The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

51. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, October 23, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 291-292.

SUBJECT

Executive Committee Meeting on 23 October 1962 6:00 p.m. All members present plus Counsel for Defense Department

1. Committee reviewed the blockade proclamation and approved it. It was signed by the President at 6:00 p.m.

2. The President instructed McNamara to review all details of instructions to the Fleet Commanders regarding procedures to be followed in the blockade. There was an extended discussion of actions to be taken under various assumed Soviet resistance activities such as (a) failing to stop, (b) refusing right to board, (c) ships turning around, heading in another direction, etc.

3. Discussion of the effect on U.S. industry by chartering and preempting the use of 20 or 30 American ships. Gilpatric reported that this would have little or no effect on the American economy. McCone questioned these findings; however Gilpatric said that this had been thoroughly studied and McCone's concerns as expressed at the morning meeting were unfounded. The Attorney General stated that it was within the law to use foreign bottoms, however decision was made to preempt U.S. bottoms and not worry about the consequences because they would not be serious.

4. The President urged that Norstad be retained at SHAPE during the period of crisis, perhaps until 1 February 63. He indicated Lemnitzer might be used as CINCEUR with Norstad remaining as SACEUR. Bundy stated that this is complicated as the two posts are so co-mingled that they really must be held by one man. Taylor raised question that if this was done it would hurt Lemnitzer's prestige. The President said that he felt that Norstad was so experienced and so capable and his judgment so sound, as evidenced by today's cable,/1/ copy of which I have not seen, that he would take the risk of NATO country criticisms, he did not think that Lemnitzer would be hurt, and he wished Norstad to remain. Defense to take under advisement and report within 24 hours.

/1/Not further identified.

5. In the prolonged discussion of report on Civil Defense problems, the President seemed particularly concerned over the situation if we should launch attacks which might result in four or five missiles being delivered on the United States. DOD spokesmen stated that the area covered by the 1100-mile missiles involved 92 million people. They felt that fall-out space was available though not equipped for about 40 million. The President asked what emergency steps could be taken. Replied that many arrangements could be made without too much publicity, such as repositioning food, actually obtaining space, putting up shelter signs, etc. I got the conclusion that not very much could or would be done; that whatever was done would involve a great deal of publicity and public alarm.

Prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara at approximately 7:00 o'clock, McCone (who had not been called upon for an intelligence appraisal) stated to the President that he felt certain intelligence should be reported to the meeting prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara as some items observed by the Intelligence Community might prove of great significance.

[1 paragraph (17-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

John A. McCone/2/

Director

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, October 23, 1962, 6:51 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Confidential; Niact; Eyes Only.

985. You should deliver following letter addressed by the President to Chairman Khrushchev immediately. This replaces message contained Deptel 982./1/

/1/Not printed. (Ibid.: Lot 66 D 204)

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October twenty-third./2/ I think you will recognize that the steps which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is.

/2/See Document 48.

I hope that you will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the quarantine, the basis of which was established by the vote of the Organization of American States this afternoon, and which will go into effect at 1400 hours Greenwich time October twenty-four.

Sincerely, JFK"

Rusk

53. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President Kennedy

Washington, October 24, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba, Security. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Rusk.

I met with Ambassador Dobrynin last evening on the third floor of the Russian Embassy and as you suggested made the following points:/1/

/1/The meeting took place at 9:30 p.m., October 23.

I told him first that I was there on my own and not on the instructions of the President. I said that I wanted to give him some background on the decision of the United States Government and wanted him to know that the duplicity of the Russians had been a major contributing factor. When I had met with him some six weeks before, I said, he had told me that the Russians had not placed any long-range missiles in Cuba and had no intention to do so in the future. He interrupted at that point and confirmed this statement and said he specifically told me they would not put missiles in Cuba which would be able to reach the continental United States.

I said based on that statement which I had related to the President plus independent intelligence information at that time, the President had gone to the American people and assured them that the weapons being furnished by the Communists to Cuba were defensive and that it was not necessary for the United States to blockade or take any military action. I pointed out that this assurance of Dobrynin to me had been confirmed by the TASS statement and then finally, in substance, by Gromyko when he visited the President on Thursday./2/ I said that based on these assurances the President had taken a different and far less belligerent position than people like Senators Keating and Capehart, and he had assured the American people that there was nothing to be concerned about.

/2/October 18; see Document 29.

I pointed out, in addition, that the President felt he had a very helpful personal relationship with Mr. Khrushchev. Obviously, they did not agree on many issues, but he did feel that there was a mutual trust and confidence between them on which he could rely. As an example of this statement I related the time that Mr. Khrushchev requested the President to withdraw the troops from Thailand and that step was taken within 24 hours.

I said that with the background of this relationship, plus the specific assurances that had been given to us, and then the statement of Dobrynin from Khrushchev to Ted Sorensen and to me that no incident would occur before the American elections were completed, we felt the action by Khrushchev and the Russians at this time was hypocritical, misleading and false. I said this should be clearly understood by them as it was by us.

Dobrynin's only answer was that he had told me no missiles were in Cuba but that Khrushchev had also given similar assurances through TASS and as far as he (Dobrynin) knew, there were still no missiles in Cuba.

Dobrynin in the course of the conversation made several other points. The one he stressed was why the President did not tell Gromyko the facts on Thursday. He said this was something they could not understand and that if we had the information at the time why didn't we tell Gromyko.

I answered this by making two points:

Number one, there wasn't anything the President could tell Gromyko that Gromyko didn't know already and after all, why didn't Gromyko tell the President this instead of, in fact, denying it. I said in addition the President was so shocked at Gromyko's presentation and his failure to recite these facts that he felt that any effort to have an intelligent and honest conversation would not be profitable.

Dobrynin went on to say that from his conversations with Gromyko he doesn't believe Gromyko thought there were any missiles in Cuba. He said he was going to contact his government to find out about this matter.

I expressed surprise that after all that had appeared in the papers, and the President's speech, that he had not had a communication on that question already.

Dobrynin seemed extremely concerned. When I left I asked him if ships were going to go through to Cuba. He replied that was their instructions last month and he assumed they had the same instructions at the present time. He also made the point that although we might have pictures, all we really knew about were the sites and not missiles and that there was a lot of difference between sites and the actual missile itself. I said I did not have to argue the point--there were missiles in Cuba--we knew that they were there and that I hoped he would inform himself also.

I left around 10:15 p.m. and went to the White House and gave a verbal report to the President.

54. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, October 23, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

SUBJECT

Soviet Challenge to the Quarantine/1/

/1/Another memorandum from Smith to McCone, October 23, estimating the effect on Cuba of a blockade covering all goods except food and medicines is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62-11/12/62)

1. Our best guess is that:

a. A challenge at sea to the quarantine is unlikely, at least for a day or two.

b. Thereafter a challenge is likely if the Soviets believe that their political efforts are not succeeding and a heightening of the crisis is required.

c. In staging any challenge, they would probably employ a vessel with nonmilitary cargo, refuse boarding, and exploit the subsequent attack by the US.

d. Retaliatory actions would follow if the incident itself failed to produce quick political results. It would be aimed either at a US ship elsewhere or at access to Berlin; we think the latter somewhat more likely.

2. Today's TASS statement suggests that the Soviets wish to retain full freedom of action while they consider their initial moves. There is some intelligence, dating from before the President's speech, indicating that the Soviets had decided to run any US blockade which might be established. Nevertheless, we think it likely that, at least for a day or two, they will avoid a challenge at sea while they observe the results of their political efforts to get the quarantine lifted.

3. If the USSR feels that these efforts are succeeding, the Soviets will probably continue to avoid challenges, lest an incident interrupt this favorable trend. On the other hand, if Soviet political tactics are bearing little fruit, they may judge that an incident would be useful as a means of heightening the crisis further and bringing extra international pressure on the US.

4. If and when they decide to permit an incident of this sort, the Soviets would not allow the US to board a vessel, since this would mean acceptance in principle of quarantine. Instead, their tactics would probably be to choose a ship carrying a nonmilitary cargo and to allow it to be attacked.

