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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

276. Summary Record of the 40th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, February 5, 1963, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. IV, 38-42, 1/25/63-3/29/63. Top Secret. The meeting was in two parts, the first on Cuba, the second on Europe. Only the first part is printed here. The meeting, held at the White House, lasted until 5:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

Director McCone circulated copies of the attached memorandum on the status of Soviet military forces in Cuba./1/

/1/February 5. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

The President asked that the U.S. Intelligence Board statement of the Cuban situation be sanitized and made public tomorrow/2/ and similar statements at frequent intervals thereafter. He said it should include the latest intelligence information. In releasing it, Mr. McCone should make clear that the Board wanted to receive all information from anyone who had it. The Board would thus be in the position of welcoming information from all sources with a view to obtaining the best picture of the Soviet military posture in Cuba. The President also asked Mr. McCone to ask Congressman Bruce for the information which he has. In the President's view, if we acted promptly in putting out all our information within the next two or three days, we would be able to stem the tide of Congressional criticism, turn it to our advantage, and reduce the problem to manageable proportions. Secretary McNamara felt that the President should make a press statement at his press conference Thursday/3/ or possibly a television show should be arranged. He said the briefing on our intelligence from Cuba would be very impressive and, by the use of aerial reconnaissance pictures, we could reveal how extensive our present surveillance efforts have been and now are.

/2/The statement, February 6, was made public by McCone. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence) See the Supplement. On February 6 at 3 p.m., Secretary McNamara gave a special briefing at the Department of State on Soviet military presence in Cuba. The text of the 51-page briefing, including questions and answers, is in Washington National Record Center, RG 330, OSD-McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Cuba.

/3/The President answered five questions on the topic at his press conference on Thursday, February 7. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 148-155.

General Taylor noted that Congressional hearings on the Defense Department budget had turned into a Congressional investigation on Cuba. Most of the time Secretary McNamara has spent on the Hill was taken by Cuban questions rather than military budget problems.

The President said the way to clarify the numbers problem was to refer to the level of Soviet military forces in Cuba in July, in November, and today, rather than to compare the level from July to today. He suggested that correspondents from the Hill and the State Department be invited to join those covering the Defense Department for briefings about the situation in Cuba. He said that the 4500 Russian troops which have been withdrawn from Cuba since about November 1st is conclusive proof that there is not a Soviet military buildup in Cuba. He suggested that General Carroll's briefing on Cuba might be made public. In addition, a backgrounder could be held following Director McCone's statement to the Congressional Committee.

With regard to questions put to military officers concerning the implications of the Soviet military presence in Cuba, the President stressed the importance of speaking with one voice. He said we should neither exaggerate nor minimize the Soviet presence in Cuba but it was important that military and civilian officials take the same line. He acknowledged that we do not know why the Russians are keeping their troops in Cuba. They may think we are planning an invasion and therefore want their troops there. On the other hand, they may be keeping their troops in Cuba in order to control Castro.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that domestic partisan pressure for an invasion of Cuba can be dealt with by pointing out that the previous Administration did not invade Cuba when it would have been easy to do, i.e. before the Soviet buildup. Now, the cost of invasion would be greatly increased.

The Attorney General expressed his concern that in all statements about Soviet military presence in Cuba we should not forget to include a caveat that we may not be seeing everything going to Cuba. He did not think we should take the risk of being accused later of not having seen something in Cuba now which turned up there in the future. He also was uneasy about the prospect of our helping the Russians by giving the public everything we know about Soviet military presence in Cuba. In response to the President's question, he suggested that release of sanitized intelligence information be done via Congressional Committees rather than directly to the public.

The President pointed out that his efforts along with those of the Departments of State and Defense had been unsuccessful in convincing many people that we knew exactly what was going on in Cuba. He said he believed a new effort should be made, namely, to use the USIB in the hope that doubting citizens would accept the testimony of our top intelligence officials. He repeated his belief that we should go as far as we possibly can in making public intelligence information in an effort to get the situation under control this week. Thereafter, we might talk to responsible Congressional Committee chairmen, proposing a procedure somewhat similar to that suggested by the Attorney General.

Cuban Reconnaissance

The President called attention to reports that a Soviet incoming ship would arrive on February 8th loaded with what was suspected to be military equipment. He noted the request of KOMAR/4/ for low-level reconnaissance flights in order to be certain that we knew the exact nature of the cargo of this Soviet ship./5/ The President said he felt there are two limitations on our use now of low-level reconnaissance missions; (a) negotiations to obtain the release of U.S. prisoners in Cuba, which he understood might be successfully concluded sometime in early March, and (b) possible withdrawal of Soviet military personnel. Low-level flights might influence a Soviet decision involving the removal of their troops from Cuba. The Russians might misread low-level reconnaissance flights as an indication of our preparing ourselves for military action in Cuba and decide that their forces must remain to counter anticipated U.S. actions. He requested that a letter to Khrushchev be drafted raising again the question of when the Russians plan to pull back their troops.

/4/The abbreviation is incorrect, it should be COMOR (Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance).

/5/In McCone's record of this meeting he recounted that he expressed one reservation on low-level flights: the effect on the Donovan mission. In response to a question from the President, McCone answered that the Simferopol was under careful surveillance. If the ship offloaded at Havana, low-level reconnaissance would not be productive because of the proximity of receiving warehouses to the dockside. If the ship docked at Matanzas or Mariel, low-level photography would be productive. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, February 6; Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963)

Director McCone said he wished to reserve on the low-level recommendation until we knew whether the incoming Russian ship would dock at Havana or Mariel. If it came into Havana, the problem of knowing the nature of the cargo was much more difficult than if it docked at Mariel where facilities were such that its cargo would have to be displayed on the dock and thereby visible to high-level cameras.

Secretary McNamara said that the USIB had listed twenty-one targets in Cuba which they wish to cover with low-level reconnaissance missions involving fourteen sorties. He said the risk of the loss of a low-level U.S. plane is very slight, but the risk of a strong Soviet and Cuban reaction is very high. In addition to the two limitations mentioned by the President, Secretary McNamara thought a low-level flight might initiate escalating actions which would place in jeopardy our current high-level reconnaissance flights. He said he saw no military need for the low-level flights but did recognize that there was a domestic political problem which had to be met. In his view, low-level flights are justified only under two circumstances; (a) when we have reason to suspect that offensive weapons are being reintroduced into Cuba, and (b) when we are preparing for an invasion and must have current information in order to do our military planning.

General Taylor acknowledged that there was a military need to know but not necessarily tomorrow. He agreed with Secretary McNamara that there was very little risk of one of our planes being shot down. He also referred to the requirement that our intelligence be kept up to date so that we could keep our invasion plans current. With respect to intelligence on incoming Soviet ships, he said the Chiefs felt less strongly about the need for intelligence and were prepared to recommend low-level flights on a case-by-case basis. He acknowledged that once a Soviet ship was in harbor we obtained a great deal of information from agents in Cuba.

The President decided that we should send a letter to Khrushchev on the Soviet troop withdrawal problem but not undertake low-level reconnaissance flights until we knew where the Soviet ship would dock.

Director McCone said that the intelligence community was very concerned about unexplained military activity taking place on Cape Francis, an island some ten miles offshore Cuba. He suggested that a low-level flight over this area would be highly useful but added that he shared the views expressed by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor as regards the U.S. prisoners in Cuba. He said he suspected that Donovan would be concerned if he were asked what effect such flights would have on his negotiations.

The President said we would decide on the reconnaissance missions on Friday. His current view was that if the Soviet ship went to Mariel we should probably overfly it. If we carried out this mission, we should probably also overfly Cape Francis.

Shipping Order

Mr. Bundy summarized the instruction to U.S. agencies which would prohibit the shipment of U.S.-owned goods on Free World ships engaged in the Cuba trade. The President approved the directive and agreed that its release should be made from the White House./6/

/6/See Document 277.

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson reported that the proposed action had been explained to numerous Congressmen who, in general, felt it was a proper action to take. He also reported that efforts would be made to explain the directive to the International Longshoreman's Association in the hope that this Union and labor in general would not frustrate the implementation of the directive by refusing to accept it as an adequate measure to take against Cuba.

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

277. National Security Action Memorandum No. 220

Washington, February 5, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 220. No classification marking. Copies were sent to the members of the Executive Committee.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Agriculture

The Secretary of Commerce

The Administrator, Agency for International Development

The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT

U.S. Government Shipments by Foreign Flag Vessels in the Cuban Trade

At its meeting on February 5, 1963, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council considered United States policy with respect to shipments financed by the Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture, General Services Administration, and the Agency for International Development on foreign flag ships engaged in the Cuba trade./1/ The President approved the recommendation that such cargoes should not be shipped from the United States on a foreign flag vessel if such vessel has called at a Cuban port on or after January 1, 1963. The President agreed that an exception may be made as to any such vessel if the persons who control the vessel give satisfactory assurance that no ships under their control will, thenceforth, be employed in the Cuba trade so long as it remains the policy of the United States Government to discourage such trade. The Secretary of State is to be consulted on the form and content of any such assurances.

/1/See Document 276.

The Secretaries of State, Defense, and Agriculture, the Administrator of AID, and the Administrator of GSA were directed to take such steps as may be necessary to carry out this policy.

The Secretary of Commerce is to make available to the appropriate Departments current pertinent information which he may have on ships engaged in the Cuba trade.

McGeorge Bundy

278. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 6, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only.

On February 5, DCI met with Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Ball to discuss the COMOR proposal for low-level overflights. There was a lack of agreement. Secretary McNamara explained the plan for seven sorties (utilizing 14 planes) to cover all of the targets. This was exclusive of the COMOR recommendations for covering the unloading of ships by day and night. McNamara did not advocate the program but merely explained it. DCI advocated the program; Rusk stated he did not advocate it but did agree to the mission over Cayo Francis.

