A procedure was arranged between the USSR and the United States for verification at sea of the removal of the missiles and bombers which the Soviet Union declared it had introduced into Cuba. However, it has not been possible thus far to effect on the ground the contemplated international system of verification and safeguards.

Pending the installation of such a system to insure against the maintenance and reintroduction of such weapons and weapons systems into Cuba, the United States is compelled to continue to employ the means of observation and verification it has found necessary.

The President of the United States stated at a press conference on November 20 that provided all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in future, and provided Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, it was not the intention of the United States to invade Cuba.

The President of the United States reaffirms his previous statement and repeats his assurance that, subject to the above conditions, the United States has no intention either to invade or support an invasion of Cuba./4/

/4/Confirming a U. Alexis Johnson-McCloy telephone conversation of the morning of December 18, the Department sent a substitute paragraph for paragraphs 7 and 8 in this telegram. The new paragraph reads: "The United States further gives assurance that provided no nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use are present in or reinforced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at his press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba." (Telegram 1685 to USUN, December 18, 12:27 p.m.; USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Incoming Telegram (TS, Exdis, etc.) 1962)

Nothing herein contained in any way affects the rights and obligations of any treaty or existing agreements to which the United States of America is a party.

The President of the United States expresses the hope that the action taken by the United States and the Soviet Union following the above-mentioned exchange of communications to avert the threat of war arising from the Cuban situation will lead to further constructive negotiations between the two countries to adjust the differences existing between them and generally lessen the tensions which might induce further danger of war. End text.

Rusk

252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, December 18, 1962, 2:09 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1862. Top Secret. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared in substance with the President.

1687. Eyes only for Stevenson and McCloy. At a suitable occasion in our negotiations with Kuznetsov and in connection with any discussion with him on the question of our continued reconnaissance, you should express to Kuznetsov our growing concern over fact Soviets are continuing work at and improve anti-aircraft arsenal in Cuba. We are concerned that someone might have the motive of interfering with our reconnaissance. We have made it amply clear to the Soviets that, in the absence of other safeguards, we must and will continue that reconnaissance. We have no desire to return to the days of late October and assume this is also shared by the Soviets. The Soviets must recognize that destruction of American aircraft and loss of American life arising from this deliberate activity of the Soviet Union could well have such consequences. We hope Kuznetsov will understand that our motive in bringing this to his attention is simply to make sure that there is no misunderstanding on this point. In short, we feel it would be unwise continue this buildup in view of the non-belligerent and non-provocative character and intent of our reconnaissance.

Rusk

253. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 18, 1962, 7:02 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: FRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January meetings. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Yost.

2401. Re: Cuba. At meeting this morning Stevenson, McCloy and Yost--Kuznetsov, Mendelevich and Counselor of Sov Emb in Wash, Kuznetsov presented new Sov proposal./1/ Gist of it was that four letters, two from President dated Oct 27 and 28 and two from Khrushchev dated Oct 27 and 28, be registered at UN and passed to SC Pres for distribution to SC members as official UN documents. Cuban Rep would follow same procedure and separately submit statement from his Govt. No SC meeting would be held and no further action would be required or taken.

/1/In a December 18 memorandum to Rusk, Cleveland informed the Secretary of this proposal. Cleveland stated that he talked to McCloy by phone and they agreed it would be appropriate to ask for clarification from Kuznetsov on two points: was it necessary for the Cubans to submit anything as part of the scenario and could the respective two letters be submitted separately by the two delegations? (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-1862) See the Supplement.

Kuznetsov opened meeting by recapitulating history of attempts to work out draft declarations, emphasizing that U.S. drafts of both separate and joint declarations had contained "completely unacceptable" condition to non-invasion assurance which were not contained in exchange of letters between Pres and Khrushchev and that Sovs could not approve in any form statement implying that U.S. has right to overfly Cuba.

Noting that U.S. does not favor SC mtg, Kuznetsov then put forward proposal summarized above.

Stevenson raised two questions. First, he pointed out it was Khrushchev's letter of Oct 26, not his letter of Oct 27, which was referred to in President's letter of Oct 27 and formed basis of agreement. Second, he asked whether Sovs had draft of joint letter to SYG or whether it was purely letter of transmittal.

McCloy noted that Sov proposal omitted any recitation of progress since exchange of letters, such as dismantling and removing of missiles and bombers, lifting of blockade and assurances in Pres's Nov 20 press conference, as well as omitting any reference to points on which agreement not achieved, such as UN verification system and need for U.S. to use own means of verification in absence of system.

Kuznetsov replied that President's Oct 27 letter does refer to Khrushchev's Oct 26 letter but also refers to its fifth para to Khrushchev's Oct 27 letter. Moreover he claimed President's letter of Oct 27 in its substance dealt with points made in Khrushchev's letter of Oct 27 rather than in his Oct 26 letter. He cited President's reference to Sov willingness to withdraw weapons systems and not to reintroduce them in future, which Kuznetsov claimed were specified in Khrushchev's Oct 27 letter.

As to joint letter of transmittal, he said it should be brief and formal and not set forth differences between us. It should be limited to following points:

1. Rep's report they are sending 4 letters;

2. They ask SYG to register letters in UN;

3. They ask SYG to send letters to SC Pres for distribution to SC members as UN documents.

If U.S. accepts proposal Sovs can then within one day prepare draft letter of transmittal for discussion.

As to McCloy's remarks, Kuznetsov said that if we attempt to include in letter of declarations points which have not been agreed, such as that U.S. will continue overflights, then we would be starting negotiations all over again. Sovs cannot be party to any document containing such provision or give impression they approve it. They cannot also agree in any way to making non-invasion assurance condition of Cuba's not threatening other states. New Sov proposal does not mean that all questions concerning Cuba will be settled. Some points we would like to include and some points they would like to include would be omitted.

Stevenson emphasized we had always understood agreement between us rested essentially on two letters, Khrushchev's of Oct 26 and President's of Oct 27 which says Khrushchev's Oct 26 letter provides basis of agreement. It would be inappropriate to include in group of letters constituting our agreement Oct 27 letter to which U.S. never adverted except in connection with future disarmament. Moreover Khrushchev's Oct 27 letter deals with proposal on concurrent action relating to Cuba and Turkey, which was never adopted and which was irrelevant. Moreover Sov proposal omits all account of what has transpired since exchange of letters. He suggested there might possibly be two letters of transmittal. He welcomed efforts to end negotiations quickly but said his first reaction was to be troubled by difficulties he had mentioned.

McCloy added that if only letters proposed were submitted there would be irresistible pressure to publish also Khrushchev Oct 26 letter which was referred to in President's Oct 27 letter. Moreover there is so much discussion in Khrushchev's Oct 27 letter of weapons in Turkey that inclusion of this letter would disturb rather than tranquilize atmosphere. He also repeated his difficulty with the omission of any statement of what has been accomplished on both sides. He pointed out that U.S. has in fact, taking into account President's Nov 20 press conference, carried out all its obligations even though we have not had benefit of on-site inspection. We must therefore continue overflights. Also if we register with UN our intent not to invade we must also register in document of equal dignity our intent continue observation by our own means until other means of verification can be established. He also pointed out that assurance we had offered in various drafts "not to support invasion" goes beyond what is set forth in exchange of letters and was offered in order to meet objections Sovs had raised.

Kuznetsov replied that he had listened attentively to objections but hopes U.N. will carefully study new proposal with view to reaching final solution. We have negotiated for weeks and if we seek to include in documents all points U.S. wants and all points Sovs want, it will be very difficult ever to conclude. Sov idea is not to raise in these documents points on which we cannot agree but to limit ourselves to letters which are already known to world as basis for settlement which has been achieved. They had selected only four letters which were concerned with settlement and which have been published. If U.S. thinks Khrushchev Oct 26 letter should also be published they would consult their govt whether do so. As to references to Turkey in Oct 27 letter, these are nothing new and Sov views in regard to foreign military bases around its borders are well known. Sovs, as concession to U.S. viewpoint, have given up idea of SC meeting and res. Essence of their proposal is to avoid stirring up all of the moot questions we have been discussing for a long time and on which no agreement has been reached. World is already aware of what has been done since letters were exchanged and is reasonably well satisfied. Sovs are still much interested in all of points covered in protocol, normalization of situation in Caribbean, but are not going to insist on inserting them in these documents. As to overflights, U.S. creates vicious circle by repeating it will continue them until international arrangements are established, while at same time it does not state what sort of international system it contemplates and rejects that which has been put forward by U Thant.

In conclusion he repeated his appeal that U.S. think seriously about latest proposal. There has been attempt on each side to understand position of other side. However, if U.S. insists on putting in documents reference to overflights and conditions as to assurances, we will be once again at very beginning of our negotiations and solution will be far away.

