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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

351. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 24, 1963.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A. Secret. Prepared by McCone.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Secretary Rusk--21 June 1963--re Cuba

IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary Rusk, Gov. Harriman, Secretary Johnson, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. McCone

1. Details of the meeting are summarized in Mr. FitzGerald's memorandum,/1/ which is complete. However I have the impression that Secretary Rusk is not enthusiastically behind the CIA program. He seems to feel that there is some opportunity of a rapprochement with Castro as referred to in the FitzGerald memorandum. I insisted on the meeting with Rusk because I sensed his reservations and, although he approved the program, it was obvious he did so reluctantly and I think the first evidence of "noise" will call for reconsideration. This is a subject that I have discussed with him on several occasions in the past. Mr. Rusk offers no explanation for his attitude but it has prevailed for a long time.

/1/Document 350.

2. [5 lines of source text not declassified] I made it abundantly clear during the meeting, and privately to Secretary Rusk afterwards, that I felt a rapprochement out of the question in view of the relationship between Castro and Khrushchev resulting from Castro's trip. Therefore I felt nothing could be done until some event occurred which would impair this relationship. I emphasized both in the meeting and afterwards that it was a very dangerous subject to approach from a political point of view; I did not think the American people would accept the concept of a rapprochement unless:

a. Castro disavowed any ideas of exporting his revolution;

b. That he broke his Moscow tie and expelled the Soviets from Cuba together with such equipment as they chose to take with them; and

c. He open up his country for free access and travel by Americans so that we could have continuing on-site inspection and hence knowledge of what is going on.

352. Telegram From Acting Secretary of State Ball and the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) in Ireland

Washington, June 25, 1963, 7:45 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only. President Kennedy was in Ireland June 25-29. Rusk was in the United Kingdom during the same time.

Sitto 8. From Ball and Kaysen. Bundy eyes only for the President and Rusk. In note from Cuban Government/1/ (delivered by Czech Ambassador this afternoon but intended for delivery June 21 or 22) protesting various exile activities directed against Cuba, following passages included:

/1/The full text of the note, June 24, is ibid. See the Supplement. Ball had telephone conversations with McCone, Kaysen, McNamara, U. Alexis Johnson, and Martin on June 25 on the question of the Cuban note and U-2 reconnaissance. (Ibid., Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba) Memoranda of these conversations are in the Supplement.

(A) "GOC protests . . . the recent low-level flight over Cuban territory, for the purpose of espionage, of a US military plane, which the US press itself has taken upon itself to reveal and warns that Cuban gunners have orders to fire against any foreign war plane which flies at a low level over our territory."

(B) (After referring to recent seizure by US customs of small plane loaded with explosives apparently for attack on Habana refineries.) "This event, as well as the attack carried at the end of April against this same Cuban refinery by a plane which took off from US territory carrying powerful explosive charges, obliges us to accelerate our defensive preparations in order to be in conditions to intercept and shoot down any war plane which violates our air space at any altitude."

On June 22, GOC requested Swiss Embassy Habana notify USG urgently that GOC did not intend publicize note in order avoid increasing existing tensions and that GOC protesting precisely because fact which motivated note increases tension. GOC added that if USG gives publicity GOC will do same.

This note must be read against fact that on three occasions from June 19 through June 24 MIG 21s have engaged in zoom climbs that have brought them in general proximity of U-2s. As a result, U-2s have followed existing procedures and aborted.

Have discussed foregoing situation with McNamara and Kaysen, and we are agreed on following procedure:

As previously decided, there will be no low-level flights before President's return. High-level flights will continue under existing procedures which call for aborts when Cuban aircraft within 40 miles of U-2 and at altitude in excess of 40,000 feet.

Taking into account need for current intelligence, we believe this provides proper margin of safety to justify continued flights even under special conditions when President out of country.

353. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in the United Kingdom

Washington, June 26, 1963, 8:21 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Secret; Priority. This telegram was apparently also sent as White House telegram CAP 63345 to Ireland. There is a notation on it that the President read it.

Tosec 17. Deptel Sitto 8./1/ FYI. Following is ARA and INR analysis of Cuban note:

/1/Document 352.

Since (a) references to action against overflights surrounded by protests against exile activities even though purpose note clearly was to get across message on overflights, and (b) there was unusual lapse time between June 10 incident in which two Cuban coast guard personnel captured and another killed and delivery Cuban note, Department concludes note carefully considered (very likely in consultation with Soviets) and drafted. Only prior reference June 10 incident which would normally have resulted swift stiff protest occurred June 19 in Castro speech at Cardenas when incident mentioned only in passing.

General tone of note (as distinct from substance) restrained and appears designed to be unprovocative. Although overflights have evidently been object continuing concern Cubans, tone, together with express desire transmitted through Swiss avoid publicity (which otherwise Castro could have based upon public references to "violation air space" contained both joint Cuban-Soviet communique during Castro visit and Castro TV interview in Habana thereafter), would indicate GOC, very likely in concert Soviets, proceeding cautiously. Fact that Cubans went unusual length stress intention give no publicity suggests they may be anxious avoid locking themselves or us in. They may look upon note as at minimum probe our determination on overflights.

Differences in language between reference to low-level flights and reference to flights at any altitude indicate harder line on former than latter which can be accounted for by Soviet control SAM's. Note that reference to overflights at any altitude significantly refers to taking steps "in order to be ready" (official translation) and refrains from flat commitment they will fire.

In sum Department regards note as (a) cautiously and unprovocatively worded and carefully handled warning against overflights which affords Cubans flexibility with respect actual response they might make at least to high level flights; and (b) as important step (additional to use MIG-21's vicinity U-2 flights) in effort force cessation overflights. High-level flight today was without incident.

Ball

354. Summary Record of the 9th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, July 9, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/9/63. Secret; Sensitive.

1. Progress report on integrated action program toward Cuba

Desmond FitzGerald reviewed developments and actions of the past three weeks since the approval by the group of the integrated action program for Cuba. He mentioned two events which are scheduled for the 26th of July. He was reading from notes.

Mr. Harriman called attention to the relation of action in Cuba to his mission to Moscow./1/ He said he hoped to be out of Moscow by the 25th or 26th of July. He appeared anxious to avoid giving the Russians an opportunity to raise with him our Cuban policy on the basis of actions which had taken place during the time he was in Moscow.

/1/Reference is to Harriman's trip to Moscow to negotiate the nuclear test ban agreement, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be a discussion of the State/USIA paper containing a draft statement of what we hoped to see develop in a post-Castro Cuba./2/

/2/A draft of the statement is in the Supplement attached to a memorandum from USIA Deputy Director Wilson to McGeorge Bundy, May 4. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/7/63) A revised version of the paper, July 12, is ibid., Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. See the Supplement.

There was a discussion as to how to handle press inquiries about developments in Cuba such as raids from outside Cuba and sabotage actions within Cuba. It was agreed that we should flatly deny any U.S. Government involvement in any of these activities. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]/3/

/3/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, July 9, which stated that the Group heard an oral report on the integrated action program toward Cuba. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/9/63)

[Here follows a report on U.S. policy toward Spain.]

Bromley Smith

355. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, July 13, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. Confidential.

SUBJECT

NSC Standing Group Meeting Tuesday, July 16, 5 P.M.: Cuba/1/

/1/See Document 356.

Attached for circulation to members of the Standing Group for the July 16th meeting are the following papers:

1. A proposed statement on Cuba to be made by the President, drafted jointly by ARA and USIA./2/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 354.

2. A proposed statement on Cuba drafted by ARA as a statement to be made by the President on July 26./3/

/3/The draft statement, undated, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. See the Supplement.

3. A "Cuban Balance Sheet" prepared by INR and incorporating the suggestions of CIA./4/

/4/The 12-page paper was an undated memorandum from Hughes to Johnson. The paper compared the Batista and Castro regimes in terms of their abilities to respond effectively to the needs and aspirations of various parts of the Cuban population. The paper also weighed the promises of the Castro regime before and upon its attainment of power against its performance. The CIA reviewed the paper, and its suggestions were incorporated into the final version. The paper gave Castro some credit for reforms in such areas as health care, housing, education, lowering rents, honest administration, and racial equality, but noted in other areas like civil liberties, economic diversification, new investment, and independence from foreign influences Castro's record was worse than Batista's. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63)

The first draft statement represents the draft ARA and USIA were requested jointly to prepare, and meets the minimum views of both of them. It could be issued at any time; a possible occasion would be the Alliance for Progress Commemorative Ceremony in Washington on August 17, to which the President was been invited.

