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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

326. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, April 25, 1963, 3 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-US. Secret. Approved in M on May 6. The source text indicates that it is Part II of IV.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PLACE

The Kremlin, in the Office of the Chairman of Council of Ministers

PARTICIPANTS

USSR

N.S. Khrushchev

Andrei Gromyko

S.G. Lapin

Viktor Sukhodrev--translator

US

Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman

Ambassador Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Michael V. Forrestal

Mr. William H. Sullivan

Governor Harriman raised the President's concern with Cuba. Khrushchev answered with some emotion: "What can Cuba do with her seven millions? You have laid a dozen Cubas around us, Turkey, Greece, Iran, Norway, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Japan"--to which Gromyko added South Korea.

Harriman said we had no substantial troops in any of the countries the Chairman mentioned, except Germany and Japan. The President is concerned about Soviet troops in Cuba and had expected Khrushchev would make a significant reduction in Soviet forces on the basis of their understanding.

Khrushchev claimed they have removed three to five times the number of troops reported in the American press, but that he would not disclose the exact numbers "because if I do you will boast that you have squeezed new concessions from the Russians. Anyway, this is a question for us and the Cubans".

Harriman said that we had reported the removal of about 4,000 Soviet troops from Cuba since the end of the year; five times that number was 20,000 and since the Soviets presumably had only 17,000 in Cuba at that time this left us with a figure of minus 3,000 which was apparently some sort of special Russian arithmetic. Khrushchev replied he would have to have a special report prepared to know exactly what numbers were involved, and there wasn't time for this now.

Harriman said that because Soviet troops remain in Cuba President Kennedy was having a great deal of difficulty keeping the country quiet on the Cuba issue. If Mr. Khrushchev could either correct the President's understanding about the numbers of troops that had been withdrawn, or withdraw more, he was sure the President would cooperate in avoiding any embarrassment for the Soviets.

Khrushchev replied that this had become a very complicated and difficult question mostly because there was so much clamor in the United States. There is nothing the Soviets can do to satisfy those who are the chief critics of the President on this issue. The President must take care of them himself.

Harriman said the President would not want to use erroneous figures in confronting his domestic opposition and it would be very helpful to him if he could have some more accurate figures. Khrushchev, somewhat excited, replied that this matter affects the sovereignty and pride of the Soviet Union . . . the Soviet Union is not accountable to the United States and cannot appear before the world as constantly conceding to American pressure. While he did not want to complicate life for the President and would in principle be ready to furnish information to the President, the latter's critics would only say this proved the need for more pressure on the Soviet Union because only pressure produced results, and that would make the situation worse. He could state that the Soviet military personnel were there only temporarily, teaching the Cubans to use the equipment they had received from the Soviet Union, after which they would return.

Harriman asked why the Soviets could not remove all their organized troop units, leaving only the instructors behind. Khrushchev replied this was a matter for the Soviets and the Cubans, and they were not accountable to anyone else. Harriman said he hoped Khrushchev understood that this was a very serious subject and that organized military units are more difficult problems than instructors. If these units were removed, feeling would be improved. Khrushchev said if the United States wants normal relations with the Soviet Union, don't aggravate the issues, don't ask questions which cause tensions for us, don't irritate our national pride. Even with a million Soviet troops there, Cuba could not be an invasion springboard. Let the President deal with his own problems at home and keep the lid on the Americans. If he doesn't want to do that, let him escalate the matter. We are ready for friendship, but are prepared to deal with the other alternative. Neither of us wants to start anything over Cuba, but if anything is started, the Soviets have retaliatory strength.

Governor Harriman said Cuba is creating much tension in the whole Caribbean area and if it is not important to the Soviets to have troops in there why don't they take them out, and leave only instructors.

Khrushchev repeated sharply that that was the business of the Soviets and the Cubans. It is a question of sovereignty. He asked about the Polaris and American bases in the UK, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, all directed against the USSR. Still we want them to report to the United States on their troops. The Soviets long ago raised the question, in the context of disarmament proposals, of mutual troop withdrawals from all foreign territory. Why don't the Americans agree to this? Moreover, why don't we leave Guantanamo? "By what right do you stay, because you are strong?" However, the Soviets will not raise this point; that is strictly between Cuba and the United States, even though the whole world knows the Americans aren't welcome there and that the Soviet Union supports Castro's position. The Soviets will not try to interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba and the United States in this regard. That sort of interference can only lead to war.

Khrushchev repeated that "we really have withdrawn a lot of troops," and "we have not replaced any . . . we have withdrawn. All the troops needed to guard the rocket installations were withdrawn after the rockets were taken out". He understood the President's difficulties and believed the President has a very sound understanding of the situation. Recent statements by the President and Secretary Rusk indicate there is in the United States a sober appreciation of the situation. This fact will help the Soviets in dealing with the Cubans, and the Soviets intend to train the Cubans as fast as possible in order to make the presence of Soviet instructors unnecessary. The Russians didn't like the Cuban climate.

Harriman pointed out that, in addition to United States statements, the President has taken many actions which should not be overlooked. Khrushchev agreed that the President's actions and his words were very encouraging. Immediately after the crisis last fall, United States policy had been somewhat irritating, but now it seemed quite reasonable. Moreover, he believed that an absolute majority of the American people were behind the President in his sober policy and that his opponents had no clear program.

327. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, April 29, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb thru April 1963. Secret; Eyes Only.

Are we keeping our Cuban contingency invasion plans up to date? I notice that there have been a number of new judgments on the amount of equipment that the Cubans have. I thought last October the number of troops we planned to have available was rather limited and the success of the operation was dependent upon, in large measure, our two airborne divisions getting in and controlling the two airfields. It seems to me that we should strengthen our contingency plans on this operation.

John Kennedy

328. Editorial Note

On April 29, 1963, President Kennedy received a letter from Chairman Khrushchev through a private communication channel. It was in response to President Kennedy's message of April 11; Document 312. The letter is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI, pages 265-268. The following extract of the letter relates to Cuba:

"Already for a protracted period, in the exchange of opinions between us no matter in what channels they took place, one and the same question has inevitably arisen--concerning the situation around Cuba. To a considerable degree this is understandable if one considers how we passed through a most dangerous crisis in the fall of last year. But it is impossible not to recognize also that tension around Cuba decreases too slowly and at times rises anew not unlike the way the mercury jumps in the thermometers of the present spring.

"And of course when one thinks about where the abnormalities are coming from which are making the atmosphere in the region of the Caribbean Sea ever more feverish, one comes to the conclusion that a one-sided approach can least of all help the situation.

"If one allows that in the Western Hemisphere uneasiness is evoked by the presence in Cuba of a certain small number of Soviet troops which are helping Cubans to master the weapons delivered by the Soviet Union for the purpose of strengthening the defense capabilities of Cuba, then how much more uneasiness should be evoked in the countries of Europe, Asia and Africa by the hundreds of thousands of American troops in the Eastern Hemisphere? It is sufficient to make such a comparison in order that things can be seen in proper perspective. At our meeting in Vienna we seemed to have agreed to proceed from the fact that the forces of our states were equal. Well, then, if our forces are equal, then there should also be equal possibilities. Why does the United States forget about this?

"You know that we have withdrawn from Cuba a significant part of our military personnel. I can tell you that we have withdrawn several times more people than has been stated in the American press. How this matter will develop in the future depends on a number of circumstances and in the first place on the pace at which the atmosphere in the region of the Caribbean Sea will be normalized, and whether, as could be expected, the reasons which occasioned the necessity for assistance to the Cubans by Soviet military specialists and instructors will disappear.

"I would like to express the thought of how important it is in eval-uating what is happening around Cuba that one rise above one-sided understandings and base his judgments on the respective estimate of the situation of the interested parties. From your point of view, as set forth in your message, the reconnaissance flights of American aircraft over Cuba are only "peaceful observation." But if one were to characterize these flights objectively, without even considering the point of view, understandable to everyone, of the country over which they are being carried out, then they cannot be described other than as an unrestrained intrusion into the air space of a sovereign government and as a flagrant violation of the elementary norms of international law and the principles of the UN Charter, to which are affixed the signatures of both the USA and Cuba. It is natural that no state prizing its sovereignty, no government solicitous of the interest and dignity of its people, can tolerate such flights.

"Perhaps it is desired that we recognize the right of the USA to violate the Charter of the United Nations and international norms? But this we cannot do and will not do.

"We have honestly carried out the obligations we assumed in the settlement of the crisis in the region of the Caribbean Sea, and withdrew from Cuba even more than we promised to withdraw. There are no grounds for you to doubt the readiness of the Soviet Union to carry out firmly in the future as well the agreement which was reached between us. Why then are reconnaissance flights by American aircraft over Cuba necessary? What are they looking for there when there is not a single thing, seen in the light of the agreement reached, which could cause concern? Trampling on sovereignty in this way can lead to quite serious consequences for us if it is not stopped in time.

"And can one pass over in silence or recognize as in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter the continuing efforts to strangle the economy of Cuba? I shall not address myself to this in more detail although of course I could find many words with which to characterize these actions, even from a purely humanitarian point of view.

"The Soviet Union gives due credit to the measures which have recently been undertaken by the USA, as well as by England, in connection with the attacks which have taken place on Soviet vessels near the Cuban coast. We of course do not underestimate the significance of these measures and hope that they will be sufficiently effective to preclude the possibility of a repetition of armed raids against Cuba.

"I read with a feeling of satisfaction that passage of your message in which you confirm that you have neither the intention nor the desire to invade Cuba and where you recognize that it is up to the Cuban people to determine their fate. That is a good statement. We have always stressed that, like any other people, the Cuban people possess the inalienable right to determine their own fate as they see fit." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-B, 4/15/63-5/8/63)

329. Agenda for the April 30 Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, April 29, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Standing Committee 4/63. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Prepared by McGeorge Bundy.

I have not been able to make special assignments to individual members of the group in this first week, but I have had helpful discussions with several members, and I know that other members have had conversations with each other. What I hope we can do tomorrow is to fill out the outline which follows of major areas of interest, and to make preliminary decisions as to ways and means of getting forward with the necessary spade work.

1. The possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind here are:

a. Interference with overflights.

b. Possible death of Castro.

c. The occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner of Hungary./1/

/1/At this point Bundy wrote, "Cubans vs Cubans."

d. Attributable interference by Castro/2/ in other countries.

/2/After Castro Bundy wrote, "or USSR."

e. Reintroduction of offensive weapons.

2. Programs which might be initiated by the United States Government with both immediate and long-run objectives. Examples which come to mind are:

a. Greater pressure against the Soviet presence, perhaps by additional OAS resolutions and then naval action to interrupt all military traffic to Cuba./3/

/3/In the left margin of this paragraph Bundy wrote, "President." In the right margin he wrote, "talk to him hard?"

b. Expanded economic action,/4/ possibly including encouragement of cooperative sabotage on a much larger scale than anything attempted up until now. Within this category additional possible gambits are of great interest to higher authority and it is hoped that some may be offered./5/

/4/Next to this paragraph Bundy wrote, "sugar, POL, money."