5. It is possible that the Soviets, in deciding to test the quarantine, would accompany their probe ship with a submarine which would counterattack the US vessel after the Soviet ship was struck. Or the counterattack might be made by an aircraft from Cuba. We think this unlikely, however, because the Soviets would almost certainly estimate that the US would respond by tightening the blockade and launching a full-scale effort to seek out and destroy a Soviet submarine in the area of quarantine operations.

6. After an incident, the Soviets would probably allow a pause while they exploited this incident and observed its effects. Unless the US showed signs of quickly yielding, however, we believe that they would then follow with some form of retaliation.

7. We do not believe that this would take the form of major military action. Instead, the Soviets would choose between an attack on a US ship elsewhere or a move on the access routes to Berlin, designed to remind the US of the vulnerability of its position there. In most circumstances, they probably would regard a Berlin move as both more effective and easier to control. Still, they would probably exercise care to avoid giving the impression that they were moving toward a general showdown with the US.

8. The USSR might use a submarine, however, to deliver through the quarantine some particularly critical item and to demonstrate, with a subsequent announcement, its ability to frustrate US efforts.

For the Board of National Estimates:

Abbot Smith

55. Record of Action of the Third Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 24, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. For Robert Kennedy's recollections of the meeting, see Thirteen Days, pp. 67-71.

1. Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence summarized the intelligence briefing. The President directed that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Central Intelligence take immediate action to obtain more "black boxes."

2. Defense Operations

a. The Secretary of Defense presented photographs of dispersal of existing U.S. planes in the southeast U.S., and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that modifications of readiness were being considered to permit improvement of the situation.

b. The Secretary of Defense reported the plans for naval interception, noted the presence of a submarine near the more interesting ships, and warned that radio silence might be imposed. There was discussion of the problem of dealing with such submarines, and it was understood that in the event of intervention by a submarine in the process of interception the submarine might have to be destroyed.

3. In the middle of the meeting there were reports that certain Soviet ships had appeared to have stopped or turned back, and the President directed that there be no interception of any target for at least another hour while clarifying information was sought.

4. Dr. Wiesner presented an initial briefing on the communications situation and the President directed that most urgent action be taken by State, Defense and CIA to improve communications worldwide, but particularly in the Caribbean area. After the meeting, the President, in discussion with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, directed that special responsibilities should be assigned to designated individuals and a plan for this purpose will be presented for approval by State, Defense and White House officers at the next meeting of the Committee.

5. The President directed that State and USIA should give immediate attention to increasing understanding in Europe of the fact that any Berlin crisis would be fundamentally the result of Soviet ambition and pressure, and that inaction by the United States in the face of the challenge in Cuba would have been more and not less dangerous for Berlin.

6. The President directed that a senior representative of USIA should regularly be present at meetings of the Executive Committee./1/

McGeorge Bundy

/1/Following this meeting, the Nitze (Berlin-NATO) Subcommittee met at 11 a.m. to consider various aspects of the Cuban crisis that might affect Berlin. For a record of this meeting, see vol. XV, pp. 395-397.

56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:24 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2462. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Ball, cleared with Tyler and NEA, approved by Rusk. Also sent to Paris for USRO.

445. For Ambassadors Hare and Finletter from Secretary. Soviet reaction Cuban quarantine likely involve efforts compare missiles in Cuba with Jupiters in Turkey. While such comparison refutable, possible that negotiated solution for removal Cuban offensive threat may involve dismantling and removal Jupiters. Recognize this would create serious politico-military problems for US-Turkish relations and with regard to Turkey's place in NATO Alliance. Therefore need prepare carefully for such contingency order not harm our relations with this important ally.

Urgently request Ambassador Hare's assessment political consequences such removal under various assumptions, including outright removal, removal accompanied by stationing of Polaris submarine in area, or removal with some other significant military offset, such as seaborn multilateral nuclear force within NATO.

Ambassador Finletter also requested comment standpoint NATO aspect problem. Do not discuss with any foreigners./1/

Rusk

/1/At 2:19 p.m. on October 24 the Department of State sent a similar telegram to Rome. (Telegram 865 to Rome; ibid.)

57. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to President Kennedy

Washington, October 24, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, WWRostow. Top Secret; Sensitive.

Representatives of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and Mr. Lovett, met to consider the course of action to be followed with respect to the Soviet vessels which have altered course (Group A), and those vessels still proceeding towards Cuba (Group B). With respect to Group A, it is recommended:

1. That the Department of Defense intercept, trail, and photograph, but not interfere with, such vessels. The object is to record the fact of their turnaround and, to the extent possible, the character of their cargo.

With respect to Group B, it is recommended that:

1. They be stopped and searched in accordance with the Proclamation;

2. That the order to search be determined by the order of their operational availability to our forces;

3. Should a vessel refuse to comply with orders to stop, we should proceed to execute the terms of the Proclamation with special attention to the minimum use of force, given the likelihood that their cargoes will prove innocent.

It is recommended that a Department of Defense spokesman announce that:

1. Some of the Bloc vessels proceeding towards Cuba appear to have altered course;

2. No intercepts have yet been necessary;

3. Other vessels are proceeding towards Cuba and will be intercepted in accordance with the Proclamation.

On a background basis, it will be explained that those vessels which altered course were those we had reason to believe contained offensive weapons; but that inspection of other vessels is required, now and in the future, until offensive weapons and installations are removed from Cuba, because such vessels could contain essential components for offensive weapons.

W. W. R./1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

58. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, October 24, 1962, 3:25 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking appears on the source text.

Bundy--Have you got the word in on what is happening at sea?

Ball--No.

Bundy--The six most interesting ships have turned back. Two others are turning on. We are starting over here a thinking session as to what might be done which will be going on all afternoon. If you want to come, it would be helpful to have you. Walt is here. If there is anyone you want to send, send him. I have told the Secretary and you are the only two I have told. Will you alert anyone else you wish to alert?

Ball--I will. The other ships are going forward?

Bundy--Two tankers are coming on, but six interesting ships have turned back; six may not be a precise figure. Khrushchev told Lord Russell he thought it would be useful to have a top level meeting.

Ball--I'll be over.

59. Editorial Note

On October 24, 1962, Acting Secretary-General U Thant sent identical messages to President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev appealing to them to refrain from "any action which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war." He requested that each side take some time "to enable the parties concerned to get together with a view to resolving the present crisis peacefully and normalizing the situation in the Caribbean." (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 422) Also printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1962, page 740.

On October 25 President Kennedy responded to the Secretary-General reiterating U.S. statements made in the Security Council and assuring U Thant of his desire to reach a satisfactory solution of the crisis. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 424) Chairman Khrushchev also wrote to U Thant on October 25 welcoming and agreeing with the Acting Secretary-General's initiative. (Ibid., page 425)

U Thant responded to Chairman Khrushchev the same day requesting that Soviet ships en route to Cuba avoid the interception area imposed by the U.S. quarantine in order to allow time for discussion of an agreement under the U.N. Charter. In a letter to President Kennedy, also on October 25, U Thant appealed to him to issue instructions to U.S. ships in the Caribbean to "do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident" and expressed the hope that a settlement could be reached quickly. (Both ibid., pages 425-426)

60. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, October 24, 1962, 8:25 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking. A similar but briefer memorandum of a telephone conversation between Bundy and Ball at 8:05 p.m. is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba)

Bundy--I am getting a little groggy, so many people have different views, but the current situation is this. Bob thinks that it may well be important to intercept a tanker and to turn him back. His own understanding was that that was his orders. I understand that there are complications. He is going to go down to Flag Plot and look hard and find out what he knows and what anyone knows about where these things will be. He agrees that we must not do this at night time. Therefore, the question is really what orders Admiral Innison (?) [Dennison] has for dawn, that they require Presidential action and a meeting of the Committee tonight. You had better argue with your Secretary.

Ball--Yes. Right.

Bundy--I understand that he is an anti-tanker interceptor. I think we have to leave the question of further discussion in suspense until McNamara has reviewed it and come in and said. If he comes in and says let's let it go until the meeting tomorrow morning, which we might as well have at 10 as at 8, because we miss dawn in either case. If he comes in and says that, does the Department wish to say no, no, we want orders for interception at dawn?

