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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 27, 1963, 8 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2763. Secret; Operational Immediate. This telegram was inadvertently filed under the discontinued decimal filing system.

2421. Eyes only for Secretary. Following is translation oral statement made to me today by Gromyko.

Begin text.

In accordance with your request,/1/ contents of oral statement delivered by you on March 16 were brought to attention Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev.

/1/See Document 293.

I have been instructed to deliver following oral reply to that statement.

Statement which you delivered expressed concern of President USA over certain remarks by Chairman of USSR Council Ministers N.S. Khrushchev, which were interpreted by President to mean that, in N.S. Khrushchev's opinion, President's position regarding Cuba had in some way changed recently. In that connection, you made reference to N.S. Khrushchev's conversation of March 6, 1963, with Mr. Trevelyan, Ambassador Great Britain in Moscow./2/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 292.

What can be said in this regard? Chairman of USSR Council Ministers Khrushchev pointed out in above-mentioned conversation with Mr. Trevelyan as well as on number other occasions, that remarks are heard more and more frequently in USA to effect that USA Government had made no commitment not to invade Cuba. N.S. Khrushchev emphasized that such remarks are very dangerous and are fraught with fatal consequences, since this can lead to destruction in embryonic stage of that confidence--even though it be slight--in the (given) word, which developed during settlement of crisis in Caribbean area.

There were more than adequate grounds for these remarks of Chairman USSR Council of Ministers. Government USA is of course aware of this and there is hardly need to enumerate now all statements, including those of American officials, which cast doubt on fact that US had taken upon itself commitment not to invade Cuba.

Now US Ambassador has stated in name of President that President's position in regard to Cuba has not undergone any kind of change. If this statement is to be understood to mean that US Government intends to abide strictly by its commitments on settlement of crisis in Caribbean Sea area, Soviet Government is prepared to welcome this. Substance of commitments which parties assumed during exchange of messages between Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers and President of United States on October 27 and 28, 1962, are well known. It is not necessary to prove that fulfillment of these commitments by parties is most important guarantee for maintaining peace in Caribbean area.

As far as Soviet Government is concerned, it, showing its concern for strengthening of peace and normalization of situation in this region, is conforming invariably to understanding laid down in above-mentioned messages and is strictly observing commitments which it took upon itself. Moreover, Soviet Government has often undertaken steps, including some quite recently, which go even further than commitments which it took upon itself on October 27 and 28, 1962, regarding settlement of crisis in Caribbean area. Soviet Government has a right to expect from Government of USA a similar attitude toward its commitments including, of course, commitment on non-invasion of Cuba.

Unfortunately, however, statement transmitted by US Ambassador on March 16, can also be understood in different sense. One cannot but draw attention, above all, to the fact that this statement in expounding position of US Government regarding Cuba, lays emphasis not upon commitments of the parties which were assumed during settlement of crisis in Caribbean area, but upon statement of US President at his press conference on November 20, 1962. In addition, this statement bears strictly unilateral character and therefore has never been considered and cannot be considered as integral part of understanding which was achieved on settling crisis. It is in direct contradiction both to commitments of USA for settling crisis in Caribbean area and also to norms of international law. It is not difficult to imagine dangerous consequences to which such a policy could lead and serious trials to which it could subject world.

In statement, transmitted by US Ambassador on March 16, it is claimed that Government of Republic of Cuba is threatening Government of Venezuela and even supporting some sort of actions undertaken against Venezuela. Question arises: what is purpose of such arbitrary statements, all the more so since we are invited, in connection with them, to exert some sort of influence on Government of Republic of Cuba. Isn't the real intention that of undertaking new dangerous steps against Republic of Cuba based on statement of President of USA of November 20. It is certainly well known to all that it is not Cuba which threatens Venezuela or any other states in Western Hemisphere, but, on the contrary, USA and some of its allies which threaten Republic of Cuba, call for overthrow of its government, and organize subversive activity against Cuba on wide scale.

It is precisely this policy of USA, and not any sort of "aggressive Communist initiatives," which are source of new danger to preservation of peace in Caribbean area, new danger to peace throughout world.

In this connection, one cannot but draw attention to fact that reference was again made, in oral statement of March 16, to intention of Government of USA to continue reconnaissance flights over territory of Cuba. What is purpose of raising this question now? Can it be for purpose of legalizing such flights and obtaining our agreement to them? But Government of USA knows well that Soviet Union always opposed and continues to oppose such actions by USA, which are crude violation of international law and of UN Charter. Efforts to justify continuation of such flights by references to necessity of inspection of territory of Cuba cannot be recognized as having any basis, since question of inspection has not existed for a long time. There is no point now in returning to all the ins and outs of this question; it was resolved in course of settling crisis in Caribbean area. It is only necessary to emphasize that continuation of completely unjustified provocative flights by American planes over Cuban territory, which evoke legitimate indignation, particularly in Cuba, can lead to most serious consequences, full responsibility for which will rest on Government of United States, and only on it.

We believe that situation in Caribbean area can be normalized once and for all and that conditions can be created there for establishment of a really durable peace. For this only one thing is necessary: That USA should not interfere in internal affairs of Cuba and should renounce attempts to export counterrevolution to Cuba.

If President of USA would use his influence in this direction, he would thereby make great contribution to cause of eliminating dangerous tension which still exists in Caribbean area. Soviet Government is convinced that precisely such a course of policy corresponds both to interest of establishing peace in Caribbean area and to interest of improvement of Soviet-American relations and relaxation of international tension. As far as Soviet Government is concerned, it invariably stands for such a course in international affairs.

End text.

Kohler

302. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, March 28, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 3/63. Confidential. Drafted by Robert Follestad, Officer in Charge of the Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, and cleared by Martin, Cottrell, and U. Alexis Johnson.

Dear Mr. President: I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vessel may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature./1/

/1/In a March 28 memorandum Chase alerted Bundy to the recommedations proposed in this letter. Chase also informed Bundy of his conversations at the Department of Justice on March 27. According to Chase, the discussions "indicated that the FBI is not doing a stellar intelligence job; they seem to know remarkably little about the activist groups. However, I have been told that FBI has been shaken up by this episode and that solid FBI contributions will be forthcoming today." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can stop and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked up about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of law has occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current Customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

303. Summary Record of the 42d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, March 29, 1963, 12:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. IV, 38-42, 1/25/63-3/29/63. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 1:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) and was the last meeting of the Executive Committee.

The President said he had asked the Council to meet in order to talk about the two recent hit-and-run raids staged by anti-Castro refugees. The State Department has twice said that these raids are not particularly helpful. Even so, we must anticipate that there will be more such attacks. We have said the raiders do not take off from the U.S., but it is difficult to maintain that they do not get their supplies in the U.S. The question is whether we should take direct action in the U.S. to cut off their supplies or whether we should try to advise them to attack Cuba but not the Russians, with the result that the raids would draw less press attention and arouse less acrimony in Moscow.

Director McCone agreed that more raids of this kind are probable. The anti-Castro groups purchase supplies in the U.S. and come in and go out of the U.S. The raids are actually staged from the Bahamas and other than U.S. territory. The raiders would be extremely difficult to control because they are brave men fighting for freedom of their country.

Reading from a paper,1 Mr. McCone said the continuance of the raids would cause trouble inside Cuba and would discredit Castro in Latin America if he was unable to prevent the raids. The Soviets, if the raids continue, might reappraise their support of Castro or, alternatively, raise directly with the President the continuance of the anti-Castro raids. Mr. McCone said his personal view was that there would be intense public and press criticism if we stand down these raids. He anticipated Congressional criticism as well. He recommended that we officially disallow the raids without acting to prevent the raiders from using the U.S. as a base.

/1/See the attachment to Document 304.

Secretary Rusk said that the hit-and-run raids against Cuba, in an area which is under our military umbrella, will be blamed on us no matter what we say. No one would believe that we do not have the capability of preventing the raiders from leaving the U.S. If anyone is shooting Russians we ought to be doing it, not Cubans who are acting beyond our control. He predicted that if the raids continue, the result will be to draw Cuban and Russian forces further outside the territorial waters of Cuba in an effort to stop the raiding ships at sea and before they reach Cuban ports. Our air surveillance of Cuba will be complicated and the cost of our continuing overflights will increase because Cuban planes will be patrolling farther off shore, searching for incoming raiding ships. He recommended that the least we should do is to stop the violation of our laws. If we decide that such raids should be conducted, we should plan them ourselves and see that they are carried out under our control rather than as now occurs.

The President pointed out that the U.S. private ship, the Floridian, was probably shot at in retaliation for earlier anti-Castro raids./2/ The result is that we have to put our forces into action to defend U.S. ships.

/2/At approximately 6 p.m., March 28, two Cuban MIG aircraft fired on the U.S. ship Floridian in international waters off the north coast of Cuba en route from Puerto Rico to Miami. (Telegram 468 to Bern, March 29; Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 CUBA-US)

Secretary Rusk approved landing anti-Castro agents in Cuba who could be useful on the ground inside the country, but he said there was no benefit from hit-and-run raids which we do not control.

Secretary Dillon said it was impossible for us to control the raids. He said that after the ships leave Florida, they proceed to an island from which the raid is launched at a later time. In some cases larger ships leave U.S. ports and rendezvous with smaller ships at sea. A naval barrier off Cuba is the only sure way to stop these raids. The Coast Guard does not have enough boats to carry out this assignment. If our intelligence on the raiders improves, we can do much more to prevent the raiders leaving the U.S.

Secretary Rusk noted that in his discussions of the raid problem with Congressmen, he had noted a mixed reaction. Not all Congressmen supported the anti-Castro raids.

Mr. McCone said the Bahama Islands were being used by the raiders as the take-off point. He predicted that the number of raids will increase rapidly.

The President commented that these in-and-out raids were probably exciting and rather pleasant for those who engage in them. They were in danger for less than an hour. This exciting activity was more fun than living in the hills of Escambray, pursued by Castro's military forces.

Secretary Rusk doubted that the Russians would get out of Cuba as an answer to the harassment of the raiders, but rather will build up the power of the Cubans to prevent the raiders from doing any damage at sea or ashore.

Secretary McNamara said that we can stop the raiders if we use the Navy. If we don't want to stop the raids, we can modify them, making it difficult for the raiders to attack targets not of our choosing. In any event we can so act that we disassociate ourselves from the raiders and avoid charges that the raids are based in the U.S.