McCloy concluded that we would of course study proposal. However he would not want to give impression through this procedure that we have reached full agreement when in fact we have not. If the documents prove to be inadequate we might find ourselves in position of seeking SC meeting to expound our point of view more fully there. He said he had been more optimistic before this meeting than he now is, as he had hoped we were moving toward separate documents to be submitted to SYG.

Stevenson

254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, December 19, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-1962. Top Secret. Drafted by Cleveland. Also sent to U. Alexis Johnson.

SUBJECT

Cuba

Mr. McCloy called to report on his luncheon with Kuznetsov today. He will try to do a cable on it later on this evening./1/ Meanwhile, this is my understanding of what he was saying:

/1/Telegram 2416 from USUN, December 19, 5:30 p.m. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January Meetings) See the Supplement. A 12-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting indicates that the discussion lasted from 11:15 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. and was held in Stevenson's office. (Ibid.)

1. Kuznetsov was "intrigued" with the general idea of separate submissions to the Secretary General of the documents in the public record on Cuba since the last Security Council meeting, which was October 25. Mr. McCloy got the impression that Kuznetsov would favorably recommend our proposal to Moscow.

2. The Soviets continue to be sticky about using the word "register". Assuming there are two separate submissions to the Secretary General, they would presumably use the word "register" in theirs, but we would be free to use any word we wanted to describe our submission. The problem is that the "Prime Minister" (Khrushchev) used the term "register" in "his" correspondence.

3. Kuznetsov "winced" at the idea of the President's November 20 Press Conference being included in our package of documents. He conceded that there was much in the Presidential statement that was good from the Soviet point of view but said that "25% of it is bad", notably the reference to overflights and the provisos on the President's non-invasion assurance.

4. Kuznetsov said that he didn't know whether the Soviet Government would want to publish the October 26 letter. He had reread it and saw nothing discreditable in it, but as we could probably tell, it had a rather special style and was in fact written by Khrushchev himself. Mr. McCloy explained we would have to show this letter to the Congression-al leaders on request, since it is referred to in the President's letter of October 27. But, McCloy added, we would not ourselves publish it unless the Soviet Government wants it published.

5. During the discussion of overflights, Mr. McCloy threw in the warning that if any plane is shot down we will be "right back in October".

6. Kuznetsov was unclear of what the Cuban submission would consist of. He referred vaguely to an early statement by Castro (which might be his long television speech answering the President's original October 22 address) and to a document dated November 13 which we are still trying to identify here./2/

/2/Possible reference to Castro's letter to U Thant, November 15; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 459-460.

7. Kuznetsov said he appreciated that we were trying to wind this negotiation up without delay, and that this was also the desire of the Soviets.

255. Circular Telegram to All Latin American Posts

Washington, December 22, 1962, 1:23 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-2262. Limited Official Use; Niact. Drafted by Hurwitch and approved by Martin.

1135. James B. Donovan, private US citizen and counsel for Cuban Families Committee, reported last night Castro signed agreement with him release 1113 Bay of Pigs prisoners on following conditions:

1. Assurances to deliver $53,000,000 pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and foodstuffs and possibly some related products such as insecticides.

2. Delivery of goods in Habana amounting to 20% of above value before prisoners released.

American Red Cross acting in collaboration Cuban Families Committee has vessel now loading which together with air cargo now being prepared will deliver the 20% by December 23 in order begin airlift prisoners Miami area dawn December 23. Three Cuban Red Cross represent-atives arrived Miami last night to inspect cargo being loaded. Transaction is therefore on Red Cross to Red Cross basis.

Goods donated by US private companies to ARC now total about $45,000,000; contributions continue to be made. (FYI. If necessary US prepared to make available upon ARC request powdered skim milk from surplus stocks in amount not to exceed about $10,000,000 which represents less than 10% existing surplus this commodity. Such release can be made within existing statutory authority. End FYI.) These donations by private companies allowable under current tax legislation. Rulings rendered by Internal Revenue re these donations conform to existing regulations and precedent. Private companies have choice under the law between paying taxes on this amount or making charitable contributions (up to 5% of their profits) for tax deduction purposes. This choice entirely theirs.

Inland and overseas freight, insurance, handling costs and labor have been donated by railroads, airlines, steamship lines, trucking companies, insurance companies and labor unions. No USG funds involved. Government role has been essentially to cut red tape in order expedite transaction.

Prisoners fought bravely at Bay of Pigs before capitulating. Since capture none has defected or publicly condemned US despite offers to reward them for doing so. Prisoners suffering severe malnutrition and disease (some may be near death).

While difficult assess precisely, Department does not believe transaction will materially affect stability Castro regime. Reports indicate veteran Cuban communists opposed transaction while 26 July group favored. Cuban normal annual imports pharmaceuticals alone over $60,000,000 hence transaction involves substantially less than year's supply any commodity. Castro regime had budgeted approximately $1,000,000 in foreign exchange for purchase pharmaceuticals; inclusion pharmaceuticals (which comprises over half of amount) therefore releases only that amount foreign exchange for other purposes.

FYI. Donovan reports Castro prepared review cases of twenty-four US citizens now imprisoned with view clemency or amnesty provided current transaction consummated good faith. End FYI.

Bearing in mind that last minute snags may upset transaction, you authorized draw on foregoing except FYI portions in reply inquiries. Cable press and official reaction transaction.

Rusk

256. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 23, 1962, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-2362. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

2477. Cuba. McCloy and Yost met this morning two and half hours with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich. Sovs stood adamantly on their last proposal that only four letters exchanged between President and Khrushchev October 27 and 28 without any other documents be transmitted to UN./1/ No progress whatsoever was made. McCloy had impression from earlier conversations that Kuznetsov personally might have favored accepting our proposal that two sets of documents chosen separately be submitted but that Moscow had overruled him.

/1/See Document 253.

Kuznetsov opened meeting with long statement commencing with assertion that US proposal to transmit along with President's letters of October 27 and 28 White House press statement of October 27 and President's press statement of November 20 was entirely unacceptable. After careful thought Sovs see no need for additional documents since basic agreement between US and USSR is embodied in four letters of October 27 and 28. Reservations which US put forward in unilateral fashion are after agreement between President and Khrushchev. White House statement October 27 and President's press statement November 20 contain same reservations as in various US draft declarations which Sovs had pronounced unacceptable. Particularly statement November 20 contains new reservations concerning export of communism, political and economic sanctions, ending of Cuban regime. US, Kuznetsov claimed, is trying to undermine value of non-invasion assurances given in President's letters October 27 and 28 by introducing new conditions. After Sovs have removed offensive weapons, given US chance to verify, and stated readiness to give assurances re reintroducing weapons, US changing its position in trying not to reaffirm its obligations. It would appear US wishes to get rid of these obligations and have its hands free not to observe non-invasion guarantee on pretext Cuba committing aggression against US or some other country. Furthermore, from sentence in November 20 statement commencing, "We will not, of course, abandon . . ." it is clear US seeking overthrow Cuban Govt and install old system. This is open attempt export counter-revolution to Cuba. This is dangerous policy and pursuing this course could bring heavy consequences. Sovs cannot appear to agree in any form, directly or indirectly, to US carrying on such policy.

Kuznetsov touched lightly on October 27 White House statement, merely saying it was never considered basic document on settlement Cuban crisis and need not be included. Returning to November 20 statement, he repeated usual arguments against overflights and added they contradict recent GA resolution on "friendly relations".

He asked why US so reluctant adopt UN system of inspection proposed by U Thant, either observation groups in Caribbean area or observation groups stationed in NY with authority visit Caribbean from time to time. US blandly rejects this proposal without even discussing it. Yet at same time US maintains that, since there is no international system, it must continue observation by its own means.

US has said Soviet Union is not obliged to agree with what was said in October 27 and November 20 press statements. However, even if documents are transmitted to SYG separately by two sides, it might appear Soviet Union had no objection to US documents and had even agreed to them to certain extent.

As to "registration" Kuznetsov said Sovs astonished US objecting to common practice wherein thousands of documents registered or filed in UN. However, he would, as further concession, drop this word and he submitted new text for joint letter of transmittal in which word not employed (text this letter set forth at conclusion this telegram).

In summing up, Kuznetsov said position of US side in negotiations in no way strengthens confidence between our govts and is inconsistent with expressed desire of US Govt to strengthen confidence. He urged US reconsider its position and accept Soviet proposal to submit to SYG four letters exchanged between President and Khrushchev October 27 and 28 and indicated these could be transmitted to SYG in either joint or separate covering letters.