The second statement, which is addressed specifically to the July 26 date, represents the flavor, content and approach to a statement that would be preferred by ARA.

The INR paper examines group attitudes in Cuba toward Batista and Castro Regimes and seeks to assess performance in certain key sectors during the Batista period as well as against Castro's promise and performance. It should be read in conjunction with the proposed statements.

U. Alexis Johnson

356. Summary Record of the 10th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, July 16, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. Secret.

1. Proposed U.S. Statement on Cuba

Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson introduced the three papers which were circulated to the group under his memorandum of July 13th./1/ Because any Presidential statement on Cuba would have an impact on the Harriman negotiations in Moscow, no one favored asking the President to issue a statement on July 26th. If it is decided to issue a statement, consideration will be given to making it on August 17th, which is the anniversary of the Alliance for Progress.

/1/See footnotes 2, 3, and 4, Document 355.

With respect to the content of the statement, Mr. McCone called attention to the following sentence which appears in both the proposed statements: "I am confident that all true friends of the Cubans share my conviction that the day is not too far distant when these aspirations will be fulfilled." His view, shared by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Martin, was that this prediction was too strong and gave a false impression that there would soon be a free Cuba.

General Goodpaster noted that in both papers it appeared that we were saying that Castro was sincere at the time he made promises to the Cuban people prior to his coming to power. He doubted that we should indicate that we believed that his promises were genuine. It was agreed that changes would be made to reflect Castro's promises as being assertions without appearing to give him the benefit of saying that his promises were genuine.

The Attorney General asked what effect the Harriman talks would have on the timing and content of the statement on Cuba. Mr. McGeorge Bundy replied by saying that Harriman had asked that there be no loud noises about Cuba during the time he was in Moscow.

Mr. Martin said that the State Department had given Secretary Rusk a paper covering suggestions to negotiate with Castro./2/ Although this paper recommended against such negotiations, Mr. Martin felt that the paper should be considered by the Standing Group before the group made any decision on a proposed Presidential statement on Cuba. He said a number of proposals had been made which involve negotiation with Castro. Two Congressmen had asked whether or not we should find out if Castro was ready to make a deal with us. One Congressman volunteered to go to Havana to talk to Castro along these lines.

/2/See Document 349.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the group should look at the negotiation paper. It was agreed that at the next meeting the paper would be considered. In the meantime, a decision on a proposed Presidential statement on Cuba would be deferred.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that he felt that things would have to get much rougher for Castro before he would consider any deal with us which we could accept. However, this did not mean that we should say now that we would never talk to Castro.

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department recommendations covering suggestions that Cuba shipping orders be made more restrictive would be coming to the White House tomorrow. Following an intense study of this problem, Mr. Johnson said he had reached the conclusion that no sharpening of the existing orders would reduce the amount of free world shipping to Cuba. The ships now in the trade are beyond our control. He concluded that the only way to reduce free world shipping would be to make the orders apply to the flag of the ship rather than the ownership. Unless we did this, which would result in our banning British ships such as the Queen Mary, the problem was not within our control. If we acted against the Yugoslavs and the Poles we would hurt our relations with them and gain little in terms of reducing trade with Cuba. For example, one Yugo ship a month goes to Cuba. In order to stop that ship, we would have to be ready to prevent forty-six Yugoslav ships coming to the U.S. monthly.

General Goodpaster referred to the INR paper on the Cuban balance sheet and asked whether the economic estimates contained in it meant that we believed the Cuban economy was as far down as it would go. Mr. McCone acknowledged that he did not know whether the economic predictions in the balance sheet paper were consistent with those in the latest National Intelligence Estimate./3/ Mr. Martin said it was impossible to predict with accuracy what would happen to the economic situation in Cuba. Some believed that it would not get worse and would gradually improve in view of the massive Soviet aid now going to Cuba. He was not persuaded that the Russians could organize the Cuban economy in a way which would result in a very great improvement. He was not prepared to say that the Cuban economy had reached the bottom, adding that there was a possibility that the situation would get worse than it now is.

/3/Not further identified.

[1 paragraph (18 lines of source text) not declassified]/4/

/4/On July 8 the United States blocked all assets of Cuba in the United States or of persons in Cuba; prohibited the transfer by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction of U.S. dollars to or from Cuba; and prohibited all unlicensed transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals or transactions involving property in which there was a Cuban interest. For text of the announcement of the decision, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 276-277.

2. Contingent Plan to Reduce Price of Sugar

Deputy Under Secretary of Agriculture Sundquist commented on the contingent plan which he had been asked to prepare./5/ He noted that sugar producers throughout the world had reacted quickly to recent sharp rise in the price of sugar.

/5/The report, dated July 5, was entitled "A Contingent Plan for Increasing World Production of Sugar." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63) See the Supplement.

Mr. McCone thought that nature was doing pretty well in solving the sugar shortage. Hysteria had gone out of the situation and the price had dropped from 14# to 9#. Sugar producers were actively planning increased production. He personally opposed increasing the domestic quota and favored borrowing from existing quotas.

Mr. Sundquist said that very shortly we would have an over-supply of sugar facing us. He opposed the plan he presented because it would cause more problems than it would be worth, i.e. approximately $22 million annually to Cuba.

The group agreed that the plan should not be undertaken, but that we should adopt a policy of watchful waiting. Mr. McCone added that there was nothing else that we could do.

Report by Mr. FitzGerald--There was a discussion of the wide-spread press reports that the U.S. was backing Cuban exiles who are planning raids against Cuba from Central American States. One news article shown the Attorney General was headed "Backstage with Bobby" and referred to his conversations with persons involved in planning the Cuban raids./6/

/6/The story, by Hal Hendrix, was in the Miami Herald, July 14, 1963.

In the discussion as to how to deal with the press reports, the Attorney General suggested that we could float other rumors so that in the welter of press reports no one would know the true facts. Mr. McCone agreed that it would be possible to confuse the situation in this manner. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. McGeorge Bundy mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson the President's interest in a declaration or doctrine which would put the Russians and the Latin Americans on notice that the U.S. would not accept a second Castro in this hemisphere. Mr. Bundy said some work on this declaration had been done, that the President had it very much in mind, and suggested that the State Department continue its work on a draft declaration./7/

/7/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting. Bundy noted that the President would not make a statement on Cuba on July 26, that further consideration would be given to a statement on August 17, and that the content of the statement would be reexamined after consideration of the Department of State paper on negotiations with Castro. Second, Bundy noted that U. Alexis Johnson reported that tightening existing restrictions on free world shipping would only be effective if restrictions were revised so that they affected the country whose flag the ship was flying rather than the country of ownership. Third, Bundy noted that Agriculture's contingent plan for increasing world production of sugar would not be acted upon because of the drop in sugar prices from previous actions. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63) See the Supplement.

Bromley Smith/8/

/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

357. Memorandum From the Chief, Special Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, August 9, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret.

SUBJECT

Luis Somoza's Involvement in Cuban Exile Operations

1. The so-called Somoza plan has probably not yet jelled. Recent talks between ex-President Luis Somoza and Manuel Artime, prominent exile leader, may have resulted in modifications. Inconclusive secondhand reports would seem to suggest that Somoza's thinking on the subject of Cuba is oriented toward commando raids, guerilla warfare and sabotage of mounting scope and intensity, culminating in a general uprising. Hardly concealed is his conviction that such an uprising would give the United States Government little choice but to intervene militarily on the side of the insurgents, especially should Soviet troops be committed to quell the uprising.