The President suggested that we first tell the British and then, on a background basis, tell the press that the raiders are staging out of the Bahama Islands.

The Attorney General said that we can slow down the raids if we wish and later stop them entirely if we so desire. We can do a great deal more to stop them than is now being done. The Coast Guard can stop outgoing ships. We can prosecute cases against those who are supplying ammunition to the raiders. We can prosecute the the ten Americans who were picked up recently at sea with arms which were to be used by the raiders. We can create a deterrent against such raids.

At this point the President read part of the most recent Soviet protest, including the sentence which asked rhetorically where do these raids originate, from Europe?/3/

/3/Reported in telegram 2435 from Moscow, March 29. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities)

The Attorney General pointed out that we would look ridiculous if the raids continue and we say we cannot control them or prevent them.

Ambassador Thompson emphasized that we must prevent any raider plane bombing a Soviet ship.

Secretary Rusk repeated his view that raids which do not result in a penetration on the ground in Cuba are fruitless.

The Attorney General commented that we did have a problem domestically of explaining why we were stopping the raids, but we can stop them by prosecuting those involved and by making the raiders' stay in the U.S. very unpleasant.

Ambassador Thompson noted that we could say that attacks on Soviet ships could prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba.

Mr. Harriman agreed with Secretary Rusk that the raids will not prompt the Soviets to leave Cuba, but rather to step up participation in Cuban military activities. He agreed that there was no value in the pin-pricking hit-and-run raids.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that even if we did not succeed in catching the raiders on their way out, we would have a serious effect on future raids if we caught the raiders upon their return.

The President asked that we handle this problem in such a way as to avoid the appearance of prosecuting Cuban patriots. He suggested that we tell the raiders that they must not attack Soviet ships--but could attack purely Cuban targets. The purpose would be to avoid heating up the situation to the point where the Russians would send destroyers to protect their ships in Cuban waters. We might tell the raiders that if they stop their present attacks and undertake to carry out assignments as guided by the CIA, they could continue, but if they refuse to accept CIA guidance, we would take action to prevent further raids.

Secretary Rusk felt there should be a prohibition against attacks on all kinds of shipping and a halt to all hit-and-run raids. He had no objection to raiding if people were actually put ashore.

Mr. McCone noted that the raiders will not go ashore because they know they will be caught. He said that even with extensive planning it is difficult enough to put in controlled agents. The CIA has means of informing the raiding groups that they should stop attacks on Soviet shipping or attacks on all shipping.

The President asked why we could not put pressure on the suppliers of the raiders. These suppliers would not be Cubans.

The Attorney General reported that the FBI is investigating the source of the raiders' supplies. He said the raiding groups were very small and it might not be possible to communicate with every group. We could proceed to arrest the raiders and later prosecute those against whom we had sufficient evidence. It did not appear likely that before the middle of April we would have a grand jury which would be responsive to our efforts to indict the raiders. In the meantime, however, we could slow down the raiders by passing word to them through the Coast Guard, the FBI, and other channels that we would not permit the continuance of their activities.

Secretary Rusk said that more public knowledge of the pressures we are putting on the raiders would, in his view, help our position.

In reply to a Presidential question, the Vice President said we would be irresponsible if we did not act against the raiders who were carrying out irresponsible actions that could result in getting us involved in a war. He said we should stop these irresponsible people. He suggested that the military prepare a plan as to how to halt the raids and inform all U.S. Government agencies that our policy was to prevent further raids. He would proceed against the suppliers of munitions. He predicted that, just as we would, the Russians will shoot back if the raiders continue shooting at Soviet ships. He acknowledged that there would be some criticism of our action, but felt that there would be much more criticism if we did not stop the raids. He urged that we inform the appropriate Congressional Committees and other governments of our intention to stop the raiding.

The Attorney General said that one way of dealing with the raiders would be to prevent their return to the U.S. if they once leave without permission. Such action would be less drastic than prosecution. It would involve warning individual Cubans that if they left the U.S., they would not be permitted to return.

The President hoped we could pick out a good case for the first one to prosecute--not Robert Emmett, but rather an ancient arms dealer. The Attorney General noted that Americans are supplying the arms used by the Cuban raiders.

The President asked the Attorney General to meet with Mr. McCone and representatives of State, Defense, and the White House to draft an action program for his approval, to include the following points:

a. Guidance by the CIA to the raiding groups.

b. Discussion with the British about the use of the Bahama Islands by the raiders.

c. Consideration of whether we should inform the press for background that the raiders are taking off from the Bahamas.

d. Preventing the planned airplane raid, if necessary, announcing that we intend to stop the raid so that if it takes place, then all would be fairly and clearly warned.

e. Ways of preventing the return of raiders leaving U.S. jurisdiction.

The President suggested that the group discuss their recommendations with him tomorrow./4/ He also asked that a policy statement for issuance to the press be prepared for his consideration.

/4/No further record of the meeting has been found.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

304. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, March 29, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret. Drafted by McCone.

SUBJECT

Executive Committee Meeting--12:30 p.m.--29 March 1963

IN ATTENDANCE

All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and others

The President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.

Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities, etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.

The President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters.

1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down the operations.

2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.

3. The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.

4. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas.

5. The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell, Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigration officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:

1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where they are, and what can be done about them.

2. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami. Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.

3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some of this.

4. Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives, arms, etc.

5. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped with DF-equipment to locate the stations.

6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete stand down before any attempt was made to guide the groups.

7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane.

Attachment/1/

Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, March 29, 1963.

/1/Secret.

SUBJECT

Unauthorized Cuban Raids

1. Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambray, Alpha 66, and Lambda 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.

2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.

3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.

4. Obviously raids of this type will exacerbate problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are undesirable. However, successful harassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United States.

5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control.

John A. McCone/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

305. Editorial Note

On March 31, 1963, British and Bahamian armed forces captured on Exuma Island in the Bahamas an armed motor boat, the Violynn III, carrying 16 Cuban exiles and 1 American. The United States had informed British/Bahamian authorities that the Violynn was seeking to refuel in preperation for an attack on a Soviet tanker.

At the 510th meeting of the National Security Council, April 2, the President and the Council discussed the status of the arrested raiders. According to Bromley Smith's summary record, April 2, the discussion went as follows:

"At this point Assistant Secretary Martin and Mr. Dungan joined the group at the President's request to discuss the current status of the Cuban raiders who have been arrested by the British in the Bahama Islands.

"Mr. Martin said the present plan was for the British to turn the raiders loose on their boat three miles off the Bahamas. The U.S. Coast Guard would pick them up there. If they refuse to go to Miami, the question before us is what do we then do?

"After a discussion of the legal points involved, the President expressed his view that we should ask the British to take away from the raiders all their ammunition, and that we would ask the leaders to come peacefully to a U.S. port. If they refuse to come into the U.S. territorial waters, the U.S. Coast Guard ship would follow them but not fire on them. We would soon know the names of the raiders on the ship and would seek to apply pressures on them to agree to enter a U.S. port. If a threat to prevent them ever again from entering the U.S. was not effective, the Coast Guard would report the situation to Washington for additional guidance." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

According to a memorandum from Chase to Dungan, April 2, the U.S. Government's plan was to ask the British to confiscate the raiders' ammunition. When, and apparently if, it returned to Miami, the Violynn would be impounded, and the American and Cubans who were not parolees would be questioned and released within a few hours. Parolees would be questioned and released in 24 to 36 hours. (Ibid., Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 4/63)

306. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, April 3, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1-4/20/63. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten "(a.m.)" was placed after the dateline on this memorandum.

SUBJECT

Cuba Coordinating Committee--Covert Operations in Cuba

Attached is an agenda/1/ which was discussed at a meeting of the Cottrell Committee on April 1. The meeting was attended by Secretary Vance, Joe Califano, Dick Helms, Dez FitzGerald, and Bob Hurwitch.

/1/The attached agenda lists items 1-6 included in this memorandum.

1. Balloon Operations Over Havana--The plan is well under way. Assuming the winds are right, CIA proposes to release balloons containing 300,000 to 500,000 leaflets on May Day (before daylight). The balloons will not be visible by radar or by the naked eye. The leaflets will (1) attack Castro's henchmen, and (2) contain cartoons illustrating sabotage techniques.

The decision on the balloons is scheduled for another review during the week preceding May Day.

2. Training of CIA-Sponsored Cuban Exiles on Military Reservations--CIA and the Army are now working on this one to find appropriate installations.

3. Russian Language Programs--The Committee decided in favor of instituting three programs (Radio Liberty, Radio Caribe, and an intrusion program). It decided against setting up an [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the grounds that it is an unnecessary duplication.

In approving the three programs for Special Group consideration, the Committee recognized that they will probably be of marginal value only; however, they will cost us very little, financial or otherwise.

4. Sabotage of Cuban Shipping (19 ships)--The Committee discussed three forms of sabotage--limpets, incendiaries in the cargoes, and abrasives in the machinery.

The Committee decided against limpets [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and even though it would be a dramatic morale booster. Unfortunately, there is no certain way of controlling a limpet; it could sink a ship and the sinking could be billed as a U.S. submarine attack. Secretary Vance came down hard against sinkings.

The Committee will recommend to the Special Group the incendiaries which would be timed to go off in international waters and the abrasives in the machinery. While the propaganda boost might be nil, they are easier to effect than limpets and could really hurt Castro.

The Committee gave CIA the option of using either its own Cubans or of using DRE as a cut-out.

5. Redirection of Cuban Exile Group Operations--The Committee discussed this one briefly--i.e. what is an acceptable target? Dick Helms pointed out that although these groups may start out to get a non-Soviet target, once you let them go, you can never really be sure what they will do. Bob Hurwitch seemed to favor the approach that attacks and sabotage should appear to come from inside rather than from outside Cuba.

The Committee came to no decision on this one. More thinking is needed.

6. Propaganda Inside Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops--While Secretary Vance expressed some concern about the possibility that this would lead to a conflagration between the Cubans and the Soviets (what would we do), the Committee decided in favor of this course of action. While the results will probably not be startling for our side, the costs and risks are small. (I'm not sure a conflagration would be such a bad thing for us, even if it did occur. How much chance would these 5,000 combat troops have against the huge and well-equipped Cuban army? I don't think the Russians would dare try to impose their will by force; they would have to grin and bear it.)