/5/Bundy added by hand paragraph c which reads: "Appraisal of small-scale sabotage over a long period."

3. The possible defection of Castro. This is a wholly separate kind of undertaking and there seemed to be considerable agreement last week that it was not very promising, but it has been properly pointed out that it could be pursued on a separate track while some or all of the things proposed above were going on./6/

/6/Next to this paragraph Bundy placed a bullet.

4. An information program for post-Castro Cuba. There was general agreement last week that this also is a matter of high importance and that it could be pursued independently of decisions in other categories.

Documents which members may want to look at before the meeting are attached:/7/

/7/Not printed.

Tab A: Draft intelligence estimate of the situation in Cuba a year from now.

Tab B: The first outline of an OAS Resolution about the Soviet military presence. This item is of considerable present interest to higher authority.

It is recognized that the diet here is relatively thin, but I think we can usefully spend one more meeting making sure that we have the elements of the problem in proper shape before we go into more detailed work./8/

McGeorge Bundy/9/

At the end of the agenda Bundy wrote, "levels of attribution."8

/9/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

330. Summary Record of the 3d Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, April 30, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/30/63. Top Secret.

CUBA

Under Secretary Harriman reported on his talks with Gromyko and Khrushchev on the subject of Cuba. (He read extracts from a long summary, copies of which he later left with the President and Mr. Bundy, copy attached.)/1/ Mr. Harriman did not think that Khrushchev was in trouble personally but his policies are being criticized by the hard line Communists. The Soviets are using Castro as an exhibit of the success of their Cuban policy. They are also seeking to handle him in such a way that he will not turn toward the Chinese Communists. Khrushchev does not think that Soviet troops in Cuba are really important, but Harriman believes the Russians will go to great lengths to ensure that Castro remains in control of Cuba. After Cuban troops are trained, the Russian troops can be expected to leave, but Soviet economic aid will be continued at a level necessary to ensure a going economy in Cuba.

/1/See Document 326.

The attached copy of Mr. Bundy's summary covers the assignments which have been made as a result of the discussion of Cuba./2/ Points not covered in that summary follow:

/2/See Document 333.

There was a discussion of whether the U.S. could destroy Castro's halo by an information program aimed at Cuba and Latin America. Under Secretary Ball said Castro was becoming a symbol and an effort should be made to undermine this symbol. Mr. Harriman pointed out that we could make fun of Castro. This is an effective way of attacking Communists who, in his opinion, can take almost anything except ridicule.

Secretary McNamara noted that he had initiated a study of how to reduce to a minimum the reaction time of U.S. forces in the event a decision was taken to use force against Cuba. He has under study a plan which would mean that within ninety to one hundred days we would have a capability of destroying all the SAM sites in Cuba with twenty-six missiles.

The Attorney General commented that the President was hopeful that we could take actions now in the OAS which would permit us in the future to act effectively in the event the Russians or the Cubans started shipping large amounts of arms to other Latin American states. The purpose would be to prepare now a basis for drastic U.S. action to halt any attempt to introduce a Soviet military presence in another Latin American country.

It was agreed that pressure against the Soviet presence in Cuba will be kept low-key for the next month in order to give Khrushchev an option of carrying out quietly the prompt withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

The preparation of a study covering the possible defection of Castro was deferred for the present. All that can be done in this connection now is to keep open the line of communication to Castro which was opened by Mr. Donovan during the negotiations about the U.S. prisoners. Director McCone's interest in this matter prompted the postponement of the discussion of this possible course of action until the Director's return.

There was recognition of the importance of relating what we are now doing to what we are planning to do in Cuba. Secretary McNamara expressed his view that small-scale sabotage over a long period of time would produce no real change in the situation and therefore was not an acceptable course of action.

Bromley Smith/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

331. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, May 1, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Secret. A note on this memorandum indicates it was part of the President's weekend reading, May 11.

SUBJECT

Probable Soviet Reaction to Low-level Flights Over Cuba

Obviously, Soviet reaction to low-level flights over Cuba would be affected by a number of factors, such as timing and scope. The reaction to a one-shot mission would be far less than that to a sustained series. Also, if the flights were such that they were widely known in Cuba, the reaction would be stronger than it would in the case of a single mission in an isolated area. Soviet reaction would, to some extent, be affected by Castro's reaction, which I should think would be quite strong, particularly as indicated above if knowledge of the flights was widespread.

So far as timing is concerned, the present would appear to be an extremely unfavorable time. Castro is in Moscow and will be there apparently for several weeks. It is assumed that he is putting the squeeze on the Soviets for more economic aid and low-level flights would put him in a position both to press the Soviets for some radical action such as firing on a U-2 flight, or at least would increase his leverage to get more economic assistance, as well as possibly to cancel or slow down any intended removal of Soviet troops.

In addition, it would appear that the Soviet Government is in the process of making a number of important decisions which could be affected by low-level flights. These include determination of Soviet policy on Laos, a general review of Soviet policy toward the United States specifically, as well as probable negotiations with the Chinese Communists over Communist Bloc policy as a whole. There would appear to be sufficient evidence to believe that Khrushchev has been having a difficult time recently, and it is quite possible that he would read into low-level flights an intention on the part of the United States to proceed vigorously to bring down Castro, which, if accomplished in a short period of time, would put him in an almost impossible situation in maintaining his leadership position and in withstanding pressures to turn Soviet policy in the direction desired by the Chinese Communists. In addition, there are important decisions pending on internal affairs which will probably be taken at the meeting of the Central Committee on May twenty-eighth.

Finally, there are some indications that Khrushchev may be having trouble with his own military, and, if so, low-level flights at this time might give the military ammunition to force a change of policy, or even challenge Khrushchev's leadership. Whatever the decision on low-level flights in general, I should think that the next six weeks would be about the worst possible time in which to take this action.

332. Letter From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Carter to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, May 2, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret.

Dear Mr. Bundy: With respect to the Lisa Howard report,/1/ Mr. McCone cabled me this morning stating that he cannot overemphasize the importance of secrecy in this matter and requested that I take all appropriate steps along this line to reflect his personal views on its sensitivity. Mr. McCone feels that gossip and inevitable leaks with consequent publicity would be most damaging. He suggests that no active steps be taken on the rapprochement matter at this time and urges most limited Washington discussions, and that in these circumstances emphasis should be placed in any discussions on the fact that the rapprochement track is being explored as a remote possibility and one of several alternatives involving various levels of dynamic and positive action.

/1/Lisa Howard of the American Broadcasting Company had a 10-hour interview with Fidel Castro on April 22. During that interview Castro made a number of points, the most important of which was that Cuba was looking for ways to establish a rapprochement with the United States. Cottrell summarized the main points of the interview in a May 2 memorandum to Martin, and Richard Helms prepared a more detailed account in a memorandum to McCone, May 1. The President read Helms' summary. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 Cuba and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V)

In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the Lisa Howard report be handled in the most limited and sensitive manner.

Faithfully yours,

Marshall S. Carter/2/

Lieutenant General, USA

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Carter signed the original.

333. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, May 2, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

The following assignments have been made as a result of the discussion in the Standing Group on Tuesday, April 30th:/1/

/1/Document 330.

1. There will be an examination of the possible developments in Cuba if Castro were to disappear from the scene. This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent and will be available for discussion at the meeting of the Standing Group on May 14th.

2. There will be an analysis of the possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. This analysis will be conducted under the direction of Mr. Alexis Johnson and Mr. Paul Nitze, and its first results will be available for discussion at the meeting of the Standing Group on May 14th. This first analysis will provide: a. A detailed examination of possible action in the event of interference with surveillance; and b. a more general assessment of possible use of other contingencies in Cuba or in the waters around Cuba.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency will prepare a general paper on the possible forms of effective interference with the economic life of Cuba by sabotage or other means. In particular, CIA will report on the oil problem in relation to Cuba. It is hoped that a first report on this study may be available next week for distribution.

4. The Department of State will examine the possible use of the sugar market as a means of complicating the life of the Castro regime. It is hoped that this study will be available next week.

5. The principal topic of discussion for the meeting of the Standing Group on May 7th will be the development of a U.S. program and policy toward post-Castro Cuba, and the initial lead in the discussion will be taken by Mr. Wilson for USIA. Appropriate papers will be circulated before noon on Monday, May 6th.

McGeorge Bundy

334. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Acting Secretary of State Ball

Washington, May 3, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Sugar

I have been requested to comment on a suggestion made at the meeting of the Standing Group on April 30/1/ that we try to figure out some way to diminish the Cuban income from the sale of sugar. It was particularly noted that the present high prices and tight market have prevented Cuba from suffering the losses which would normally be expected from the sharp fall off in her production.

/1/See Document 330.

I attach an INR memorandum,/2/ a copy of which has already been sent to Mr. Bundy, on the sugar situation.

/2/Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, RES-15, April 19. (Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 50, Cuba-Standing Group) See the Supplement.

From this memorandum and discussions with sugar experts I am convinced of several things:

1. The present high prices and tight market represent a real shortage of sugar in the world.

2. The Soviet Union is not holding sugar off the market--Cuban or otherwise. In fact there is some evidence that satellites are exporting more than usual. Therefore the high price is not the result of Soviet rigging of the market.

3. To keep United States prices down the Department of Agriculture is doing everything it can to increase supplies of sugar in the world and for the United States in the foreseeable future.

4. Even with a good beet crop in Europe this year and a good cane crop in early 1965, the sugar situation will still not return to the surplus and low price condition of a year ago. It will take until the end of 1964 with another beet crop but more probably into 1965 before there is any material change in the situation.

I conclude from this that there is no feasible way in which the Cubans can be deprived of the prices they are now getting for their sugar or of free world markets for a year and a half and possibly two years. I therefore suggest that this idea be shelved for at least a year.

335. Record of Actions at the 4th Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 7, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/7/63. Secret.

There was a discussion of a U.S. program and policy toward post-Castro Cuba.

a. There was preliminary agreement on the need by mid-summer for a U.S. Government statement from a high source, possibly the President, expressing our view of post-Castro Cuba./1/

/1/On May 4 USIA Deputy Director Wilson sent Bundy a memorandum advocating making a statement and attaching a proposed one. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

b. An analysis is to be prepared by State, CIA, and USIA covering specific aspects of the Cuban society (1) under Batista; (2) under Castro, including the revolution's aims as stated and as realized to date; and (3) under a post-Castro regime, including actions we would be prepared to take to help in the reconstruction of Cuba. Among the subjects to be included in the comparison are: education, tax system, defense, housing, land ownership, economic development, religion, and civil rights, including press freedom, race relations, and the administration of justice.

c. There was a recognized need to interest non-governmental institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations or the Brookings Institution in preparing studies on post-Castro Cuba. A White House officer is to initiate action on this problem.