2. As a corollary to the above-mentioned long-range considerations, the brothers Somoza, especially Anastacio who is director of the National Guard, have taken into consideration the prospect of exposure to a serious military threat if Nicaragua lends herself as a base for aggressive acts against Cuba. Reportedly Luis Somoza has stated that in the event that Cuba takes retaliatory action against Nicaragua, the United States would be forced to come to the aid of Nicaragua and thereby a confrontation would be achieved. In this context, the assurances which Luis Somoza claims to have been given by leading United States Government officials take on particular significance and continuing probing by him for more tangible promises of support can be anticipated.

3. Attached herewith is a listing of the names of prominent Cubans reported as having talked with Somoza about operations against Cuba from Nicaraguan bases./1/ These include one former President of Cuba (Carlos Prio Socarras), one former Prime Minister (Jorge Garcia Montes) and one former Ambassador to Washington (Guillermo Belt).

/1/Not printed.

4. It remains to be seen whether the Somoza concept can be sufficiently refined to accommodate and keep out of the limelight of public curiosity a project which, as we now see it, is essentially designed to rebuild an indigenous resistance movement inside Cuba. There is some question whether the Somozas could temperamentally adjust to the essential characteristics of such a program representing a long-term effort that can only prosper in an atmosphere of conspiratorial tranquility.

5. We consider that most if not all of the exile plans (with the exception of Artime's) which have been discussed with Luis Somoza will probably come to naught in typical exile fashion. As to Artime, we believe that any ill effects of Somoza's long-range concepts could be contained by the following lines of action:

a. Artime to forego raids and externally based sabotage actions and to concentrate on resistance within Cuba.

b. While leaving elements of his operational mechanism in Nicaragua and not breaking with Luis Somoza, Artime to shift to the use of the more limited facilities Costa Rica has to offer.

c. If additional pressures be needed, it should be remembered that ex-Ambassador Whelan, who is considered to enjoy the trust of the Somoza brothers, could be asked to help in tempering their zeal.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

6. Sources of varying reliability have cited Luis Somoza as claiming to have received the following assurances:

a. The "green light" to run anti-Castro raider and resistance operations obtained in Washington discussions with President Kennedy and the Attorney General.

b. Asked by President Kennedy and the Attorney General to take four Brigade leaders to Nicaragua.

c. Appointed by President Kennedy to represent him in dealings with the five Central American presidents who are interested in overthrowing Castro.

d. To have talked with United States Government representatives who promised "not to intervene" (i.e., in Somoza's plan to offer Nicaragua as a base for operations against Cuba).

e. To have found "that there are no obstacles, despite the fact that the United States Government did not tell me anything concretely."

Desmond FitzGerald

358. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy

Washington, undated.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-131, OSD Misc.--1963. Top Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum was undated and unsigned, but it was attached to an August 20 memorandum from Califano to Gilpatric recommending that the Deputy Secretary send it to the President. On August 26 Bundy sent Gilpatric a memorandum indicating that the President had signed this memorandum on August 22. The President asked Gilpatric to undertake the Top Secret and Sensitive distribution of this addition to rules of engagement.

SUBJECT

U.S. Action in the Event of Cuban Attack on U.S. Aircraft/Ships (U)

At your direction on 28 February 1963, Rules of Engagement were promulgated with respect to action by U.S. forces in event of a Cuban attack on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory./1/ These rules prohibit U.S. forces from penetrating Cuban territory in pursuit of Cuban forces involved.

/1/See Document 290.

Under these rules, overflight of Cuban territory while en route to the scene of attack is not included in the authorized military options for responses to an attack by Cuba on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory.

Incidents of Cuban attack on U.S. forces operating outside Cuban territory, which are considered most likely, would involve aircraft engaged in reconnaissance efforts, but also could involve U.S. shipping and cases where lives of U.S. nationals or national interests are in jeopardy. Should attacks occur, for example, south of western Cuba and north of eastern Cuba, the en route time for U.S. fighter support can be reduced by 10 to 30 minutes, with a comparable increase in time for action at the scene, by routing over Cuban territory. This quicker en route reaction time could be the difference between providing an effective defense for U.S. interests and arriving too late for action.

In light of the fact that occasions may arise where the presence of U.S. forces on the scene with least possible delay would be in the best national interests, a draft statement of policy which would authorize overflight of Cuban territory in certain instances, and under certain conditions, has been prepared and is attached. The draft policy has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinated with the Department of State and, based on the recommendation of that Department, delineates the individuals in the military chain of command authorized to approve overflights of Cuban territory.

I recommend its approval.

Attachment

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON US ACTION IN EVENT OF CUBAN ATTACK ON US AIRCRAFT/SHIPS (U)

The following policy is issued pertaining to US action in the event of Cuban attack in the area surrounding Cuba against US aircraft/ships:

a. In specific instances in which adherence to international airspace would delay significantly the arrival of US fighter aircraft at the scene of a Cuban attack against US aircraft/ships operating outside of Cuban territory, overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized subject to the following:

(1) It must be established that the US aircraft/ship is being attacked, or the US aircraft/ship has been attacked and lives of US personnel are endangered.

(2) Overflight times are minimized with due regard to risk to aircraft. While en route every effort will be taken to avoid provocative acts. Engagement will not be undertaken during the overflight except for self-defense against aircraft attack.

(3) From the time of arrival at the scene current rules of engagement will pertain, with return to home or diversion airfield via air space over international waters, if practicable.

(4) The most expeditious means possible will be used to inform highest national authorities that overflight of Cuba has been directed, and details on the action shall be furnished in the same manner.

b. Decision to overfly Cuban territory may be delegated to but not below the level of Commander Naval Base, Key West and Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo.

359. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 26, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Drafted by Thompson, approved in the White House on August 28 and in Thompson's office on August 29. The discussion was held at the White House and lasted from 11 to 11:53 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

SUBJECT

Possibility of further agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The President

Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume V.]

The President then referred to Cuba, and said that apparently the Soviets had withdrawn many of their troops, but we did not know how many were there now.

Dobrynin said that Khrushchev had recently stated that all combat units had been withdrawn from Cuba. The President asked what would happen over the next six months with the Soviets. Would the Soviets withdraw more or would the number remain the same?

Dobrynin said that he had no instructions to say anything on this point, but his strong impression was that when the Soviet instructors there had finished their jobs, they would leave.

Dobrynin said it was Khrushchev's intention to go to Cuba toward the end of the year, but that no exact date had been set. He inquired whether the President intended to go to the United Nations General Assembly and make a speech there.

The President said that he had not yet decided.

Dobrynin said that Khrushchev definitely did not plan to go to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, although there had been some thought that he might appear in connection with his trip to Cuba.

The President said he was sure Mr. Khrushchev was aware of the sensitivities involved in his visiting Cuba. This was Mr. Khrushchev's affair, but he wanted him to know of these sensitivities.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

360. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, August 22, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/24/63 Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Secret.

SUBJECT

Reply to Cuban Note on Overflights/1/

/1/For a summary and discussion of the note, see Documents 352 and 353.

We have for various reasons, including most recently a request of the Swiss Ambassador in Habana who is negotiating on Cuban efforts to take over our Embassy building, delayed replying to the Cuban note of June 24 on overflights. However, in order to keep the record clear, we feel a reply should now be made.

As you know, the Cubans have thus far taken no action to follow up on threats made in that note on overflights. Secretary Rusk feels that our reply should be non-polemical and not of a nature that would encourage the Cubans to feel it necessary to respond in strong verbal terms and possibly match their actions to their words.

The attached draft, upon which I would appreciate your comments, has therefore been drawn along these lines. In referring to the "publicly expressed position" of the USG in the attached note, we particularly have in mind Secretary Rusk's statements of March 12 and April 13, 1963,/2/ and, when handing the note to the Czechs, we would orally call these statements to the attention of the Czechs.

/2/Attached, but not printed.

U. Alexis Johnson

Enclosure/3/

/3/On August 26 Bundy sent Johnson a memorandum stating that he had shown the President the draft reply to the Cuban note. The President approved it. Bundy suggested when passing the note to the Czechoslovaks, the United States should call to their attention the public statements by the President on the importance of surveillance.

DRAFT

The Government of the United States has taken note of the statements contained in the note of the Government of Cuba of June 24, 1963, that Cuban gunners have orders to fire at any foreign war plane that makes low-altitude flights over Cuban territory; and that the Government of Cuba is stepping up its defense preparations in order to be ready to intercept and shoot down any war plane that violates Cuban air space at any altitude.