Comment:

1. In considering specifics of a covert program, I think we should keep in the back of our minds the possibility that we may want to turn our policy around sometime in the future. This does not necessarily mean that we would rule out covert operations--rather, we would probably want to direct them towards splitting the Cuba/Soviet tie (e.g. a "Russki Go Home" campaign) instead of forcing Castro to embrace the Soviets more tightly (e.g. inactivation of Cuban shipping which would lead to further Cuban dependence on Bloc shipping). In this regard, we may wish to consider carefully the gains and risks involved in directing more violent efforts against selected Russian targets within Cuba. I have a feeling that the risks are not as great as they seem.

2. Assuming we continue our present policy or consider a turn-around policy very far down the road, I like an active covert program. It seems to me that a good sabotage program is one of the few tools we can use to really hurt Castro economically. Our present policy of isolating Cuba from the Free World is not going to bust Castro. Instead, I suspect that the Cuban economy is at its low right now. With no effective U.S. covert intervention, it will probably grow healthier from here on as the Cuban economy moves from the difficult transition stage between economic dependence on the West and economic dependence on the Bloc.

GC

307. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, April 3, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1-4/20/63. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten "(p.m.)" was placed after the dateline on this memorandum.

SUBJECT

Cuban Coordinating Committee--Covert Operations

The Cottrell Committee held a meeting on Wednesday afternoon to discuss covert operations. Secretary Vance, Dez FitzGerald, Bob Hurwitch, and Joe Scott attended.

1. Propaganda Inciting Cubans Within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops

The Committee discussed the program outlined in the attached document/1/ and agreed to recommend it to the Special Group. These attacks will be useful since they will tend to exacerbate relations between every Cuban and every Russian in Cuba. Besides, the Communists are doing the same thing to us in Vietnam.

/1/Memorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group, April 3, entitled "Propaganda Inciting Cubans Within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops." (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

There was an interesting discussion about where to stop regarding Cuban attacks on Soviet troops and installations. The general consensus was that it was O.K. for individual Cubans to attack Soviet troops or installations (e.g. throw a grenade over the camp fence) but that it was undesirable for groups of Cubans to organize attacks against the Russians. Dez FitzGerald pointed out that, under present circumstances, any action which requires organization is highly dangerous. Also, the Committee felt that the organized attacks would initiate wide-spread reprisals by the Castro government; this was not generally considered a good thing.

2. Shipping Sabotage--Limpets

Dez FitzGerald brought up again the issue of attaching limpets to Cuban ships; this had been turned down by the Committee on Monday/2/ because of the possibility that the limpets would sink a ship. Dez said that, upon further reflection, he felt we were giving up a good thing; also, the danger of a sinking was a very small one. Dez went on to say that he came away from Wednesday's meeting with the President/3/ with the feeling that the President would like some noise level in our sabotage program for morale purposes; limpets fill the bill.

/2/April 1; see Document 306.

/3/No further record of this meeting has been found.

Secretary Vance was reluctant to submit the limpet plan to the Special Group on Thursday. Instead, he suggested that the limpet plan be included on the list of major sabotage acts which is due to be submitted to the President next week. The Committee agreed.

GC

308. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President Kennedy

Washington, April 3, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-A, 1/4/63-4/11/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert Kennedy; a copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy.

Mr. Markov of the Russian Embassy/1/ called this morning and said that the Russian Ambassador wished to come by and see me. I arranged for him to come in at 3:30 p.m.

/1/Petr I. Markov, Attache, Soviet Embassy.

We exchanged some pleasantries. He told me that Norman Cousins had asked to see Khrushchev and he had arranged it./2/ What was Cousins' relationship to the President? Then, as is his custom, he handed me a so-called "talking paper."/3/ This document was particularly long--approximately 25 pages. It was ostensibly to me from the Ambassador but in fact it was from Khrushchev to the President.

/2/Editor of the Saturday Review who met Khrushchev on April 12 to discuss the nuclear test ban treaty.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 250-262.

The paper made five or six major points, among which were the following:

[Here follows Robert Kennedy's 2-page account of the talking paper's points on the test ban treaty; the full text is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 262-265.]

Another point that was made was a sharp and bitter criticism about the raids that had taken place against Russian ships. These were piratical acts and the United States must take responsibility for them. It isn't possible to believe that if we really wanted to stop these raids that we could not do so. They were glad to hear of the steps that are being taken lately but in the last analysis the specific acts, namely, the arrests that we made would be the criteria by which they would judge our sincerity. The Soviet Union questions whether in fact we wish to end these attacks for our criticism of them has been not that they were wrong but that they were ineffective. The clear implication was that if the raids had been effective they would have had our approval.

Further, our efforts to isolate Cuba, to build a virtual wall around it, was a barbaric act. Our actions to stifle Cuba's commerce and to create economic difficulties and isolate her from her neighbors in Latin America were completely unwarranted. The support given to counter-revolutionaries and the statements to the barbaric mercenaries in Miami by the President were also bitterly criticized.

The document also stated that the President should understand the continued pressure on the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of troops from Cuba was not going to be effective. The Soviet Union does not respond to pressure. As a matter of fact, they had already withdrawn twice as many troops as the largest number that had appeared in the newspapers here in the United States. However, he said that he was going to refuse to give the actual number that had been withdrawn because then public statements would be issued that they had been withdrawn because of pressure by the United States and "trumpets would have been blown" by us.

This letter took note of the criticism of the fact that the Russian SAM sites remained within Cuba. The author of the letter wanted us to know that those ground-air missiles were going to stay in Cuba for the protection of the Cuban people.

The overflights that were taking place were deeply resented by the Soviet Union and by Cuba. He then went on to say clearly and distinctly that these U-2 planes would be shot down and that this had better be clearly understood in the United States. The U-2 plane that Eisenhower sent over the Soviet Union was shot down and they had better understand the same thing would be done in those flights over Cuba.

The document then returned to the theme that we were treating the Soviet Union as inferiors; that this could not be continued; that the statements McNamara and Malinovski were making were not contributing to peaceful understanding; that Malinovski's statements were brought about by McNamara's warlike pronouncements. The United States was interested only in making profits from munitions, building up their efforts to dominate the world through counter-revolutionary activity. We were run by capitalists and we should understand that we could not push the Soviet Union around. He also expressed deep concern about the deployment of the Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, replacing the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy.

At the end of the document it said that Mr. Khrushchev had felt in the past that this confidential exchange had been helpful but he said it had not been used lately because of the provocative statements that had been made by representatives of the United States Government which were offensive to the Soviet Union. However, if President Kennedy wanted to reopen this area of contact he would be glad to accept it. He also said that as far as a meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy he thought that that might be helpful. This was, however, left in rather enigmatic terms.

After I read the document I returned it to Dobrynin. I pointed out to him that I had met with him frequently and that he had never talked like this before. He said that was correct. I asked what was the explanation for this document and he said that I should understand that it came from the Soviet Union. I said it demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of the United States and President Kennedy and that I thought it was so insulting and rude to the President and to the United States that I would neither accept it nor transmit its message. I said if they had a message of that kind to deliver it should be delivered formally through the State Department and not through me. I said that during our conversations in the past we attempted to work out matters on a mutually satisfactory basis. I said we might disagree but I never insulted or offended him or his country or Mr. Khrushchev. I said I felt that was the only basis for any kind of relationship. I said I thought this kind of document did not further that effort or our mutual interests and I repeated that if they intended to transmit that kind of message that it should be done through the State Department. He said he could understand my position. He was obviously embarrassed./4/

/4/Thompson prepared a memorandum to Rusk, April 3, suggesting possible causes and motives for Khrushchev's message of April 3. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files, 1963) See the Supplement. Thompson also met with Dobrynin on April 6, to discuss the message of April 3. Thompson said that there seemed to be a misunderstanding developing between the United States and Soviet Union. Thompson stated that he was thinking of suggesting to the President that a special envoy who had close contact with the President should see Khrushchev. Dobrynin thought it a good idea. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR File, 1963) See the Supplement.

309. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Army's Special Assistant (Califano) to the Secretary of the Army (Vance)

Washington, April 9, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Sabotage/Destruction. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Presidential Action on Special Group Items Concerning Cuba

1. The President rejected the balloon item on the recommendation of Ed Murrow.

2. The President approved the propaganda item (inciting Cubans to harass, attack and sabotage Soviet military personnel in Cuba) provided every precaution is taken to prevent attribution.

3. The President approved the sabotage of cargoes on Cuban ships and the crippling of ships (through sand in the gears, etc.).

4. With respect to Russian language broadcasts, the President (a) rejected such broadcasts by exile groups over Radio Caribe in the Dominican Republic, (b) rejected black intrusion on Radio Moscow Russian language broadcasts, and (c) withheld a decision on the use of such broadcasts on Radio Liberty from North Carolina, pending consultation with Llewelyn Thompson.

5. Pursuant to Special Group approval of the use of DoD facilities to support training of CIA agents, General Rosson and I met with CIA representatives yesterday and agreed to provide certain weapons training on a military reservation, under such circumstances that the trainees would not know they were being trained by military personnel and would not know they were on a military reservation. Such training will probably commence within the next several days. Parachute jump training under comparable circumstances will commence at a later date but within the next few weeks.

6. We have also agreed with CIA that we would spot about 20 inductees now in training at Fort Jackson whom we consider to have the necessary characteristics for CIA operations inside Cuba. These personnel, along with those given jump training under 5 above, would also be used in advance of the introduction of Special Forces, should there be a decision to invade Cuba.

7. It now appears virtually certain that Dr. Cardona will resign within the next day or two.

JACJr/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these type initials.

310. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Kennedy

Washington, April 10, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, JOB 80-B01285A, DCI's Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the top of the memorandum reads: "Read by the Pres 4/10 at 1:00 p.m. Note retained."

SUBJECT

Donovan Negotiations with Castro

1. James Donovan returned from Cuba yesterday after a four-day visit. As a result of talks with Castro, the Americans imprisoned on the Isle of Pines are to be released on 22 April. During the intervening period Castro will observe closely American policy toward Cuba and make sure that the Red Cross deliveries are being concluded in good faith.