PRESENT

Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Attorney General

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Administrator of AID

Deputy Director of USIA

Deputy Under Secretary of State (Johnson)

Major General A.J. Goodpaster (JCS)

Special Counsel

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

336. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy

Washington, May 7, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Contingency Plans for Cuba (U)

1. In response to your inquiry, dated 29 April 1963,/1/ I wish to assure you that our contingency plans for invasion of Cuba have been and are being maintained up to date. A revision of CINCLANT's basic invasion plan for Cuba was reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 February 1963.

/1/Document 327.

2. Intelligence reports received since last October do indicate the assignment of additional materiel to the Cuban armed forces. Responsible commanders are being kept fully informed of the changing intelligence picture and our plans are continually updated to insure that the U.S. forces and equipment and their planned employment reflect the latest information available. For example, the order in which U.S. forces and their supporting equipment are committed is being restudied in the light of the estimated increases in Castro's T-34 medium tanks and self-propelled anti-tank guns.

3. The most significant change in the basic invasion plan since last October has resulted from our increasing capability to introduce larger numbers of troops and heavy combat equipment into the objective area early in the operation. This capability is being achieved by the reactivation of 11 LST's, which will materially expedite the delivery of combat forces and equipment. In the longer term, programmed acquisition of additional C-130 aircraft into the air lift force will expedite the delivery of airborne and airlanded forces during the initial assault. Through these measures the weight of our early attacks will be increased and the probability of their success further enhanced.

4. The time factors for the Cuba operation are today as follows:

[6 lines of source text not declassified]/2/

/2/Duration of air attacks depends upon post-strike reconnaissance, supporting intelligence, and readiness to execute the assault. [Footnote in the source text.]

Robert S. McNamara

337. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, May 10, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT

Contingency Studies with Respect to Cuba

In accordance with the request made at the Standing Group meeting of April 30, 1963,/1/ there are attached:

/1/See Document 330.

1) A paper setting forth a possible scenario whereby an attack on a United States reconnaissance aircraft could be exploited toward the end of effecting the removal of the Castro regime;

2) A paper discussing in broad outline other contingencies which might be exploited to the same end.

We desire to emphasize that while we have used a few members of our staffs in preparation of these papers, they have not been fully staffed in either State or DOD, have not been seen by the JCS, and thus do not necessarily represent the views of our respective Departments. We also make no recommendation with respect to the possible courses of action set forth in these papers, which are presented only in accordance with the desires of the Standing Group to provide a basis for discussion.

U. Alexis Johnson/2/

Paul H. Nitze

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

Attachment 1/3/

Memorandum for the Standing Group

/3/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT

Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights--A Contingency Plan

1. The Problem.

To capitalize on an attack on a US aircraft engaged in reconnaissance of Cuba by taking reprisals designed to place pressure on, or to effect the removal of, the Castro regime.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the rate of approximately two sorties per day. These flights have come to be accepted as a US right emanating from Cuban refusal to fulfill the Soviet commitment of October 28, 1962, for on-the-ground safeguards against the presence and reintroduction of offensive weapons.

b. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available, but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these alternative methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2 and would not meet the stated requirements. A prolonged hiatus in high altitude surveillance would be intolerable in view of the continuing Soviet option of reintroduction of MRBMs. This need has also become public knowledge as a result of the widespread news coverage and the Secretary of Defense's briefing of the public; hence, there would be substantial political support for the US insistence on maintaining an acknowledged vital right.

c. Present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington would have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the attack. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked by MIG aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques. In this case also, information would probably be available promptly. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.

d. If the US did institute increasing surveillance by low and medium altitude aircraft, ostensibly and partly in order to acquire more detailed information, the chances of an incident triggered by the firing on a US reconnaissance overflight would be increased.

3. Political Considerations.

a. Balancing Objectives--The fundamental political judgment in this problem involves balancing the opportunity to achieve our long term objective in Cuba, the overthrow of Castro's regime and elimination of Communism from Cuba, with the risks of the US-USSR confrontation and the political acceptability of our means of attaining that objective. Since the political and power realities argue against arbitrary and unilateral action without provocation, the exploitation of Cuban provocations is the most feasible means for taking the action necessary.

The political costs of using an incident to press courses of action and reaction leading to the achievement of US objectives in Cuba, possibly including the removal of the Castro regime, have been considered. We conclude that such costs will be least, and will be acceptable, if (a) initial Cuban provocation is internationally recognized, and (b) a measured pattern of increasing US military reprisal, in reaction to escalating Cuban actions, is established.

4. Scenario--Phase I.

a. The most appropriate reprisal to destruction of a US reconnaissance aircraft engaged in overflying Cuba would, if the attack were made by a SAM, be either (1) a limited number of SAM sites in the vicinity of the action (depending on the geographical location, three or four nearby sites), or (2) to eliminate all SAMs in the initial attack. In the case of an interceptor attack, either (1) the facilities of the nearest (or, if known, the offending) fighter airfield, or (2) facilities of the few active fighter airfields, should be completely taken out. At the same time, the US would initiate a high volume of harassing medium and low level reconnaissance overflights, in addition to maintaining the U-2 coverage.

b. The US would promptly initiate (without publicity) generation of the necessary invasion force, so that it would be ready as soon as possible, in the event Cuban escalation were to lead to a decision to invade.

c. US forces would be placed on appropriate readiness (DEFCON 3 for SAC).

d. The US would inform selected heads of government, NAC, and the OAS governments immediately prior to the reprisal action, of the reprisal and of the UN proposals we planned to make, and would initiate promptly consultations with the NAC and OAS groups on possible future measures which might be required--especially a new quarantine.

e. The US would call for prompt consideration of the crisis in the Security Council, and would vigorously attack Cuba and defend the necessary but limited US reprisal. We would concentrate our charges against Castro's regime, rather than the Soviet Union, and we would take the initiative in hauling him before the UN. We would, in addition to defending the requirement for reconnaissance, offer to end all aerial reconnaissance over Cuba if the Cubans would accept UN (including US) ground inspection adequate to insure against the presence or introduction of offensive weapons or offensive training, and when all Russian military personnel were returned promptly to the USSR.

5. Phase II.

a. It is unlikely that the USSR would react to the US Phase I actions by instituting serious counterpressures at Berlin or elsewhere, unless of course they had shot down the first reconnaissance aircraft intending to use our reaction as a pretext to create a crisis in Berlin or elsewhere. If that were the case, we would in any event be faced by a Soviet created crisis. If this were not a deliberate Soviet action to touch off a crisis, the Soviets would probably be cautious at least while assessing our intentions in Cuba. During this period, they would probably give strict orders to Soviet personnel manning the SAMs and in other positions on Cuba to avoid any reprisal or provocative action.

b. The Cubans would almost certainly initially reject the US offer. The Soviets and Cubans would exert maximum political and propaganda pressure on the US in the UN and in general.

c. It is possible that the Cubans might shoot down another US aircraft, either through lack of discipline or miscalculation of the consequences. As a general principle, the most appropriate level of reprisal would seem to be graduated suppression of Cuban air defenses. Thus, if the first plane had been destroyed by a SAM and only a few SAMs had been knocked out in the initial reprisal, and if a second aircraft were attacked by a SAM, all SAMs would be destroyed. If the initial attack had been by a fighter, and the second by a fighter or a SAM, any remaining SAMs and fighter airfields would be taken out on the second offense. If the second attack were by AAA, the problem would be more complicated but all AAA in the area of the attack could be promptly suppressed, as well as any remaining SAMs.

6. Phase III.

a. In the second round of US initiative (Phase III), there are two broad alternative courses of action, depending upon whether the enemy reaction (Phase II) had involved military engagement.

b. Alternative 1. If the Cubans have made a second military attack in Phase II, the US, in addition to the immediate further military reprisal sketched above (in 5.c.), would note that since the Cubans did not accept our offer of an equitable arrangement to dispense with US overflights, and were continuing to interfere with them, a quarantine (on everything but food and medicine) was being established. The US would either seek OAS authorization, for which a majority but not unanimity could probably be gotten, or would undertake it unilaterally on the basis of its earlier consultations with the OAS and NAC, and the OAS resolution of October 1962.

(1) US justification for a quarantine would include stress on the vital Hemispheric need for information on military activities in Cuba, the fact that the Cuban action demonstrated a determined effort to overthrow the status quo established in October-November 1962, and the fact that such action further raised suspicions of Cuban military intentions. We were compelled by these facts to interdict all direct and indirect military support to the Island until complete assurance of the security of the Hemisphere could be obtained. We could further note that the US had chosen to exercise a restrained course of action which would involve minimum sacrifice by the innocent Cuban people. We might publicize our earlier offer, and the reasons why the quarantine was necessary, in leaflets to be dropped over Cuba.

(2) Quarantine might be initiated even in the absence of a second Cuban attack, for example if our reconnaissance detected suspicious signs of new threatening military activity, or perhaps if the Cubans or Soviets instituted reprisals elsewhere.

(3) Once the quarantine was established, in due course something would have to give. Assuming the Soviets would comply with the blockade, Castro or some other element of Cuban leaders might decide that there was nothing that the Soviets could or would do to help them, and that agreeing to the removal of Russian military men and inspection, in exchange for withdrawal of the quarantine and harassing reconnaissance, would be their best deal. The US would, in that case, settle for that agreement.

(4) The Soviets would, in the case of a quarantine, be under conflicting pressures to do something but not to overcommit themselves. They might risk an incident in challenging the quarantine, which would have to be strictly enforced. If they did undertake counterpressure on access to Berlin, the existing contingency plans would be put into effect as necessary. The US would have to persevere in maintaining the quarantine until Castro cracked or capitulated, or the deterrent effect of our will to stand up to Soviet pressures and counterpressures in other cases would be badly undermined.

(5) It is possible that an effective quarantine would provoke an uprising. In that case, the US would support the uprising by whatever means are necessary, up to and including invasion, to insure its success. (This represents a new situation for which a different scenario applies.)

c. Alternative 2. If there is no military counteraction to the harassing reconnaissance, and no other persuasive trigger for a quarantine, the US could undertake various measures designed to stimulate the Cubans to provoke a new incident.

(1) The US might initially intensify its reconnaissance with night flights, "show-off" low-level flights flaunting our freedom of action, hoping to stir the Cuban military to action.

(2) The US might extend its actions to large scale leaflet drops, drops of agents, "CARE"-type packages delivered to known or possible guerrilla areas, and the like. This course might stir the Cubans to military action or induce them to agree to the US terms. It also might stimulate an uprising. In any of these cases the subsequent course of action would be clear, and would be to our advantage: either invasion if an uprising occurred or the Cubans undertook military action, or removal of the Russians and ground inspection if the Cubans agreed. If, however, the Cubans did not react, this kind of activity on our part would give them propaganda ammunition. Such measures must therefore be gradual, geared to world political reactions.

