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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
IV. The Rusk Mission To Vietnam, April 17-19, and Planning for Pressures Against the North, April 4-May 7 Washington, April 4, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos. Top Secret. Dear Cabot: I have delayed in carrying out the job assigned to me in the President's 1484 to you of March 20th,/2/ because the planning documents and our whole thinking have been evolving so that it did not seem useful until now to go into the situation more deeply with you. /2/Document 92. As you know, we carried with us to Saigon a so-called "Annex A" which was an analysis of the implications of direct US military action against North Viet-Nam./3/ You saw that analysis at the time and gave your comments to Bob McNamara and John McNaughton. The latter subsequently revised it into the form which I now enclose as Tab B./4/ /3/Apparent reference to papers cited in footnote 4, Document 93. /4/Not found. For the first ten days after our return, we were so preoccupied with the various actions under the first 11 recommendations of the report that we did not again focus on the issue, except that the JCS in this period went forward with their examination of the implications of putting in readiness the various categories of action described in the final McNamara-Taylor report at pages 6 and 7./5/ The original criterion provided that the Border Control Actions, going beyond those approved by the President at present, should be placed on a 72-hour basis, that the same should be done for the Retaliatory Actions, and that the actions falling within "graduated overt military pressure by GVN and US forces" should be placed on a 30-day readiness basis. /5/Document 84. In their examination, the JCS worked to the categories as stated in the report, but pointed out, quite rightly, that they needed further political guidance. Accordingly, we in the Department, with great help from Mike Forrestal in the White House, turned our attention to re-thinking the political scenario. The result is the attached Tab A,/6/ which has now been talked over informally with the JCS and will be the subject of further refining and inserting appropriate military actions within its framework. (It should be noted that this scenario, in Part III, goes beyond Recommendation 12 and deals with the kind of actions discussed in Tab B.) /6/Not attached, but apparent reference to the attachment to Document 102. Three conclusions stick out from the re-analysis and I think are now accepted here: 1. There would be serious domestic problems in moving directly to overt US military action, and, even more basically, if we are to focus the objective where it belongs, on North Viet-Nam, it seems to us vital that the initial acknowledged actions be carried out extensively by the GVN itself. Hence, the new scenario would call for a progression of actions that would put the GVN and Khanh right in the forefront for a period before we ourselves considered moving to overt US action. 2. The categories used in the McNamara-Taylor report seem to us more and more not to fit the most likely time sequence. In particular, we believe that actions against Cambodia and Laos are dependent heavily on the political position in these countries at the time, and that, in general, it seems more likely that we would wish to hold off in hitting Cambodia until we had gone ahead hard against North Viet-Nam itself. Serious as the Cambodian role is, if we start to take strong military action, even in the form of hot pursuit, we will perhaps be making Cambodia wholly hostile and ready to help the VC, and we would certainly be stirring up an international hornets nest that would obscure the real objective and focus of our effort against North Viet-Nam. Laos is a somewhat different case. If we are to carry actions against Laos to the point where North Vietnamese forces would move back in, we must be prepared to deal with all the implications of upsetting the "settlement" in Laos (however precarious and unsatisfactory it is). At the very least, we should be ready at that point either with forces stationed in Thailand or to do that at once. [sic] Moreover, for a whole host of reasons, opening up a Laos theater is the least appetizing way to go about it until we have made a real attempt in North Viet-Nam. Trouble in Laos can only be dealt with with ground forces effectively, and I am sure you know that this would not be an easy move to take from a domestic standpoint nor would it be too good from a strictly military view. In short, there appear to be reasons not to open up other theaters until we have made clear that North Viet-Nam is the main theater and have got really started on it. Obviously, we must deal in due course--once we really mean business--with the activities of North Viet-Nam in both Laos and Cambodia. But our feeling is that this would probably come later rather than sooner, and we are writing an annex to the next revision of Tab A that will cover the problem in that sense. We have also considered the part to be played by retaliatory actions of a tit-for-tat variety. As you will see, these are woven into the present scenario, but we do not necessarily envisage them as a separate and prior category of action. Part of the reason is that they are hard to fit and to present as fitting specific actions by the Viet Cong; one can hit an oil dump in response to an attack on an oil dump, but attempts to retaliate against the far more subtle and damaging Viet Cong assassinations, for example, may be hard to rationalize. But, more basically, tit-for-tat actions, presented as such, do not seem to us by themselves to convey the picture of concerted and steadily rising pressures that reflect complete US determination to finish the job. I state this to you frankly, knowing that you and Paul Harkins are looking at this category of action, and I do not exclude the possibility of there being individual cases where our general conclusion will yield to the attractiveness of a specific proposed operation. We will examine them too in an annex. 3. The result of the above would be to require some sorting of military and political actions and perhaps to change appreciably the readiness times applicable to each category. The Border Control and Retaliatory Actions may not need as short a fuse as 72 hours, but conversely the initiation of actions under the old category of graduated military pressure should probably have a shorter fuse than 30 days. The re-sorting of the actions is now in process within the JCS, and will be reflected in the revised and enlarged scenario we are now preparing. It will require the careful selection of actions which would make a strong impact right from the outset and might be applied thereafter either in the form of a single large action--if and when we move to the US overt phase--or through successive, progressively more serious groups of targets. The JCS considered this informally the other day, and feel that it should be no serious problem to arrange the sequence of actions so that it could be handled in either way. As to the problem of readiness times on the military side, the overt GVN actions are mostly ready now, since we contemplate extensive and perhaps even exclusive use of the Farmgate unit on the air side; even the insertion of B-57s, to be flown with a Vietnamese who would in fact be only a passenger, would take very little time. Thus, the whole question of readiness times is more apparent than real, except for actions to respond to possible escalation although of course we will fit this in and see if there are bugs that do need to be ironed out. Thus, we are now working to amplify the political scenario and dovetail it with the military actions that would be taken at each stage. Secondly, we are working on an annex that would frame the possible timing and type of action in Cambodia and Laos. Thirdly, we will do an analysis of retaliatory actions. And fourthly, once these three jobs are done, we propose to refine our estimates and judgments of North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist reaction, through a comprehensive National Intelligence Estimate. Lastly, this Estimate in turn will give us a better fix on how likely the more drastic forms of North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist action really appear to be, so that we can properly advise the President, at the right time, just what the real risks of escalation are and what it would take to deal with them from a military standpoint. This, then, is the status of our planning. I am pouching this rather detailed explanation so that you, in consultation with Paul Harkins and his senior people as you see fit, can see how our minds are working and give us your own comment back. I am hoping that this will reach you by about April 10, and, if you saw fit, I myself will be in Manila from the 12th through the 15th,7 and would welcome a discussion with whomever you might choose to send. I could make several hours available for this purpose more or less at their convenience, and we could settle time and place by cables between Manila and Saigon if this does not reach you before our departure the morning of the 10th. In order to make the consultation not too conspicuous, I would suggest that the Saigon representation be small and arrive in a discreet manner. 7 As a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Ninth Ministerial Council Meeting of SEATO. I need hardly add that all of this planning is on a contingency basis and does not reflect any policy decisions yet taken by the President. I have some other thoughts that relate back to your memorandum of October 30th to Averell Harriman,8 and I will write you a separate letter on this.9 However, you will see that we have at least put in the motif of the carrot-and-stick, in the form of possible food offers. As to our negotiating position with respect to some reduction of the US presence eventually, this would take further thought, and my own inclination is that we should not raise it at an early point. /8/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. iv, pp. 656-659. /9/Not found. Forgive the length of this, but the subject is complex and we will doubtless need further exchanges to see if we are all thinking at least in the same general lines. With warm regards to you and to Emily, Yours ever, William P. Bundy/10/ /10/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. P.S. I have gone over this letter with General Goodpaster (General Taylor's Assistant), with John McNaughton, and with Bill Sullivan and Mike Forrestal. However, it would not make much sense at this point to try to write you any firm views on behalf of the Department, Secretary McNamara, or the JCS. All of us tend to agree with much of the substance contained in the attached Tab A, but it has not been examined in detail and does not reflect a firm "Washington position." On the contrary, we very much need your thinking at this point in particular. W.P.B./11/ /11/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 109. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 9, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, Special Papers. Secret. SUBJECT /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. iv, pp. 656-659. 1. Lodge's plan runs counter to realities, such as: (a) Our estimate of the objectives and tactics of the various Communist groups involved; (b) Hanoi's outspoken denunciation of any neutralization of North Viet-Nam; (c) Hanoi's repeated denial of support for the Viet Cong who are depicted as an internal liberation force. (Even if, incredibly, Hanoi accepted neutralization, the VC would continue to operate with Hanoi's support.) 2. Any US overtures at this time would be regarded by North Viet-Nam as a sign that we were becoming war weary and frustrated, and this would convince Hanoi all the more that its tactics were wearing us down and succeeding. 3. While neutralization of North Viet-Nam might conceivably have attractions to the USSR, the latter well knows that the ChiComs and the other Asian Communists would never accept this "solution". Incidentally, the idea that old man Ho could be bought off with any offers of rice grants is ridiculous. In turning Lodge down on his suggestion, it might be conceded to him that, when it becomes possible to withdraw US troops, we should, as he suggests, consider means for extracting maximum benefit and concessions from the NVN.
110. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, April 9, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3. Confidential. SUBJECT I talked to my brother about the specific mission which you have in mind for the Secretary of State,/2/ and he reports the following. This has been discussed in the Department, with Ball and Manning in favor, with the Far Eastern experts evenly balanced, and with the Secretary so far not deciding to do it. /2/See Document 111. Bill himself thinks that the considerations are quite evenly balanced. On the one hand, we have had so much high level visiting at Saigon that there is always something to be said for not putting another top level mission in. Moreover, the Secretary has a very strenuous schedule already with the SEATO meeting/3/ and a visit to Taiwan. /3/April 13-15. On the other hand, there is some feeling in the Department that our posture is too McNamara-warlike and that it would be helpful to the Department and to the Secretary for him to spend a day with the Ambassador and with Khanh. Bill agrees with me that the balance of considerations is tilted quite positively if the picture of this trip is that you have asked the Secretary to make it. We have to be careful not to undercut Bob in this, but I think we can manage that side with an announcement something like the following for George Reedy either tonight or tomorrow: "The President had a good discussion with the Secretary on Thursday afternoon of the issues which will come up at the SEATO meeting in Manila./4/ The President also requested Secretary Rusk to extend his visit to the Far East to include a visit to Saigon as a followup to the recent visit of Secretary McNamara. The President's desire is to take the occasion of the Secretary's visit to the SEATO meeting to ensure continued effective consultation with General Khanh and Ambassador Lodge." /4/On April 9, Rusk conferred with the President from 6:30 to 7 p.m. No record of that meeting has been found. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) McG.B./5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, April 9, 1964--8:37 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State. Central Files. ORG 7 S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and initialed by Rusk. 1653. President and I have decided that it would be important for me to extend my visit to the Far East with a two or possibly three day visit to Saigon. This would give me a full opportunity to bring you and General Khanh up-to-date on our discussions at SEATO in which South Viet-Nam will play a most important role. Further, it will give you and me a chance to go over the situation in great detail, to give me some personal feel of a country which I have not visited as Secretary of State, and another opportunity for us to reemphasize our support for our common effort there. I could arrive in Saigon in the early afternoon of Friday, April 17. I hope this will not cause you or General Khanh undue inconvenience about existing schedule commitments. Would much appreciate your suggestions as to how to make best use of time./2/ President is asking General Wheeler to proceed direct to Saigon to be there when I arrive. I do not plan to swamp you with entire SEATO delegation most of which I would leave in Manila. Names of few who would accompany me to Saigon will be forwarded later. Putting aside personal considerations I am of a somewhat divided mind as to whether to bring Mrs. Rusk since your and my time will presumably be filled with business. I would greatly appreciate your personal and frank advice on this. Please reply to Acting Secretary with Nodis relay to Manila for me. Warm personal regards. /2/In telegram 1953 from Saigon, repeated to Manila for the Secretary, April 10, Lodge suggested Rusk should plan to have a long talk with Khanh and Quat, and he might consider a trip to the countryside to see how the pacification program was working. (Ibid.) Rusk
112. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President/1/ Washington. April 10, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos. Top Secret. McGeorge Bundy initialed the memorandum, and an "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw it. VIETNAM I have reviewed the status of our record with Ambassador Lodge. There are two principal matters between him and Washington which are still open. U.S.-French-South Vietnam Relations After learning the results of Bohlen's talk with De Gaulle last week,/2/ Lodge has said that he feels he can no longer advise Khanh to keep the French Embassy in Saigon./3/ Secretary Rusk has asked Lodge to try to stall Khanh's break with France until after the Secretary has had another go at Couve de Murville at the SEATO meeti~ng in Manila./4/ /2/See Documents 105 and 106. /3/Reported in telegrams 1916 and 1930 from Saigon, April 7 and 8. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Both are published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 296C and 296D. /4/In telegram 1620 to Saigon, April 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Planning for Military Pressures against the North Bill Bundy has written Lodge (copy of letter attached)/5/ explaining the status of our political and military planning and sending him a copy of a draft political scenario to lay the groundwork for action against the North. /5/Document 108. Although the Saigon Embassy has expressed interest in mounting cross-border operations into Laos, it is by no means clear that this is Lodge's idea; nevertheless the matter is being studied both at State and in Defense. Some such operations will no doubt be part of the military plans for pressures against the North. Follow-up The Secretary and Bill Bundy, accompanied by General Wheeler, will go to Saigon from the SEATO meeting in Manila to discuss all of the above matters with Lodge. He will have received Bundy's letter by then and will transmit his comments through the Secretary. The Secretary and Bundy will also be able to discuss with Lodge the French position on Vietnam, which they will have picked up in Manila. Upon their return to Washington they should be in a position to make recommendations to you. All the other matters raised by Lodge have been or are in the process of resolution in Bill Sullivan's committee. Lodge's cables continue to get unusually prompt and responsive attention within the Department. Mike
113. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy Chancery, Manila, April 12, 1964, 5:45 p.m./1/ US/M C-2 /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Salans and approved by Rusk on April 16. The source text is labeled "Part II of II." Rusk and Couve de Murville were in Manila as the heads of their respective delegations to the Ninth Ministerial Council Meeting of SEATO, April 13-15. PARTICIPANTS United States France SUBJECT Viet-Nam The Secretary asked Couve what his thoughts were about South Viet-Nam. Couve said he hadn't changed his mind since his last discussions with the Secretary in the autumn./2/ The problem in Viet-Nam, as he saw it, was not military but rather a complete political vacuum in Saigon. The Vietnamese people do not want to fight. Couve stated that French reports are that apart from the cities Vietnamese territory is out of the control of the Vietnamese government. The Diem government, although unpopular, was at least a government. Now there is nothing at all. /2/Couve de Murville and Rusk discussed Southeast Asia and Vietnam in October 1963. (Ibid.) The Secretary asked what France meant by "neutrality" for Viet-Nam. Couve replied, "Quite simply, the Geneva Agreements of 1954." Those accords, he said, provided for the division of Viet-Nam with a commitment by both sides not to accept military aid from outside (sic)/3/ and not to enter into military alliances--which is really neutrality. The Accords provided for independence, nonalignment and reunification. But, Couve admitted, reunification would not be possible with a Communist regime in the North which is not independent. /3/As on the source text. Couve said, if you tell me military victory, I will say that is fine. But if the war is not extended to the North and if U.S. forces do not participate, there is not likely to be military victory in Viet-Nam. The South Vietnamese people are out of the game. All you have is a professional army supported from outside. Couve stated that the situation is exactly the same as the French experienced in Viet-Nam in 1954 and again in Algeria. In 1962 in Algeria, when the French gave Algeria its independence, the French had complete physical control of the country, "but in spite of that we lost the battle. You can't win without the people." The Secretary asked whether there were large numbers of Vietnamese and Algerians fighting with the French in those situations. Couve said yes--200,000 Vietnamese and large numbers of Algerians. Couve continued. There is the game in Viet-Nam, he said, and the game in the international field, with China. North Viet-Nam depends greatly on China. China is an expansionist, imperialist country, and Southeast Asia has always been a target of China's expansionism. All Southeast Asian countries are terrified at the thought of Chinese expansion. Is there any possibility of China's considering it in its own interests to reach an accommodation with the West, i.e., the United States? He thought there was, that in order to concentrate on internal development and to reduce the threat to it, China would renounce its expansionist drive in Southeast Asia on the understanding that Southeast Asia would not be hostile. The Hanoi government would have to follow suit. The Secretary asked, would North Viet-Nam agree to be nonaligned? Couve admitted it would be difficult to conceive of that at the present time. But, he said, it would be enough if North Viet-Nam would agree to let South Viet-Nam alone. National cohesion in VietNam, Couve added, depends on the Vietnamese alone. The Vietnamese don't like the Chinese and it is not in their interest to be aligned with China. The Secretary questioned whether the formula described by Couve would appeal to the Chinese any more than in the past. Couve said, "you omit the fact that you are there." The Chinese are terrified by that. The Secretary said, we were not there in force in 1957. That's not fair, Couve rejoined. Since 1954 the United States supported the Diem government. The Chinese felt that South Viet-Nam was an American sphere of influence. The Secretary pointed out that our increased presence in Viet-Nam came only after 1959 when Hanoi announced that it was after the South. Mr. Bundy indicated that before that, our presence in Viet-Nam was within the scope of the 1954 Geneva Accords. For example, we had no more than 500-600 military personnel, the number the French had in 1954. Couve replied that for China 500 French military personnel in South Viet-Nam is one thing, but 500 American personnel is another. Couve said France was trying to find the best means calculated to keep South Viet-Nam from falling to the Communists. The Secretary asked, "Is it the heart of French policy not to have a Communist regime in South Viet-Nam?" Couve answered, "Of course. I have said it many times." The Secretary asked, then wouldn't it help for France to throw its support behind those who are trying to stop a Communist takeover? No, said Couve, because we don't think you can win. The South Vietnamese think that French policy is to get the United States out of Viet-Nam and to have the Communists take over, the Secretary added. The Secretary said we thought there was a chance for a settlement in Laos, but we haven't seen it. Couve attributed this fact to the deterioration of the Vietnamese affair. In any case, Couve said, Laos is no longer a "crisis" and Laos is not finally divided. There is still a possibility of unification under some kind of government. The Secretary said that when Couve speaks of the Laos agreement not having worked because of Viet-Nam, it meant to the Secretary that the Viet Minh want to continue to use Laos to push people into South Viet-Nam. That is one reason, Couve admitted. Another is that the Pathet Lao and Phoumi had no intention of implementing the Geneva Agreements. Both thought there was still something to gain. Phoumi hoped to be master of South Laos-to have a divided country. Couve asked the Secretary how he saw things for the SEATO Conference. The Secretary said he thought there would be full discussion in the private meetings of Laos, Viet-Nam and Malaysia. He thought it important for SEATO to express interest in there being no further expansion of Communism in Southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam, after all, was one of the SEATO Protocol States. The Secretary did not think SEATO would be called upon to get into the Malaysia question. The Secretary said he hoped he and Couve would have a further talk. Couve said perhaps something could be arranged on Wednesday afternoon./4/ /4/April 15. No record of a conversation has been found.
114. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy Chancery, Manila, April 12, 1964/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, WFB Chron. Secret. Drafted by Bundy on April 13. PARTICIPANTS Following the conclusion of Dr. Quat's discussion of his plans at the Conference,/2/ he asked to stay on alone with the Secretary and myself. /2/At 3:30 p.m. on April 12, Quat, accompanied by Nguyen Duy Lien, the Vietnamese Observer at the SEATO Council Meeting, and Do Lenh Tuan, the Vietnamese Charge in Manila, met with Rusk, William Bundy, and Max V. Krebs, Political Counselor at the Embassy in Manila. Rusk stressed to Quat that he should use the Council meeting to talk with each of the SEATO foreign ministers and describe the situation in Vietnam, the threat from the North, and how South Vietnam was countering it. Rusk thought it important that Quat give the impression that South Vietnam was confident of its ability to cope successfully with the situation. Quat stated that such was his intention, and the two foreign ministers discussed the best means of doing so. (Memorandum of conversation, April 12, US/MC/1; ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) Dr. Quat said he wanted to describe the real situation in Saigon, which he had talked about with Ambassador Lodge recently. He said that the essential problem was that all groups should pull together to assure victory. In particular, he was deeply concerned that there was not full military-civilian cooperation. He said that Khanh knows the situation uniquely among the generals, but that some of his advisors were not so wise. He said there was presently a tendency for Khanh to draw in on himself, and likened this to an accordion which had been fully extended but was now sharply contracted. He made clear that what he meant was that there was a tendency toward increasing military domination and military powers. This he thought might increase effectiveness in the military sense, but that the result would be ephemeral without better political understanding. Dr. Quat said that the resignation of Interior Minister Ky/3/ was an "eclatement" of feeling between the military and the civilians; the implication was that he was friendly to Ky's position. /3/Ha Thuc Ky. Dr. Quat said that he himself was playing the part of an unofficial intermediary between the military and the civilians, and that in his talks with the military leaders, one or two of them had expressed what Dr. Quat regarded as dangerous ideas. Specifically, it was being suggested that if the press did not behave in a disciplined fashion, it should be suppressed. Secondly, it was being suggested that there should be anti-intellectual demonstrations, apparently by military forces ("sorties dans la rue"). Dr. Quat thought there were two possible solutions. One would be a "real marriage" between the two groups, so that not only would there be a plan (which he conceded there was at present) but it would be carried out in unison on both the military and civilian sides. Alternatively, Dr. Quat thought there might be a sharing of responsibilities. For example, the MRC might be taken out of political life and lay down the basic guidelines of action for the so-called "points" of the plan, and there might be a civilian government set up under the MRC in order to carry out the plan. If the civilian government then did not do its job, it might be changed. Comment: Throughout the conversation, Dr. Quat spoke in a low, intense manner, apparently reflecting deep feeling. He was obviously trying to get across the picture that all was not well with Khanh's handling of the civilian side, and that he himself, despite his asserted position of intermediary, was among those who were sharply unhappy with the way things were going. He did not refer specifically, except in the one instance, to the position of the intellectuals, but I should judge that this, too, is very much on his mind. (I note Khanh's attack on the intellectuals as useless in his statement yesterday.) I am not sure how seriously to take Quat's expression. He himself has always been something of an intellectual, and recollection is that he expressed similar misgivings early in the Khanh regime. Nonetheless, his description does tally sufficiently with other evidences of military-civilian friction so that we should take it as not wholly unfounded. William P. Bundy/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
115. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Ministerial Council Meeting to the Department of State/1/ Manila, April 15, 1964--7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SEATO 3 PHIL (MA). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, and Vientiane. Passed to the White House on receipt in the Department of State. Secto 49. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. 1. As expected, communiqué presented main issue. Text key paragraphs concerning Viet-Nam and Laos being transmitted septel./2/ As you will see, all members except French finally supported strong paragraphs on Viet-Nam, with French submitting separate paragraph expressing their sympathy for Viet-Nam effort but saying they did not think it wise to join in declaration made by others. /2/For full text of the communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 835-839. 2. Believe this result best we could have achieved in circumstances and at least heartening evidence of solidarity other SEATO members. Couve had resisted stoutly all efforts produce more forthcoming French statement of support during restricted session yesterday,/3/ and had simply gone on repeating that since French believed effort in Viet-Nam doomed to failure they considered political solution must be explored. Incidentally, in discussing escalation possibility in restricted session, Couve said that if French were consulted they would probably be "rather against" extending the war to the North, which in his view would have to include hostilities with China. This seems to clarify French thinking this point and to negate Alphand's contrary interpretation. At same time, Couve said there certainly was no assurance Chinese Communists in fact would accept a neutral Viet-Nam (even with US forces withdrawn, which he had made clear in private conversation was what French envisaged). Comment on this position seems superfluous, but at least we are a shade clearer where French stand and they are at least willing to express their sympathy for Vietnamese effort. /3/Rusk's assessment of this restricted session was transmitted in Secto 26 from Manila, April 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3. As to impact on French-Vietnamese relations, Quat seemed both satisfied with strength of declarations by other members and even somewhat pleased that French had finally ended up with some affirmative [statement?] however mild. Couve and Quat have also had two conversations here,/4/of which second was reported by Quat to be cordial and Quat considers door now open for French to initiate discussions that could include economic issues as well as restoration of Ambassadors. I will want to discuss this more fully in Saigon to assess what our next move and position with Khanh should be. /4/An account of Quat's discussions with Couve de Murville as recounted to William Bundy by Quat is in Secto 68 from Saigon, April 19. (Ibid., POL FR-VIET S) 4. As communique shows, all others remained solid throughout although Pakistanis said little and Lopez/5/ made abortive effort find common ground between our strong position and that of French. Thanat, as expected, particularly firm. Essentially French were isolated in restricted session but were not publicly pilloried except by Thanat in opening public session, which Couve did resent. Otherwise, he probably content with result and had no latitude to go further. In this morning's session on communique he quickly suggested solution along lines ultimately reached. /5/Salvador P. Lopez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. 5. What French future in SEATO is or should be is a matter we should consider on my return, but there no indication here French plan withdrawal. On contrary, given probable rigidity de Gaulle's instructions, Couve seemed to be going to some length to avoid confrontation. 6. As to greater individual contributions to Viet-Nam, I have obtained no specific promises of material significance but believe communique and atmosphere here have prepared way for us to keep pressure on. 7. In Laos discussion, French proposed text that would have blamed "factions" impartially but yielded to final text which refers "particularly" to Communist violations. 8. Other communiqué issues revolved around Pakistani effort to invoke SEATO support as between member states and non-member states, meaning of course India, and brief British effort express concern on Malaysia. We stayed out of Pakistani fight, partly in order to avoid disturbing Pakistanis and possibly upsetting their support for Vietnamese paragraphs. Believe result innocuous. 9. In sum, meeting closed on fairly high note, considering adamant French position. Rusk
116. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of State, at Taipei/1/ Washington, April 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Vietnam, Rusk/ Lodge, Wm. Bundy Correspondence. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Personal; No Other Distribution. There is no indication on the source text how this memorandum was transmitted to Rusk in Taipei, which he visited after the SEATO Council Meeting. The President has asked me to emphasize again the importance which he attaches to your conversation with Ambassador Lodge and the opportunity which this conversation gives for the most candid discussion of our policy toward the struggle in South Vietnam. The President sets the highest possible importance on maintaining the effective understanding with Ambassador Lodge which has been established ever since November, and he thinks it of the greatest importance that this cooperation should be sustained, especially in the light of the possibility that others may try to inject partisan politics into the matter. The President therefore reiterates his hope that you and Bill will examine closely with the Ambassador any recommendations which he may have which in any sense go beyond current policy positions of the USG. The President will wish to give the most sympathetic and careful study to any specific recommendation which the Ambassador makes, and will go to very considerable lengths to assure full harmony. It does remain possible, of course, that there may be some particular recommendation from the Ambassador which the Administration will not be able to accept, but in any such case the President will himself review with the Ambassador the reasons for the Administration's decision and will do his best on his side to work the matter out amicably with the Ambassador. In this connection President is asking Ambassador to take up with you the possibility presented in his Secret 8 of April 16 to the President./2/ We need to develop before decision here a more complete picture of proposed "tit for tat" operations, as well as implications of any warning to Ho. /2/Reference is to telegram 8 from Lodge to the President, April 16, which reads as follows: "1. Through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we have had report from source judged by the police to be reliable of a VC plan bomb American community school. We can get no information as to date." [1 line of source text not declassified] "2. Such a terroristic act would completely justify 'tit for tat' retaliation NVN. There could be no target more precious and more deserving of retaliation." "3. It also points to desirability of notifying Ho as a preventative measure that any terroristic act against Americans will bring instant retaliation. This, however, should not be done in a way to destroy our existing sources of information." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1710 to Saigon, April 16, 7:14 p.m., the President informed Lodge that he was "authorized to take whatever action you and General Harkins see fit to meet the threat to the school." (Ibid.) In summary, the President hopes that any specific new recommendations will be pinpointed, and that you will convey to the Ambassador the President's strong desire to have a fully agreed common policy between Washington and Saigon. The President continues to recognize the distinguished service which the Ambassador is giving in this most difficult post. New Subject: While the President has repeatedly insisted that no one in the Administration should appear to be pressing the Ambassador to give up his present post because of any domestic political involvements, George Ball and I both believe that it would be entirely appropriate for you as Secretary to ask the Ambassador to share with you his own present thinking on any possible early change in his assignment. The nomination of any possible replacement will be your responsibility and will be a matter of great importance, and in the present situation in South Vietnam any significant gap between Ambassador's return and the assignment of his successor would be most undesirable.
117. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos. Top Secret. SUBJECT Herewith a brief status report on the progress of planning for pressures against the North. The political scenario which I developed with Bill Sullivan's help/2/ has been turned over to John McNaughton for further refinement before it is presented to the JCS. Sullivan and I have tried to press John to get something simple into the hands of the JCS as rapidly as possible. We are afraid that they are going off on two politically unproductive tracks. First, they may be spending most of their time planning for cross border raids and aircraft incursions into Laos and Cambodia; and second, they may be ginning up a variety of "tit-for-tat" actions against the North. Planning on both of these tracks has been largely stimulated, I think, by General LeMay./3/ In order to get the Chiefs something more politically useful to work on, we are pressing McNaughton and McNamara to get something like our paper officially into their mill before we are faced with a mass of ineffective and politically explosive planning. /2/See the attachment to Document 102. /3/An example of such planning is JCSM-298-64, April 14, in which General LeMay and General Greene advised Secretary McNamara that they were "convinced that operations in Vietnam should be extended and expanded immediately." They recommended a plan for a series of overt and covert actions against North Vietnam and across the Lao and Cambodian borders in order to force the North to cease its support for the insurgency in the South. The other members of the Joint Chiefs dissented on the grounds that the plan was premature. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 092 Vietnam) Since a majority of the Joint Chiefs dissented, McNamara took no action on JCSM-298-64. (Memorandum from the Administrative Secretary, OSD, to the Secretary of the JCS, May 5, enclosure to JCS 2343/345-4, May 7, as quoted in Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, JCS, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960-1968, Part 1, Chapter 9, p. 22) I think that there is some fear at the Pentagon, among the more reasonable military as well as the civilians, that since the President will never authorize anything like the actions proposed in the political scenario, it is better to concentrate on the cross border and "tit-for-tat" approach. In short, they suspect us of putting up a straw man. There may also be an underlying worry that what we have proposed might get the U.S. involved in an unmanageable, large-scale war. As matters stand now, John McNaughton has agreed to prepare a simple memo for the Chiefs based upon our scenario but adding some elements of cross border operations and "tit-for-tat" actions as one of several tactics we might use. McNaughton, Sullivan and I will discuss this with Bob McNamara on Saturday afternoon,/4/at which time we will press him to put it to the Chiefs officially, so that we stop the growing criticism that no formal political proposal has been made to them. /4/April 18; no record of a meeting has been found. What would be helpful now is a very delicate hint from the President that he has not excluded actions directed against the North before the election. I realize how dangerous this could be if any such hint got out of control; and consequently I have perhaps been overcautious in not repeating any of our conversation with the President several weeks ago, except in a very oblique way to Bill Sullivan. We should have a chat about this and other aspects of Vietnam when you get a minute. Mike
118. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Prime Minister Khanh, Saigon, April 18, 1964/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy. SUBJECT /2/Document 119. PARTICIPANTS /3/General Wheeler was in Vietnam, April 15-20, to represent the Department of Defense during Rusk's visit and to assess air operations in South Vietnam. Wheeler's report, April 22, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FR(3 71 A 3470. South Vietnam. Khanh initiated this topic. He said he agreed with the idea of carrying the war to North Vietnam, and that there were a lot of possibilities of action such as commando raids, etc. We could not stay on the defensive but must move to the enemy. The Secretary responded that there were two important considerations. First, the base here must be made firmer, as Khanh himself had indicated to Secretary McNamara in March. Secondly, the Sino-Soviet situation was not yet clear. Khrushchev appeared to think a real break could be prevented. Moreover, the Secretary said, the United States had to study the implications carefully. The United States would never get into another Korea with large conventional forces, and enlargement of the war might mean a high level of military action in which we would have to consider using nuclear weapons. Because of these problems, we should do absolutely all we could to improve the situation here before we started actions against the North. The Secretary further noted that some of our Asian allies had expressed opposition to the use of nuclear weapons. Khanh responded that as far as he was concerned we could use anything we wanted against China. As long as Communist China remained "you will never have security." Communist China was Vietnam's hereditary enemy, and the issue must be resolved. The Secretary said others in Asia felt the same way. He went on that there were a number of actions that might be taken that would not be likely to lead to general war. These we needed to discuss between our two governments.
119. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 29, 1964--6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Passed to the White House on receipt in the Department of State at 5:48 a.m. Secto 71. Department repeat parts to other posts as needed. From Secretary for Acting Secretary. Following were highlights my talk with Khanh, supplemented as necessary by my earlier shorter talk with Quat. 1. I stressed our complete commitment to GVN and that this based on national interest. Khanh responded that struggle vital both for area and principle and that he annoyed when "some" did not understand. (I took up this cue in dinner toast, pointing out two Senators disagreed, but 98 supported US policy and both parties did.) Khanh went on to say that this new kind of war in which aggression could not be neatly proved but in which special laws applied and should not hang on exact words. Really total Communist war, with Mao following Stalin policy of biting off small nations. First Central Europe, now Southeast Asia, later Africa. 2. I strongly urged importance decentralizing authority and giving local officials initiative, asking whether he satisfied with present province chiefs. Khanh responded no magic formula and could not change old habits of society and especially officials quickly, but that he moving to bring all groups in, to provide firm and determined leadership, and to give officials responsibility. He said much talk of dictatorship, but this not at all his way and that he doing all possible to get lower levels to act on own. 3. Khanh encouraged by Manila result. I responded Quat had been most helpful to GVN cause and that this showed importance GVN getting out and selling own case, including naming key Ambassadors who might be men who for political reasons could not be used at home. (I did not refer directly to Kim and Don, but he clearly got point.) Khanh said he recognized this weak point, hard to find people, but that he would "handle this month" (meaning Kim and Don, for what this may be worth in light previous statements similar nature). 4. GVN-French relations. I said French attitude 80 percent motivated by de Gaulle's wish to be independent of U.S., that French had no more real power or interest in Asia and that it best to ignore them. If French individuals misbehaved, then get rid of them. Cooperation of French community in VN important, and since it seemed to support GVN effort should be made to make this clear. Khanh concurred that French here anti-de Gaulle, but went on to say that he deeply concerned that document obtained by secret means from French Embassy had shown French had specific plans to supersede us in information area. I said such document hard to interpret and that French might think badly of some U.S. information efforts in their former African areas on same lines. Khanh said he would look further into this. Note: In earlier Quat talk he had reviewed his Manila talks with Couve along lines reported separately. Quat had concluded that situation not grave and that now up to French to take initiative if they wanted to discuss restoration of Ambassadors and commercial problems. He said he recommending to Khanh they play it cool, and my deduction from tone of Khanh talk is that he agrees unless specific stronger evidence turns up of French activity against GVN. Khanh did say he on watch for such evidence and that lines ran into other countries. I did not draw him out or offer our intelligence help but obviously we should watch very closely in such places as Paris and Phnom Penh as well as here. 5. Cambodia. Khanh said France dictates Sihanouk attitudes, not necessarily through Ambassador but through French advisors. Sihanouk believes Commies will win and hence threatens to negotiate with Hanoi. He said he particularly concerned latest Sihanouk talk of dealing with both Hanoi and with National Liberation Front which of course just name for Viet Cong. If Sihanouk did this, "I will no longer be obliged to respect the frontier". He went on to cite latest Cambodian border incidents, saying that supporting fire had come from Cambodian side of border. He thought Sihanouk might be stirring up such incidents and then planning to use them to justify dealing with NLF as party really controlling border, and repeated that if he did so he, Khanh, would be compelled to counter-attack into Cambodia. He considered the situation grave. 6. I responded that Couve had assured me that the French would press Sihanouk to work out his problems by bilateral dealings with both Thailand and South Vietnam, and that we ourselves would support such efforts strongly. I urged he hold off till after Sihanouk's visit to France. Khanh did not seem wholly persuaded and said that they had just sent a forthcoming note to Sihanouk, but that the latter had responded badly (presumably meaning the threat about the NLF). Note: I conclude we will have to watch this one very closely and consider whether there are ways to get Sihanouk to withdraw at least his NLF threat. 7. SEATO action. Khanh said the Manila communiqué/2/ seemed to indicate the SEATO countries were ready to move to action and asked whether the GVN should make a formal appeal to SEATO. I said that SEATO still had the rule of unanimity on military actions although the nations in fact acted under the principle of the Rusk-Thanat communiqué/3/ that their obligations continued even though SEATO as such did not note the action. (He at once grasped this point and showed, as throughout, great acuteness.) Thus, I said the thing was to find out what more individual nations were prepared to do, not as SEATO but under their SEATO obligations. We fully supported getting more help from such nations both for its military help and its political significance in showing GVN had many supporters. I referred specifically to the past Philippine offer of Rangers which I understood had been turned down by Diem, and urged that it be revived. I also mentioned Thanat's suggestion about training Thai Rangers for use in Laos. Khanh asked if the use of military forces from other nations would raise international complications, and I said I thought not. (In retrospect, it occurs to me he may have had ChiNats in mind here, but I doubt if ChiNat armed forces apart from specialists are now a live issue here in light Gimo's comments in Taipei/4/ and also fact General Khiem told me specifically at dinner last night that he had approached Gimo about possibility ChiNat military units and been fumed down flat ) /2/See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 835-839. /3/For text of the joint statement issued at Washington by Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman on March 6, 1962, see ibid., 1962, pp. 1091-1093. /4/In a discussion in Taipei, President Chiang Kai-shek told Rusk that the best way for the Republic of China to aid South Vietnam was by airdropping 5,000 to 10,000 Chinese Nationalist guerrillas into China's southwestern province to encourage and promote an anti-Communist revolution and disrupt Chinese Communist supply lines to their allies in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. Chiang wanted the United States to provide the planes for the airdrop. (Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Chiang Kai-shek, April 16; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) 8. Laos. Khanh said the Lao asking him to help in South Laos. He said that the southern corner of Laos was of special concern to them, showing on the map how the trails run from south Laos down into Cambodia and east to Ban Me Thnot. He had guerrilla forces who could move into this area to work with the FAR, and of course the Viet Cong pipeline ran through this area. (He seemed to focus much more on this area than on the Tchepone area.) 9. I responded that the GVN should focus on its own interests not on the struggle between the various groups in Laos. The important thing was to get intelligence on what the Viet Cong were doing. I then said that since the three factions were meeting and also we ourselves were pressing the Soviets for help, they should wait a few days and Ambassador Lodge should then talk further with the GVN. Khanh said that Moscow was far and Peking near, and he doubted if the Soviets could do much. 10. Action against North Vietnam. Khanh raised this topic. I will report fully on my return./5/ /5/See Document 118. 11. Relations with GRC and ROK. Khanh asked what we thought of the idea of their forming a common front with these two, which would not be a military alliance but a "common moral front" to show solidarity. I said we would favor regular consultations to show sympathy, and also forms of aid short of combat forces, but that we did not encourage an alliance and believed particularly that the issue of Southeast Asia should not get mixed with the enormous issue of the basic Chinese conflict. 12. Overall. Conversation friendly throughout. He was carefully prepared, knew what he wanted to get across, and responded quickly to my points. A most impressive man. Rusk
120. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, April 19, 1964, 10 a.m./1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. IX, Memos. Top Secret. Drafted by John M. Dunn, Special Assistant to the Director of USOM in Saigon. SUBJECT /2/Document 108. PARTICIPANTS Ambassador opened discussion with summary of Mr. Bundy's letter of April 4. He indicated that the letter and the attached scenario and rationale were impressive and interesting. He summarized the letter as follows: Actions fall into three categories. Category A. In essence this is what is being done now and what is projected already under OP Plan 34-A./3/ It is very questionable whether these actions influence events to any important extent. There may be a training benefit which might be useful if more far-reaching actions are adopted later. Essentially, all actions under Category A are and should be covert South Viet-Nam measures with covert U.S. support. /3/See footnote 2, Document 4. Category B. The distinction between Categories A and B primarily is that South Viet-Nam actions become overt with U.S. covert support continuing. These actions would include both aerial mining of selected harbors and sea routes and VNAF attacks on selected DRV targets, possibly including the use of Farmgate aircraft. Category C. Actions would involve joint overt SVN and U.S. participation. Would consist of (a) warning and preparatory actions, to include intensified U.S. aerial reconnaissance activities, sizable area build-up of naval power, and large-scale overflights of North VietNam; and (b) destructive activities, to include naval control measures (involving either selective or total blockade of North Viet-Nam through use of patrols, mines, and other measures), naval bombardment of selected DRV targets, and air attacks on selected DRV targets. Both GVN and U.S. would prior to taking any destructive action make clear to its own people and to the world the rationale which supports such efforts against the North. Lodge questioned wisdom both of massive publicity and of massive destructive actions before a well planned and well executed diplomatic attempt had been made (with military and economic backing) to persuade NVN to call off the V.C. Hanoi should be told, in a way not to involve loss of face, of a carrot-stick program, aim of which would be cessation of V.C. terrorism. One element would be fear, to be produced by bombing some target. The pot could also be sweetened for Hanoi by adding the possibility of food imports (perhaps from Western nations other than the U.S.) and by some U.S. personnel withdrawal which we had decided to do anyway (none other). To make such a statement to Hanoi the right kind of interlocutor was important. There is a fairly long list of names which Lodge had rejected for various reasons. These were UAR, Yugoslavs, Poles and United Kingdom. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Lodge felt it was very difficult to predict the Viet Cong reaction to large-scale measures against the North-particularly measures involving overt U.S. participation. It is possible that the VC might react violently here. We are not at all sure that we know their full capability-how much they hold in reserve. Almost certainly, targets in the South such as dams and oil refineries, power transmission lines, generators, etc. would immediately be taken under attack. There is also a possibility that the PAVN, perhaps followed by the Chinese Communist Army, would cross the border in open invasion of South VietNam. U.S. could not match Chinese millions of men. If so, would the defense of the South necessarily involve U.S. use of nuclear weapons? For us to make such a statement to Hanoi through an interlocutor is neither a negotiation nor a dialogue. It is more nearly an ultimatum. Certainly no Geneva-type conference should be considered unless and until we grow much stronger here than we are now. General Discussion Followed The Secretary raised the question as to what the attitude in South Viet-Nam would be toward another Geneva Conference for Laos. Lodge indicated that it would be bad, that a proposal for such a conference inevitably would have a bad reaction here. Consternation reigns even when the New York Times, for example, speculates on the possibility of a Geneva Conference. This is because the Vietnamese feel the subject of Viet-Nam necessarily will come up in any Geneva Conference. Embassy representatives indicated, however, that there is a difference, which can be drawn distinctly, between a conference called on Laos to settle specific points which arise on an urgent basis and one called for the general purpose of considering the situation in Southeast Asia or the Protocol States. Mr. Bundy commented generally on the rationale of his paper. The paper represents an effort to pull together a political scenario which would at least represent a useful beginning. The basic premise is that we must first state our objective-getting Hanoi and Peking out of South Viet-Nam. While the paper does not make explicit the possibility of American troop withdrawal from the South, some change in our military posture here would result if Northern and Chinese involvement is discontinued. Implicit in our whole stand is the fact that the U.S. military presence here would be very different if the war became a case simply of counter-insurgency. It is, in any case, very difficult to play the card