2. The main thrust of Donovan's discussion, however, was political and can best be evaluated by a very confidential statement made to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo, a close personal advisor of Castro who was present at the meetings. Vallejo said Castro knew that relations with the United States are necessary and Castro wanted these developed. However, there are certain Cuban Government officials, communists, who are strongly opposed, even more than certain people in the United States. These officials are under close surveillance. They have no great following in Cuba; but if they rebelled at this time, Cuba would be in chaos. He believed that Donovan and Castro could work out a plan for a reasonable relationship between the two countries./1/

/1/The Donovan-Castro meetings were discussed after what McCone called an Executive Committee meeting on April 10. McCone was mistaken. it was a meeting of the full Council, dealing mostly with Laos, after which McCone and the President had a private meeting. In that meeting Kennedy expressed great interest in the information in paragraph 2 and raised questions about Castro's future within Cuba, with or without the Soviet presence. McCone stated that the matter was under study and he proposed to send Donovan back to Cuba on April 22 to secure freedom of the remaining prisoners and also keep the channel of communication open. McCone worried that there might be a confrontation over U.S. aerial surveillance between then and April 22, but the President insisted it must continue and the U.S. Government must be prepared to act if a plane was shot down. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

3. Donovan had two sessions with Castro, one for five hours, the other for fourteen hours. A variety of subjects were covered including the role of Red China in world politics, the Cuban economy, and Cuba's role in Latin America. In discussing any subject Castro came around to relating it to Castro's plan for developing Cuba. Castro finds the Soviet Union useful, but Cuba under Castro he claims will never become a Soviet satellite. He emphasized that the Cuban role in Latin America depended upon Cuba's viability rather than the export of subversion.

4. Donovan has the confidence of Castro, who believes that Donovan is sincere and direct with no official ties to the United States Government. Our debriefing of Donovan is continuing.

John A. McCone

311. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 11, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 83, April 18, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Gilpatric, and McCone.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963

PRESENT

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-3

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4

[Here follows discussion of items 1-3, unrelated to Cuba.]

4. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April,/1/ giving a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program, and outlining proposals in this field for the next month. The Group approved this projection. In response to a question about the status of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to date come up with any such proposal.

/1/Reference is to a paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group, which outlines three specific sabotage operations proposed for April 15 to May 15. (Ibid., April 11, 1963) Another more general paper, also dated April 9, entitled "A General Sabotage and Harassment Program Against Cuba," was sent from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group. (Ibid.)

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April,/2/ on the three papers being considered at today's meeting were noted. The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known. He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to interfere with those negotiations at this stage.

/2/Cottrell commented on both papers in April 11 memoranda to U. Alexis Johnson. (Ibid.) The third paper has not been identified.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups, it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma. Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also commented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a presentation should be made to higher authority at which time all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the preparation of this paper./3/

/3/Apparent reference to Document 318.

[Here follows discussion of items 5-7, unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

312. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, April 11, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-A, 1/4/63-4/11/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution.

Dear Mr. Chairman: It has been some time since I have written you directly, and I think it may be helpful to have some exchange of views in this private channel./1/ As we have both earlier agreed, it is of great importance that we should try to understand each other clearly, so that we can avoid unnecessary dangers or obstacles to progress in the effort for peaceful agreements.

/1/In an April 11 memorandum to Rusk, Thompson stated that when delivering this message to Dobrynin on April 11 at 2 p.m., he told the Soviet Ambassador: "I wished to underscore one point in the message, and said that in doing so, I knew I was reflecting the views of my highest superiors, and that was the usefulness of continued withdrawal of troops from Cuba." (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files)

[Here follow the President's remarks on the test ban treaty and the spread of nuclear weapons; the full text of the letter is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 265-268.]

Although together we found workable arrangements for ending the very dangerous crisis which was created when strategic weapons were introduced into Cuba last year, I am sure we can agree that the situation in that island is not yet satisfactory or reassuring to those who care for the peace of the Caribbean. Although the recent withdrawal of a number of your forces has been an important contribution to the reduction of tension, the continued presence of Soviet forces in Cuba can never be regarded with equanimity by the people of this Hemisphere and therefore further withdrawals of such forces can only be helpful.

Meanwhile, we on our side have been endeavoring to reduce tension in this area in a number of ways. For example, the fundamental justification of our practice of peaceful observation of Cuba is precisely that it is necessary to prevent further increase in tension and a repetition of the dangers of last fall. Without such peaceful observation in 1962, this Hemisphere would have been confronted with intolerable danger, and the people of the Hemisphere could not now accept a situation in which they were without adequate information on the situation in Cuba. It is for this reason that this peaceful observation must continue, and that any interference with it from Cuba would necessarily evoke whatever response was necessary to retain it.

We are also aware of the tensions unduly created by recent private attacks on your ships in Caribbean waters; and we are taking action to halt those attacks which are in violation of our laws, and obtaining the support of the British Government in preventing the use of their Caribbean islands for this purpose. The efforts of this Government to reduce tensions have, as you know, aroused much criticism from certain quarters in this country. But neither such criticism nor the opposition of any sector of our society will be allowed to determine the polices of this Government. In particular, I have neither the intention nor the desire to invade Cuba; I consider that it is for the Cuban people themselves to decide their destiny. I am determined to continue with policies which will contribute to peace in the Caribbean.

[Here follows a brief call for U.S.-Soviet cooperation on Laos.]

There are other issues and pro.blems before us, but perhaps I have said enough to give you a sense of my own current thinking on these matters. Let me now also offer the suggestion that it might be helpful if some time in May I should send a senior personal representative to discuss these and other matters informally with you. The object would not be formal negotiations, but a fully frank, informal exchange of views, arranged in such a way as to receive as little attention as possible. If this thought is appealing to you, please let me know your views on the most convenient time.

In closing, I want again to send my warm personal wishes to you and all your family. These are difficult and dangerous times in which we live, and both you and I have grave responsibilities to our families and to all of mankind. The pressures from those who have a less patient and peaceful outlook are very great--but I assure you of my own determination to work at all times to strengthen world peace./2/

/2/Printed from an unsigned copy.

313. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, April 11, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1-4/20/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Cuba--Covert Actions

The Cottrell Committee met Wednesday afternoon/1/ to discuss a number of items which are to come up at the Special Group meeting. Secretary Vance, Sterling Cottrell, Dez FitzGerald, Bob Hurwitch and Joe Califano attended. Here are some of the points.

/1/April 10.

1. Black Operations--A number of new intelligence operations were approved with little comment.

2. Sabotage Targets for April/May--Dez FitzGerald presented three targets for approval--a railway bridge, some petroleum storage facilities and a molasses storage vessel. During the Committee's discussion and approval of the three targets, a number of points were made.

a. This will meet the President's desire for some noise level and for some action in the immediate future.

b. These are relatively soft targets. They will not hurt the Cubans terribly much. (Unfortunately, this is usually the case with soft targets--the ones that really hurt are hard and require extensive planning.)

c. These targets will not be attacked before April 22, if it looks as if the American prisoners will be released on that date.

d. The Special Group should be aware of the consequences of these raids. For example, raids from the outside may prompt Cuban firings near or at American ships.

3. Sabotage of Cuban Shipping--The Committee split on the question of limpets. Secretary Vance was against limpets because of the possibility of sinkings. While Cott went along with limpets, Bob Hurwitch pointed out that there are dangers in attaching them in Free World ports. It could prove very embarrassing to U.S. relations with other governments; this aspect should be considered on a port-by-port basis. Dez pointed out that operating in Havana harbor was difficult.

4. Attacks from the Inside--Dez pointed out that, as a general rule, it was difficult to control sabotage from the inside. So far, sabotage has been taboo; our people inside Cuba have been restrained. Once the taboo is lifted, it will be difficult to restrict them to certain targets; they may hit targets we never dreamed of. Also, we will not have control over the exact timing of the raids.

Dez said that probably one of the best targets inside Cuba is the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It would really hurt the Cubans but would be a complicated and difficult job and would take about eight months to accomplish. He urged getting started on the planning.

5. Attacks from the Outside--The Committee agreed that these attacks could and should be approved on a project-by-project basis.

6. General--Dez feels that the President wants some action. Dez is working on a program which will show continuous motion. The soft targets, which are generally unimportant, will be first because they require the least preparation. As time goes on, however, we will be hitting some harder and more important targets.

GC

314. Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, April 15, 1963.

Source; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret.

As I analyze it, the situation in Cuba is about as follows:

1. Undeniably there has been a withdrawal. A figure of 4,000 can be supported by visual observation, analyses of shipping, refugee and clandestine reports.

2. There is no evidence of withdrawal of equipment. In fact, there is evidence of the recent introduction of some equipment of an undisclosed nature during the last several months.

3. Some reports, including statements by Castro and other high Cuban officials, would lead to the conclusion that a continuing, gradual Soviet withdrawal is to be expected and will be completed in about a year. At this time all Soviet equipment including SAM sites will have been turned over to the Cubans. This is contradicted by evidences of Soviet intention to stay in Cuba, the most persuasive being substantial permanent construction of facilities to house Soviet personnel.

4. At the present time the Soviets are manning the SAM sites, coastal defense missiles, KOMAR ships, MIG-21 aircraft and maintaining their 4 military encampments of about battalion size. The appearance of Cuban tents adjacent to each of the 4 camps could mean one of two things:

a. A Cuban training program, or

b. Utilization of Cubans for support activities such as camp maintenance, mess hall duty, etc.

Under the latter assumption, it could be that personnel withdrawn have been support personnel, and that the combat personnel remain intact. Soviet Cuban relationships remain strained but not as seriously strained as they were last Fall. A situation has evolved which both sides seem willing to live with. Castro is asserting and declaring his independ-ence of the Soviets. He considers that he is not a satellite but he is obviously beholden to the Soviets for economic aid and military assist-ance.

5. We have no hard intelligence which would indicate a change in Castro's basic attitude toward other Latin American governments.

6. Castro's talks with Donovan have been mild in nature, conciliatory and reasonably frank. Of greater significance is Dr. Vallejo's private statements to Donovan that Castro realizes he must find a rapprochement with the United States if he is to succeed in building a viable Cuba. Apparently Castro does not know how to go about this, therefore the subject has not been discussed with Donovan.