McCone stated he felt the situation in Cuba was more ominous than thought by many in the Administration./1/ He felt that if the Soviets wished merely to control Castro and to maintain Cuba as a base for infiltrating Latin America, they could do so at much less cost and with much less provocation than the present program. He therefore warned that in his opinion we could expect a more ominous situation relative to Cuba--perhaps the introduction of offensive weapons again. DCI said that Khrushchev had taken one step backward, we could expect him to take two steps forward surreptitiously.

/1/At the White House daily staff meeting on February 7, Bundy noted that McCone "was something between concerned and angry because some of Secretary McNamara's statements did not agree with some of his (McCone's) statements already on record." Bundy appeared worried that this could result "in the first big, internal, high-level personality clash of this administration." Bundy himself said the difference in their views "was a simple reflection that McCone is afraid of the military situation in Cuba while McNamara is not." (Memorandum for the record by Lawrence Legere, February 7; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, February 1963)

At 11:30 DCI met with the President and Mr. Bundy. The discussion revolved around conditions in Cuba and the presentation to be made to the Executive Committee later in the afternoon./2/ McCone repeated his concern about the situation in Cuba, also the danger of either threatening to halt or actually halting our U-2 reconnaissance. The President said that would bring a new confrontation and that as far as he was concerned would require action. McCone said he felt that both Rusk and McNamara did not share this determination. It was agreed that the DCI should make a public statement on the situation in Cuba, and the President ordered a statement prepared./3/

/2/See Document 276.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 276.

John A. McCone/4/

Director

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

279. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretaries of the Army (Vance), Navy (Korth), and Air Force (Stahr)

Washington, February 8, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Confidential.

SUBJECT

Armed Forces Training Program for Members of the 2506 Cuban Brigade

The attached military training program/1/ for members of the 2506 Cuban Brigade, is approved. The Secretary of the Army, as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for all aspects of Cuban policy, will direct implementation of this program by the Services. The military departments will be prepared to begin processing both enlisted and officer Brigade members by 25 February 1963.

/1/Attached, but not printed.

It is recognized that adequate personnel standards must be maintained, but the objectives of this program must not be frustrated by unduly rigid adherence to current high induction standards. The age limit for induction of enlisted men of the 2506 Cuban Brigade for the attached program will be 18 through 34. The age limit for commissioning Brigade officers will be 21 through 45. Notwithstanding existing Service policies and regulations concerning temporary appointments of non-declarant aliens as commissioned officers, Brigade personnel who apply for officer training and who meet stated requirements will be commissioned in the Service of their choice as ensigns or second lieutenants.

After completion of training, Brigade members who desire to continue on active duty will be permitted to do so if they qualify and are selected. Enlisted trainees who, upon completion of their training, do not continue on active duty may be discharged or, if they desire and are qualified, will become members of the standby Reserve. Officers who, upon completion of their training, do not continue on active duty will be released or, if they desire and are qualified, will become members of the standby Reserve.

The Air Force will conduct all English language training provided for in the attached program.

The Army will induct Brigade members from age 35 through 50 who volunteer and meet appropriate qualifications for a special eight week military training program. Upon completion of this training program, such inductees, if they desire and are qualified, will become members of the standby Reserve.

The Miami Armed Forces Induction and Examining Station will provide for group processing of Brigade members and for their transportation to designated training centers.

Funding and manpower requirements resulting from implementation of the program will be absorbed by the military departments. Expenditures in connection with this program should be identified separately.

Robert S. McNamara/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

280. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 9, 1963, 3 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CUBA-US. Secret. Drafted by Gutherie and approved in S on February 18. The meeting took place in Rusk's office and lasted approximately 45 minutes. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

The Secretary told the Ambassador that Cuba is still a troublesome problem. In his talk with Ambassador Dobrynin at lunch on February 8, Ambassador Kohler had referred to Cuba as something that was poisoning our relations./1/ This was an accurate statement. President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev understand that the United States has no desire or intention to invade Cuba. It was not possible, however, to make a wholly unqualified commitment concerning the future, as this depends on the attitude of the Cuban Government. If Cuba wishes to live in peace then there will be peace in the Caribbean. However, we were not encouraged by the way in which Castro has attempted since January to whip up violence in Latin America. Subversive activities in Venezuela and elsewhere make the future very uncertain. As for the Soviet presence in Cuba, the United States is concerned over the fact that the movement of Soviet forces out of Cuba has stopped while additional military equipment continues to enter the island. We had supposed that the troops connected with the operation and protection of the missiles which had been emplaced in Cuba would be removed. Evidently some Soviet troops had been sent there initially to protect these weapons but these troops were still there although the weapons had been removed. Training was clearly not the mission of these troops as there are few Cubans to be found where the Soviet forces are. The presence of these troops contributes to the heightened tensions in our relationship. Therefore, we hope that the Soviet Government will find it possible to reduce tensions by making it clear there is no Soviet military build-up in Cuba and that there is an intent to further reduce the number of Soviet forces there, as Khrushchev had indicated would be the case. The Secretary had noted a press report of a conversation which Khrushchev had had with a Canadian businessman in which Khrushchev had stated all the Soviet troops in Cuba were on a training mission. Clearly, the Secretary said, not all of them are there for this purpose.

/1/No other record found.

The Secretary went on to say that the President has a serious problem over Cuba. Last August and September he had tried to calm down the American people on this issue. However, the events of September and October were not only serious in themselves but had reduced the President's credibility in the eyes of his own people. Now, it was not so easy for the President to reassure the country over Cuba. The American people remember what Senator Keating had said last August and what the President had said and Keating's speculation had turned out to be correct. This situation makes it very difficult for the President to calm the atmosphere in the United States. We hope, therefore, that steps will be taken in Cuba to make it clear that Cuba is not being prepared as a base for adventure in the rest of the hemisphere. We do not agree that a Soviet military presence in this hemisphere is a normal situation. The Cuban question is clearly poisoning United States-Soviet relations and we strongly urge the Soviet Government to do what it can to reduce this complication.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied that he assumed the Secretary's reference to Castro's activities since January referred to Castro's speech of January 2. It should be remembered that many things were being said in the United States. Castro's speech was a point by point reply to statements made by the President. The President had just told the Bay of Pigs prisoners that their banner would again fly in Cuba. The Ambassador asked the Secretary to consider how Castro regards threats from the United States. He also noted that the Cuban Government was very unhappy with the result of the United States-Soviet negotiations on Cuba. The Ambassador said that he could not believe the United States fears Cuba and that the Cubans have a rather natural resentment against the large country only 90 miles from their shores. While he personally believed the President's pledge not to invade Cuba, the Cubans did not believe it. The Secretary replied that we do not of course fear Cuba but that we do link Castro's speeches with subversive activities in other countries. He told the Ambassador he would give him more precise information subsequently about Cuban subversive activities.

The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary was seeking some clarification regarding the status of the Soviet military personnel in Cuba. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and reiterated that we were looking for some outward movement of Soviet forces now there. The Ambassador promised to report this conversation to his government./2/

/2/On February 18 Dobrynin handed Rusk an aide-memoire stating that the Soviet Union had decided to withdraw from Cuba "Soviet personnel connected with the protection of the types of weapons withdrawn from Cuba and likewise some of the military specialists involved in training Cuban troops. It is intended to recall from Cuba in the nearest future--before the middle of March--several thousand men." (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/63-3/63) See the Supplement.

281. Message From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 13, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret. According to an attached covering letter from Carter to Rusk, February 13, McCone (who was in Europe) sent this message to Acting Director Marshall S. Carter, asking that he give a copy to Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and the members of the USIB. Carter assured the addressees that the Deputy Director (Intelligence) and the Office of National Estimates were at work evaluating the matters raised by McCone.

1. I am growing increasingly concerned over Soviet intentions in Cuba. The agent report of deep verticle wells, three to four meters in diameter in Pinar del Rio is not satisfactorily answered by negative surface indications or the absence of spoils as quantities of earth involved could be trucked away and hidden from view and other signs of workings could be easily camouflaged. I therefore feel we cannot dismiss this possibility on the basis of negative photographic interpretation and analysis.

2. Several recent events contribute to my growing concern over the possibility of reintroduction of an offensive capability in Cuba and I wish the entire Intelligence Community to intensify efforts to satisfactorily answer this question. In addition to reports mentioned, the receipt of two shiploads of unexplained military cargo and the precipitous discharging of the cargos by military personnel, together with news of a possible third cargo, is to me an ominous sign. In addition Khrushchev's false and absolutely misleading statement that his technicians were in Cuba to train Cubans is inconsistent with the facts as were his and Dobrynin's statements prior to the October crisis.

3. Furthermore, the disarmament proposals by the Soviets in Geneva yesterday were so obviously unacceptable to the West (as they have been on numerous occasions during the past ten years) that I believe they were stated as a justification for a Soviet offensive weapons base in Cuba than for any other purpose. Certainly they were not advanced for the purpose of serious negotiation.

4. In view of all of the above, I am inclined to the view that it is highly dangerous for the Intelligence Community or spokesmen for the Government to take a categoric position concerning the possible exist-ence or future clandestine development of an offensive threat and am inclined to place greater emphasis on my statement that this can only be proven by penetrating and continuing on-site inspection.

282. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, February 14, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Confidential.

SUBJECT

Isolation of Cuba

There seems to be very little doubt that Cuba has been substantially isolated from the Free World.

1. Only about 5 OAS countries maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba and all of the OAS countries, to a lesser or greater degree, regard Castro as a menace.

2. Free World shipping to Cuba has fallen precipitously during recent months. There are about 1/2 as many Free World ships travelling to Cuba now as opposed to the period before the quarantine.

3. Cuba's trade with the Free World has dropped considerably over the past few years--trade with the Free World totaled about $1-1/2 million in 1958 as opposed to $200 million in 1962.

4. Free World air services are extremely limited. At present only Mexico and Spain permit flights to Cuba.

This isolation has not come about accidentally. We have actively encouraged this isolation unilaterally (shipping restrictions), bilaterally (representations to certain countries trading with Cuba), and multilaterally (OAS).