(3) Perhaps the US could use some drone aircraft as "bait," flown at low speeds and favorable altitudes for tempting Cuban AAA or aircraft attacks.

(4) Soviet politico-military counterpressures elsewhere, beyond a vigorous political offensive and propaganda, would not be likely. Soviet commitments to Cuba might rise at whatever time the Soviets decided we did not intend to escalate the crisis--perhaps a few weeks after the invasion force had been readied but not committed. It is possible that the Soviets might approach us privately with an offer of quiet withdrawal of their military men from Cuba in exchange for our dropping the harassing reconnaissance (by implicitly accepting the U-2's only) and our demand for inspection.

d. Thus, depending above all on whether the Cubans were or could be made to be trigger-happy, the development of the initial downing of a reconnaissance plane could lead at best to the elimination of Castro, perhaps to the removal of Soviet troops and installation of ground inspection in Cuba, or at the least to our demonstration of firmness on reconnaissance and, if our initial reprisal had eliminated all the SAMs, we would have greatly increased our future military freedom of action and political options.

7. Conclusions.

If this course of action were to be pursued,

(1) Medium and low level reconnaissance overflights of Cuba, on a scale paralleling present U-2 high altitude flights and as a supplement to them, should be instituted.

(2) Authorization should be given for programs to reduce the present eighteen day period required for the generation of invasion forces, by prepositioning some equipment, buildup of sealift, etc., so that the US would be able to support more quickly an uprising on the Island, if that were necessary.

Addendum

We have considered the question of a fabricated incident and conclude that it would not be feasible or desirable to contrive a mock Cuban attack on a US reconnaissance aircraft. This plan applies to a genuine attack on a US aircraft over to near Cuba.

Attachment 2/4/

Memorandum for the Standing Group

/4/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT

Certain Cuban Contingencies

The Problem.

To capitalize on various Cuban provocations by taking reprisals to place pressures on, or to effect the removal of, the Castro regime.

A. Internal Revolt

1. An internal revolt could take one of two general forms: (i) a revolt within the structure of the existing regime or (ii) a revolt essentially outside the governmental structure against which the full power of the Government might be arrayed. In addition (i) might trigger (ii) or vice versa. Either might also involve Soviet troops in countering the insurgency. Any of these cases could provide the basis for increasing US military pressures to eliminate the Castro regime.

2. Case (i) is the most likely, and also the case most likely to succeed without outside intervention. It would draw its inspiration and support from nationalistic elements who had become disenchanted by the abject dependence of the regime on the Communist Bloc, isolation within the Hemisphere, deepening of the economic crisis, a threatened or actual Communist accession to complete control of the regime at the expense of the remaining members of the 26th of July Movement, or the death of Castro.

3. Case (ii) might take the form of widespread disruptive behavior supported in whole or in part by elements of the militia, or an uprising in one of the mountainous areas which might attract local militia elements.

4. There are several variants to case (i), in particular:

(1) A "palace coup" either by hard-line Communists, or by members of the 26th of July Movement.

(2) A revolt by the Cuban armed forces or militia.

a. Palace Coup.

1) A palace coup by hard-line Communists might be the trigger for a counter-coup by elements of the armed forces or militia. Each of these cases has a great danger of involvement by Soviet forces, but presumably the Communist coup is most dangerous from this standpoint. Since the world is on notice that the US would tolerate no interference by local Soviet forces in an attempt by the Cuban people to throw off the Castro yoke, it would provide a platform for US intervention on behalf of the Cuban people.

2) A palace coup by members of the 26th of July Movement would probably arise from a broad conspiracy involving support from elements of the armed forces and militia. Such a coup might start with the assassination of Castro and a plea to the US to fend off intervention by Soviet forces. Clearly, if both Army and militia arrayed themselves against the putschists, the opportunity for US intervention would be fleeting. The attitude and actions of Soviet forces would vitally affect the outcome. The most favorable case for persistence of the coup would ensue if both elements of the Cuban forces supported them and the Soviets remained aloof. On the other hand, were the latter to intervene, the basis for forceful US action would be more solid.

b. Military Revolts.

Local or general revolts by the Army or militia coupled with attempts to seize the seat of Government or proclaim an alternate regime are possible quite apart from any links to a conspiracy within the regime. It is possible that an action within one of these elements might be the catalyst for similar action within the other. A militia revolt opposed by the Cuban Army and the Soviet troops would provide the least time for the US to react while the revolt was still alive. It is conceivable, however, that the revolutionists could take to the hills, prolonging resistance and giving us more time to react.

5. Popular Uprising. Case (ii), a revolt outside the governmental framework, could manifest general discontent through the appearance of a number of guerrilla bands operating at widely separated points and supported with food by the peasants. Alternatively, a single guerrilla leader, operating in a particularly disaffected province, might expand his operations to the point where the Government was compelled to react massively. Suffice it to say, in the atmosphere of present-day Cuba neither of these possibilities is very likely. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea approaches to the Island, and the peasants as yet are unwilling to risk their necks until the Government's chances appear poorer than they now are.

B. Cuban Intervention in Latin America

1. A flagrant case of Cuban interference and violence in the internal life of another country (such as Venezuela or the Dominican Republic) could provide the basis for OAS sanctions, including a quarantine or perhaps a demand for inspection at Cuban ports and airfields. It would be difficult to use such an incident directly as justification for an invasion. However, in addition to the institution of a quarantine, the US could use the resulting tension as justification for a quiet buildup of the invasion force, and then use a new incident in quarantine enforcement, Cuban incursions on Guantanamo, or an uprising as justification for invasion.

2. It might be desirable in preparation to highlight Cuban training and dispatch of subversives, instruction for sabotage, etc., as background for "the incident." The incident itself should be domestic, violent and quickly identified as part of a pattern of Castroist export of revolution which would threaten other Latin American governments. (A "one-two" series of incidents would excellently serve to underline this point.) In this manner, the need for a drastic quarantine would be established.

3. A quarantine should cover POL as well as all arms entering, and arms and "agents" leaving, Cuba; it should probably not cover food and medicine. In the long run, a POL blockade should be effective in disrupting Cuba internally. If Castro sought to negotiate an end of it, we should set an unacceptably high price such as unlimited inspection to verify no subversive training being undertaken, no arms shipments in or out (except returns to the USSR), etc.

4. An "uprising" in this situation would be similar to any other, except that the US would have been able to generate US invasion forces for its support during the blockade.

C. Incidents at Guantanamo

1. An incident at Guantanamo, such as a Cuban incursion, or cutting off of the water supply (the source of which is off the US reservation), could provide an opportunity for protective action beyond the perimeter of the base. In particular, restoring the source of water and protecting it from further interference would provide a reasonably good justification for the US to react with whatever degree of force was deemed necessary for this task. Assuming the Cubans resisted, the security of the element would justify broadened actions. This could come to involve pitched battles, and require US invasion.

2. Expansion and escalation from an incident at Guantanamo would be fully supported in the US and by some Allies, but it would have the political disadvantage of stemming from a US base held against the desires of the incumbent government. In general, justification based on protecting US rights would be less suitable than support to a Cuban uprising or strong action after Cuban export of revolution.

3. While the scenario of events following from an incident might escalate to full-scale US-Cuban combat, it might not. The Cubans might, at once or after some initial skirmishes, break contact and withdraw to permit the US to restore the water supply and even to keep guards outside the US military reservation. In that case, especially if the Cubans had offered to restore the water supply, it would be very disadvantageous for the US to appear to be "picking a fight" over a broad definition of our base rights.

4. An uprising fortuitously located within range of US assistance from the Guantanamo Bay base would be militarily favorable, but it might appear to be contrived by the US.

D. Incidents at Sea

1. There are two categories of possible incidents at sea which might justify reprisal against Cuba:

a. Castroite hi-jacking of a Latin American vessel; or

b. Cuban naval attacks on or harassment of a US or Latin American ship.

The former would not, in itself, seem to provide clear opportunity for reprisals of a direct effective nature. The latter could be met by attacking the offending Cuban vessels and perhaps counter-harassment of Cuban ships with the possibility of an incident arising.

2. Escalation at sea might lead to US reprisal against Cuban gunboats in port as well as at sea, but unless such action led to shooting down a US plane it is difficult to see how it would justify US quarantine or invasion. If a US attacking aircraft (at sea or over a Cuban port) were attacked, we might start the scenario of reprisals against Cuba's air defense. Thus, an incident at sea could trigger the air defense scenario; otherwise, incidents at sea do not seem promising.

338. Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, May 13, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a covering memorandum from Sherman Kent to McGeorge Bundy, May 13, while this memorandum was a "draft" at Bundy's instruction, it "represents our best and most careful effort in the time available. A number of knowledgeable people from parts of the Agency other than the Office of National Estimates participated."

SUBJECT

Developments in Cuba and Possible US Actions in the Event of Castro's Death/1/

/1/This memorandum is a general analysis of the situation and prospects for US action after Castro's death. We have not sought to work out in detail Latin American, Western European, or other third party reactions in the various contingencies adverted to in our examination of the problem. In paragraph 13 we consider very generally the problem of Soviet reactions. [Footnote in the source text. Paragraph 13 stated that the Soviet Union's interest in Cuba would not be lessened by Castro's death, but it would react cautiously behind the scenes to influence events if a power struggle developed. If the struggle reached open conflict or the United States intervened, the Soviet Union would have to act. Such potential action was outside the scope of the paper.]

SUMMARY

We believe the odds are that upon Castro's death his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over control. However, there is a good chance that a power struggle would ensue, and a lesser chance that such a struggle would spread, either into a many-sided conflict or with the Moscow-oriented Communists lined up on one side and those who are essentially Cuban nationalists on the other. In any case the loyalties of the military commanders, now committed to Fidel but probably divided after his death, would significantly influence the outcome. Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive US help in order to win, and probably US military intervention.

[Here follows the 12-page discussion portion of the memorandum.]

339. Summary Record of the 5th Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, May 14, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63. Top Secret.

Mr. Alexis Johnson presented the paper he and Mr. Nitze had prepared entitled "Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights--a Contingency Plan."/1/ He said two basic problems are (1) getting the Cubans to act in such a way that we can escalate in a manner adequate to achieve our objectives of overthrowing Castro, and (2) how to go about this in such a way as to obtain the maximum amount of support in the UN and domestically. He said a major effort could be made to deal with the resulting situation in the OAS, but we should acknowledge now that we would not be able to keep our action from being discussed in the UN. Therefore, we should go to the UN immediately after our actions as a plaintiff rather than as a defendant. We will receive far less support for any of the actions contemplated in the paper than we did last October at the time of the crisis over the Soviet missiles.

