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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
V. The Second McNamara-Taylor Mission To Vietnam And Planning Discussions, May 8-26 146. Editorial Note After meeting in Bonn with the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 9-11, Secretary of Defense McNamara and two aides traveled to Saigon for brief consultations and an assessment of the situation. General Taylor, William Sullivan, and Michael Forrestal flew from Washington and arrived in Saigon on May 11. McNamara arrived on May 12 and the group, with the exception of Forrestal, returned on May 13. According to Taylor, President Johnson was "impatient" with the lack of visible progress in the war against the Viet Cong and in implementation of plans to strengthen the South Vietnamese Government. There was also a general feeling in Washington that Khanh had rather too abruptly changed directions on the question of taking the war to North Vietnam. Therefore, McNamara, Taylor, Sullivan, and Forrestal were to take a second look at the situation. (Swords and Plowshares, pages 311-312)
147. Memorandum of a Meeting, Saigon, May 11, 1964, 11 a.m./1/ /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 333 Vietnam. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text is Enclosure A to an undated memorandum from McNamara to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of DIA. SUBJECT PRESENT During the discussions, the following points we reopened: a. The Ambassador is not particularly afraid of a military coup to oust General Khanh. He does regard the Buddhists as a possible source of danger to the government. In particular, he thinks that Tri Quang, the Buddhist leader, is a potential trouble maker. Having overthrown one government, he may feel like trying again against Khanh. He has indicated to the Ambassador that he does not regard Khanh as a "good Buddhist"--meaning, presumably, that he is a Buddhist who does not follow Tri Quang's direction. b. From a discussion of a possible coup, the Ambassador expressed the view that we should be giving serious consideration to our course of action if Khanh were ousted or assassinated. He suggested the possible need of a US presence to take over and run the government. In such a case, he thought a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay might be used as a US headquarters external to Saigon. He apparently feels that in a situation of civil turmoil, the US facilities in Saigon would not be available. c. In discussing the famous interview with General Khanh,/2/ he explained Khanh's frame of mind as one of frustration at recent heavy losses and the inability to bring the VC to bay. He is not happy in contemplating a long drawn out guerrilla war offering no decisive victory. Hence, he looks to the North as a battlefield offering more attractive targets. /2/See Document 136.
148. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) and the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan), Saigon, May 11, 1964/1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, Vol. IX, Memos. Top Secret. Drafted by Sullivan on May 14. Copies were sent to Rusk, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, McNamara. McCone, and William Bundy. SUBJECT After the initial call which General Taylor and I, accompanied by General Harkins, made on the Ambassador,/2/ I stayed behind at the Ambassador's invitation for further discussions. After reviewing a number of immediate issues, we turned to a review of the Ambassador's thinking with respect to additional pressures on North Viet Nam. /2/See Document 147. The Ambassador opened the discussion by referring to the cables which had been exchanged between himself and Secretary Rusk concerning the Canadian interlocutor./3/ I said that because I would be traveling to Canada to discuss this matter with the Canadians, it became important that I have a clear and precise idea of the Ambassador's views. /3/See Document 134. The Ambassador began by indicating his belief that there should be a steady escalation of the clandestine operations now being conducted under Plan 34-A./4/ At an appropriate point, he believed these operations should include air strikes. He was not certain what targets should be involved in the air strikes but did mention such things as railway bridges. /4/See footnote 2, Document 4. I asked whether he expected these air strikes to be carried out by Vietnamese or by Americans. He said that he considered it a matter of indifference whether the pilots were American or Vietnamese so long as they were proficient and capable of pinpoint accuracy. I then asked who would accept the credit for these actions. He said that he believed that they should be disavowed entirely by both the Vietnamese and the Americans. He would envisage them as taking place "in the dark of the night" and that no one would admit responsibility for them. He said he thought that they should be carried out with unmarked planes and that one arrangement we might consider would be a volunteer squadron such as the Flying Tigers. However, he was emphatic in his statement that neither we nor the Vietnamese should admit responsibility for the actions. I asked him how he viewed the Canadian intercession in this respect. The Ambassador said that he would expect the Canadians to tell the North Vietnamese that they could continue to expect this sort of action so long as they harassed South Viet Nam. They could particularly expect retaliation whenever they committed an especially grievous offense in South Viet Nam. In making these statements, the Canadians would be talking entirely in confidence and would not assign responsibility for the retaliatory acts either to the South Vietnamese or to the Americans. When I expressed some doubt that this position of disavowability could be maintained, the Ambassador insisted that maintenance of such an attitude was something the United States needed to learn and to practice. He said that in the United Nations he had practiced the policy of "no comment" for several years on certain key issues. It was valuable to keep our mouths shut. He himself had relearned this lesson recently. He had said absolutely nothing in the last few months and had received surprising political support in the New Hampshire and Massachusetts primaries. I then gave the Ambassador a copy of the scenario which had been presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a military planning document for action against North Viet Nam./5/ I told him that I would not leave the paper in Saigon but hoped he had a chance to read it and return it to me before I left. Within a half hour the Ambassador sent for me again, said he had read the planning document and was entirely opposed to the approach which it was taking. He said that it was in effect a repetition of the program which had been contained in Bill Bundy's letter./6/ He said he had made clear to Secretary Rusk and Bill Bundy when they were here that he did not concur in that approach. He particularly objected to the idea of the Government of Viet Nam or anyone else accepting responsibility for the actions against the North. He reiterated the need for disavowable actions which would not be acknowledged. He showed me a copy of Mike Dunn's record of conversation with Rusk and Bundy to demonstrate that he had opposed this position in the past./7/ /5/Apparent reference to a later, April 20, draft of the attachment to Document 102. The April 20 draft is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, Vietnam 092. /6/Document 108. /7/Document 120. I then asked for further clarification on the manner in which he wanted this entire matter discussed with the Canadians. He referred to his telegram on this subject and pointed to the sentence which stressed the need for advising the North Vietnamese that there would be retaliatory action against the North on a tit-for-tat basis./8/ I asked whether he wished this made clear to the Canadians when I saw them in Ottawa. He said as far as he was concerned that was the main point of the arrangement with the Canadians. /8/See footnote 2, Document 134. In discussing this point further, he said it might be useful to let a few of these occur in the North before the Canadian actually delivered his statement to the North Vietnamese authorities. I asked what, therefore, he contemplated as a time frame. He said as far as he was concerned, we should be able to do this some time this summer. He was not sure what the military requirements for protection against DRV retaliation would be, but he saw no reason why these measures shouldn't be initiated as soon as we felt competent to mount the initial actions. I said that my discussions with Secretary Rusk and Bill Bundy did not indicate to me that there was a meeting of the minds on this whole approach. The Ambassador expressed some surprise at this and said that he felt he had made himself explicitly clear in the conversations which had been held in Saigon. I therefore closed the conversation with the assurance that I had a clear picture of his views and would take them back to Washington for further discussion with the Secretary. Later that evening after dinner, the Ambassador again reverted to the need for military measures. He said that General Khanh was under great strain and that perhaps only by the introduction of action along these lines could Khanh rally the support of the population which he needed to be successful in the South. I said that Secretary McNamara would be prepared to discuss this whole question of General Khanh's attitude as reported in recent cables when he arrived. The Ambassador felt it would be useful for the Secretary to get a first-hand view of this from Khanh and that he thought this would clarify the way in which both he and Khanh viewed the problem. I did not pursue this line any further at that session.
149. Memorandum of a Meeting, Saigon, May 11, 1964/1/ /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, Vietnam 333. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text is Enclosure B to an undated memorandum from McNamara to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of DIA. SUBJECT 1. Saigon to State 2108./2/ At a recent Embassy meeting which General Westmoreland reported on,/3/ it was the consensus that subject conversation reflects Khanh's basic dissatisfaction with the present level of the war effort (i.e., the Pacification Program in RVN). He was unhappy with the humdrum, nasty nature of the affair and would prefer to have some glamorous, dramatic victory. /2/Document 134. /3/See footnote 2, Document 143. 2. The nation-wide Pacification Program will not be in full gear before 1 September 1964. The preparations to expand capabilities against North Vietnam will all be ready by 1 September except the round-out of the Second A1E squadron for the Air Commandos. The capabilities created will include those for air strikes by VNAF and Farmgate aircraft against North Vietnamese targets, aerial mining (ready by 1 June), and parachute saboteur drops [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Also, the Nasty boats will be capable of interfering with fishing activities and can engage small craft of the North Vietnamese Navy. The C-123 will be capable of various forms of air activities outlined in the 34A program. 3. General Taylor stated it was his impression that the 34A program in relation to CINCPAC 37-64/4/ should be reviewed. Many of the 34A actions such as air attack on POL facilities are not plausibly deniable by the South Vietnamese government and should be taken out of the 34A program if it is to remain covert in the sense of being plausibly deniable. /4/CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, "Military Action To Stabilize the Situation in the Republic of Vietnam," March 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, ICS Files) 4. General Taylor then asked the opinion of the assembled group as to the time required to establish sufficient control in the South to warrant a consideration of operations against the North beyond the scope of covert sabotage operations. General Harkins expressed the view that by 1 January 1965, acceptable control will have been established everywhere except in the Delta which will require the entire calendar year of 1965. General Westmoreland is far more conservative. He says that it will take a year from now to establish acceptable control north of Saigon and two to three additional years to clear up the Delta. 5. No one in the conference showed enthusiasm for taking action under OPLAN 37-64. The most they were willing to consider was an escalating application of 34A. The thought seemed to be to get things going favorably in the Pacification Program and then add blows against the North to accelerate the trend against the enemy. General Harkins feels that it would be dangerously easy to divert the South Vietnamese from the main job of internal pacification by the attractiveness of a venture directed against the North. According to General Westmoreland, when ARVN Generals use the expression "march North", nine out of ten of them mean full scale attack. 6. J-2 MACV made the points that the VC are growing in sophistication, better weapons (including antiaircraft), and that battalions in the Delta are tied up by the Number One problem, to ferret out the covert VC (Fifth Column) in the villages, etc., in RVN. 7. Need for a third squadron of A1Es. General Taylor expressed the view that it was premature to expect approval for the third squadron of A1Es. He stated that we should proceed with the organization of the two approved squadrons and meanwhile, develop data for the need for the third squadron. 8. Progress in setting up a reporting system on combat effectiveness and morale of RVNAF based on use of US advisers. It was established that MACV had not understood the requirement to develop a US adviser reporting system on the effectiveness of the RVNAF. General Harkins expressed some concern lest it involve critical reporting by advisers upon their opposite numbers and that the substance of such reports might get back to the Vietnamese. General Taylor reiterated the purpose of the report and told General Harkins it was the responsibility of his headquarters to work out a system to accomplish it. He stated further that it was his feeling that every person in uniform should be an eye for MACV to report on such matters through military channels. 9. Causes of the Vietnamese manpower shortages. Explanation of working of the conscription system. Desertion problem. a. The GVN policy is to have at least 80 per cent volunteers and not more than 20 per cent conscriptees in combat divisions. The stated military reason for failing to recruit and induct sufficient numbers during 1964 was budgetary. Additionally, the various military and paramilitary organizations and the VC compete for recruits. The paramilitary is more popular now because recruits can remain at home. General Harkins has repeatedly pressed to bring units up to strength. Some drain-off of manpower is caused by excessive overhead at headquarters and maintenance of security at excessive [levels at?] rear area bases. Advisers are constantly pressing for elimination of these excesses. During the visit, remedial action was in process by virtue of an order issued by General Khiem, CINCVAF as follows: (1) Retains conscripts due for discharge in June, July, and August. Releases them in October and November. (2) All conscript training can be done at Quang Trung and National Training Centers. (3) A study should be made to reduce manning levels of Central Agencies (High Command Headquarters), Corps area logistic centers and combat support units. It is expected that people from the above will begin shifting to combat units by 1 June. As a part of the MACV proposed augmentation, RVNAF rifle companies will now have a 25-man replacement company. b. The training establishment has been used at about 30 per cent of capacity for the past three months. The efforts of the GVN to bring the RVNAF up to strength should be reflected by an influx of conscriptees into training centers. A general conclusion reached is that there is no short term correction of the Vietnamese manpower problem because of the ineffectiveness of the conscription machinery. Also there is some hesitation to use conscripts generally for fear of introducing VC sympathizers into the Vietnamese Armed Forces. c. Factors affecting the desertion rate are: (1) Statistics reflect AWOLs which occurred 30-60 days before the date of the statistics. (Therefore, rates now are in part reflection of the Tet Holiday.) (2) Lack of ordinary leave. (3) Heavy casualties coupled with understrength in the units. (4) Although there is little effort to round up deserters, some are found when looking for VC. (5) Very little punishment is meted out to deserters. 10. Cross Border Operations. With regard to cross border operations into Laos, General Harkins and his people are satisfied with the limited approval which they have just received for two areas of patrolling. They stated that even though the operations are limited, their approval justified the establishment of a joint mechanism for planning and preparation. An estimated two to four weeks will be required before implementation. (General Taylor cautioned that sufficient time should be taken for preparation to ensure success.) They are generally against harassment and sabotage measures using Hard Nose, fearing that the main contribution of intelligence from these patrols would be jeopardized. 11. Westmoreland-Moore/5/ Committee on air support. No Ad Hoc committee has been set up. However, General Harkins stated he would be glad to have them restudy the air support situation. Concerning recent improvements, General Moore described the progress made on the quick response net to be established in the 7th Division, III Corps: /5/Major General Joseph H. Moore, Commander, 2d Air Division and component U.S. Air Force Commander in Vietnam. a. Eight (8) VNAF ALOs trained. b. Seven (7) VNAF ALOs started training. c. Hardware (i.e., communications) for net is on hand. d. US ALOs are in position. e. Hardware for all Corps is on order. 12. Introduction of B-57s into RVN. In discussing the possible use of B-57s in RVN, General Taylor expressed the opinion that they would never be admitted unless required for use under OPLAN 37-64. General Moore pointed out the awkwardness of requiring Vietnamese in all planes involved in Farmgate operations. General Taylor replied that this presence has been a prerequisite for conduct of Farmgate operations and probably would remain so. 13. Low-level reconnaissance over Laos and Cambodia. Although all parties present favor low-level reconnaissance into Laos just as soon as possible, General Taylor stated that it was not permitted for the present in deference to Ambassador Unger's wishes to withhold it until the situation jells in Laos. It was revealed that reaction would be almost immediate if authorized. Possible areas are Route 9, Kontum, and along the DMZ. Results are used to improve target folders for future plans. Readout on U-2 photography is about 48 hours and pictures are produced the following day. Reaction time is such that missions could react to Hard Nose intelligence. 14. Length of tour of US advisers. General Harkins feels that length of tours of US advisers is about right. Normally, advisers are with battalions roughly six months, then go to training centers. Some sector advisers represent the only continuity because of the great number of changes which have been made in province and district chiefs. 15. Austere naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. There is limited enthusiasm over the concept of an austere naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. It was agreed that a survey should be made to determine the nature of the problem. The Cam Ranh Bay locale is presently a secure area. 16. Policy on foreign military observers visiting RVN. There was a discussion of visits of foreign military observers to RVN arising out of the Argentine request. Several patterns were considered for permitting such visits. MACV was requested to recommend a policy. 17. There was a brief discussion of Secretary Rusk's proposals made following his visit to RVN. There was general agreement with his ideas except with regard to anti-junk operations north of the 17th parallel. It was felt that little would be gained by hit and run actions whereas a considerable increase in GVN naval strength would be required to permit sustained naval operations.
150. Memorandum of a Meeting, Saigon, May 11, 1964, 5 p.m./1/ /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text is Enclosure C to an undated memorandum from McNamara to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of DIA. PRESENT 1. General Minh feels we have been losing ground since January. The reason is that the government has lost the confidence of the people. General Khanh has brought back into the Army bad officers who had been dismissed by the Junta. What is needed is a popular leader. 2. General Taylor pointed out that it was difficult to be popular in time of civil war, that there were times when Lincoln's popularity was very low in the United States during our civil war. He insisted, however, that something had to be done to attract the people to the side of the government. 3. Speaking of neutralists, Minh said that Diem used to see communists everywhere; now Khanh sees neutralists everywhere. The fact is that many friends are neutralists and anti-American. However, their political influence is not important. 4. The Buddhists do have a political importance. They have been infiltrated to some extent by communists. Tri Quang may become dangerous. 5. General Minh sees no present likelihood of a coup but he is quite sure that victory is not in sight.
151. Memorandum of a Meeting, Saigon, May 12, 1964/1/ /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, Vietnam 333. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text Enclosure D to an undated memorandu~m from McNamara to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of DIA. PRESENT Country Team Visitors Secretary McNamara 1. Appraisal of Khanh's progress or lack thereof in strengthening government: a. Central Government: Administrative mechanism of government has not [been] and is not functioning smoothly. Greatest psychological weakness in SVN is attitude of "every man for himself". Khanh centralizes authority in himself to detriment of efficiency of government operation. Lodge is encouraged by Khanh's request for American advisors to assist his government. Given time, inter-governmental relationships may work out, but prospects are not good. b. Provincial Government: Remains weak. Uncertainty as to Corps Commanders' responsibility handicaps administration. Khanh's 23 new province chiefs and 80 new district chiefs on the whole have improved quality of administration. c. Central Pacification Committee: Lacks number and quality inspection personnel to be effective. It is of major importance to seize one place (Long An, for instance), conduct intensive economic-political campaign, and publicize success. 2. Khanh's support by various groups, particularly Buddhists. Buddhists are fragmented. Tri Quang is "nearest thing to a political animal" Lodge has seen in RVN. He is ambitious, anti-Christian, full of hatreds, and agitating against Khanh. Because of Buddhist agitation, particularly that led by Tri Quang, Catholics are about to withdraw from Army all Catholic chaplains. Country Team does maintain close contact with Tri Quang. Some communist infiltration of Buddhists exists. Labor unions have, in general, avoided communist infiltration. Students generally support Khanh. Intellectuals oppose Khanh, as they have opposed everything else. 3. Extent to which increased U.S. aid can strengthen GVN counterinsurgency program. a. Existing U.S. program "is about right size". Skill, energy, leadership is what is needed. b. Lodge is anxious to have a civil advisor added to each Corps Area. Qualifications: fluent in French, about 45 years old, 2-4 year tour, bring family, live in capital of Corps Area, have assigned air and ground transportation, be under Ambassador. c. U.S. should not increase number of American families in RVN. 4. Creation of Administrative Civil Corps. a. GVN is underdeveloped government. Much progress has been made. USOM fears putting too much pressure on government or it might shatter. b. USOM is short 25% of authorized strength (about 1/2 for expanding rural affairs staff). c. Mr. McNamara was greatly disturbed over this shortage and suggested consideration of use of active duty military personnel, Foreign Service officers or Peace Corps people to fill this shortage. Sec/Def requested Mr. Forrestal to look into this problem, collect facts, and make recommendations upon his return to Washington. d. National Institute of Administration is short of faculty members for two reasons: (1) Seven instructors are assigned elsewhere in government; and (2) an inadequate budget. e. Current plans call for training of 7,000 hamlet cadre personnel for three weeks and 235 district officers by end of 1964. f. USOM stated that the most important thing to do is to develop a plan for organization and operation of GVN. g. Sec/Def directed Mr. Forrestal to follow this item and to check on usefulness of Michigan State work bearing on this.
152. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, May 14, 1964--7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. 2203. For Rusk and McNamara from Lodge. 1. Herewith report McNamara-Khanh conversation,/2/ attended also by Lodge, Taylor and Harkins. /2/Held on May 13. 2. General Khanh began by reviewing the recent course of the war. He noted that over the past three months, the GVN had reestablished its control over some 3,000,000 Vietnamese citizens. He said that while there was obviously much that still had to be done, he was satisfied with the rate of progress. He said that an obvious problem was the danger that Communists would reinfiltrate into or otherwise reassert their control over the areas that had been made secure. The GVN was taking appropriate measures to assure that this did not happen. 3. General Khanh then said that his biggest problems and most time-consuming preoccupations were political. He protested that he was unskilled in political matters and wanted to lean heavily on Ambassador Lodge. He said that in addition to the normal political problems of a post-revolutionary situation, he had to cope with serious religious problems. It happened that almost any political question included a religious question. There were two major areas of religious conflict: that raging between the Catholics and the Buddhists, and that raging within the Buddhist movement. He said there were Catholics who dismissed all Buddhists as Communists, and Buddhists who made similar allegations about the Catholics. While the two religious groups were fighting, the GVN was in the middle and was receiving the blows each camp aimed at its adversaries. The Catholics accused him of being pro-Buddhist and the Buddhists accused him of being pro-Catholic. 4. The worst thing about this religious problem was that feelings were beginning to run so high that the religious dissension could spread to the army and completely shatter its unity. The importance of the religious problem could not be exaggerated. He felt that the best way to cope with it was to get authoritative spokesmen for the moderate tendencies in each religious group together, and let them work out the agreements and reconciliations that were in the manifest interest of both. 5. The real troublemaker in all this was Thich Tri Quang. General Khanh said he discussed the problem at length with the Ambassador, and hoped that the Ambassador would use his influence on Tri Quang to get him to adopt a more moderate position. The Ambassador remarked that he had tried this, that he was nevertheless prepared to try again, and would make another effort to influence Tri Quang to take a more conciliatory attitude towards the Catholics. The Ambassador added that Embassy officers frequently saw Tri Quang, and that perhaps they could influence him. General Khanh said this latter approach might be the better one; he felt that Tri Quang might respond better if approached at a working level, because if the Ambassador sought him out too often, there was a danger that this fact would go to Tri Quang's head and make him more difficult than ever. 6. In addition to the religious problem, there was also the problem of the press. General Khanh remarked that more often than not the main purpose of a newspaper in Vietnam was to support specific financial or commercial interests, and that the press tended to be defamatory. Further, it got involved in the intrigues of those whom he called "parlor politicians"--those Saigonese who had had no contact with the war whatsoever, who knew nothing of the sacrifices that it entailed for the rural populations who lived in the midst of it, who had never struck a blow for freedom but who nonetheless set themselves up as the champion of freedom, often in opposition to the government and to the detriment of the war effort and whose sole interest was power and preferment for themselves. 7. All things considered, General Khanh was not displeased with what had been accomplished in recent months. There was no escaping the fact that the mobilization, induction and training of recruits and the mounting of operations had all suffered and been set back as a result of the two coups of last fall and winter. There had been no effective government in Vietnam since last May, but GVN was extending its authority, and there was good reason to believe that it would do so at a more rapid rate in the future--the progress of consolidation would not only be an oil spot, it would also snowball. 8. General Khanh said he was a soldier and not a politician, and that he wished he could spend more of his time on mounting military operations, on assisting the pacification program, and in thinking a bit about longer-term strategy and the international relations of his country, rather than spending so much time on internal political squabbles. He said these squabbles were like stomach troubles: they caused him considerable discomfort and served no useful purpose. 9. He had to think of the security of his regime. He said the Americans, and especially the Secretary and the Ambassador, had gone all-out in support of him. He wanted to be worthy of this American commitment and make it prove to be worthwhile. To do this he had to protect his regime from any divisive tendencies or attempted coupe. That he was doing, and he felt his prospects of success in that particular effort were good. 10. After he had completed this general expose of his thoughts and hopes, Khanh asked if his guests had any questions. The Secretary suggested that General Khanh go on and outline any specific points he had in mind. The Secretary said that he had noted in one of the Ambassador's reports (Embtel 2108 of May 4, 1964)/3/ that Khanh had said he did not want to prolong "the agony" and wanted to push on with a more vigorous prosecution of the war. The Secretary said he would like to hear Khanh's thoughts in this connection. /3/Document 136. 11. Khanh said that when he spoke of not wanting "to make the agony endure", he did not want to give the impression that he would lose patience in a long, grinding struggle of the sort that doubtlessly lay ahead in this kind of a war. But he did think the process could be speeded up by something like the following: the proclamation that South Vietnam was on a war footing and was being attacked from the North; that if this attack did not stop within a specified period of time, which could be six weeks, a month, or two weeks, South Vietnam would strike back and carry out attacks on the North comparable to those the North had been carrying against the South. These countermeasures would be comparable in degree and importance and extent, although not necessarily identical in form, "whereas the North attacks us with guerrillas that squirm through the jungle, we would attack them with 'guerrillas' of our own, only ours would fly in at tree-top level and blow up key installations or mine the port of Haiphong." 12. The Secretary asked General Khanh if he thought it would be wise to undertake such operations now. Khanh replied that before starting such operations, we had to think about what the enemy reaction would probably be. It could well be that the North would attack in strength, perhaps even with Chinese Communist assistance or direct participation. This would rapidly become America's problem, so it would have to be for the Americans to decide on timing or whether attacks against the North were to be undertaken at all. Having said this, he said, he would like to note that the NFLSVN and the VC were but the arms or legs of the enemy monster; its head was in Hanoi--"and maybe further North;" and to destroy it properly and quickly, a blow at the head was needed. The purpose of putting the country formally on a war footing would be to set the stage, to set a proper frame of reference, for the ultimate extension of the war that would follow. 13. General Taylor asked how General Khanh thought he could best attack the North. Khanh replied by air or by sea but not by land. It was noted that some small-scale infiltration operations had been tried or were in progress, but it was generally agreed that these had not been successful and were unlikely to make any decisively significant contribution to the war effort. When the question of the material capabilities of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to mount such attacks came up, Khanh replied that they either were ready or could quickly be brought to a point of readiness. This was not the problem. The problem was to be certain that the GVN would continue to enjoy full American support in connection with a strong attack by the North in reaction to what the GVN had done. Khanh noted that there were always unknowns that must be taken into account. He recalled the parts played by comparable "unknownsv in the French war in Indochina-the decisive role played by a Viet Minh division that had been grouped and held secretly just over the Chinese border for a sudden and decisive intervention in the fighting in the Tonkin. The French had known nothing about it. He would point out the risks and the prospects for gain, but the Americans would have to make the basic decisions. 14. General Taylor recalled that at their last (March) meeting,/4/ General Khanh had said he would prefer to hold off on attacking the North until he had established a better and sounder base in the South. General Taylor asked if we now had a stable base. Khanh indicated that there was much more to be done in this area, but that it was almost impossible to describe the problem or his approaches to it in absolute terms. He said that the very fact that the base in the South was not yet satisfactorily solid might be a reason to strike against the North at once, rather than wait for the weakness to be corrected, because it could be, in a certain international conjuncture and set of circumstances, that the best cure for weakness in the South would be an attack on the North. He saw some merit in drawing clear lines of battle and thereby engaging men's hearts and their all-out efforts. That would be the advantage of proclaiming a war footing: it would increase people's awareness of the war and of the fact that they had to take a position and play their part. It could be that an attack on the North would galvanize opinion in the South and speed up the successful prosecution of the war considerably. /4/See Document 77. 15. Furthermore, General Khanh said, we had to be mindful of the diplomatic and international consequences of our acts or possible courses of action. For example, there was the problem of the French. When Secretary Rusk had spoken with him a few weeks ago, the Secretary had urged him not to break relations with France. When Khanh asserted that he knew that certain Frenchmen were involved in subversion, Secretary Rusk had said to expel them selectively and for cause, but not to break off diplomatic relations with France. This Khanh had done yesterday: three Frenchmen had been expelled on security grounds. This was just the beginning. He was going to expel any Frenchman who spread neutralist doctrine or otherwise threatened the security of the government, the state, or the war effort. Khanh said this with considerable force and pride, in the manner of a man who felt he was getting underway and enjoyed the feeling of motion and concrete achievement, and looked forward to more of the same. 16. General Khanh then asked the Secretary for his views. The Secretary recalled their conversations of last March and the increases in levels of forces upon which they had then agreed. Notably, there was to be a 72,000 man increase in the ARVN and another 72,000 increase in the paramilitary forces, to replace casualties, separations and to raise the level of forces to something like 238,000 for the ARVN and 98,000 each for the Civil Guard and the SDC. The Secretary noted that the figures for what had actually been accomplished in these areas in April and May did not suggest that we were on schedule. The Secretary emphasized that he was making the observation only to introduce his main point that the USG was willing to help in any way it could to get this program back on schedule. If more money or materiel was needed, it would be made available whenever a real need could be demonstrated. 17. The Secretary then produced a chart showing what should have been accomplished over the past few months and what had actually been achieved. The Secretary and Khanh went over these figures carefully. After this study of detailed specifics was completed, Khanh asked the Secretary what general observation he would like to make on the war effort to date. 18. The Secretary noted the limitations of his vantage point as compared to that of General Khanh, but gave a clear and concrete listing of important points. First of all, he said, he would emphasize strength levels. Second, he said, the Vietnamese Air Force needed more fighter-type aircraft. These could be delivered over here within three or four months. The Secretary indicated which aircraft types should be substituted for which types currently in use. Thirdly, the Secretary said, there was the matter of the budget. This was very important. Delays in the granting of budgetary approval seemed to be holding up progress of the pacification effort. The Secretary emphasized that the GVN could count on the USG to supply any funds that were clearly needed, and to cover any shortfall that had been occasioned by worthwhile activity. The GVN must emphasize, particularly in the provinces, that it is a crime not to disburse funds one is supposed to disburse. Khanh said he had recently gotten this message across to a large group of province chiefs at Cap Saint Jacques; he was going to talk to the remainder of the province chiefs within a week or so. He said jocularly that he was going to tell them that he would cut off the head of anyone who put money into his own pockets, but would also cut off the head of anyone who sat on money he was supposed to disburse. All present expressed satisfaction at Khanh's having accepted this important point of speeding up disbursements and removing obstacles to adequate funding of key projects. Khanh explained that many of the GVN's difficulties in this area stemmed from their heritage of French budgetary practice and its particularly formidable system of controls. 19. At Khanh's request the Secretary offered more detailed points of advice. He said once again that he could not emphasize too strongly the importance of raising forces to the agreed levels. He felt still more effort should be made in the strategic provinces. There was also the problem of replacing incompetents. The Secretary said that in every relevant report, he had heard that the commander of the 5th Division was incompetent. He must be replaced quickly. The same applied to the province chief of Hau Nghia Province. 20. General Khanh said he agreed regarding the incompetence of these two individuals. They would soon be replaced. The case of the commander of the 5th Division presented something of an internal problem, but it would be arranged. 21. The Secretary then noted that the GVN was failing to receive much support that it might get from third-country nations interested in its struggle simply because it was inadequately represented abroad. The GVN must send out many more able Ambassadors. Ambassador Lodge remarked that he knew of several Vietnamese available in Saigon who would make excellent Ambassadors. The Secretary pointed out that the GVN could do much good for its cause by being properly represented at the UN, in a number of African and South American countries, and in Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany. 22. General Khanh replied that he had this problem very much in mind. He said that an Ambassador, unlike a province chief, cannot be assigned quickly and then withdrawn if he does not work out well. A very careful selection must be made in the first place. There were, to be sure, many able men available, but there were also many problems. Ambassadors had to be representatives-nationally, socially and politically. They had to be worthy of the trust imposed in them. There were many otherwise suitable men who had family problems that complicated their cases; the wives of some were unsuitable for a diplomatic assignment. He was moving as fast as he could on this. 23. Finally, the Secretary said there must be a more effective administration of the pacification program. Those running it must be pushed to higher levels of effectiveness, and any obstacles in their paths must be removed. General Khanh said he hoped in the near future to be able to spend much more time on military and pacification matters, if only this political "stomach trouble" that took so much of his time could be quieted. 24. General Taylor, in a very serious and deliberate manner, said there was one problem of which he wished to remind General Khanh: the matter of proper supervision of communications security, this was extremely important. The fate of a nation could hang on communications security practices, and General Khanh would have to insist on higher standards. Khanh acknowledged this. 25. Ambassador Lodge said he had a problem too: he had just learned that Major Dang-Sy/5/ was soon to be brought to trial in Hue and on a date (May 21) that was psychologically extremely dangerous. This trial could only exacerbate the religious strife of which General Khanh had earlier complained. Khanh said the date was May 18 and assured the Ambassador that Major Sy would not be executed. Khanh said, with some determination and inflexibility in his voice, that Sy would be tried. But he added with equal firmness and as a firm and personal commitment to the Ambassador, that he would not be executed. The Ambassador warned him that with religious feeling running as high as it was, any mishandling of the Sy trial could even start a religious war. Khanh acknowledged the Ambassador's points. He objected, however, that he had recently received a letter from Monseigneur Binh, the Bishop of Saigon, which was little less than an ultimatum. Khanh repeated again that Tri Quang was stirring up trouble, this time in connection with the Sy case. The Ambassador acknowledged that he did not envy the position in which Khanh found himself, but emphasized again that nothing must be [done?] even to justify the impression the GVN was in the slightest degree anti-Catholic. /5/Major Dang-Sy was Deputy Chief of Thua Thien Province and the official responsible for the government attacks on Buddhist demonstrators in Hue on May 8, 1963. Dang-Sy was relieved of his duties soon after the incident. After the overthrow of the Diem government in November 1963, he was arrested. 26. The meeting, which had been frank and friendly throughout, ended on a particularly warm and friendly note, with Khanh expressing his obviously sincere thanks for the Secretary's and the Ambassador's statements of all-out USG support for him and for his government. Lodge 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, May 14, 1964--5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2205. Literally eyes only to Rusk and McNamara from Lodge. From a very reliable source I reamed after McNamara departure that "Big" Minh stated on Wednesday/2/ afternoon that he was planning a coup to overthrow Khanh. This should be very closely held because knowledge of it might create the very developments we wish to discourage. Khanh is infinitely the best bet in this country./3/ /2/May 13. /3/On May 15, Lodge sent the following update to Rusk and McNamara in telegram 2213 from Saigon: "Since my 2205, I have learnt that 'Big Minh' is moving at a very slow speed and letting things come to him, and that there is no high pressure plot to get anything done quickly. What is chiefly significant is the state of mind. My present intention is that it would do more harm than good for me to tell Khanh that I am aware of this. Undoubtedly, he is thoroughly aware of it and has been for a long time. I will exercise my best judgment." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) Lodge
154. Notes Prepared by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ Washington, May 14, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 4370, South Vietnam-Statements and Supporting Papers. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary of May 14, Johnson met with McNamara, Taylor, McGeorge and William Bundy, Bell, and Colby from 10:40 a.m. to noon. Sullivan was not listed as a participant at the meeting. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) RMcN's NOTES FOR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT Summarized below are my comments and conclusions based upon the discussions which General Taylor and I held in South Vietnam May 12 and 13. 1. The Situation a. Since last September the number of villages under Government control has declined by 200, approximately 12%. Most of this decline occurred between September and January, but the decline continued at a lesser rate through March. The adverse trend appears to have leveled off in April. b. Khanh states that today the Government controls 8 million people out of a total population of 14 million. c. The Viet Cong continue to hold the initiative. The rate of harassing incidents, with its adverse effects on public morale, continues to rise. The fighting strength of the Viet Cong has risen and they are now able occasionally to stand and fight rather than to retire and dissolve in the face of Government pressure. However, they are not yet capable of seizing an area and holding it for an extended period of time against determined Government attack. d. The Government's operations are improving in effectiveness: "Holding" and "oil spot" operations are under way in several parts of the country. Khanh has a clear and effective concept of the pacification program. However: Frequent changes of leadership continue (there have been six Province Chiefs in Long An in recent weeks). Incompetent leadership exists in many critical areas, e.g., the 5th Division and Hai Nghia Province. Resources are not concentrated in the areas of highest priority (for example, the crescent of provinces around Saigon including Long An, Binh Duong, and Hai Nghia, has fewer troops and less competent leadership in relation to the Communist threat than do less critical areas). Operational plans for applying the "holding" and "oil spot" concepts to all provinces or to all major parts of each important province (Long An) have not yet been developed. Desertion rates remain high and the strength of both regular and pare-military forces is inadequate and falling. The administrative processes of the Government, particularly as they relate to the war effort and especially its budgetary aspects, are ineffective (the budget for January has not yet been approved and province chiefs are reluctant to assume responsibility for spending for such purposes as increases in pay, additions to strength, the rural pacification program). The Government remains fragmented by dissension and distrust (e.g., the Foreign Minister reported to Manfull on May 13 that Khanh had possible Communist or neutralist connections). A religious crisis is brewing both among the Buddhists and between the Buddhists and the Catholics, and the latter may spread to the Army (note the "ultimatum" letters to Khanh from both the Buddhists and the Catholics and the Bishop's proposal to remove Catholic chaplains from the Army). Tri Quang, the leader of the Buddhists in the central part of the country, is an ambitious, dangerous, unpredictable, powerful, political force antagonistic to Khanh's Government. e. MACV estimates: 1) The Pacification Program will not be in full swing until September. 2) Governmental control over the Central and Northern areas will not be achieved before mid-1965 and possibly as late as the end of 1965 (per Westmoreland and Stilwell). 3) Governmental control over the Delta will not be achieved in less than two to three years (per Westmoreland and Stilwell). 4) Governmental preparations for operations against the North will not be completed before September or October. 2. Actions which we have recommended to strengthen the Government's Program. a. The strength of the regular and paramilitary forces must be increased substantially by the end of the year. MACV was asked to prepare a detailed plan to accomplish this, to obtain Khanh's approval of the plan, and to monitor its implementation. The plan, prepared while we were in Saigon, proposed the recruitment of 147,000 men between April 1 and December 31, 1964. I asked Khanh to approve this plan--he did. b. South Vietnam's financial budget must be approved immediately and the province chiefs must be instructed to implement it at once. Khanh agreed to issue the necessary instructions. c. Financial limitations or the fear of such limitations must not be allowed to stand in the way of the action required to expedite the Pacification Program. Mike Forrestal will stay in Saigon until he negotiates with Oanh a plan for providing whatever budgetary support is required to offset the bad psychological effect of what the South Vietnamese view as our restrictive financial policies. (Oanh has requested an additional $56 million for the CIP plus $20 million to be added to the foreign exchange reserve.) d. Detailed plans for the extensive application of the "oil spot" concept must be developed for all provinces and resources provided and allocated in accordance with these plans. MACV will assume the responsibility for this action. e. Certain additional training or logistical support is required for the Vietnamese forces. We will endeavor to increase by 100% the number of Vietnamese fighter pilots within 90-100 days. We will increase the number of fighter aircraft by approximately 3.3% by the first of October and provide by that date additional pilots for such aircraft. We will approve MACV's request for additional financial and material assistance totalling approximately $7 million (this list of items to be submitted in response to my request that they tell us of any additional assistance which they required). A detailed training program for the 7,000 additional civilian administrators to be used for pacification cadres must be developed and expedited. The USOM Chief will follow this program. 3. Khanh's views. (For a more complete exposition of his comments, see the report of my interview with him.)/2/ /2/Document 152. a. As stated earlier, Khanh believes that today the Government controls approximately 8 million of the population. He believes his plans for application of the "oil spot" concept will gradually extend the Government's control over the remainder of the population, but he points out this will require a long time. b. He states that his major problem today is not military, but rather political and religious in character. Irresponsible elements of the urban population, who have not been exposed to the dangers and pressures of the war, press for political reforms which are inappropriate under the present circumstances. Religious crises involving controversy among the Buddhists and between the Buddhists and Catholics are mounting rapidly. He fears they will spread to the Army. In these areas Khanh stated he is "a fish out of water" and he seeks our advice. c. Because the war will last a long time, Khanh believes that at some point a strike against the North will be desirable. He will probably not be ready for such a strike before the end of the year, although it may be forced upon him earlier by political and psychological factors. The strikes against the North can be carried out by South Vietnamese forces, but the decision to undertake such action must be that of the United States because if the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists respond by attacking South Vietnam, Khanh must depend on U.S. forces for the protection of his country. In any event, Khanh states strikes against the North are not required now and he is not yet ready to carry them out. d. Khanh accepted my statements of the requirement for: 1) A plan to increase the military and paramilitary strength of the GVN forces. 2) The early approval and effective provincial application of the financial budget. 3) The early assignment of ambassadors to key nations throughout the world. 4) The concentration of resources in the strategic heartland. 5) The removal of incompetent leaders in both the military and political organizations. e. Following Khanh's acceptance of my statements of the action he should take to increase the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program, I emphasized again that the U.S. would support fully whatever financial expenditures were required for projects which contributed to the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program. 4. Lodge's proposals for strikes against the North. a. Lodge wishes to carry out air strikes against the North [4 lines of source text not declassified]. The objective of Lodge's program would be not only to cut off the supply of men and equipment from the North, but also to destroy the morale of the North Vietnamese and to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese. b. Not only is this the program which Lodge believes should be followed, but, according to Bill Sullivan, Lodge believes his record shows he has consistently recommended it. His memorandum of record of the conversation with Messrs. Bundy and Rusk indicates to him that he proposed such a plan to them./3/ He considers that since his memorandum of last October to Averell Harriman he has consistently advocated this proposal. /3/See Document 120. c. Lodge believes he has made clear his opposition to Bill Bundy's proposal for establishing a political base and time schedule for action against the North. Dunn's notes of the conversations with Bundy and Rusk refer to Lodge's arguments against Bundy's proposal. d. The time schedule which Lodge apparently would follow is based on the Canadians' arrival in Saigon in June. Lodge believes the necessary training will be completed and plans to protect Saigon implemented by the end of the summer, at which time the political-military program could start. e. Almost certainly Lodge has discussed such a plan with Khanh, hoping to lead him to accept it. 5. Administration of the Country Team. [Paragraphs a and b (8 lines of source text) not declassified] c. Harkins and Lodge do not communicate effectively with each other. Neither Harkins nor Nes saw Lodge's cable reporting on his conversations with Khanh, /4/ nor did they see his "Dienbienphu" cable./5/ [1 line of source text not declassified] /4/Document 136. /5/Document 143. [Paragraph d (2 lines of source text) not declassified] e. The morale in the Embassy is poor because the able people on the staff see no effective direction of the counterinsurgency program within the Country Team. 6. Miscellaneous comments. a. Lodge believes that if Khanh disappears, the U.S. should be prepared to run the country, possibly from Cam Ranh Bay. b. With respect to coup possibilities, DeSilva states that although Khanh is not very popular, this is a normal condition for a leader of such a country and coup prospects, in his opinion, are lowest since January 30 of this year. RMcN
155. Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/ Washington, May 14, 1964--8:04 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent as telegram 1942 to Saigon, which is the source text. The message was drafted in the White House and, according to a May 14 note from McGeorge to William Bundy, it was approved by the President and McNamara. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IX) McNamara and Sullivan have reported fully this morning regarding their conversations with you and your colleagues./2/ I was particularly struck by Sullivan's report of his conversation with you in which you indicated your concept of a strategy for moving against the North./3/ While you had discussed this matter with Dean Rusk and Bundy earlier, they had not understood that you were proposing that a sequence of actions be initiated in the near future. /2/See footnote 1, Document 154. /3/See Document 148. I consider it vital that you and I at all times fully and clearly understand each other's minds and would therefore greatly appreciate it if you would send me urgently your precise present recommendations with respect to the North including the Canadian aspect, the timing, and the degree of visible U.S. participation at each stage. With respect to the Canadians, I feel it important to know whether you contemplate their being informed of the full range of the actions you propose and being advised at this time of the precise nature of the messages you would wish them to convey to the North Vietnamese. Bob McNamara also reports that in his discussion of-these matters General Khanh indicated his own present belief that action of this sort will become necessary later but that he will not be ready for such action before the end of the year. Khanh also emphasized that any action of this kind must require a U.S. decision and a U.S. promise of protection against any reprisal. I would appreciate your estimate both as to the prospect of reprisal and of the need for advance protection./4/ /4/Telegram 1942 does not bear President Johnson's signature.
156. Summary Record of the 532d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 15, 1964, Noon/1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 11, Tab 4. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. A list of attendees is ibid,. Memos to the President. McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 4. The agenda of the meeting, which included presentations on U.S. assistance to Indonesia and U.S. policy toward Panama, was cancelled. The bipartisan Congressional leaders had been invited by the President to attend the Council session to hear reports by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. [Here follows Rusk's brief summary of the NATO meeting he attended with specific reference to France and Cyprus.] 3. United Nations--A report on what we are doing in South Vietnam accompanied by a plea to the NATO members to assist in the effort against the Viet Cong. About half a dozen States may register their presence in South Vietnam. It is important that more flags appear in South Vietnam. The contribution which additional states will make helps the war effort but also has a beneficial effect on the morale of the South Vietnamese government. The resistance among NATO members to assisting in Vietnam is an echo of the past and recalls colonial disputes in which European nations believe we worked against them. [Here follow discussion by Rusk of the U.S. position on overflights of Cuba as presented at the NATO meeting and his brief summary of NATO discussions concerning tripartite talks on German reunification.] Secretary McNamara then summarized the report he had prepared following his most recent visit to South Vietnam. 1. The situation in South Vietnam has worsened since his last visit. The number of people under Viet Cong control' and the amount of Vietnamese territory they control is increasing. The Viet Cong holds the initiative in the military action. The Khanh government is fragmented and a religious crisis is brewing. South Vietnamese efforts involve clear and hold exercises, the oil spot program, and pacification programs. Khanh controls eight out of fourteen million South Vietnamese. His major problem is not military but civilian and religious. He does not feel that he should strike north before his security situation in the south is improved, possibly by this Fall. No strike to the north is required now, but there may be a psychological requirement to hit North Vietnam at a later time. He feels that because the reaction of the Communists to an attack on North Vietnam is unknown, he must have a U.S. guarantee of protection, i.e., the introduction of U.S. forces, before such an attack is initiated. In response to the President's question, General Taylor said that if we attack North Vietnam, there would be a strong reaction by the Viet Cong in the south. It is difficult to estimate what the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists would do. The Chinese Communists could intervene but probably would not. The larger the U.S. attack, the greater chance of Communist reaction. The level of the attack would be the determining factor on the Communist reaction. The President pointed out that Khanh's support of any attack on North Vietnam would be essential. Secretary McNamara said that the most important thing to do now is to back Khanh solidly. He suggested that we could help Khanh in the following ways: 1. Increase the South Vietnamese force level. 2. Help get his budget approved and implemented. 3. Provide financial support to ensure the stability of the South Vietnamese economy. More foreign aid in 1965 will be needed, as well as additional military equipment. 4. Train Vietnamese pilots in order to provide crews for the increased number of U.S. planes which we should send to Vietnam. In answer to a question, Secretary McNamara said that U.S. military personnel would be training Vietnamese and would not be in combat. However, U.S. men are exposed to fire on the ground and in the air during their training time. He referred to Jungle Jim, an Air Force program to train a Vietnamese force for counterguerrilla activity. As to U.S. planes given to the Vietnamese earlier, he said there was a sound case for sending the T-28s. Propeller-driven planes are more appropriate to Vietnam than jets. The size of the airfields is small. The T-28s had been used to provide air cover for helicopters. U.S. experts agree that the T-28s are the best type of plane for the Vietnamese war. Fatalities were low, considering the large number of sorties flown. Secretary McNamara said, in summary, that we would be obliged to increase our previous level of economic and military assistance. In answer to Senator Dirksen's question, Director Bell said total U.S. assistance amounted to about $500 million a year. Senator Dirksen recalled Secretary McNamara's earlier report to the Congressional group/2/ and asked whether the Vietnamese had been able to enlist or conscript the additional soldiers called for under their program. Secretary McNamara said the present goal is 75,000 more men by the end of the year. In fact, 150,000 recruits are needed but it is unlikely that this number will be obtained. /2/See Document 107. In answer to a question by Senator Dirksen as to the effect of our increased assistance on the economy of South Vietnam, both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Bell agreed that the effect would be little. This year's rice crop is expected to be good. In answer to Senator Dirksen's question about the Cambodian border incident,/3/ Secretary McNamara said it was very difficult to determine the specific facts. Apparently there were two different incidents involving the crossing of the border by South Vietnamese. Secretary Rusk added that the Viet Cong felt free to move across the border into Cambodia. He added that we may try to use the Cambodian appeal to the UN to get UN observers on the Cambodia/ South Vietnam border. Director McCone noted that both sides have crossed and recrossed the border. These crossings are not deep and are in areas where the border is not clearly identified. /3/Reference is to a South Vietnamese armed incursion of Cambodia on May 7 and 8 in pursuit of the Viet Cong. (Memorandum from Samuel E. Belk to McGeorge Bundy, May 15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IX) The President summarized the McNamara report by saying that the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating and caused us to be extremely alarmed. The religious situation is explosive. A great effort will be necessary to turn the tide back to our side. Senator Saltonstall asked whether U.S. soldiers will be engaged in fighting under the new program. He also asked whether U.S. planes were being adequately maintained, adding that many people had expressed their concern to him on this point. Secretary McNamara replied that U.S. soldiers are not engaged in combat except in the course of their training Vietnamese. The number of our fighter pilots in South Vietnam has not been greatly increased. The bulk of the air effort is by South Vietnamese forces and does not involve exposing our men. Congressman Jensen asked whether our allies are helping us. He wanted to know why the U.S. is carrying so much of the load and why our allies can not be forced to contribute more. Secretary Rusk replied that we are carrying almost all of the load but are getting some assistance from Germany, France, the U.K. and Australia. The U.K., however, is involved in Borneo and in Malaysia. Some twenty nations have been asked to help us in South Vietnam. Congressman Jensen made clear that he thought we are merely puttering around instead of launching a campaign against the Red Chinese. He is convinced that we have to deal with the Red Chinese. He is unhappy because he believes our allies really do not give a damn about Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Secretary McNamara repeated his view that effective action must be taken in South Vietnam. Attacks on North Vietnam may become necessary, but our purpose would be to make possible the carrying out of present programs in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong is being hurt in South Vietnam now. We are trying to get our allies to help, but many of them have severe limitations. However, the Australian effort is much too small. Because their entire defense budget is so low, the Australians would be able to put only a token force in South Vietnam. Secretary Rusk pointed out that Prime Minister Menzies can now increase his defense budget because, in a recent election, he gained sufficient additional political support to make this action possible. Congresswoman Bolton asked when we began training South Vietnamese pilots. Secretary McNamara replied in January 1962. He added that in two and one-fourth years twenty-eight U.S. lives have been lost, but that Vietnamese sorties had increased eight times. He cited additional facts to refute criticism that the Vietnamese are not fighting and that U.S. soldiers are actually carrying on the war. When Secretary McNamara finished, Mrs. Bolton requested that his information be made public. She said she is getting a tremendous amount of mail criticizing our actions in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said we are making the information he had summarized available to the public and he had given some of it during his testimony before Congressional committees. In response to a question from Senator Dirksen as to the location of the Seventh Fleet, Secretary McNamara said elements of the Fleet are off the coast of South Vietnam, within forty-eight hours steaming time of Saigon. In response to a question by Senator Dirksen as to whether Communist China is increasing the number of weapons shipped to South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara replied that there had been no increase in weapon shipments above the March level. Senator Dirksen asked for a description of the routes of supply from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara described several of the routes, adding that 90-95% of Viet Cong forces are recruited in South Vietnam. Only cadres are sent from North Vietnam. Speaker McCormack said that the Administration was doing everything it could to get help from our allies. He pointed out that if South Vietnam goes, all of Southeast Asia will fall to the Communists. It is in our national interest to keep Southeast Asia non-Communist. Congressman Jensen agreed that the U.S. has an interest in Southeast Asia but firmly restated his view that so do others who are not now helping us. He asked about the position of Thailand. Secretary Rusk replied that Thailand is focusing on the problem in Laos and has moved some of its forces to northeast Thailand. This helps the situation in South Vietnam. In addition, the Thais are worried about the activity of Sihanouk. The South Vietnamese do not want Thai forces in their territory. The Thais are giving us good political support, but we have not pressed them to send military forces to South Vietnam. Secretary Rusk called attention to the fact that the Vietnamese problem is ten years old. We have been committed to help Vietnam remain independent since 1954. In 1959, U.S. aid to Vietnam was increased when it became clear that Hanoi was intensifying its efforts to overthrow the South Vietnamese government. The President said that a request for a supplemental appropriation to pay for increased economic and military assistance to South Vietnam would come from the Bureau of the Budget to the National Security Council and then be sent to Congress. The amount required was more than could be covered by the contingency fund. The specific amount was not yet known. The President requested that information on this point not be made public Senator Saltonstall asked what could be said. The President replied that we would say that Congressional leaders had been asked to attend the National Security Council meeting to hear a briefing by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. It was clear that more U.S. funds would be required for the Vietnamese program, but no details should be given out because they were still considered confidential. In response to a question, Secretary McNamara said that Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins were in full agreement that more U.S. effort was needed in South Vietnam. The President concluded the meeting by commenting that even with increased U.S. aid the prospect in South Vietnam is not bright. Bromley Smith/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
157. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President/1/ Saigon, May 15, 1964--4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 2212 from Saigon, which is the source text. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1982, 002002. This is in reply to your 1942./2/ /2/Document 155. 1. My views on this subject were last submitted in my memorandum of October 30 to Harriman/3/ and later various aspects were covered in the following wires from me to you: my 1583 of February 19,/4/ my 1594 of February 20,/5/ my 1757 of March 16,/6/ my 1454 of March 18,/6/ my 1776 of March 19,/7/ my 08 of April 16,/8/ and my 1803 of March 23./9/ /3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 656-659. /4/Document 53. /5/Document 55. /6/See footnote 2, Document 85. /7/Document 91. /8/See footnote 2, Document 116 /9/Document 93. 2. I think the Canadian interlocutor on his first trip to Hanoi should state that the Americans are utterly determined to win the struggle in South Viet Nam and will do whatever is necessary to win it. He should also point out that the North Vietnamese have it in their power to behave in such a way as to bring about the eventual withdrawal of U.S. military personnel, and so as to get food and economic aid for themselves, but that if they persist in their present gross and murderous intrusion into South Viet Nam, they will unquestionably be punished. 3. If prior to the Canadian's trip to Hanoi there has been a terroristic act of the proper magnitude, then I suggest that a specific target in North Viet Nam be considered as a prelude to his arrival. The Vietnamese Air Force must be made capable of doing this, and they should undertake this type of action. 4. I much prefer a selective use of Vietnamese air power to an overt U.S. effort perhaps involving the total annihilation of all that has been built in North Viet Nam since 1954~ because this would surely bring in the Chinese Communists, and might well bring in the Russians. Moreover, if you lay the whole country waste, it is quite likely that you will induce a mood of fatalism in the Viet Cong. Also, there will be nobody left in North Viet Nam on whom to put pressure. Furthermore, South Viet Nam's infrastructure might well be destroyed. What we are interested in here is not destroying Ho Chi Minh (as his successor would probably be worse than he is), but getting him to change behavior. That is what President Kennedy was trying to do in October with Diem and with considerable success. 5. I believe the Canadian interlocutor idea offers the opportunity of using military power in a sharp focus to achieve specific political objectives, and we can increase or decrease the dose as we judge the traffic will bear and depending on our own readiness. 6. This is a procedure the intensity of which we can constantly control and bring up to the point to which we think the Communist reaction would cease to be manageable. It should be covert and undertaken by the Vietnamese, but, of course, we must be clear in our own minds that we are ready and able to take care of whatever reaction there may be. 7. It is easy for us on the one hand to ignore our superiority as we did at the time of Berlin in 1948 (when we still had sole possession of the atomic bomb). It is also a relatively simple concept to go all out and destroy North Viet Nam. What is complicated, but really effective, is to bring our power to bear in a precise way so as to get specific results. 8. Another advantage of this procedure is that when, as and if the time ever came that our military activities against the North became overt, we would be in a strong moral position both with regard to U.S. public opinion, the U.S. Congress, and the U.N. I say this because we would then have a record to show that we had given Ho Chi Minh fair warning to stop his murderous interference in the internal affairs of Viet Nam. Not only would we have given him fair warning, but we would have given him honest and valuable inducements in the way of some withdrawal of American personnel and in the way of economic aid, notably food. I think it is indispensable to lay this kind of basis on which we can then reasonably expect to get the support of Congress, public opinion, the United Nations. 9. The capacity to provide adequate protection against NVN reaction is a matter for the best military judgment available. I favor starting this procedure as soon as the Canadian can get going and as fast as military adequacy permits. Canadian should be a really big man. Lodge/10/ /10/Telegram 2212 bears this typed signature.
158. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, May 15, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Chron. Confidential. At yesterday's meeting/2/ Secretary McNamara and Sullivan reported that Lodge was now urging that we undertake the Canadian gambit in the full sense as soon as the man gets out there (June 15 is now estimated), and that the initial threat-carrot approach be followed by covert air strikes against targets in North Vietnam. Lodge claims that it is the position that he took in his discussions with you in Saigon. /2/See footnote 1, Document 154. As you know, we have asked Lodge to make this specific. But just on the point of what he said to you during your visit, I have checked the notes taken by Lodge's own man./3/ They make clear that Lodge proposed the Canadian gambit but did not have in mind, at that time, that it would be undertaken before the new Canadian man arrived, which then looked like July. As to the question of initial air strikes being wholly "covert", the record contains absolutely nothing to support Lodge's contention that he made this point during the discussion. Our own scenario, which he should have read but (according to Nes) had not (!) made it quite clear that our script thought that the initial air strikes would have to be acknowledged by the GVN. Thus, it was an obvious point for Lodge to seize on if he disagreed with it, but the record is perfectly clear that he did not do so. /3/See Document 120. This only for use if the President appears to believe that you and I did not take Lodge in correctly. As often, he was simply fairly woolly. I have now made a master file of all our exchanges with Lodge on this subject, and will do an analysis of this very soon so that we know just what kind of things he really said. W.P.B.
159. Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency/1/ [document number not declassified] Washington, May 15, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IX. Secret. A covering memorandum from McCone, May 16, brought this memorandum to President Johnson's attention. (Ibid., SEA Special Intelligence Material, Vol. I) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 21C. At 1:03 p.m., May 16, McCone called Rusk to discuss this memorandum: "M said he thought the situation in Viet-Nam was much more serious than Bob's report; we are trying to deal with it isolated from Cambodia, Laos and M thought the situation there was really serious. M said that was why he produced the paper this morning, the May 15 appraisal; he thought the Sec should read it; the Sec said he had not seen it. M said we are hanging on a thread of two people--Khanh and Phoumi. M said also the great emphasis was on the military and none on his building a government, which he did not have. Sec said he was working this week end on a long message from him to Lodge; probably President, McNamara and M would see before it went out." (Department of State, Rusk Papers: Lot 72 D 172, Telephone Conversations) For McNamara's report, see Document 154 SUMMARY The over-all situation in South Vietnam remains extremely fragile. Although there has been some improvement in GVN/ARVN performance, sustained Viet Cong pressure continues to erode GVN authority throughout the country, undercut US/GVN programs and depress South Vietnamese morale. We do not see any signs that these trends are yet "bottoming out." During the next several months there will be increasing danger that an assassination of Khanh, a successful coup, a grave military reverse, or a succession of serious military setbacks could have a critical psychological impact in South Vietnam. In any case, if the tide of deterioration has not been arrested by the end of the year, the anti-Communist position in South Vietnam is likely to become untenable.
160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, May 16, 1964--6:59 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 8 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Stoneman, cleared in substance by Bell and in draft by Poats and Blouin, and approved by Sullivan. 1968. Joint State/AID/DOD message. Pass Forrestal for info. Rpt to CINCPAC for info. Subject: Vietnam Supplemental Appropriation Request. Decision made today to proceed on Monday with supplemental appropriation request $125 million for increase in FY 1965 U.S. foreign assistance to Vietnam, $70 million economic and $55 million military. Septel gives verbatim text presently proposed draft of message./2/ /2/Telegram 1967 to Saigon, May 16. (Ibid., DEF 19-7 US-VIET S) The May 1& message to Congress is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 970-972. Based information available here, supplemented by Secretary McNamara's observations during this week's Saigon visit, the $70 million economic aid will be divided $50 million additional for commercial import program and $20 million additional for counter-insurgency program. This additive to Congressional Presentation figures of $95 million CIP and $35 million C.I. This action being taken in order to assure availability of funding for increased needs now foreseen and to remove any possible psychological or political impediment to all-out GVN budgetary, administrative and military efforts. This is to be used for real needs as they actually arise within the illustrative context of the current supplemental presentation and as additional reassurance in negotiating with GVN for maximum effort on its part. For instance, we envisage announcement of our additional support will enable Country Team to obtain effective GVN commitments to following, inter alia: (a) Immediate, decisive GVN action to provide all plaster financing needed for civil counter-insurgency and increased military effort; (b) Greatly simplified and streamlined budgetary and administrative procedures; (c) Further curtailment of luxury imports; (d) Sharing of import-financing costs through drawdown of GVN reserves by $25 to $30 million in FY 64 from the Jan 1, 1964 level of $ 179 million: (e) RAND/USOM/GVN study on appropriate economic mobilization measures will be carried on vigorously and results applied to maximum extent feasible. (f) Better utilization of military manpower and equipment. In short, U.S. is providing under most extraordinary procedures virtually everything by way of external resources for which GVN has indicated need and it is now calling on GVN to exert maximum effort on its part along lines already jointly agreed as necessary. Rusk
161. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ JCSM-426-64 Washington, May 19, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 300, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 092 North Vietnam. Top Secret; Sensitive. A summary version is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 511-512. SUBJECT 1. The first phase of operations against North Vietnam, under OPLAN 34A,/2/ terminates on 31 May 1964. In reviewing the military commanders' proposal for a four month continuation of operations, commencing June 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have appraised the achievements, and limitations, of the first three months of the program now being conducted under cognizance of the Department of Defense. /2/See footnote 2, Document 4. 2. The over-all objective of the program is primarily to help convince the North Vietnamese leadership that it is in its own self-interest to desist from its aggressive policies. Ancillary objectives are: a. To gain more information regarding the enemy, and b. To intensify the current psychological warfare, deception and resistance operations in order to weaken Hanoi's control of the population and to involve the regime in costly countermeasures. 3. The indices of the progress of the war in South Vietnam for the past three months indicate a slow beginning in an over-all program designed to deter the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRY) aggression against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). There are, however, indications that attempts at infiltration and certain psychological activities, together with widespread press and radio speculation over the extension of the war, have had an effect on the DRV. Its reactions tend to substantiate the premise that Hanoi is expending substantial resources in defensive measures. 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude from their appraisal of the program that: a. A general lack of program direction by the Government of Vietnam (GVN) was caused by the 30 January coup. b. The program was initiated before the special materiel and personnel required for such a program were assembled in adequate numbers. Some of the assets inherited at the outset of the program were not operationally effective. c. Overflights of Laos, while presently severely restricted, are essential in order to take advantage of en route weather conditions, avoid DRV radar and antiaircraft defenses, reduce time over DRV territory, permit planning flexibility, and enhance the security of drop zones and aircraft. d. Other factors which have limited operations are bad weather, inadequate combat intelligence, motivational problems, and the time required for [to?] ready major items of equipment. 5. With due regard for the difficulties encountered in commencing this program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the potential of this total program remains high. They advocate continuing the program for the Phase II period of June, July, August, and September at a rate commensurate with the growing operational capabilities of COMUSMACV and GVN armed forces. The next four months will bring a substantial increase in the military resources which can be brought to bear in the form of improved electronic intelligence, trained RVN, military sabotage teams, increased C-123 airlift, including crews, Nasty type PT craft, and operating experience for all echelons. The recently developed capability of the VNAF to conduct aerial mine-laying should be exploited during this period. In addition to aerial mining, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the VNAF has the capability to conduct air strikes successfully now and their recommendations concerning this type of operation during the Phase II period will be provided in the near future. 6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. RVN operations against North Vietnam be continued during the Phase II period commencing 1 June 1964 and intensified as operational capabilities are achieved and demonstrated. b. Aerial mining against Swatow bases utilizing unmarked aircraft and non-US crews be authorized during this period. c. The restrictions on overflights of Laos in support of this program be removed for unmarked aircraft with non-US crews. d. Intelligence collection efforts, reconnaissance, and psychological operations be conducted at an increased tempo to include ground intelligence collection probes into the DMZ, the infiltration of intelligence teams into North Vietnam via Laos, and the development of intelligence networks and resistance cadres in tribal areas. e. Joint planning, training, and organizing be conducted to provide for an intensified Phase III commencing 1 October 1964. f. The recommendations contained herein, together with the proposed list of actions for June, July, August, and September contained in the Appendix hereto,/3/ be the basis of the Department of Defense position and presented for decision as a matter of priority. /3/Not printed. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /4/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, May 20, 1964--8:50 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 8 VIET S. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sullivan, cleared in draft by Stoneman, and initialed by Rusk. 2022. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. As you and I agreed during my recent visit to Saigon, it is extremely important that the material effort we are investing in Viet Nam should have a visible impact upon the rural areas of the country where the Viet Cong terror strikes hardest. In discussions here in the United States and with our friends abroad, I am increasingly impressed with the general feeling that we have done little or nothing to improve the lot of the rural population. While I know that this feeling is inaccurate, I still wonder whether we are doing all we can, given the vast scope of our resources, to be sure that the peasant is receiving his share of the aid we are supplying or are prepared to supply. It seems to me that some of the most useful evidences of concern for the peasant would be farm tools, seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, etc. which would ease his labor and increase his productivity and income; medical supplies and services which would meet his health needs; hamlet schools where none existed before to educate his children; and radio sets, which would place him in contact with Saigon and increase his appreciation of what the GVN is doing for him. All of these items are within the scope of materials being supplied by our AID Mission and I am informed that, with the exception of some lag in the arrangements with the GVN for the handling of radio sets, there are generally plentiful supplies either on hand in Viet Nam or in the pipeline. However, the obvious bureaucratic inadequacies of the Vietnamese administrative apparatus--especially plaster releases, staffing and transportation bottlenecks--cause us to have great doubts that many of these benefits are actually reaching the hamlets and the villages. I hope you will personally look into this matter, have your USOM team give you a full report on the status of their programs in these and related fields, and satisfy yourself that we are doing all we can to achieve the intended results. It may be that in addition to force-feeding these materials into the Vietnamese distribution channels at Saigon, we will need more Americans at the rural end of the distribution system extracting the commodities themselves and placing them in the hands of Vietnamese officials to present to the peasants as benefits from the Khanh Government. It is reported to me that Trang Quoc Buu, the Vietnamese Labor Leader now in Washington, feels that Americans are needed in the countryside to handle this sort of problem. I know that this raises the risk of casualties, especially to civilians who are not supposedly intended to take combat risks. On the other hand I can think of no other way to be sure that what we are trying to do is actually accomplished. I would appreciate your comments on this or any alternative proposals which will help ensure that our aid to the rural population is truly reaching its destination./2/ /2/In telegram 2330 from Saigon, May 29, Lodge reported that USOM felt that its rural programs were benefiting the peasant population, but there could be improvements in the logistical system. He reminded Rusk that USOM had requested 80 additional American positions and additional third-country nationals. In its 1965 request, USOM would stress the kinds of basic farming tools, health services, local schools, and radio communication which Rusk suggested. The Mission would continue to press the South Vietnamese to improve bureaucratic procedures. Lodge then stated that too many Americans in Vietnam would diminish the Vietnamese consciousness of their responsibility for the war and the need to make their government effective, and concluded that the best thing for the Vietnamese peasant was security, followed by social justice, efficient administration, and economic vitality unencumbered by inefficient government bureaucracy. (Ibid.) Rusk
163. Memorandum From William Y. Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/ Washington, May 21, 1964. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-248-87. Top Secret. Drafted by Smith. SUBJECT 1. From 0930 to 1045 today Mr. McGeorge Bundy received briefings on OPLAN 34A,/2/ and OPLANs 37/3/ and 99/4/ by Capt Bowell (SACSA) and Col Kidd J-3). Capt Eggeman of SACSA accompanied Capt Bowell. /2/See footnote 2, Document 4. /3/See footnote 3, Document 149. /4/OPLAN 99, as described in this memorandum, was similar to OPLAN 37, except that U.S. Forces would be involved overtly rather than covertly. 2. Capt Bowell described the origin and the scope of operations envisaged in OPLAN 34A. Mr. Bundy seemed particularly interested in the capabilities of the VNAF to carry out the more difficult operations called for in the plan. He was assured this was primarily a problem of training and could be handled. Bundy also was interested in the aerial mine-laying operations and the desirability of such operations. 3. Col Kidd then described the three categories of operations of OPLAN 37. He identified some of the more important targets that would be attacked in the various categories; he also covered the US forces that would be alerted when Category 1, 2, and 3 operations began. He noted that the 12 day reaction time for category 3 operations stemmed in large measure from the desirability of getting US forces moving into position so that they could both help deter escalation and be prepared to meet it, should it occur. 4. In the discussion of the target systems in OPLAN 37, Mr. Bundy, when POL bulk storage was mentioned as one option, asked about the strategic importance of oil and oil storage. He asked if we had any method of measuring the effects of destroying the DRV bulk storage facilities. With respect to possible attacks on rail lines, he asked if our intelligence could provide us with any indications of the degree of reliance the DRV placed on railways as opposed to seaways and truck movements. Finally, he asked about the difficulty of amphibious (maritime) operations. It was agreed they would be more difficult to mount but it was also pointed out that even if they were not completely successful, they did force the DRV to divert resources they might otherwise apply against the GVN. 5. Emphasizing the need to minimize any adverse political consequences, Mr. Bundy asked if we could warn the North Vietnamese populace of impending attacks. He had in mind possible leaflet drops to warn civilians that the area in which they were might be attacked. Col Kidd informed him that he felt certain that such warnings could be made. There then followed a brief discussion of our ability to produce the leaflets, and Capt Bowell assured Mr. Bundy that the problem could be handled. 6. Mr. Bundy also showed interest in the degree of public notice attendant to the various categories of actions in OPLAN 37. He said he believed that a major factor in the 1962 Cuba crisis had been the major movements of US forces in Southeast US. Moscow knew something was coming. He wanted to know if any such visible signs would accompany the alerting actions in OPLAN 37, or if they would not, was the plan flexible enough to permit them to do so. He was told that some of the alerting steps would surely attract public notice and others could be made to. 7. After completing the discussion of OPLAN 37, Col Kidd briefly explained that OPLAN 99 was very similar in that the same types of actions would be undertaken against the same target systems, but that US forces would be overtly involved rather than covertly as in the case ;of OPLAN 37. 8. Mr. Bundy seemed very well satisfied with the briefing, and commented that he certainly had learned a lot from the discussion. Recommendation: I recommend that General Burchinal, by a copy of this memorandum, be asked to look into the principal matters raised by Mr. Bundy. Specifically, these questions should be looked into: Can we develop any yardstick concerning the importance of POL and POL storage facilities to the DRV? What degree of reliance does the DRV place on rail versus sea or truck lines of communication? What capabilities exist to warn populations in selected target areas that an attack may soon be forthcoming? Is it a good idea to provide advance warning in some cases? Which measures alerting US forces in OPLAN 37 will become public notice? What steps could be taken if it were desired to increase the public awareness of US alerting and movement actions? W.Y. Smith/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, May 21, 1964--3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2027. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. 1. Situation in Southeast Asia is clearly moving toward basic decisions both in the free world and in the communist world. The present activity with regard to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam illustrates that the central issue of pressures from the Communist North will have to be faced not just by us but by other allies. 2. You are aware of recent steps with regard to bombing operations in Laos and reconnaissance which step up the pace. The Geneva Accords of 1962 are very specific and have been grossly violated by the continued presence of Viet Minh in Laos and the persistent use of Laos for infiltration of South Vietnam. We intend to press very hard for the full and complete implementation of those accords on the basis of an international and legal position which is very strong indeed. 3. At a time when we and other governments are facing decisions on further military action in Southeast Asia, including the possibility of actions against North Vietnam, the fragility of the present situation in South Vietnam is very much on our minds. On the basis of my talks with congressional leaders and committees and a sensing of public concern about Southeast Asia, I am convinced that the American people will do what has to be done if there is something to support. The prospect that we might strike the North, with all of the attendant risks, only to lose the South is most uninviting. 4. We need your judgment as to what more can be done to achieve the reality and appearance [of] greater solidarity in South Vietnam and to improve the actual administration performance of the government itself in grappling with the awesome problems. 5. When I was in Saigon, we talked about whether the nongovernmental community could be stimulated to demonstrate solidarity with the fight against the Viet Cong. Recent reports of new religious crises, rumblings among senior officials of government, delays in administration action to get on with the most elementary tasks of government are all disconcerting. From this end we are prepared to furnish men, material, funds on whatever scale is required to defeat the Viet Cong. But I feel the need to assure the President that everything humanly possible is being done both in Washington and by the government of Vietnam to provide a solid base of determination from which far-reaching decisions could proceed. I would greatly appreciate, therefore, your comments on such questions as the following, plus any others along the same lines which might occur to you. (A) Is there any way in which we can shake the main body of leadership by the scruff of the neck and insist that they put aside all bickering and lesser differences in order to concentrate upon the defeat of the Viet Cong? (B) Can we find some way to get the leaders of the religious communities to declare a moratorium on their differences until the anti-religious Communist threat has been thrown back? (C) How can we provide personnel experienced and trained in military government to work along side Vietnamese counterparts in order to galvanize the machinery of government? (D) Can we find some way by which General Khanh can convince larger segments of the people that they have a stake in the success of his leadership against the Viet Cong? (E) Can we devise further incentives to enlist the full cooperation of ordinary people both in the cities and in the countryside to pursue the struggle as one in which they are personally involved? 6. Everyone here in Washington is deeply impressed by the magnitude and difficulty of the problems faced by General Khanh, yourself and General Harkins but, in the face of the prospect of a deepening crisis and the possible necessity for asking the American people to accept larger sacrifices and grave risks, we want to be sure nothing is left undone which could be done to strengthen the position of South Vietnam itself. I find it hard to believe, for example, that General Khanh and General Minh cannot find a basis to work together as patriotic Vietnamese even though it may require General Khanh to take some chances on working with some of those he displaced when he assumed power. I do not understand why so much delay in strengthening the puny diplomatic effort of Vietnam abroad. I can't see why we are just now able to approve a January budget. I can't see why materials in warehouses and pipelines cannot be moved promptly to the countryside to achieve the purpose for which such materials are being supplied. Surely administration can go on a war footing and French techniques of triple entry bureaucracy can be set aside in order to get prompt action. Having served in India, Burma and China during World War II I have had considerable personal experience with how deliberate all deliberate speed can be in that part of the world, but somehow we must change the pace at which these people move and I suspect that this can only be done with a pervasive intrusion of Americans into their affairs. I would deeply appreciate it if you would give me your best judgment as to how we on the American side can further stimulate Vietnamese solidarity and effort. In other words, what more can we do to make it quite clear to the American people that if a great deal more is required of them there is something solid to support and that what we may ask of them has point and the prospect of success. Rusk
165. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, May 22, 1964--1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2284. Eyes only for the Secretary from Lodge. Your 2027./2/ /2/Document 164. 1. There is no doubt that the situation here is fragile and unstable. The religious crisis, the rumblings among senior officials, and the delays in administrative action continue. See my 2282 3 for friction between General Khanh and General Minh. 3 Telegram 2282, May 22, contained a long report of a conversation between Lodge and Khanh on Thursday, May 21, which ranged over many topics. One was the upcoming trial of Generals Don, Kim, and Dinh. Lodge suggested that they be found not guilty and released on the grounds that they had been misled by General Xuan. Khanh stated he had solid information that Generals Kim and Xuan planned to transform South Vietnam into a pro-French neutralist state and that the trial would expose Chief of State Minh's role. According to Khanh, Minh was already considering resignation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 2. This unhappy country emerged from colonialism ten years ago and has been trying to get along since then with help from us that is, in all truth, advisory and not at all colonial. The question clearly arises as to whether this "advisory" phase is not about to be played out and whether the United States will not have to move into a position of actual control. This time has clearly not arrived yet, but it may be approaching. Whether it means that we will have a High Commissioner or a Commissioner General, or a man who really gives the orders under the title of Ambassador, will have to be determined in the light of circumstances as they develop. It appears to me now that such a relationship can only succeed if we are invited in. 3. Replies to your specific questions are as follows: A. As you will see from my talk with Khanh on Thursday afternoon, I have made this point very clear to him. I will, of course, be glad to talk to Hoan, Oanh and Do Mau, and impress them with the importance of concentrating on the defeat of Viet Cong. I also stressed again yesterday the importance of increasing GVN diplomatic activity. B. Monsignor de Nittis has just called here Friday morning and is tremendously upset because the trial of Dang-Sy is, at [after?] all, going to be held in Hue, and he fears violent actions against the Catholics. I am going to talk to Khanh about this, but this shows what chance there is of getting the "religious communities to declare a moratorium". Everything is going the other way. I intend to tell Buddhist leaders Saturday night that they must do their part to avoid religious strife. Any more of these barbaric public trials can destroy the country. C. We have at the present time literally hundreds of Americans, each of whom individually has many contacts with their Vietnamese counterparts. I started in some months ago making a list and am pouching it to you now. The question of going further than we are now going by installing American personnel involves the whole question of whether we shall shift from a basis of being advisory to that of being actually in control. We could probably use military government personnel in provinces and districts. Have we not got many in the U.S. who did military government in World War II? It does not seem to me that it can possibly work for us to compel them to install American advisors throughout the government in a control capacity against their will. The result would be absolutely certain xenophobia, a stoppage of effort by the Vietnamese, a placing of full responsibility by [on] us for everything that went wrong. To bring about a system where the Americans run the show, we must be asked to do it. You can find many Vietnamese around town who will tell you frankly that they would like the Americans to run the country for ten years and get it through this difficult period, and then turn it back to the Vietnamese. But we have not reached the point where any Vietnamese in a position of responsibility will say this. D. With a good deal of prodding by me, General Khanh is making radio speeches, and they go over quite well. This is a new departure for Viet-Nam, and it is promising; but you cannot expect any "crash" results from it. It must, at best, be gradual. E. This is your most promising question. At this moment, I personally cannot think of "further incentives", but I do not doubt that some could be found. I believe that greater security at night is the one thing which would be most appreciated by people throughout this country, and that if the able-bodied men could join with the military forces to patrol the villages and hamlets at night, you would get an increased degree of security which would be much appreciated and which would, at the same time, discourage the Viet Cong. Also this would tend to lessen the emphasis on military activities such as napalm bombing which, whatever their military merit may be, hit women and children and do not make votes for our side. I am also interested in promising land to veterans as we did in the Civil War. 4. Finally, I wonder whether the Americans should not give up "business as usual" atmosphere in Saigon, with its lavish cocktail parties and black tie dinners. If we lived in tents and drank out of lister bags, GVN might step up the pace. As it is, we keep numbers of them up at night going to our parties. This raises the question of evacuating dependents, which should not be done suddenly, but we can at least start policy of not bringing out any more. Also, the luxury items at our commissary (which are not available to Vietnamese) do not give a sense of urgency. Lodge
166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, May 22, 1964--7:40 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret: Priority; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Sullivan, and approved by Rusk. 2049. Literally eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. 1. Many thanks for your thoughtful 2284./2/ We are continuing to review carefully just what more we may be able to do within South Vietnam and also the question of possible action against the North. /2/Document 165. 2. In connection with the latter, we have of course cranked in your proposal for use of a Canadian intermediary and have been examining your other proposal that substantial initial attacks be carried out without acknowledgment by either the GVN or ourselves. On the Canadian matter, in light of present Canadian attitudes we tend to see real difficulty in approaching Canadians at this time with any message as specific as you suggest, i.e., that Hanoi be told by the Canadians "that they will be punished." But we are keeping this in mind and will see whether we can go further when we consult them next week than the more general type of message stated in my 1821./3/ As you can see, the more specific message might lead us into a very difficult dialogue with the Canadians as to just what our plans really were. c /3/Document 134. /4/In telegram 2318 from Saigon, May 26, Lodge provided Rusk with the following additional thoughts: "1. Upon reflection let me add that the scheme which I propose involves the use of Vietnamese planes and pilots. Also, the Canadian interlocutor does not need to tell North Viet Nam that the bomb is about to come. What I propose, if a proper opportunity offers, is that the bomb does come just prior to his arrival in Hanoi. There is no question whatsoever of consulting the Canadian." "2.1 am coming to the conclusion that we cannot reasonably and prudently expect a much better performance out of the GVN than that which we are now getting unless something new of this kind is brought into the picture. I am, of course pressing vigorously on all facets of our program and good breaks may occur." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3. On the other question, whether initial substantial attacks could be left without acknowledgment, it is our present view here that this would simply not be feasible. Even if Hanoi itself did not publicize them, there are enough ICC and other observers in North Vietnam who might pick them up and there is also the major possibility of leakage at the South Vietnam end. Thus, publicity seems almost inevitable to us here for any attack that did significant damage. Once such publicity occurred, I think you can see that the finger would point straight at us and that the President would then be put in perhaps a far more difficult position toward the American public and the Congress. 4. Thus, we are using a GVN- or US-acknowledged enterprise as part of our main planning track at the present time, although we do recognize that something a little stronger than the present OPLAN 34-A might be carried on on the basis you propose. 5. One final note. We have had some press inquiries here based on a report from some source that you were planning a speech in the United States on June 22. Both for press guidance and for wider reasons, would you let us know if you do have any thoughts in this direction? As I have indicated above, we may be entering a considerably more intensive phase in the whole area. Rusk
167. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, May 22, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. IV. Top Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 473A. SUBJECT A small, tightly knit group meeting at my call has now had two long sessions in working forward the two basic plans which you asked for Wednesday afternoon./2/ Today's session had the benefit of the full-scale participation of both Bob McNamara and George Ball. /2/May 20. 1. A group under William Sullivan is now preparing a basic statement of a three to six month program for major stiffening of our effort in South Vietnam, essentially by marrying Americans to Vietnamese at every level, both civilian and military. (The direct military aspect of this stiffening is being studied by General Goodpaster and members of the Joint Staff.) The object of this exercise is to provide what Khanh has repeatedly asked for: the tall American at every point of stress and strain. This cannot be done overnight, but for the first time there is agreement that we must prepare a means to do it. The persuasion of Lodge and his relation to such an effort are tricky problems to which outline answers are being prepared. 2. An integrated political-military plan for graduated action against North Vietnam is being prepared under John McNaughton at Defense. The theory of this plan is that we should strike to hurt but not to destroy, and strike for the purpose of changing the North Vietnamese decision on intervention in the south. This is easier said than done, but McNamara has confidence that we have the military means as long as we have the political will. 3. An estimate of enemy reactions to both of these plans is being prepared on a crash basis by a task force of the intelligence community under Chester Cooper. This task force will examine in particular such sensitive questions as whether the Chinese or the Soviets would intervene and the equally edgy question whether the North Vietnamese reply to air strikes might be an irresistible increase of action against the shaky regime in South Vietnam. (Bob McNamara thinks this is not likely, but others are more worried.) 4. A small group under George Ball is drafting alternative forms of a Congressional resolution so as to give you a full range of choice with respect to the way in which you would seek Congressional validation of wider action. The preliminary consensus is that such a resolution is essential before we act against North Vietnam, but that it should be sufficiently general in form not to commit you to any particular action ahead of time. Our hope is that you might be able to persuade Dick Russell to accept a three-day truce in Civil Rights on straight patriotic grounds. 5. I am meeting this afternoon with Douglass Cater to make sure that he understands this whole situation and to ask him to begin drafting a speech or statement which would precede any new action on any of the above fronts. 6. Drafts of all of these plans and papers are to be submitted to my office in time for duplication and distribution the first thing Sunday morning./3/ The working group plans to meet on Sunday morning and will be ready to report to you in a preliminary way at any time after lunch. My suggestion is that you might wish to have such a consideration in the latter part of Sunday afternoon. /3/May 24. McG. B./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
168. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, May 23, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Negotiating Files: Lot 69 D 412, Vietnam Negotiations, Seaborn. Top Secret. SUBJECT The Canadian Embassy has, with some insistence, scheduled my visit to Ottawa for Thursday May 28. I, therefore, plan to depart in the afternoon of May 27 and return in the morning of May 29. I will be accompanied by Mr. Chester Cooper of CIA. Attached is a draft talking paper which builds upon your original cables to Lodge concerning the terms of reference for the Canadian interlocutor. While it does not accept Lodge's suggestions concerning "punishment of North Viet Nam" it does expound upon the massive military power of the United States available in the area and the vulnerability of North Viet Nam should that power be brought into play. I would be most appreciative if I could have your approval or revision of this paper prior to May 27. Mr. Ball and Mr. Bundy have already reviewed and approved it./2/ /2/No revisions have been found. Attachment/3/ /3/Top Secret. Drafted by Sullivan on May 22. SUBJECT It is our hope that Commissioner Seaborn, upon assuming his new duties in Viet Nam, will place much greater stress than heretofore upon the nature and frequency of Canadian contacts in Hanoi. Since Seaborn has had considerable experience in Communist countries, he should know the means to establish useful arrangements in Hanoi which will bring him into touch with significant officials of the North Vietnamese Regime. He should make it clear to these officials that he is a political personality who can be dealt with and is not merely an observer who functions as a customs inspector. In the course of his initial rounds in Hanoi Seaborn should express considerable interest in attempting to understand the North Vietnamese motivations for their policy in South Viet Nam. He should perhaps begin by giving all North Vietnamese officials who so desire an adequate opportunity to express not only their policies but their various complaints and the rationale for the course of action they are pursuing. In the course of these discussions, Seaborn should attempt to determine what the state of mind is among the various high functionaries in Hanoi. He should specifically be alert to: a. Differences in attitude with respect to the Sino-Soviet split; b. Frustration or war weariness with the slowness of the effort in the South; c. Indications of the North Vietnamese desire for trade or other contacts with Western nations; d. Evidences of cliques or factions within the Party and Governmental apparatus; and e. Evidences of differing points of view between the political cadres and the military group. Seaborn should additionally seek to develop the best information concerning the prevalence and the importance of the Chinese Communist presence in North Viet Nam. While it may not be possible for him to develop direct contacts with the Chinese Communist representation there he should learn as much as he can about the nature of that representation and particularly its relationship to other official representatives in Hanoi. Drawing upon his Moscow experience [he] ought to be able to establish contact with the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi and draw him out on his evaluation of both domestic and international issues affecting the North Vietnamese regime. In addition to these efforts, Seaborn should also establish himself as the authority upon United States motivations and policies. He should use every convincing evidence, including his discussions with United States officials in Saigon, to present to the North Vietnamese the full measure of the United States commitment to South Viet Nam. He should make clear that the United States views the problem in South Viet Nam as something which affects its policies and its stature throughout the entire world. Because the United States holds this view he should make it resoundingly clear that we do intend to see the problem through in Viet Nam and not withdraw ignominiously. He should carefully and deliberately stipulate that, if it becomes necessary for the United States to choose an alternative to the course it is now pursuing, that alternative would be in the direction of enlarging the military action and escalating direct pressure against North Viet Nam. He should draw on examples of United States actions in other parts of the world and in other circumstances to underline this statement. At the same time, he should make clear the limitations of United States ambitions in Southeast Asia. He should specifically state that the United States seeks no military bases or other permanent installations in that area. Our purpose instead is to assure that the South Vietnamese are able to live independently free from external aggression. He should point out that we know that the aggression against South Viet Nam is directed and controlled from Hanoi. He should state that we hold Hanoi directly responsible for the guerrilla action in South Viet Nam. He should state that the United States evaluation of North Vietnamese intentions suggests that Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh truly hope to succeed to the territorial control exercised by France in its colonial regime over the Indo-Chinese states. He should therefore emphasize th |