Ball--I don't think that we feel that strongly about that. My position is that since we are not singling out any special ships, then we ought to just take anything that comes on a completely nondiscriminatory basis, and not indulge any presumptions about what any particular kind of vessel might--

Bundy--I think that you will find that to do that requires a very distinct adjustment in the basic orders to the Navy. They are not operating on the basis of enforcing a blockade in that sense. They are enforcing a blockade with instructions from McNamara as to which ship to enforce it upon.

Ball--Adm. Ricker [Rickover?] felt that that was the easiest operational kind of--

Bundy--All I'm saying is is that means different orders from what they now have.

Ball--My own view, you may pick out certain ships as we were preparing to do, those ships are not now in the equation; therefore, the thing to do is to take anything that comes and I would feel happier if the first ship that came along was a Belgian or Moroccoan ship, so that we could establish the principle of what we are doing.

Bundy--Right.

Ball--If it happens to be a Soviet tanker, . . .

Bundy--Right.

Ball--I will probably hear later tonight from Bob after he has been out there and had a look.

Bundy--I would think that when Bob has had a look at Flag Plot, he will call me and I will call you.

Ball--Very good.

61. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, October 24, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba. A copy of this letter, transmitted in telegram 1070 from Moscow, October 24, arrived in the Department of State at 9:24 p.m. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 304)

Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter of October 23,/1/ have studied it, and am answering you.

/1/See Document 52.

Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this would have been understandable to us.

In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what kind of states they may be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established, according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.

No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.

Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This Organization has absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former isolation with the advent of modern types of armament.

Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you--the United States--you would reject such an attempt. And we also say--no.

The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.

Respectfully,

N. Khrushchev/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original.

62. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 25, 1962, 8:40 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. Confidential; Limited Distribution. The source text bears the notation "Bundy saw 11 p.m. 25 Oct."

UNMIS 18. For Harriman--State; Forrestal--White House. From Schlesinger. Fol is text of memo I sent to Stevenson October 24: "Memorandum to Governor Stevenson.

I had a talk this evening with Averell Harriman. He made the following points:

1. Khrushchev, he said, is sending us desperate signals to get us to help take him off the hook. He is sending messages exactly as he did to Eisenhower directly after the U-2 affair. Eisenhower ignored these messages to his cost. We must not repeat Eisenhower's mistake.

2. The signals are (1) the instructions to the Soviet ships to change their course; (2) the message to Bertrand Russell;/1/ (3) his obviously premeditated appearance last night at an American concert in Moscow and his subsequent visit with the American singer.

/1/For text of this letter, October 24, see American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962, pp. 421-422.

3. In view of these signals from Khrushchev, the worst mistake we can possibly make is to get tougher and to escalate. Khrushchev is pleading with us to help him find a way out.

4. The best way out is the resolution recommended by Cleveland as Tab C in his memorandum (the defanging resolution)./2/ However, Harriman disagrees with Cleveland's view that we should try to negotiate this resolution. He thinks we should try to get Ireland to introduce the resolution tomorrow. We cannot afford to lose any time. Incidents--stopping of ships, etc.--will begin the process of escalation, engage Soviet prestige and reduce the chances of a peaceful resolution. If we act shrewdly and speedily, we can bail Khrushchev out and discredit the tough guys around him--the ones who sold him the Cuban adventure on the theory that Americans were too liberal to fight.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

October 24, 1962"

/2/Presumably a reference to Cleveland's October 24 memorandum to Rusk and Ball. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438) See the Supplement.

63. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, October 24, 1962, 10:30 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball--The letter from Khrushchev/1/ is garbled, and I am trying to fill it in. As far as shipping goes, it is pretty repetitious. The significant part is the last paragraph. It says: Ball reads last paragraph. It simply says that the OAS has no authority in these matters; that one has to bide by international law; we are committing an act of piracy; if you were in his place you would take the same view. The significant part is the part I read to you. I don't think we have any option but to go ahead and test this thing out, in the morning, but at least this is the notice he has given to us.

/1/Document 61.

Pres.--Do you want to call up Bob McNamara because we have got the tanker we talked about stopping.

Ball--I'll talk to Bob about it and I will also get hold of Dean and maybe we had better get back to you./2/

/2/A memorandum of Ball's telephone conversation with McNamara at 10:40 p.m. is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba)

Pres.--I will be around.

Ball--The second thing is this. U Thant has just gotten through speaking, and I am waiting for a call from Stevenson. Stevenson is kicking like a steer about reply tonight, but I think we have to reply tonight.

Pres.--He doesn't want to reply tonight?

Ball--He is concerned primarily about the conditions which we put in that proposed reply because he feels that those are in effect conditions to talking rather than the kind of conditions that might emerge out of talk. My own feeling is that we have got to be quite specific about them, otherwise we will get ourselves in a hopeless harass, and I don't think we can afford to do it at this point.

Pres.--How does he want us to change it?

Ball--I think he would like to suggest some concessions we are prepared to make. I am waiting for a call from him. If it is agreeable to you, I am going to take a very firm line that we have to get this thing back to U Thant tonight even though it isn't published because I think we ought to be very prompt in getting some reply back before the Soviet Union comes in with an acceptance of the U Thant proposal. I may not be able to hold the line with him and he may insist on talking with you. I think we have got to go ahead.

Pres.--They are obviously not going to stop. He is stopping the ones he doesn't want us to have. I suppose we will have to stop these. The press will give the impression that we are easing the situation.

Ball--That is inevitable. I have told them that there was no decision not to stop tankers, but only the fact that the initial version does not include POL. They are confused on this. I think we have worked it out so that story will be all right.

Pres.--I think the impression tonight seems to be that the Russians are giving way, which is not quite accurate. They want to believe that it is giving way. I think that, after you talk to McNamara and the Sec., they ought to have either State and Defense put out the indication that Russian ships are approaching.

Ball--I'll do that. Maybe I can persuade Adlai, if not he may insist on talking to you. In the meantime, I will get hold of Bob and Dean, and we may have to get back to you.

64. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:15 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Pres.--To be sure that the Russians./1/ Of course we didn't present them with a way out. I don't know whether U Thant has presented them with a way out, whether they are interested in a way out. I suppose there may be a slim chance they may be, we ought to give out a message in a way that gives them enough of an out to stop their shipments without looking like they completely crawled down.

/1/At 10:45 the President had called Ball and stated that he had just had Khrushchev's letter (Document 61) read to him. A memorandum of this telephone conversation, which also deals with stopping a tanker, is ibid. See the Supplement.

Ball--We could try something along that line.

Pres.--In other words just say that we suggest the Russians suspend their shipping, until we have a chance to meet with them. Just say otherwise, they have got, we can't withdraw shipping, we can't stop. It may be that is the way he wants it. There is not much time.

Ball--This is what the letter said, that you said last night,/2/ because what you said last night was that you hoped that he would not challenge, direct his captains not to challenge the blockade, and that we were talking about these letters in the Security Council. It would be the same idea.

/2/Document 52.

Pres.--I don't know if there is any way for a binding concentration. The time is so short. When we talk about a barrier, we talk about 500 miles, we can always take it at 300 miles if you have to. We can take it late in the afternoon, the question would be if there is any message we would send to U Thant to give them a way out.

Ball--What we might do, we might get up a draft of something tonight. Let me just read you what we sent him last night, what you sent him last night. Ball reads the letter. He had this in front of him when he, this looks as if he wrote it himself, saying in effect, talking about it in the Security Council . . . . This is a letter coming back and saying that he can't do it.

Pres.--The only thing it seems to me would be to U Thant. I don't think there is anything we can say to him that will cause him to change. We are saying not to send them and he is going to send them. Whether U Thant gives him a way out or not, I don't know.

Ball--I just have been talking to Stevenson and the trouble with the U Thant proposal is that there is no inspection or verification in it at all. Stevenson said that he thinks that if we were to accept the principle of some preliminary conversation, in the course of the conversation we could insist upon some kind of verification about when you have to point into the UN; I would not have too much confidence in him or boarding parties in the UN getting on ships and that would give us protection while we were trying to work something out. That is going to take 2 or 3 days to do.

Pres.--He is going to hold up his ships during that 2 or 3 days.

Ball--What we could say is that if you will hold up your ships during the 2 or 3 days, we would have some preliminary talks in the UN to see to if there is some solution.