315. Memorandum of a Conference With President Kennedy

Palm Beach, Florida, April 15, 1963, 5:30 p.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on April 16.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President--5:30--15 Apr 1963

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

3. Discussed in some detail the Donovan negotiations in Cuba. Gave the President a copy of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] summary of the Donovan discussions/1/ and a copy of my memorandum of April 15th on Cuba./2/ President raised the question of Miro Cardona, stated that Cardona had misrepresented the facts. I urged that the President not involve himself personally in a public argument with Miro Cardona./3/

/1/Not found.

/2/Apparent reference to Document 314.

/3/In an undated memorandum to McCone, written after April 13, FitzGerald reported that Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, had stated his intention to resign unless he had word that President Kennedy was prepared to discuss the matter with him or unless he had a clear indication that there was a plan for the liberation of Cuba. Miro planned to publish a resignation letter denouncing U.S. policy toward Cuba. FitzGerald stated that Miro's usefulness to the U.S. Government had ended, even if he should reconsider his decision to resign. (Central Intelligence Agency, McCone/DCI Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963)

I raised the question of the possibility of working on Castro with the objective of disenchanting him with his Soviet relations causing him to break relations with Khrushchev, to effect the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba, reorient his policies with respect to Latin America, and establish in Cuba government satisfactory to the rest of the Hemisphere. I explained to the President that the Cuban problem must be solved in one of two ways; either the manner outlined above or alternatively, by bringing consistent pressure of every possible nature on Khrushchev to force his withdrawal from Cuba, and then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of the Soviets troops (but not before) and thereafter establish a satisfactory government in Cuba. I stated to the President that we were studying both courses of action and I had not made up my mind concerning the feasibility of either plan. The President thought both approaches should be carefully examined and suggested the possibility of pursuing both courses at the same time. In any event it was decided that we should keep the Donovan channel open. I advised the President that Donovan has to return to Havana at the end of the week and that I will see him privately prior to his departure.

4. The President and I talked at some length concerning sabotage in Cuba. I expressed grave doubts and pointed out the hazards from his standpoint in view of the stand-down of the hit-and-run exile operations, the danger of attribution, etc. The President seemed to question whether active sabotage was good unless it was of a type that could "come from within Cuba." I said this was very difficult and that the initial operations conceived were from the sea. I said I thought a program should be engaged in only if it was an essential building block in an agreed program to remove the Soviets from Cuba and to take care of Castro.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

316. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 16, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/16/63. Secret. Drafted by Thomas A. Parrott of the National Security Council Staff.

SUBJECT

Review of Cuban Operations for the Standing Group of the NSC

Bromley Smith told me today that the "revived" Standing Group of the NSC/1/ would consider Cuba at its first meeting, next Tuesday at 5:00/2/ (the "regular" time will be 10:30 Tuesdays). He said that Cottrell will be asked to prepare a paper to be ready by the close of business this Thursday, the 18th./3/ This will be a status report, not an action document. Mr. Smith said Mr. Bundy had asked that he discuss with me the handling of the Special Group input.

/1/The new NSC Standing Group was comprised of the following officials: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Harriman, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Taylor, Attorney General Kennedy, Under Secretary of the Treasury Fowler, Director of USIA Murrow, AID Administrator Bell, Special Counsel to the President Sorensen, and Special Assistant to the President Bundy who served as its chairman. The task of the revived Standing Group was to deal with matters of national security which did not require Presidential determination, a role different from the earlier Standing Group which had been established to organize and monitor the work of the NSC.

/2/April 23; see Document 322.

/3/Later--In view of the meeting with higher authority scheduled for Friday the 19th, it has been agreed that the covert annex would be more meaningful if prepared after that. Therefore, the deadline for this will be Monday afternoon. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is Document 318. Monday was April 22.]

I pointed out to Smith that while the members of the Special Group are also members of the Standing Group (with the exception of Harriman who replaces Johnson for State), some of the other Standing Group members have never been exposed to Special Group affairs and the remainder have been only sporadically. We agreed on the desirability of not spreading knowledge of covert operations any wider than absolutely necessary, if we are to preserve the principle of deniability.

I suggested that Cottrell be instructed to put the report on covert operations in a separate annex, and urged that this not be distributed in advance of Tuesday's meeting, as the basic paper will be. Mr. Smith agreed that this could probably be handled by passing the annex out at the meeting and retrieving it at the end.

Thomas A. Parrott/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

317. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, April 17, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Hearings Before the Committee on Export Control. Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson.

SUBJECT

Free World Shipping to Cuba

I. Present Status. Discussions which the United States has conducted with other maritime nations during the past several months about shipping in the Cuban trade resulted in positive action to remove Free World ships from the Cuban trade. Liberia, Turkey, Honduras and Panama have issued official decrees barring their ships from all trade with Cuba. West Germany has issued a decree prohibiting ships under its registry from trade between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. More recently, a Greek decree prohibited Greek vessels not presently under charter to the Bloc from carrying cargoes to Cuba, and provided that Greek vessels will be withdrawn from the Cuban trade, as present charters expire. The Lebanese have assured us of their cooperation and state that they hope to rewrite their shipping laws within three months. Repeated approaches to the United Kingdom have not been productive, and HMG has reiterated its position that it does not have a legal basis for pulling its vessels out of the Cuban trade. However, HMG has engaged in informal discussions with British shipowners with some effect.

A further spur to action by foreign governments in this regard has been Section 107(b) of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963, which in substance provides that no United States economic assistance (not including PL 480) shall be furnished to any country which "permits" ships under its flag to carry "items of economic assist-ance" to Cuba./1/

/1/Public Law 87-874, approved October 23, 1962; 76 Stat 1163-1170.

Another factor has been the fear of shipowners and operators that the ILA would not load cargoes in American ports if their ships engaged in the Cuban trade.

The result of all this has been that the number of Free World vessels calling at Cuban ports was reduced from 337 in the first three months of 1962, to 62 in the first three months of 1963. However, while the number of such ships reached a low point of 12 in January of 1963, it increased to 22 in February and to 28 in March. (The foregoing figures are in part based upon classified information and the public list of ships released by the Maritime Administration in accordance with NSAM 220/2/ shows 12 in January, 19 in February, and 23 in March.) However, as a part of the increased number of vessels shown for March arrived in ballast to carry out sugar cargoes, there has not been a corresponding increase in the goods brought to Cuba by Free World ships. Preliminary information indicates that the amount of such imports was about the same in March as in January.

/2/Document 277.

The following is a breakdown of the flags of the 78 ships which have arrived through April 17, 1963: United Kingdom 32, Greece 20, Norway 6, Lebanon 6, Italy 4, Yugoslavia 4, Spain 2, Japan 1, West Germany 1, Denmark 1, Morocco 1.

Since January 1, 1963, no Free World ship which has called at a Cuban port has subsequently called at a United States port. One vessel called at a United States port and then proceeded to Cuba. Pursuant to NSAM 220, commitments to withdraw their vessels from all Cuban trade have been or are in the process of being received from a line in each of Japan, Italy, Denmark, and West Germany.

II. Discussion. The Soviet Bloc has thus far readily replaced Free World vessels withdrawn from the Cuban trade, and can presumably do the same for the remaining vessels. Thus the effects on the Cuban economy are minimal. However, Free World vessels calling at Cuban ports have, in domestic opinion, become a symbol of the willingness of the Free World to cooperate with us with respect to Cuba. Replacement of Free World vessels also in some small degree may increase the cost to the Soviet Bloc of maintaining Cuba.

NSAM 220 was confined to vessels calling at Cuban ports rather than to all ships owned or controlled by a line largely in order at that time further not to exacerbate our relations with Poland and Yugoslavia. To have applied the NSAM to ships owned or controlled by would have meant that ships of those two countries could not have carried their customary share of PL 480 cargoes destined for those two countries. The shipping of those two countries to Cuba has averaged one or two ships per month. It is likely that they will continue their participation in the Cuban trade irrespective of whatever measures we may take short of a naval blockade. Polish and Yugoslav ships are currently carrying United States-financed cargoes under the PL 480 agreements with those countries signed on February 1, 1963, and November 28, 1962, respectively. Yugoslav ships are also carrying some merchandise financed under an outstanding Export-Import Bank credit. Subsequently, a ship of the Moroccan Government line has called at a Cuban port. As this line is also carrying PL 480 cargo from the United States to Morocco, the effects on Morocco would be similar to those on Poland and Yugoslavia.

The strict application of Section 107(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act raises serious problems of fact and policy. Questions of fact are whether a country has "permitted" its ships to carry "economic assistance" and what cargoes may in fact be "economic assistance" as opposed to normal trade. Stringent and extreme application of the Act could result in the cutting-off of all economic assistance to the United Kingdom possessions such as Kenya, British Guiana, et cetera, as well as to Greece. The political disadvantages of such drastic action are of course obvious. Nevertheless, we have and are continuing to press the countries involved to purge themselves of all actions that could require us to invoke the Act. The Battle Act administrator (the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) is, in accordance with the law, now assembling and transmitting to the AID Administrator factual information bearing on the application of Section 107 for legal determination required of the AID Administrator.

Because of measures now taken by the Greek Government, it appears that, as their charters expire, most if not all of the 20 Greek vessels which have called at Cuban ports since January 1 will be withdrawing from the Cuban trade. (The Greek Government is now assembling exact information on the terms of the various charters.) Commitments from the lines now being obtained will also assure the withdrawal of at least one of the four Italian ships, the one Japanese ship, the one Danish ship, and a West German ship which is now completing its charter. The principal remaining problem is thus the 32 British and six Norwegian ships.

The minimal additional public action that we could now take would be the extension of the provisions of NSAM 220 to all ships owned or controlled by anyone owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade. Apart from the not inconsiderable problem of exacerbation of our relations with Morocco, Yugoslavia and Poland, this could have useful and important domestic and international psychological effects. At the request of the Department of State, the Maritime Administration is now urgently studying shipping patterns in order to arrive at some estimate of its practical effect. Preliminary information indicates that its practical effects might be minimal with respect to tankers, which comprise 16 of the 32 British ships engaged in the trade. Mr. McCone feels, and I agree, that it would not be desirable to take additional public steps during the present stage of Mr. Donovan's negotiations for the release of American prisoners in Cuba.