McCloy replied had hoped we were close to agreement today but it appears that we have gone backward. He had described previously how US had in fact already done or offered more than was required by exchange letters between President and Khrushchev and said he saw no use going over arguments once again. Sovs have turned down three US proposals as unacceptable. We find latest Sov proposal unacceptable. Perhaps best we can do is for each side transmit SYG whatever documents it wishes without disclosing in advance what it is submitting and thereby not implying there is any approval by other side. This would not be good solution but might be only one available.

As to inspection, there had in fact been no formal U Thant proposal. US would still like inspection on the spot. It is still getting numerous reports from exiles of heavy Cuban armament, of strong Soviet military presence, and camps for training guerrillas. Satisfactory inspection system would have to be elaborate and it would at best take months to work out.

November 20 statement expresses frankly our views concerning Castro. We do not think Cuban people are free and do not like Castro's social system but that does not mean we are gong to invade Cuba. If Sovs include Turkey letter with all its emphasis on Turkish bases we would have to include October 27 press statement. US is sincerely desirous of carrying out its obligations and believes it in vital interest both parties terminate this affair. He described possible solutions as follows:

1. Joint declaration;

2. Separate declarations but ours would have to include what we are going to do in our own defense;

3. Separate transmittal of unagreed documents to UN;

4. Separate unagreed statement outside UN by chiefs of state, Foreign Ministers or UN Reps, simply summing up, stating it had not been possible to reach full agreement but that crisis is terminated, and both sides hope for progress in future.

McCloy concluded by expressing regret that situation cannot be terminated before reconvening of Congress when whole question likely subject of Congressional debate.

Kuznetsov expressed his govt's sincere desire reach agreement and show two govts can do something together. Much has already been done to avert disaster and we should be able to agree on documents to be submitted to UN. He then however reiterated that only document Sovs believed it necessary submit are four letters October 27 and 28.

McCloy emphasized we are not asking Sovs to agree to documents we submit. Yost suggested that there might in separate letters transmittal be clear disclaimer by each party that it did not necessarily approve all documents submitted by other party. Possibility of this suggestion was explored but Kuznetsov concluded by repeating from his instructions that "reservations contained in President's statement of November 20 and White House statement October 27 contradict the understanding which had been reached and Soviet side cannot sanction them in any form whatsoever".

McCloy made it perfectly clear that, while he would of course report Soviet views to Washington, he was convinced US could not accept their proposal to submit four letters alone.

It was agreed that, while there appeared to be total impasse, both parties would reflect and communicate with each other later.

At conclusion of meeting Zorin announced that for reasons of health he is leaving his UN post and returning to Moscow to resume his duties as Deputy FonMin. He emphasized that his health has been poor for some time. Kuzentsov mentioned that Zorin's successor is present Soviet Amb to Japan, has spent more than ten years in China, and is outstanding expert on Chinese affairs.

Following is text of new joint draft letters of transmittal proposed by Sovs.

"Esteemed Mr. Secretary General,

Attached herewith are the letters of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev and the President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy of October 27 and 28, 1962 which contain the obligations assumed by the Govts of the USSR and the United States for the settlement of the crisis that arose in the Caribbean area.

It is requested to transmit them to the President of the Security Council for circulating these messages as documents of the Council.

Respectfully,

Representative of the USSR

Representative of the United States"

Stevenson

257. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, December 26, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 12/62. Confidential. Copies were sent to Cleveland, Martin, Thompson, and McGeorge Bundy.

SUBJECT

Cuba New York Negotiations

McCloy called me this morning to state that after dinner yesterday/1/ Kuznetsov took the initiative in raising the question of the negotiations for the report to the UN on the Cuban affair. McCloy said that during the course of the conversation Kuznetsov said that Khrushchev himself placed great emphasis on inclusion of his October 27 Turkish Jupiter letter, explaining that he needed this domestically as he had used his position on this in defense of his action in Cuba. Kuznetsov also reiterated their objections to the inclusion of the President's November 20 press conference. Kuznetsov urged McCloy to come up with some new formula.

/1/No other record of the dinner conversation has been found.

McCloy said he made it clear that he was at the "end of his string" and had no further suggestions to offer. He said he also made it clear that we could not agree to any of the proposed Soviet procedures. McCloy felt that Kuznetsov was "squirming".

McCloy said that he did not recommend or propose to take any new initiatives and would wait for Kuznetsov to get in touch with him. I said that we entirely agreed.

258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, December 28, 1962, 1:53 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-2862. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by Martin, Cleveland, Thompson, Rusk, and in substance with President Kennedy.

1761. Eyes only Stevenson and McCloy. Confirming McCloy-Johnson telcon,/1/ following is text of proposed US letter to SYG which you are authorized to discuss with Kuznetsov:

/1/No other record of this telephone conversation has been found.

"In the period since the last meeting of the Security Council on the Cuban crisis, I am pleased to report that considerable progress has been made in relieving the tension which arose between the Soviet Union and the United States in connection with the introduction of certain offensive weapons in the island of Cuba.

In this connection, for the Council's record, I am transmitting true copies of the President's letters of October 27 and October 28. Other statements relating to the United States position in this matter are contained in a White House press statement dated October 27, and in the President's opening remarks at his press conference on November 20, 1962.

The President of the United States has asked me to express to you his hope that the steps taken by the two governments in this matter may lead to further constructive efforts on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to adjust the differences between them.

My Government is also grateful to you for your own part in assisting both parties to find the means to avert the serious threat to the peace which the Cuban situation then entailed.

In view of the present situation, my Government, which originally requested the Cuban item to be placed on the Security Council agenda, believes it need not further occupy the Council's attention at this time."

If Kuznetsov rejects foregoing formulation, you are authorized subsequently to propose to Kuznetsov the following text of a proposed joint letter to the SYG:

"On behalf of our respective Governments, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting the Soviet and United States Governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which arose in connection with the Cuban situation.

While our Governments regret that it has not been possible fully to resolve all of the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the considerable progress that has been made, it is no longer necessary for this item to be retained upon the agenda of the Security Council."

Alternatively, the substance of the foregoing joint letter could be incorporated into separate letters by US and Soviet representatives.

Rusk

259. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 28, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-2862. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

2513. Dept pass White House. Cuba. McCloy, Plimpton and Yost met this afternoon with Kuznetsov and Mendelevich (USSR).

1. McCloy gave Soviets following draft of suggested separate letter to be given to SYG by US, on assumption Soviets would also give SYG a separate letter in form previously submitted to US, presumably accompanied by copies of Khrushchev's letters of Oct 27 and 28 and reference to any other documents Soviets want.

[Here follows the draft of the first letter in Document 258 with the exception of the last 2 paragraphs that were slightly revised and combined. The revised final paragraph of the letter as submitted to the Soviet delegates is printed below.]

2. McCloy pointed out US draft merely referred to White House press statement Oct 27 and Presidential news conference statement Nov 20, and did not submit them as UN docs, thus moving toward Soviet position.

3. Kuznetsov asked why the reference in the letter could not be limited only to the Presidential letters of Oct 27 and 28 since the White House press statement and news conference were matters of public record, and since the basic obligations of the two parties were contained in the four letters of Oct 27 and Oct 28.

4. McCloy said this was impossible and that he had gone as far as he possibly could in eliminating the submission to the UN of the press statement and news conference statement and merely referring to them.

5. Kuznetsov said the letter was not acceptable, and that the Soviets could not agree to or approve either openly or tacitly any reference to any qualifications or reservations to the US obligations under the October 27 and October 28 letters.

6. McCloy pointed out that Soviets were not being asked to approve or agree to anything, and that the Soviet separate letter would presumably not contain any such intimation.

7. Kuznetsov repeated that Soviets could not approve any reference to over-flights over Cuba or intrusion into Cuban territorial waters (which violation of Charter and international law) or to Cuban behavior. None of foregoing had been referred to in Oct 27 and 28 letters or negotiations incident thereto. Presidential news conference Nov 20 was first reference to Cuban behavior as a qualification of US obligation not to invade, and qualifying references to subversion, export of communism, Cuban aggression, etc., so vague as to weaken and vitiate US obligation.

8. McCloy said that these were familiar Soviet arguments, and that he would not repeat US counter-arguments, and that neither US nor any other country could unqualifiedly and unconditionally agree not to invade another country.

9. Kuznetsov also objected to word "offensive" as applied to weapons in US draft. McCloy said he would agree to taking out word.

10. Kuznetsov then submitted following new draft of joint letter to SYG by USSR and USUN Reps (accompanying Russian text being pouched Cleveland).

McCloy stated this not acceptable, since US must make reference to White House press statement Oct 27 and President's press conference Nov. 20.

Begin Verbatim text.

Esteemed Mr. Secretary General,

Attached herewith are the letters of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev and the President of the United States John F. Kennedy of October 27 and 28, 1962 which contain the obligations assumed by the Govts of the USSR and of the US on settling the recent crisis in the Caribbean area.