If he can help it, I don't think the President should play too hard this afternoon/1/ on the great job we are doing by isolating Cuba; it may come back to haunt us. While a policy of isolation has some advantages (e.g. highlights the problem and sets the scene for more drastic action in the future) it is becoming quite clear that isolation from the Free World does not hurt Cuba in any real sense (e.g. total import levels remain the same). It may well be that at some future date we will find it in our interest to back off some of our formal and informal restrictions on contact between the Free World and Cuba. The real crux of the matter, of course, is to isolate Cuba from the Soviet Bloc.

/1/Reference is to the President's press conference, February 14, which included questions and answers on Cuba; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 172-180.

I would much prefer to see the President steer away from the isolation issue and instead try to get across to the American people a sense of perspective in viewing the Cuban problem.

GC

283. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, February 18, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Report of a Possible Revolt in Cuba on February 20th/1/

/1/The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared an assessment on February 18 of reports of a possible revolt. The assessment acknowledged the possibility of a small uprising in one or more parts of Cuba, but doubted the likelihood of a large-scale uprising. (Ibid.)

The discussion at State this afternoon brought out the following points regarding the possibility of a revolt in Cuba on February 20th.

1. Both State and CIA doubt the reliability of the report. CIA noted, however, that if such a thing were about to happen, the report of it would come in just this way.

2. One of the tough questions--what size and type of revolt is worthwhile to support? Do you determine this by the number of people involved? The geographic area it covers? etc. The revolt should have a potential political appeal to a large cross section of Cuban people. For example, a revolt by a number of disgruntled farmers would not meet this criterion.

3. There was some discussion of a possible outline of action. First, there could be a deniable airdrop of supplies by CIA while the U.S. military arm began to wind up. This could be followed by a limited airstrike within about twenty-four hours and a full island air-strike within seventy-two hours. It would take a maximum of eighteen days to mount a full invasion force. Between the full airstrike and the invasion, things could be going on--e.g. special forces dropped in Cuba. A diversionary action should be initiated quickly so that Castro cannot concentrate his forces on the insurgents, leaving us no one to liberate.

4. The presence of Russian troops, of course, presents a very sticky problem. One of the first targets would be the SAM sites and inevitably Russians would be killed. The effect of this on Khrushchev would have to be weighed.

Perhaps we could tell Khrushchev what we are going to do and advise him to take all Russians off the SAM sites and move them to restricted areas. In this regard we could risk a flight or two over the SAM sites to test whether he has followed our advice.

If the prospects for the removal of the Russian troops in the near future look very good, we may want to dampen the revolt for now--broadcasts by Cuban exiles that Castro is setting a trap.

5. The present Department of Defense off-the-cuff estimate of fighting in Cuba is that there would be four or five days of heavy fighting and another thirty days of less severe fighting. There might or might not be prolonged guerrilla activity. If the campaign is short and sweet, there probably will be less guerrilla fighting afterwards.

6. It was noted that the invasion would violate the Havana Treaty (can respond to calls for help only by recognized governments)./2/

/2/The Havana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, signed at Havana on February 28, 1928; see 46 Stat. (Pt. 2) 2749.

Sterling Cottrell is zeroed in on this and hopes to have something over here between noon and 1:00 PM on Tuesday./3/

/3/On Tuesday, February 19, Brubeck sent Bundy a memorandum on the reports of the uprising and an attached "Alternative Course of Action in the Event the Reported Large-scale Uprising Occurs." The plan of action envisioned recognition of and assistance to the insurgents including air strikes, unconventional warfare, and an invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces. The plan recommended no action until the uprising occurred and there was a call for help from the insurgents. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63)

GC

284. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 19, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Hearings Before the Committee on Export Control. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to McNamara and McCone. In a covering memorandum Bundy asked for any corrections or additions. A handwritten note on the cover memorandum indicated that Rusk said it was "O.K. with him," and Bundy's office was informed.

As a result of a discussion on Monday, February 18th, from 5:30 to 7:30, a consensus emerged among the four of us on the following guidelines for discussion of various aspects of the Cuban problem, both in public and in Executive Session.

1. The invasion of April 1961 and its aftermath

It was agreed that only those who had had an active part in the April invasion would discuss it before Congressional committees. With respect to the prisoners of that operation and their exchange, all questions would be referred to Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach or Mr. Robert Hurwitch, who would be made available to testify to any appropriate committee. Questions relating to the future of the released prisoners would be referred to Mr. Cottrell of the Cuban Coordinating Committee.

2. Intelligence collection and evaluation in September and October 1962

a. It was agreed that the first responsibility in discussion of this subject belonged to the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. With respect to statements made by Administration officials in September and October, it was our expectation that these statements would turn out to be consistent with the agreed estimates of the intelligence community at the time, except where an individual might have signalled a personal view as being at variance with the estimates. (The only individual known to me who may have done this is Mr. McCone himself.) It was agreed that CIA would prepare, in consultation with State and Defense, a full record of these estimates which could then be submitted in whatever way seemed most effective to deal with charges against such witnesses as Mr. George Ball and Mr. W.P. Bundy.

c. It was agreed that all witnesses should explain that unverified refugee and agent reports were not normally forwarded to high policy officers and that before the 15th of October the prevailing intelligence judgment was that there was not credible evidence of offensive missiles in Cuba. (This is the conclusion of the DCI's coordinated report to the President's Board, pp. 47-48.)/1/ There were reports of sufficient interest to lead to targeting of the overflight of October 14th, but no reports which led to changes in the estimates of any intelligence agency as reported to the President's senior advisers.

/1/Apparent reference to the Killian Report.

d. With respect to overflight policy, we agreed that all flights requested of the President were authorized by him; all priorities set by the USIB were accepted; only one low-level flight was proposed by a senior intelligence officer, and this one (for overflight of Banes) was held up until appropriate efforts had been made by a high-level flight. The absence of this low-level flight did not prevent positive identification of the Banes site in intelligence publications of September 17th.

e. It was agreed that refugee reports proved useful, but that they were not adequate for positive identification without photographic confirmation.

f. We also agreed that Senator Keating was not in fact way ahead of the Government with respect to offensive weapons. His first assertion that there were missile bases in Cuba came on October 10th. By that time, the President had already authorized the flight of October 14, which was targeted for the verification or disproof of raw reports of the sort upon which Senator Keating appears to have relied. The Senator took a chance on unverified information. The Executive Branch made arrangements to check it in the most effective possible way. We need not feel defensive over having chosen this course of action.

g. With respect to "management of news," the fact is that there was no special control over the dissemination of verified information except between October 15th and October 22nd. There were justified limitations upon widespread dissemination of unverified information. There were also, by some Administration spokesmen, too energetic assertions that because we did not have credible evidence of Soviet personnel and weapons beyond those in the agreed estimates, no such personnel or weapons were in fact in Cuba. This was to assert a negative which in the nature of things could not be certain, and we should accept the fact that some overstatements were made.

h. We agreed that, on balance, and judged by the result, a basically creditable job was done on the intelligence front. Effective and timely reports were produced on all weapons systems before they became operational. That very sensitive intelligence weapon, the U-2, was used without public clamor and with decisive effect. A denied area was penetrated accurately and in time. We also agreed that in retrospect there were discernible weaknesses in this process: as, for example, that the estimates took too little account of the possibility of a dangerous new departure in Soviet policy; that there was a lack of all-out energy in framing and presenting intelligence requirements; that delays in executing approved reconnaissance missions were not reported upward, or monitored downward; and that dissenting recommendations were not carried to the President. Remedial action on all these matters is in hand under the Director of Central Intelligence, who himself accurately anticipated the Soviet move.

3. The present situation

a. The military position. We hoped that our current estimates could be ironed out closely between CIA and Defense, especially on the following points:

(1) That the agreed number of missiles and bombers did leave and that our inspection at sea was convincing.

(2) That our policy on surveillance is to conduct steady high-level overflight and to use low-level flights when it is agreed in particular cases that they are necessary.

(3) That our estimates on MIGs, submarine bases and FROGS are what they are, and that any apparent discrepancies are due to personal opinion or differences in methods of statement not to disagree to estimates.

(4) There is an important distinction between offensive weapons and defensive weapons--a distinction which was first made by the President in September--although many spokesmen have correctly pointed out that one must be careful about making this distinction too hard and fast.

b. Subversion. It was agreed that the State Department would take the lead in stating our view of policy toward subversion toward Cuba, and Mr. Edwin Martin has agreed to circulate to all concerned his authoritative statement on the subject delivered to the Latin American Sub-Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 18, 1963.

4. General assessment and policy

It was agreed that insofar as possible, we would all be guided by authoritative Presidential statements on these matters, and I shall circulate later today a set of the relevant Presidential statements since November 20, when the President first made an authoritative summary of the U.S. position as it stood after the October crisis.

McGeorge Bundy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

285. Editorial Note

On February 21, 1963, the U.S. Intelligence Board considered and approved a report of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance recommending that high-level photography of activities related to impending movement of Soviet personnel and equipment in Cuba be supplemented by low-level photography and night photography. Low-level photography would target Soviet ships in Cuban ports and unidentified installations. (Memorandum to the U.S. Intelligence Board from James S. Lay, February 21; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb. thru April, 1963) For text of the memorandum and the attached report, see the Supplement.

Also on February 21 the Central Intelligence Agency submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board a special estimate, SNIE 85-2-63, "Reactions to U.S. Low-Level Overflights of Cuba." The estimate concluded that Soviet and Cuban forces would refrain from hostile action against three or four low-level missions per week for 2 weeks. Should the flights continue without interruption or increase, Castro would press the Soviet Union for military counteraction. The Soviet Union would temporize, seeking a political or propaganda campaign against the flights. The Soviet Union might pass private warnings to the United States and initiate diplomatic negotiations to end them. Faced with continued flights and Soviet refusal to act, the estimate suggested that Castro would probably take unilateral action against low-level reconnaissance planes. The Special Estimate did not predict at what point Castro would attempt to act. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry) For text of SNIE 85-2-63, see the Supplement.

286. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 21, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II (Thompson). Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Tyler, and Hillenbrand.

SUBJECT

Visit of Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Soviet Ambassador came to see me at 6:00 p.m., Wednesday, February twentieth, and informed me with reference to the statement which we propose to make in regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba/1/ that the Soviet Government proposed a substitution of the following sentence for the first sentence in our draft statement:

/1/The text of the proposed U.S. statement, given by Thompson to Dobrynin on February 19, reads: "Following discussion with the Government of USSR and in accordance with assurances received from Chairman Khrushchev in November, U.S. Government has been informed by Soviet Government that several thousand Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Cuba before middle of March. This government understands that passenger ships are en route to Cuba for that purpose. U.S. Government considers this action by Soviet Government useful step in reduction of international tensions." (Telegram 1755 to Moscow, February 19; Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR)

"The Soviet Government has informed the United States Government of its intention to withdraw from Cuba by the middle of March several thousand Soviet military personnel having to do with guarding the kinds of weapons which were removed from Cuba and also some of the military specialists who were occupied in training Cuban military cadres."

I inquired whether he thought his Government would object to our keeping in a reference to the fact that there had been discussions between us on this subject. He said he was not authorized to agree to any change and understood that if we accepted the proposed Soviet draft, Moscow would not feel obliged to make any statement. If this were not the case, his Government would probably make a statement of its own in which it would set forth its position. I said it did not seem to be either in their interest or ours for it to appear that the Soviet withdrawal was a result of all the noise that had been going on recently about this matter and wondered if he thought there would be any objection to the President making the statement as proposed by the Soviet Government but, in reply to questions at his press conference, making reference to the discussions which we had had./2/ The Ambassador was reluctant to commit himself, but indicated he thought this would be all right.

/2/For text of the President's news conference on February 21, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 206-207.

The Ambassador then read me the following oral statement:

"The Soviet Government cannot disregard the fact that during recent days there has taken place in the USA a real rush and devils sabbath in connection with the question of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. In this connection statements are made, one more reckless than the next. Some permit themselves even to resort to threats against the Soviet Union. It stands to reason this will in no sense contribute to a clearing of the international atmosphere and to an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. If all this continues and if the necessary restraint is not shown, then naturally, this will require the other side to state its attitude toward such a kind of performance in the USA and give the necessary rebuff to unbridled and irresponsible people who, raising a provocational racket in connection with the question of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, are obviously trying to exert pressure on the Soviet Union.

"These persons are deeply mistaken if they think that anything is permitted to them and that there are no forces which could withstand them. They clearly fail to take into account that other countries, in this case the Soviet Union, have the possibility of putting such people in their places, if they themselves don't know how to put themselves in their places and come to reason.

"In Moscow they wish to express the hope that the noisy and unbalanced chorus of voices hostile to the Soviet Union, which are still giving forth today, will give place to a more reasonable approach to the matter, which would meet both the interests of repairing Soviet-American relations and the interests of lessening international tension."

I pointed out that the position of my Government on the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba was well known and I saw no need to repeat it. So far as statements by others were concerned, he was, of course, aware that we did not control nor inspire such statements. The Ambassador said he understood and that his Government had similar problems.

287. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 25, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II (Thompson). Secret.

SUBJECT

Aide-memoire of February 25, 1963/1/

/1/The aide-memoire stated that the United States would appreciate further information concerning arrangements for withdrawal of troops from Cuba, and expressed the view that comprehensive information on this matter was in the interests of both sides. (Ibid.)

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, USSR

Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State

The Soviet Ambassador telephoned me about 10:00 this morning to say that he could not transmit to Moscow the attached memorandum which was handed to the Soviet Counselor by Mr. Guthrie on February twenty-third. He pointed out that the memorandum implied an agreement which did not exist. I inquired if it would be satisfactory if we left out any reference to the conversation I had had with the Ambassador./2/ He replied that, speaking personally, he thought this would be considered in Moscow as a kind of ultimatum since the Soviet Government would have to either accept our proposed procedures or protest them. He said if we wished to propose an agreement with the Soviet Government on this subject, he would, of course, transmit our proposal, but he could not transmit the memorandum.

/2/Apparent reference to a February 21 Dobrynin-Thompson conversation; the memorandum of the conversation by Thompson reads:

"At the White House reception last night, I had just started talking to the Soviet Ambassador when the President walked up. In the course of the conversation, I said I had just been on the point of suggesting to the Ambassador that it would be in our mutual interest for them to arrange a boat drill on the vessel taking Soviet troops out of Cuba in order that we could get some good pictures.

"The Ambassador replied that he did not think we would have any difficulty whatever getting good pictures by the same methods we had used when the missiles were removed." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb-April 1963)

After discussion with the Secretary, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Bundy, who discussed the matter with Secretary McNamara by telephone, and after clearance with the President, at 1:00 p.m. today I handed the Soviet Ambassador the aide-memoire of February twenty-fifth on this subject.

After reading the aide-memoire, the Ambassador inquired what kind of information we were seeking. I replied that it would be helpful to know the names and times of departure of the ships involved, and added that if the Soviet Government could do so, I thought it would be most helpful to be informed of the numbers and types of troops involved. The Ambassador inquired whether it was intended that this information be made public. I replied that I did not think we would need to make public the fact that we might be informed of the names and departures of the ships, but that if they could give us the numbers of troops, it would be to our mutual interest that we be allowed to make this information public. I pointed out that our whole thought in this operation was that it was in our mutual interest that the public be convinced that the useful action being taken by the Soviet Government be convincingly confirmed.

Attachment

Washington, February 23, 1963.

With reference to Ambassador Thompson's discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin, February 21, the United States Government wishes to inform the Soviet Government that the United States will photograph outbound special interest passenger ships from Cuba during daylight and that aircraft and/or ships approaching for photographic coverage will:

a. Approach from the stern on a parallel course.

b. Take station well clear on either beam.

c. Fixed wing aircraft will dip wings: ships sound four or more blasts on the whistle, helos no special signal required.

This information is being provided in order that it will be understood by both the U.S. ship/aircraft and Soviet passenger ships involved as

a. An intention to approach closer without hostile intent.

b. An intent to overfly or close for photographic purposes.

c. Provision of opportunity for the Soviet ship to have its embarked troops on topside, and

c [d]. An understanding that both are to come up on 500 kcs for radio communication should such be required.

288. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 25, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Secret. Also sent to McNamara and McCone. In an attached personal memorandum to the same three men, Bundy stated that in light of their comments, he had decided not to attempt a resume of guidelines for Congressional testimony as it would be subject to misunderstanding.

In a follow-up to our discussion of last week,/1/ I am circulating herewith certain documents which I think may be helpful to all who are called upon to discuss the problem of Cuba either in Executive Session or in public. These documents are:

/1/Document 284.

First, a compendium of the President's own principal comments on Cuban affairs./2/ The President's statements obviously represent the position and policy of the Executive Branch, and witnesses undertaking to explain the position of the Executive Branch on policy matters should be guided by these statements.

/2/Attached but not printed.

The second major document enclosed is a report prepared under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to intelligence on Cuba before and during the October crisis./3/ This account represents a coordinated report, and witnesses undertaking to discuss the matter will wish to be familiar with it. Since the subject is highly classified, it is assumed that witnesses without appropriate clearance will be cautious in commenting on it, and that witnesses who are more fully informed will take appropriate precautions as to the character of hearings in which they discuss it. Discussion of any possible modifications in our intelligence procedures growing out of this experience should be avoided by any witnesses not having direct responsibility.

/3/Apparent reference to a memorandum dated and distributed on February 27. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis--Miscellaneous) See the Supplement.

Finally, I am circulating copies of a public statement presented by Assistant Secretary Martin on February 18./4/ This statement is an unusually clear and comprehensive account of the problem of subversion, and witnesses called to testify on this subject will wish to be familiar with the official position presented by the Department of State.

/4/Printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1962, pp. 347-356 and March 18, 1963, pp. 404-412.

McGeorge Bundy/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

289. Memorandum for the Record

CM-351-63

Washington, February 28, 1963.

//Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-257-69. Top Secret. Drafted by Taylor on March 1.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President on 28 February 1963

All the Chiefs were present at the above meeting which lasted from 5:30 p.m. to 6:45 p.m. The following subjects were the principal topics of discussion.

a. The Cuba Invasion Plan.

(1) The Chiefs discussed the time-space factors in the implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 312 and 316 using the chart attached as Annex 1./1/ The President was shown why it would take approximately 18 days from decision to D-Day from present troop and ship dispositions. In order to reduce this time to something like 7 days, considerable prepositioning would be required in order to get Army/Marine units to the East Coast and to assemble the necessary cargo shipping. The Chiefs expressed the view that it was unlikely that a period of tension would not precede a decision to invade Cuba which would allow ample time for preparatory measures; hence, it was undesirable to make permanent changes of station of Army and Marine units which would upset the present disposition of strategic reserve forces.

/1/Not printed.

(2) The President expressed particular interest in the possibility of getting some troops quickly into Cuba in the event of a general uprising. He was told that only the airborne troops could arrive with little delay, that the first Marine elements would require about 7 days before landing. He asked the Chiefs to develop specific plans in anticipation of the need for this kind of quick reaction.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

f. Rules of Engagement. The President referred to the rules of engagement transmitted by the JCS to CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CINCSAC, and CINCONAD (number 8756 dated 22 Feb 63)./2/ After some discussion with the Chiefs, he directed that the phrase on hot pursuit contained in line 11 of sub-paragraph 1a be changed from "into Cuban air space" to "to Cuban air space." Following the meeting the Chairman transmitted this decision to the Director, Joint Staff for transmission to the field./3/

/2/Not found.