/1/Printed as attachment 1 to Document 337.

Following a discussion of medium-level aerial reconnaissance, it was agreed that a paragraph would be added explaining the rationale for such expanded aerial surveillance.

Mr. Johnson agreed that if the Cubans or the Russians do not react to our actions, we are unable to make them do so.

There was some discussion as to whether the paragraph on page eight/2/ stated the reaction of the Soviets accurately. There was also discussion as to whether the Soviets would respond in another area, such as Berlin, if we put into effect a full quarantine of Cuba.

/2/Reference is to sub-subparagraph (4) of subparagraph b of paragraph 6, "Phase III."

Mr. Sorensen suggested that a paragraph be inserted listing as an alternative a situation in which the U.S. would announce that a state of war existed with Cuba. This might be done in lieu of a full blockade. If a state of war were announced in Phase 2, a blockade would become legal.

In connection with aerial surveillance, Mr. Bundy referred to the new international law of peaceful observation./3/ He suggested that more public attention be drawn to our belief that observation from outer space is entirely peaceful and not a violation of national sovereignty.

/3/Not further identified.

Mr. Ball read part of page five,/4/ commenting that the Soviets would have to respond elsewhere if our actions in Cuba resulted in our killing Soviet soldiers.

/4/Reference is to paragraph 5, "Phase II," subparagraph a.

The Attorney General said he believed the Russians would attempt to force upon us a choice involving the continuation of our aerial overflights of Cuba. He said Khrushchev had said he would try to bring about termination of our overflights. He foresaw a situation in which the Russians might take the overflights case to the UN after withdrawing their forces from Cuba.

It was agreed that a paper would be prepared to deal with the contingency of the Russians' attempt to end our U-2 and aerial surveillance flights by measures short of force./5/

/5/Reference is to a May 27 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63) See the Supplement.

There was a discussion of the April 24 paper which is the current draft of our contingency plans in the event a U-2 plane is shot down./6/ This paper has been approved by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, but has not been presented to the President. It is being held in the event that the contingency materializes and will be used by the President at that time in deciding how to retaliate against a shootdown.

/6/Not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U-2 Flights--Contingency Plans) See the attachment to a May 15 memorandum from Johnson to Brubeck in the Supplement.

Mr. Bundy suggested that the threat of Cuba to the U.S. was an appropriate subject for officials to emphasize publicly. He referred to the study on post-Castro Cuba, adding that we are not in a position to undertake some of the actions described in the Johnson-Nitze paper unless we are convinced an improved situation in Cuba will result.

On page ten,/7/ the heading "Conclusions" was deleted in order to avoid confusion. The actions which follow this heading are aimed at building up the importance of aerial reconnaissance, thereby serving as a rationale for serious actions taken following an attempt to prevent us from continuing aerial reconnaissance.

/7/Reference is to paragraph 7.

The paper is to be revised to include the state of war suggestion by Mr. Sorensen and other suggestions. It will be considered further at a later meeting.

The second paper, entitled "Certain Cuban Contingencies" was discussed briefly./8/ It consists of a catalog of other contingencies which have not been studied in depth as was the contingency of an attack on a reconnaissance plane. It contains no recommended actions or plans. Study of actions to meet these possible contingencies was not thought profitable. The military question centers around the necessity of obtaining a tenable presence in Cuba in a very short time after a decision has been made to react. The political problem is how to generate a right of intervention. The catalog of contingencies reveals that all are either unlikely or unhelpful. Even the contingency of a so-called Hungarian situation, namely, Russians attacking Cubans, is highly unlikely. Our statement that we would not permit such a situation to develop in Cuba is a good noise but deals with a highly unlikely contingency.

/8/Printed as attachment 2 to Document 337.

There was a discussion of the sugar paper presented by the State Department./9/ Mr. McCone disagreed with the State recommendation that nothing be done to affect the world sugar market. He thought this was an area where action could be taken to prevent the Russians from financing their aid to Cuba by means of buying Cuban sugar cheaply and selling it at the much higher world market price.

/9/Apparent reference to Document 334.

There was a discussion of the current world sugar market. Mr. McCone cited a 4% increase in sugar consumption and an 8% decrease in production, very low stocks, resulting in a sugar price of 10# per pound.

It was agreed that Secretary Freeman be asked to produce a study of the current situation with particular reference to the effect of the very high sugar price on the future Cuban economy./10/ This study will consider increasing U.S. production to force down the world market price, as well as to benefit domestic producers.

/10/See Document 340.

The paper produced by Sherman Kent of CIA entitled "Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death,"/11/ was not discussed because of lack of time./12/

/11/See Document 338.

/12/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, May 16. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63)

Bromley Smith/13/

/13/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

340. National Security Action Memorandum No. 244

Washington, May 15, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Confidential. Copies sent to all members of the Standing Group of the National Security Council.

TO

The Secretary of Agriculture

SUBJECT

The Future of the World Sugar Market

The current situation in the world market for sugar is a matter of considerable concern to the Standing Group of the National Security Council. The unusually high price of sugar is significant both in its relation to the economic prospects of Cuba and in its relation to restrictions on the production of sugar in free countries, and not least in the United States. It is requested that you take the lead in a study of the current situation and of alternative courses of action that might best serve the economic interests of the United States and of other free countries, bearing in mind the particular interest which we have in preventing any long continuation of unjustifiably high prices for Cuban sugar on the world market.

It is hoped that a report might be available for distribution not later than Monday, May 27,/1/ and that you might be willing to join with the Standing Group in a discussion of this matter on Tuesday, May 28, probably at 5:00 p.m./2/

/1/The paper, May 27, is ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. See the Supplement.

/2/See Document 344.

Both the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have expressed their interest in this study and their readiness to cooperate, and I assume that you will draw on other agencies of the government in any way you wish. Here at the White House I am ensuring that Myer Feldman is informed of the Standing Group's interest in the problem.

McGeorge Bundy

341. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, May 21, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone.

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Discussion of Low-Level Flight Over Cuba, attended by The President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, General Taylor, Secretary Ball, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone

1. Colonel Steakley presented a plan for a flight over Remedios. Lundahl displayed the relative photography of high- and low-level from previous missions. McCone stated that high-level photography gave no evidence of whether people were at a base. He said the intelligence community did not know whether the four military bases were fully occupied, partially occupied, or not occupied at all. Low-level photography might (but this is not absolutely sure) throw some light on this important question.

2. Ambassador Thompson pointed out that a low-level flight during Castro's visit in Moscow would exacerbate relations with Castro and would enhance the prospect of Castro and Khrushchev agreeing to some retaliatory action against our missions. After a brief discussion concerning the pros and cons of the issue, the President decided as follows:

1. that low-level flight was necessary, however, there was no immediacy and therefore he suggested it be postponed until after Castro had departed the USSR, now estimated to be about May 28th;

2. if we run one low-level flight, there should be at least two and possibly three, and he therefore would like one or two additional missions to be developed.

The issue is to be raised again.

Action: NRO and Colonel Steakley should develop three priority missions, following the established groundrules, to cover the most important COMOR targets.

342. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, May 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/16-5/31/63. Secret. This memorandum was briefly discussed at the 6th meeting of the Standing Group, May 21. It was circulated with general agreement to the assignments. (Summary Record of 6th NSC Standing Group, May 21; ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/21/63)

SUBJECT

Committee Responsibilities in Cuban Affairs

1. The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, acting as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba, is responsible for the coordination of day-to-day actions. Examples of such problems are: efforts to reduce Cuban Free World shipping, problems of refugees, problems of countering Cuban subversion, and supervision of ongoing propaganda and information efforts. This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. On covert matters, the Coordinator reports to the Special Group (NSC 5412).

2. The Standing Group is responsible for the development of contingency plans and the assessment of long-range policy objectives and means for meeting them.

3. The Special Group (NSC 5412) is responsible for covert activities, with appropriate liaison to the other two committees.

McGeorge Bundy/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

343. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, May 28, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

The meeting this afternoon will be devoted to a number of special problems on Cuba, but I hope we may have a few minutes at the end to take a reading on the general position as it appears to be developing.

1. First, we will turn to the problem of sugar as presented in the papers of the Department of Agriculture./1/ For this part of the discussion, Under Secretary Sundquist will be present for Secretary Freeman.

/1/Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman sent Myer Feldman a preliminary memorandum of May 16, bringing him up to date on what the Department of Agriculture had been doing about sugar and its thoughts on future action. Freeman also sent a copy to Bundy. (Ibid.) On May 24 Agriculture submitted another more definitive paper without any indication of authorship. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

2. We should briefly discuss a paper on possible U.S. actions in the event of Castro's death./2/ For this part of the discussion Mr. Sherman Kent will be present.

/2/Document 338.

3. There are two highly sensitive CIA papers which Mr. McCone has requested that we hold for distribution at the meeting. They deal with a list of possible actions under consideration at CIA and with the specific problem of Cuba's oil supplies./3/

/3/The analysis of Cuban supply and demand of crude oil and refined petroleum products, May 6, and an undated annotated list of additional covert actions against Cuba. (Both in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series) See the Supplement.

4. I propose at the end to make a brief oral comment on the results of our discussions thus far, as I understand them. My own preliminary conclusions are not optimistic, but that is not an excuse for avoiding the issue.

McGeorge Bundy

344. Summary Record of 7th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, May 28, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. Top Secret; Sensitive.

The discussion of the attached sugar paper/1/ emphasized the necessity of increasing domestic and world sugar production. Deputy Under Secretary of Agriculture Sundquist was asked to develop for consideration a program of action to force down the world sugar price. The interest of the Standing Group in this subject is a desire to deny high sugar prices to the Castro government. The attached Record of Action summarizes the study which the Department of Agriculture and a task force will make./2/

/1/Reference is to the second paper cited in footnote 1, Document 343.

/2/According to Bundy's May 28 record of action, the Department of Agriculture would develop for consideration a U.S. program to reduce substantially the price of sugar on the world market. The program should outline measures to be taken, their estimated costs, and take into account U.S. balance of payments consequences as well as consequences to friendly sugar-producing countries. The Department of State, CIA, and IAD would make available to the Department of Agriculture experts to assist in the study. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series)

There was a brief discussion of Sherman Kent's paper on "Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death."/3/ The general view was that all of the courses of action discussed were singularly unpromising.

/3/See Document 338.

Mr. Bundy asked the question: What do we do about Cuba? He said he was coming to believe that we could not say that by a date certain we could overthrow Castro. He believed that we should face this prospect. Of the various contingencies which we might exploit, none were controllable by us. It is possible that changes in the Castro government cannot be brought about until Soviet troops are out of Cuba. Even a blockade involves a naval confrontation with the USSR. Because the level of danger is now equal to that of last October, a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets is not feasible. He suggested that at the next Standing Group meeting the comments he had made should be fully discussed.