It is requested to transmit them to the President of the Security Council for circulation as documents of the Council.

The Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States express the hope that the action taken to avert war arising from the crisis in the Caribbean area will lead to further constructive efforts by the parties concerned to settle differences existing between them and generally to lessen the tensions which might induce further threat of war.

On the instructions of our respective governments we express gratitude to you, Mr. Secretary General, for your efforts in the cause of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean area.

Respectfully,

The Representative of the USSR

The Representative of the United States

End verbatim text.

11. McCloy said he had done his best to meet the Soviet position in that the last US draft merely referred to the White House press statement and Presidential news conference without submitting them, thus making them of less dignity than the Oct 27 and 28 letters, but that no country could give an absolute guarantee against invasion if it or its allies were attacked, and that the US did not intend to make Cuba a sanctuary for Castro. He also pointed out that the Nov 20 press conference statement contained many provisions favorable to the Soviets, going beyond the Oct 27 and 28 letters. He also pointed out that the Nov 20 statement was made before the weapons were all removed, and that Khrushchev had publicly thanked the President for that statement.

12. Kuznetsov said that Soviets had hoped that there could be an agreed text evidencing an agreement between the Soviets and the US which would have provided a favorable atmosphere for the future composition of differences, but that the raising by the US of new conditions, new points made the matter more complicated and gave the impression that the US did not want to finish the matter and that it would have been in the interest of the whole world to have a full agreement reached. He further referred to the US responsibility for the Bay of Pigs affair and that recent statements by US officials gave the impression that the US was continuing to do its utmost to overthrow the Castro regime mentioning great TV emphasis on returned prisoners and their statements that they would go back. He also referred to supposed US support ever since World War II of reactionary groups such as Nationalist Chinese, South Koreans, etc., and to US unwillingness to consider U Thant's suggested reciprocal inspection plan.

13. McCloy, after appropriate rejoinder to Kuznetsov propaganda, said that perhaps new negotiations should be initiated for proper inspection of US, the Soviet Union and Cuba, but that time was limited and that perhaps the best thing for Soviets and US to do was to send joint letter to SYG to effect that they express their thanks to him for his efforts, that they had made progress but had not completely agreed as to the matter, and that they saw no need for further SC meeting. He then presented, as an uncleared draft of his own, the following proposed joint letter:

[Here follows the verbatim text of the second letter in Document 258.]

15. McCloy said it might be possible to incorporate in such joint draft letter some of the language contained in the Soviet draft joint letter just submitted by Kuznetsov, but that any joint letter must indicate that there had not been complete agreement between the parties.

16. Kuznetsov said he could not make a comment on the new draft, but would consider it and report it to his govt.

17. The meeting closed with Kuznetsov's admission that the ball was "in his net." We would like to think this meant we had scored a goal at basketball, but realize he thought the game was tennis.

18. Comment: Kuznetsov gave impression he had firm, explicit instructions not to agree to any reference to White House press statement of Oct 27 or Presidential press conference statement of Nov 20./1/

/1/Stevenson, McCloy, and Plimpton met Kuznetsov and Mendelevich on the morning of December 31. Kuznetsov said that he gave "sincere examination" to the first U.S. draft letter submitted to him on December 28, but it was still unacceptable. The two sides discussed the second joint letter, Kuznetsov suggested some minor changes, but neither side came to any final decision. (Ibid., 737.56361/12-3162) See the Supplement.

Plimpton

260. Memorandum From the President's Military Aide (Clifton) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, December 29, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 213. Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuban Focal Point in the Miami Area

During the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting at Palm Beach,/1/ the question came up of the future use and employment of the Cuban brigade/2/ trainees.

/1/President Kennedy met the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 27, 10:15 to 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

/2/On December 29 President Kennedy addressed the members of the Cuban Brigade who had been released and returned to the United States on December 25. The text of the President's remarks are in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 911-913.

For the military, the question was how many of these brigade officers could be used at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in helping to train the Cuban trainees, how many of the Cuban officers might need a special officers' course for updating and retraining as officers, and finally, how many of the Cuban refugee prisoners would actually go in for a 20-week retraining course.

There were no numbers involved, but it was agreed by all that certainly some of them would end up at Fort Jackson.

The next question raised was whether this Cuban brigade would be a focal point for a new political groupment. From all we could learn it looks like they might become such a party. The President pointed out that one of the tough problems in dealing with the 100,000 Cuban refugees in the Miami area is their lack of formalized party--he stated that there are four major parties and about one hundred splinter groups--and he thinks that the Cuban brigade might become a fifth rallying point, possibly a rather heavily emotionally charged one.

The Chiefs brought up the future political problems in connection with future military plans for Cuba, and it was stated that what we actually need is the establishment of a government-in-exile. This was in response to the President's directive that in their future planning the political preparations would have to be carefully organized. By this he meant the military, political preparations: the civil affairs, military government aspects, and the preparations to receive defectors en masse, if and when it occurred; but also to be prepared for their political organization at any time that we were back on Cuban soil.

With all this as background, the question came up about how our government is going to deal with this 100,000 nucleus in the future. It was suggested that whatever we do in Washington it was essential that we establish a "focal point" in the Miami area. Right now these various groups sit down there, stew in their own juice, elect committees, become emotionally upset, and then finally call upon somebody in Washington to let off their steam. If we are to get any benefit for future operations with this large group of people, it was suggested that we have a continuing office down in that area so that these committees could be guided and they would have a place to put in their requests and let off steam before they get to such an emotional pitch.

That evening after I got home the President called me and asked me to discuss this further with General Wheeler (because of the Army's future involvement both as a trainer of Cubans and as the executive agent for the Department of Defense in Cuban affairs), with Katzenbach of Justice, and with Director McCone (because of the Agency's interests). I have done all this.

General Wheeler and Secretary Vance both want to sit in on any meeting that you hold to formulate recommendations for the President on this matter; Mr. Katzenbach says that the Department of Justice's future interest is primarily one of the immigration authorities and he would very much like to have immigration represented, both in Washington and in Miami in anything that is established, including preliminary discussions. Mr. McCone has some deep feelings about the whole process, and especially his future relationships with the Cubans, and he would like to have General Carter sit in on any deliberations. He feels that if we establish a Miami "focal point," the Agency certainly would have to work in coordination with them.

The President then asked especially that I get the matter to your attention and he will await your early recommendations, including the advice of the Department of State. All concerned felt that the Department of State should be the chief agency for the focal point, if it were established.

Last footnote: HEW is the most involved at the moment. There are 100,000 Cuban refugees down there and 60,000 of them draw money from the Cuban refugee relief program. They obviously would be very important in the Miami area and are going to be continuously involved as long as they are paying money out to these refugees.

Mr. Katzenbach has a rather large immigration installation at the Miami National Airport--it can house as many as 600 people on a transient basis. It was his suggestion that any headquarters set up in the Miami area be set up at this location because the Cubans are already used to dealing with the government at that location. HEW concurs in this.

C.V. Clifton/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

261. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, January 4, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba, Security, 1963. Secret.

SUBJECT

Further organization of the Government for dealing with Cuba

On your oral instructions conveyed by General Clifton, I have met with an interdepartmental group to try to work out an improved arrangement for our handling of Cuban policy and action in 1963. The time is ripe for such a reorganization, because we seem to be winding up the negotiations in New York, the prisoners are out, and there is well nigh universal agreement that Mongoose is at a dead end. The people with whom I have been working are: Vance, Yarmolinksy and General Wheeler as delegates for McNamara and Gilpatric; Nick Katzenbach as a delegate of Bobby; Pat Carter from CIA; and Alexis Johnson and Ed Martin from State Department.

The following paragraphs represent my personal sense of what we have worked out together, and while there may be some small differences of point of view or need for revision, I think they are ripe for your consideration.

1. The first guiding principle is that final policy responsibility should remain with you, working with the Executive Committee when necessary. There is no point pretending that major Cuban policy decisions can be made anywhere else than in the White House, and your own executive role, supplemented by the Executive Committee when there are major policy issues or interdepartmental difficulties, is indispensable.

2. The more complicated matter is where to put day-to-day coordinating responsibility. After considerable discussion, the unanimous consensus is that we should locate this responsibility in a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, working as a deputy to Ed Martin in the State Department and acting as chairman of an interdepartmental group on Cuba. The Coordinator would be responsible to Dean Rusk and Ed Martin for departmental business, and, under their guidance, to you and the Executive Committee for interdepartmental coordination. Nothing in his authority would supplant the responsibility of other operating departments for management of their own assigned tasks, or their right to be consulted before their resources are committed; but it would be clear that you and the Executive Committee were looking to the Coordinator and his interdepartmental committee for effective execution of your policy decisions. In ordinary circumstances, the necessary coordination will be carried out effectively by good will and good sense on all sides. When there is an honest difference that cannot be resolved it will, of course, have to come upstairs one way or another.