of promised troop withdrawal, since we don't know yet how many and what types of military men are needed here. We may, in fact, require American troop increases in South Viet-Nam. We can and will, of course, provide economic aid of some type from the West if North Viet-Nam cooperates. Rice imports, for example, could be scheduled in a manner similar to the wheat now going into Communist China. Lodge indicated that it would be very hard indeed for Ho Chi Minh to provide a salable package for his own people and for other Communist nations unless we can do something that Hanoi can point to, even though it would not be a real concession on our part. The Secretary indicated that he was not too concerned about the possibility that any withdrawal from the South on the part of North Viet-Nam and the Chinese might be temporary. He indicated that, in his opinion, we can rebuild our strength here faster than they can if this becomes necessary. He stated his concern that the extent of infiltration and other provision of support from the North be proven to the satisfaction of our own public, of our allies, and of the neutralists. Mr. Bundy stated that Mr. William Jorden's draft paper on this subject is coming along nicely,/4/ that he feels unit strengths can be projected from individual POW reports, and that aerial reconnaissance has been and will continue to be particularly useful. [2 lines of source text not declassified] /4/See footnote 9, Document 102. General Harkins stated that the VNAF now has two prisoners definitely identified as coming from the North Vietnamese 325th Division. The prisoners are now on their way up for interrogation at the National Center. Important evidence should result. A discussion of the efficacy of aerial photography flights ensued: Mr. de Silva indicated that his understanding was that present U-2 flights had produced no evidence of infiltration. It was decided that for low-level reconnaissance U.S. planes would be preferable, but that their use even over Laos raises many political problems. Ambassador Unger, for example, feels strongly that any air reconnaissance involving U.S. aircraft should not be performed below 10,000 feet. It was agreed that the psychological value of U.S. low-level reconnaissance could be great and should be considered when weighing such a program. The Secretary then raised the possibility of a U.S. naval presence at Tourane or Cam Ranh Bay. He also suggested the possibility of nibbling on North Viet-Nam shipping above the Demarcation Line. He asked about the possibility that the junk fleet might pick up some North Vietnamese small vessels above the parallel and whether air cover would have to be provided for such an operation. General Wheeler did not feel that aerial attack was a problem, but that the Swatow-class gunboats would make it impossible for junks to operate in that area. He feels that the Nastys will be more than a match for the Swatow boats when they become operational and should be used for such purposes. General Harkins indicated that even the very limited naval operations undertaken to date have had considerable impact on the North. There is, for example, considerable evidence of increased defensive measures already having been taken all along the coast. [1 paragraph (3-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] The availability of other Asian troops to fight here then was discussed. The Secretary stated that we are not going to take on the masses of Red China with our limited manpower in a conventional war. While China's Chiang Kai-shek is adamantly opposed to America's use of nuclear weapons in Asia, the Chinats do not offer the kind of conventional forces that would be useful here or probably even on mainland China. Ninety per cent of the enlisted men now are Formosans and not particularly well motivated to fight outside Formosa (or perhaps the off-shore islands) where they may be reasonably expected to give a good account of themselves. The use of individuals from Taiwan as cadre and advisers, and of some special units such as UDT and the like is, of course, a different matter. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] General Wheeler agreed that the Chinese solders are used to getting along with a great deal less than we are and that it would be very difficult to interdict from the air [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified]. Mr. de Silva suggested that the principal question which must be considered before undertaking such a program is whether the Chinese feel themselves capable of taking on the U.S. at this time. The Secretary indicated that he felt this was primarily a question of Chinese-Soviet relations. If the Chinese do not feel they can count on Soviet support, it is highly questionable whether they would want to face our power. He feels that a great deal can be done with the Chinese based on the fact that their trend in trade relationships has shifted over the past few years from the Red Bloc to the West in greater measure. The Australians and Canadians, for example, could bring great pressure on Red China by withholding wheat and other grains. If we go much further with the plans under discussion, we must consider approaching our allies along these lines. The Ambassador indicated that he was very dubious about what might happen to the Viet Cong here in SVN if we took out the industrial targets in the Haiphong-Hanoi complexes. They have ample weapons and a base from which to recruit and supply themselves with food and other necessities. It is entirely possible that we would have forfeited the "hostage" which we hold in the North which provides a certain amount of security to some of our more sophisticated and complex installations here without markedly affecting the fight against the Viet Cong, at least in the short run. The basic problem was still the creation of a proper political atmosphere. He stated that he found the idea of a naval presence in Tourane and Cam Ranh Bay very attractive. This would provide feasible evidence of American strength for both the South Vietnamese and the North. The Secretary stated-that he would couple such a presence with intensified civic action projects to be launched in the immediate area to give the Vietnamese people an added stake in the American presence. The Secretary raised the point of our intelligence operation and its apparent inadequacies here in the South. He finds it difficult to understand how VC forces of the strength of two battalions can literally "spring from the ground" and launch a coordinated attack without prior detection. Mr. de Silva stated that a great deal more can be done if present restrictions on the Cambodian and Laotian side of the border are removed. General Harkins feels that the key point is to obtain intelligence from the people who at the present time simply won't provide information in certain areas either because they are terrorized or committed to the VC. These are the very areas in which, because of the geography and vegetation, the VC can move readily and stealthily. For example, in the lower Camau Peninsula, they can use the canals virtually without fear of detection. The Secretary indicated that we should go ahead with our plans to use a Canadian as intermediary and begin the groundwork now to obtain such a man and station him here.
121. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, April 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3. No classification marking. You decided yesterday to call Mike Pearson and to say to him that Dean Rusk will be bringing an important personal message 2 from you when he goes up to the Ministerial discussions on U.S.-Canada relations next week. You may or may not want to indicate to Pearson that this message deals with our view that the very best possible Canadian should be assigned to the ICC team in Vietnam with the specific mission of conveying to Hanoi both warnings about its present course and hints of possible rewards in return for a change. 2 The message has not been found, but see Document 134. McG. B.
122. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to the President/1/ Washington, April 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series. Vol. VII. Cables and Memos. Secret. SUBJECT During the recent trip to Saigon with Secretary Rusk, I came to the conclusion that the weakest part of the war operation, both on our part and that of the Government of South Viet-Nam, is in the field of information and psychological warfare. According to a report by the Military Advisory Commission as well as information gathered by USIS, this is true on both a nationwide basis and a province-by-province basis. It is my judgment that the Viet-Namese people will never give sufficient support to the war effort until certain glaring gaps are closed in the information-psychological campaign. In view of the importance of public opinion in Viet-Nam, in this country and in the world at large, I believe that top priority should be given to a large scale United States program to improve the GVN ability to win the support of the people and to tell its story abroad. Two steps are urgently required: 1. We must place informational-psychological advisors into every major area, just as we have placed military and economic development advisors throughout the GVN organization. 2. We must begin a crash program to train promising South VietNamese personnel in radio, motion picture, publishing and other techniques crucial to any program of psychological warfare. This is essential because it is unanimously agreed that the GVN is sorely lacking in personnel with the motivation and training to do the job required. I found Prime Minister Khanh and Minister of Information Pham Thai extremely forthcoming in talks about a new information program, and both expressed eagerness to have United States assistance-a sharp improvement over the attitude of the Diem government. This Agency already has submitted to the GVN a detailed proposal of steps needed to improve its psychological warfare performance. The GVN has promised to respond with a detailed proposal of areas in which it wishes our immediate assistance. While in Saigon, I also held sessions with the representatives of CIA, MACV, USOM, the Embassy political section and my USIS staff. We agreed on steps now underway, or soon to be gotten underway, which require no action from Washington. (For example, a small group of key Americans and a few top Viet-Namese officials Monday held the first meeting of a joint psychological operations committee which had been set up some time earlier but had never gotten together.)/2/ /2/No record of the meeting on Monday, April 20, has been found. If the proposed program is to succeed, it will require a modest outlay of U.S. funds and some increase in personnel from USIA and perhaps other U.S. agencies. I recommend also that we explore the possibility of third country contributions to the information program. U.S. expenditures in the information-psychological field are now quite small, relatively speaking. In fact, I was informed that the program is a failure in several provinces because of the lack of small bits of money to pay for such things as the running of a projector, or paper on which to print leaflets. I emphasize strongly my belief that the information effort will fail, no matter what resources we pour into it, unless it has the clear direction of a single individual capable of formulating the program required and of guiding it to success. For many reasons, I believe that the control should be civilian and that Barry Zorthian, the Country Public Affairs Officer and one of the most capable men in this entire agency, should be given this responsibility. I further recommend that a top USIA officer be included as an official part of any subsequent missions from Washington to study the development of the Viet-Namese operation. Likewise, if Mr. Zorthian is to have a chance at success, USIA must be represented on all committees in Washington which are mapping plans to carry us to victory in VietNam. In a few days I shall submit for consideration by you, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense a detailed plan to meet the objectives spelled out above./3/ /3/Apparent reference to a memorandum from Rowan to Sullivan, April 28. (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Psychological Operations Files: FRC 68 A 4933, INFO-PSYCH Operations, 1964) Carl