Mr. McCone argued for courses of action which would increase economic hardship in Cuba. Such actions, supplemented by sabotage meas-ures, would create a situation in Cuba in which it would be possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting to overthrow Castro. He acknowledged that any sabotage measures taken in Cuba would create a very high noise level.

Secretary McNamara repeated his view that sabotage measures would not be conclusive and suggested an examination of those economic pressures which could upset Castro.

Mr. FitzGerald summarized a paper containing a list of all covert actions which could be taken against Castro Cuba. (Copy attached)/4/

/4/Reference is to the second paper cited in footnote 3, Document 343.

Secretary McNamara said there were three lines of action. The first would be to over-react to some action taken by Castro or made to appear to have been taken by him. For example, a Cuban attack on Guantanamo, even one inspired by us, might create a situation which we could exploit and thus justify courses of action adequate to overthrow Castro. The second line would be long-range economic warfare against Cuba. The third would be to buy off Castro.

Mr. McCone said Castro's visit to Moscow was inspired by a Russian desire to forestall any effort by the U.S. to negotiate with Castro. Under Secretary Harriman flatly disagreed, saying that Khrushchev invited Castro to Moscow in order to prove the success of Russian policy toward Cuba and to refute Chinese accusations that Khrushchev's "softness" toward the U.S. had produced no returns.

There followed a discussion as to where we thought Cuba would be five years from now. Secretary McNamara indicated his belief that the Russians would and could make Cuba a showcase for Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Under Secretary Harriman doubted they would try to do this and stated that they could not, even if they tried.

The Attorney General, who entered the meeting in the middle of Mr. FitzGerald's briefing, said the U.S. must do something against Castro, even though we do not believe our actions would bring him down.

Mr. Bundy acknowledged that we can give an impression of busyness in Cuba and we can make life difficult for Castro.

Mr. McCone said that economic measures, such as restriction of trade, were wasting assets because of the increasing reluctance of our allies to act with us. In addition, Cuba has money obtained from selling sugar futures. Such sales amount to $40 million already. Thus, economic warfare is very difficult to carry on. In response to a question by the Attorney General as to what Mr. McCone recommended should be done, the Director repeated his earlier proposal of sabotage and subversion of the Cuban military.

Mr. Bundy summarized by saying that the best we could do was to decide now what actions we would take against Castro, acknowledging that the measures practical for us to undertake will not result in his overthrow.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

345. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, May 28, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 5/63-6/63. Confidential. A handwritten "P.M." follows the dateline.

SUBJECT

Cuban Exiles

Attached is a draft paper, prepared by the Cuban Coordinator, on the subject of U.S. policy towards exile unity. It is being circulated to Coordinating Committee members for comments and clearance.

The Coordinator recommends that the U.S. follow a "hands-off" policy towards exile efforts to achieve unity and that public statements of all U.S. officials be consistent with the recent Ed Martin statement,/1/ as amended. Judging from the tenor of the last Coordinating Committee meeting, I suspect that the draft will be approved with few substantive changes./2/

GC

/1/The statement is quoted in the paper. It was made on May 22 before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees and is attached to a May 28 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, on U.S. policy toward exile unity. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

/2/Bundy wrote the following on Chase's covering memorandum: "Good: I have cleared this in principle with the President (altho I would not exclude a shift if Bobby felt strongly the other way)."

Attachment

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT

United States Position on Efforts by Cuban Exiles to Achieve Unity

Problem

To determine the position of the Government with respect to efforts by Cuban exiles in the United States to achieve unity.

Background

A. As a result of developments in the past two months especially the U.S. measures against hit-and-run raids, Miro Cardona's resignation as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the withdrawal of U.S. support for the Council, and its consequent decline--a vague, confused and still embryonic movement toward "unity" (usually conceived of as a single body or organization speaking or acting for all exiles) has taken place in the Cuban exile community. The search for a unifying formula arises from a variety of motives: a psychological need on the part of the exiles for a single organization which they can consider as their repre-sentative an instructive belief that unity in itself will advance the cause of liberation; the desire for an organization which can address governments, international bodies, and public opinion; the belief that to work toward unity is to conform to the wishes of the U.S. Government, which is the only potential source of major material support; and the hope on the part of the ambitious that participation in unity will lead to political preference in post-Castro Cuba.

B. So far the developments in the effort for unity have resulted in the following line-up:

Left. The Second National Front of Escambray, Alpha-66, the Anti-Communist Liberation Front, and elements of the People's Revolutionary Movement and the 30th of November Movement have reached a working agreement. Although the working agreement is essentially action-oriented, the member organizations tend to the view that the original revolution promised by Castro should be reclaimed and redirected. The adherence of Manuel Ray's Revolutionary Junta (JURE) would increase the influence of this grouping, which probably has the most potential appeal to Castro's opponents within Cuba, but which is an object of concern to more conservative exiles.

Center. Revolutionary Unity (UR), Revolutionary Recuperation Movement (MRR), Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), Revolutionary Student Directorate (DRE), and other less well-organized center groups, have held aloof from attempts at unity.

Right. The Alliance for Cuban Liberty (ALC), and the Association for Economic Recovery of Cuba (AREC) have had difficulty attracting adherents. They principally look to the return of their lost property, rather than action and politics. Recent discussions by these groups with U.S. nationals promising large-scale financial support appear to have had no results.

"Letter of Integration." Stimulated by old-line politicians, Alonso Pujol and Carlos Prio, this grouping has secured a number of signatures of prominent exiles on a document which calls for the liberation of Cuba, the extirpation of Communism, and the return to the 1940 Constitution. Rightist in makeup, heavily weighted on the side of discredited politicians, it is unlikely to have much support within Cuba.

Plebiscite. Jose (Pepin) Bosch (Bacardi Rum) is forming a committee to organize a plebiscite to elect a single leader. There has been little forward movement to date.

Enrique Ruiz Williams. He has formed a unity committee and claims the personal support of Attorney General Kennedy. His efforts have shown only limited results thus far.

Students. Student sectors of eleven organizations are reported to have reached a working agreement. The extent and significance of this attempt is unknown. Significantly, the DRE is not included in this bloc.

Brigade. An association of Brigade veterans, formed in April and claiming a membership of 900, is primarily--at least at present--a fraternal organization, but some of its leaders appear to have hopes that the group might form a nucleus for unity of all exiles.

C. The public attitude of the Government toward unity efforts was expressed by Assistant Secretary Martin last week as follows:

Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community if it is to have vitality.

It is desirable that a point implicit in the foregoing statement be made explicit, that is, the requirement that unity reflect the basic desires of the people within Cuba.

D. It is unlikely that the exiles will be able to achieve a unity which meets the criteria set out in the Martin statement. So far the efforts toward unity have been tentative and competitive. Political divisions, both ideological and personal, are deep and there appears to be little disposition or ability to effect a real accommodation of views. The groups on the left distrust those on the right and vice versa; the center groups are wary of both. Any formula for unity would have to be so diluted as to be almost meaningless. Moreover, the ability of a united exile organization to reflect, to any meaningful degree, the attitudes and aspirations of those within Cuba would be minimal.

1. Support of Unity Efforts

Considerations: Through judicious use of our resources, we might be able to force or induce unity among all or the principal democratic groups from right to left. Such a movement or organization would have to be of the least-common-denominator type. It would generally be recognized as an artificial creation of ours, although it might have some favorable effect on domestic public opinion. Our interference would probably be resented by many of the best exile elements (as in the case of the CRC), would deprive any unity movement of spontaneity (one of the sole virtues of a Cuban-originated and directed effort), would commit us to continuing support of the movement or organization, and would probably be suspect within Cuba. Even beyond these considerations, unity in itself does not significantly contribute to the achievement of our present objectives in Cuba. In fact, it is quite possible that a continuation of the present situation in which there is no pre-eminent central organization would be easier and more effective from an operational standpoint.

2. Opposition to Unity Efforts

Considerations: By judicious use of our resources, we probably could thwart movements toward unity. Our interference in this sense would be strongly resented and would be widely interpreted as a demonstration that we are "giving up" on the Cuban question. It would be very difficult to explain, particularly to domestic public opinion, since "unity" on its face is attractive. In any case, the prospects for a spontaneous, effective, and meaningful unity are hardly good.

3. Hands-Off

Considerations: If we were to remain as aloof as a decent public posture allows, the chances are considerably better than even that unity efforts would fail. There is an outside possibility, however, that a unified organization or movement meeting our standards would emerge. If it did, it would have the strength endowed by the free, undistorted (by U.S. interference), competitive play of political currents, and it would not carry the taint of U.S. sponsorship.

A "hands-off" policy incurs the risks of permitting the possibly embarrassing intensification of division among the exiles, of sacrificing some sound but poorly financed groups to the necessitudes of exile politics in which less sound but better-financed elements might become dominant, and of being faced, should a unity movement or organization be formed, with demands for U.S. support. In the last case, the fact that we had not participated in the formation of the movement would give us maximum flexibility.

Conclusions

1. The U.S. Government should follow a "hands-off" policy toward exile efforts to achieve unity.

2. The statement of position made by Assistant Secretary Martin is a good expression of this policy, provided it is expanded by a reference to the requirement that unity reflect the basic desires of the people within Cuba.

Recommendations

1. That the U.S. Government follow a "hands-off" policy toward exile efforts to achieve unity.

2. That public statements by all officers of the U.S. Government on the subject of exile unity be consistent with the following:

Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community and be consistent with the desires of the people within Cuba if it is to have vitality.

346. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, June 8, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/63. Secret; Eyes Only. According to a covering memorandum from Smith to Bundy, June 10, this paper was to be submitted to the NSC Standing Group on June 11. The next (8th) meeting of the Standing Group was held on June 18, not June 11. Bundy's record of action of the June 18 meeting indicated that the group discussed this paper and approved it for final decision by the President. (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 6/18/63)

SUBJECT

Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

I. Introduction

1. Submitted herewith is a covert program for Cuba within CIA's capabilities. Some parts of the program have already been approved and are being implemented. Being closely inter-related, the total cumulative impact of the courses of action set forth in this program is dependent upon the simultaneous coordinated execution of the individual courses of action.

2. This program is based on the assumption that current U.S. policy does not contemplate outright military intervention in Cuba or a provocation which can be used as a pretext for an invasion of Cuba by United States military forces. It is further assumed that U.S. policy calls for the exertion of maximum pressure by all means available to the U.S. Government, short of military intervention, to prevent the pacification of the population and the consolidation of the Castro/Communist regime. The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/Communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba.