The key to this administrative organization is, of course, the individual appointed as coordinator. The recommendation of the State Department is that Sterling Cottrell should be given this job. He has been doing a very solid and constructive job as head of the Vietnamese Task Force, and he is due for reassignment to Latin American Affairs, which turns out to be his preferred professional field, both by experience and by interest. He has the necessary professional seniority in the Department, and high interdepartmental acceptance. He has worked well with the White House staff.

If this arrangement should be approved, the Cuban desk of the Department would be absorbed in a new, higher level Office of Cuban Affairs under Cottrell, with Bob Hurwitch as his deputy. Hurwitch has done a very able job within the Department, but he is a little junior for a major job of interdepartmental coordination. At the same time, Cottrell would be expected to find and appoint a deputy coordinator, to be based in Miami, to handle day-to-day relations with Cuban refugees and with interested agencies of Government on the spot. Bob Orrick has been asked to expedite effective interdepartmental administrative support, as necessary, for both the Coordinator and the Miami office.

3. If a Coordinator for Cuban Affairs is established, then we think the Mongoose office should be disbanded and responsibility for covert operations should be a part of the work of the Coordinator and his associates from other departments, reporting on covert activities to the Special Group (5412) in the normal way. The Special Group would in turn be guided by broader policy as established by you through the Executive Committee. The covert aspects of our Cuban enterprise are not the most important ones, at present, and they need to be handled in the wider context of an open Cuban policy, centered in a visible office of Cuban Affairs. Such a change would liberate General Lansdale for many other tasks in which his services are uniquely valuable.

4. The problem of organization is of course less than half the battle: what we really need is to sort out our policies toward Cuba. There are a number of loose ends, large and small, of which the following are samples:

a. The shipping orders and the broader question of economic pressure on Cuba are still unsettled. Executive Orders have been prepared along the lines of your press conference statement, but they are being held up, as I think Dean Rusk has explained to you, pending discussion with OAS and other Allies. The State Department will take any public rap for this delay.

b. The organization and handling of refugees needs restudy. We need a much more open and continuous communication with refugee leaders, and we need clarification of the opportunities to be offered to Cuban volunteers, whether or not they are veterans of the brigade. If we can manage it, we need to get a stronger process of representation of free Cubans.

c. We should intensify our investigation of ways and means of communicating with possibly dissident members of the Castro regime, perhaps including even Fidel himself. Donovan, for example, has an invitation to be Castro's guest at the beach of Veradero, and there is work to be done also in our relations with men like Manolo Ray.

d. The role of intelligence officers needs to be redefined. The very large commitment of the CIA to Mongoose activities should be reexamined, and probably substantially reduced, and the role of CIA as an apparent spokesman and agent of the United States Government in Cuban affairs should probably be reduced still further--although this in no sense reflects on the Agency, which has been trying to do what it was told to do.

e. The political, psychological, and personal aspects of the effort to isolate Castro's Cuba should be pursued intensively in the OAS. We do not want Cuba to be a hemispheric training ground for Communists, and we have not exhausted our weapons here.

f. We need to keep up a continuous and high-level barrage of public statements explicitly defending our rights of surveillance. You said on television that the camera will be our best inspector and this position should be energetically sustained.

g. The question of Pan American flights should be reviewed. My own view, which Ed Martin shares, is that it is probably to our advantage to have such flights, and that Juan Trippe should not be allowed to get away with poor-mouthing on the cost to Pan American. Over the long run this franchise is of the highest importance to Pan American, and nothing I have heard about their marginal losses is very impressive.

5. It would help to have your general reaction to these matters by Monday./1/ If you approve, we could put the organization into effect at once and have a preliminary discussion of the substantive issues by Cottrell's people with the Executive Committee before the end of next week.

/1/January 7.

McG. B.

262. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 7, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President in Palm Beach, Florida--9:45 a.m.--Saturday--5 January 1963

The meeting was brief. General discussions consumed about an hour. Secretary Rusk was present during the latter half which involved Cuban program.

1. McCone generally reviewed the Killian report,/1/ stated it was a good report, indicating that it "called the glass of water half full, not half empty," the report was well received but only a part of the total review being made by the Killian Board and that the DCI could not forecast a final Killian Board position. McCone stated that he personally felt the Intelligence Community had done a good job but looking back in retrospect he felt that they could have done better. DCI expressed the feeling that principal errors or intelligence deficiencies were:

/1/The final Killian report, February 4, submitted to the President, is in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 361-371.

a. Failure to press aggressively overflight program between August 29th and October 14th and this was due to timidity throughout the government, including the Intelligence Community for fear of a "U-2 incident" once SAM sites were detected in Cuba. This foreclosed earlier detection of the existence of offensive missiles.

b. A conviction on the part of government officials and intelligence estimators that the Soviets would not accept the responsibility of a confrontation which would result from placing of offensive missiles in Cuba and

c. Because of this conviction the estimators and others in Government failed to fully evaluate many indicators which, if carefully analyzed, would lead to the conclusion that something more than defensive armament was going into Cuba.

The President seemed inclined to believe estimators should not be criticized for their judgment as it was reasonable to assume the Soviets would not place themselves in an indefensible position militarily, they would assume we would find out and would respond and this would place them in a difficult position, which it did. Furthermore he felt the SAM sites placed the Soviets in an awkward position for if they used them against one of our airplanes we would be inclined to respond militarily and they could not defend the SAM sites. In general the President agreed with Sherman Kent's position that the Soviets made a bad guess as to our response.

2. The President questioned me concerning refugee reports and I responded substantially as summarized in the Killian report, indicating the only refugee or agent reports dealing significantly with offensive missiles came in on or after September 20th and at most there were only 8 or 10 out of a total of some 1200 reports.

3. The President asked if the 5412 Committee reviewed raw intelligence of this type and I responded that their doing was not within their province, that raw intelligence was circulated to the Intelligence Community and that matters of significance should be brought to the members of the 5412 Committee through their respective intelligence officers and, if necessary, such matters should be considered by the United States Intelligence Board. I maintained that handling of raw intelligence was not a problem for 5412 Committee.

Action: In view of the importance placed on the 5412 Committee by the President, we should insist that the Committee meet regularly and for a sufficient time for review of their responsibilities (and not be crowded off the calendar by the Special Group CI) and furthermore that action papers be sent to the members of the 5412 Committee not later than Tuesday morning for consideration the following Thursday.

4. With respect to Cuban policy, the President expressed concern over the welfare of the prisoners, urged that arrangements be made to barracks them at Opa Locka or elsewhere in order to avoid growing distress and criticism. DCI agreed to go into this with proper authorities.

There followed an extended discussion of policy with respect to Pan American flights. The President wished them resumed but did not feel doing so should be in response to a demand by Castro. It was therefore agreed that DCI would meet with Donovan and arrange for him to go to Havana and work out suitable considerations for the resumption of flights which would specifically avoid the appearance of responding to a Castro demand.

5. The President spoke favorably of the Cuban Task Force outlined in the recent Bundy memorandum/2/ which would be chaired by State with departmental representation. The President also recognized the need for CIA to complete liaison arrangements with free countries, indicating that this should be pursued aggressively even if it required DCI to visit several countries personally to work out these arrangements.

/2/Document 261.

6. DCI reported proposed meetings with the Chairmen of CIA Congressional Committees and later with the Committees themselves. The President agreed. Both McCone and the President felt that DCI line should not be defensive but rather should indicate that a substantial intelligence success occurred.

7. The President suggested that McCone prepare a briefing for the Leadership meeting on Tuesday afternoon./3/ He questioned DCI concerning Keating issue,/4/ asked where Keating had gotten his information and why Keating had stated that 95% of it came from within the government. McCone answered that he had no verification of this and that he was convinced that Keating information had come from refugee sources. In answer to a question McCone stated that he had concluded that the first offensive missiles reached Cuba between the 2nd and 9th of September.

/3/January 8; see Document 265. The material McCone used for the briefing of the Congressional leadership is in the Supplement.

/4/Senator Kenneth B. Keating (R-N.Y.), one of the Kennedy administration's most persistent critics, charged that the administration was purposefully overestimating the extent of Soviet withdrawal from Cuba and downplaying the Soviet presence still in Cuba.

8. McCone advised the President that he expected an investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which would probably be initiated by a demand from Senator Lausche.