Pres.--I think rather than direct a message to him, we should get ourselves back to U Thant and say that he can request the Soviet Union to hold up their shipping for the next, for the immediate area, that we would be glad to get into conversations about how the situation could be adjusted.

Ball--If we were to say to the Sov. Union, it appears that a confrontation is about to take place,

Pres.--And to hold their ships, while we meet with him tomorrow afternoon. Probably that is about all we can do. Otherwise we just have to go with this thing. In that case, we could pick up this tanker tomorrow afternoon, instead of tomorrow morning.

Ball--Yep. I will talk to Bob, Dean and Adlai and get back to you.

65. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:25 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball--The President called me again and we've been talking about what we might do about getting some kind of a message to K [Khrushchev]. The Pres. had the idea that maybe we ought to do with U Thant tonight instead of trying to get a message back to K because there isn't much we can say that we didn't say in that message he sent last night. Try to get U Thant to make a direct appeal to Mr. K to hold off his ships on the ground that there is going to be a confrontation in the morning which could escalate until there is a chance for a discussion on the modalities of negotiation. The Pres. is very reluctant to face this thing particularly with a tanker involved tomorrow until we make one last try to see if the UN can get itself in between.

Secretary--I must say that I don't think a tanker is the best case.

Ball--It isn't the best case. I talked to McNamara and what he said they had in mind with regard to the tanker was simply to hail it and ask it what it is carrying, where it was going, and if it answered satisfactory to let it go, not to board it. In fact the Commander has no instructions to do more than that. If it goes on through, then we have lost the principle of the quarantine, having done that. On the other hand, we could let this one go but then there will probably be a whole day without stopping a ship, and I am afraid this would be misinterpreted in Moscow, particularly in the light of this letter. The President's idea, this was a kind of an idea we were developing together was possibly if we could get Thant tonight to make the appeal on the ground that there was going to be a likelihood of a confrontation and ask K to instruct his fellows to talk with ours and see if a negotiation could be gotten under way. In the meantime, to hold his ships away from Cuba that something might be done.

Sec.--I don't think there is a chance in the world that K would get instructions to this tanker by 2 am.

Ball--In the meantime, we could hold off til, actually we could even change the thing for half a day as far as that goes. We could outrun the tanker.

Sec.--I should think that we ought to wait til daylight anyhow.

Ball--Well, we are going to wait til daylight as I understood it.

Sec.--I think you might talk to Adlai about this and see if U Thant on his own responsibility will ask Mr. K not to send his ships pending modalities.

Ball--Let me see what we can do.

Sec.--All right, fine. What about the answer?

Ball--If we did that, I suppose we wouldn't answer.

Sec.--Hold off until in the morning?

Ball--Yes. There really isn't anything much that we can say that hasn't been said. If we can now get Thant to do something rather than doing it ourselves.

Sec.--Right.

Ball--Let me see what I can work out when I talk to Stevenson.

66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)

October 24, 1962, 11:45 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking. Ball was in Washington; Stevenson was in New York.

Ball--We've got another idea that I would like to try out on you. Do you think there is any chance that U Thant would be willing to send Mr. K a [letter?]. Let me bring you up to date. We've had a message from K/1/ in which he says in effect that he can't give instructions to his ships to abide by the blockade and that if we violate these rules, that will be our fault and they will be forced to take measures that they deem necessary and adequate to protect their rights, and they have what's necessary to do that. Implications being knowing that there may be a submarine or two in the waters, that could be an attempt to torpedo one of our ships. Would U Thant under all the circumstances knowing the possibility of a confrontation tomorrow be prepared to send a message to K along the lines that he is very concerned about possibility of a confrontation in connection with this quarantine, and that he asked K to hold his ships away from Cuban waters on the condition that we will not molest them while there is a discussion of the modalities of a possible negotiation.

/1/Document 61.

Stevenson--Yes, I think he might do something like this.

Ball--If we could get something out like that tonight, I think we would hold off, because all we've got is a tanker coming through. We've just given instructions not to touch the thing tonight. We can buy a day or two here and see how it goes.

Stevenson--I think it would be a lot more helpful for me in trying to get U Thant to do this if I could have a copy of the message that we have from K.

Ball--I can give you. It's a garbled message, and it hasn't been cleaned up yet.

Stevenson--Well, if you could put on the wire to me, so that I would have it first thing in the morning a substantial text of it.

Ball--I think it would have to be done tonight if we're going to do it because we've got a time dislocation and things are moving so swiftly. Is there a chance of getting hold of Thant tonight.

Stevenson--He's awful hard to get when he goes home. I am afraid it will be almost impossible to do anything with him tonight.

Ball--If you could even talk to him tonight.

Stevenson--I could talk to him on the phone and tell him what the burden of this thing is and that I'm going to be around in the morning with a suggestion that he send a message to K saying that he. I don't know whether he should say that he has this word.

Ball--I don't think he needs to say that he has any word.

Stevenson--See, what he's already said is please hold off on everything.

Ball--What he can say is that he is disturbed about the possibility of a confrontation at sea under the quarantine before further action could be taken toward trying to get this into political channels and he would therefore like an agreement from K that he will hold his ships off on the condition, away from Cuban waters, we won't molest them while the discussion of modalities goes forward.

Stevenson--He says that all concerned should refrain from any actions which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war. He will say, well I've already said that.

Ball--Yes, but this is giving specific content to it in terms of what the real danger, an immediate confrontation, may be.

Stevenson--I think if he had some feeling that we were likely to present this thing in general subject or conditions, which he knows about, I think maybe he would send such a message.

Ball--This position, I don't want to misrepresent the President on it, but this position that I have from him is that we could hold off for a while while there is some discussions on the modalities of the thing if they will hold their ships away while we do that.

Stevenson--As I understand it, are there any ships nearby?

Ball--There is a ship which was going to be challenged at 2 o'clock tomorrow morning, which is just about 2-1/2 hours from now. We have got that held off.

Stevenson--That was a tanker?

Ball--Yes, and we can continue to hold that one off until we can see if something like this would work.

Stevenson--Would we stop it anyway?

Ball--Yes, we were going to stop it.

Stevenson--Although it was not carrying--

Ball--That is on the theory that we stop everything and challenge it and find out what's on board.

Stevenson--Let me call him. I think he may have trouble getting this message off tonight.

Ball--You know, there is a little flexibility in this because we are challenging these ships 5 hundred miles out; we could outrun most of them and we could challenge them 200 miles out if necessary.

Stevenson--What's next . . . .

Ball--I'm not very clear just what comes how soon. But we could adjust that. We don't want to let ships go through because this discredits our firmness of attention. What I think, if we could get an agreement from the Russians to hold their ships off while we talk about this, the modalities.

Stevenson--For a couple of days?

Ball--Yes, I think it would be that long probably before we get something settled. We won't take any action as long as their ships are held off, that way we avoid a confrontation until we can see if we can get the modalities with negotiation.

Stevenson--He has diverted the armed ships?

Ball--Yes.

Stevenson--Let me call him and see what I get.

67. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking.

Washington, October 25, 1962, 12:30 a.m.

Bundy--We have now written, and everybody but you have signed off on it, and I hope you won't object, a message to the Chairman/1/ telling him it's your fault and not ours on the basic ground that they misled us--the thing that we think we ought to get back into his chest--. The word of the Soviet Government is what caused the trouble. David Cline [Klein] is arranging to send it out. Do you want to hear it?

/1/See Document 68.

Ball--I would like to hear it. I'll tell you about my conversation with Stevenson./2/

/2/A memorandum of Ball's conversation with Stevenson at 12:20 a.m. is in Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. See the Supplement.

Bundy--How did it go?

Ball--With Stevenson?

Bundy--Yes, mine is in the typewriter.

Ball--The situation with Stevenson is that he finally got Thant out of bed and Thant has agreed to send a message to K which he probably can't do tonight because of the communications but will do it first thing in the morning.

Bundy--Why don't we offer him some communications?

Ball--I think it is probably a matter of his composing it.

Bundy--Nothing is going to happen tonight.

Ball--He says that first thing in the morning he will send the message to K saying that he, pending some consideration of his proposal, he would hope that K will keep his ships away and prevent a confrontation because he thinks there is a chance the Americans are prepared to discuss the modalities of a negotiation.

Bundy--Does that pin us to anything?