III. Recommendations. Considering all of the foregoing factors, I recommend that:

1. We make another approach to the United Kingdom, through their Ambassador here as well as in London, seeking United Kingdom cooperation and pointing out the necessity of our taking further action unless a prompt reduction in United Kingdom shipping to Cuba can be achieved.

2. Similar approaches be made to Norway, Italy and Spain.

3. We now make all administrative preparations for the issuance, at a time to be subsequently determined, of an extension of the provisions of NSAM 220 to ships owned or controlled by persons owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade with a grace period of forty-five days to permit withdrawal of vessels in the course of a voyage at the time the extension is made public.

4. At a time subsequently to be determined, request United States owned or controlled oil companies to refrain voluntarily, within the Western Hemisphere, from bunkering vessels known to be engaged in the Cuban trade, and seek the cooperation of the United Kingdom in the application of a similar policy by British oil companies. (This would have its principal impact on a number of very small vessels which now may be operating between Central American ports and Cuba.)

Dean Rusk/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

318. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Special Group

Washington, April 18, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-01131, Sabotage/Destruction. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the bottom of this memorandum indicated it was prepared for the April 18 meeting of the Special Group, which deferred consideration of this paper until April 25. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 84 B, April 25, 1963)

SUBJECT

Proposed New Covert Policy and Program Towards Cuba

A. The following guidelines are being used in our present covert policy towards Cuba:

1. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to our basic policy objectives. (No offensive weapons reintroduced into Cuba, removal of Soviet forces, no aggressive Cuban military action, reducing subversion in the hemisphere, divorcing Castro from USSR, replacing present regime, maximizing cost to USSR, political isolation of Cuba and preparing for military contingencies.)

2. Intensifying covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime.

3. Supporting the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: a) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and b) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and c) secure intelligence.

4. The use of variety of propaganda media to stimulate passive resistance and low-risk, simple, sabotage actions by the populace of Cuba.

5. The placing of incendiary devices and/or explosives with suitable time delay within the hull or cargo to disable or sink Cuban vessels and/or damage their cargos while on the high seas.

6. Introducing abrasives or other damaging materials into the propulsion, communication and other systems of the ship to inactivate the ship.

B. The questions now to be decided are:

1. Should the U.S. move beyond the above policy to a program of sabotage, harassment and resistance activities?

2. What kind of effective action can be taken?

3. What capabilities do we possess?

4. What repercussions can we expect?

C. With respect to (1.) above, the following considerations apply:

1. U.S. policy statements have consistently reiterated the view that the liberation of Cuba is primarily a function of the Cuban people themselves.

2. The absence of continued harassment against the regime inside Cuba will consolidate its control and indicate the success of Castro in imposing Communism upon the Cuban people.

3. The absence of U.S. assistance inside Cuba to those who desire the overthrow of the Communist regime will deny an important asset.

4. The U.S. effort to assist the fighters for freedom inside Cuba will involve expense and risk of lives to those Cubans who are trained for this purpose.

5. The risk of U.S. involvement through confessions of captured personnel is a continuing one. However, world opinion in the event of such exposure is not likely to be severely damaging to the U.S. position.

D. With respect to (2.) (3.) and (4.) above, the following additional proposals are submitted for consideration (see Annex for details)./1/

/1/The annex, April 17, entitled "Prospects for and Limitations of a Maximum Covert Action Program Against the Castro Communist Regime," is not printed. (Ibid., Book I, Special Group) See the Supplement.

1. The placing of explosive devices with suitable time delays on the outside of ships either in Cuban or non-Cuban ports.

Considerations: UDT teams can be ready by June for attack in July on a once monthly basis. This measure would place increased strain on Cuban shipping and demoralize Cuban crews. Soviet reaction is likely in form of propaganda and UN demarche. Retaliation in kind or forceful reactions are probably unlikely.

2. Surface attacks by maritime assets firing on Cuban ships in Cuban waters. When the maritime asset cannot reach the target, shore based attacks on shipping in port or passing the offshore keys will be undertaken.

Considerations: Attack craft from the sea would be manned by Cubans. Shore based attacks by paramilitary trained Cubans firing on ships with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers or 20mm cannon. First sea attack in May and once monthly thereafter. First shore based attack in June. These operations would disrupt coastal commerce. US would probably be blamed. Cuban reprisal measures possible. Soviets likely allege US culpability. Probably no direct Soviet counter-action outside Cuba. Soviets would probably supply additional hardware to Cubans but caution against too aggressive Cuban response.

3. Externally mounted hit and run attacks against land targets. Examples: molasses tanker, petroleum storage dumps, naval refueling base, refineries, power plants.

Considerations: Operations conducted by Cubans with paramilitary training. High possibilities of complex operations going awry. First attack in April with one per month thereafter. Effects would be increased exile morale, some economic disruption. Repercussions would include charges of U.S. sponsorship, and increased Cuban security force activities. Soviet reaction likely to be propaganda-political moves and support to Cuban patrol activity but caution to avoid escalation.

4. Support of Internal Resistance Elements, providing materiel and personnel to permit them to undertake a variety of sabotage and harassment operations.

Considerations: The internal elements being supported will attack targets of their own choosing in their own manner. They will be targets of opportunity in line with their capabilities. Effect could be cumulative and snow-balling. The materiel will be introduced by maritime infiltration, diplomatic channels and concealment in open mail. Indigenous materials will be used and instructions provided. Initial sabotage results within 30 days. This program could produce major economic damage, lift morale and keep resistance alive. Repercussions would involve increased security measures. Soviet reaction largely propaganda and supplies.

Attachment

SUBJECT

A Covert Harassment/Sabotage Program against Cuba

I. This paper presents a covert Harassment/Sabotage program targeted against Cuba; included are those sabotage plans which have previously been approved as well as new proposals. While this program will cause a certain amount of economic damage, it will in no sense critically injure the economy or cause the overthrow of Castro. It may, however, create a situation which will delay the consolidation and stabilization of Castro's revolution and may cause some of his 26 July followers to doubt Castro's ability successfully to create a new Cuba.

Losses in men and equipment with the attendant adverse publicity must be expected. Even without such losses, U.S. attribution will be claimed.

When the policy and guidelines of the overall sabotage program are established, it will be possible progressively to develop up to a limit additional covert assets and support capabilities. However, materially to increase the pace of operations, a period of four to six months is required. Ultimate limiting factors are weather, length of "dark-of-the-moon" period each month and appropriate targets. A source of additional agent personnel is from Cuban personnel trained by the U.S. Military Forces under the recent programs, but released to civilian status.

319. Editorial Note

At the 512th meeting of the National Security Council, April 20, 1963, the issue of Cuba was briefly raised. Most of the discussion at the meeting dealt with Laos; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 976-980. According to Bromley Smith's summary record, the discussion of Cuba was as follows:

"Director McCone said that our latest information was that the remaining twenty-three American prisoners would probably be leaving Cuba on Monday. He had reports that these prisoners were being moved from the Isle of Pines to Havana. Donovan appeared hopeful that the removal would be completed Monday.

"The President commented that with the prisoners out of Cuba, we might be in a position to act against Cuba if Khrushchev made no move to halt the deterioration in Laos. He asked what action we could take against Cuba.

"Director McCone said we should fly low-level reconnaissance missions which were necessary no matter what happens in Laos. He said we need to have pictures of Soviet convoys, some of which were described in considerable detail by Donovan upon his return from his last visit to Havana.

"Ambassador Thompson pointed out that a U.S. bombing raid on Pathet Lao forces in Laos would be easier for Khrushchev to accept than U.S. action against Cuba." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, National Security Council Meetings, No. 512, 4/20/63)

William Colby, Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, prepared an account of the meeting which he sent to Director of Central Intelligence McCone. Colby's extract relating to Cuba reads:

"The President stated his belief that it was necessary to raise the pressure somewhat in Cuba. He felt that we could hardly continue to carry out a mild policy in Cuba at the time the Communists are carrying out an aggressive policy in Laos. He thus approved certain U-2 flights over Cuba. These flights and other activities against Cuba, however, will be delayed until the anticipated release by Cuba of prisoners on April 22. The President requested recommendations on April 22 for additional efforts which can be taken in Cuba." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963) The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXIV, pages 985-988.

320. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, April 21, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63, Part A. Top Secret.

THE CUBAN PROBLEM

The attached papers are circulated as background material for the meeting of the Standing Group now scheduled for Tuesday, April 23, at 5:00 p.m./1/ This meeting will not aim at reaching agreed conclusions, but rather at an initial and wide-ranging discussion of the prospects and alternatives for American policy in Cuba.

/1/See Document 322.

The papers attached are intended mainly for reference, and much of their contents will be familiar. Except for Tab 1, which is a White House summary of the problem and of alternative approaches to it, these papers are forwarded from the Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. Through no fault of the Coordinator, these papers are not fully-up-to-date on certain special aspects of contingency planning, and they omit certain covert plans and operations on which there will be oral briefing Tuesday. The papers are as follows:

Tab 1--White House summary

Tab 2--(Annex 3), Current Situation/2/

/2/Annex 3 stated that the Cuban economy had continued to decline, with sugar production 60 percent of the 1961 levels, GNP 25 percent below the 1958 level with 20 percent less goods available. It concluded that Castro was the unchalleged leader of Cuba, with the mass of Cubans resigned to his rule and resistance weak and disorganized. The annex estimated that 9,600 Soviet troops and technicians had left Cuba, while in the same time 300-1,000 had arrived. Soviet withdrawals would continue slowly, but a large number of Soviet technicans would remain in Cuba indefinitely. See the Supplement.

Tab 3--(Annex 4), Multilateral Efforts to Isolate Cuba and Combat Castro-Communist Subversion/3/

Tab 4--(Annex 5), Cuban Hemisphere Subversion/3/

/3/Not printed.

Tab 5--(Annex 6), Economic Restrictions/4/

/4/Annex 6 suggested that economic restrictions were working. Free world shipping to Cuba was sharply reduced, international civil aviation to Cuba had almost been entirely cut off, free world trade to Cuba was 20 percent of the 1959 figure, and strategic commodities had been blocked from going to Cuba. See the Supplement.