3. While the effect of a program of maximum pressure is unpredictable, it is suggested that a sustained intensive effort undertaken now to prevent the consolidation of the Castro/Communist regime may in the future present the United States with opportunities and options not now foreseeable. The consequences of a policy of allowing Castro to "stew in his own juice," however, are foreseeable. According to current estimates, barring Castro's death or a decisive change in the U.S. posture or Soviet policy towards Cuba, the Castro regime is likely to be more firmly established a year hence, despite possible economic setbacks. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as the population and elite groups in Cuba become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in administrative experience and the security organs become more efficient. Over the longer run, the existence of an organized party apparatus as well as a stable governmental machinery could reduce the indispensability of Castro's personal leadership. Thus, if left to chance, the U.S. must be prepared to accept for the indefinite future a Communist regime in Cuba closely tied to and a significant component of the Soviet world power structure.

4. Within the context of the policy assumptions and estimate of the situation in Cuba outlined above, CIA submits a program consisting of the following interdependent courses of action:

A. Covert collection of intelligence, both for U.S. strategic requirements as well as for operational requirements.

B. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance.

C. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and other power centers.

D. Economic denial actions on an increased basis.

E. General sabotage and harassment.

F. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.

5. A vital feature of the foregoing program to exert maximum pressure on the Castro/Communist regime is the dependence of the impact of each course of action on the simultaneous and effective execution of the other courses of action. Thus, intelligence information is needed to permit the planning and mounting of operations against economic denial and sabotage targets. Covert propaganda actions are designed to produce a psychological climate in Cuba conducive to the accomplishment of the other courses of action in the integrated covert program. Only after the effects of economic denial and sabotage actions are deeply felt by the populace and the elite groups can one hope to convert disaffection in the armed forces and other power centers of the regime into militant revolt against the Castro/Communist entourage. It is also at this point where CIA-controlled and autonomous activist elements in the Cuban exile community can begin to assume genuine resistance proportions. As a consequence of this inter-related and continuous process, it is reasonable to expect a considerable increase in the volume and quality of the intelligence product on the basis of which additional and increasingly more effective operations can be mounted. Unless all the components of this program are executed in tandem, the individual courses of action are almost certain to be of marginal value, even in terms of achieving relatively limited policy objectives. This is clearly a cause where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

II. Discussion of Components of an Integrated Program

6. In amplification of the courses of action listed in paragraph 4 above, the following additional description and terms of reference are offered:

A. Covert collection of intelligence, both for U.S. strategic requirements as well as for operational requirements.

Covert collection of intelligence continues to be a major CIA mission. Without detracting from our strategic intelligence efforts, emphasis is being given to increasing the volume and quality of intelligence needed for planning and mounting the operations contemplated in the integrated program described in this paper, particularly for defections and penetrations and for economic denial and sabotage actions against vulnerable sectors of the Cuban economy.

B. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance.

In accordance with a previously approved psychological program in support of U.S. policy on Cuba, CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media directed at Cuba encourage low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance. These media also seek to stimulate and exacerbate tensions within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc, taking advantage of Sino-Soviet tensions. All of these propaganda operations are calculated to create a psychological atmosphere within Cuba which will facilitate the accomplishment of the other courses of action within the integrated covert action program.

C. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and other power centers.

We are undertaking an intensive probing effort to identify, seek out and establish channels of communication with disaffected and potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime, particularly in the armed forces hierarchy. The objective is to promote the fragmentation of the regime and possibly lead to an internal coup which would dislodge Castro and his entourage, and make it possible to eliminate the Cuban Communists from positions of power and force the withdrawal of the Soviet military presence and the termination of its economic aid. Several promising operations are already underway.

D. Economic denial actions.

Overt official U.S. economic sanctions in conjunction with covert economic denial operations (such as denial of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]) is causing a marked adverse effect on the Cuban economy. For maximum impact on the Cuban economy this effort must be coordinated with sabotage operations. We propose to continue and intensify economic denial operations which would be greatly enhanced by an inter-agency committee with a charter enabling it to call upon member agencies for rapid action.

E. General sabotage and harassment.

Sabotage in this program is both an economic weapon and a stimulus to resistance. As an economic weapon, it is a supplement to and therefore must be coordinated with the economic denial effort. As a stimulus to resistance, there must be visible and dramatic evidence of sabotage to serve as a symbol of growing popular defiance of the Castro regime.

These operations will be conducted either by externally held assets now available or by existing internal assets or those to be developed. Assets trained and controlled by CIA will be used as will selected autonomous exile groups. Initially, the emphasis will be on the use of externally held assets with a shift to internal assets as soon as operationally feasible.

The types of sabotage considered appropriate for this program are:

(1) Simple low-risk sabotage on a large scale stimulated by propaganda media (approved and being implemented).

(2) Sabotage of Cuban ships outside Cuban waters (approved and being implemented).

(3) Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against appropriately selected targets.

(4) Support of internal resistance elements, providing materiel and personnel to permit them to undertake a variety of sabotage and harassment operations.

It must be recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate significant resistance. However, it is our opinion that a well-planned series of sabotage efforts, properly executed, would in time produce the effect we seek. Each action will have its dangers: there will be failures with consequent loss of life and charges of attribution to the United States resulting in criticism at home and abroad. None of these expected consequences should cause us to change our course if the program as outlined can be expected to be successful.

Annex A is an elaboration of a proposed sabotage and harassment program against Cuba.

F. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.

In the past, CIA has utilized only fully controlled and disciplined agent assets as a safeguard against unilateral and irresponsible action by Cuban exiles intent upon the liberation of their country. If sabotage and resistance activities are to be undertaken on a larger scale, it will be necessary to accept the risks involved in utilizing autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals who will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance. CIA proposes the following "rules of engagement" to govern the conduct of these autonomous operations:

(1) It is the keystone of autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.

(2) The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, it cannot be resumed.

(3) All autonomous operations will be mounted outside the territory of the United States.

(4) The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U.S. complicity.

(5) The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the U.S. representative will make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily, except to counter intervention by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide general advice as requested as well as funds and necessary material support. He may be expected to influence but not control the conduct of operations.

(6) These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule.

III. Recommendation

7. Policy authority already exists for courses of action described in paragraph 6 A-D. In order that full advantage can be taken of an integrated covert action program, the Standing Group is requested to approve courses of action outlined in paragraph 6 E and F within the terms of reference and rules of engagement therein.

Annex A

SUBJECT

Sabotage/Harassment Program

The broad target categories against which the sabotage/harassment operations would be mounted and a preliminary evaluation of their effect, can be summarized as follows:

A. Electric Power

Disruption of any of the existing power grids which might be effected by damage to or destruction of the generating facilities or of the critical sub-stations in the distribution network, would significantly weaken the existing economic and social structure, particularly in view of the fact that in many areas the power now available is not adequate to meet the demands of industrial and public consumers. Smaller acts of sabotage/harassment by the populace such as throwing chains over high tension lines to short them out, would also exacerbate the current power shortage, and the cumulative effect of all such actions could cause a prolonged breakdown of the power system as there is already a shortage of spare parts and replacement materiels.

B. Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)

Damage to or destruction of POL production and/or storage facilities would seriously affect almost all aspects of the Cuban economy. The electric power industry depends almost entirely upon POL as fuel for the generating plants and the sugar industry depends upon POL powered processing and transportation facilities as does all intra-province transportation. Production and storage facilities are susceptible to external attacks by heavy weapons or by more subtle methods if internal assets having an appropriate degree of accessibility can be developed. The loss of refining facilities could be offset by increased Bloc shipments of refined products but such a shift would require a period of readjustment during which there would be a heavy strain on the Cuban economy. An additional burden on the Bloc refining capacity would also exist until Cuba's refining capacity is restored.

C. Transportation

Damage to or destruction of railway and/or highway rolling stock or the destruction of key bridges would lead to breakdowns in the regional economics which to a large degree are dependent on the distribution of imported products. The processing and export of the vitally important sugar crop is also entirely dependent on transportation. It is not anticipated that we could achieve that degree of disruption which would cause a collapse of the economy or social structure, but even a minor degree of disruption will adversely affect the standard of living and the output of the economy, both of which are key factors in the stability of the regime. The type of operations envisioned in this category would range from fairly sophisticated attacks by external or internal assets against the rolling stock, key bridges and repair facilities to simple low risk acts by the populace such as the derailing of rail transportation or placing tire puncturing material on highways.

D. Production Processing and Manufacturing Facilities

While the Cuban economy primarily depends on imports for indigenous consumption and even though the sugar crop is by far the most important item in Cuban exports, there are still a number of other facilities such as the nickel complex at Nicaro, cement plants, distilleries, and the myriad industries associated with the provision of food, clothing and shelter, which are worthwhile targets in that stopping or lessening their output will weaken the economy and breed discontent against the regime. These targets are particularly susceptible to attack by external or internal assets in that due to their profusion and their relatively low strategic importance they are not well guarded or otherwise secured against attack.

The selection of specific targets within the above categories and the determination of timing and tactics will be predicated upon detailed analysis of the following factors:

1. The extent to which the target can be physically damaged.

2. The resultant effect upon the Cuban economy.

3. The cost or effort required if additional burdens are placed on Bloc support.

4. The psychological effect on the Cuban population.

5. Anticipated adverse reactions.

6. Operational capabilities and limitations of CIA assets.

347. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 85-63

Washington, June 14, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to covering sheets this estimate was submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board by the Central Intelligence Agency on June 14. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Security Agency participated in its preparation. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred with it with the exception of the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. This NIE superseded NIE 85-2-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," August 1, 1962, and SNIE 85-3-62, "The Military Balance in Cuba," September 19, 1962. For texts, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. X, Documents 363 and 433.