Ball--I raised this with Stevenson and in the first place this is not a public thing, this is a private--

Bundy--It will be public soon enough.

Ball--He doesn't.

Bundy--U Thant is on and we are not on on this?

Ball--That's it.

Bundy--Stevenson may go down the drain.

Ball--He just gives his impression. I think it's worth a play.

Bundy--It's worth a try.

Ball--I asked Stevenson to try to get the thing from him in the morning and shoot it down to us as soon as he can. I think I would have put it up in tougher terms, but that's the way it went.

Bundy--Yes, I think the main thing is that Adlai should know what he has sent in the morning.

Ball--I asked him to get it from Thant first thing and let us know, and he said he would and I hope Thant doesn't give too much of an impression of our willingness, but in any event it's just Thant giving an impression.

Bundy--Bundy reads reply to K.

Ball--There is only one very minor point, but I think it might be a major one. That is we use these offensive weapons; actually, my understanding in the conversation with Gromyko, that Gromyko was explicit that they had no weapons that could reach the US.

Bundy--He didn't say it that way.

Ball--I got this from the Secretary.

Bundy--He didn't say it. At least it did not appear in any transcript we had.

Ball--This may have been given by Dobrynin.

Bundy--It is true that Dobrynin has said things. I think this language is more precise in the case than we can document to the Chairman.

Ball--Well, of course his answer will be that they are not offensive.

Bundy--Well, he never said that actually.

Ball--Well, except that this was the implication of what was said by--

Bundy--Then change it to "such as long range nuclear missiles."

Ball--Yes, I think we can do that. It takes it out of that dialectical argument as to what's offensive and what isn't.

Bundy--"Such weapons as long range nuclear missiles."

Ball--Yes.

Bundy--That doesn't let us off the bombers. "Such weapons as (we don't want quite long range) nuclear missiles?"

Ball--I think that would be all right.

Bundy--"Of considerable range?" I don't know George; I have cleared it with everybody else; I think we had better leave it as it is. The point is clear enough.

Ball--Yes. We will deliver that tonight then.

Bundy--It'll be along. Klein is handling that.

Ball--The only thing that concerns me about the Stevenson thing is that he has probably given the impression to U Thant that we will go further than we will go. That's what worries me.

Bundy--I don't know how to advise you on that other than to say that we probably will not go further than we will go.

Ball--If it indicates a weakness in relation to K that will create another element of miscalculation.

Bundy--If he will hold off his ships, then the Americans are interested in the modalities?

Ball--Yes.

Bundy--Has Stevenson showed him our answer?

Ball--No. That is reserved for tomorrow morning.

Bundy--It would seem to me that you should say to Adlai that nothing in, from the point of view of us in Washington, any message to K should be inconsistent with that message.

Ball--I think I will get hold of Adlai first thing in the morning and let him go over and talk to Thant.

Bundy--If Adlai knows early in the morning that he must not sign the US to anything that would make that letter impossible without checking back with us.

Ball--I think that's the way to leave it.

Bundy--Right.

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

//Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted at the White House. A note on the source text indicates it was relayed to McNamara, Lemnitzer, CIA, and Departments of the Treasury and Justice.

Washington, October 25, 1962, 1:59 a.m.

997. Ref: Embtel 1070./1/ Signed original following message from President to Khrushchev delivered to Soviet Embassy 1:45 a.m. Washington time October 25. Please deliver to highest ranking Soviet official immediately available.

/1/See the source note, Document 61.

October 25, 1962

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurance from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by TASS in September, you will see how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied--namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours, John F. Kennedy"

Please report time delivery.

Rusk

69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

//Source: Department of State, USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received in New York at 3:01 a.m.

Washington, October 25, 1962, 2 a.m.

1084. Deliver to Ambassador Stevenson personally 8:30 am.

On further checking with White House believe it important that you follow up first thing Thursday morning/1/ on suggestion you made to Secretary General late Wednesday night to make sure his message to Khrushchev reflects following general line:

/1/October 25.

1. Concern that Soviet vessels may be under instructions to challenge quarantine and thus bring on a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and Western hemisphere ships which could lead to escalation of violence.

2. Concern that such confrontation would destroy possibility of talks such as Secretary General has suggested as prelude to political settlement.

3. Hope that Khrushchev will hold his ships out of interception area for limited time in order to permit discussions of modalities of agreement.

4. Confidence, on basis that Soviet ships are not proceeding to Cuba, that United States will avoid direct confrontation with them during same period in order to minimize chances of untoward incidence.

FYI: While we are quite ready to begin conversations on modalities as suggested by SYG we should not give SYG impression nor encourage him to give Khrushchev impression that we can agree on any interim arrangement for uninspected moratorium or "voluntary suspension" without explicit provision for adequate UN observation to ensure against weapons being imported, work on sites continued, or offensive weapons being operational. In other words White House feels it undesirable to give any impression to SYG that would be inconsistent with draft answer to SYG's proposal that was cleared by President and sent you Wednesday night.

Rusk

70. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, October 25, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in part in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 305-307. For Bundy's account of this meeting, see Document 71.

SUBJECT

Executive Committee Meeting 10/25/62--10:00 a.m. All Members present

McCone reported on intelligence, reviewing summary of 25 October, including penciled memorandums as indicated, plus Cline memorandum of 25 October on talks with Sir Kenneth Strong, and the Watch Report of same date./1/

/1/A summary of the briefing paper, SC No. 08179/62, October 25 (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5), is included in the Supplement. The other documents have not been identified further.

I called special attention to the Belovodsk and reported on page II-5 and the searching of the Cubana airplane by Canadians as reported on page IV-2. Also the shipping schedule.

McNamara reported that at 7:00 o'clock a destroyer intercepted the tanker Bucharest which responded destination was Havana, cargo was petroleum and the Bucharest was permitted to proceed under surveillance. He stated that no United States Navy ships had orders to board. He recommended orders be issued to immediately board Bloc ships and then the Bucharest be boarded. Decision was reached that Navy be instructed to board the next Soviet ship contacted which would be the Graznyy, a tanker, but which was carrying a deck load which might be missile field tanks. Later in the meeting decision was reached not to board the Bucharest. Contact was to be made with the Graznyy as early as possible and that was estimated to be about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Friday, October 26th.

McNamara recommended several recurring low-level surveillance strikes of multiple aircraft in an operation that would resemble an air strike. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] It was the Secretary's opinion that since all of these were indicators of some indecision on the part of the Soviets, that we should pursue low-level surveillance in the interests of gathering intelligence, simulating air attack, demonstrating our intention to watch construction, familiarizing ourselves with camouflage and to determine whether the Soviets are building additional sites. This recommendation was approved and 8 sorties were ordered immediately to cover the nine missile sites, the IL 28 site, the MIG 21 airfield, and the nuclear storage sites and the KOMAR missile ship sites. It was decided this reconnaissance should not be announced but, if questioned, we should refer to the President's statement.

McCone then noted the number of ships in the Eastern Atlantic and in the Baltic and Mediterranean which had turned back. Dillon asked about ships in the Pacific. The President asked whether Soviet ships bound elsewhere than Cuba had changed course. McCone said he would report on this in the afternoon.

There was a further discussion of the policy of stopping or hailing non-Bloc ships. It was decided that all ships must be hailed.

Rusk raised the question of discussions with the United Nations. Draft of U.S. reply to the U Thant letter was approved with modifications. It was agreed at the meeting that we must insist upon the removal of missiles from Cuba in addition to demands that construction be stopped and that UN inspectors be permitted at once.

Bundy reviewed Khrushchev letter to the President of the 24th of October and the Kennedy reply./2/ McNamara raised the question of accelerating or raising the escalation of the actions we have so far taken, expressing concern over the plateau, indicating determination to meet our ultimate objective of taking out the missile sites.

/2/Documents 61 and 68.

Rusk then asked certain actions on the part of CIA as follows: (1) An answer to questions of the effect on Cuba because ships were turned about as indicated in recent reports; (2) What had happened to Soviet ships which were bound elsewhere than Cuba; (3) The general Cuban reaction to our actions to date:

(a) Do they know about Soviet missiles?

(b) Have they heard the President's speech?

(c) What is the morale in Cuba?

McCone promised answers.