/3/In JCS telegram 8874 to CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CINCSAC, and CINCONAD, February 28. (Department of Defense, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense's Cable File, Cuba, 1963)

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

290. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 28, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, JCS Conferences with the President, Vol. II. 2/28/63-9/9/63. Top Secret.

On Rules of Engagement, the President made it very clear in the meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff today, and the Chiefs agreed, that they should amend the present Rules, which were approved in November, 1960. The President also made it very clear that according to the present Rules, in the case of an incident where we are attacked, etc., we can chase them to the Cuban airspace and not into it. These Rules will prevail until another incident arises. But the President feels that we must have a chance to decide in Washington whether or not this has been a political decision of Castro's government before we risk one of our aircraft flying clear into Cuban airspace and being shot down by one of their SAM outfits. He would hate to have this sequence of events occur without having a chance to evaluate the situation.

C.V. Clifton/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

291. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, March 4, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.

SUBJECT

Meeting with The President--4:30 p.m.--4 March 1963

The President stated he felt that an attempt was being made to drive a division within the Administration, most particularly between CIA on the one hand and State and Defense on the other. This he said worried him and he hoped we could avoid any statements on the Hill, publicly or to the Press, which would exacerbate the situation.

I replied that I felt there was no reason for all the furor and that I had prepared a background memorandum/1/ which, if used, would correctly project what had happened, all of which was understandable, and avoid the situation that worried him. I then pointed out that I well understood the problems within CIA as they felt that throughout September they had operated under an inhibiting policy and, knowing this from innumerable discussions with high authorities, had recommended only most limited overflights in September as they felt, and I feel correctly felt, that recommendations for a more aggressive program would undoubtedly have been refused to them. Nevertheless I felt the situation was adequately covered in my memorandum (referring to memorandum of 27 February, "U-2 Overflights of Cuba. . .")/2/ and, while the Sunday morning quarterbacks could possibly criticize failure to adopt a more aggressive program in September, it was my opinion that any photography prior to October 16 and 17 would not produce the type of evidence necessary for Executive action, particularly when OAS, British, German and French support was essential.

/1/Reference is to McCone's memorandum of February 27; see the Supplement.

/2/In a March 6 memorandum to McCone, U. Alexis Johnson stated that the Department of State reviewed his memorandum of February 27, "U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October, 1962." Johnson suggested that the memorandum be revised to exclude the descriptions of positions taken by various individuals and institutions. Johnson reasoned that if the U.S. Government was to "maintain that degree of frankness and freedom to state views out of which sound decisions can be reached, particularly on sensitive intelligence matters, it seems to me that we should seek to preserve the anonymity of our advice and deliberations." Johnson recommended that the memorandum be changed to a factual account of events. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. IV) See the Supplement.

McCone responded in a March 7 memorandum to Johnson that it would not be possible to make the changes suggested by the Department of State as he had already distributed it to members of the USIB, most of whom had already testified before Congress. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 64 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis, Miscellaneous) See the Supplement.

I then said there was considerable distress within CIA over their failure to act on my telegrams and I read to the President excerpts from several of the September telegrams. He expressed surprise that they were as firm, perceptive and detailed as they were and said, "You certainly had the situation sized up, but I was one of those who did not think the Soviets would put missiles in Cuba." He recognized that there was bound to be something of an internal problem but felt that we should minimize it and should not permit it to get into an interdepartmental row. I assured him this would not happen.

We then spoke of the decoration of the four lost fliers./3/ He said he would mention it at his Press conference, but seemed to favor withholding decorations for about two months. However, he favored ultimately giving the decorations posthumously.

/3/U.S. employees killed during the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The President queried me concerning the number of CIA people who had been killed or imprisoned in our operations and I said I would supply him with this information.

In summary the purpose of his asking me to call was to try to avoid a split within his organization and I assured him that I did not think one was necessary. However, I did point out that it was necessary for everyone to recognize and to understand that extreme caution was used through September in considering U-2 operations over Cuba.

292. Summary Record of the 509th National Security Council Meeting

Washington, March 13, 1963, 4:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 509. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Latin American Policy/1/

/1/On March 11 McGeorge Bundy sent the members of the National Security Council a memorandum explaining that the President was calling the meeting to have a "broader exchange of views" on Latin American and European policy. Bundy also submitted talking points used by Secretary Rusk in a recent talk to the Cabinet, dated February 28, which noted that while it was not a formal State paper, it was a "responsible statement of the main lines of our present courses." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

PRESENT

President, Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, General Taylor, Director McCone, Secretary Vance, Under Secretary Ball, Ambassador Stevenson, Administrator Bell, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Director Murrow, Director McDermott, U. Alexis Johnson, Assistant Secretary Martin, Assistant Secretary Tyler, Paul Nitze, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Dungan, Mr. Kaysen, General Clifton, Mr. Bromley Smith

The President opened the meeting by asking Director McCone for a summary of current intelligence on Cuba, as well as a summary of his recent experience on the Hill with Congressional Committees.

Mr. McCone reported that Soviet troops were withdrawing from Cuba; that between 1700 and 2000 had already left, more were probably leaving, but we had no knowledge of how many thousands would actually depart. Because there appears to be no movement of major items of military equipment, we do not know whether the Soviet troop withdrawal to date has actually affected the Soviet military capability in Cuba.

With respect to U.S. prisoners in Cuba, Mr. McCone reported that Mr. Donovan would be in Havana this week where he expects to arrange for the release of all U.S. prisoners without more conditions. Mr. McCone said we have held off flying low-level reconnaissance missions until the U.S. prisoners were out of Cuba. He hoped we could fly low-level missions just as soon as the prisoners were out.

Director McCone reported that the Stennis Congressional Committee will make a favorable report./2/ All members appear to be satisfied with the performance of the Intelligence Community and their public report will cite no intelligence gap to be criticized. Mr. McCone said the Congressional group pressed very hard with respect to future policy toward Cuba and Latin America. He said he told the group policy was beyond his competence, but on being pressed he told them there was a Cuba problem and a separate Latin American problem. He said he favored taking positive steps to prevent any other country from falling to Communism. As regards Cuba, he said first we must get the Soviets out and, after that, the Castro government can be broken up by a military coup favorable to the U.S. Mr. McCone said he favored a military uprising rather than a civil uprising. He concluded by predicting that the investigation of past actions in Cuba was about finished on the Hill.

/2/The Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, Senator John Stennis, Chairman, released a sanitized version of its report to Congress on May 9. The report concluded that while the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations made mistakes in some areas, U.S. intelligence "performed creditably" in other areas. The report discounted the idea of an "intelligence gap" between September 5 and October 14, 1962, but expressed concern that all Soviet strategic bombers and missiles might not have been removed and that there was a minimum of 17,500 Soviet troops remaining in Cuba. (Congressional Quaterly Almanac, Vol. XIX, 1963, p. 316)

The President indicated the Soviets may be pulling away from a Cuba withdrawal and apparently are not taking out the four armored groups now there. Secretary Rusk said that if the armored groups do not come out, we can go back to the Russians and remind them that these groups, which were used to protect the missiles, should come out as part of the commitment to remove missile-associated forces.

The President referred to a State cable which reported that Khrushchev is saying that we are moving away from our no-invasion pledge./3/ This may explain why Khrushchev is hesitant to pull out his troops. He asked that we raise this subject with Khrushchev within the week./4/

/3/Telegram 2241 from Moscow, March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR) See the Supplement.

/4/See Document 293.

The President asked whether we are doing all we can to isolate Cuba. He cited (a) free world trade with Cuba, (b) embargo of allied shipping, and (c) the movement of students and subversives into and out of Cuba.

Secretary Rusk indicated that we are keeping the pressure on, but acknowledged that unless the British take immediate action, we would have to raise with them the question of U.K. ships in Cuba trade. Assist-ant Secretary Martin called attention to the pressure which he had put on the NATO members during a recent trip to Paris.

The President asked for a report on current shipping restrictions and on what actions we would take as soon as the U.S. prisoners were out of Cuba.

Secretary Rusk commented that he did not believe it would be useful to demand the withdrawal of all Latin American missions from Havana. He said we had been working bilaterally on the Bolivians and the Uruguayans with a view to prompting them to break relations. Afterwards, we would suggest that Chile might break relations. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The President, referring to his forthcoming trip to Costa Rica,/5/ wanted to be certain that we avoided the impression that we want to go further on Cuba than we actually do. He was concerned that the Nicaraguans and the Guatemalans would want to take more forceful action than we are now prepared to take. He asked that we make certain that the other countries were aware of this problem prior to the opening of the Costa Rica meeting.

/5/Reference is to the President's trip for meetings with the Presidents of Central America, March 18-20.

Secretary Rusk commented that he believed that there was a real falloff in Congressional demands for the invasion of Cuba. He felt that in the last ten days the demands for military action had been decreasing substantially.

The President commented on the problem of persons going to and from Cuba. He said we have little hard evidence on who was moving and he referred to the use by Time magazine of the word "flood" to describe persons going to Cuba.

Mr. McCone indicated that he had told Mr. Luce that the use by Time of the word "flood," to describe the number of persons going to Cuba, was wrong. The President said he had also told Mr. Luce that the use of the word "flood" by Time's staff was an excellent illustration of how Time overstated situations. There resulted a humorous exchange to the effect that the President was delighted that Mr. McCone supported him in telling Mr. Luce that the word "flood" was wrong and leading the President to suggest that we should have meetings more often to be sure we were taking the same line.

Mr. Martin said that on the basis of the evidence we had, the number of trainees in Cuba has dropped off since last October.

In this connection, the President asked how we could sort out the students who come back from Cuba. Some become obviously activists in the Communist movement, but not all. He asked for further information on this subject.

[Here follows discussion of Haiti, economic development in Latin America, and independence for British Guiana.]