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

Conclusions

A. After a period marked by bitterness on Castro's part and by restraint on the part of the Soviets, the two parties now appear to have agreed to emphasize the consolidation of the Castro regime. We believe that the current situation within Cuba favors this consolidation. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in experience. It is unlikely that internal political opposition or economic difficulties will cause the regime to collapse. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel, whose charismatic appeal continues to be the most important factor in the forward drive of the Cuban revolution. (Paras. 1, 15, 18, 31-32, 41)

B. Dependence on the person of Castro is, however, a major vulnerability of the regime. Without leadership and without goals--and these would have to be revolutionary and reformist to appeal to a majority of Cubans--no opposition force is likely to develop the power to challenge Castro, however much equipment or support it might get from the outside. But his death could result in one form of disorder or another ranging from power struggles within the regime's leadership to open civil war. Any successor is likely to be more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro has been because he will lack Castro's ability to command the loyalty of substantial numbers of Cubans. Furthermore, even under the most favorable circumstances, any opposition would have to have the support of a large part of the military before it could hope to overthrow the Communist regime, and would have to take account of the presence of Soviet troops. (Paras. 15, 42-43)

C. On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the missile crisis. The Soviet military picture in Cuba is in transition with a scaling down of their forces becoming apparent. The total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be about 12,000 to 13,000, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be several thousand more. The Soviets remain in control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate some of them. We believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that they intend eventually to turn various weapons systems over to them. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba; indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets will maintain a significant presence there. (Paras. 2, 5, 12-14, 35, 37)

D. With respect to the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, we doubt that the Soviets have specified an exact date for transfer of operational control or would carry out such an agreement if subsequent developments produced new dangers. We believe that the Soviet Government remains acutely aware of the risks involved. (Para. 36)

E. The capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces have been augmented by increased training, new equipment, and some reorganization. The Cuban ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. In the event of US invasion, however, they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type. (Paras. 8, 12-14)

F. In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplates an attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba. Continued US aerial surveillance remains a major deterrent. We cannot, however, altogether rule out such an attempt. Greatly enhanced Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods with respect to Cuba would make it possible to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception, during both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence would be relying on. At some point the Soviets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by introducing other weapons previously labeled "offensive" by the US. In such cases they would almost certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction. (Paras. 38-40)

G. The joint Khrushchev-Castro communique/1/ held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but without endorsing Castro's earlier general incitement to revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes that revolution will come only through violence, but the regime's exhortations on the subject have been muted recently. The outlook is for a mixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking to avoid a crisis with the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures. In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which Castro could intervene with substantial force without rendering himself vulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. (Paras. 46-48)

/1/The Joint Soviet-Cuban Statement signed in Moscow by Castro and Khrushchev, May 23, 1963; for a partial text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 269-271.

H. While the Soviets and Cubans have probably resolved their more immediate problems we foresee varying degrees of friction in their future relations, particularly over the long run. They probably have not reached a fundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America, and Castro appears to insist on a unique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites. Nevertheless, Castro has taken a long step toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro has received a strong boost to his ego; assurances of continued economic support; the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution; and recognition of Cuba's special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed. (Paras. 49-51)

[Here follow a 13-page discussion section and an annex listing major Soviet military equipment in Cuba. See the Supplement for both.]

348. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 19, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret. Prepared by FitzGerald.

SUBJECT

Meeting at the White House concerning Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

PRESENT

Higher Authority

Secretary McNamara

Under Secretary Harriman

Mr. McCone

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Thomas Parrott

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald

Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General W.F. McKee

1. The program as recommended by the Standing Group of the NSC/1/ was presented briefly to Higher Authority who showed a particular interest in proposed external sabotage operations. He was shown charts indicating typical targets for this program and a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages ensued. It was well recognized that there would be failures and a considerable noise level. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bundy described the integrated nature of the program presented and made the point that, having made the decision to go ahead, we be prepared to take the consequences of flaps and criticisms for a sufficient period to give the program a real chance. Mr. Harriman stated that the program would be "reviewed weekly" by the Special Group. (It is believed that an arrangement can be made with Mr. Bundy for less detailed control by the Special Group than was indicated by Mr. Harriman.)

/1/See Document 346.

2. Higher Authority asked how soon we could get into action with the external sabotage program and was told that we should be able to conduct our first operation in the dark-of-the-moon period in July although he was informed that we would prefer to start the program with some caution selecting softer targets to begin with. Higher Authority said this was a matter for our judgment. Although at one stage in the discussion Higher Authority said that we should move ahead with the program "this summer" it is believed that Mr. Bundy will be able to convince him that this is not a sufficiently long trial period to demonstrate what the program can do./2/

Desmond FitzGerald

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

/2/McCone added an addendum to this memorandum stating that he emphasized to the President "the importance and necessity for continuous operations," and he also pointed out that the activities "would create quite a high noise level." McCone also stated that the noise level "must be absorbed and not create a change in policy." He concluded that "no single event would be conclusive."

349. Paper Prepared by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State

Washington, June 20, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuba--1963. Top Secret. According to a covering memorandum, Assistant Secretary Martin sent this paper to U. Alexis Johnson on June 20.

FUTURE RELATIONS WITH CASTRO

I. Background

The cardinal point of Castro's foreign policy until the missile crisis was to bind Cuba tightly to the USSR as a means of ensuring the regime's survival in the shadow of United States power--based on the proposition, as Cuba goes so goes world communism. Soviet refusal to run the quarantine and its acquiescence in withdrawing the missiles shook the foundation of Cuban foreign policy.

Since the missile crisis, Castro has indicated, sometimes vaguely, sometimes rather clearly, through various channels, public as well as private, that he is interested in an accommodation with the United States. His immediate disillusion over the Soviet missile crisis posture probably prompted him to grope for a policy which would diminish his depend-ence upon the Soviet Union, lessen his ties with the communist world and enable him to establish counter-balancing relations elsewhere. In casting about for some sort of new alignment, he may possibly have envisioned Cuba's emergence as a neutralist state. (Given Castro's temperament and ambition, any such neutralization would have to be dynamic and proselytizing rather than passive.) Although it is of course impossible to be certain, it would seem that Castro, at least in his early post-missile crisis flirtings with accommodation, was acting essentially in his own interest and may have been prepared to move further from the Bloc than the USSR, despite its general urging that Castro seek ways to reduce tensions, would have liked.

Castro's Moscow visit re-cemented Cuban-Soviet relations, at least for some time. In his TV broadcast upon his return to Cuba, Castro left no doubt that he accepted Khrushchev's leadership of a communist world that included Cuba, and he specifically and flatly rejected the possibility that he might stray. Whatever possibility may have existed immediately after the missile crisis that Castro might in fact adopt an independent and more neutralist policy has probably vanished under present circumstances. Viewed in this context, Castro's latest gesture toward "normalcy" in United States-Cuban relations appears clearly to constitute a concerted Soviet-Cuban initiative, encouraged by the Soviets and fully consistent with the policy of "peaceful co-existence."

Castro's comments have not made clear what he envisages as the terms of such an action. Castro has indicated a willingness to negotiate concessions for expropriated properties, though his opening position is a rather onerous one, involving the use of Cuban receipts from the sale of sugar to the United States in excess of 3 million tons at 5.56#. He has implied that his subversive activities in Latin America would be no problem, but largely by denying that he is currently engaged in anything of the sort. He has made clear that nothing can change the fact that his regime is Communist and must continue to have the closest of political ties to the Soviet Union.

There have been indications from Soviet sources that Soviet military presence in Cuba could be removed if that is an obstacle.

The general tone of Castro's discussion of this subject in his TV broadcast on his return from Moscow is that we need a settlement more than he does and therefore we should offer the concessions. In this connection he again mentions the abandonment of Guantanamo as one of the conditions he would affix to a reconciliation.

II. Motivation

It seems likely that the motives both for Castro and the Soviets in seeking some kind of an accommodation are both economic and political. Castro's economy is not doing well, and he needs trade with the United States both as a market for sugar and source of supply for spare parts and equipment generally. He may even hope to get some United States technical aid to supplement that from the bloc with which he seems to have considerable dissatisfaction.

The Soviets probably wish to get some relaxation of the burden they are now carrying to keep the economy going at all. It would certainly cost them nothing not to have to buy Cuban sugar whatever the price.

It may be also that Castro retains some interest in such an accommodation in order to have more maneuverability vis-a-vis the Soviets. From a long-term standpoint as well as in the incidents at the time of the missile crisis, an independent egoist such as Castro must find his dependence on the Soviets galling.

From a longer-term standpoint Castro and the Soviets may also feel that there will be a better opportunity to make Cuba more nearly a showcase of communism in the hemisphere rather than a glaring example of economic failure, if an accommodation with the United States is possible. Not only would economic benefits accrue but the respectability and prestige that Castro would derive from successful accommodation, which would be played as "victory over the United States," would significantly advance both the Soviets and Castro toward their long range goals in the hemisphere. Support for the regime from within Cuba might well become wider and more active with an effect on economic prosperity as well as political attitudes.

III. Concessions

For any negotiation to have a prospect of success, we should probably have to agree to the following:

1. Stop overflights.

2. Stop giving support to Cubans who are attempting to overthrow the regime.

3. Pass legislation restoring a sugar quota to Cuba.

4. Take legislative action, and executive action in consultation with Congress, permitting trade with Cuba on at least as extensive a basis as the Soviet bloc.

5. Possibly seek to remove the strictures against Cuba and her activities in the hemisphere adopted in the Inter-American System and perhaps accept Cuba back into the OAS and its subordinate bodies.

6. Agree to continuation of political, economic and some international ties with the USSR.

In return it may be presumed that Cuba might agree to the following:

1. Send back Soviet personnel except for training missions in connection with Soviet military assistance programs of a type similar to those which accompany United States military assistance programs.

2. Halt Cuban assistance to subversion in Latin America.

3. Agree that Cuban armed forces will not be used outside of Cuba except in accordance with decisions of the Inter-American System.

4. Agree that the Soviets will not be permitted to use Cuba as a base for armed action.

5. Negotiate an agreement for some compensation for seized properties, presumably tied to the level of export earnings from sales of sugar to the United States.

IV. Conclusion

This is not an acceptable arrangement for the following reasons:

1. It would be an agreement with Castro and in no general sense with the regime as a whole or the people as a whole. It would fall with his fall. Even with his continuation, his word has too frequently been demonstrated as worthless to give us much long-term assurance of quiet in the Caribbean.

2. Without the political break with Moscow a precedent would be established for other communist regimes in the hemisphere and the whole effort to keep them out of this area and to establish its special status would fall to the ground. It could mean the death of the Inter-American System.

3. Since subversive activities in Latin America are to a very considerable extent covert anyway, there would be no effective means of ensuring that Castro had kept his word. Moreover, it would be all too simple for activities which he has been conducting to be shifted in large part to other bloc countries, who are already extensively engaged.

4. Approval of a communist regime would be a great encouragement to native communists in Latin America and would increase their power.

5. With the threat perhaps increased or at least substantially unchanged, there would inevitably be a major relaxation of anti-communist effort on the part of the Latin American countries since there has been so much focus on the threat of Cuba. The prospect of communist take-over would thus be enhanced.

6. It is exceedingly difficult to envisage this as a two stage operation with the second stage the elimination of communism or Castro. Any such compromise would enormously strengthen him with the Cuban people and make the regime less dependent on him personally than it has been. A communist regime in Cuba would be even more securely entrenched than it is now.

7. An essential component of the economic aspects is legislative action by the United States Congress. This must take place before Castro limits in any way his present dependence and close relations with the Soviet bloc. He cannot afford economically the possible gap. It is probably not feasible at any time, but particularly under these circumstances, to secure Congressional assent to the economic measures while Castro maintains his full present relationship with the bloc. The sugar legislation will be made particularly difficult by the need to deprive other friendly countries of sugar quotas and to assign a sugar quota before adequate assurances have been secured with respect to compensation for United States sugar property owners.

8. Any such settlement will cause serious problems of order within the United States so far