123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 22, 1964--7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. 2033. CINCPAC for POLAD. 1. General Minh, on the occasion of Secretary Rusk's call,/2/ exclaimed to me that he never saw me anymore. When I said that I would gladly come whenever he would see me, he said he did not wish to summon me, but hoped he could see me nonetheless. Accordingly, I called on him late Monday afternoon/3/ at his home. /2/Apparent reference to a courtesy call on Minh by Rusk when he was in Saigon, April 1 7-19. /3/April 20. 2. He says the Buddhists are turning against Khanh. The newspaper Tin Sang, which he suspects is backed and managed by the Buddhist clergy, has openly attacked him in two editions in a row on the ground that Khanh is appointing "bad Diemists". 3. Khanh is making the same errors as Diem. He puts people at the head of key posts because he trusts them rather than because they are capable people. 4. The man who is now chief of military security, Col. Phuoc, was a key member of Nhu's secret service and had arrested many Buddhist professors and students. 5. Khanh badly needs to win more confidence than he has. Minh had gone to the movies incognito the other night, and when Khanh's picture came on the screen, he could discern the discontent. He felt Khanh was unpopular throughout the country. When I asked him what he meant by unpopular in a country where there is really no public as we know it, he meant the businessmen, intellectuals, and the professional classes in the big towns. 6. Khanh sees Minh as a rival. When I asked why Minh didn't go around the country making public appearances and shaking hands, Minh said: "I withdraw voluntarily because I don't think he wants me to be active." 7. I said that if he made a public appearance somewhere, I would be delighted to go with him, and that I intended to say to General Khanh that it was a pity that General Minh was not out making public appearances. The job of getting the Vietnamese Government before the people was bigger than any one man. 8. Minh said that Khanh had made the fallacious declaration that General Minh is not Chief of State because of not being elected and that he is only "carrying out the duties of Chief of State". 9. Minh had a low opinion of Khanh's advisers. He said there were 17 advisers talked of in the press, but he only knew of 2. One was Tuoc, Khanh's brother-in-law whom Minh described as a "bandit". The other was Hong, the Secretary to the Presidency who is a dishonest lawyer. 10. Vice Prime Minister Hoan is insisting on government employees joining the Dai Viet Party. 11. Khanh promised elections too soon before the people were ready for them. 12. There should be no public spectacle about Ngo Dinh Can. The national interest does not require his death./4/ The whole matter could be indefinitely postponed. There are 1,600,000 Catholics in the country who could easily become upset. /4/Ngo Dinh Can, the brother of the late President of South Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem, was the unofficial governor of Central Vietnam during the Diem years, although he held no government position. In the coup of November 1, 1963, Can unsuccessfully sought refuge in the U.S. Consulate in Hue, and was taken into custody by coup forces. Lodge received assurances from Minh that Can's physical safety would be assured and he would receive a fair trial; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. iv, pp. 427 ff. Can was found guilty of murder, extortion, and misuse of power by a revolutionary tribunal on April 22, 1964, and was sentenced to death. 13. Apparently irrelevantly, he then said it is not yet time to put outside people in the saddle. By this he meant the Vietnamese of real merit who are in Europe and in the United States, and who should at some time be brought back. 14. When I asked what I could do about all of what he had said, he said that I could do nothing, that it was all an internal matter. Comment: I really do not take any of this very seriously in a country where the people are so firmly committed to the ideal of every man for himself and devil take the hindmost. I cannot imagine any head of government who would get anything less than this in the way of criticism. I do intend, however, to continue to try to get Minh out on the stump because I am sure it would help the effort against the Viet Cong. Lodge
124. Summary Record of the 528th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 22, 1964, 4:45 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, Tab 9. Top Secret Secretary Rusk chaired the meeting in the absence of the President and reported on his recent trip. a. The SEATO meeting in Manila--French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville made clear in bilateral conversations that the French have no specific plan for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. The French are convinced that our policy in Vietnam will not succeed but they don't want South Vietnam to fall into the Communist camp. The French think we must either enlarge the war, which they oppose, or negotiate a settlement. Therefore, French policy aims at keeping flexibility so that it can promote negotiations at the earliest possible moment. Couve did not veto the SEATO communiqué but merely added his disagreement with the conclusion reached by all the others with respect to the importance of defeating the Communists in Vietnam. b. Discussion with General Chiang Kai-shek--The most interesting point was Chiang's passionate statement that nuclear war in Asia would be wrong. Chiang does not think that the U.S. will put only conventional forces on the Mainland and that, therefore, his military capability is limited to that under his control in Formosa. However, Chiang thinks that disorders on the Mainland would break out when he invades, thus, making it possible for his forces to defeat the Communists. U.S. military advisors in Formosa are not certain how Chiang's army would react if it were ordered to invade the Mainland because 90% of his army now consists of Formosans. c. South Vietnam--Most of the recommendations he has made on South Vietnam are being worked on. (1) Khanh is a very impressive person who realizes fully that his problem is not just military. (2) We need to get more flags flying in South Vietnam. We need to help persuade other countries to provide assistance to Vietnam, not only for the value of assistance, but also because of its importance to Vietnamese morale. (3) The Vietnamese need to fill diplomatic posts in several major capitals so that their point of view can be put across to other countries. (4) The relationship between Khanh and Big Minh is not entirely satisfactory. Ambassador Lodge is trying to bring these two men closer together. If some of Minh's followers are taken care of and put in jobs abroad or in Vietnam, it is possible that Minh will actively support Khanh (5) Khanh needs to seek a broader civilian base for his government. A non-governmental organization has been formed to try to produce greater unity among the civilians. (6) Psychological warfare in Vietnam is very spotty. Mr. Rowan studied this problem and has made some recommendations as to what should be done./2/ /2/Document 122. (Mr. Rowan, in response to the Secretary's request, commented that the critical information need is to train South Vietnamese. The Vietnamese information service is very weak in the provinces. Limited physical facilities exist but maintenance is very poor. A great improvement can be made with the expenditure of a very small amount of money. The USIA in Vietnam is now working on a joint basis with the Vietnamese and it is hoped that progress will result from the joint effort.) (7) Limitation of funds-we may not be doing some things that we ought to be doing in Vietnam because we still think we must limit expenditures. As compared to the cost of a war or our withdrawal, the amount of money we are spending in Vietnam is small. Ambassador Lodge says he has enough U.S. funds but this may not be so. We should look again at our programs and examine all ideas without thinking whether or not they can be done without increasing our expenditures. (8) The Defense Department is studying several new military recommendations made by the group. (9) We are anxious to get a new Canadian member on the International Control Commission. This Commissioner would be visiting Hanoi and seeing Ho Chi Minh every few weeks. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Secretary Rusk asked Assistant Secretary William Bundy to comment. Mr. Bundy said that we are now getting good reporting in both the political and military fields. Newspaper reporters have been misleading us. Unrest within the South Vietnam government has been exaggerated. The security situation is much better than as reported in the press. In the most recent large engagement. the Vietnamese stood and fought very well. General Wheeler said he agreed. He called attention to a page one story in the New York Times which was quite misleading in that it left the impression that the Viet Cong had achieved a major victory over the Vietnamese. Viet Cong losses in this battle were sizable. A1though the week has been bloody, it has been pretty successful for the Vietnamese. Among the military advisers there is a growing sense of accomplishment even though the war is hotting up. The Viet Cong forces are tending now to stand and fight harder but the Vietnamese are also fighting much better. We should be encouraged by the progress which was being made. Secretary McNamara said he was impressed by two things, one, our restriction on funds, and two, our restriction on people. As to funds, he thought we were unduly conservative. We are keeping the Vietnamese under too much financial pressure by insisting that they pay for certain projects, They are not doing things they should be doing because they do not have sufficient funds. This is especially true in the difficult areas where we should be building the infrastructure, such as schools and roads, because the Vietnamese cannot do so. As to the restrictions on people, we do not have enough U.S. civilian advisers to show the Vietnamese how to do some of the things they should be doing. Secretary Rusk said that because of the critical security problems in many areas, we have been concentrating on military activity. The result is that we tend to take for granted the provinces which have been pacified. We should be building up the pacified provinces and exploiting our opportunity to carry on activities helpful to the people, such as providing doctors and schools, etc. Secretary McNamara said that to accomplish its task AID had one-fourth of the people that the military had to accomplish its objective. We may be wasting some people and some money in Vietnam, but this is unimportant because of the critical nature of the task. The country team is too restrictive. AID is doing a great job and the AID people are true heroes, but there are too few AID people. Director Bell acknowledged that neither money nor people should stand in the way of our achieving our objectives in Vietnam. However, AID officials in the provinces are not asking for more U.S. citizens, but they want people from third countries, especially Filipinos. AID is trying to get in third country people and is currently engaged in recruiting many of them. However, Ambassador Lodge has limited the number of people that AID could send. Secretary McNamara acknowledged that Lodge had done this and it was an attitude of mind of his. Despite this, we need many more people in Vietnam. Assistant Secretary Bundy interjected to say that Lodge had recently changed his mind on this point. Director Bell said that he had instructed American officials to ask for what they need. He added, however, that the Vietnamese must do the job. What we need is more Vietnamese who exercise leadership rather than more Americans. We must keep the heat on the Vietnamese to do the job themselves. Secretary McNamara said we can't find enough Vietnamese. He said we need a great deal more training by USIA. We need an increased program for the civil administration school. Director Bell said that in addition to numbers we need Vietnamese leaders and administrators. Secretary McNamara said there appeared to be a new mood in Saigon which would result in Vietnamese being used more extensively. Secretary McNamara said we were right on the margin in Vietnam and that he could not guarantee that we would still be there six months or twelve months from now. Therefore, we should pour in resources now even if some of them are wasted because of the terrific cost that would be involved if we had to use U.S. forces. He said the Defense Department, with its $50 million budget, must somehow be used effectively in Vietnam. Mr. Rowan commented that there was a joint U.S.-Vietnamese plan which called for a field service center. Nothing had been done because more people were required to organize this center. USIA is now sending people to help the Vietnamese organize radio programs aimed at North Vietnam. Mr. Rowan said he had had long discussions with U.S. correspondents in Saigon. He asked why they did not write affirmative stories and why their leads could not be on Viet Cong losses rather than on Vietnamese losses. He said the correspondents complained that they were not being helped; for example, that military information officers are not even in their offices on weekends. Mr. Rowan added that the USIA chief there could not be very helpful because he had been told by Ambassador Lodge that he should have no contacts with the press since the Ambassador would handle all such contacts, as he had always done in his long government experience. Secretary McNamara said that we were just now getting organized to aim black broadcasts into North Vietnam. White broadcasts were not yet being made. He expressed irritation at the length of time that it took to get these broadcasts organized primarily because of a lack of radio programmers and Vietnamese technicians. Director Bell said that up until recently he had been unable to use former Peace Corps Volunteers in Vietnam. He had just succeeded in reaching agreement that former Peace Corps Volunteers could be recruited by AID and used throughout the world, including Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said we need up to 200 more civilians in Vietnam now. He was prepared to take out one military person for each civilian added. He has made military personnel available to AID, allowing them to work in civilian clothes. In his view, only one-fourth of the civilians needed by AID in the provinces are now there. Secretary Rusk called attention to the importance of providing basic health services for the Vietnamese. He cited simplified methods being used successfully by AID and suggested that military health officers and doctors be allowed to work with the Vietnamese. Mr. Sullivan commented that we are asking our allies, especially the Filipinos, to make available civilians for service in Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said he wished to cite another illustration, namely, the Vietnamese coastal railroad. If we spend enough money we can get this railroad running even though the Viet Cong continues to sabotage it. We are pouring money into Korea which is not now critical and we are not spending enough in Vietnam. Secretary Rusk agreed that we need a rapid expansion of our programs and should not consider a money limitation. Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that a telegram containing the new proposals be sent to Ambassador Lodge./3/ So far, we have asked for his approval on all matters and have been successful in persuading him to go along with Washington proposals. We should continue our method of persuasion. /3/Apparent reference to Document 129. Secretary Rusk noted that if we go in with new expanded programs we might prompt the French, as well as Sihanouk, to change their attitude of pessimism. General Wheeler said he wished to comment that in his view more military personnel would be required in Vietnam shortly. More air forces will probably be required as well. We will have to train more people and this is difficult to do. The President joined the meeting. Secretary Rusk suggested that Assistant Secretary Bundy report on his trip to Laos. [Here follow William Bundy's briefing on Laos and discussion of cutbacks in nuclear production.]
125. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 24, 1964--3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. 2045. Called on General Khanh at 9 am Friday. 1. I expressed concern about his health, having seen a story in the papers and also having reports from other quarters that he had been ill. He made a very full disclosure, treating me like a friend and uncle. He had been having indigestion, difficulty in sleeping. I gave him the best advice I could and told him that he had to learn to live with his responsibility and not think he could be in a perpetual state of crisis all the time. I urged him to eliminate all unnecessary activity, including superfluous American visitors, if any. 2. I said that as regards the VC victory in Long An on April 8,/2/ it was evident to me that the VC had penetrated the GVN forces, and I suggested using a polygraph to find out who the traitors were. I also said it was apparent that in Long An there was a failure of leadership. He did not disagree and said that to remedy this would involve changing the province chief once again, and there had been too many changes already. He thought well of the province chief, but also said that he was not in good health, that there was something "in his insides which didn't work". In other words, he admitted that the man was not doing his job. /2/On April 8, the Viet Cong launched a company-sized attack on a training center in Long An Province. Apparently aided by agents from within the garrison, the Viet Cong killed 28 government defenders, wounded 36, and captured 112 weapons and 5 radios. ("The situation in South Vietnam," Weekly Report, April 15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII) 3. I then said that I felt he could get a great deal more value out of General Minh than he was getting, by having Minh get out on the stump, shake hands and show himself around the country. Khanh agreed and said that if Minh did not do this, it was because Minh did not want to. I said that Minh had told me that he, Minh, feared that Khanh did not want him to be conspicuous. Khanh said this was not true. I said: Can I say to General Minh that you would like to have him go around, and he said: Yes, and I will tell him so myself. 4. I then brought up the case of Ngo Dinh Can and said that I hoped he would be given executive clemency and that he not be executed, and that he be allowed to wither away and die in peace./3/ Khanh agreed but said that this was one case in which Minh had a very great deal of real power. If he did nothing, Can would under the law die in five days, although there was a possibility of extending this because of Can's involvement in other litigation. Nonetheless, it was up to Minh to act affirmatively to give Can clemency. He hoped I would speak to Minh about this, which I agreed to do. /3/See footnote 4, Document 123. 5. Khanh was mobilizing all of the different religious groups in Viet-Nam, the Hoa Haos, the Cao Dais, etc., and the Buddhist leaders, in favor of clemency. It was going well with everyone except Tri Quang, who wants vengeance. He hoped I would see Tri Quang in view of the great favor which the US Embassy had done him, and tell him it was not good for Buddhism and not good for Viet-Nam for Can to be executed. I agreed to do this. 6. I then said that I thought Minh would be in much better humor if the cases of Generals Don and Kim could be disposed of. Khanh said I was misinformed, that the only person in whom Minh had a strong friendly interest was Tho. Actually, General Don disliked General Minh intensely. Khanh knew this to be the case as he saw Don frequently. 7. He said the case of the four Generals would be dealt with before the end of April. He was going to convene a "court of honor" and oblige all of them to justify themselves. The "court" would be composed of the commanders of troops and other officers and would number about ten. The four imprisoned Generals would be called upon to admit their misdeeds and volunteer to make amends. They would then be freed and given work to do either at home or abroad. 8. This would inevitably mean that General Don would have to explain why he signed a travel order for a man named Huan, a member of the Council of Notables, to travel to France to contact a large number of French persons interested in "neutralism". General Don would have to state that General Minh had ordered him to do this, and this would inevitably bring Minh himself before the court. Minh would have to justify the money that he obtained with which to buy "villas" in France and would have to account for his action in sending Huan to France. It would inevitably come out that Minh was a long time friend of Tran Van Huu, the Vietnamese leader who lives in France, is General de Gaulle's trump card, and who talks with the Viet Cong, etc. Khanh said he very much feared this would be the end of General Minh. 9. I was flabbergasted by this revelation and said that it was, first of all, important for Minh to act on Can's clemency first, and then when the "court of honor" convened, to dispose of Don, Kim, Xuan and Dinh first. It was also vital that at no time would it appear that Khanh was taking any initiative against Minh at all. Khanh agreed and said that this would not come from any initiative of his, that he, Khanh, had gone out of his way to be nice to Minh and to bring him into the government, but that this would inevitably flow from the statements which the other Generals would make. Comment: A. I will, of course, see Minh/4/ and Tri Quang/5/ as soon as possible in the interest of Can. /4/See Document 126. /5/On April 25, Lodge made a special trip to Hue to talk to Tri Quang about clemency for Can. Lodge noted that Can might become a symbol of persecution of Christians in Vietnam. Lodge thought that an appeal by the Buddhist clergy for compassion in Can's case would have a beneficial "world-wide impression." Lodge's report of their meeting in telegram 2055 from Saigon, April 25, reads in part as follows: "[Tri Quang stated] that I should realize that the Khanh government was unpopular, particularly with Buddhists. If Can were not executed it would be accepted as evidence that the old Diem crowd including particularly Catholic leaders and clergy, with all its money and weapons, were still in control. This would injure the struggle i.against the Communists which was still not going well because the people did not believe in the government's sincerity for freedom. Clemency for Can would weaken the faith in the United States, because many would think clemency was due to US influence. If it were known that I had come to see him to intercede for Can, my popularity in Vietnam would be seriously injured." "He agreed to think over what I said and stressed that he was not asking for Can's death. (But he did not warm up to the idea of life imprisonment as an alternative. Evidently in this country you either get it or you don't.)" (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) B. Obviously, the case of the four Generals has been hanging over us ever since Khanh came to power, and once their cases are disposed of, I hope that Khanh can devote himself to the pacification effort. It is at first blush very regrettable indeed that the proceedings involving the Generals should tear down "Big" Minh. We will have to follow the facts closely. C. Khanh said there was much evidence that Kim was "up to his neck" in intrigues with the French. D. Perhaps we are on the edge of getting some solid information about the French operations against the RVN of which so much has been said. Secretary's statement to Khanh about this eventuality comes to mind./6/ The sending of Huan looks as though it might be the clincher. /6/See Document 119. Lodge
126. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 24, 1964--3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. 2046. 1. At 10:45 am I called on Minh, pursuant to Khanh's request, and told him how serious it would be if Ngo Dinh Can became a martyr and gave the GVN the reputation throughout the Christian world to be anti-Christian. This was not a remote contingency. I reminded him of the uproar in the United States last year when it appeared that the GVN was anti-Buddhist. If there could be a reaction like this in a country where there were no Buddhists, he could imagine what the reaction would be in a country which was predominantly Christian. A situation would arise in which it was politically well nigh impossible for the US Govt to support the GVN if it wanted to. I therefore requested him in clear-cut language to give executive clemency to Ngo Dinh Can. 2. After a long silence, he said in a very emotional tone as though on the verge of tears: "The Ngo Dinh family has paid enough. The coup of November 1 was not made for hatred of anybody, but for the good of the country. I still very much regret the death of Diem. It was Nhu who was bad. Can is a pathetic specimen, insufficiently educated. It was the regime which made him bad. He would not have acted as he did if he had not been the President's brother." 3. "Khanh should not have formed revolutionary tribunal. By its very terms, it was inevitable that it should sentence Can to death. When I was running things, I temporized and tried to give time for the people to calm down. Now the people are super-excited. I am in an extremely difficult position. I must answer yes or no in writing. Khanh sets a five-day limit on me." 4. I interrupted to say that I understood this was the law, which Khanh had told me was the case, to which Minh replied: "Yes, but Khanh makes the law. Why does he set a five-day limit? He always tries to put me in a difficult position. I must find a solution for Can. I will be hated and denounced from one end of the country to the other if I give him clemency." 5. I then suggested that Minh take the position that Can's presence was essential for possible testimony and evidence in further litigation. 6. Minh said: "That's it, I will reprieve him on the ground that he is going to be needed in other litigation in the future." He distinguished between this procedure and clemency. He added: "I had a long talk with my family last night. We agreed that I should be prepared to sacrifice all my popularity, which is what I do if I give clemency to Can. I know I will be denounced." 7. He then said: "I want to ask you a question about a money matter. Did Conein ever give General Don money for the November coup?" 8. I said: "Definitely not. Had he done such a thing, I would certainly have known it." 9. Minh continued: "I am surrounded by traps. I may be accused of taking money to give clemency to Can. It is said already that Can's friends are very rich, and that many are at large. It will be said that they are bribing me to prevent Can's execution." 10. "I am also very unhappy that General Khanh said that when I was in power, I had only prepared a three-page indictment which would only have given Can five days of punishment." 11. "What we need in this country is to have good feeling between Catholics and Buddhists. That is what I have always tried to get for national unity." 12. I then said that I knew that General Khanh would be glad to have Minh go out on the stump and make tours in the country, and that Minh was in error in thinking that Khanh did not want him to do so. 13. Minh changed his ground. He said everything [sic] he had friends who were also friends of Generals Don and Kim, and they ask him "why have you done nothing for our mutual friends?" "They accuse me of disloyalty. It is so disagreeable that I do not want to make any trips in the country." Comment: A. From all this I get the impression that he will not allow Can to be executed. I am sure I have pushed him as far as I can today. I would bet that he would prevent Can from being executed. But he has not yet really signed on the dotted line in a way so that he cannot wiggle out of it. B. Clearly Khanh is rigging matters so that Minh will bear all obligation for not executing Can./2/ /2/Can was executed on May 9. Lodge
127. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, April 24, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Drafted by Sullivan. A note on the source text indicates that Secretary Rusk saw the memorandum. SUBJECT /2/For Rusk's recommendations, see Document 124. This is an interim report on the actions which we are taking to implement the recommendations which you have made concerning Viet Nam. For the sake of easy reference, we will run down the list in accordance with the numbered sequence you have laid out in your own summary of those recommendations. A. Actions presenting no substantial policy problems: 1. Increase in Sources of External Assistance. The Department of Defense has been directed to send a message through military channels to MACV instructing the latter to indicate the types of assistance that can best be integrated into the current US military efforts. MACV has been directed to discuss the problem with the Ambassador before answering. As far as other types of assistance are concerned, AID/Washington has been asked to compile a list of desirable economic and technical projects which could be provided from national resources other than the US. We had already undertaken efforts for increased medical assistance and have suggested to USOM in Saigon that they send a representative to Manila to investigate the Filipino potential. 2. GVN Diplomatic and Foreign Information Activity. Lodge has spoken once again to General Khanh on this subject and has been once again assured that Khanh will give it urgent attention. 3. Enlistment of General Minh. Lodge has talked with both Khanh and Minh about getting Minh more actively involved in support of the current government. Lodge seems to be fully convinced of the need for this and has pursued it with imagination and vigor. 4. Support from Civilian Groups. We have sent our Regional Buddhist Advisor, Mr. Gard, from Hong Kong to Saigon to assist in obtaining Buddhist support for the regime. We are bringing Mr. Buu, head of the Trade Union Movement, here to the United States and we hope to be able to provide him with certain material incentives such as fertilizer to be distributed through his rural organizations. We have assigned two officers from the Embassy to conduct regular contact with the local French community in order to develop ways in which they can be better enlisted behind the Government. 5. Psychological Warfare. Carl Rowan has agreed with our suggestions that we send Ambassador Lodge a copy of his memorandum to the President/3/ on the deficiencies in the Psychological Warfare effort. Carl is also preparing a more detailed recommendation on this matter. In the meantime, we have used MAP funds from the Department of Defense to purchase a new 50 kw. transmitter to be located in Viet Nam for Voice of America broadcasts to the North. The negotiator for this installation left for Saigon yesterday. We sent his instructions to the Post last evening. /3/Document 122. 6. Expulsion of Undesirable Characters. This is one on which we are having to move cautiously. However, there are at least two members of the USOM whom we are going to have removed in the near future. One has been a constant source of bellyaches to the press and has been an irritant inside US Mission operations. There is also a Defense Department team in Saigon now investigating certain reports concerning problems in one element of our military establishment. 7. Promotions for US Civilians. We have begun discussions with the personnel people to determine the procedures for carrying out these on-the-spot promotions. 8. Money. The draft Presidential telegram which you cleared has now also been cleared by Secretary McNamara, Dave Bell and Carl Rowan./4/ It has been sent to the White House this evening. /4/Apparent reference to Document 129. 9. Special Services. The Defense Department is looking into the possibility of providing additional services to its more remote units in Viet Nam. In the meantime, USIA is investigating the availability of current American entertainment films to be shipped in on a regular basis for Lodge to use at his own discretion within the American community. B. Actions presenting policy problems: 1. Provincial Programs. This matter is touched upon in some detail in the draft telegram from the President. If Lodge answers in a positive vein the message which you sent on the subject of the Pacification Committee, we can follow up further in that series. This will require continued attention by State and AID. 2. U.S. Naval Presence. The Pentagon has been in touch with CINCPAC, and Admiral Felt, who has been here in Washington for the last two days, has been consulted. The Department of Defense members of the Coordinating Committee will have a memorandum in a few days giving the JCS views on what could be done with respect to a naval presence without handicapping the general readiness posture in the area. 3. Junk Operations North of the Demarcation Line. This, too, is being discussed in the Pentagon and a similar memorandum will be prepared. There is some reluctance to undertake operations which would pit Swatow boats against Nasty crafts. The Swatows are more heavily armed. 4. Improved Intelligence in Laos and Cambodia. Alex Johnson will discuss this whole matter in the Special Group 5412. 5. Canadian Contacts with Hanoi. In coordination with EUR, we are preparing for you a talking paper/5/ to be used with Mike Pearson when you meet with him on April 30./6/ /5/Not found. /6/See Document 134. 6. Economic Interdiction of North Viet Nam. We have prepared for your signature a letter to the Secretary of Treasury asking that foreign assets control be applied against North Viet Nam./7/ We will undertake more extensive discussions within the Department to determine how best to have the same sort of action undertaken by other friendly countries. We have already approached the Japanese with a brief message and have spoken to the British concerning their shipping. Our intelligence estimates indicate that the problem is a very limited one, with most ships of the Free World arriving at North Vietnamese ports in ballast. Cargo carried out of North Viet Nam consists almost entirely of anthracite coal. /7/The draft letter as approved by McGeorge Bundy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos.
128. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 28, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos. Top Secret. SUBJECT The attached memorandum from Bill Sullivan results from my request for a status report on our responses to Lodge's suggestions. Bill's memorandum is somewhat cryptic, because the actions which Lodge has suggested have been incorporated into a political-military scenario, which is now in the hands of the Joint Chiefs. I sent you yesterday the latest version of the political half of the scenario./2/ /2/Reference is to an April 20 draft of a three-part political/military scenario with the narrative portion also summarized in tabular form. (Ibid.) For an earlier draft, see the attachment to Document 102. I would suggest that the President see the narrative part (not the charts) of the scenario and consider whether it isn't time for you and him (and perhaps Rusk and McNamara) to discuss future moves in Vietnam at one of your lunches. The point to keep in mind is that almost any of the actions suggested by Lodge, but not yet implemented, could start a chain of escalation for which we are not yet prepared. Mike Attachment Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan)/3/ Washington, April 27, 1964. /3/Top Secret. There are three categories of action in which Ambassador Lodge has made certain recommendations which we have not as yet fulfilled. These are (a) cross border probes into the Laos corridor; (b) hot pursuit into Cambodia; and (c) tit-for-tat raids on North Vietnamese targets in the event of terror against Americans. All of these recommendations have involved certain contingencies. For example, the tit-for-tat suggestion was first made as part of a political-military scenario which involved covert diplomatic contacts with the North Vietnamese, offers of food and partial withdrawal of US forces, etc., etc. The Cambodian hot pursuit suggestion was in the context of further action by Sihanouk detrimental to the legal status of the Saigon Government. The operations into Laos were recommended if we considered current intelligence operations unsatisfactory. Therefore, although we have not responded positively to these proposals from Lodge, it should be understood that the proposals themselves were in one measure or another designed to be part of a larger schematic view of our political and military posture in Southeast Asia as a whole. On the other hand all of Lodge's recommendations have in one form or another been incorporated into a planning document which has been roughed out on the political side here in Washington and is currently under study in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine its military consequences. Therefore. we have given positive consideration to these recommendations. The basic question of course is whether the planning document can be considered a "live" plan directed toward ultimate accomplishment in the forseeable future, or whether it is a contingency arrangement which will always remain on the shelf. If it is the former, we can categorically state that we are acting on all of Lodge's recommendations. If it is the latter, that statement would need considerable qualification. W. H. Sullivan
129. Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/ Washington, April 28, 1964--7:02 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 1791 to Saigon, which is the source text. According to a draft of telegram 1791, the message was drafted by Sullivan and revised by McGeorge Bundy. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. VII, Cables and Memos) McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this draft telegram to the President under cover of a memorandum, April 26, which reads as follows: "This is a draft dispatch from you to Lodge which argues out a general proposition that people should not be timid in asking for what they need. It has been cleared in substance with Rusk, McNamara, and Bell, although this draft is a revision of a State Department original. The one point of substance on which there may not be full agreement is that Sarge Shriver hates to have his Peace Corps graduates tapped for unpeaceful missions. None of the rest of us agrees with him, and I think you are safe in going ahead." (Ibid.) Dean Rusk has reported fully to me and to the National Security Council on the encouraging impressions which he has brought back from his recent visit to Viet Nam. He made a number of recommendations which he had already discussed in general terms with you, and as soon as they have been studied and reviewed by appropriate departments here in Washington, we will be sending you separate messages on them. Meanwhile I would like to raise with you one general question that has come out of our most recent discussions here. Dean Rusk has reported that he gets a strong impression both here and in Viet Nam that our plans and recommendations are often inhibited by a feeling that resources available for this struggle are closely limited, so that there is no room for bold new efforts. Bob McNamara has reported a similar concern. So I have told them both what I want to repeat to you and to all members of the country team--that in our effort to help the Vietnamese to help themselves, we must not let any arbitrary limits on budget, or manpower, or procedures stand in our way. We can do extraordinary things within the limit of our current appropriations and we can, if necessary, seek emergency appropriations if they are needed for success in Viet Nam. We all recognize that a prompt and clear success in Viet Nam would be worth a very large amount to us; and we should not shrink from using the necessary funds to obtain the result. Both Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara, for example, wonder whether we have committed enough Americans to assist on a crash basis in the development of civil administrative services in those areas of Viet Nam which have already been partially pacified and where the "holding" process must now be pressed forward vigorously. There is a danger that the Vietnamese Government, because of a shortage or an absence of its own resources, may rest on its oars once an area has been militarily cleared and fail to carry through the civil efforts needed to win the population in that area. We know that Vietnamese resources for such leadership are woefully short, but relative to their needs, our own resources are large. I have authorized Dave Bell to recruit as many highly motivated young men as he may need to help train the Vietnamese to provide civil services in these cleared areas. Our civilian staffing in the Provinces still seems too thin in many areas. I understand that our military often have 10 to 20 times as many field personnel assigned to provincial pacification work (excluding tactical advisors and support personnel) as does USOM--yet the largest job in cleared areas is surely civil. I have suggested to Bell that young people emerging from two years' service in the Peace Corps would represent an ideal source of experienced and motivated assistants for this work, and I have asked Sargent Shriver to cooperate in supporting such recruiting if it proves necessary. Carl Rowan has given me a carefully prepared report/2/ on deficiencies which he found in the informational-psychological operations of both the Vietnamese Government and our Mission. He has strongly endorsed proposals originating within the country team to train Vietnamese for these operations and to provide more US guidance, both in Saigon and in the provinces. These proposals will involve a small increase in USIA personnel, and perhaps from other agencies, as well as a modest outlay of US funds. Rowan is in the process of detailing a plan to improve the overall psychological effort, so we should soon have specific ideas on which to act. /2/Document 122. I have been informed of your energetic and highly commendable efforts to maintain the size of your Mission at the minimum necessary. I thoroughly endorse your views in this regard and think particularly that frugality and economy of manpower should be applied above all with respect to the headquarters and home office staffs in Saigon, which are reported to have shown the usual tendency to mushroom. I hope, however, that you share our feeling that we should take a different attitude out in the countryside because it is so important that we get the job done there where the war is actually being fought. I know that one of your concerns is to keep the American presence in Viet Nam from becoming excessive, but we all believe here that the need for effective leadership on the civilian side out in the country is overriding, and for this reason Bob McNamara has agreed that if you think it necessary any civilian increases on this side can be matched by reductions of up to two or three hundred military personnel, so that we could say flatly that there was no net increase but merely a shift of effort towards the arts of peace. All in all the guidance I would like to give to your entire Mission is not to let your thinking be limited by possible budgetary or personnel restraints upon the resources at your disposal to execute our policy. As far as I am concerned you must have whatever you need to help the Vietnamese do the job, and I assure you that I will act at once to eliminate obstacles or restraints wherever they may appear./3/ /3/Telegram 1791 does not bear President Johnson's signature.
130. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President/1/ Washington, April 29, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 111. Secret. LAOS CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS There will be raised with you this afternoon at the NSC meeting 2 the question of authorizing military operations from South Vietnam across the border into Laos for the purpose of gathering intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The issues are as follows: /2/See Document 131. 1. Recent high level photographic surveillance has revealed a new truckable road between Route 12 and the area of Tchepone in central Laos, together with some apparent supply bases. There is a feeling in the JCS that we should take direct ground and air action against these targets if intelligence proves them out. 2. Ambassador Unger discussed this problem with Assistant Secretary Bundy in Saigon./3/ He is very much opposed to any kind of cross border operation into Laos which would be internationally visible, particularly at a time when Souvanna Phouma's position in Vientiane is not secure. /3/Reported in a memorandum by William Bundy, April 29. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 092 Laos) 3. The Department of State will suggest a compromise designed to reduce the risk of causing trouble in Laos. They would permit small-scale, carefully controlled intelligence sorties into Laos organized in such a way as to avoid, to the maximum extent possible, creating an international hue and cry. State will probably recommend against direct involvement of U.S. personnel, except for emergency air transport to the intell |