Mr. Murrow reported that we are getting our message through to the Cubans by radio even though some of our programs are being jammed. He said the missing ingredient in our message to the Cubans is hope. He believes we must present long-range plans on the future Cuba after Communism. Now, he said that we are unable to talk about the promise of the future.

In response to the President's question as to whether or not we had a speech on what we hope for the future of Cuba, Mr. Martin referred to the comments made to the Brigade in Miami./6/ The President thought something should be put in the communique at Costa Rica, but he was doubtful that we could develop an agreed future program because of splits among the Cuban exiles.

/6/See footnote 2, Document 260.

Secretary Rusk wanted to be certain that we do not create false hopes. Mr. Murrow felt we are entitled to issue some promissory notes.

The President said he doubted that we could do better than to try to get a statement from the Cubans of what they want.

Mr. Murrow said what was required was a U.S. government statement. Secretary Rusk said we did not want to do anything which would get in the way of the movement of Soviet troops out of Cuba. Mr. Bundy expressed his doubts as to whether actions we take now affect the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Under Secretary Ball thought we should involve the OAS in the work of developing plans for Cuba of the future. Mr. Martin agreed and said he would discuss it with the OAS members.

The President commented on the continuing pressure which he thought we would get from the Hill when it became clear that not all the Soviet troops were leaving Cuba. He said we should protect ourselves as best we can with the shipping policy, the trade matters, and the movement of persons, with the overall purpose of increasing the isolation of Cuba.

The President suggested that the group meet every week. He postponed discussion of the European policy until his return from Costa Rica. [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, March 13, 1963, 4:24 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson; cleared with Ball, Martin, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk and Johnson.

1933. Eyes only for Ambassador. With reference Khrushchev's statements to Trevelyan on US commitments with respect to Cuba reported Embtel 2241,/1/ President desires that you take advantage of suitable opportunity to point out to Khrushchev that the President's position has been entirely consistent on this matter and that the President is concerned that Khrushchev should feel there has been any change. The President clearly set forth our policy in his November 20 press conference, which stated inter alia "as for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. As I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this Hemisphere.'"

/1/See footnote 3, Document 292.

As the President said in his message of November 21, he regretted that Chairman Khrushchev had not been able to persuade Mr. Castro to accept a suitable form of inspection or verification in Cuba, "and that, in consequence, we must continue to rely upon our own means of information. But, as I said yesterday (referring to his November 20 press conference), there need be no fear of any invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course."

As the President has subsequently been very careful not to depart from the position taken in his press conference of November 20, he finds it difficult to understand how Chairman Khrushchev could believe that he is now in any way departing from his previous policy, with which Khrushchev had expressed understanding, as noted in the President's letter of December 14.

In your discretion and in manner you consider most appropriate, you should reiterate to Khrushchev that, in view of history this affair and in absence other means of verification contemplated in original undertaking embodied in President's letter of October 27 and Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 28,/2/ we must continue to rely upon our own means of information and any interference with our ability to obtain such information would bring about a most serious situation.

/2/Documents 95 and 102.

Chairman Khrushchev should also understand that Castro's belligerent attitude toward the other states of Latin America creates a most difficult situation for the President. Castro's threats toward such forward-looking and progressive leaders as Betancourt, in Venezuela (as well as others), followed by terrorist attacks, sabotage and bombing by terrorists within Venezuela who are publicly supported by Castro, make it difficult to believe that Castro desires to live in peace with his neighbors. The President hopes that Chairman Khrushchev continues to share the President's desire to reduce tensions in the Caribbean area and will thus exercise his influence on Castro to this end./3/

/3/In telegram 1950 to Moscow, March 14, the Secretary told Kohler that the last paragraph of this telegram was not intended to imply that the President "has any intention of invading Cuba under present circumstance, or otherwise modify the statement of policy set forth in the first three paragraphs." Rusk noted that Kohler would understand that the President "cannot make to Soviets any open-ended commitment which would amend or detract from our treaty obligations in this Hemisphere." (Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR)

Rusk

294. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 16, 1963, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret; Priority.

2315. Eyes only for Secretary. Deptels 1933 and 1950./1/ My meeting at noon today with Kuznetsov (Embtel 2311)/2/ lasted forty-five minutes.

/1/See Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto.

/2/Telegram 2311, March 16, informed the Department that as Khrushchev was on vacation, Kohler was meeting Kuznetsov at noon, March 16. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR)

I made oral statement to him as instructed Deptel 1933, prefacing it with sentences: "The President has been disturbed to learn of Chairman Khrushchev's remarks with regard to the President's position on Cuba. I have been instructed to inform you of the following in this regard, and to ask you to transmit it to Chairman Khrushchev." (I discussed with British Minister-Counselor Barker March 15 problems involved in referring to statement made by Khrushchev to British Ambassador Trevelyan, who absent from Moscow for few days visiting Leningrad. Barker saw no particular difficulty. In view of precise manner in which it was necessary to cite Trevelyan as source for Khrushchev's remarks, Department may wish consider providing FonOff with suitable fill-in.)

Following translation, Kuznetsov responded he should first of all say that he was very surprised by such a statement. With regard to SovGovt position on this question, it had been set forth with sufficient clarity several times, by Khrushchev in period both before and after crisis and in series of documents, as well as in discussions in New York that lasted almost two and half months. Kuznetsov was now wondering why USG was making such statement at this time. It was incomprehensible to him.

He continued, SovGovt has stated its views with regard to President's statement in his November 20 press conference and with regard to questions he had raised there. Basic documents in this matter were letters exchanged by Khrushchev and President October 27 and 28, which contained obligations of two sides. With regard President's November 20 statement, SovGovt could not accept it in full. He wished to recall to me that SovGovt had not agreed with claim of USG that it had assumed right to conduct flights over territory of another state. By virtue of this claim, USG was disregarding sovereign right of Cuba and was assuming policy "from position of strength" towards Cuba. This was dangerous policy.

My raising question of so-called on-site inspection evoked very great perplexity. Why was it being raised again? If legal side of matter were considered, Khrushchev's letter of October 27 said that such inspection could be conducted if Cuban Govt agreed. Moreover, SovGovt, with agreement Cuban, had given US authorities opportunity to verify withdrawal of weapons, to photograph and count them. It seemed at time that American side was satisfied. With regard to question of future inspection, he wished to remind me of Thant proposals and others for UN presence in Caribbean, which would have involved inspections in Cuba and US on terms of equality. USG had refused to consider, let alone accept, these proposals and must bear responsibility for their non-adoption. Making such statement now to SovGovt evokes great lack of understanding.

In President's November 20 press conference, he made statements of arbitrary character, saying USG could conduct inspections it wished to. This did not correspond to obligations assumed on October 27-28. It contained many arbitrary elements and many "ifs." President said USG could decide unilaterally whether Cuba was danger to US and other Western Hemisphere states.

Now representatives of USG are saying that Cuba by its very exist-ence constitutes danger to US. USG officials and US intelligence even fabricated data to show Cuba has been conducting subversive acts.

If such questions exist, USG should talk to Cuban Govt.

Kuznetsov said he must resolutely reject effort to raise this now with SovGovt and attempt to engage it in discussion of question of events in Venezuela. USG always tried to explain such events by talking about "hand of Moscow", "Communist plots", and so forth, but all that is simply invented. Those who invent such things know they do not correspond to reality. Trouble is USG does not want to let Cuban people decide on their own way of life.

If US thinks it suffers from existence of Cuban regime, why shouldn't USG meet with Cuban representatives and discuss these questions in effort to find solutions to them. Cuban representatives, including Premier and President, have expressed their willingness to discuss these questions.

Provisionally, Kuznetsov said, he decidedly rejected assumption contained in statement to effect that SovGovt should discuss matters relevant to Cuban Govt as though it had taken upon itself some obligation in this regard. It would be better if I did not make such statement. While he could not say definitively, he was not sure SovGovt would accept it. It was not quite clear why I was making it at all.

I said I thought there had been some misunderstanding here. This was oral statement which I was asking him to communicate to Chairman Khrushchev. It was not a demarche. Reason for statement was to be found in remarks Chairman had made to foreign diplomat. Purpose of statement was not to raise new questions, but to reassure Chairman Khrushchev that his doubts about a change in President's policy were not founded, but that President's policy remained unchanged. Consequently, I was surprised by what Kuznetsov had said in commenting on statement, since President wanted only to reassure Chairman. President's policy not changed.

Kuznetsov said that what surprised him was part at end where President talked about Venezuela as though USG wanted to make SovGovt responsible for something that had happened there. He asked me to repeat this part, since that was part he could not accept.

I repeated portion of statement derived from final para Deptel 1933.

Kuznetsov said he wished to re-emphasize that this was not merely simple restatement of US policy but raised question of SovGovt and Khrushchev using influence on Castro. He could not accept these last words.

Relations between US and Cuba are very abnormal. Who is responsible? USG is responsible. American actions are things which create this tension. I knew about steps which USG had taken. It therefore sounded very funny for USG to ask SovGovt to take steps towards Cuba. Secretary Rusk had made statement few days ago to effect that existence of Cuban Republic was incompatible with US interests./3/ Who gave USG right to dictate? There had been all that noise in US about Cuba. There had been noise when invaders returned and about economic sanctions. Kuznetsov therefore thought that this sort of appeal should be addressed in first place to USG. It should be apparent to US from history of Bolshevik Revolution how futile our efforts were. I must know what Ryabushinsky had said on eve of revolution, that "hand of hunger would strangle revolution."

/3/Apparent reference to Rusk's remarks before the Advertising Council, March 12. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 1, 1963, pp. 467-475.

He continued, if we wished to put responsibility on SovGovt for events in Latin America, that was really too much. President himself had recently made statement to effect that events in Latin America were not ones for which Moscow or communism could be held responsible. These charges were "nonsense, nonsense."

I said I thought I should understand whether he wished to transmit this statement to Khrushchev.

Kuznetsov answered that he was not sure Khrushchev would accept it; he would have to ask him.