Tab 6--(Annex 7), Exile Problems/5/

Tab 7--Military Contingency Planning/6/

Tab 8--The Cuban Situation in Eighteen Months or Two Years (prepared by State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research)/7/

By separate distribution I am also circulating an unclassified compilation of the President's statements on Cuba./8/

/5/Annex 7 indicated that the U.S. refusal to support Miro Cardona's demand for an alliance of exile groups for military action under the Cuba Revolutionary Council (CRC) had caused Miro's resignation and would probably cause the disintegration of the CRC, a "desirable development." The annex noted that uncontrolled hit and run raids had been stopped, members of the Cuban Brigade were offered civilian and military opportunities, and 50,000 Cuban refugees had been resettled outside the Miami area, leaving 125,000 still in the Miami area. See the Supplement.

/6/Annex 8 contained a description of CINCLANT OPLANS for Cuba. See the Supplement.

/7/In this memorandum, April 18, INR concluded that the Cuban economy would deteriorate, the economic cost of Cuba to the USSR would be somewhat greater, the isolation of Cuba would increase, but otherwise the situation would remain essentially unchanged. It was therefore difficult to reach a definitive judgment on whether time was running out for Castro. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1/63-4/20/63)

/8/Attached, but not printed.

McGeorge Bundy

Tab 1

SUBJECT

A Sketch of the Cuban Alternatives

I. Present Policy and prospects

Present U.S. policy toward Cuba has the following elements:

(1) Prevention of a direct military threat to the U.S. or the Hemisphere from Cuba. To this end it is clear that all necessary measures will be taken.

(2) Elimination of Soviet military presence from Cuba. Currently our level of effort here is limited to quite diplomatic pressure and careful public statement. Decisions on further action are deferred pending the result of current efforts.

(3) Isolation of Cuba from the rest of the free world. To this end we are ready to exert considerable diplomatic and economic pressure on Western Allies.

(4) Counter-action against Cuban/Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere. We are developing an extensive program of cooperation with Latin American governments in this field, and it is clearly our policy to develop this program energetically.

(5) Surveillance to Cuba by all appropriate intelligence operations. It is clear that the maintenance of this surveillance is essential in support of objective 1, above.

(6) Covert action to damage the Cuban economy. The possibilities of such action appear limited, but they have not been fully explored. It is current policy to develop additional resources for selective action in this field.

Opinions differ as to the probable result of this policy in the absence of major shifts inside Cuba or in Soviet or Cuban behavior. At Tab 8 is an informal memorandum from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department on this topic. This memorandum is to be supplemented soon by a community-wide intelligence assessment. The probability is that in the absence of new developments, the policy outlined above will not lead to early major change in Cuba.

II. Possible New Directions

Broadly speaking, major changes in the situation can be produced in one of two ways: either we can await events which would permit or require new action by the United States Government, or we can initiate actions designed to produce major change, whether or not the actions of others produce crisis opportunities.

1. Contingency Planning

Contingency planning currently envisages three kinds of cases in which stepped-up action is intended:

a. Interference with U.S. surveillance

b. Any new major Soviet military intrusion or any significant military move from Cuba against the Hemisphere

c. Possible general action against Cuba in the context of an international crisis originating elsewhere.

Contingency planning for b. and c. is limited so far to straight military planning on a wholly hypothetical basis. Planning for a. is primarily directed toward the immediate objective of insuring continued surveillance by a minimum necessary force. The broader political question is whether these or other contingencies should be regarded as opportunities for deliberately enlarged action aimed at a major political result. On the one hand, contingency planning can be based on the premise that we wish to protect and restore the situation existing immediately before the new crisis; this was essentially the purpose of U.S. policy in the October missile crisis. Alternatively, contingency planning can be developed with the purpose of using a given critical development as a means of changing the situation in ways advantageous to us. It is obvious that greater commitments of force and greater risks are inevitable in such alternative planning, and it is equally obvious that these greater commitments and risks may not be desirable in any given case. The point here is simply that such choices are a necessary element of the choice of responses to any particular contingency. Perhaps the Standing Group should give some attention to the question whether wider contingency planning--or at least contingency thinking--is needed.

2. Possible New Initiatives

a. A decision to force a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means.

Such a decision would imply the development of pressures which would insure gradual escalation of the confrontation in Cuba to whatever point was necessary to produce the overthrow of the present regime. Such a policy would not exclude the use of contingencies as a means for advancing U.S. policy, but it would require that the pace be forced and that pressures be sustained in such a way, at every stage, as to prevent solutions short of overthrow of the regime. A program of this kind might or might not be openly avowed at the outset. It might proceed at varying rates of speed and with varying concern for public support here and abroad. Probably its dominant feature would be a willingness to use military force to invade Cuba, and it seems probable too that this invasion would have to be carried through.

b. A decision to insist on major but limited ends.

The United States could deliberately adopt a policy of gradually increasing pressure designed to produce more limited results at least initially. Possible objectives are the total withdrawal of Soviet military forces, the verifiable abandonment of subversive training in Cuba, the reopening of the island to peaceful on-site visitation and inspection by non-Communists--or all three. Such a program again might be developed at varying rates of speed and with varying combinations of political and military pressure. Probably it would require a clear willingness to move to the level of a POL blockade, and at a guess such a blockade might in fact have to be established at some point.

c. The U.S. could move in the direction of gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro.

Faint hints of this possibility appear in Donovan explorations and elsewhere. There is always the possibility that Castro or others currently high in the regime might find advantage in a gradual shift away from their present level of dependence on Moscow. In strictly economic terms, both the United States and Cuba have much to gain from reestablishment of relations. A Titoist Castro is not inconceivable, and a full diplomatic revolution would not be the most extraordinary event in the 20th century. The Special Group may feel that this possibility also should be explored.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the three possibilities sketched above are not wholly exclusive of one another. In particular, the process of gradual pressure outlined in b. could be developed in support of both course a. and course c. Indeed, it is possible to begin on course b. without deciding between a. and c., and conceivably the process of gradual pressure could be so developed that Castro could be made to confront a decisive choice between his overthrow and an accommodation on terms acceptable to us.

McGeorge Bundy

321. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, April 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret. A note on this memorandum indicates it was part of the President's weekend reading of April 27.

SUBJECT

Cuba a Year Hence/1/

/1/A National Intelligence Estimate on the Cuban situation and prospects is now scheduled for USIB consideration in May. [Footnote in the source text.]

CONCLUSIONS

1. Various indications and evidence which have accumulated during the past two months seem to us to form a pattern which permits certain tentative conclusions to be drawn respecting trends in Soviet-Cuban relations and in Soviet intentions respecting Cuba. It now appears that the Castro regime and the USSR have overcome for the most part the difficulties in their relations resulting from the October missile crisis and have managed to devise a common policy aimed primarily at easing tensions over Cuba in order to be able to consolidate the present regime. They probably intend to continue this policy until they are satisfied that Cuba can again be used as a Communist base for forward action without excessive risk.

2. The USSR has evidently decided to supply sufficient economic aid to sustain the Cuban economy at about the current level, and will probably train Cubans in the operation of the Soviet military equipment now in Cuba under Soviet control. It seems likely to us that a year hence most of this equipment, except perhaps for the SAM system, will have been turned over to the Cubans, and the Soviet military presence in Cuba will probably have been further reduced. Such a development would tend to improve considerably the Cuban and the Soviet image in Latin America, though it could not completely offset all the adverse effects of the missile crisis. For the time being, Castro, perhaps in Soviet persuasion, has toned down his inflammatory appeals for violent revolutions throughout Latin America. There is no indication, however, of a basic change in Castro's determination to promote insurgent movements. In his mind Venezuela in particular continues to be a priority target.

3. In our view, if present trends continue, both in the reduction of Soviet forces and the training of Cuban personnel, this would mean that the USSR did not contemplate an attempt to reintroduce strategic weapons into Cuba. It is true that the risks of detection would be less than those attending the original operation. The Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods would make it possible to adopt improved measures of camouflage and deception, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence will be relying upon. Thus we cannot altogether rule out an attempt by the Soviets to reintroduce strategic missiles.

4. A year hence (barring Castro's death or some decisive US intervention in the situation) the Castro regime is likely to be more firmly established than ever. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in administrative experience and efficiency. The "year of organization" will result in the further development of the PURS, Castro's all-purpose political machine. The Cuban economy will probably not be much better than it is today, but also probably will not be much worse. Castro's prestige will have been enhanced by the acquisition of advanced weapon systems, and by the consequent demonstration of his "independence."

[Here follows the discussion portion of the paper, 14 pages; see the Supplement.]

322. Summary Record of the 2d Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, April 23, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63 (Part A). Top Secret.

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy entitled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives."/1/

/1/See the attachment to Document 320.

Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance, it should consider whether the present policy we are following would produce a major change in Cuba. He expressed his firm view that Castro's position over the short term would improve if we took no actions other than those now under way or projected. He made clear his belief that the elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would produce changes acceptable to us. The program should aim at creating such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retaliation by the USSR on the West.

Mr. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that Castro's position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from now than it is at present. He expressed his belief that present policy would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of the Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of existing policy on the Castro regime. He cited evidence to indicate that present measures are crippling the Cuban economy, leading to shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit full rations for Cuban militia. Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was no way to finance Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds, had proved that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for example, Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba early enough to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut loose from the USSR and not yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i.e. he did not stay bought. The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was not feasible because Castro was a true revolutionary who could not be induced to give up his revolution.

The Attorney General proposed three studies:

a. A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2.

b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in eighteen months.

c. A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next eighteen months.

Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against Communist aggression. He urged that our policy toward Cuba always be kept in this perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major importance to us.

USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a statement of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba.

Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba we could live with if it were no longer run by Castro or tied to Moscow. He said that American companies had written off their expropriated sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared in Cuba.

There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. There appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result would be to raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen listed the seven objectives raised at the meeting as follows:

a. Improve our present course of action by doing some things that we are not now doing.

b. Agree on military responses which we should make to contingencies, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane.

c. Develop a program to get rid of Castro.

d. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba.

e. A program to induce Soviet withdrawal.

f. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow.

g. A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba./2/

Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to the kind of a regime we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro.