The Government of the United States wishes again to call the attention of the Government of Cuba to the well-known, publicly expressed position of the Government of the United States on this question. The position of the Government of the United States on this matter has not changed.

361. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, August 26, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Cuban Note Protesting Exile Raids

The Cubans will probably circulate a note in the UN/1/ today protesting one of three recent exile raids on Cuba; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. USUN recommends that, in view of the Department's press disclaimer last week,/2/ we wait for UN reaction before deciding whether or not to reply to the note.

Bill Bowdler tells me that it is standard procedure for the Cubans to circulate this sort of note in the UN; for example, they also circulated the note protesting US blocking controls. State agrees with USUN's decision to wait for UN reaction before deciding whether or not to reply to the note. If asked, State's public position is roughly "Beyond the reports of the Cuban Government, we have no knowledge of these events."

GC

/1/The Cuban Permanent Representative sent the note to the United Nations on August 20, where it was received on August 23. A copy was sent to the Department of State in airgram A-257, August 28. (Department of State, Central Files, CUBA-US)

/2/Apparently a reference to a press briefing of diplomatic correspondents at the Department of State.

362. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, August 26, 1963.

[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

363. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 10, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II. Top Secret. Drafted by Thompson. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rusk.

SUBJECT

United States Actions in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

Ambassador Dobrynin said he had a personal message for the President, and he considered it so confidential, that he had not had it typed but would read from his handwritten notes.

He said that the Soviet Government considered that things had recently taken a turn for the better in the international situation and in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. With the signing of the Test Ban Treaty and the exchange of views with Secretary Rusk, there had developed a relaxation of tension and the prerequisite for the settlement of other questions had been established. This could lead to a real turning point, and the end of the cold war. The Soviet Union took satisfaction from the willingness of the United States to look for the solution of other international problems. If both countries were determined to accomplish this, it was important that nothing be done contrary to this intention. The Soviets wished to tell the President, frankly, what was of concern to them. There were certain facts which did not fit in with the situation and these were the provocative actions against Cuba, which had increased in recent weeks. Unknown planes had shelled industrial establishments and there had been landings of saboteurs on the Cuban coast. These actions had been intensified after the conclusion of the nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It had been stated that the United States had nothing to do with these actions, but no one could believe this. When the United States took a position against the attacks on Soviet ships in Cuban waters, these attacks had stopped. This action had been understood by the Soviet Union as a measure showing the good intentions of the United States. How then could these recent actions be interpreted? If such attacks continued--and they could only be taken from the United States proper or from countries allied with the United States and with the knowledge and connivance of the United States--this could only lead to a new crisis.

The Soviet Union did not want a new crisis to emerge. Both sides had expressed their satisfaction over the elimination of the last crisis, which had been resolved after each side had undertaken certain commitments. The President had said that these commitments should be carried out. The Soviets agreed with this. They believed that for the future of our relations, it was important that effective measures be taken to stop the piratic attacks against Cuba. The Soviet Union had undertaken certain commitments in respect to the protection of the independence of Cuba which were aimed exclusively at preventing Cuba from becoming a victim of aggression, and the Soviet Union would certainly fulfill its commitments if aggression were unleashed against Cuba.

The Soviet Union hoped for understanding of the motives that prompted them to convey to the President, personally from N.S. Khrushchev, this assessment of the effect of the activation lately of provocative actions against Cuba.

364. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 10, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II. Top Secret. Drafted by Thompson. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rusk.

SUBJECT

United States Actions in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thomson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

On the occasion of his call on me today, Ambassador Dobrynin referred to the possibility of Mr. Khrushchev stopping in New York and the possibility that at that time there might be demonstrations against him or other unpleasant developments. He said he realized that I had mentioned this in a private way, and he had so informed his Government. He also referred to the fact that the President had told him how deeply the Cuban problem was felt in the United States. He said his Government understood that these remarks were prompted by good intentions. He said, however, that when one side expressed concern about speeches that had not yet been made, how should one regard speeches that were being made, particularly in connection with the Test Ban Treaty.

He said Mr. Khrushchev wished to convey to the President that he did not have in mind to speak on subjects that do not arise from the situation, but this depended not only on the Soviet Union, but on the United States. If provocations against Cuba continued, Mr. Khrushchev would be put in such a position that he would be compelled to react. The Soviet Union believed that if there were a real desire to improve relations, there is a wide field for action. If there is such a desire, it would have complete understanding and support on the part of the Soviet Union. It was expected that the United States Government and the President would adhere to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. In this case, it is only the Cubans, as the President himself had said, who should decide how Cubans are to lead their lives. If the principle of noninterference were violated in Cuba, a situation would arise where both the Soviet Union and the United States would be driven to extreme poles. It was the conviction of Mr. Khrushchev and the Soviet Union that we should make every effort to avoid such a development in the interests of our countries and of peace.

I asked Ambassador Dobrynin if his remarks about speeches meant that the Chairman had decided to speak at the General Assembly. Dobrynin said he had no information other than the fact that before leaving Moscow to return to the United States he had asked the Chairman what his plans were. The Chairman had said he would probably visit Cuba about the end of this year or the first of next year, and that then might stop over in New York. Dobrynin said he understood that U Thant had suggested to the Chairman that he visit the United Nations.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if it were true, as indicated in the paper this morning, that the President would address the General Assembly. I said this had not yet been decided and probably would not be before the end of the week. I said that we would let him know and added that it was my understanding that if the President did speak, he would probably remain in New York only one day.

365. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, September 12, 1963.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Exile Raids From Outside Areas--Pros, Cons, and Public Position

I understand that the President may be interested in stopping free-lance exile raids which originate from outside the U.S., as well as those which originate from the U.S. I find the case for stopping raids from the U.S. vaguely convincing because the possibility of Russian reaction to our direct involvement is greater. However, I find less convincing the case for trying to stop raids which originate from outside the U.S. Here are a few thoughts I jotted down, admittedly in a hurry, this morning; anyway, you might find them useful for the press conference./1/

/1/Reference is to the press conference of September 12, at which questions were asked about Cuba in general, but none specifically about exile raids. For a transcript of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 672-679.

Arguments in Favor of Trying to Stop Raids Originating from Outside the U.S.

1. They might provoke a Russian reaction.

2. They don't hurt Castro much.

3. They are haphazard and kill innocents. Inter alia, this might mean a bad press in some friendly countries.

4. They might provoke the Cubans to extreme retaliatory meas-ures.

5. They increase Cuban alertness, [1 line of source text not declassified].

Arguments Against Trying to Stop Raids Originating from Outside the U.S.

1. The exile action program seems to be gaining momentum. Pretty soon, as they become more expert, they may start to hit something worthwhile.

2. There is a fair chance that these raids hurt Castro more than we think; he seems to be screaming louder than necessary if the raids don't hurt him at all. At the least, intelligence reports indicate that the raids cause a considerable amount of activity in the Cuban armed forces--and this is undoubtedly not inexpensive. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. The raids may cause more psychological damage than we now think. I keep thinking of my own reaction (and I am a red-blooded American) if I were working in a sugar mill and the mill down the road were attacked. The fact that it was a Piper Cub which dropped two bombs, 100 yards wide of the mark, wouldn't be terribly reassuring to me. Inter alia, absenteeism in Cuba, which is already a serious problem, conceivably could be made more serious.

4. If our opposition to the raids becomes known we run into a number of problems. First, exile reaction. Second, reaction of activists in Latin America; among other things, we may get another cooling-down period in which it will be very tough to get cooperation in our isolation policy. Third, reaction of the hard-noses in the U.S. (e.g. "the Administration won't even let others try to solve the Cuban problem"). Fourth, Cuban and Soviet reaction. If our opposition is known and we are successful in stopping the raids (and I think we could be successful if we really set our mind to it), substance will be lent to the Soviet/Cuban belief that we can control all the activities in the Caribbean. [1 line of source text not declassified] The Soviets and the Cubans will certainly raise the noise-level when some U.S. sponsored attacks really hurt them and when the history of such operations clearly indicates that we control them. Fifth, we can probably expect Castro to crow as he did last spring. "The U.S. has capitulated on one of my 5 points."