John A. McCone/3/

Director

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

71. Record of Action of the Fourth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 25, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. For McCone's account of this meeting, see Document 70.

1. Mr. McCone presented the intelligence briefing.

2. The President requested Mr. McCone to prepare a careful analysis of the present situation inside Cuba, and he asked for further consideration by USIA of the possibility of dropping propaganda leaflets.

3. The Secretary of Defense reported the current military situation, and on the President's direction instructions were issued for selective investigation and boarding of non-bloc ships, excluding tankers.

4. The Secretary reported that all armed forces in Cuba have been instructed to fire only in response to attack. Many installations are so camouflaged as to be in a low state of readiness. The Secretary recommended a program of low-level reconnaissance for the purpose of improving intelligence, camouflaging the possibility of a later low-level attack, and emphasizing our concern with offensive installations already in Cuba. The President approved an immediate daylight mission of 8 low-level reconnaissance aircraft to cover missile sites, airfields holding IL28's and MIG's, KOMAR naval vessels, coastal installations, nuclear storage sites, and selected SAM sites.

5. The President directed that the tanker Bucharest not be intercepted for the present. Her status as a tanker with no contraband cargo made it desirable to allow her to proceed. He directed further that the Defense Department be prepared to make an intercept of an appropriate bloc ship on Friday in daylight.

6. The President approved a version of an answer to U Thant, but in later discussion a revised version was worked out between New York and Washington and approved by the President at 1:15 p.m./1/

/1/For text of this letter and the letter from U Thant, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 422 and 424.

7. There was preliminary discussion of alternative courses of action in the immediate future, and the President asked the other members of the Committee to make appropriate arrangements for preparing alternative courses of action for discussion with him at a later meeting.

8. The President approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense that missile fuel be added to the list of contraband goods under the Proclamation of Interdiction./2/

McGeorge Bundy

/2/Following this meeting of the Executive Committee both the Nitze and Rostow subcommittees met to continue their work. Records of these meetings are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin; and ibid., Cuba, General Planning Subcommittee, respectively. See the Supplement.

72. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 25, 1962, 2:30 p.m.

//Source: USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Stevenson and Sisco.

1459. Subject: SC on Cuba.

I saw U Thant this morning and conveyed to him suggestions contained in Deptel 1084 (USUN 4963)./1/ He said he would transmit suggestions to Khrushchev in form of confidential message./2/ He would also send President Kennedy note reporting his message to Khrushchev and asking that US exercise restraint in circumstances.

/1/Document 69.

/2/For text of U Thant's letter to Khrushchev, October 25, see American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962, p. 425.

Thant told me Zorin asked him at 7:30 last night what Thant appeal in Council was going to say. Thant replied that it was based on his appeal to Khrushchev and Kennedy. Zorin said he had not received it. After Thant explained to Zorin nature of his appeal, Zorin replied that it was very bad proposal, since blockade was wholly illegal and that Thant should be concerned with legality and should not equate lifting quarantine with stopping ships going to Cuba. Thant replied he was not concerned with legality, but with averting a crisis.

Thant told me that Afro-Asians were putting great pressure on Zorin to accept, but that on basis of Zorin's preliminary reaction Thant expects negative reply. Thant anticipates long legal attack on the quarantine.

If both sides accept his suspension proposal this afternoon, he thinks SC should recess pending discussion on modalities. Parties should then report what agreement they have reached on modalities and thereafter substantive negotiations could take place without another Council meeting.

Stevenson

73. Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 25, 1962, 5 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's 3-paragraph summary of this meeting is in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, and reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, p. 309.

Director McCone gave an intelligence briefing which contained no major new information. He listed fifteen ships en route to Cuba, among them the Graznyy, which is one of three oil tankers with deck tanks probably containing ammonia.

Mr. McCone noted that a Bloc ship would be entering the Panama Canal on November 2. It would be searched, as have Bloc ships transiting the Canal during the past seven years.

Mr. McCone said he had no information of any unusual developments in Europe.

Secretary Dillon noted that there had been a run on gold in Germany and to a lesser extent in London. His conclusion was that these gold purchases reflected the fear of the buyers.

Secretary McNamara said that the East German passenger ship Voelker Fruendschaft was at the Cuban barrier. It is a fairly large ship, 525 feet long, and has been ordered to report its position every four hours. He said we faced a decision as to whether or not to stop it.

Secretary McNamara reported that the Lebanese ship which was to have been boarded had turned back before crossing the barrier. Late information on the Graznyy revealed that it was lying dead in the water. The result is that to date no ship has yet been boarded.

Secretary Rusk reported on diplomatic developments. He said the question was whether we can get Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba or at least under UN control. He added that if there was any prospect of success in following a political track, we would have to keep heavy pressure on the Russians. He reported that Soviet representative Zorin in New York was furious about U Thant's proposals for U.S./USSR talks under UN sponsorship in New York, but that Khrushchev had agreed to such talks./1/ Our position would be that during these next two days of preliminary discussions we must somehow stop the missile buildup in Cuba. We must know what is going on at the IRBM sites in Cuba and we need to know whether warheads have actually been delivered to Cuba. Shortly we must decide if the Soviet signals which they are sending us means they are getting ready to talk or whether they are getting ready to attack us.

/1/See Document 59.

Referring to possible UN action, Secretary Rusk said we would probably be able to get only a seven-to-two vote in the Security Council,/2/ but even so, action in the UN General Assembly was a possibility. He specifically mentioned one possibility, i.e. Latin American States proposing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. He thought that many Latin American States would support this zone, along with many other UN members, and the Soviets would have a difficult time opposing it.

/2/The U.N. Security Council had resumed discussion of the Cuban crisis at 4 p.m. on October 25. For a verbatim record of the discussion, see U.N. doc. S/PV. 1025.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the relationship between our quarantine and Soviet-Cuban relations. The Cubans, who would not be able to survive in political isolation, must henceforth rely entirely on the Soviets. He suggested that we might ask the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana to tell Castro that there was little for Cuba in being tied permanently to the Soviet Union. An appeal might be made to Castro to step aside so that a new government might break this complete dependence from here on out on the Soviet Union.

Secretary Rusk explained the nature of the preliminary talks which are to be held in New York in the next two or three days between U Thant and Zorin on one side and Stevenson and U Thant on the other. The purpose of these talks is to arrive at a solution of the crisis or, if no solution is possible, to provide a basis for later action, having been unable to negotiate a settlement. He said that these talks could not go on for two weeks, but must be limited to a very few days because the IRBM sites in Cuba are becoming operational and the IL-28 bombers will soon be able to fly.

Secretary McNamara said all of his actions were taken with a view to applying force gradually. The ten air reconnaissance missions flown today went well and he recommended that ten more missions be flown tomorrow. Other military actions being taken would be meaningful to the Russians but would still not force escalation.

Secretary McNamara described night reconnaissance flights which involve dropping flares--[6 lines of source text not declassified] The Soviet missiles now have an eight-hour countdown. Low-level reconnaissance could give us intelligence as to whether the Soviet missiles are being placed in position to reduce the length of the countdown.

Secretary Dillon noted that the urgency of the situation was considerably reduced if the Russians do not try to break the quarantine.

Secretary McNamara expressed his concern that if the New York talks go along very long, a kind of plateau will have been reached which would make the decision to take new actions very difficult.

Secretary Rusk summarized the political track as follows. We might get a unanimous vote in the OAS for our actions. We could expect a veto from the Russians in the Security Council. If the U Thant proposals were rejected, we could go to the General Assembly where as many as eighty States might support a Latin American denuclearization proposal. He was not ready to knock out the possibility of a political solution.

Secretary McNamara said there were many ways of increasing pressure on the Russians by military measures, i.e. quarantine, inspection at sea, surveillance, the addition of jet fuel to the list of products embargoes, and the holding of all petroleum tankers.

The Attorney General noted that if all Bloc cargo ships turn back rather than cross the quarantine barrier, we might let Soviet tankers through in order to avoid an incident at sea during the discussions in New York. He said we might decide that it was better to knock out the missiles by air attack than to stop a Soviet ship on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we might buy the charter and cargo of tramp steamers going to Cuba. We could pay either the captain or the owner of the ship whatever he asks to defect with his ship. Such action would step up pressure on the Cubans without further use of military force.