John A. McCone/5/

Director

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

263. Editorial Note

On the morning of January 2, 1963, Vasiliy Vasilevich Kuznetsov met with John McCloy to inform him that the Soviet Union greatly preferred the short form of the draft letter as contained in Document 258. Kuznetsov handed McCloy a revised joint letter of which the second paragraph was substantially different from the U.S. draft. According to telegram 2558 from the Mission to the United Nations, January 2, the Soviet Union's draft second paragraph reads:

"The USSR and USA Govts believe that in view of the understanding reached between them and of the progress in the settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean area there is no further need for this item to occupy the Security Council attention at this time, though it has not been possible fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this crisis."

After consultation by telephone between Stevenson and Rusk, the United States Mission was authorized to transmit the following draft second paragraph to Kuznetsov:

"While it has not been possible for our Govts fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the considerable progress that has been made, it is no longer necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the SC at this time."

If the Soviets objected to this second paragraph, McCloy was prepared to agree to substitute the following:

"The Govts of the Soviet Union and the United States of America believe that, in view of the understanding reached between them and of the progress in the settlement of the crisis, there is no further need for this item to occupy the attention of the SC at this time, although it has not been possible fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with it. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January Meetings)

McCloy and Francis T.P. Plimpton met with Kuznetsov and Mendelevich, Kuznetsov's assistant, at the Soviet Mission at 5 p.m. on January 3. Kuznetsov deplored the omission of the reference to "understanding" in the new U.S. draft's second paragraph. Kuznetsov maintained there was an understanding and it was in the interests of both sides to include the word.

Kuznetsov presented a new Soviet draft of the second paragraph which reads:

"While it has not been possible for our govts fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and of the progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is no longer necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the SC at this time."

Kuznetsov pointed out that the Soviet draft closely followed the United States draft. McCloy countered that he was disappointed that the Soviet Union did not accept the United States draft. Both men agreed to minor stylistic revisions in the third paragraph of the letter. McCloy told Kuznetsov that he would consider the Soviet draft and let Kuznetsov know his answer. (Telegram 2587 from USUN, January 4; ibid.)

After discussion with U. Alexis Johnson in Washington, McCloy telephoned Kuznetsov on January 4 and told him that the United States agreed to the insertion of the word "understanding," but within the context of the phrase "degree of understanding." McCloy also insisted on the phrase "extent of progress." Kuznetsov objected to these qualifiers, but McCloy commented that his opposition seemed weak by reason of the inclusion of "understanding." (Telegram 2600 from USUN, January 4; ibid.)

On the afternoon of January 5 the Soviets accepted the U.S. draft as conveyed to Kuznetsov by McCloy in the January 4 telephone call. The two sides agreed to sign and release the joint letter on January 7. (Telegram 2617 from USUN, January 5; ibid.) All the telegrams referred to above are in the Supplement.

The joint letter as submitted to the United Nations Secretary General, January 7, reads:

"On behalf of the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our Governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area.

"While it has not been possible for our Governments to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connexion with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.

"The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connexion with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war." (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, page 243)

264. National Security Action Memorandum No. 213

Washington, January 8, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 213. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

TO

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT

Interdepartmental Organization for Cuban Affairs

The President has approved the following organizational arrangements to facilitate the coordinated management of all aspects of our current policy toward Cuba; final policy responsibility of course remains with the President, working with the Executive Committee of the National Security Council when necessary.

1. Day-to-day coordinating responsibility will be vested in a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State, acting as Chairman of an Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba. The Coordinator will be responsible to the Secretary of State for State Department business, and under his guidance to the President and the Executive Committee for interdepartmental coordination.

2. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee shall consist of the Coordinator and representatives of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Representatives of other departments will be associated with the work of this committee as necessary in particular cases. Officers shall also be detailed to the Office of the Coordinator from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, HEW, CIA, and USIA. Other departments and agencies may be requested to participate in the work of the Interdepartmental Committee and in the work of the Coordinator's Office as appropriate. A White House officer will maintain liaison with the Coordinator and with his Interdepartmental Committee.

3. The President and the Executive Committee will look to the Coordinator for effective coordination of the execution of policy decisions, and for timely recommendations on new courses of action. The Coordinator will work through his assigned officers and with the Interdepartmental Committee in meeting these responsibilities.

4. The Coordinator's authority will not supplant the responsibility of other operating departments or agencies for the management of their assigned tasks or their right to be consulted before their resources are committed. Differences which arise will be promptly referred to higher levels of resolution.

5. The Coordinator will name a full-time representative who will open an office in Miami to represent the U.S. Government in relations with Cuban refugee organizations and coordinate the implementation of all Federal programs being carried on in the area, relating such programs to State, local and private programs.

6. The Coordinator will assume the same responsibility for covert operations as he does for overt actions. However, he will report on covert matters to the Special Group which will be guided by broader policy established by the President through the Executive Committee.

McGeorge Bundy

265. Editorial Note

On January 8, 1963, President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Director of Central Intelligence McCone met with the bipartisan Congressional leadership from 5:30 to 6:35 p.m. Attending were Senators Mike Mansfield, Hubert H. Humphrey, George Smathers, Richard Russell, Everett Dirkson, Thomas Kuchel, Leverett Saltonstall and Bourke Hickenlooper and from the House of Representatives were Speaker John McCormack, Representatives Carl Albert, Hale Boggs, Carl Vinson, Thomas Morgan, Charles Halleck, Leslie Arends, and Frances Bolton. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

McCone drafted a brief memorandum for the record of the meeting, noting that McNamara gave a briefing on South Vietnam "expressing an optimistic point of view"; Rusk briefed the Congressional leaders on the Cuban negotiations at the United Nations and on the Congo; and McCone briefed them on Cuba. McCone noted that there were "no significant questions" from the Congressional leadership.

McCone's January 8 briefing statement was attached to his January 9 memorandum for the record. In it he stated that the Soviet Union had withdrawn 42 strategic missiles, 42 jet bombers and their related equipment and about four or five thousand military personnel associated with the maintenance and operation of this equipment--leaving approximately 17,000 Soviet troops still in Cuba. McCone noted that the Intelligence community believed, but could not prove by aerial recon- naissance, that these withdrawals represent all the strategic weapons placed in Cuba by the Soviet Union. Aerial reconnaissance would reveal if strategic missiles were reintroduced or reactivated. McCone stressed that there was still a substantial Soviet military presence in Cuba. McCone summarized the situation as follows: "Castro remains in control, his attitudes seem unchanged, but the Soviets have retained sufficient military capability in Cuba to give them powerful leverage on Castro should he oppose their policies too actively." McCone finished his briefing with an overview of the current areas in Latin America in danger of subversion directed by Moscow and Havana. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963) For McCone's briefing paper and memorandum for the record, see the Supplement.

266. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 9, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Guthrie, cleared in draft by Thompson, and approved by the White House on January 14. The meeting was held at the White House and lasted until 6:02 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book) The Department of State prepared a January 9 briefing memorandum for the President for this discussion. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1161/1-963) See the Supplement.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador at Large

John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

USSR

Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich, Assistant to Kuznetsov

Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, First Secretary of Embassy (Interpreter)

Kuznetsov thanked the President for receiving him, saying that he considered this an honor, particularly in view of how busy the President is. He said that he had come to New York on Khrushchev's instructions to assist the UN Secretary General in the handling of the Cuban crisis. The Soviet Government considered that this part of the negotiation has been completed and that it would therefore be useful to meet the President and pay his respects. Everyone in the USSR understands that Khrushchev's instructions played a crucial role in the troubled days of crisis in the Caribbean and that as a result the danger of a thermonuclear war had been averted. The President had also displayed understanding. And so he had been instructed by his Government to make certain observations on the situation and related matters.

The President said that he appreciated Kuznetsov's coming to Washington and noted that Mr. McCloy had told him he had been very courteous throughout the New York negotiations and had made every effort to work out a satisfactory solution. He noted that Kuznetsov's stay in this country, while not as long as Mikoyan's in Cuba, had been lengthy and that he appreciated his efforts in New York.