I personally think we should be very careful about the way we handle this problem. As it stands now, we should seriously consider the desirability of taking the public position (1) that we have already made our position clear with respect to attacks originating from the U.S., (2) that we intend to enforce this policy, (3) that while we sometimes doubt the effectiveness of attacks originating in third countries, we are obviously not in a position to control them; these are sovereign nations which determine their own foreign policy.

I am a complete non-expert in Russian policy but feel that we may want to take the following line with them, when and if pressed; (1) that we have made our policy clear with regard to raids from within the U.S. and (2) that we have no control over raids originating from areas outside of the U.S. In this regard we might note that the Russians seem to have no control over Communists in Laos, Vietnam, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, etc. These people, like the anti-Castro forces, seem intent on overturning established governments.

GC

366. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 13, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR Files, 1963. Secret. Drafted by Thompson.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

I made the oral statement which is attached hereto. The Ambassador said he wished to ask how he should translate the sentence reading "The United States could, of course, consult with any government in this Hemisphere from whose territory we have information that flights were originating against Cuba . . . ." He asked if this meant that we knew where these flights were coming from. I replied that we probably had some suspicions. I did not think the information was specific, and asked him to add the word "indicating" after the word "information."

The Ambassador said he hoped that Mr. Khrushchev's motives in raising this question were understood. He said that the Chairman believed it was to our mutual interest to reduce tension in the Caribbean and to avoid a crisis over the Cuban problem.

I said I was sure that the President did understand, and thought that our position was clear from the statement which I had just made to him.

Attachment

ORAL STATEMENT

The President wished Mr. Khrushchev to know that he shares his view that the signing of the Test Ban Treaty and the recent exchange of views with the Soviet Government is encouraging, and he hopes it will be possible to proceed to the solution of other problems. The President is hopeful that the Test Ban Treaty will be approved by the United States Senate in the course of next week.

With respect to the Cuban situation, the President also agrees that the emergence of a new crisis would be in the interest neither of the Soviet Union nor of the United States, and can assure him that the United States will faithfully carry out its commitments.

With respect to any air attacks on Cuba, it can be stated categorically that not only was the United States not involved in any way in such attacks, but has been making every effort to prevent them. It is possible, but not likely, that a light private aircraft could take off from one of the large number of private fields in the southeastern portion of the United States. No such illegal flights have been detected by the means available to us. The President has directed, however, that the measures already taken be reviewed to see what further steps could be taken.

In keeping with the March 30, 1963 declaration by the Departments of State and Justice concerning hit and run attacks by Cuban exile groups against targets in Cuba, the law enforcement agencies are taking vigorous measures to assure that the pertinent laws of the United States are observed.

Apparently it is assumed that the United States exercises control over the policies and actions of the other sovereign, independent states of this Hemisphere. This assumption betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between the United States and the other American Republics. The history of inter-American relations makes abundantly clear that the American Governments will not tolerate interference with their foreign or domestic affairs. The states of this Hemisphere jealously defend the principle of juridical equality of states and reject any insinuation that difference of size and power in any way modifies this fundamental rule governing their relations.

The United States could, of course, consult with any government in this Hemisphere from whose territory we have information indicating that flights were originating against Cuba, but, in all candor, we must point out that such consultation would be greatly complicated by the increasing sense of outrage among the governments of this Hemisphere about Cuba's deliberate stimulation and support of subversive activities throughout the Hemisphere in direct violation of international norms. This is not simply a matter of speeches or words by Castro, as has sometimes been indicated. Clear evidence of Cuban involvement in this form of aggression is to be found in the fact that:

a) The Cuban Government is recruiting Latin Americans, sending them to Cuba for training in guerrilla tactics and returning them to their countries to engage in terroristic activities. A case in point are the Cuban-trained Peruvians captured on May 14 and 15, 1963, at Puerto Maldonado as they attempted clandestinely to enter Peru from Bolivia.

b) The Cuban Government is furnishing funds to revolutionary groups seeking the overthrow of governments by force and violence. By way of illustration, in May 1963, two leading members of the Ecuadorean Communist Party, Jose Maria Roura and Alejandro Roman were seized as they were returning to Ecuador. They were carrying over $30,000 which they confessed had been given them by Chinese and Cuban sources.

c) The Cuban leaders continue to exhort revolutionaries in Latin American countries to resort to sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla action. Premier Castro returned to this theme in his July twenty-sixth address when he called on activists in Venezuela and other countries to "open the breach" and begin fighting. Major Ernesto Guevara, in an article published in the September issue of Cuba Socialista, strongly advocates guerrilla warfare as the surest road to power in Latin America. Information available to us shows a direct connection between terroristic activities in Venezuela and the Castro regime. In addition to being guilty of such aggression against other American Republics by promoting these and other activities, the Cuban Government recently embarked on a most risky venture of direct violation of the territory and territorial waters of another country in this Hemisphere using units of its armed forces. On August 14, 1963, a Cuban helicopter and two patrol boats furnished by the Soviet Union forcibly removed from Cay Anguila, one of the islands of the Bahamas group, nineteen persons who had sought refuge on the island. This incident led to a vigorous protest by the British Government on August 21, 1963, requesting an apology and return of the persons taken prisoners.

In sum, it is not the United States, but the behavior of the Castro regime that is to blame for the difficulties in the Caribbean area.

367. Memorandum by William Attwood

Washington, September 18, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. No classification marking. Attwood was Ambassador to Guinea March 29, 1961-May 27, 1963. In August 1963, he joined the U.S. Mission to the United Nations as an adviser. McGeorge Bundy wrote the following note on this memorandum: "G[ordon] C[hase]. Speak to me on this. McG B."

This memorandum proposes a course of action which, if successful, could remove the Cuban issue from the 1964 campaign.

It does not propose offering Castro a "deal"--which could be more dangerous politically than doing nothing. It does propose a discreet inquiry into the possibility of neutralizing Cuba on our terms.

It is based on the assumption that, short of a change of regime, our principal political objectives in Cuba are:

a. The evacuation of all Soviet bloc military personnel.

b. An end to subversive activities by Cuba in Latin America.

c. Adoption by Cuba of a policy of non-alignment.

This memorandum is also based on the assumption that our present policy of isolating Cuba economically and politically will not overthrow the Castro regime in time to keep Cuba out of the 1964 campaign. So long as he receives Soviet aid and keeps his power base among the peasantry, his position seems secure.

It follows that the effect of our present policy is mainly negative:

a. It aggravates Castro's anti-Americanism and his desire to cause us trouble and embarrassment.

b. In the eyes of a world largely made up of small countries, it freezes us in the unattractive posture of a big country trying to bully a small country.

Since we do not intend to overthrow the Castro regime by military force, is there anything else we can do which might advance U.S. interests without risking charges of appeasement?

According to neutral diplomats and others I have talked to at the U.N. and in Guinea, there is reason to believe that Castro is unhappy about his present dependence on the Soviet bloc; that he does not enjoy being in effect a satellite; that the trade embargo is hurting him--though not enough to endanger his position; and that he would like to establish some official contact with the U.S. and go to some length to obtain normalization of relations with us--even though this would not be welcomed by most of his hard-core Communist entourage, such as Che Guevara.

All of this may or may not be true. But it would seem that we have something to gain and nothing to lose by finding out whether in fact Castro does want to talk and what concessions he would be prepared to make.

The most propitious time and place to find out would be at the U.N. during the present General Assembly. Without appearing to take the initiative for a meeting, we could easily feel out the Cubans as follows:

a. As a former journalist who spent considerable time with Castro in 1959, I could arrange a casual meeting with the Cuban Delegate, Dr. Lechuga. This could be done socially through mutual acquaintances.

b. I would refer to my last talk with Castro, at which he stressed his desire to be friends with the U.S., and suggest that, as a journalist, I would be curious to know how he felt today. If Castro is ready to talk, this should provide sufficient reason for Lechuga to come back to me with an invitation.

It would be understood that I would be going as an individual but would of course report to the President before and after the visit.