Director McCone agreed that such action would be effective because it would greatly reduce imports into Cuba and also take away from the Cubans their outgoing cargoes.

Secretary McNamara suggested that we might consider harassing all ships heading for Cuba by requiring that they go into U.S. ports for inspection, which could take up to several weeks. The purpose would be to throttle imports by Cuba.

In a discussion of other military measures, Mr. Rostow said any reconnaissance flights would have a beneficial effect on developments in New York.

Secretary McNamara commented that the dropping of flares on the IRBM sites at night would be highly effective. General Taylor thought that the psychological effect of night reconnaissance would be entirely favorable as well as serving to keep up the pressure and providing more information about the readiness status of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk said that he would seek to define our future political moves later in the evening.

Secretary Dillon stated his support of the idea of a Latin American denuclearized zone.

The Attorney General repeated his question as to whether we really wanted to stop a Soviet ship. He said he believed the Soviets had turned their ships around because they did not want us to see what was on them. The tankers, however, continue to move toward Cuba because they have nothing but petroleum. He said he felt that the measures we take should indicate clearly that we mean business but we should avoid a direct confrontation now.

Secretary McNamara said we should decide tonight to take meas-ures tonight which would put us in a position of being ready to board Bloc ships approaching the barrier. We could let Soviet tankers through the quarantine and announce later we were putting an embargo on aviation gasoline. If we were going to board the East German ship we would have to decide tonight.

Both General Taylor and Secretary Dillon pointed out that we could not permit Soviet technicians to go through the quarantine even though technicians are not on the embargo list.

Secretary McNamara recommended that the East German ship not be stopped because it might be necessary for us to shoot at it or to ram it. There would be great danger to the some 1500 passengers aboard. The current situation is that the ship has been hailed and a U.S. destroyer is following it. If we ask it to stop and it does not, then we would have to use force. If in so doing we injure passengers and then discover there are no strategic missiles aboard, we would be in a very difficult situation. In addition, our world position would appear weak if we allow Soviet ships through the quarantine but stop an East German ship. The Voelker Freundschaft will make a landfall tomorrow and a decision must be made by 2:00 AM this morning if we want to stop it outside Cuban territorial waters.

At this point the President entered the Cabinet Room.

Secretary McNamara reviewed the situation with respect to the Voelker Freundschaft. He said the East German ship had left Rostov on October 11 and Leningrad on October 14. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The destroyer Pierce is following the ship which is still outside the barrier. Secretary McNamara recommended that we not stop this ship.

The President referred to the message from U Thant asking us to avoid incidents pending the talks at New York./3/

/3/See Document 59.

Mr. Bundy said the East German ship was not covered by U Thant's message.

General Taylor and Director McCone asked Mr. McNamara [5 lines of source text not declassified]

The President said the only argument against stopping the ship is U Thant's request for no incidents for the time being. He said that we would have to drop the other shoe soon.

Secretary McNamara repeated his earlier statement with respect to the difficulty of stopping a passenger ship. He preferred to stop the Graznyy tomorrow if Khrushchev did not accept U Thant's proposed mediation effort.

The Attorney General said he wished to describe again the other side of the argument. He said we could let the tanker through the barrier. As of now no other ships were approaching the barrier. Surveillance measures could be taken to keep the pressure on the Russians and provide time for the political measures suggested by Secretary Rusk without appearing to be backing off from a confrontation. He repeated his view that we may decide that it is better to avoid confronting the Russians by stopping one of their ships and to react by attacking the missiles already in Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said he preferred that the confrontation take place in Cuba rather than on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk noted that the quarantine had become fully effective.

Secretary McNamara reported that there had been no response yesterday or today to our low-level reconnaissance flights. He recommended that we continue to fly daylight reconnaissance missions and add night reconnaissance not only to gain information, but also to convince the public that we are increasing the pressure on the Russians.

The President decided that we should not stop the East German ship. Tomorrow we will know the Soviet response to U Thant's proposal. We will let the tanker through the barrier and later add jet fuel to the list of products embargoed.

The Attorney General said that fifteen ships have turned back, which is an impressive action taken by the Russians. We must be careful that the Russians do not think that we are backing down.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the importance of the first case of our boarding a ship. If the ship carried deck cargo or dry cargo, the case would be different than a passenger ship which is a bad first case.

Mr. Rostow stated the argument for adding petroleum products to the blockade which he said would have a drastic effect on the Cuban economy.

The President again said we should let the East German passenger ship go through and we should seek to avoid any incident in order not to create a bad effect on U Thant's negotiations. We could decide tomorrow afternoon what more we should do after we know Khrushchev's reply to U Thant. He said we must act soon because work on the missile sites is still going on and we must back up very soon the firmness we have displayed up to now.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that we must react very soon to Khrushchev's strong letter./4/

/4/Document 61.

Secretary Rusk noted that Bloc shipping worldwide was behaving normally except for the ships in Cuban trade.

As the meeting concluded, Mr. McCone reported that some of the strategic missiles deployed in Cuba are now operational.

The President had before him at the meeting a folder containing drafts of alternative next major moves (copy attached)./5/

/5/Not found attached. Apparent reference to three papers entitled "Political Path," October 25 (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Political Actions), "Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba," undated (ibid., Air Strike--Cuba), and a paper on the Progressive Economic Blockage. The first two papers are in the Supplement. An earlier version of "Possible Courses of Action," undated, includes a section on the blockade. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962) See the Supplement.

Bromley Smith/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

74. Record of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan

October 25, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Macmillan Telephone Conversations. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. For Macmillan's account of this conversation, see At the End of the Day, pp. 205-208.

President: Prime Minister, how did you do with your debate?

PM: We did very well, actually very good, very good. I sent you the text of what I said, and I think it was very well accepted. I made all the points I could, especially the one you gave me about your statement of September 11, and the reception was good--and that was very well received.

President: We've got a second message from U Thant/1/ which you may be familiar with which says that . . . asks Khrushchev to keep the ships out of there and asks us to avoid a confrontation. Now we are inclined to--we are sending back a message that if he keeps his ships out of there of course we will avoid a confrontation. As you know, today we figure now 14 ships turned around. They were probably the ones with the aggressive cargo. One tanker we stopped; we asked where it was going; it said it was coming from the Black Sea to Cuba and the cargo was oil. It was obviously a tanker and we passed that. We have tomorrow 2 or 3 vessels that--including particularly an East German vessel which has probably 600 or 700 passengers. It stopped in Leningrad on its way and it may have 6,000 tons of cargo on it, so we are going to have to stop that, we think. That's what we are now discussing. Now we've got two tracks running. One is that one of these ships--these selected ships--which Khrushchev continues to have come toward Cuba--on the other hand, we have U Thant--we don't want to sink a ship, and then right in the middle of one, U Thant is supposedly arranging for the Russians to stay out, so we are going to have to let some hours go by, but sooner or later, probably by tomorrow evening, we are going to have to accost one of these and board it. Now we got a message last night from Mr. Khrushchev/2/ which I'll make sure you get, if you haven't gotten it already, which says that this is piratical and their ships are going to go through and not submit to this, and if we do stop them they have the means of action against us. That's last night. So that's about where we are.

PM: Thank you very much. I have just seen your message to U Thant./1/ It seems to me extremely ingenious and very calm, because you are saying that the--as you say, the real point is that they ought to get rid of these weapons.

/1/See Document 59.

/2/Document 61.

And then Ambassador Stevenson will be discussing with U Thant the arrangements. What time do you think the Ambassador will be speaking with U Thant?

President: . . . about a half hour ago which goes somewhat further than the first one went. The second one said that he is asking Khrushchev to keep his ships out of there. His first message didn't do that. We are therefore going to accept that because it comes further in our direction than his first one, and tell him that if he can keep the ships out of there that's fine, then we won't have the incident. On the other hand, we do point out in our response to him that some ships still are coming. Now that is that. Now if these conversations begin we are going to point out--once we get this matter of the ships straightened out, because we still haven't had our first search yet, and that's going to be a very important event because we will then know what the Russians are going to do, but that will come tomorrow. Now then, if we begin the conversation we are going to begin to point out that work is going on and that work must stop or otherwise we have got to extend this blockade, and consider other action to stop it. But I think that's at least 24 hours away. I think the next thing for us to do is to figure out how we will handle this first search in view of the fact that the UN is involved in this now. In other words, I don't want to have an incident--fight--with a Russian ship tomorrow morning and to search it at a time when it appears that U Thant has gotten the Russians to agree not to continue. I hope that by tomorrow afternoon it will be clear either that the Russians are discontinuing their shipping during these preliminary conversations or, if they are not, then the responsibility is on them.