Bromley Smith/3/

/2/The Record of Action of this meeting, April 23, reads as follows: "Following discussion of U.S. Policy Towards Cuba, it was agreed that discussions would be continued at the next meeting scheduled for 10:30 am, Tuesday, April 30. It was also agreed that it is important that present lines of policy and operation should be continued." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63 (Part A))

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

323. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 25, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, 303, Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 25 April 1963

PRESENT

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-4

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1-5

Mr. Jorgensen was present for Item 3

Mr. Tweedy was present for Item 6

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

4. Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba

The DCI said the USIB unanimously reaffirmed yesterday the priority intelligence requirements for low-level coverage of Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that there is high-level interest in reviewing this situation.

Mr. Johnson said that in the view of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, the Soviets would interpret a resumption of low-level flights as an indication of the adoption by the U.S. of a harder line toward Cuba. More significantly, Ambassador Thompson is very much opposed to such resumption at this time; he feels that this could result in a reduction in the rate of withdrawal of Soviet troops or a Soviet decision to withdraw none at all in the future, and it might affect Soviet policy in Laos in a manner adverse to U.S. interests. The importance of the Harriman mission with respect to this last proposition was noted. Mr. Johnson said we should know the results of the Harriman mission in a day or two.

It was agreed that the matter would be discussed with higher authority this afternoon./1/

/1/See Document 324.

5. Proposed New Policy and Program toward Cuba

Mr. McCone opened the discussion of this topic by pointing out that the overt and multilateral pressures now being applied to Cuba are useful; on the other hand, while they will slow Castro down they will not hurt him critically, and the interest of our allies in maintaining such pressures will almost certainly erode as time passes. Similarly, any sabotage program can hurt the Castro government, but not lethally; and in order to be effective at all, it must be done on a continuing basis and cannot be subjected to a stop-and-go treatment. The DCI went on to say that any such activity is bound to be attributed to the United States and if we are to carry through with it, we must be prepared to accept the accompanying noise level. He said that a sabotage program will not be entirely beneficial to U.S. interests; on the minus side, there is the fact that this will complicate the running of intelligence operations and it could result in Cuban retaliation. Additionally, Mr. McCone said he is not in favor of extreme types of sabotage such as complete destruction of crops, contamination of water supplies, etc. He would prefer open intervention to this kind of thing.

The DCI said that the combination of economic and other pressures with sabotage activities, might provide a feasible climate for a successful attempt to fragment the Castro organization. He foresaw the possibility of such fragmentation leading to assumption of power by a military dictatorship, which would probably be friendly to the U.S. In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that we have a line on certain high-ranking officers who are not entirely sympathetic to the regime. He pointed out, however, that a major operational obstacle to capitalizing on this situation is the difficulty of persuading individual Cubans of this type to place their trust in each other. In addition, we will have to be able to assure them that the U.S. will be sympathetic to possible successors to the present government, even though such people may have been former Castro supporters.

Mr. FitzGerald touched on the proposed support to selected Cuban exile groups, for autonomous operations, as being one of the key points of the possible new program. He made the point that there is no use in the U.S. trying to deny that it backs such operations, since it will be accused of this in any case, and the accusations will be generally believed; further, such a posture is not detrimental to U.S. interests. Mr. Bundy agreed with this point. He added, however, that a "scenario" will have to be worked out, clearly indicating who in the government should respond to accusations in this field and what in general they should say.

Mr. Bundy questioned a statement in the paper to the effect that covert action which might be used as a pretext for overt military intervention is ruled out. Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald said that the purpose of this statement was to indicate that the covert program is not specifically directed toward the end of providing such a pretext, but that it is not intended to preclude such a situation if it should turn out to be desirable at some time in the future.

Mr. FitzGerald then described a number of possible sabotage operations. In this connection, he pointed out that the paper contains a proposal for the placing of limpets, carrying suitable delay mechanisms, on the outside of Cuban ships so as to explode at sea. He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this proposition because of the possibility that the explosions would be attributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr. Vance's argument, Mr. Gilpatric felt that this risk was acceptable.

The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group to the proposals as follows:

a. The proposition for dealing with selected exile groups is a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to be more carefully defined.

b. There is no objection to limpets, subject to further technical studies.

c. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularly attractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature.

d. Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against land targets appear worthwhile. The operations in this category which can be run in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineries and power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operations of this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction with other resistance activities.

e. Internal resistance should be stimulated, again in conjunction with related operations.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott

324. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 25, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President, Rusk, McCone, McNamara, and Bundy, 25 April, to discuss low-level overflights

Bundy presented the DCI paper/1/ and then explained the opposition which had been expressed to him by McNamara./2/ McNamara took very strong opposition to conducting low-levels because of political consequences, and furthermore stated that, in his opinion, there was absolutely no need for overflights from the intelligence point of view. McCone contradicted this statement stating that this matter had been carefully reviewed by USIB and that on last Wednesday/3/ each member of USIB, including all six representatives of DOD, the State representative, the CIA representative and others, had favored low-levels for the reasons expressed in the COMOR paper/4/ and because of the inadequacy of high-level reconnaissance. All of this was based on intelligence needs.

/1/Reference to an April 25 memorandum from McCone to the Special Group noting the USIB recommendation for low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. The request had been deferred until the end of the Donovan mission and then deferred once more while Harriman was in Moscow. On April 24 the USIB asked again for low-level reconnaissance on 10 priority installations and facilities and expected coverage of 15 more. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

/2/Evidence of McNamara's opposition can be found in a telephone conversation with Ball, April 19. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba) See the Supplement.

/3/April 17.

/4/Apparent reference to USIB-D-41, April 20, subject: "Priority Requirements for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba," in which COMOR reanalyzed the requirements for such reconnaissance. The paper, which has not been found, is summarized in McCone's memorandum to the Special Group, April 25; see footnote 1 above.

Rusk very briefly reviewed the political consequences as expressed by Johnson in the 5412 meeting,/5/ earlier in the day. However, he took no strong position. McNamara asked Rusk for a statement in writing of the political consequences. McCone put forth a very positive argument to the President, pointing out the areas in Cuba which had gone unsurveyed for as long as 12 days at a time and the incidents in which high-level photography could neither confirm nor deny reports which were ominous and gave McCone concern, and gave the intelligence community concern.

/5/Reference is to the 5412 Special Group meeting; see Document 323.

The President felt that the Administration could not very well ignore a request of DCI and USIB. He proposed three rather than six sorties on a trial basis and asked that such a recommendation be made. In any event, nothing will be done until Harriman's return.

Action: General Carter should review this whole matter and should develop three most desirable targets including one of the armed camps. He should write a precise and full justification. (COMOR's justifications are too broad and many other arguments are based on the need for increasing the total inventory of intelligence.) The President felt that justification should be on the basis of the fact that we did not know about specific locations, construction, or activities. He questioned whether we could justify low-levels which would be provocative if we were merely increasing our inventory of intelligence or technical information. DCI agreed this was to be done promptly.

Note: Rusk at one point mentioned that perhaps we should not escalate the tensions in Cuba but should wait until there was an indication of escalation by the Soviets and the Cubans, then go with low-levels. McCone reported that this might be too late, that it was possible that the Soviets would, in secrecy, develop some move which might threaten the United States and that we would not detect them. Therefore, we could not wait for the Soviet "escalation" to take place. What we have to do is keep the island under surveillance, develop all comprehensive intelligence, so that we would know in advance of any such escalation of ominous move on the part of the Soviets.

Note: I expect quite an argument over this problem. I therefore think our case should be very carefully prepared. I took the position that the intelligence community felt that they could not depend exclusively on high-level photography and still say with assurance that we knew all there was to know about what was going on in Cuba.

325. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, April 25, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 Cuba. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch, and cleared by Cottrell, Martin, and Ball.

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with the Present Cuban Revolutionary Council

Miro's resignation and the accompanying withdrawal of most of the CRC component organizations and personalities has converted the CRC into a rump organization of little attraction in the exile community. This CRC remnant, which within itself is divided, essentially constitutes "Tony" Varona's effort to preserve his personal political machine, established through his control over the years of fifty per cent of the U.S.-supplied CRC funds. Varona, who lacks wide support, is actively seeking adhesion from a wide variety of exile leaders including Batista elements. We doubt that unity of the exiles under present circumstances is an achievable goal. The highly individualistic Cubans, who were really not "unified" in the pre-Castro era, are usually not inclined to submerge differences and organize themselves. The frustrations of exile life in general and the absence of "proof that Castro's end is in sight" in particular combine to aggravate rather than decrease differences.

The CRC has been receiving $137,000 monthly. In addition, seven exile organizations (some of which are CRC members) receive a total of $103,500 monthly. The next monthly installment of U.S. financial assist-ance is due the CRC on May 1. While some possibility exists that the CRC may dissolve of its own accord before May 1, its demise would be virtually certain were U.S. aid withheld. If the CRC disappeared, some of its present and many of its former component organizations would require our financial assistance to enable us to accomplish the intelligence, propaganda and other clandestine tasks we have set.

In causing the CRC rump to disappear by withholding the May installment we would:

1. Reduce substantially our intimate involvement in exile politics.

2. Sever our relationship with an unrepresentative exile group, thus avoiding charges of imposing our will on the exile community.

3. Enhance the possibility of the eventual emergence of a more widely supported exile leader by enabling exile political forces to operate more freely.

4. Avoid the possibility of a "Miro resignation" recurring at a more inopportune time from the domestic political standpoint.

5. Create the opportunity for an unencumbered review in depth of what our basic policy toward the exiles should be.

6. Incur criticism from some sectors of the exile community and of U.S. public opinion that we were engaging in further "persecution" of the exiles.

Temporizing with the CRC by provisionally extending its life for another month or so would increase the difficulty of disengaging later.

On balance, the Department recommends:/1/

/1/A note at the top of the source text indicates Chase called from the White House to say that this memorandum was "O.K." and the decision to call off aid had been made. Chase stated that "something should be done for Varona."

1. that the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs at Miami be authorized to inform CRC officials before May 1 that while we wish to maintain cordial relations with exile leaders and continue to consult them frequently, we do not believe that the CRC as presently constituted warrants continued U.S. financial support. Discontinuance of salaries would be accomplished gracefully, i.e. accompanied by notice and lump sum termination payments.

2. that certain former and present CRC component organizations essential to achieving our intelligence and other missions continue to receive U.S. financial assistance.

Dean Rusk/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates the original was signed by Rusk.

[end of document]

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