My reasons for suggesting that I undertake this mission are threefold:

a. Although Castro did not like my final article in 1959, we got along well and I believe he remembers me as someone he could talk to frankly.

b. I have had considerable experience in the past seventeen years talking with Communist and neutralist leaders on both sides of the iron curtain.

c. I have enough rank to satisfy Castro that this would be a serious conversation. At the same time, I am not so well-known that my departure, arrival or return would be noticed.

Two other points are worth emphasizing:

a. Such a meeting would be purely exploratory. I would make no offers, promises or deals. I would simply sound him out as to whether he would be willing to take the three steps listed in paragraph three, and on what terms. I would report to the President and the decision to pursue negotiations or not could then be taken.

b. The risk that the press would get wind of this project is minimal. For their part, the Cubans would not want it known they had solicited a meeting. On our side, it is of course important that the fewest possible people know of it. But in any case we are on firm ground so long as the invitation comes from the Cubans, since we are always ready to listen to an offer that could advance U.S. interests.

For the moment, all I would like is the authority to make contact with Lechuga. We'll see what happens then.

William Attwood/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

368. Summary Record of the 14th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council

Washington, October 1, 1963, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 10/1/63. Secret.

Cuba

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald of CIA reviewed the situation in Cuba, emphasizing that a swing of the pendulum was taking place. Because things were becoming so bad for Castro momentarily, we should not overreact and conclude that the Cuban problem was on the way to being solved.

Several items were discussed:

1. The Defense Department agreed to review the feasibility of monitoring planes flying out of Cuba suspected of carrying arms to other Latin American countries.

2. Allied trade with Cuba--The Central Intelligence Agency will prepare a list of critical items [2 lines of source text not declassified]. The list will be sent to the Commerce Department, which will devise ways of preventing such items [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to Cuba, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

3. A proposed Presidential statement on Cuba, originally suggested by USIA but not yet been made, will be looked at again with a view to recommending to the President that he comment on the future Cuba in a forthcoming speech.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended sabotage actions--General Goodpaster asked whether the Agency had considered the two covert actions which the Joint Chiefs had suggested, i.e. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] dropping U.S. arms into Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald replied that CIA had never gotten the Joint Chiefs' suggestions. The Attorney General expressed some concern about whether suggested Cuban actions were being followed up. (It later developed that the Joint Chiefs' suggestions had been sent to the Defense representative on the Special Group who had chosen not to recommend these actions to the Special Group. Further consideration of the Joint Chiefs' recommendations will be undertaken by the Special Group.)

5. Sugar price program--It was agreed that this exercise had been completed and that there was nothing further to be done on this item.

6. Economic warfare group--Mr. FitzGerald urged the prompt establishment of a proposed economic warfare group which would coordinate all economic warfare measures taken against Cuba./1/

/1/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, October 1. Bundy noted that "the Department of Defense agreed to review the feasibility of monitoring planes flying out of Cuba suspected of carrying arms to other Latin American States;" that CIA and Commerce "will consider together how to block the movement of specific critical items [text not declassified] to Cuba;" and noted that the "proposed statement on the future of Cuba will be reviewed with a view to recommending that the President include it in a forthcoming speech." (Ibid.)

Brazil

A draft policy paper on Brazil was circulated to the group but not discussed. The Latin American Policy Committee is scheduled to deal with the paper on Thursday.

Bromley Smith/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

369. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 4, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. This memorandum, drafted by Judd and approved in the White House on October 15, was part 5 of 6 separate memoranda of conversation. The meeting was held at the White House. The full conversation lasted until 11:25 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

SUBJECT

Cuban Shipping

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary European Affairs

Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA

[Great Britain]

Lord Home, Foreign Secretary

Sir David Ormsby Gore, Ambassador to the U.S.

Oliver Wright, Foreign Office

The President showed Lord Home and the British Ambassador the latest figures on free world shipping in the Cuban trade./1/ British ships were in the lead followed by Greek ships. The number of Greek ships could be expected to decline drastically as a result of the Greek Decree recently issued. The President said the situation was embarrassing to us. He was constantly being asked why he didn't speak to our Allies, and why they did not cooperate with us. He asked Lord Home if the British Government could not do something about the situation.

/1/Apparently a list attached to Document 370.

Lord Home said that HMG would see what could be done. The trouble was that legislation would be needed. Also, a number of the ships were registered in Hong Kong and it was almost impossible to do anything with them. As a result of U.S. measures, the charter rates on ships on the Cuban trade had gone up, making the trade more attractive.

The President said that there must be some way that the British could get at this problem and Lord Home again said that he would see what could be done.

In passing, Lord Home mentioned that the UK was negotiating with Cuba for the sale of some buses.

370. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, October 8, 1963.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May through Dec. 1963. Secret.

SUBJECT

(U) Appraisal of Bloc and Free-World Shipping to Cuba, Soviet Forces Remaining in Cuba, and the State of Cuban Economy as Compared to a Year Ago

1. Forwarded for your information are copies of three appraisals prepared in response to an oral request from the Military Aide to the President./1/

/1/According to an attached covering sheet sent to Clifton, the oral request was made on October 4. The three attached appraisals were a review of shipping to Cuba over the past year, an estimate of Soviet personnel remaining in Cuba, and an estimate of economic conditions in Cuba as compared to last year. The appraisals are ibid.

2. The comparative assessment of Soviet Bloc and Free-World shipping points out that total shipping averaged 48.1 dry cargo and 19.2 tanker arrivals per month during the past year, as compared with an average of 90.6 dry cargo and 25.5 tanker arrivals during the first nine months of 1962. No significant decline in Soviet Bloc shipping is noted, attributable to the fact that in the preceding period Bloc ships were carrying large quantities of military materiel while during this year they have carried primarily foodstuff and industrial equipment in order to make up for the significant drop in Free-World shipping.

3. The assessment of the status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, prepared in collaboration with CIA, concludes that Soviet military personnel withdrawals are continuing and that total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be between 5,000 and 8,000--representing a reduction to date of at least two-thirds of the number originally estimated to be on the island during the crisis. Most of those remaining are advisors and technicians engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet weapons, in supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to the Cubans, and in operating the Soviet-controlled air defense system. No organized Soviet ground combat units remain in Cuba.

4. The appraisal of the economic situation cites a continuing decline in Cuban production--on the order of 5 to 7 per cent, with 20 per cent decline in sugar harvest (the main stay of Cuba's economy) and with living conditions continuing to deteriorate. So far, however, the continued economic decline has not adversely affected the Cuban military establishment.

Joseph F. Carroll

Lieutenant General, USAF

371. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 10, 1963, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko talks with President. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on October 21 and by S on October 16. The meeting was held at the White House. This memorandum was one of eleven covering a conversation that lasted until 6:10 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) For conversations on U.S.-Soviet relations in general as well as an accounting of the other memoranda of this conversation, see volume V.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President

The Secretary

Ambassador Thompson

Assistant Secretary Tyler

Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR

USSR

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov

Ambassador Dobrynin

Mr. Sukhodrev, Foreign Ministry

Mr. Gromyko recalled the President's remark about Soviet personnel in Cuba and said that, as Mr. Khrushchev had told Mr. Harriman, there were now no Soviet troops in Cuba. The Soviet personnel now in Cuba were specialists training the Cubans in the use of arms supplied by the USSR. When this limited task was accomplished these would be withdrawn. As to what had been done in Cuba so far, there was no need to repeat that now because the President was informed on this matter. The Soviet Government was acting in Cuba on the basis of the understanding the President and Mr. Khrushchev had reached in their correspondence.

The President asked how many Soviet military specialists would remain in Cuba in, say, six months.

Mr. Gromyko said that he was unable to answer this question. He preferred not to speak in terms of dates but he wished to ask the President to understand that the USSR had in Cuba only military specialists with a limited mission.

The President commented that it would be helpful if, when the specialists were completely withdrawn, Mr. Khrushchev were to consider making a statement to that effect.

Mr. Gromyko said he would inform Mr. Khrushchev about this. However he suggested that the President take into account the difficulty of mentioning specific dates. So if Mr. Khrushchev did not mention any dates, this did not mean that specialists would stay forever.