. . . . garble . . .

President: Prime Minister, can you repeat that?

PM: I was saying that the question of dealing with the weapons in Cuba--you will be discussing that with U Thant?

President: Yes. As I say, the first problem we have is the circumstances under which we will search the first Russian ship, on the basis of two things: first, Mr. Khrushchev's reply to me last night that he will not permit it; and secondly, U Thant's appeal for a suspension of Russian shipping while these talks go on so that if we get Russian shipping suspended that will produce one situation; if Russian shipping does not suspend, then we will have to face the search and the possible sinking of the ship sometime tomorrow afternoon, so that's our first problem. Then . . . but if we satisfactorily get through that problem, then when these conversations begin we are going to then begin to emphasize that work on these sites is continuing and that unless it is discontinued we must tighten the blockade and possibly take other actions. That would probably begin to be emphasized the minute the talks begin, but even if the talks don't begin, we are going to begin to say it on Saturday/3/ anyway.

/3/October 27.

PM: I quite understand, and I think that's what you must do. As I see it, there are two stages: the first question is the ships, and then the question of the actual weapons in Cuba. . . .

President: As I say, the 14 ships that have turned back are obviously the ones that have the sensitive cargo that he doesn't want us to be able to produce. The ships that are continuing probably are ones that don't have anything important in them, but we cannot permit him to establish the principle that he determines which ships will go and which will not, but as I say, I think we will--tomorrow night--we will know a lot better about this matter of the UN's actions and Khrushchev's attitude about continuing the shipping, and also what attitude he will take in regard to our searching them.

. . . garble . . .

PM: I say that this is very interesting about the ships. And we . . . the situation tomorrow night.

President: That is correct. We will know tomorrow night whether Khrushchev will accept U Thant's proposal to cease all shipping going to Cuba during these talks, No. 1. No. 2, if he doesn't do that, we will know what their reaction will be to our searching of a vessel, so I think that I could call you tomorrow night at the same time, unless this is too late for you.

PM: . . . indeed. I am very much obliged to you. We will have a talk tomorrow night. Good night.

President: Good night, Prime Minister. I'll send you Khrushchev's message of last evening. Good night.

PM: Yes, I'd very much like to see that.

President: Good night, Prime Minister.

75. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, October 25, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter--Cuba. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:41 p.m. October 25.

Polto 506. Eyes only for Secretary. Department may desire repeat Ankara and Rome eyes only Ambassadors. Policy. Reference: Deptels 2345 and 2349./1/

/1/Document 56 and footnote 1 thereto.

1. Turkish PermRep here has consistently made it clear that Turks set great store in Jupiters placed in Turkey. He makes very clear that Turkey regards these Jupiters as symbol of Alliance's determination to use atomic weapons against Russian attack on Turkey whether by large conventional or nuclear forces, although Turks have been most reluctant admit presence IRBM's publicly. Fact that Jupiters are obsolescent and vulnerable does not apparently affect present Turkish thinking. My impression is that symbolic importance represents a fixed GOT view, although of course Hare can comment much better than I on this point.

2. For above reason any arrangement of kind suggested reftel which would not have received prior complete support by GOT would, it seems to us, be most damaging. I emphasize prior consultation, and I think it should be an arrangement freely arrived at by them. My guess is that any arrangement that would not substitute some other considerable kind of atomic capability in Turkey for Jupiters would be rejected by them. See suggestions paras. 8 and 9 below.

5. In this connection, would appear preferable, since Cuba is by definition outside NATO area, to offer close down some US nuclear-capable base outside NATO area rather than making deal involving Turkey or Italy. Such deal would then be strictly US-USSR trade rather than involving one of our NATO allies in any deal.

6. I think that we must be fully aware there is real possibility that, outside of any arrangement made in over-all disarmament context, whole Alliance might be dismayed by such a deal which would compromise and invalidate firm US action re Cuba which has received substantial approval from Alliance. As all know, these weapons were put in Europe as result of heads of government decision in 1957 in response to boastful Soviet MRBM threat to Europe, and Alliance might very well conclude that US was willing weaken nuclear defenses in Europe in order to remove threat in Western hemisphere. However, cannot discount possibility that some members Alliance might be willing accept Cuba-Turk deal "to avoid nuclear war", i.e., Norwegians, Danes and maybe even British.

7. Re question of removal Jupiters accompanied by stationing of Polaris submarines in area, doubt whether mere deployment Polaris would be attractive to Turks since they really would have no say in use of Polaris in time of crisis and they turned down similar proposal in April 1961. Nevertheless, one might argue Turks really have no say over Jupiter use now because of custodial arrangements, but they feel some assurance in having weapons on their territory and somewhat in their hands. Turkish concern re Polaris substitution might be partially met by consulting them on targeting so as to assure that targets of interest to them are covered by Polaris. Also could point out that three Polaris submarines in area would effectively more than double coverage presently afforded by obsolete Jupiters. Doubt, however, above arrangements would adequately compensate Turks.

8. Re suggestion reftel concerning some other significant military offset such as NATO seaborne multilateral nuclear force, we believe most expeditious way do this would be set up small southern command multilateral seaborne force on a "pilot basis". If such firm suggestion made this should be acceptable arrangement to Turks to compensate for loss of obsolete Jupiters. Such offer would take form of converting a number of merchant-type vessels to MRBM force, utilizing Polaris A-2 missiles along general lines of US studies and presentation to NAC by Smith on 22 October./2/ Ships could be deployed in eastern Mediterranean and could be manned by Turkish, Italian and American mixed crews and also possibly Greeks, with appropriate targets of interest to Mediterranean allies covered. Although implementation of this type of force could be realized in short period of time, it would be necessary, as interim step before force comes into being, to station Polaris, as suggested reftel, in eastern Mediterranean. Polaris deployment would then fill gap caused by removal of Jupiters, while Southern Command Multilateral Force was being put together. At same time, rest of Alliance could be investigating possibility of setting up NATO-wide multilateral seaborne force. Southern Command MLF might well serve as model for larger force and could be expanded as other allies indicated desirability to join arrangements this type. To make this whole alternative palatable to Turks and others would require clear US support to implement multilateral seaborne-type force, and if properly presented to Turks and Italians we could highlight flexibility and greater efficiency this type force over Jupiters. Our impression here is that Italians more prone to dismantle Jupiters if proper substitute can be found.

/2/Descriptions of the North Atlantic Council briefing on October 22 are in Polto 502, October 23 (Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2362), and Sherman Kent's November 14 memorandum for the record. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850A) See the Supplement for both.

9. Such pilot arrangement, which would not come into being immediately, could permit us offer Soviets withdrawal obsolete Jupiters as face-saving device for Cuban withdrawal (Polaris deployment would cover in interval). Whether or not this would be acceptable to Soviets, the gesture could be made and might well look good in face of world opinion. Whether or not they accept this type of trade, we believe that in any event strong consideration should be given to withdrawing Jupiters and creating pilot MLF since this would strengthen NATO nuclear capability in eastern Mediterranean. Although Turks didn't agree to stop Jupiter program in 1961, even when faced with facts Jupiters obsolete, of no military value and good Soviet target, they might be willing now to accept substitute in MLF which more effective from all angles./3/

/3/On October 26 the Embassy in Rome replied that removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy "would probably be manageable," but the United States should consult with the Italian Government before making the final decision. (Telegram 936 from Rome; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter--Cuba) See the Supplement. On the same day Ambassador Hare replied from Ankara that removal of the missiles from Turkey would present a major problem not only for U.S.-Turkish relations but also for NATO. He explained in detail the ramifications of removal and how some of them might be met. (Telegram 587 from Ankara; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter--Cuba) See the Supplement.

Finletter

[end of document]

Return to Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol. XI.
Return to the Department of State Home Page. This is an official U.S.-Government source for information on the WWW. Inclusion of non-U.S. Government links does not imply endorsement of contents.