I said I should emphasize once again that this was response to Chairman's doubts about President's policy. We had two different analyses of Cuban situation. We regarded belligerent attitude and threats of Castro as cause of tension in Caribbean. We think he has broken his word by imposing his regime on Cubans without giving them promised opportunity to express their will.

With regard to last words in statement asking Chairman to exercise his influence on Castro, this was expression of President's hope. Perhaps this hope would not be realized, but understandable he should express it.

At this point Kuznetsov asked which remarks of Chairman President had in mind in making statement.

I said they were remarks Chairman had made to Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, in which Chairman had expressed view President's position had changed with regard to Cuba.

Kuznetsov then asked whether President wanted final words of statement, "and will thus exercise his influence on Castro to this end," included. I said he did.

I then handed Kuznetsov note on aircraft violations.

While Kuznetsov was serious during this discussion, his attitude and manner were not unfriendly, and encounter ended as it had begun, with good-natured personal small-talk.

Comment: While Kuznetsov handled himself well, as usual, I got definite impression he was either not aware of what Khrushchev had told Trevelyan or, if aware, had regarded Khrushchev's statement as routine effort warn US against increasing pressure on Cuba and consequently had not anticipated effect remarks would have. It is of course possible that, particularly in view all he said, Soviets will refuse accept statement. Regardless of this, I believe point has been made. We should nevertheless perhaps anticipate response in kind.

Kohler

295. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy

Washington, March 17, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

Mr. President:

1. Attached is the latest on Cuba from Moscow. In Khrushchev's absence, Foy Kohler delivered his oral message to Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov's comments are at Tab 1./1/ At Tab 2 for reference are Kohler's instructions./2/

/1/See Document 294.

/2/See Document 293.

2. Donovan called the Department this morning. He expects to have one more meeting with Castro this morning and will be back in Miami at 5:00 P.M., when we will know more. He spent yesterday with the U.S. prisoners, seeing the 17 at the Isle of Pines and the others in confinement near Miami. He has reported that all are in reasonable condition although the ones on the Isle of Pines are in better shape. He has arranged for the release of the two women and one mentally ill man. The Cubans have agreed to release the rest of the natural born U.S. citizens once all the goods are delivered, but are still holding out on the naturalized citizens.

The Department is working hard on getting shipping and hopes to have the deliveries completed in two weeks.

C. K./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

296. Report of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State (Cottrell)

Washington, March 21, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63. Secret. Executive Secretary Brubeck sent this report to McGeorge Bundy on March 21.

SUBJECT

First Report of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

I. Introduction

It is contemplated that these reports will be issued twice monthly to provide, in summary form, a guide to the recent activities of the Coordinator and the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee. A separate section will be devoted to each NSAM or to Presidential memoranda directed to the activities of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee.

II. Memoranda Guiding the Coordinator's Activities

A. National Security Action Memorandum No. 213 of January 8, 1963./1/

/1/Document 264.

1. The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs has taken over responsibility for the day-to-day coordination of Cuban Affairs.

2. An Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, chaired by the Coordinator, has been established. It consists of the Coordinator, Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance, representing the Department of Defense, and Deputy Director Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency. Officers have also been detailed to the Committee from State, Defense, Justice, HEW, CIA, and USIA to work as necessary in particular cases. A White House representative from the office of Mr. McGeorge Bundy has maintained close liaison with the Coordinator and the Committee. The Coordinator works through these assigned officers in meeting the responsibilities in (1) above.

3. The Coordinator has named Mr. John Hugh Crimmins, a Foreign Service Officer, to represent the U.S. Government with Cuban refugee groups in Florida and to coordinate Federal programs there. He has opened a branch office of the Coordinator in Miami.

4. The Coordinator has assumed the same responsibility for covert as for overt operations, while recognizing that he is to report on covert matters to the Special Group, which will be guided by broader policy set by the President through NSC ExComm.

B. National Security Action Memorandum No. 220 of February 5, 1963./2/

/2/Document 277.

NSAM 220 directed the Secretaries of State, Defense, Agriculture, and the Administrator of GSA to carry out a new policy on U.S. Government shipments by foreign flag vessels in the Cuban trade.

The Coordinator receives reports from these agencies indicating what steps have been taken. The Secretary of Commerce is making available to the Coordinator, through the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State, reports on current pertinent information on ships engaged in the Cuban trade.

C. Memoranda from the President of February 15, February 25, and March 2, 1963./3/

/3/In these memoranda the President asked the Departments of State and Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare under coordination of a CIA official specific proposals on lessening and possibly eliminating the flow of labor leaders, students, and others from Latin America who went to Cuba for training and indoctrination and returned to their own countries as possible Communist organizers. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63)

These memoranda concerned the flow of students, labor leaders, etc., who go to Cuba for subversive training, the development of precise information as to their travel techniques, and the development of a program to control such traffic.

The President outlined three general avenues through which the problem should be approached. They are bilateral negotiations with friendly Latin American countries, working through the Organization of American States (OAS), and the presentation of a program by the President at the meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica.

So much work toward a solution of these problems has been done over the past month that a report of reasonable length can hope only to give the highlights of government-wide efforts. They include:

1. The Department of State has for some time been dealing with the problem of Cuban subversive training, both bilaterally and through the OAS. It has been trying to have governments withhold permission to their nationals to travel to Cuba and to reduce further free-world air traffic, both scheduled and unscheduled, to Cuba. Several memoranda to the White House have concerned this work.

2. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs met to study the subversive problem on February 15, and a working group headed by Ambassador Thurston submitted a report on February 25 which encompassed the SCCS Report to the OAS and the recommendations of experts drawn from appropriate government agencies./4/

/4/A copy of the February report is ibid.

3. The Coordinator, on the basis of these studies, appointed a Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion. It was established on February 27, with Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, as chairman.

4. The Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion submitted its first report on March 8./5/ This report on movement of personnel to and from Cuba was forwarded by the Coordinator to the White House, and the Coordinator and Major General Krulak met with the President on the afternoon of March 8. Subsequently, the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion has prepared action papers on a) the movement of propaganda materials, b) the movement of arms to and within Latin American countries, c) the establishment of a surveillance system in the Caribbean, d) the exchange of intelligence information on a bilateral and multilateral basis, and e) the movement of funds.

/5/The report was submitted to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 36 Cuba)

5. The Office of Regional Political Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, submitted to the Coordinator on March 8 a draft OAS Resolution on Cuba, which was forwarded to the White House via the Coordinator and the Secretary of State. This office also submitted talking points on Cuba for the President at San Jose, Costa Rica.

[2 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

8. Our posts in the Caribbean were informed on March 13 that we desire to consult with them on possible additional U.S. training and other assistance which may be required to develop or improve border and coastal patrol capabilities of their respective security forces. This program would involve possible assistance to Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama, and the Central American countries of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras. This offer was discussed at the San Jose meeting.

9. The action taken above is part of our plan for the establishment of a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by U.S. forces; a U.S. military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movements will be rapidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors to countries concerned through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command; a unilateral surveillance and interception effort by each country in its own territorial waters; and U.S. assistance in the final interception in territorial waters upon request of the country concerned.

10. Following the San Jose meeting with the Central American and Panamanian Presidents, and a study of the Subcommittee's reports, the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee will make further recommendations on the problems raised in the President's memoranda.

297. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, March 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 3/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

At the President's press briefing on Thursday morning (March 21),/1/ the question of the activities of Alpha 66 and similar groups arose./2/ The President expressed some concern as to why we were without good intelligence on the intentions of these groups. We might well want to prevent them from engaging in further raids, and at the present we appeared to be without any capability to do so.

/1/On March 18 a Cuban refugee group, Alpha 66, mounted attacks on a Soviet ship and Soviet installations in Cuba. On March 19 the Department of State issued a statement that it was "strongly opposed to hit-and-run attacks on Cuba by splinter refugee groups." The statement continued, "such raids do not weaken the grip of the Communist regime on Cuba--indeed they may strengthen it." The statement concluded that the U.S. Government was investigating the raid to see if U.S. law was violated. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 266. In his press conference, Kennedy stated that "our best information was that they did not come from the United States." He also stated that the United States did not support the group and had no connection with it. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 277-278)

/2/Under Secretary Ball had nine telephone conversations with Department of State, Justice, and White House officials between 9:10 a.m. and 2:15 p.m., March 19, prior to the release of the Department of State's statement. Ball was told by U. Alexis Johnson that the United States had no connection with Alpha 66; but as Ball observed, "nobody is going to believe this." Ball noted that the actions of Alpha 66 were in clear violation of the U.S. neutrality laws. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba)

In consequence of this observation, I spoke with the Attorney General, Mr. Helms and, the next day, with Mr. McCone. I expressed the President's concern and made the point that it would be undesirable for a jurisdictional boundary line between the activities of the FBI and the CIA to prevent our doing as much as we should be able to do in this matter. All agreed that the matter would be examined and an improvement in our means of dealing with it effected.

CK

298. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, March 23, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Cuba

Here are some of the latest developments regarding Cuba.

1. Donovan's meeting with Castro: As you probably know, Castro released only two female prisoners. A memorandum is attached as Tab 1 which gives some of the highlights of the Donovan/Castro meeting./1/ Donovan hopes to go down to Havana again in about a week to pick up the nine skindivers (the Cubans indicated they would be released at that time).

/1/Not found.

Also attached as Tab 1 is Carl Kaysen's memo to the President on press conference day. It is in response to the President's interest in knowing whether or not Castro's present reluctance to release the prisoners reflects a change in his December commitment to release them.

2. Russian Withdrawal from Cuba: Although State, in its press briefing book, recommended that the numbers game be avoided, the President announced at his press conference on March 21, 1963 that three thousand Russian troops had been withdrawn from Cuba. Attached as Tab 2 is the pertinent excerpt from the President's press conference./2/

/2/For text of the President's March 21 press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 273-282.