The President said this might be so, but perhaps Mr. Khrushchev could make such a statement to one of the visiting newsmen in terms of an accomplished fact.

Mr. Gromyko said that he did not think there was any need to remind the President that Cuba was being subjected to constant pressure and provocation on the part of some forces which engaged even in such things as sending planes with bombs. The President probably knew better than he, Gromyko, who those forces were. The Soviet Government was convinced that if the US Government and the President personally wished to stop these activities, they would cease immediately.

The President said we believed we had stopped harassment by planes and had given warning, although perhaps if someone was close enough he could still fly in and drop a bomb. In any event, he did not see any benefit to the US from harassment. This would not unseat Castro and serve no useful purpose.

Mr. Gromyko commented that those air raids must be originating somewhere. If they originated outside the US, they could be stopped too, because the USSR had a high opinion of US influence in Latin America.

The President said we were not sure that the planes came from Latin America. Of two recent flights over Cuba, one has perhaps come from Central America, and some plane may have come even from Florida. We tried to stop the planes, but there were many fields in Florida, light planes were used and it was very difficult to keep them under control.

The Secretary recalled his remarks to Mr. Gromyko about activities in the other direction, noting this made it more difficult for us to deal with this situation. He also observed that the Chinese may be involved in this matter.

Mr. Gromyko asserted that the USSR had no information about such activities. If the US regarded speeches by Castro or other Cuban leaders as subversive, then Soviet speeches about capitalism and US speeches about communism were also subversive. In any event, the USSR had no information about any subversive activities from Cuba.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Gromyko thought Cuba had said its last word regarding the signing of the Test Ban Treaty.

Mr. Gromyko said the US was familiar with the Cuban position on this matter. As he had told the Secretary earlier, the USSR believed that this question was under consideration by Cuba. Thus the USSR believed that the Cubans had not spoken their last word, although they did take the position that the policy of the US Government prevented them from signing. However, Mr. Gromyko noted that he could not speak for the Cubans.

The President commented that the Cubans might not like our policy; we did not like Cuban policy, but we wanted the Cubans to sign. He wondered whether the Cubans took this attitude because of China.

Mr. Gromyko said the USSR had no information which would confirm such a supposition. The USSR gave credence to the Cuban statement that it was the US policy which was the reason for their present stand.

372. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, October 21, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT

Accommodation with Castro

As you requested, I spoke to Ambassador Attwood in New York about the attached./1/ He gave the following information. (The conversation was necessarily vague and we didn't go into much detail.)

/1/Apparent reference to Document 367.

1. Adlai Stevenson had received approval for the approach.

2. Ambassador Attwood spoke to Lechuga. Lechuga expressed interest (he is a soft-liner) and suggested that someone from our side should go down to Cuba to talk with Castro. Attwood replied that the UN was a more appropriate talking place. Lechuga said he would convey the message to Havana.

3. Attwood concluded that the ball is in Cuban hands and the door is ajar. However, he is not hopeful. While Lechuga and Castro, himself, might be interested, he feels that Castro is too well boxed in by such hard-liners as Guevara to be able to maneuver much.

GC

373. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 5, 1963.

//Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, S.G. 104, November 14, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on November 6. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Gilpatric, and McCone.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group, 5 November 1963

PRESENT

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone

The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, Dr. Wheelon, and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 and 2. The Attorney General and Mr. Helms were present for Item 3

[Here follows discussion of items 1, a report of an unsuccessful sabotage operation of October 21-22 in Southeast Pinar, and item 2, a proposal for low-level sabotage to be carried out on the north coast and tentative approval of a sabotage operation in northern Oriente province and infiltration of a radio operator into Cuba.]

3. Cuba--Peace Feelers

Mr. Bundy stated that it has come to the attention of the White House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about some kind of "arrangement" with the U.S. To hear what Castro has to say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of some use to the U.S. Mr. Bundy suggested that for this initial talk Mr. William Attwood, currently on the staff of Mr. Stevenson at the United Nations, might be a likely candidate since Mr. Attwood has been in touch with Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Also, Attwood has a fairly friendly relationship with Castro based on previous acquaintance.

In the Group discussion which followed it was thought inadvisable to allow Mr. Attwood, while on the UN staff, to get in touch with Castro. The suggestion was made that he might be removed from his official UN status and then go to Cuba for the ostensible purpose of writing an article for Look magazine. In this way it might be learned how badly Castro might want a detente with the United States.

It was suggested by Mr. Helms that it might be profitable to "war game" this problem and look at it from all possible angles before making any contacts.

A further suggestion was made by Mr. Bundy that Dr. Rene Vallejo Ortiz, Castro's aide and personal physician, might be flown to Mexico with Castro's proposals and discuss them with the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City.

The Attorney General emphasized that as a prelude to all this the U.S. must require some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion in Latin America and removing the Soviet troops in Cuba before any serious discussion can take place about a detente.

Mr. McCone stated that it might be possible to use again Mr. James Donovan who is known to have excellent relationships with Dr. Vallejo. Vallejo might be flown to the UN for such talks or better still Donovan could go to Cuba.

It was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a firm decision at this time but to study the problem for several days and attack it again.

Paul Eckel/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Eckel signed the original.

374. Memorandum From William Attwood to Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff

New York, November 8, 1963.

//Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Secret.

Following is a chronology of events leading up to Castro's invitation on October 31, to receive a U.S. official for talks in Cuba:

Soon after joining the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on August 26, I met Seydou Diallo, the Guinea Ambassador to Havana, whom I had known well in Conakry. He went out of his way to tell me that Castro was isolated from contact with neutralist diplomats by his "Communist entourage" because it was known he was unhappy with Cuba's satellite status and looking for a way out. He, Diallo, had finally been able to see Castro alone once and was convinced he was personally receptive to changing courses and getting Cuba on the road to non-alignment. Diallo added that the exile raids were an obstacle since they strengthened the hand of the hard-liners both with Castro and the public.

In the first week of September, I also read ABC correspondent, Lisa Howard's article, "Castro's Overture",/1/ based on her conversation with Castro last April. This article stressed Castro's expressed desire for reaching an accommodation with the United States and his willingness to make substantial concessions to this end. On September 12, I talked with Miss Howard, whom I have known for some years, and she echoed Ambassador Diallo's opinion that there was a rift between Castro and the Guevara-Hart-Alveida group on the question of Cuba's future course.

/1/War/Peace Report, September, 1963, pp. 3-5.

On September 12, I discussed this with Under Secretary Harriman in Washington. He suggested I prepare a memo and we arranged to meet in New York the following week.

On September 18, I wrote a memorandum based on these talks and on corroborating information I had heard in Conakry./2/ In it I suggested that discreet contact might be established with the Cubans at the United Nations to find out whether Castro in fact wanted to talk, and on our terms. I showed this memo to Ambassador Stevenson, who felt the matter was worth exploring quietly and who indicated he might discuss it with the President.

/2/Document 367.

/3/See Document 372.

On September 19, I met Harriman in New York. After reading my memo, he suggested I also discuss it with the Attorney-General because of the political implications of the Cuban issue.

On September 20, I made an appointment with the Attorney-General in Washington. Meanwhile, Stevenson obtained the President's approval for me to make discreet contact with Dr. Lechuga, Cuba's chief delegate at the United Nations.

On September 23, I met Dr. Lechuga at Miss Howard's apartment. She has been on good terms with Lechuga since her visit with Castro and invited him for a drink to met some friends who had also been to Cuba. I was just one of those friends. In the course of our conversation, which started with recollections of my own talks with Castro in 1959, I mentioned having read Miss Howard's article. Lechuga hinted that Castro was indeed in a mood to talk, especially with someone he had met before. He thought there was a good chance that I might be invited to Cuba if I wished to resume our 1959 talk. I told him that in my present position, I would need official authorization to make such a trip, and did not know if it would be forthcoming. However, I said an exchange of views might well be useful and that I would find out and let him know.