Kuznetsov said that Messrs. McCloy and Stevenson and others had been very experienced. The atmosphere of the talks had been business-like and they had clearly expressed the United States viewpoint. He agreed with the President that the results had not been everything that had been hoped for. He said that under instructions he wished to comment on the results of the situation in the Caribbean. The Soviet Government and people are constantly working to improve relations with the U.S. In Moscow great significance is attached to the fact that throughout the Caribbean crisis the United States and the U.S.S.R. acted on the basis of trust and mutual understanding. Whether this basis can be maintained, including that personally between the President and Chairman Khrushchev, and whether the clear and definite commitments made during the negotiations and exchange of letters can be maintained would determine whether other international problems could be settled in the future. The Soviet Government will firmly adhere to the commitments it undertook toward Cuba and proceeds on the assumption that the United States Government will do the same. The fulfillment by both sides of these agreements will be a touchstone of the ability of the two powers to trust each other's word and to avert a military conflict. Speaking frankly, he had to say that during the course of the talks in New York on the settlement of the Caribbean crisis, especially during the last stages, the U.S. side handled the matter not in a way it seems it should have if it were also seeking to create trust between the two states. The Soviet Government would like to believe that the United States Government will in the future act in a manner which would not bring the world to the abyss of a thermonuclear war. The crisis in the Caribbean demonstrated with great clarity that both countries should act in accordance with the United Nations Charter concerning relations between all nations, large and small. Without this, there could be no guarantee that the United States and the U.S.S.R., which possess powerful armaments, will not confront each other again. Furthermore, the demonstrative welcome by the President of the Cuban refugees could not but be noted in Moscow; demonstrations like this revive the shadows of the past and leave their mark on the present. The overcoming of the crisis on the basis reached, puts other problems in the forefront: Chairman Khrushchev spoke of this in messages to the President and in public speeches. Two main problems to be solved are the question of the German peace treaty and the question of general and complete disarmament. Without eliminating the remnants of World War II it will be impossible to achieve normal relations and without the trust such relations engender general and complete disarmament would be impossible. The Soviet Government will make every effort to move the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee ahead and is prepared to do everything that would contribute to the success of these negotiations.

The President said that he thought Kuznetsov knew from his talks with McCloy and Stevenson of the particular sensitivity in the United States to anything involving Cuba. This is a delicate nerve in the United States stretching back to the beginning of our country. On the other hand, the President said, he was anxious to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. He had noted before that these two most powerful countries have no national interests which bring them into collision. The President had spent a good deal of time defending this viewpoint prior to the Cuban crisis. Now that the matter had quieted down he saw no reason why the United States and the U.S.S.R. should be involved again in the same way. He asked Kuznetsov to explain to his principals American sensitivity over Cuba. The fact that there are 15 to 17,000 Soviet troops still in Cuba causes difficulties for the United States Government and for those in the United States who seek to maintain good relations with the U.S.S.R. The President said the Soviet Government could understand how the United States felt about this if they could imagine a similar situation in Finland. He was hopeful that Soviet policies toward Cuba, including the personnel and armaments there, would lead to a further relaxation of the situation. As to the question of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, the President said he had put them on the beach and he felt responsible for them. He had not said in his address to them that the United States would invade Cuba, though he had expressed the hope for a change in the situation there. All the U.S. forces which had been mobilized during the crisis were back in their camps. If the Soviet Union can comprehend the sensitivity and difficult nature of the problems the United States faces in the Caribbean, this can lead to a solution of other problems.

In reply, Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Government will fulfill all of the obligations it undertook with the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and the President. As for the Soviet military personnel in Cuba, it seemed to him that all the agreements in the exchange of letters had been carried out. This problem had been dealt with in the course of the exchange and there was a clear understanding on both sides concerning this matter. The Soviet Government will abide by all its agreements so there is nothing new in this problem.

The President noted that Khrushchev had given a clear commitment to withdraw all military personnel connected with the missile sites in Cuba and all others "in time". He recognized that the latter was not the same kind of commitment since no time was specified. Nevertheless, he wanted to mention this matter which occupied attention in the United States.

Kuznetsov reiterated that he thought that there was no misunderstanding on this point.

Referring to the President's comparison of the Cuban situation with Finland, Kuznetsov noted that there were many U.S. military bases, armed with deadly weapons and occupied by troops, around the U.S.S.R. However, he had no instructions on this point and said that the U.S.S.R. is not raising the question at this time.

The President replied that the U.S. had not introduced a new major base in any country such as Finland. A thermonuclear base there would have created a new situation. He repeated that Cuba was a matter of great sensitivity to the American people and again asked Kuznetsov to communicate this to his Government. Good relations between our two countries, the President said, will be made easier if the Soviet Government understands this.

Kuznetsov reverted to the question of the President's reception of the Cuban brigade in Florida./1/ He said this had created the opinion in Moscow that this brigade will be maintained, that others will be created and that then there would be a fresh invasion of Cuba.

/1/See footnote 2, Document 260.

The President replied that this was not going to happen. In a backgrounder which he had given in Florida he had said that the United States had no intention of invading Cuba and noted that our position remained that which he had set forth in his press conference of November 20. He said there would be no third hand invasion of Cuba. Nevertheless, it would be easier for the United States if there were a reduction of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. The President noted that Castro makes many more speeches than the President does and in them calls for revolution in Latin America. However, Castro was of no concern to the United States. The relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are more important and the President was anxious to lessen areas of disagreement between the two countries.

Kuznetsov replied that while the results of the New York negotiations were not as great as they might have been, the situation was better now than it had been at the end of October. The immediate threat had been averted. However, normalization of relations required that something else should be done. No one can agree that a situation is normal when a great power threatens a small one, and officially expresses a desire to strangle and overthrow the government of the smaller one. Thus, some problems remain and further normalization of the situation depends on the United States Government. During the New York talks, the Soviet side had mentioned a tripartite protocol in which the head of the Cuban Government would have obliged himself to abide by the United Nations Charter and not to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries. If the United States Government fears Cuban actions, perhaps it should reexamine this protocol.

The President reiterated that the United States was not concerned with Cuba but with the Soviet military presence there. He noted a number of speeches which Castro and Che Guevara had made during the last two months calling for armed struggle in Latin America, saying that small bands of guerrillas would act as a catalyst in the process of taking power from the hands of the Yankee imperialists and insisting that this must be done in a large number of Latin American countries. He read a quotation from an interview by Che Guevara on November 23.

Kuznetsov replied that he was not at all sure the quotes which the President had made from the Cuban speeches were exact. It seemed to him that the Cubans had far more reasons to fear and worry than the United States. Ever since the beginning of the 1959 revolution, Cuba had been under various undermining pressures. The Cuban Government and Castro had made quite clear their willingness to negotiate with the United States concerning all points awaiting solution. The United States could respond to these Cuban proposals in order to normalize relations. He noted that the New York talks had been between the United States and the U.S.S.R. but that the problem had been made more difficult by the fact that they had been talking about another country./2/

/2/Kuznetsov met earlier with Secretary Rusk at noon in Rusk's office. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 63 D 330) See the Supplement.

267. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 12, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, 1/1/63-2/17/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith on January 15. The meeting took place in the President's office and lasted until 11 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President--Cuba Aerial Reconnaissance

OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Director McCone, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Assistant Secretary Tyler, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen, Mr. John McNaughton

Mr. Bundy said that we had evidence of greater participation of Cuban nationals in the air defense system of Cuba which raised the possibility of an attack on one of our reconnaissance planes. Although the President was not being asked to reach a decision today, the group did wish to discuss two questions:

a. In the event there is a radar lockon of one of our planes, does the plane complete its mission or abort?

b. Is our need for information about the cargo of a Soviet ship approaching Cuban waters sufficient to fly low-level reconnaissance, both day and night, including flights during the time the ship is being unloaded in port?

The President asked why a plane should abort in the event of a radar lockon.

Mr. Bundy replied that if the plane continued on its flight, it is possible it would be shot down. Secretary McNamara said he did not think we should permit ourselves to get into a situation where we would have lost a plane and not yet have decided how we would respond to such hostile action. He suggested that there were three possible courses of action:

a. We could fly a reconnaissance mission, have a plane shot down, and then decide how we would react.

b. We could fly missions equipped with our most sophisticated electronic countermeasures equipment. The cost of using the ECM equipment would be the possibility of compromising highly advanced and highly classified instruments.

c. We could use alternative equipment such as drones.

In response to the President's question, Secretary McNamara said we did not have yet positive proof of a radar lockon on any of our planes although we had evidence indicating radar tracking.

The President said that he thought the Defense Department should decide whether or not to use our sophisticated ECM equipment. He said he intended to believe that if it appeared that the Cubans were taking actions with a view to shooting down one of our planes, the plane should abort the first time this happened and we could then prepare ourselves for prompt reprisals in the event the circumstances were repeated.

Mr. Bundy said that during this week there would be no change in the present rules regarding aborts by reconnaissance planes.

Director McCone said he favored using the U-2 in good weather, but if the weather were bad, he thought we should fly low-level missions.

Secretary McNamara said that he did not agree with low-level aerial reconnaissance in bad weather because the loss of a U.S. plane or the controversy arising out of low-level flights would be all out of proportion to the value of the information obtained from pictures taken at a low-level. He said that the cargo of the Soviet ship/1/ probably did not consist of missiles and that certain knowledge about it was not worth the complications arising out of low-level flights.