3. Activist Refugee Groups: On the nights of March 17-18 the Second Front of the Escambray, with the probable assistance of Alpha 66, made a raid on the port of Isabella de Sagua. Attached as Tab 3 is a memorandum describing the action,/1/ a brief statement giving our attitude toward such raids, and the President's comments on March 21./3/

/3/See footnote 1, Document 297.

The incident highlighted a jurisdictional problem between the CIA and the FBI--i.e. who is responsible for knowing about the activities of these groups. The answer is probably that both have an interest in the activities of these groups which seem to operate both from within and without the United States. We have been in touch with State, CIA and FBI and have urged them to get together on this question (Carl's memorandum on this subject is also attached as Tab 3)./4/ They will also get together regarding what, if anything, we want to do or can do to stop the raids.

/4/Apparent reference to Document 297.

4. Exchange with USSR on Cuba: Attached as Tab 4 is the latest on Cuba from Moscow. In Khrushchev's absence, Ambassador Kohler talked to Kuznetsov. The background cables are also included in Tab 4./5/

/5/See Documents 293 and 294.

5. The Flow of Cuban Refugees: HEW's John Thomas told me about the recent unofficial (no-funds, no-staff) hearings held in Miami by representatives Pepper and Fascell on the depressing impact of the Cuban refugees on the Miami area. The hearings tended to exaggerate the problem and to cover up for indigenous problems in the Miami area--e.g. the bad year for the citrus fruit industry and a decline in the tourist industry. Mr. Thomas felt that while Fascell has a real interest in the Miami situation and is probably aiming to get federal works projects, etc., Represent-ative Pepper used the hearings primarily as a political device to further his own career. Mr. Thomas will send us a copy of the hearings as and when they are published.

While Mr. Thomas does not regard the Miami situation as explosive, he is not at all happy about it. Fifty-six thousand refugees have been resettled but over one hundred thousand still remain. It is necessary to increase the net outflow of refugees from the area. Just as important, it is necessary to show the Miami public that there is a substantial outflow.

Mr. Thomas noted that the problem is to make a dent in the settled refugee population. While these people are more difficult to resettle than newly-arrived refugees, Mr. Thomas hopes, within a month, to increase the rate from four hundred to eight hundred per week. (The rate of flow into Miami is now about fifty per week.) He has a number of devices for effecting the increase. Among other things, in about a week, he hopes to surface an organizational mechanism whereby Protestant resettlement facilities will be used to assist in resettling Catholic refugees. This will help a lot.

6. Subversion: The Krulak Subcommittee is now working on a paper to control the movement of Cuban funds in Latin America. Also, the Subcommittee is focusing on preparations for a meeting in Managua with Central American governments. The meeting, which was called for at Costa Rica, will be held on April 3 and 4. The pertinent portion of the Costa Rica declaration which lays the groundwork for the Managua meeting is attached as Tab 5./6/

/6/For text of the Declaration issued at Costa Rica by the Presidents of the Republics of Central America, Panama, and the United States, March 19, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 234-238.

7. Americans Traveling to Cuba: Attached as Tab 6 is an excerpt from the President's March 21 press conference regarding the travel of Americans to Cuba. The Justice Department is now working on this one.

GC

299. Note by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, March 26, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. No classification marking. Drafted by McCone. This was an addendum to a conversation between McCone and the President on March 25 lasting from 12:15 to 1 p.m. The main conversation was unrelated to Cuba.

ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague. McCone stated that indicators were conflicting. On the one hand, certain information such as the recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report of Castro's own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment. This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.

300. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 27, 1963, 7 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities. Secret; Operational Immediate.

2420. Eyes only for Secretary. Deptels 1933 and 1950;/1/ Embtels 2315/2/ and 2321./3/ Gromyko called me in at 4:00 p.m. Moscow time to make oral statement in response my March 16 statement to Kuznetsov. Translation his statement contained next following tel./4/

/1/Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto.

/2/Document 294.

/3/In telegram 2321, March 17, Kohler stated to Kuznetsov that the President's message (see footnote 2 above) was a "purely private communication for the Chairman from the President which would not be published." Kohler did warn that Khrushchev could "decide to come back hard and publicize. Consequently we should be alert to this possibility." (Department of State, Central Files, POL Cuba-USSR) See the Supplement.

/4/See Document 301.

Subsequent 30-minute discussion began with Gromyko's asking me transmit contents of statement to President and saying he wished to add a few words about note Embassy received earlier today regarding attack on L'Gov (Embtel 2422)./5/ He said MFA had received word just before our meeting about analogous provocation involving another Soviet ship in Cuban port./6/ MFA did not yet have details and would in due course give Embassy Soviet reaction to this new provocative act. But, it appeared USG underestimated gravity of such provocative actions against Cuba and Soviet ships. If it correctly estimated gravity of such actions, it would not permit them to take place.

/5/In telegram 2422, March 27, the Soviet Foreign Ministry protested the attack on the Soviet cargo ship L'Gov in the Cuban port of Isabela La Sagua and insisted that the United States take measures to prevent such acts in the future. The Foreign Ministry stated that "Surely [it is] clear, that without material support of US Government and without supplying of American weapons and ships, group of traitors to Cuban people, sheltering on territory USA would not be able undertake these kinds provocation." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities)

/6/The Lambda 66 Cuban exile group attacked the Soviet ship Baku when it was loading sugar in the Cuban port of Caibarien. The raiders had a free lance photo journalist aboard. See memoranda from Chase to McGeorge Bundy and Clifton to the President, March 27. (Ibid.) The texts are in the Supplement. On March 30 the Departments of State and Justice issued a statement that they neither supported nor condoned these attacks which were probably counter productive. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1963, pp. 600-601.

I said I first wished to comment on his oral statement. President's intention had been to give private reassurance to Chairman Khrushchev as result of doubts President felt Chairman had expressed regarding USG policy towards Cuba. President had also wished express hope that SovGovt might exercise influence to alleviate situation. I said I should certainly report statement to President and assumed this remained a private exchange.

Gromyko said that was correct; for time being Soviets had no intention of giving information on exchange to press.

I said that, since I had no new instructions, I would not reply now to statement but would stand on what I had said before. With regard to L'Gov, I said I wished to call Gromyko's attention to Lincoln White's March 19 statement and to President's March 21 statement,/7/ that exiles who conducted raid had not come from US, that we did not feel these kinds of raids served useful purposes, and that we had not supported this and these men did not have connection with USG. I said these statements were already on record and it was thus appropriate to cite them today.

/7/See footnote 2, Document 298.

Gromyko said SovGovt acquainted with these statements, but has to ask itself how we can make such statements and at same time act in direct contradiction to them. SovGovt could not regard State Department statement as satisfactory. Its understanding of State Department statement is that if raids were bigger and more successful, that would be a different thing. As for SovGovt, it categorically condemns all acts of this kind. Can USG really hope to find serious people who can believe that it is not involved, when this exile scum was sitting under US wing? These groups only acted with the knowledge and connivance of USG. He wished to emphasize that USG is not attributing serious significance to these acts. On other hand, SovGovt regretted position taken by US. It was high time more sober approach was taken to such actions.

Gromyko continued, Caribbean crisis had apparently been settled, but he and I, like US and Sov representatives elsewhere, had to keep reverting to it. There was, however, one possibility for settling matter: USG should leave Cuba in peace. In Soviet view, this lies in best interests of US and whole world.

I said I felt I had to comment now because Gromyko's additional remarks had called into question statement of President. When we make these statements, we do so because they are true. I repeated raiders had not come from US territory. With regard to "scum", we have different understanding from Soviets of who are scum and who are honest people. As to question of fulfilling terms of Oct. 27-28 agreement, they had never been fulfilled. Provisions for inspection and verification had not been made. What did Soviets want us to do: protect Cuba from such raids? It should be clear to them we are not going to do so. Just as Soviets expect many countries to opt for communism, we expect many countries, including Cuba, to opt for freedom. Perhaps solution was for USSR to leave Cuba alone. I had pointed out to Dobrynin in Washington that this problem was poisoning our relations. If USSR would only leave Cuba alone, this poison would be removed. USG has recognized measures taken by SovGovt to reduce poison. But Oct. 27-28 agreement had never been fully realized, and that must be recognized.

Gromyko, moderating his tone, asked again whether we expected to find people who would believe our statements that USG can do nothing at all about actions of these emigre groups. He fully recognized and appreciated that it did not please US when he pointed out there was no way to reconcile statements of top US officials with facts of provocations. New provocation had occurred only today. SovGovt was expressing hope that USG and President would take more sober approach to such serious provocations and would act in spirit of agreement that had been reached Oct. 27-28. USSR had always and would always act in accord-ance with this agreement. He was sorry to have to protest and would prefer not to do it, but circumstances compelled it.

I said, as was evident from statements I had cited, USG was opposed to these raids and would do everything it could to discourage them. I did, however, want to make it clear to him that USG did not intend to institute blockade of Cuba in order to stop such raids. I assumed Sovs would not like us to do so. However, there is great deal of Soviet activity on island. Perhaps they should stop it, since it was inflaming public opinion in US. Way to solve problem was to remove this element which poisoned US-Soviet relations.

Gromyko said difference in our positions was that USG was threatening Cuba and Cubans were taking steps to protect their frontiers. That was why Sov specialists were in Cuba. Chairman had explained this to President and there was little he could add at this time to that explanation. However, he agreed it would be good to remove poison. As afterthought, Gromyko said he assumed that by "poison" I meant these raids.

I said by "poison" I meant everything involved in Cuban problem: Belligerent statements of Castro, presence of Sov military, and reaction this evokes in US. I agreed that if we could eliminate all this it would be good. I asked whether they intended publish note on L'Gov.

Gromyko said they probably would. (Subsequently, his office called Emb to specify that both L'Gov note and their reply to our Alaska aircraft intrusion note would probably be published.) But, for time being, they regarded exchange of oral statements as private and did not intend publish.

Kohler

[end of document]

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