On September 24, I saw the Attorney-General in Washington, gave him my September 18 memo, and reported my meeting with Lechuga. He said he would pass the memo on to Mr. McGeorge Bundy; meanwhile, he thought that it would be difficult for me to visit Cuba without it being known and risking the accusation that we were trying to make a deal with Castro. He wondered if it might be possible to meet Castro--if that's what he wanted--in another country, such as Mexico, or at the United Nations. Meanwhile, he agreed it would be useful to maintain contact with Lechuga. I said I would so inform Lechuga and wait to hear from him or Bundy.

Back in New York, I informed Stevenson of my talk with Lechuga and the Attorney-General.

On September 27, I ran into Lechuga at the United Nations, where he was doing a television interview in the lobby with Miss Howard. I told him that I had discussed our talk in Washington, and that it was felt that my accepting an invitation to go to Cuba would be difficult under present circumstances, especially in view of my official status. I added, however, that if Castro or a personal emissary had something to tell us, we were prepared to meet him and listen wherever else would be conven-ient. Lechuga said he would so inform Havana. Meanwhile, he forewarned me that he would be making a "hard" anti-U.S. speech in the United Nations on October 7. I remarked that it wouldn't help reduce tensions; he replied he couldn't help making it because of the "blockade."

On October 7, in his reply to Lechuga's tough speech, Stevenson suggested that if Castro wanted peace with his neighbors, he need only do three things--stop being a Soviet stooge, stop trying to subvert other nations, and start carrying out the promises of his revolution regarding constitutional rights.

On October 18, at dinner at the home of Mrs. Eugene Meyer, I talked with Mr. C.A. Doxiades, a noted Greek architect and town-planner, who had just returned from an architects' congress in Havana, where he had talked alone to both Castro and Guevara, among others. He sought me out, as a government official, to say he was convinced Castro would welcome a normalization of relations with the United States if he could do so without losing too much face. He also said that Guevara and the other communists were opposed to any deal, and regarded Castro as dangerously unreliable; and that they would get rid of Castro if they thought they could carry on without him and retain his popular support.

On October 20, Miss Howard asked me if she might call Major Rene Vallejo, a Cuban surgeon who is also Castro's current right-hand man and confidant. She said Vallejo helped her see Castro and made it plain to her he opposed the Guevara group. They became friends and have talked on the phone several times since the interview. Miss Howard's purpose in calling him now was that she thought any message from Lechuga would not get past the foreign office, and she wanted to make certain, through Vallejo, that Castro knew there was a U.S. official available if he wanted to talk. I told her to go ahead, so long as she referred to my talk with Lechuga and made it quite plain we were not soliciting a meeting but only expressing our willingness to listen to anything they had to say. She then called Vallejo at his home. He was out and she left word for him to call her back.

On October 21, Gordon Chase called me from the White House in connection with my September 18 memo. I brought him up to date and said the ball was in their court.

On October 23, Vallejo called Miss Howard at her New York apartment. She was out of town; he left word with the maid that he would call again.

On October 28, I ran into Lechuga in the U.N. Delegates Lounge. He told me that Havana did not think sending someone to the United Nations for talks would be "useful at this time." But he hoped he and I might have some informal chats from time to time. I said it was up to him and he could call me if he felt like it. He wrote down my extension.

On October 29, Vallejo again called Miss Howard at home. He assured her, in response to her question, that Castro still felt as he did in April about improving relations with us. As to his going to the United Nations or elsewhere for such a talk, Vallejo said it was impossible for Castro to leave the country at the present time. But he said he would relay her message to Castro (that there was now a U.S. official authorized to listen to him), and would call her back soon.

On October 31, Vallejo called Miss Howard, apologizing for the delay and saying he had been out of town with Castro and "could not get to a phone from which I could call you." He said Castro would very much like to talk to the U.S. official anytime and appreciated the importance of discretion to all concerned. Castro would therefore be willing to send a plane to Mexico to pick up the official and fly him to a private airport near Veradero where Castro would talk to him alone. The plane would fly him back immediately after the talk. In this way there would be no risk of identification at Havana airport. Miss Howard said she doubted if a U.S. official could come to Cuba but perhaps he, Vallejo, could come and see the official at the U.N. or in Mexico, as Castro's personal spokesman. Vallejo replied that Castro wanted to do the talking himself but did not completely rule out this situation if there was no other way of engaging a dialogue. It was agreed Miss Howard would relay the invitation to me and call Vallejo back as soon as possible with our reply. At this point she identified me as the U.S. official. Vallejo asked for the spelling, and recalled having met me in 1959 (I do not remember him). Miss Howard got the impression that Lechuga's previous message to Havana had not reached Vallejo or Castro.

On November 1, Miss Howard reported the Vallejo call to me and I repeated it to Chase on November 4.

On November 5, I met with Bundy and Chase at the White House and informed them of the foregoing. The next day, Chase called and asked me to put it in writing.

375. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 12, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-30 November 1963. Secret. Drafted by McCone. A draft copy was sent to Helms.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Policy Relating to Cuba--10:30 a.m.--12 Nov 63

IN ATTENDANCE

The President, Secty. McNamara, Secty. Rusk, Secty. Gilpatric, Attorney General, Secty. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Secty. Johnson, Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Shackley

McCone opened the meeting with a brief resume of conditions in Cuba along these lines:

1. Cuba still belongs to Castro though his grip is weakening.

2. The military remain essentially loyal to Castro with some evidences of dissension and dissidents which are being exploited by CIA.

3. The internal security forces and apparatus are effective and show evidence of increasing efficiency.

4. The economy is bad and is deteriorating, causing increasing hardships to the civilian population. This is due to economic sanctions and Flora.

5. The Soviets are continuing a gradual withdrawal. No organized Soviet units appear in Cuba although they apparently provide principal manning for the SAMs. There are recent evidences of considerable rotation with between 1,000 and 2,000 new arrivals, but in balance there is a decrease.

6. Training of Cubans continues on all Soviet equipment including the SAMs. It is not clear whether the SAMs will be turned over to full Cuban control; however it is clear the Cubans will supply the majority of the operating personnel.

7. The only equipment which has been withdrawn has been the advanced C-band radar for the SAMs and certain communication equipment. No military equipment has been withdrawn. There have been some recent new arrivals of military equipment, particularly between 25 and 50 tanks.

McCone then stated that the program which had been followed for the last several months, having been approved about the first of June, was integrated and interdependent one part on the other and therefore should be considered as a comprehensive program and not a number of independent actions.

FitzGerald then made a presentation./1/

/1/FitzGerald's presentation was on the six-point integrated program against Cuba that included covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions to stimulate low-level sabotage and passive resistance, economic denial actions, exploitation of disaffection with the Cuban military and power centers, general sabotage and harassment, and support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. FitzGerald's presentation is described in detail in a memorandum for the record of this meeting by Bruce B. Cheever, November 14. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

With respect to sabotage, McCone stated that no one event will particularly affect the economy. However a continuous program will have its effects on the economy and it will encourage internal sabotage by dissident people within Cuba. There have been 109 events since April which were probably internally-inspired sabotage.

The President then raised the question of the sabotage program; whether it was worthwhile and whether it would accomplish our purpose.

Secretary Rusk then spoke at considerable length, the thrust of his remarks being opposed to sabotage. He stated we should concentrate on obtaining information as to what Castro is doing with respect to other countries, particularly sending arms to Latin American countries. Rusk said we must replace Castro; we must accomplish a reduction in Soviet troops, however sabotage might result in an increase in troops. Rusk had no problem with infiltration of black teams; furthermore internal sabotage gave him no problem and the more of this, the better. In addition he strongly supported our economic efforts. However he opposed the hit-and-run sabotage tactics as being unproductive, complicating our relationships with the Soviets and also with our friends and indicated a connection between our sabotage activities and the autobahn problem.

McCone observed that infiltration was difficult, internal sabotage was extremely difficult to stimulate but that external hit-and-run sabotage had the effect of automatically stimulating internal sabotage.

McNamara could see no connection between the Cuban operations and the Berlin autobahn incidents. He saw many advantages to going ahead which he advocated but ordered a careful watch.

The President asked questions concerning the immediate operations, and the next one on the schedule was approved.

FitzGerald explained the independent operations of the Artime group. McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking.

[end of document]

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