/1/McCone prepared his own memorandum of record of this meeting on January 12. In it he indicated that the ship being referred to was the Simferopol and that the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance had recommended it be subjected to round-the-clock photography at 4-hour intervals. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963) McCone also wrote a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, January 15, explaining his views on surveillance of the Simferopol. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III) For both these memoranda, see the Supplement. According to a January 17 memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy on the advice of Rusk and McNamara, the President authorized only high-level surveillance of the Simferopol. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III)

Director McCone said that CIA was trying to find out what was in the cargo and would continue to do so during the time the cargo was being unloaded, but he was not certain that they would be able to obtain the information we wanted. He expressed a view that the cargo might contain armaments dangerous to us.

Mr. Bundy said there were political problems immediately ahead of us, such as Donovan's proposed visit to Havana in connection with the remaining prisoners in Cuba and Kuznetsov's visit this week. He said the group would return to the President at a later time when more information was available.

Secretary McNamara said the Defense Department would be prepared to carry out low-level missions on very short notice if the President so decided.

Bromley Smith/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

268. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, January 18, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, 1/62-9/62. Secret.

The President has mentioned again his interest in maximizing the information we get from Cuba by other sources than air surveillance, and has asked me to report this interest to you. He would like to know what we are now doing to encourage visits to Cuba by knowledgeable and friendly observers of other nationalities, and also whether our arrangements with friendly countries having embassies in Havana are as effective in this respect as they should be. He would like to know what additional measures are being taken in this respect. He believes that we should be able to arrange for regular visits to Cuba of visitors of a rank and sophistication which would give them access to high authorities of the Cuban government, and make their reports correspondingly valuable. He would like to know what plans are proposed for this purpose.

McGeorge Bundy/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

269. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

CIA/RR CB 63-10

Washington, January 19, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label. Secret. Prepared by the Office of Research and Reports.

THE CUBAN ECONOMY IN 1961 AND 1962 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1963 THROUGH 1965

Summary and Conclusions/1/

/1/The 9-page discussion portion of the paper is in the Supplement.

The Cuban economy during 1963 probably will not decline further in total output and may show some improvement in comparison with 1962. Cuban GNP in 1962, measured in 1958 prices, is estimated to be 25 percent below the 1958 level. The total supply of available goods, however, was only about 20 percent lower than in 1958 because Cuba ran a trade deficit in 1962 that was substantially higher than the deficit in 1958.

Total agricultural output will not increase much during 1963, for the sugar harvest probably will decline slightly from last year, largely offsetting moderate gains in other crops. Industrial production will increase to some extent as Cuba's new managerial class gains experience and the economy begins to regain some of its lost efficiency. Investment also probably will expand as a number of new industrial projects are started during the year. The dynamic upward improvement of prices in the world sugar market probably will raise Cuba's export earnings in 1963 above the 1962 level. The increase will not be enough, however, to finance the required volume of imports, and Cuba will still require large balance-of-payments credits from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

It appears probable that the Cuban economy will continue to improve during 1964 and 1965. The government is making vigorous efforts to expand agricultural production. The traditional failure of most Communist regimes to achieve satisfactory results in agriculture, however, precludes the prediction of any dramatic successes for Castro in this sphere during 1964-65. Continuing improvement at the managerial level may well yield further increases in industrial production. Investment activity also probably will continue to expand. Finally, the outlook for export earnings suggests that Cuba will remain dependent on the Bloc for large industrial and balance-of-payment credits.

270. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, January 19, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Cuban Coordinating Committee

The following are some further thoughts on the work of the Committee:

1. Future Policy Toward Cuba--As I mentioned to you in my memorandum of January 18,/1/ Secretary Vance submitted a paper to the Committee which identified two possible courses of action in trying to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba: (1) a policy of applying increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, and (2) a policy of applying political, economic, psychological and military pressures as appropriate opportunities present themselves./2/ In presenting the paper to the Committee, Secretary Vance made it abundantly clear that while he had identified an alternate course of action, the identification did not include an endorsement--he had not yet reached a decision on that question.

/1/Not found.

/2/This paper, in what was apparently a final form, is Document 272.

While, on the surface, Bob Hurwitch seems to have accepted the consideration of an alternative course of action in the policy paper, he undoubtedly views it coldly. He believes strongly that such factors as (1) our hope to act with full OAS support, and (2) Presidential statements about our non-aggressive intentions, necessarily limit our policy to one of applying pressures as opportunities present themselves; this is neither a "hard" nor "soft" policy but the only politically realistic policy. Deep down, I think he regards the consideration of the so-called "active policy," at best, as a useless exercise and waste of time and, at worst, as an insidious attempt by DOD dreamers to bring to life a policy which will earn battlefield promotions at the expense of U.S. national interest. I can't say yet how far Mr. Cottrell goes along with this view.

On this one, I'm with Secretary Vance. The alternate course of action is substantively worth focusing on. Also, the educational aspect is important. Both Mr. Cottrell and Secretary Vance are new at the Cuban business. If they are to be really effective in their new roles, it seems worthwhile that they think through basic courses of action which may appear to others to be unattractive. The process need not turn out to be either very time-consuming or dangerous.

After you received the phone call from Secretary Vance,/3/ I passed your message to Mr. Cottrell. He and Mr. Vance planned to meet late Saturday/4/ afternoon to thrash out the policy paper.

/3/No record found.

/4/January 19.

2. CIA vis-a-vis the Miami Office (Mr. Crimmins)--I mentioned to you in a previous memorandum that at one meeting, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], the CIA representative, viewed the work of the Miami office in a narrow sense; he obviously was reluctant to see Mr. Crimmins getting involved in CIA business. Bob Hurwitch tells me that this problem is under control. He said (1) that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had simply not gotten the word, (2) that Mr. FitzGerald and others in CIA do have the word, and (3) that there is no need at present to make an issue of this point.

3. Timing of Meetings

The following meetings on Cuba are scheduled for this week:

Monday, 2:00 PM--Cuban Coordinating Committee at State

Wednesday, 10:30 AM--Mr. Cottrell, Secretary Vance, Mr. Helms, Mr. Dungan, with you in your office

Thursday, 10:00 AM--ExCom/5/

/5/January 21, January 23, and January 24. For the account of the Executive Committee meeting originally scheduled for January 24 at 10 a.m. but postponed until January 25 at 4 p.m., see Document 274. No records of the other meetings have been found.

4. Papers

Papers for the ExCom meeting/6/ will be distributed on Tuesday afternoon.

/6/See Documents 272 and 273.

Gordon Chase/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

271. Notes of President Kennedy's Remarks at the 508th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, January 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings, 1963, No. 508, 1/22/63. No classification marking. A note at the top of the memorandum indicated it was drafted by a "CIA Reporter." McGeorge Bundy prepared a briefing memorandum, January 21, for the President for this meeting. (Ibid.) The portion of Bundy's memorandum on Cuba is in the Supplement.

Other memoranda of this meeting exist. One apparently by Bromley Smith, January 22, is ibid; another by Maxwell Taylor, January 22, is in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor's Memos for Record; a third, apparently by a Department of State official, is in Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/1-2263.

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments--both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crisis and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate courses of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union--and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.

The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba. Cuba might be our response in some future situation--the same way the Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready--although this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military, in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had Berlin to limit our actions.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

272. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, January 24, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.000/1-2463. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that this paper was prepared for the Executive Committee meeting of January 24, which was postponed to January 25, see Document 274.

SUBJECT

United States Policy Toward Cuba

There are submitted for your consideration two alternative statements of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba. Alternative I was prepared by the Department of State. Alternative II was prepared by the Department of Defense. The Coordinator's Recommendation that Alternative I be approved, and the Department of Defense non-concurrence, appear at the end of this paper.

Alternative I

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS;

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U.S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days.) These orders:

a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

4. At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

Alternative II

United States Policy

1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension; erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities, negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of four point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of and participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U.S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U.S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U.S. will not permit the maintenance of a Communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures of Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U.S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U.S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

Coordinator's Recommendation

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

Statement of DOD Representative

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U.S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

273. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, January 24, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2463. No classification marking.

SUBJECT

Papers for NSC Executive Committee Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to members of the NSC Executive Committee for consideration at the meeting of the Committee on Friday, January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8 for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade."/1/ The other two papers transmitted on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be considered at the Friday meeting. They are: "United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States"/2/ and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."/3/

/1/The memorandum on the Cuban Brigade is in the Supplement with the addition of the new page 8.

/2/Attached, but not printed.

/3/Not printed; see the Supplement.

CCW/4/

/4/These typed initials appear above Brubeck's typed signature.

Attachment 1

Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

SUBJECT

Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U.S. Policy Objectives

The following should be the objectives of the U.S. with respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

Note: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U.S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

Attachment 2

Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

SUBJECT

United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

[Here follows a list of objectives identical to that in Attachment 1.]

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS 24 hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days.) These orders:

a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission Conference--January 28-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assist-ant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtainin