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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964 Department of State Washington, DC

Vietnam/1/ I. The Khanh Coup, January 1-31   1. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President/2/ Saigon, January 1, 1964. /1/For documentation on U.S. relations with Vietnam during 1961-1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volumes I-IV /2/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Heads of State Correspondence, General Minh Corres. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent over CIA channels from Saigon. The source text bears neither a telegram number nor time of transmission. Relayed to the President at his ranch in Texas on receipt at the White House. McGeorge Bundy sent copies to Rusk and McNamara. Ref CAP 63663./3/ Many thanks for your public letter to General Minh which I presented personally this morning at an appointment which I have reported to the State Department./4/ /3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, p. 744. /4/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 745-747. Thank you too for your best wishes and warm encouragement to me personally for the new year, which I heartily reciprocate. I also particularly appreciate your kind words about my agreeing to serve in Saigon. I agree that there is much to be done here. It is true that a trend has been arrested which, had it continued a few months longer would have led inevitably to disaster. We are also now just beginning to see the full extent of the dry rot and lassitude in the Government of Viet-Nam and the extent to which we were given inaccurate information. It is also true that praise is due to President Kennedy for his decision to make changes in U.S. policy and personnel without which the trend of last summer and autumn would have rocketed on to certain catastrophe. I am free to say this because, although I agreed with them, I did not make the policies; I carried them out. All of this merely underscores the fact that we have a difficult job ahead. But I do not think that we are being unduly optimistic when I say that we are getting on to the right track. Let me assure you that I shall spare no effort to provide the kind of leadership which you describe. I also believe that I am in a good position to support and advise the Minh government. I am happy to read your dismissal of the suggestions that because we belong to different parties, there may be some political tension between us. To me, knowing you, your intelligence, and your broad patriotic outlook so well, and also knowing myself, such a suggestion is fantastic. You are everlastingly right that we are involved in this problem together and I am glad to see it that way. You can indeed rely on me: to leave no stone unturned; always to keep you thoroughly informed; to make all recommendations to you which I think will lead to victory; and to carry out all your instructions with complete energy and loyalty. With my warmest and very respectful regards, Faithfully yours, Lodge/5/ /5/The telegram bears this typed signature.   2. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to the President/1/ Washington, January 6, 1964. SUBJECT Viet Namese Situation /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. 11, Memos and Misc. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a note from McGeorge Bundy to Rusk and McNamara, January 6, which reads as follows: "The President received the enclosed papers this morning from Senator Mansfield, and asks if each of you would write a personal memorandum of refutation which he can review and then use with Senator Mansfield if he wishes, not later than Wednesday morning." This memo is responsive to your telephone request during Christmas week to Frank Valeo./2/ I have discussed the request with him and would respectfully refer you to my memo of December 7th, a copy of which is enclosed./3/ /2/No record of this telephone conversation has been found. /3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 691-692. As you remarked to him on the telephone, we do not want another China in Viet Nam. I would respectfully add to this observation: Neither do we want another Korea. It would seem that a key (but often overlooked) factor in both situations was a tendency to bite off more than we were prepared in the end to chew. We tended to talk ourselves out on a limb with overstatements of our purpose and commitment only to discover in the end that there were not sufficient American interests to support with blood and treasure a desperate final plunge. Then, the questions followed invariably: "Who got us into this mess?" "Who lost China?" etc. We are close to the point of no return in Viet Nam. A way to avoid another Korea and, perhaps, another China may be found in the general policy approach suggested in the memo of December 7th. If so, there ought to be less official talk of our responsibility in Viet Nam and more emphasis on the responsibilities of the Vietnamese themselves and a great deal of thought on the possibilities for a peaceful solution through the efforts of other nations as well as our own.   3. Telegram From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/ Washington, January 7, 1964--1:40 p.m. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. I, Pres./Rusk/Lodge Messages. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to Saigon over CIA channels. CAP 63633. Personal for Ambassador Lodge from the President. At my instruction, John McCone has searched the rolls of Agency officers to find the ablest senior executive in the whole outfit for assignment as the new chief of station. I told him that the operation in Vietnam is an absolutely number one priority. He has nominated, and I have approved the appointment of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. I shall see De Silva when he is back here, and I will say to him what I now say to you, that it is of the first importance that there be the most complete understanding and cooperation between you and him. He will understand that you are the head of the Country Team, and his reputation in a series of previous appointments of this sort is that of absolutely outstanding cooperation with the Ambassador. I am concerned not only to sustain effective cooperation, but to avoid any mutterings in the press. I look to you all to ensure the complete absence of any backbiting and the establishment and maintenance of a relationship of genuine trust and understanding at all levels. I cannot overemphasize the importance which I personally attach to correcting the situation which has existed in Saigon in the past, and which I saw myself when I was out there./2/ /2/ For documentation on Vice President Johnson's trip to Vietnam, May 11-13, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, pp.135 ff.   4. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, January 7, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security file, Memos to the President, Vol. I, McGeorge Bundy. Top Secret; Sensitive. A note on the source text in Bundy's hand reads: "Read by the P[resident] Jan. 13." Defense and CIA have together prepared a plan for covert operations against North Vietnam/2/ which has been reviewed by Rusk, McNamara, McCone and myself, and we are united in recommending that you approve it. In essence, the proposed program would involve the following: /2/The joint draft plan, the basis for Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A-64, January 3, was outlined in a 3-page covering memorandum to the President to be signed by McCone, McNamara, and Rusk. The program of operations had as its premise that North Vietnam directed and supported the Viet Cong in South Vietnam through a radio network and through infiltration of cadres, weapons, and materiel from Laos and Cambodia. To demonstrate to North Vietnam the risk it ran in supporting the insurgency in the South, an interdepartmental committee under Krulak recommended a 4-month program of covert operations against North Vietnam beginning on February 1. The program was designed primarily to convince the North Vietnamese that it was in their economic self-interest to desist from aggression in South Vietnam. Attached to the covering memorandum were a 3-page annotated target list and a map. (Ibid.) 1. Expansion of intelligence collection by U-2 and by communications/electronics intelligence missions. 2. Expansion of psychological operations by leaflet drops and phantom covert operations and increased black and white radio broadcasts from South Vietnam. 3. Intensified sabotage operations in North Vietnam by Vietnamese personnel. Sabotage and propaganda operations in North Vietnam in the last year and a half have been most disappointing. The operators now believe that substantial improvements can be achieved, and the policy officers are all in favor of trying. Specific views are as follows: McNamara is highly enthusiastic. McCone thinks you should understand that no great results are likely from this kind of effort. Rusk is favorable; while he believes 98% of the problem is in South Vietnam and not in cross-border operations, he thinks that an increase in such operations will help to persuade Hanoi that we have no intention of quitting, and may help also to put muscle behind our argument that the trouble comes from the north and that when that trouble stops, our presence in South Vietnam can become unnecessary. I myself recommend that you approve this general program for detailed development of operational plans in the field, these plans in turn to be reviewed as usual within the Government by the Special Group which monitors all covert programs. You may recall that this group consists of McCone, Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson and myself. McG. B.   5. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, January 7, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. Rusk's initials appear on the source text. Dear Dean: It was apparent when Secretary McNamara and I visited Saigon in December/2/ that information furnished to us from MACV and the Embassy concerning the current Viet Cong activities in a number of provinces and the relative position of the SVN Government vs. the Viet Cong Forces was incorrect, due to the fact that the field officers of the MAAG and USOM had been grossly misinformed by the province and district chiefs. It was reported to us, and I believe correctly, that the province and district chiefs felt obliged to "create statistics" which would meet the approbation of the Central Government. /2/McCone was in Vietnam, December 18-20, and McNamara December 19-20, 1963. For their reports to the President, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 721-738. I believe it is quite probable that the same practice might be repeated by the new province and district chiefs appointed by the MRC. Furthermore, it is obviously quite difficult for the United States civilian and military personnel to overtly audit the reporting in detail by on-site visits to all areas, villages and hamlets. I therefore propose developing a new covert method of checking on information on the progress of the war and the counterinsurgency efforts. The details of this plan are outlined in the attached memorandum./3/ 3 [Footnote (7 lines of text) not declassified] I should like to discuss this plan at today's meeting./4/ Obviously its implementation and success is contingent upon the support of both State and Defense, and the issuance of appropriate orders to the Ambassador and MACV. I also believe the plan should be reviewed with higher authority in the interest of securing his endorsement. /4/ There was an NSC meeting on January 7, 4:10-5 p.m., which McCone and Rusk attended, but Vietnam was not on the agenda. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) The reference is more likely to an Executive branch oversight meeting on covert operations of which no record has been found. Sincerely, John   6. Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/ Washington, January 7, 1964--8:09 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. This message was sent by the White House to the Department of State for transmission. It was cleared by Ball and sent as telegram 1031 to Saigon, which is the source text. I have read with great interest your 1257,/2/ and I want you to know at once that any program which you recommend in this area will have my very strong support in principle. From all that I have heard, I could not be more in agreement that political energy is at the center of the government's problem in South Vietnam. I cannot spare Larry O'Brien, but I can and will get you just about anyone else. I am asking all agencies here to prepare a coordinated and constructive response showing what we can do to help you in executing this idea, but I want you to know immediately of my personal support. /2/ In telegram 1257, January 6, Lodge stated: "The war cannot be won without there being the rough equivalent of a nation-wide precinct organization so that ultimately every family in Vietnam will be known to precinct worker and the government will become favorably known to every family." Lodge suggested that this was something on which President Johnson's own personal advice would be "precious," and also asked if the services "of such a top flight political organizer as Lawrence O'Brien" could be made available. (Ibid.) Lyndon B. Johnson/3/ /3/ Telegram 1031 bears this typed signature.   7. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 8, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. II, Memos and Misc. Secret. SUBJECT Reporting on the Situation in South Vietnam I looked at John McCone's letter of January 7 to Dean Rusk./2/ I see nothing wrong with attempting to improve the reporting system out of Saigon. As you are well aware, the great difficulties we had to live through last August and September resulted largely from a nearly complete breakdown of the Government's ability to get accurate assessments of the situation in the Vietnamese country-side. The more we learn about the situation today, the more obvious it becomes that the excessively mechanical system of statistical reporting which had been devised in Washington and applied in Saigon was giving us a grotesquely inaccurate picture. Once again it is the old problem of having people who are responsible for operations also responsible for evaluating the results. /2/Document 5. John McCone has made a great effort, aided and abetted by Lodge, to get his people out of all except a few operations in South Vietnam. He has been trying to put them back into the intelligence business, and I think we should encourage him to do so. Bob McNamara is now equally aware of the reporting failure, and sincerely desires to do something about it. I have the impression, however, that the military system of reporting will not be responsive to the problem; and unless McNamara can create a separate reporting staff outside the chain of command, he won't get very far. McNamara faces considerable difficulty in accepting the thought that CIA should take on a separate reporting function. His problem is that to do so is an implied criticism of the Saigon command and its uniformed counterpart in Washington. If John is discreet enough and if his efforts are very low key, McNamara's problem will be reduced. One way of doing this is not to send large numbers of new CIA people into the field, but to utilize the civilians we already have there from whom the most accurate reporting has come in the past. The Agency's function could be coordination and evaluation./3/ /3/A revised plan for a covert spot-check on counterinsurgency reporting, reflecting in part these concerns, was sent by McCone to Rusk and Bundy on January 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET S) I think John's efforts should be encouraged along these lines, something which I will do at subterranean levels if you agree. Mike   8. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, January 9, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. II, Memos and Misc. Confidential. SUBJECT Comments on Senator Mansfield's memorandum on Vietnam/2/ /2/Document 2. On Monday/3/ you asked for short comments by Rusk, McNamara, and myself on Senator Mansfield's memorandum on Vietnam. These comments are attached--Rusk at Tab A, McNamara at Tab B, and Bundy at Tab C. The Mansfield memorandum itself is at Tab D. I have two small additional comments, as an ex-historian: /3/ January 6; see footnote 1, Document 2. The political damage to Truman and Acheson from the fall of China arose because most Americans came to believe that we could and should have done more than we did to prevent it. This is exactly what would happen now if we should seem to be the first to quit in Saigon. Mansfield's analogy with Korea neglects the fact that a very solid anti-Communist base existed in South Korea when the armistice was worked out in 1953. Moreover, the U.S. presence has continued. There is literally no comparison between this solution and proposals for "neutralization" and U.S. withdrawal in the present situation in South Vietnam. When we are stronger, then we can face negotiation. Perhaps you can trade with Mike Mansfield: his support for the war effort against our support, which is real, for new and energetic political, social, and economic programs in South Vietnam. McG. B. Tab A Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President/4/ Washington, January 8, 1964. /4/ Confidential. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1982, 002001. SUBJECT Viet-Nam I am attaching an unclassified statement on our policy toward Viet-Nam which bears upon Senator Mansfield's two memoranda to you./5/ /5/ See Document 2 and footnote 3 thereto. In addition, the following points should be made: (a) It has been made repeatedly clear to Moscow by me personally that U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia would cease if Hanoi would leave its neighbors alone. Similar messages have been sent, through a variety of channels, to Hanoi. We have made it clear that we are not interested in U.S. military bases or a military position in Southeast Asia./6/ /6/ Reference is to Rusk's answers to questions asked at a news conference on November 8, 1963; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 880. (b) Peiping and Hanoi are defying the Geneva Accords on Southeast Asia, both those of 1954 and the more recent Geneva Accord on Laos./7/ There is little reason to suppose, therefore, that a diplomatic effort to obtain still another Accord of that type would cause Peiping and Hanoi to leave their neighbors alone. /7/For text of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, July 20, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505-1520. For the Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos, July 23 1962, see 14 UST 1104. (c) The proposal for the "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam is a phony. I have proposed to Gromyko, and he has rejected, the idea that there be a neutralization of both parts of Viet-Nam, North and South. He said that North Viet-Nam is a part of the "socialist camp" and that that cannot be changed./8/ What the communists mean by "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam is a regime which would have no support from the West and would be an easy prey to a communist takeover. /8/Apparent reference to a Rusk-Gromyko-Home discussion at the United Nations on September 28, 1963. When Rusk related this conversation to Couve de Murville on October 7,1963, he recalled that "on Vietnam, there was a complete impasse." (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) (d) I have discussed Viet-Nam with President deGaulle and he has no interest in the kind of "neutralization" which the communists talk about. His attitude toward the eventual settlement of Viet-Nam is very close to our own. (e) The argument is made that there could be no long-term settlement of Southeast Asia without the agreement of Peiping. But this depends upon what Peiping will agree to. There has been no evidence thus far that Peiping would agree to genuinely independent neighbors in Southeast Asia. If any such possibility opens up, we would move promptly; our own moves in that direction have been repeatedly rebuffed. We are now studying whether Mr. Khrushchev's most recent message on "territorial disputes" can offer any fresh opening./9/ /9/ Reference is to a letter, December 31, 1963, from Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson on the subject of peaceful settlement of territorial disputes; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 938-940. Dean Rusk Attachment to Tab A U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM When President Kennedy announced, in December 1961, that the United States would increase our assistance to help the Republic of Vietnam preserve its independence, he made clear that this assistance had a limited objective. As he told the Vietnamese at that time "If the Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary."/10/ /10/ Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem, December 14, 1961; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1056-1057. On many subsequent occasions, this government has reiterated its desire to see genuinely established in the former Indo Chinese states that truce which was negotiated in Geneva in 1954, but which the North Vietnamese have arrogantly abrogated ever since. We have stipulated that our intention in Southeast Asia is not to establish a position of Western strength, but to see there a community of independent states, with the confidence that they can develop free from the constant terror of subversive warfare. We believe this goal is very much the same as Senator Mansfield has described as "a Southeast Asia less dependent on our aid-resources and support, less under our control, not cut off from China but still not overwhelmed by China." Our basic objectives, therefore, coincide with those suggested by Senator Mansfield. But we differ sharply with him on the means by which these objectives can be achieved. We do not believe that North Vietnam's terrorism can be called off by "an astute diplomatic offensive" at this time. While diplomacy may eventually play a role, we believe this will happen only after the North Vietnamese become convinced that they cannot succeed in destroying the Republic of Vietnam by guerrilla warfare. "Political and social acts of popular benefit" are an essential part in preserving the Republic against destruction. But these acts can only become possible if military successes against the marauders make feasible an unfettered exchange of confidence between the people in the villages and the government in Saigon. We believe the fight against the Viet Cong can be won without major and direct United States involvement provided the new South Vietnamese Government takes the proper political, economic and social actions to win the support of the rural people and uses its armed forces effectively. We further believe that only such a victory will give the people of Vietnam and of all Southeast Asia the confidence they need to establish that community of states which both we and Senator Mansfield desire. As General Duong Van Minh, Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council in South Vietnam recently stated, neutralism cannot be considered until South Vietnam is strong. And peace will not prevail in Southeast Asia until aggression is frustrated. Any "truce" which might be "won now in Vietnam" would be bought at a price which I am convinced would eventually prove far more costly to us than the peace which we hope to see established there by the action of the new South Vietnamese Government. I am also convinced that the overwhelming majority of the American people agree with me. Tab B Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President/11/ Washington, January 7, 1964. /11/Secret. SUBJECT Comment on Memoranda by Senator Mansfield I recommend the following points in your conversation with Senator Mansfield. 1. We should certainly stress that the war is essentially a Vietnamese responsibility, and this we have repeatedly done, particularly in our announced policy on U.S. troop withdrawal./12/ At the same time we cannot disengage U.S. prestige to any significant degree. U.S. news reports are bound to place a heavy U.S. cast on the action. Moreover, the whole history of our support of South Vietnam going back to 1954 makes it inevitable that the U.S. is deeply involved, and this would have been true even if we had not made the decision to intervene on a substantial scale in the fall of 1961. /12/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 652-653. 2. The security situation is serious, but we can still win, even on present ground rules. The government has experienced extreme turmoil incident to the coup d'etat. Almost every key official from the head of State to the village mayor has been changed, as well as most of the military leaders. Order, cohesion and direction are only now beginning to appear. In the past few days there have been early evidences of strength and resolution. The military command structure has been further streamlined, more combat forces have been concentrated in the critical provinces and there is direct response to our urging to consolidate and strengthen strategic hamlets on a systematic basis. In any case, the current dry season in the Delta is the critical time, and the next four months will disclose whether the new government can establish its presence in terms of a cohesive base of popular confidence. During that period anything other than exhibitions of resolution and encouragement on our part could do serious hurt to the Vietnamese cause. 3. Senator Mansfield's suggestion about dividing South Vietnam by present areas of control is impractical. The GVN exercises some degree of control throughout the country. The same is true with the Viet Cong. In much of the country the people are more committed to peace and security than to any political organization, and there could be no negotiated division which would be a meaningful reflection of political control. More basically, although the present government has popular support--probably more than any predecessor--it could not survive a partition. Any deal either to divide the present territory of South Vietnam or to "neutralize" South Vietnam would inevitably mean a new government in Saigon that would in short order become Communist-dominated. By hypothesis, any such "division" or "neutralization" would involve complete U.S. withdrawal, and the situation would then collapse. 4. The consequences of a Communist-dominated South Vietnam are extremely serious both for the rest of Southeast Asia and for the U.S. position in the rest of Asia and indeed in other key areas of the world. a. In Southeast Asia, Laos would almost certainly come under North Vietnamese domination, Cambodia might exhibit a facade of neutrality but would in fact accept Communist Chinese domination Thailand would become very shaky, and Malaysia, already beset by Indonesia, the same; even Burma would see the developments as a clear sign that the whole of the area now had to accommodate completely to Communism (with serious consequences for the security of India as well). Basically, a truly "neutral" Southeast Asia is very unlikely to emerge from such a sequence of events, even if the U.S. itself tried to hold a firm position in Thailand, if Malaysia too tried to stand firm and even if such remote and uninvolved powers as France backed the concept of "neutrality." b. In the eyes of the rest of Asia and of key areas threatened by Communism in other areas as well, South Vietnam is both a test of U.S. firmness and specifically a test of U.S. capacity to deal with "wars of national liberation." Within Asia, there is evidence--for example, from Japan--that U.S. disengagement and the acceptance of Communist domination would have a serious effect on confidence. More broadly, there can be little doubt that any country threatened in the future by Communist subversion would have reason to doubt whether we would really see the thing through. This would apply even in such theoretically remote areas as Latin America. 5. Thus, the stakes in preserving an anti-Communist South Vietnam are so high that, in our judgment, we must go on bending every effort to win. In the final analysis, Senator Mansfield is challenging what he regards as the gross imbalance between the extent of our involvement in Southeast Asia and our narrow self-interests in the area. My assessment of our important security interests is that they unquestionably call for holding the line against further Communist gains. And, I am confident that the American people are by and large in favor of a policy of firmness and strength in such situations. Robert S. McNamara   Tab C Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/13/ Washington, January 6, 1964. /13/ Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 128B. SUBJECT Senator Mansfield's Views on South Vietnam 1. To neutralize South Vietnam today, or even for the United States Government to seem to move in that direction, would mean the following: a. A rapid collapse of anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam, and a unification of the whole country on Communist terms. b. Neutrality in Thailand, and increased influence for Hanoi and Peking. c. Collapse of the anti-Communist position in Laos. d. Heavy pressure on Malaya and Malaysia. e. A shift toward neutrality in Japan and the Philippines. f. Blows to U. S. prestige in South Korea and Taiwan which would require compensating increases in American commitment there--or else further retreat. 2. We may have to move in these painful directions, but we should do so only when there is a much stronger demonstration that our present course cannot work. If we neutralize, it should not be because we have quit but because others have. Today a move in this direction would be regarded as betrayal by the new regime in Saigon and by all anti-Communist Vietnamese. There are enough of them to lose us an election. 3. The right course is to continue to strengthen our struggle against the Communist terror (which is exactly what it is). For this we need new and stronger leadership in the U.S. effort. In particular, we need a wholly rejuvenated military command and a rapidly stepped-up political effort of the sort which Lodge has at last recommended./14/ /14/ Apparent reference to Lodge's presentation of 11 points to the Government of Vietnam on January 1; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 745-747. 4. I take it from his memorandum that Senator Mansfield would agree with this recommendation but would add that we should engage in diplomatic feelers with the French and should show more sympathy to the Cambodians. I disagree about the French because such feelers would inevitably stir talk of neutralization at the wrong time. I agree about soothing the Cambodians and believe that we have been heavy-han~ded in this area in recent weeks. McG. B.   9. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, January 10, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Southeast Asia. Secret. Copies were also sent to Ball, Harriman, and U. Alexis Johnson. Rusk's initials appear on the source text. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 147C. SUBJECT Southeast Asia and China Three forces are converging which might well produce the greatest setback to US interests on the world scene in many years. 1. The rise in South Vietnam of a popular mood, spreading into the bureaucracy and the armed forces, that neither the South Vietnam government nor the US has a viable concept for winning the war and that a neutralized South Vietnam is the only way out. 2. A spread of neutralist thought and feeling in Thailand as well as Cambodia; and the growing judgment in Indonesia that we shall fail in South Vietnam and that the National Liberation Front, supported by Hanoi, will win. 3. De Gaulle's campaign both to encourage neutralist feeling in Southeast Asia and to bring about the Chinese Communist entrance into the UN. Many of these despairing neutralist elements were also present in the wake of Dienbienphu and the outcome of the Geneva Conference of 1954. They were reversed by vigorous US diplomatic action, including the negotiation of the Manila Pact, the creation of SEATO and a strengthening of the position in South Vietnam itself. It may be that actions now taken within South Vietnam itself, military and political, can retrieve the present situation or hold it short of a definitive crisis through the calendar year 1964; but from such evidence as is available to me, this appears doubtful. I return, therefore, to the concept of a direct political-military showdown with Hanoi over the question of its direct operation of the war in South Vietnam including infiltration of men and supplies./2/ /2/Rostow was referring to memoranda which he sent Rusk on November 28, 1962, and November 1, 1963. In these memoranda, both of which Rusk saw, Rostow argued that the United States should confront Hanoi with the choice of ceasing to direct and support the war in the South or accepting retaliatory military damage in the North. Neither is printed. If we succeed in forcing Hanoi to respect the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1962 this would have profound psychological and political effects throughout Asia; and we might then be able to deal with the gathering forces designed to put Communist China into the UN from a position of poise. But until it is demonstrated that the game of "Wars of National Liberation" is not viable and that the borders of China and North Vietnam are firm, the acceptance of Communist China within the world community and in the UN could be a major disaster. The present combination of circumstances, if not reversed, would signal to those on the spot that we have granted Chinese Communist hegemony in Southeast Asia.   10. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, January 10, 1964--6 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET. Secret; Limdis. A note on another copy of this telegram reads as follows: "MAC: This is worth your looking at. Lodge may be a little fuzzy, but there is at least a sense of give and take. Mike Forrestal." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. II, Cables) 1290. A two-hour meeting with Generals Minh, Don, Kim, PriMin Tho, Ministers Quang and Lam, parts of which are being reported in separate telegrams./2/ I had prepared some questions in French so that we could all concentrate conversation on the same subject. I read these questions aloud as follows:/3/ /2/ Reference is to telegrams 1287 and 1288 from Saigon, both January 10, 5 p.m. In telegram 1287, Lodge reported that after the 2-hour meeting with the Generals, General Kim told him that the 11 points which Lodge had made to Minh on January I (see footnote 14, Document 8) were already being implemented by the government with the exception of point 8, early revitalization of the amnesty program, which was still under study. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1288, Lodge reported that Generals Kim and Minh spoke of "the extreme undesirability" of U.S. advisers going into the districts and villages because they would seem "more imperialistic than the French" and their presence would substantiate Viet Cong charges that the government was a U.S. "lackey." Minh was also unimpressed with Vietnamese who worked directly for the United States, since they were viewed by the people in the same way "as the Vietnamese who worked for the Japanese during the war." Generals Minh and Don complained of special U.S. support for the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao who they believed were trying to play the United States off against South Vietnam. Finally the Generals asked the United States to stop supporting financially a Vietnamese student group which they maintained was involved in anti-French demonstrations. (Ibid., POL 23 VIET S) /3/The paper from which Lodge read is in the Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge II Papers, Box 123, Vietnam. "I. Aim:" "Is this the aim? That: in the seven key provinces the government's writ runs day and night; the ordinary person can sleep throughout the night without fear; government officials need only minimum police protection; and that the seven provinces become a 'show case' end as secure as Saigon is now." "II. How to achieve it?" "What orders have been issued by the central government to reach above objective? For example, is the Long An Province Chief getting one set of orders? And is he getting enough people to help him? Is there a pacification directive? If a pacification directive is in existence, what are its provisions as regards:" A. Political B. Military "III. What is being done under A (Political)?" "1. How is it that the VC guerrillas put up such a tough and relentless fight without helicopters? Obviously because they believe in something; the Communists have conveyed to these men clear picture of a program which they think will make life better. We have not. They are also well organized politically; we are not." "2. What, therefore, are we doing to enunciate a political program in terms people can understand, which will at a very minimum remove age-old inequities and the grievances which these have caused and which will also make honest promises of constructive improvement for the future--a doctrine which can be applied meticulously from the grassroots up, in which deeds will be matching words and which can be communicated effectively and repeatedly to the people?" "3. Will there be an active national information program, using the extensive communications apparatus now available to contrast your program with that of Communism?" "4. Such a program must go hand in hand with the military security measures considered under B because when the military achieve security, the people will then be in a position to make a choice. Now they are in no position to choose anything because they are terrified and can only think of survival. What then are we doing to see to it that when they are in a position to make a choice, they choose our side rather than the other? For it is when they choose our side that they will have destroyed the infrastructure of the VC--and we are much more interested in destroying the infrastructure, the very base of the VC, than we are in killing individual VC." "5. Should not such a program assure them:" of our interest in their security, improve their facilities for education, reform the system of land ownership (so as to at least be competitive with VC) abolish favoritism, eliminate exorbitant taxation and forced labor (where labor is not for manifest benefit of people performing it), improve health, protect people from extortionists? "6. In your speech to the Council of Notables/4/ you spoke in general terms of a domestic program. Why not amplify this, with specific illustrations named in paragraph 5?" /4/A summary of and extract from the speech, which the Embassy characterized as commendable "for its anti-Communist and anti-neutralist tone and for its sincere tribute to democratic values," is in telegram 1246 from Saigon, January 2. (Department of State, Central Files. POL 15 VIET S) "6. [7.] We are advised that the GVN has increased troop strength in Long An but that the VC have simply shifted from military to political tactics and are defeating us politically. This is the old Mao Tse-tung maxim "fight, fight, talk, talk". We are, therefore, as yet essentially no better off in Long An than we were. We are at present overwhelmingly outclassed politically because there is literally no Vietnamese corps of junior governmental/political workers to carry out directives of the GVN. Province Chief, although excellent, cannot possibly cover all the strategic hamlets. At present of 219 strategic hamlets in the province the government controls 20, and 40 have been completely abandoned." "8. Can war be won without there being the rough equivalent of a nation-wide precinct organization so that ultimately every family in Vietnam will be known to a precinct worker? In the case of Long An this means eventually three teams of eight men each for each of six districts--a total of 144 men. I understand that this would cover the entire population of the province. These men must be competent, enthusiastic, and well trained. Eventually and ideally they should be local men, but this is not possible in Long An at present. The men that are sent in should look for promising local men and turn responsibility over to them." "9. Must not these men sleep in the hamlets? That is the first and most important commandment, for this makes clear as nothing else can that the government is truly interested in the security of the people. Then, in addition to [garble] for local talent, these men should systematically maintain contact with each hamlet, counter the Viet Cong propaganda, and explain the new MRC and its program for the country. This means MRC must have a program which is truly competitive with Communism. On such a program item no. 1 must be security which will never be believable unless MRC workers sleep in the hamlet." "10. Can you not recruit an elite group here in Saigon to work in Long An, said men to be withdrawn as soon as they have built a local corps, for the purpose of training others for other provinces? Should not an intensive program of schooling be started to build up a corps like this for all of the other 42 provinces in Vietnam?" "11. Should not these men actively promote General Minh's program for the nation? They certainly should not be sent into the provinces unless there is something for them to do. They could be kept busy initially, carrying out the local program which is now going on, involving cement, well drilling, insecticides, pesticides, roofing and building of schools." "12. The above is not the old civic action program. This old program was for propaganda, whereas what we here suggest is for performance. The old program aimed to keep a certain group in power whereas this program aims to give Vietnam a political organization which can compete with the political organization of the Viet Cong." 1. When I finished reading, PriMin Tho said that there was much in the paper which was good, but that there were some things that could not be done now. On the matter of taxes and rents, they were planning to cancel all the repayments due from farmers to owners over the next 12 years, which would amount to 500 million piastres. 2. General Minh said that they had already reduced taxes from 40 per cent to 20 per cent on houses and on farms used for habitation. 3. When I commented that I was following events in Vietnam very closely, and had not heard of this, General Don replied "That is why we have changed the Information Minister". 4. General Minh continued that they were suppressing the taxes paid by Vietnamese students abroad. This would entail a 75 million piastre loss. 5. They agreed on the importance of public support for the government and felt that public support for them was improving. General Kim said that during last Sunday's/5/ clear and hold operations in Long An by the airborne battalion, information was given to them by peasants on the location of 50 fresh VC corpses. They had actual photographs of the corpses which they showed me and which evidently were not decomposed at all. /5/January 5. 6. General Minh felt they were getting really well organized on the elimination of the key VC in each village. General Kim said this kind of thing was much better done locally, and not by bringing in people from Saigon. 7. General Minh felt that, referring to my number III, para 1, the Vietnamese people were really not actuated much by having a clear picture of a program. If, he said, I were to go into California and divide it all up into 3-acre lots and give it away, the people to whom I gave it would be pleased, but this was not a question of ideology so much as a question of banditry. 8. I agreed that there was a lot of banditry in it, but that ideology was also involved. He agreed and said that he had made a declaration of a domestic program in his speech of Jan 2. 9. When I applauded his speech, but pointed out that it was largely generalities, he said that he as the Chief of State had to deal in generalities and that it was up to Tho to give the details. 10. When I said that a Chief of State would make more of an impression if he dealt in things that were concrete, he finally agreed and said that on February 13, he was making a statement on amnesty and for giving land owners the purchase price for their 3 hectares which they had bought under the Diem regime. 11. On the question of building a sort of political machine, he pointed out that they were creating a "Council of Notables" in each village which, in all but 10 percent of the villages in Vietnam, would consist of local people. They would be the ones to expound the program, know the people, and to serve as a link between the people and the government. 12. General Kim, with obvious agreement from the rest, spoke of the great helpfulness of USIS, notably in the tracts which they made available to province officials. But he did hope that all USIS activities would be done "hand in hand" with the province people, and General Kim volunteered to give advice to USIS personnel himself. He commented that the Long An Province Chief had decided not to use the atrocity photographs which USIS had provided during the Diem regime. 13. I then raised the question of intensifying the Chieu Hoi program./6/ General Kim said that it had some definite value but that too much could never be expected from it. The people who "fight against us" are, broadly speaking, in 3 categories--(1) the hard-core Communists whom no Chieu Hoi program can reach; (2) the nationalists who are against French, Japanese, and American "imperialism", many of whom are already under Communist influence; (3) those who joined the VC because they were pursued by the Diem police because of the Buddhist troubles, or something similar. /6/The Vietnamese Government's amnesty program which aimed at resuming Viet Cong to government control. See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. III, p. 229. Note: The VC Chief who kept the American, Krause, a prisoner for 5-1/2 months, had become a VC because the Diem police had killed his father, beaten his mother to death, and had made it clear he had no future whatever if he stayed in Saigon. End of note. 14. General Kim said it was obvious that only limited results could be obtained from the Chieu Hoi program and nothing whatever with regard to categories 1 and 2. The important thing, he said, with evident agreement by all present, was to "keep what we have" and make it impossible for the VC to recruit any more. 15. On the matter of night operations, he said these were going on and that the Long An Province Chief had reported that in November there were 30 night operations and in December more than 200. 16. Many were not used to fighting at night and Kim was looking for new tactics and planned to consult General Harkins and General York. For example, carbines were not much use at night, and perhaps shotguns would be better. 17. On the matter of rewards to encourage night fighting, it was largely a question of money with which to buy information. In Long An there was 20,000 piastres a month allotted for this purpose, which was not very much. He would like to see money taken away from "useless projects" so that they could do more of this. 18. I said I hoped he would give me a list of "useless projects", because no one would like to suppress them more than I would. 19. In response to another question of mine, he said that firm and constant pressure was being exercised by the government, that now they had a real wartime general staff, a real command situation and not a peacetime style of organization such as they had before. They are prepared to "cut off a man's head" for unsatisfactory performance and had already done so. In fact, he cited a case of a Colonel Dao who had had two SDC executed for looting. 20. He gave me the new list of the 7 provinces in which they were concentrating their efforts and asked whether this was satisfactory to us: Long An, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Dinh Tuong, Hien Hoa, Tay Ninh and Kien Tuong. Comment: In their own way, these men are obviously trying to put out a program and create a sort of political organization to serve as a link between them and the people. They are obviously not as concerned with ideology as I am. Their Council of Notables in each village is obviously not what I had in mind. I still think my emphasis is about right, but I also recognize that they know this country much better than I do. These men are obviously intelligent, very hard working, and are giving this whole effort everything they've got. Believe we should work with these Councils of Notables as the best thing available. Lodge   11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, January 11, 1964--3:59 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Mendenhall; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, Hilsman, Poats (in draft and substance), William Bundy, and Krulak (both in draft); and approved by Harriman. Repeated to CINCPAC. 1055. CINCPAC for POLAD. Saigon pass COMUSMACV for Harkins. Joint State/Defense/Aid Message. In elaboration of brain trust concept suggested by General Minh and accepted by President Johnson (our 1000),/2/ it is our view here that high-level advisors may be essential key to instilling ingredient most sorely lacking in GVN: efficiency and urgency of action. Minh's invitation to establish brain trust and readiness to accept US advice and cooperation which it connotes should be seized upon as avenue to increase guidance of new government along proper lines in effective conduct of war. What we have in mind is advisors working directly with Vietnamese officials on day-to-day implementation of agreed policy lines. They would, of course, be completely responsible to you for policy guidance and would in no sense supplant your policy role with top GVN officials nor would they infringe direct and comprehensive military advisory role of COMUSMACV. On contrary they would be continuously implementing policy Country Team urges on GVN and would in effect be extension your arm into key sectors GVN by maintaining closest possible liaison between Country Team and key GVN officials. We believe that this new link should reinforce, not compete with, influence of Country Team members. We recognize such advisors must operate behind the scenes and that their persistent prodding must be done with great tact. We believe this can be done and it is essential to do it to reverse war trend. /2/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 745-747. Specifically, we think it would be useful to begin by assigning three senior experienced full-time advisors (plus necessary assistants) to work with top levels of GVN. One would be senior FSO working with General Minh and Premier Tho on broad program implementation; second would be ranking AID official working with GVN counterinsurgency and economic officials, especially those dealing with rural programs; and third would be high ranking military officer provided by COMUSMACV to represent him in working with Minister of Defense and Joint General Staff particularly on coordination military policy with other related programs. (In economic area this would not supplant joint committee work in which Kaysen and Silver involved.) Other advisors might be added later depending on experience we gain in these operations. We envisage these advisors as team subordinate individually to their respective Country Team principal but working closely with each other and advisors who are already assigned within, for example, Joint General Staff, as well as with high-level Vietnamese officials whom they are advising. Primary task this team will be to advise and assist GVN in coordinating policies and programs related to war effort, in issuance implementing instructions and funding for policies and programs to lower echelons, and in following up to help insure action is taken at lower echelons. They would necessarily require full support of Embassy, USOM, and MACV. We would not expect them to prepare policy or technical proposals; we would expect them to contribute to proposals developed by the Country Team elements and to help gain effective Vietnamese implementation. Examples include coordination of plans for military clear-and-hold operations with follow-up program for protection villagers, assistance in preparation of directives for this follow-up program (whether it be strategic hamlet program or some modification of that program), amnesty program and Minh's domestic Peace Corps proposal. These advisors will, in other words, assist top-level GVN officials and Country Team members by helping to serve as coordinators and expediters of actions to implement policies decided upon by GVN officials. We contemplate that American assistants to these officers be Vietnamese language officers (like Helble and Rosenthal) to maximum extent possible to achieve optimum efficiency. Both advisors and assistants should have office space in GVN buildings close to officials they advise. We know that extent of direct US involvement envisaged in concept set forth here may be somewhat greater than General Minh had in mind in suggesting the brain trust idea. If we can put forth right people, however, we think it likely that he and other generals will welcome this further evidence of our determination to do everything possible to help them. We think advantages from our point of view quite clear. Unless you or Harkins find difficulties with concept, you are authorized to discuss it with General Minh at early opportunity./3/ /3/ In telegram 1304 from Saigon, January 14, Lodge commented in response that the Vietnamese Government was loath to follow up on the brain trust idea and refused to treat it as a businesslike proposal. Lodge doubted whether the government "would like the idea of high-powered Americans on an "opposite number" basis in adjacent offices to them all through the government" Lodge thought such a scheme had a "colonial" touch. Instead, he recommended advice in a purely advisory, friendly basis through existing channels. Lodge maintained that American advisers would sap the determination of the Vietnamese to act responsibly on their own. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) You should ask General Minh whether he likes this suggestion or whether he has different ideas. Also what individuals GVN would like to have for these advisory portions. We believe it desirable that American advisory personnel working in close contact with Vietnamese officials as set forth above should be known to and held in high regard by GVN. If this not possible, they must at very least have strongest endorsement of Washington. With regard to senior political, military and economic advisors, we would expect them to be at level of FSO or FSR 1 or 2 and Brigadier General and assigned permanently. Re your 1257 further message will be forthcoming./4/ /4/ In telegram 1052 to Saigon, January 10, the Department "heartily endorsed" the Embassy proposal in telegram 1257 from Saigon of setting up a domestic Vietnamese peace corps organization drawn from the youth and students of Saigon (see footnote 2, Document 6). This organization could aid in getting the government's message across to the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam. Equally important, the Department contended, was the creation of trained resident village and hamlet leaders to carry on the work between visits of the Vietnamese peace corps. The Department also considered that Long An would make an excellent "showcase" for such a program and suggested consideration of a radio contact/airborne troop carrier system to defend Long An's villages and hamlets from Viet Cong attack. (Ibid., POL 23 VIET S) Rusk   12. Memorandum for the Record of the Meeting of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency/1/ Washington, January 16, 1964, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Special Group Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, Minutes of Meetings. Secret. Drafted by James W. Dingeman who is not listed among the participants. PRESENT Governor Harriman, General Taylor, Mr. Coffin vice Mr. Bell, Mr. Wilson vice Mr. Murrow, Mr. Solbert vice Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Karamessines vice Mr. McCone, Mr. Brubeck vice Mr. Forrestal Ambassador Trimble, Mr. Fredericks and Mr. Coote were present for Item No. 1. Mr. Poats was present for Items 1 and 3. Mr. Koren and Mr. Mendenhall were present for Items 2 and 3. Mr. Margolies and Mr. Engle were present for Item No. 4. Mr. Maechling was present for the meeting. 1. Counterinsurgency Intelligence Summary Mr. Karamessines, in commenting on the major items in the intelligence memorandum, stated that in Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong appear to be shifting to terrorism and harassment while they continue to prepare for renewed offensive actions. A recent report indicates that the Communists plan to bring reinforcements into the central section of Viet-Nam. [Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Vietnam.] 2. Status Report on Counterinsurgency Projects in Viet-Nam Mr. Koren stated that the Vietnamese Generals are aware of the need for programs to solve socio-economic problems, but they lack the sense of urgency that we attach to these problems. Recent favorable developments are: the reorganization of the military command structure; the recognition of the need for concentrated efforts in the southern provinces, particularly in Long An; the development of a new pacification plan; and continued efforts to rally the religious sects to support the Government. In their foreign relations, the Vietnamese have made significant bilateral efforts to resolve their differences with Cambodia; however, due to the nature of these issues, no quick resolution is anticipated. On the negative side: The Government has not yet made a clear statement of policy on the strategic hamlet program, and the continued delay in establishing specific authorities, responsibilities, and command channels has caused a backlog of supporting US funds and commodities. It is understood that General Minh plans to announce the Government's policy on the strategic hamlet and Amnesty Programs on Tet (Vietnamese New Year--February 13). Mr. Koren said that the Vietnamese plan to use "Council of Notables" at the district and village level to encourage support for the Government, does not seem adequate to achieve desired results. He believes that some sort of domestic peace corps is required to get young people out to work in the country to foster closer identification and allegiance to the Government. In addition, this type of program might serve to quell restlessness existing in student groups. General Taylor commented that no problem exists in placing US military advisors down to the necessary levels in the Vietnamese military establishment and that no US military advisors have been in contact with religious sect forces. He recommended, and the Chairman agreed, that General Harkins should be invited to be present when military matters are being discussed between the Ambassador and the Generals. Mr. Mendenhall commented that two problems related to the strategic hamlet program have not been resolved: whether the people will be forcibly resettled into the hamlets, and what subsequent controls will be placed on them. General Taylor stated that the strategic hamlet concept is sound and what is needed now is better execution of this program. He believes that there should be specific individuals, both in the Vietnamese Government and the Country Team, responsible for this program. Mr. Mendenhall agreed to check into this matter. The Group, in noting the status report, agreed that the responsibilities of the Group for execution of programs in Viet-Nam would be discussed at a subsequent meeting./2/ /2/At the Counterinsurgency Group meeting, February 20, Harriman stated that the Sullivan Coordinating Committee on Vietnam, established by authority of NSAM 280, February 14 (Document 46) had assumed primary responsibility for South Vietnam. Thereafter, the CI group would keep Vietnam within its cognizance and would assist the Sullivan Committee when required. (Department of State, Special Group Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, Minutes of Meetings) [Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Vietnam.] James W. Dingeman Executive Secretary   13. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency/1/ Saigon, January 20, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent by the CIA to the Department of State Exclusive for Hilsman, to the Pentagon Exclusive for Krulak, and to the White House for McGeorge Bundy. Rusk's initials appear on the source text. No time of transmission is on the source text. CAS Saigon 3902. Ref [document number not declassified]./2/ Following are Ambassador Lodge's comments on ref. /2/ This joint State/Defense/CIA telegram, January 16, personal for Lodge, Harkins and the CIA Station Chief, outlined the manner in which the President created an interdepartmental committee representing the Departments of Defense and State and the CIA to select from the comprehensive 12-month plan for increased pressure against North Vietnam "those operations which are most feasible, and which promise the greatest return for the least risk." In this telegram, the three agencies stated that the President had approved execution of the plan commencing February 1, and they asked for comments from Lodge, Harkins, and the Station Chief. (Ibid.) 1. Your [document number not declassified]. Herewith my comments as requested your paragraph 4. 2. I welcome exerting increased pressure on North Vietnam with the double aims of bringing about a cease-fire by VC and Pathet Lao and the neutralizing of North Vietnam, turning it into an oriental Yugoslavia. I do not think it profitable to try to overthrow Ho Chi Minh, as his successor would undoubtedly be tougher than he is. 3. We should have it clearly understood that GVN intensifies its efforts as our operations start in accordance with a definite commitment approved by MACV. 4. Reur paragraph 7,/3/ I propose to bring GVN into planning process by personally explaining to General Minh the purpose and general types planned operations. In this connection General Minh likely to ask U.S. estimate of actions North Vietnam (NVN) might take in retaliation. I intend to ask General Minh for GVN estimate of possible NVN retaliatory actions in any event, but would appreciate estimate of interdepartmental committee having in mind possible actions against American employees and dependents. /3/Paragraph 7 of the telegram suggested that the covert use of Vietnam's best military forces and their military resources required that the Vietnamese Government be brought into the planning on a "secure" and "most discreet basis." 5. Assume that actual operations will be accompanied by supporting political actions designed to leave no doubt in minds of NVN leaders (and their Chinese mentors and Soviet associates if any) that these operations are merely first phase and examples of type of treatment NVN can expect if they persist in their support of indirect aggression in SEA. In this regard, we hope that our pressure program could be carried out in a manner which would: (a) permit Ho Chi Minh to give ground without losing face; and (b) not give appearance of a direct challenge to the entire Communist bloc. Our strong preference therefore is to maintain the maximum possible deniability on part of ourselves and GVN (paragraph 3 reftel)./4/ /4/Paragraph 3 of the telegram noted that the actions contemplated could be plausibly denied by the United States and that deniability by the Vietnamese Government, while more difficult, should be attempted. In some cases Vietnamese acknowledgment of complicity might be appropriate and the message requested the recipients' views. 6. In general we believe the sooner the NVN leaders realize they are dealing with the U.S. (albeit from discreet sources) the better. Further, NVN would tend to lose less face in giving ground to U.S. rather than to SVN. 7. As a related subject, we wonder whether it is not possible to inject a carrot along with the stick at some later stage in the pressure program. The carrots might be withdrawal of some U.S. military personnel (assuming we are going to do it in any case) and some SVN rice to assuage NVN's obvious agricultural difficulties. Depending on progress of events, we may be able to gain some advantage from anticipated U.S. action (i.e., withdrawal of some U.S. military personnel), which otherwise would not be matched by any corresponding actions on part of NVN. [Numbered paragraph 8 (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] 9. General Harkins concurs.   14. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Secretary of State/1/ Saigon, January 21, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, TIGER Basic File. Top Secret. Repeated to JCS and CINCPAC for POLAD. Sent over CIA channels. [document number not declassified]. 1. Accompanied by DCM, Gen Harkins [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] I spent two hours with Generals Minh and Kim, Prime Minister Tho and For Min Lam late yesterday on plan for expanding operations against North Vietnam [document number not declassified]./2/ Discussion of recent French actions and of Laotian matters in separate telegrams./3/ /2/Reference is to the telegram described in footnotes 2-4, Document 13. /3/See Document 15; the message on Laotian matters has not been found. 2. I opened discussion with following statement: "The United States Government has drafted a plan, which has been approved at the highest levels, for expanded operations against North Viet Nam. The first phase would begin February 1. We desire your agreement and that you should carry it out. The execution of the whole plan would take 12 months." "As an example of what is contemplated, there would be clandestine, aggressive and daring attacks, principally in the nature of sabotage, against the port of Haiphong; and destruction of petroleum reserves and of naval installations." "The goal is to convince the rulers of North Vietnam that if they continue their war-like actions in South Vietnam, there will be reactions from our side which will be more and more expensive and destructive for them. After operations at an accelerated rate, the word would be gotten to the chiefs of North Vietnam that they ought to cease fire and that this could be done without loss of face. They should know that South Vietnam, with the tacit approval of the United States, intends to increase the rate and the extent of operations against North Vietnam, thus causing immense destruction on the economic and military installations of North Vietnam, if that becomes necessary." "The operations are in three phases of increasing intensity. President Johnson, assuming the agreement of the Government of Vietnam, has approved the commencement of the first phase on February 1 for four months, under the direction of MAC/V."/4/ /4/On January 22, Hilsman, who was en route to Australia and New Zealand, sent the following message from Honolulu over other-agency channels: "Suggest it be made clear in subsequent conversations our view that phase 2 and 3 operations not intended to be launched until after we begin make headway in Delta and it becomes increasingly clear to all concerned that Vietcong are losing any chance of gaining loyalty of SVN population. In the first place, phase 2 and 3 operations prior to beginnings of headway in Delta would likely be interpreted by North Vietnamese as act of desperation and therefore would not be effective in bringing change in their policies. In the second place, phase 2 and 3 actions launched prematurely would greatly increase pressure from Western allies and certain segments of U.S. opinion for international conference since U.S. involvement with North is principal fear of neutralist sentiment. Purpose of phase 1 operations is to maintain threat in interim period until we begin to make progress in Delta and to lay groundwork for launching phase 2 and 3 operations at a time when they most likely to result in Viet-Nam backdown." (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files, TIGER Basic File) "We consider that you have great assets here and that the personnel of the Vietnamese special branch which has been so well trained can serve as a foundation on which a more extensive organization can be built. Perhaps you will want MAC/V to make a contact with the special branch of your Special Forces High Command. It goes without saying that we are at your disposal." 3. Reaction Gen Minh and others was thoughtful and constructive and consisted exhaustive canvass various eventualities and problems which could result implementation first phase. Most important questions raised and our responses were: a. As past experience with intelligence and propaganda operations in North had been largely failure, did this plan offer anything new which promised greater chance success? We said risk to personnel remained high but possible achievements particularly in sabotage operations far greater. Lessons had been learned from past, and targets this plan now quite different and more far reaching. b. What was our real motive? In seeking "cease fire" was there not possibility this in reality only disguised step toward neutrality conference? Gen Kim here raised AFP story-handling of which subject separate telegram through State channels./5/ I countered this extreme sensitivity any idea "cease fire" by assuring Minh that what we all wanted here was unilateral "cease fire" by Viet Cong on orders from Hanoi resulting from our increasing pressure against North Vietnam. Once VC had stopped fighting GVN and U.S. would decide what to do next. /5/ Reference is to telegram 1337 from Saigon, January 19, in which Lodge informed Harriman of a call he received from Foreign Minister Lam, who complained about an Agence France Presse article of January 18 entitled "The Asian Policy of France." The article suggested France planned to use its recognition of China to bring about a settlement in Indochina, equated U.S. actions in South Vietnam with those of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, and called for a cease-fire in South Vietnam. Lam thought the article was "obviously inspired by the Elysee or Quai d'Orsay" and expressed grave concern over it. (Ibid.. Central Files. POL 27 VIET S) c. What would be UN and world reaction? I pointed out operations envisaged would be clandestine and implication GVN and U.S. would be publicly denied, though of course Ho Chi Minh would be left in no doubt as to what was happening and why. Should GVN and/or U.S. eventually become publicly involved our actions would be portrayed as self-defense against North Vietnamese aggression. I believed this could be effectively done. d. Reactions of North Vietnam and ChiComs. Here Gen Minh and others cited following as possible eventualities for which provision should be made in course detailed prior planning each operation contemplated. 1. Greatly intensified Viet Cong activity, particularly in sabotage of installations in South. We agreed RVNAF could meet this threat. I said our reaction could also be stepped up operations in North. 2. If economy, especially agriculture, in North as fragile as reported Hanoi might resort to directed mass flight South hungry refugees including many subversives and combatants. Minh said trained division could easily be hidden in million refugees. How could GVN hope to cope with this? They could not prevent such a march; they could not put people into camps; they would be overwhelmed. We agreed contingency plan meet this possibility should be developed. 3. Two North Vietnamese divisions presently in north Laos might be moved south to "protect refugees". Gen Harkins pointed to impossible logistical problems involved and expressed view RVNAF could adequately meet any overt invasion this quarter. 4. How could RVNAF effectively meet air attacks launched from North Vietnam or China and what would U.S. be prepared do in this eventuality? Minh suggested hostile aircraft could be jets flown by Chinese and carrying either North Vietnamese markings or no markings. I said entirely new war would result. 5. Gen Minh asked whether U.S. public prepared support USAF retaliation against North Vietnam and possible Chinese targets. Would U.S. retaliate at all? e. Would actions contemplated involve men and materials which could more effectively be employed against Viet Cong or against Cambodia? Very fast boats were badly needed in war in South Vietnam. We replied that only 200-400 men would be involved and equipment contemplated not of type needed against Viet Cong. f. Tho said they would prefer act against Cambodia than North Vietnam. Minh agreed this preferable from military but not psychological standpoint. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] explained equipment designed for operations against North Vietnam not equally appropriate for use against Viet Cong. g. On own initiative Minh suggested any activities against North should be paralleled by some form of intensified effort against Viet Cong. We agreed. h. In conclusion Gen Minh stressed he was not trying to pick plan to pieces but merely wished canvass all possible eventualities so as to be ready to meet them. He felt plan fully deserved penetrating and constructive study and would assign Gens Don, Kim, and Chieu to proceed forthwith. Finally he emphasized fact we presenting such plan at this time demonstrated continued U.S. determination vigorously pursue war in Vietnam. 4. Gen Don has just contacted Gen Harkins and suggested that he [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] meet with Gen Kim on 23 January to discuss military details this plan. 5. Would appreciate joint State-DOD-CAS comments all points raised and in particular on 4. d and e./6/ /6/In telegram [document number not declassified] to the Station in Saigon, January 22, the CIA made the following observations on these concerns as expressed by the Vietnamese: "1. The tenor of thoughtful MRC questions, particularly in paragraph 4d of reference, suggests that their first reaction to your presentation was one of apprehension that the U.S. might be headed for a major enlargement of the war, both geographically and physically, and that the GVN might somehow be left holding the bag. This may have derived from their focusing on the statements quoted in paragraph 2 of reference regarding accelerated rate of operations, three phases of increasing intensity and the prospects of immense destruction." "2. In any case, it is suggested that through the medium of the working meeting noted in paragraph 4, which will get down to the actual details, you will be able to put the matter in perspective. It will then be plain that we have approval at this time for only a modest program, and not one which, in itself, will result in immense destruction or which should entail the broad questions raised by the Generals. While planning for broader actions should proceed, we have no approvals beyond the specific actions listed in [document number not declassified]." "3. A summary of the Board of National Estimates evaluation of the approved program is being transmitted to you separately. It addresses the general matter of DRV and international reaction. While it does not discuss, in detail, the specific contingencies raised in paragraph 4d, it estimates that there will not be a strong reaction to the approved actions." (Ibid.) For the Board of National Estimates summary, see Document 16. The document referred to at the end of paragraph 2 is the one described in footnotes 2-4, Document 13. 6. Gen Harkins has read and concurs in this message.   15. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, January 21, 1964--1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. 1352. Deptels 1083 and 1092./2/ This relates to meeting with Minh, Kim, Tho and Lam attended by DCM, Gen. Harkins, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and myself on Monday, Jan. 20,/3/ insofar as it pertains to recent French actions. /2/ In telegram 1083 to Saigon, January 18, Harriman informed Lodge that intelligence reports, which Lodge would have seen, suggested that "one element French negotiations with ChiComs was latter's agreement accept neutralization Southeast Asia." Harriman informed Lodge that he had spoken bluntly to the French Ambassador in Washington about the French acceptance of a connection between recognition of the People's Republic of China and the promotion of neutralism in Southeast Asia. Harriman stated that in spite of his private language, "public expression will be to play a restrained key." He instructed Lodge to inform the MRC that the United States still supported the Republic of China, and to state explicitly that the French diplomatic moves would not alter U.S. commitments in Vietnam. (Ibid., UN 6 CHICOM) In telegram 1092 to Saigon, January 19, Harriman told Lodge that the contents of telegram 1083 to Saigon should give him "necessary ammunition to talk with General Minh et al." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) /3/See Document 14. 1. I had sensed at lunch on USS Providence that Tho and Kim were disturbed. On returning to office, was told that Info Min, Gen Do Mau, was going to be at the afternoon meeting, which made it evident that they thought I had asked for the meeting in order to discuss the AFP article./4/ I felt this would put us in the position of building up the French. I therefore telephoned Tho and stated topic of our meeting was military and secret and had nothing to do with anything in Do Mau's department. I also decided not even to mention De Gaulle or France at the meeting but to leave it to the Vietnamese to do so if they wanted to. /4/ See footnote 5, Document 14. 2. I believe Harriman and Rusk decision, as revealed in Deptels, to make it crystal clear in private that we are totally opposed to the French line and totally uninfluenced by it, and in public to "play it cool", is absolutely right. If we here in Vietnam do not in any way enlarge the importance of the French action (which we could easily do), it will fizzle out very fast. 3. During the discussion, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Gen Kim brought up AFP story (of which he had an elaborately annotated copy) and solemnly spoke of the dangers inherent in the seeking of a "cease fire". I brushed it aside by saying that De Gaulle had no real chips to play in SEA--neither men, nor arms, nor money of any significance, and that if one wanted to play in this poker game, one had to buy a seat at the table. Quoting our English proverb that "sticks and stones can break my bones, but words will hurt me never", I characterized De Gaulle's pronouncements on SEA and AFP expose of French policy as "baragouinage", which could neither affect US policy nor the fundamentals of the SEA situation. They grinned with pleasure when I said that the French were indulging in a favorite national pastime of "garglingwords" and that, of course, US policy was unchanged. 4. Generals Minh and Kim appeared greatly reassured and relieved that we did not take the French maneuvers too seriously. They stressed that regardless of the points of detail [document number not declassified],/5/ the big fact of the day which emerged [document number not declassified] was the US determination to win the war. In fact, as we were leaving, Minh said he hoped I understood that GVN had "not been overly impressed with AFP story."/6/ /5/Reference is to the telegram described in footnotes 2-4, Document 13. /6/In telegram 1105 to Saigon, January 21, the Department informed the Embassy that the "line" which Lodge took was "just right." The United States was "180 degrees opposed" to the recommendations in the Agence France Presse article. It believed that the war could be won and considered the "French approach as avenue of disaster which could lead to Communist control of all Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia." The Department instructed the Embassy to try to dissuade the Vietnamese from breaking diplomatic relations with France over recognition of the People's Republic of China, should they be so inclined, because it "would blow up French action beyond its real significance" and would complicate U.S. efforts to convince the Republic of China to "also play matter cooly." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Lodge   16. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Saigon/1/ Washington, January 22, 1964--3:56 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Also sent to the Department of State Eyes Only for Hilsman, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Eyes Only for McNamara, to the JCS Eyes Only for Krulak, and to the White House Eyes Only for McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to Honolulu Eyes Only for Felt. Rusk initialed the source text. [document number not declassified]. Ref CAS Washington [document number not declassified]./2/ Summary of Board of National Estimates study on probable reactions to various courses of action with respect to North Vietnam:/3/ /2/See footnote 2-4, Document 13. /3/Reference is to a memorandum from the Office of National Estimates to McCone, January 2. (Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Vietnam 1964) A. Communist reactions to most of these operations would be slight. B. Communist reactions would be sharper in cases of operations against Haiphong and railroads near borders of China. Reactions would be felt primarily in South Vietnam and Laos, but would not be so extreme as to change character of hostilities in those countries. C. Operations would not be likely to lead to appreciably increased Chinese Communist involvement in area. Neither would operations lead Soviets to believe that United States had made significant change in its policies. D. Proposed sabotage operations, taken by themselves, even if all were successful, would not convince the DRV leadership that their continued direction and support of insurgent activities in South Vietnam and Laos should cease. E. It is possible, however, that North Vietnamese Government might see these operations as representing significant increase in vigor of U.S. policy, potentially dangerous to them. If so, they would probably wish to halt new developments at early date and would therefore try to arouse international pressures for conference to settle problem of Vietnam before it expanded into more general conflict in Far East. In such case U.S. could probably expect little political support from its major allies. F. Principal determinant of DRV prosecution of war will not be damage suffered from such small scale operations, but course of war in South and degree of risk Hanoi believes will be involved in its prosecution.   17. Editorial Note On January 22, 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary of Defense McNamara a memorandum recommending that the United States put aside many of the "self-imposed restrictions" in South Vietnam and undertake bolder action. The Joint Chiefs stated that success or failure in Vietnam was crucial to the U.S. position in all Southeast Asia. They recommended the following specific actions: "a. Assign to the US military commander responsibilities for the total US program in Vietnam." "b. Induce the Government of Vietnam to turn over to the United States military commander, temporarily, the actual tactical direction of the war." "c. Charge the United States military commander with complete responsibility for conduct of the program against North Vietnam." "d. Overfly Laos and Cambodia to whatever extent is necessary for acquisition of operational intelligence." "e. Induce the Government of Vietnam to conduct overt ground operations in Laos of sufficient scope to impede the flow of personnel and material southward." "f. Arm, equip, advise, and support the Government of Vietnam in its conduct of aerial bombing of critical targets in North Vietnam and in mining the sea approaches to that country." "g. Advise and support the Government of Vietnam in its conduct of large-scale commando raids against critical targets in North Vietnam" "h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]." "i. Commit additional US forces, as necessary, in support of the combat action within South Vietnam." "j. Commit US forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926,092 Vietnam) McNamara sent a copy of this memorandum to Rusk on January 28. The full text of the memorandum is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume III, pages 496-499.   18. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency/1/ Saigon, January 28, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam Coup Two, January 30,1964 Secret. The source text, which bears no time of transmission from Saigon, is a copy sent by the CIA to the Department of State for Hilsman. Also sent to JCS for Krulak and to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for the Defense Intelligence Agency. A later White House copy is published in part in Declassified Documents, 1975, 58C. [document number not declassified]. 1. Maj Gen Nguyen Khanh on 28 Jan told Col Jasper Wilson, senior MAAG advisor for I Corps, that he had info indicating that another coup would be attempted possibly as early as Friday 31 Jan. Coup, which would be of Palace variety involving little or no bloodshed, would be mounted by pro-French, pro-neutralist Generals with Mai Huu Xuan playing leading role. Once coup successfully carried out, perpetrators would immediately call for neutralization of SVN. Plotters in touch with Gen Nguyen Van Hinh./2/ /2/Chief of Staff of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, 1953-1954. 2. Khanh appeared deeply concerned, stating that if plot not immediately crushed, it stood fair chance of success. Although officers at field grade level generally opposed to neutralism, Khanh fears neutralist platform might strike responsive chord among junior officers, who might help sustain Palace coup. Khanh personally coming Saigon today or tomorrow. 3. In conversation with Wilson, Khanh did not indicate sources of his information or reasons for his obvious concern. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] a. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Interesting to note that during conversations Xuan told Ly that he intended to report meeting to Big Minh. Ly subsequently informed by intermediary that Minh anxious to talk to him./3/ /3/At this point, Mendenhall wrote the following note in the margin of the source text: "Yes, but see," and then drew an arrow to paragraph 4 below. b. Lt Col Tran Dinh Lam, most recent returnee from Paris, is alleged by col who met him at airport to have been empowered, presumably by the French, to spend substantial sum (two billion piastres) to achieve neutralization of SVN. Lam reported by this source to have been brought back to SVN at request Gens Tran Van Don and Le Van Kim./4/ /4/Mendenhall at this point wrote in the margin the following comment: "Cf. [?] attitude expressed by Generals to Lodge of adamant opposition to neutralism. JM" c. Earlier this month American observer noted number of military trucks bringing ammunition and weapons into Xuan's police HQS at Camp Du Mare. d. Maj Gen Le Van Nghiem has stated both to American observers and Vietnamese sources on number of occasions. that Gens Kim, Don, Nguyen Van Vy, and Duong Van Duc are pro-French and privately in favor of neutralization. 4. Worth noting in connection with assessment of Xuan's capability to pull [off] coup is recently instituted policy of MRC to thin out military units in Saigon area. However, there still significant ARVN security forces Saigon area. 5. Difficult to evaluate these various reports and indications, including Khanh's claims. They may merely reflect, in cases of Nghiem/5/ and Khanh/6/ in particular, disgruntlement over failure to achieve more prominent positions in MRC. Nevertheless, noticeable rise in uneasiness, rumor-mongering and political maneuvering detectable in past few days. Restiveness finding its focus in continued dissatisfaction with Premier Tho, concern and confusion over question of neutralism and De Gaulle's China initiative, and expectation of further changes in composition military high command and provisional govt. Will continue to watch situation closely and report developments. In the recent past Khanh has also identified Big Minh, Don and Kim as pro-French and pro-neutralist. It is possible that he feels this alleged tendency on their part is becoming so pronounced that he and his like-minded military associates must act to prevent a neutral solution. /5/At this point in the margin of the source text, Mendenhall wrote the following comment: "Nghiem is central Vietnamese and this is obviously gov't in which southern Vietnamese predominate. Thus Nghiem's comments to be taken with several grains of sand. JM" /6/Mendenhall wrote the following comment in the margin at this point: "Personally very ambitious. Thus has his own axe to grind in this situation. JM" 6. Amb Lodge and General Harkins advised.   19. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, January 29, 1964--8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam Coup Two, January 30, 1964. Secret: Nodis. Received at 8:03 a.m. 1431. For the Secretary of State from Lodge. 1. Believe that it would be healthy to tell General De Gaulle that we have many reports from particularly responsible sources about French neutralist plot, French money, and French agents, and request him to cease these activities./2/ Even though he would undoubtedly not comply with our request, it is well for him to know that we know what is going on, and that we suspect a secret agreement between him and the ChiComs. We should give him a sense of pressure. It is good tactics to start making a list of the things which he is doing which are against our vital interests. We can decide what use to make of the list later on. In a situation of this kind, we simply must start somewhere and then watch for the breaks. What is being rumored is too responsibly vouched for to be ignored. /2/In telegram 1413 from Saigon, January 28, Lodge made a similar suggestion as follows: "Department might consider telling Gen. De Gaulle that U.S. has secret information indicating that there are persons purporting to be under the strong influence of the French Government who are working directly against U.S. vital interests in Viet-Nam, and requesting him to call off his dogs." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET 5) The Department responded in telegram 1138 to Saigon, January 28, 7:22 p.m., as follows: "1. Our relations with de Gaulle at this time are such that approach to him would be fruitless." "2. We believe it would be worthwhile to sound out General Khanh on sources and reliability his information and also whether he had informed General Minh". "3. Would appreciate Country Team assessment significance these reports and what action you are taking in Saigon." (Ibid.) 2. As to General Khanh he is profoundly disturbed by his expectation of a strong move towards neutralism by the Government of Vietnam which he thinks will take place either tomorrow or Friday. He thinks if it is not vigorously crushed, it might succeed because of war weariness among the Vietnamese, including the Junior ARVN Officers. His other views are: a. French inspiration in all of this he believes to be very strong. When pressed at my suggestion by Colonel Jasper Wilson, I Corps MAAG Adviser, he identified Generals Don, Kim and Xuan as talking publicly against neutralism, but as actually dealing with the French. He said that Kim and Don are former French OSS Officers, that they are still French Nationals, that they are "rabidly pro-French", and added that General Dinh would go along for the money. b. Khanh considers General Dinh [Minh?] to be an "honest patriot", but he is "isolated". But even he has sent money to France at Christmas time and has bought a home in France. c. General Khanh, therefore, says "we want to be in a position of strength". When he says "We", he says he means himself, General Khiem of the III Corps, General Tri of the II Corps, 90 percent of the Army and 70 percent of the existing Civil Government. d. He wants U.S. assurance that we are opposed to neutralism. In reply to this, Colonel Wilson pointed to my statement in the press which General Khanh said was totally satisfactory to him. e. Then he wants U.S. assurance that we will get his family, who are now in Da Nang, out of the country, if required. I said that I could not give asylum anywhere but in the Embassy in Saigon, but that I would provide a plane in Da Nang provided General Khanh's family could get to the plane. f. He wants to use Colonel Wilson as his exclusive contact with us and has asked Wilson to stay in Saigon and, if possible, to obtain two [garble--radios?] so that he and Witson might maintain radio contact because of the insecurity of the telephone system. [3 lines of source text not declassified] 3. I believe all the above should be closely held on a "need to know" basis, and am limiting knowledge of this to Harkins and De Silva. My assessment is that General Khanh is considered to be the most capable general in Vietnam, that he controls the I and II Corps, which is the most orderly part of Vietnam, and that in addition to being a capable soldier, he has the reputation of being politically perspicacious. While I have no great faith in Xuan, I continue to believe that Generals Don and Kim are patriotic Vietnamese. Therefore, what General Khanh says about them goes against my own deepest instincts. But, General Khanh's reputation for perspicacity gives me pause, even though I hardly know General Khanh at all. 4. The allegations which he makes against General Don, specifically, are contrary to what I have understood to be the case. For example, I was told that General Don was the first Vietnamese in the French Army who publicly gave up the French Army and burned up his insignia. [2 lines of source text not declassified] 5. Khanh is contacting Wilson again later today, so there may be more to report. 6. I am not reporting anything to the GVN as yet. 7. General Harkins has seen this message and agrees. Lodge   20. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Acting Secretary of State/1/ Washington, January 29, 1964--9:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. II, Memos and Misc. Secret; Noforn. Rusk was en route from Japan. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) SUBJECT The Coup in Saigon According to our latest information the situation in Saigon is as follows: A coup has taken place under the leadership of General Khanh, Commander of I Corps, which has the support of the generals in command of the other three corps areas (Generals Tri, II Corps; Khiem, III Corps; and Co, IV Corps) as well as other important officers. The coup is clearly directed at removing Premier Tho./2/ It appears that changes are also intended in the Military Revolutionary Council, the chairman and leading members of which, Generals Minh, Kim, and Dinh, are in custody. Minh will reportedly be offered a figurehead position if he agrees to align himself with Khanh's group. /2/Lodge reported to the Department in telegram 1432 from Saigon, January 30, 3:15 a.m. Saigon time, that Khanh had informed him through Wilson that a coup would take place at 4 a.m. and that "Tho must go." The telegram was received at the Department at 2:32 p.m. on June 29 and relayed to the White House at 2:40 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) We have no reports of bloodshed or armed resistance./3/ Such troop movements as have been reported appear to be in support of the coup. /3/At 6:25 a.m., when the coup was in progress and General Minh's and Kim's houses surrounded by rebel troops, Lodge instructed Wilson to tell Khanh and Khiem that he strongly advised that all possible efforts be made to avoid bloodshed. (Telegram 1437 from Saigon, January 30; ibid.; published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 213C) General Khanh has expressed a desire to see the Ambassador later today (it is now Thursday, Saigon time)./4/ Khanh was reportedly to go on the air to announce the new government at 7 a.m. Saigon time but we have no indication that he actually did so./5/ A late bulletin from Saigon states that Khanh and his group tentatively plan to institute military government with Khanh as Prime Minister and Khiem as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces./6/ /4/January 30; reported in telegram 1437 from Saigon. /5/At 4:45 p.m. on January 30, Radio Saigon broadcast a resolution in the name of the Military Revolutionary Council dissolving the Executive Committee set up after the November 1, 1963, coup and naming General Khanh as the Council's new chairman. (Telegram 1446 from Saigon, January 30; Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam Coup Two, January 30, 1964) /6/Reported in telegram 1442 from Saigon, January 30, 9:14 a.m. Also reported in this telegram, which was received at the Department at 8:56 a.m., January 29, was a conversation between Khanh and Wilson in which Khanh stated that he began planning for the coup 5 days earlier because he feared the corps commanders were to be arrested by pro-French neutralist elements. Because of his political inexperience, Khanh promised to rely heavily for political assistance" on Lodge. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) We have had some recent indications of coup plotting in Saigon, but none of the available material gives us a clear picture of the motives and intentions of Khanh's group. One or more of the following considerations were probably involved in the decision to stage a coup. 1. Growing concern with Minh-Tho leadership. There has been growing concern that Minh and his collaborators have moved too slowly in restoring the momentum of the counterinsurgency effort. Tho has been a particular target of criticism, many Vietnamese feeling that he is too identified with the former Diem regime, that he has appointed personal followers to key posts, and that generally he is incapable of providing dynamic and efficient civilian leadership. Minh, however, has resisted pressure to remove him. 2. Personal ambitions. A number of generals, particularly Khanh and Khiem, feel that they were not assigned sufficiently important positions since the ouster of the Diem regime. Khanh, for example, was in effect head of the armed forces under the Diem regime, and Khiem was Chief of Staff of the Joint General Staff for several months last year. 3. Concern over possible pro-neutralist or pro-French tendencies. Although General Minh and the other leading members of the MRC have shown no evidence of neutralist sentiments, during the past several weeks their French background has been commented upon with concern by Generals Khiem and Khanh, as well as by other military officers. Two arrests made during the coup, those of General Xuan and Colonel Lam, indicate a possible effort to counter neutralist activities. General Xuan, head of the National Police, was earlier reported to be planning a pro-neutralist, pro-French coup;/7/ Colonel Lam has just returned from France and is suspected by some Vietnamese of being a French agent. /7/See Document 18.   21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, January 29, 1964--7:47 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by Marshall Green; cleared by Forrestal, Mendenhall, and Rusk, who resumed to the Department of State at 6:25 p.m.; and approved by Harriman. 1149. For Ambassador. We have so little info on motivations and other factors involved in current crisis that we leave to your judgment how to handle. Meantime we trust you will make very clear through your actions that we had nothing to do with coup. If you consider it advisable and possible there would seem to us to be merit in preserving Minh as head of Government since he appears to have best potentialities for rallying support of people. Ball   22. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President/1/ Washington, January 30, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. III, Memos. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw this memorandum. SUBJECT Vietnam As of 11 a.m. the situation is as follows: 1. General Nguyen Khanh is in control. He has taken the leaders of the Military Committee, Generals Minh, Don, Kim and some of their associates into custody. There has been no bloodshed. 2. Both Lodge and Harkins report that the reason for the coup was Khanh's fear that the old government was dickering with the French in an effort to bring about the neutralization of South Vietnam./2/ We have no hard evidence that this was so. /2/Lodge made this observation in telegram 1443 from Saigon, January 30, 8:30 p.m., received at 7:34 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The White House copy of this telegram is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 214A. Harkins reported Khanh's motivation as such in telegrams MAC 321 and 325, both January 30, 12:30 and 2:05 p.m., respectively, received at the Department of State at 2:07 a.m. and 9:16 a.m., January 30. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. 111 Cables, and Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam Coup Two, January 30, 1964. both of Harkins messages are in Declassified Documents, 1975, 156C and 156D.) 3. Both Lodge and Harkins think that Khanh is a tough, able military leader. Harkins says that with proper help and support, he may prove to be stronger than the present set-up of Committee government./3/ Khanh apparently does not intend to make wholesale changes in the lower echelons of government. This is good, if true. /3/ Harkins made this prediction in MAC 321. He also characterized Khanh as "the strongest character in the military" and expressed surprise that given his outsider position and open disagreement with the MRC he had survived to stage a coup. 4. The Viet Cong appear to have been caught by surprise and have as yet not been willing or able to take advantage of the situation. Mike   23. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, January 30, 1964. /1/ Source: Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Vietnam 1964. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall. Copies were sent to Forrestal, Ball, and Harriman. Hilsman was in Australia. SUBJECT The New Vietnamese Coup Situation. Major General Nguyen Khanh has seized complete control in a bloodless coup. In a public statement carried over Saigon Radio Khanh stated that the coup is directed against the inefficiency of the "administrative organ" of the displaced government and against a "number of people" who are neutralists paving the way for a Communist victory. Khanh has made no public charges against the French but his denunciation of "colonialists" obviously refers to the French./2/ /2/Reported in telegram 1446 from Saigon, January 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 VIET S) Khanh told Ambassador Lodge (7 hours after coup) that he has tried to persuade General Minh to remain as chief of state, but will not accede to Minh's conditions that all generals arrested be released. He expressed determination to get on with the war, and promised a prompt public announcement to province chiefs and the army to carry on. He raised questions with Lodge about U.S. recognition (we preparing reply)./3/ /3/The Khanh-Lodge conversation of 11 a.m., January 30, is reported in telegram 1443 from Saigon, January 30, 8:30 p.m. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Specifically, Khanh asked what would be established diplomatic practice concerning recognition if Vietnam changed presidents and also whether the United States would recognize the new government. In telegram 1154 to Saigon, January 30, the Department informed Lodge that from a legal standpoint the United States had the option of extending formal recognition or handling the matter as a continuation of normal relations. In a number of recent cases, the United States had continued relations after coupe, which was the preferred course in Vietnam. If Lodge agreed, the Department suggested telling Khanh to inform the United States officially that there had been a change in the chairmanship and composition of the MRC and to make no reference to the matter of recognition. (Ibid., POL 16 VIET S) A subsequent Saigon Radio broadcast names Gen. Khanh as Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council, and drops Minh, Don, Kim, Xuan, and Dinh from Council membership./4/ /4/No record of this broadcast has been found. Lodge comments that Gen. Khanh is cool, clear-headed, realistic planner; has good record; is tough, ruthless, farsighted./5/ /5/This assessment is taken from telegram 1443 from Saigon. Assessment. Khanh's main reason for seizure of power is undoubtedly his personal ambition. His allegations about efficiency and neutralism on the part of elements of the displaced government are a cloak for his own desire for power. He is unquestionably pro-U.S and may carry on the war more efficiently and energetically than the preceding government. But there will probably be a new period of confusion during Khanh's settling-in. Part of the aura of mistrust which surrounded the Diem regime may return because Khanh will probably feel the necessity of protecting his rear with security forces in Saigon. This means fewer troops available for use against the Viet Cong. Khanh does not have the qualities of popular appeal which "Big" Minh has, and was beginning to use. Conceivably, as a young, attractive figure, he might develop a style of his own for winning the people. In the domestic political picture he seems to have two options: either to restore many of the Can Lao like Thuan, Tuyen, etc., to positions in the government, or to push for "total revolution" against ex-Diem elements as many students, Buddhists, and others in Saigon have been demanding. We suspect he will choose the latter path. Public Posture. Our public position is going to be difficult because this is a second coup within three months in war-torn Viet-Nam. We believe we should use publicly the two elements which Khanh has used in his public statement: improved efficiency and anti-neutralism. These two points should evoke a somewhat favorable response in the U.S. in view of recent press stories on how badly the war has been going, and in the light of the recent French actions in the Far East.   24. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, January 31, 1964--7 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 2:07 p.m. and passed to the White House, Office of the Secretary of Defense, CIA, and JCS. The White House copy is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 214E. 1451. CINCPAC for POLAD. 1. Called on Gen Khanh and gave him gist of the pertinent parts of your 1154./2/ He is instructing FonMin Lam to work out a text of the note with DCM along lines your last part./3/ At 4 pm press conference will announce there has been a change in the chairmanship and composition of the Military Revolutionary Council, and that the Council continues to respect Vietnam's international obligations./4/ He also plans to invite all the diplomats to a reception tomorrow, Saturday afternoon. /2/See footnote 3, Document 23. /3/Text of the Vietnamese note, January 31, and the Embassy's reply, January 31, acknowledging it, are in telegram 1460 from Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 VIET S) The U.S. note is printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1964, p. 239. /4/A summary of the press conference, held at 5:31 p.m., January 31, is in telegram 1452 from Saigon, January 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S) 2. With this out of the way, I told him that the purpose of my call was to make him understand clearly that he would rise or fall, as far as American opinion was concerned, on the results which he obtained in the effort against Viet Cong. Nothing could be more fatal as far as US confidence was concerned than another 6 weeks interregnum, or a period of any length devoted to fumbling around and to so-called "reorganization". It was utterly vital that the commanders and the province chiefs in the field understand that all existing orders are still in force and are confirmed, and that he actually gave vigorous impetus, including a few kicks in the rear end where necessary, to see that the whole effort against the Viet Cong went ahead in all phases--military, political, psychological, economic and social; that what I hoped for was not rhetoric, but concrete results in Long An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuang and other provinces where the situation is so critical. I wanted news of specific hamlets which had been cleared, I hoped for reports showing that corrupt district officials who had been extorting and oppressing the people were being removed. 3. Gen Khanh agreed emphatically with all of this and repeated what he said to me yesterday--that competent people were to be kept on the job. 4. I said I was glad to hear this because unless he conveyed a strong, hard focused picture of a thoroughly aggressive and capable leader, there was going to be tremendous disappointment not only in the US, but throughout free world. 5. He said that he would announce in his press conference that he was determined to get on with the war effort in the above way. 6. He then said he wanted to ask my advice. He was thinking of forming a "govt of national union" of all responsible parties, 5 or 6 in number, and what did I think? I said I did not know the details of Vietnam well enough to give him specific advice, but that certainly one good rule of politics in any country was to include rather than to exclude, and to give all elements in the community a sense of participation. I asked him whether, in addition to the 5 or 6 major political parties, he was planning to include persons who adhered to the Catholic religion and whether he had considered the Buddhists, the Hoa Haos, and the Cao Dais. He said that he would. 7. He then said he would like to ask my advice on whom he should name as PriMin--who did I think was the best man? PriMin Tho was leaving and he had to find someone else. I said I did not feel I knew the personalities in Vietnam well enough to give him a worthwhile answer, as I had not yet been here seven months, but that I would consult people who knew this country much better than I did, and that if I had a valuable suggestion, I would let him know. 8. He then said that "within 7 to 10 days" he would be obliged to take some very "clear positions" regarding France and wanted to know whether we would help if this action were to lead to blockage of funds, elimination of French financial aid, or other retaliatory measures. 9. I asked him just what he meant by "clear positions". If he meant total rupture, that was one thing. If he meant merely rupture of diplomatic relations, with consuls still present, that was something else. I asked him whether he was seriously contemplating expelling all of the 450 French schoolteachers and all of the French doctors? Did he seriously contemplate closing down the Grall Hospital which had given a million cholera shots free in the last 10 days--because if he did, he was taking on a very big proposition indeed, and one which would cause a great deal of suffering. It was not realistic to think that all these services which had been built up over a long period of time could suddenly be replaced. The US certainly had no ambition to substitute English for French in this country, and perhaps it would be possible to recruit French-speaking teachers in Quebec, Belgium and Switzerland, but that this would be a long process and it seemed to me a very imprudent thing to do without careful study. 10. He seemed impressed. He obviously feels strongly the need of some very vigorous gesture against France, in order to justify his seizure of power and in order to prevent it from looking like a naked power grab. Perhaps the outcome will be breaking diplomatic relations, but leaving consuls. 11. Question: Is there anything I can tell him in reply to his question on helping Vietnam against possible French retaliation to a breach of relations? (see Embtel 1416)/5/ /5/In telegram 1416, January 29, the Embassy warned that deterioration of French-Vietnamese relations could result in the withdrawal or departure of the French technical and managerial community in Vietnam as well as the withdrawal of French aid. The Embassy concluded that while a break in relations between France and Vietnam would not eliminate much of the French private investment in Vietnam, the United States would find it costly to replace even a portion of the official French commitment. (Ibid., POL FR-VIET S) Lodge   25. Telegram From the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) and the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins)/1/ Washington, January 31, 1964--1:16 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Sent over CIA channels. The source text is a copy the CIA sent the Department of State Exclusive for Rusk. Also sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Exclusive for McNamara. In an undated memorandum which bears a handwritten note indicating that it was taken from the President's bedroom on February 1, Moyers made the following recommendations to the President: "(1) After the last coup in Vietnam, the Communists waited about ten days before launching an aggressive attack which caught Vietnamese and Americans off-guard." "(2) They will probably try it again now." "(3) Therefore, Rusk and McNamara should be instructed to inform Lodge and Harkins to take the initiative now--to get the Vietnamese moving against the Viet Cong--to launch an offensive before the Communists launch one." "(4) This could then be leaked, if desirable, in an effort to show that you are determined to push the war at a faster pace." (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 312 Vietnam) At 9:59 a.m., January 31, McNamara telephoned Rusk concerning the need for such initiative in Saigon. The transcript of the call reads as follows: "M said re South Vietnam, President asked what to do. M said his only suggestion was to step up South Vietnamese operations; if that seemed good, he would have a cable developed on it and would get his people to work with Sec's people. Sec said it was a very good idea. M will get the cable drafted and get it over for clearance." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) [document number not declassified]. Joint State/Defense message. For Amb Lodge and Gen Harkins. After the coup in November, South Vietnamese military operations were neglected. A period of uncertainty ensued and the Viet Cong took advantage of the confusion in government and the weakness in administration of both political and military affairs. Serious setbacks to the counterinsurgency program resulted, particularly in the Delta. We fear similar results from yesterday's coup. Therefore, you and General Harkins are instructed to state to Khanh that there must be no opportunity for the Viet Cong to benefit from the events of the past few days--it is essential that he and his government demonstrate to the people of South Vietnam, the people of the United States and the people of the world their unity and strength. To do so, the tempo of South Vietnamese military operations must be stepped up immediately and visibly so. The President would like to be able to announce tomorrow (Saturday am) that he has been informed by General Khanh that General Khanh has instructed the corps commanders to step up the pace of military operations immediately and has directed certain specific operations./2/ /2/On the afternoon of February 1, President Johnson read the text of a personal letter to General Khanh at a press conference. The letter reads: "I am glad to know that we see eye to eye on the necessity of stepping up the pace of military operations against the VietCong. I particularly appreciate your warm and immediate response to my message as conveyed by Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins. We shall continue to be available to help you carry the war to the enemy and to increase the confidence of the Vietnamese people in their Government." (Telegram 1168 to Saigo