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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
VII. Taylor's First Month as Ambassador; the Increase in U.S. Advisory Forces in Vietnam, June 25-July 31 Washington, June 29, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S. Secret. Drafted by Leonard C. Meeker and Carl F. Salans of L, cleared by Norb Schlie of the Department of Justice and by William Bundy. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 002145. SUBJECT The enclosed memorandum/2/ is submitted in response to your request of June 22 for a consideration of the legal basis for sending American forces to Viet-Nam./3/ The conclusions of the memorandum may be summarized as follows: /2/Not printed here; published ibid. /3/Apparently the request was oral. (Memorandum from Meeker to Rusk, June 26; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S) 1. The sending of American military personnel to serve in an advisory, non-combatant role rests on specific authority contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and on a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Viet-Nam. 2. The assignment of United States military personnel to duty in Viet-Nam involving participation in combat rests on the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, as Chief Executive, and in precedents in history for the use of these powers to send American forces abroad, including various situations involving their participation in hostilities. In the case of Viet-Nam, the President's action is additionally supported by the fact that South Viet-Nam has been designated to receive protection under Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty; both the Treaty and the Protocol covering Viet-Nam received the advice and consent of the Senate. Dean Rusk/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
227. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 1, 1964, 7:15 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved by Rusk. Copies were sent to William and McGeorge Bundy. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Alphand, at his request, called on the Secretary at 7:15 p.m. on July 1. One of the subjects discussed was Southeast Asia. [Here follows discussion of Laos.] Discussion of the French Position The Secretary said he wished to discuss frankly the French position on Southeast Asia and the points which troubled us. As we saw it, the French position was based on the following points: 1) there should be no Communist takeover in Southeast Asia; 2) the problem cannot be resolved by military means; 3) there was no solid political structure in South Vietnam and it was unlikely that it would be possible to create such a solid structure; 4) there should be a political solution and France should reserve herself for an initiative in this direction; 5) a political solution required strong U.S. military presence in the area. Ambassador Alphand did not dispute any of these points. The Secretary continued that we had three problems with regard to this position. One was fundamental, the two others were of a psychological nature. The fundamental problem was that we did not |understand what was meant by a "political solution." We realized, of course, that the war could not be won by military means alone, but, in our opinion, a political solution for the area had been reached through the 1954 and 1962 accords. We could not see any new solution which would not be much worse for the interests of the West. Ambassador Alphand agreed that the 1962 agreement on Laos was an acceptable political solution. All that was required were the reconstitution of the three political tendencies and perhaps stronger controls. As to Vietnam, the only new element to be added to the 1954 accords was the concept of neutrality. The Secretary asked whether neutrality would apply to both North and South Vietnam. Ambassador Alphand said that it should, but suggested that it should be applied to South Vietnam first and that it should be gradually extended to the North. The Secretary said that if the other side would leave South Vietnam alone, U.S. forces would be withdrawn. The only reason for U.S. military presence was the continued interference by Hanoi in South Vietnam. Ambassador Alphand agreed that U.S. military presence in South Vietnam was a result of the military activities of the other side. On the other hand, the U.S. had exerted a dominant political influence in South Vietnam immediately after the French withdrawal in 1954. The French had warned against this because they had been concerned about the reactions of the other side. The Secretary repeated that we had no desire to control South Vietnam and that our presence there would end as soon as the other side stopped its interference. Ambassador Alphand said that the U.S. and France had a different evaluation of the situation in Communist China. The French felt that the Chinese were beset by their domestic problems. The Chinese were also in difficulties with the Soviets. The only sure way to solve the problem in Southeast Asia was a settlement guaranteed by the United States and China. The Secretary said that we had such an agreement with regard to Laos; it had not worked. Ambassador Alphand said that Laos had only been a partial settlement which had not worked because of the continued war in Vietnam. The Secretary said he wanted to mention the two other points in the French position which gave us difficulties. He noted French skepticism about the possibility of creating a viable political structure in South Vietnam. Yet, the French could be of great help in creating such a viable structure by using their influence. Ambassador Alphand asked what France could do. Should it give advice to the Vietnamese politicians? The Secretary said that France should state openly that it is opposed to a Communist takeover of the area and that it was prepared to cooperate with South Vietnam to this end. Ambassador Alphand felt that France had already made it clear that she was opposed to a Communist takeover. The Secretary said that the other point concerned U.S. military presence in the area, the need for which France appeared to recognize. On this, we could use some moral support. Standing aside and equating U.S. with Communist presence was definitely not helpful. Ambassador Alphand said that he recognized the difficulties. He alluded to France's own experience in Indochina until 1954. He recognized that France had received material support from the United States. Nevertheless, the war had cost France $8.5 billion and she had to fight the war alone. The Secretary said that it had always been his view that the West had made mistakes with regard to Indochina in the 1953-54 period. Ambassador Alphand said that it was his personal opinion that a choice would have to be made sooner or later with. regard to the Vietnamese problem. The Secretary reiterated that if Peking and Hanoi would leave Southeast Asia alone, there would be no need for U.S. presence in the area. As long as this was not the case, the U.S. would remain. He said that if the French were to tell this to the Chinese, this would be an accurate statement of U.S. policy. Ambassador Alphand said that it was necessary to talk to the Chinese. The Secretary said that we have indeed talked to the Chinese. Perhaps we have talked more seriously with the Chinese than any other Western nation that has diplomatic relations with Communist China. The absence of such relations between the U.S. and China was no obstacle to serious talks. We have not ignored China but we haven't liked what we have heard in these talks. We want a decision from the Chinese that they, as well as North Vietnam, will cease their interference in South Vietnam and Laos. The Secretary said that there were indications that an important meeting is currently going on in Hanoi. He could also tell Ambassador Alphand in confidence that we had closely watched the situation on the southern border of China and that there had been no Chinese troop movements to the South. Ambassador Alphand suggested that perhaps a political solution with regard to Laos was in the offing. The Secretary said that we wanted to return to the 1962 accords. The Secretary said that he wanted to be brutally frank. It appeared to him that there were people in Paris--he did not know who they were--who seemed to interpret U.S. actions on the world scene as an attempt to replace and to diminish French influence. Nothing could be further from the truth. Ambassador Alphand interjected that he could assure the Secretary that neither he, nor Couve, nor, he thought, General de Gaulle held this view. The Secretary said that, on the contrary, we would be delighted to see an extension of French influence in Southeast Asia, in Africa and in other parts of the world. There have been reports that the French wish to extend their influence in the Congo. Nothing would please us more. Ambassador Alphand said that since the last war the U.S., as the dominant power, had been thrust into a position where it had to exert its influence. He said this had been a good thing and had helped to ensure peace. On the other hand, it had led to a deep involvement of the United States in certain areas, such as Southeast Asia. He referred to our initial support of Diem and alluded to CIA activities in Vietnam. The Secretary said that seen from Europe, Southeast Asia seemed very far away. We, on the other hand, were an Atlantic as well as a Pacific power and the security of Asia was as important to us as the security of Europe. To us, the defense of South Vietnam has the same significance as the defense of Berlin. Ambassador Alphand disputed this. He felt the situations were not comparable. The stakes in Europe were enormous. The loss of Berlin would shake the foundations of Western security. On the other hand, if we were to lose South Vietnam we would not be losing much. The Secretary said that if we were to pull out of South Vietnam our guarantees with regard to Berlin would lose their credibility. It was all part of the same struggle, to prevent an extension of Communist influence. Ambassador Alphand said that an agreement on Vietnam with guarantees would not have the effect of lessening Western confidence in U.S. guarantees. The Secretary pointed out that we already have such an agreement on South Vietnam. Ambassador Alphand said that we had not signed the agreement. The Secretary said that we had nevertheless accepted it. The Secretary said that the reason why we have allies is that we believe in the right of nations to independence. We have 42 allies. Nevertheless, we are not troubled by the concept of non-alignment and neutralism as long as it is genuine. Ambassador Alphand wondered what could be done in practical terms. He said that with regard to Southeast Asia, we appear to have a difference of opinion and we were going along different paths. The Secretary asked precisely what was the difference of opinion. Ambassador Alphand said France believed there should be a negotiated agreement. The Secretary said that we already have the 1954 and 1962 agreements. Ambassador Alphand suggested that perhaps all that was needed was the 1954 agreement with new guarantees and new controls. The Secretary asked why France did not say so publicly and offer her cooperation to South Vietnam. He said that Saigon did not know what France meant by a "political solution". Did it mean the inclusion of the Vietcong in the government? Ambassador Alphand admitted that he did not know. He reviewed General de Gaulle's approach to the Algerian problem: de Gaulle had a policy--a negotiated settlement. The details, the means to get there, varied depending on day-to-day developments. The Secretary said that it was distressing that France used the term "neutralization" without giving it any concrete contents. Used in this manner, the concept becomes negative and creates the impression that France does not really care about the security of the area. The terms "neutralization" and "political solution" without concrete contents are merely words, not a policy. Ambassador Alphand felt that these words nevertheless expressed a policy, a direction. He felt that a choice would have to be made, and although he did not wish to exaggerate the importance of the coming elections, he felt that the choice would be reached more easily once the elections are over. The Secretary assured Ambassador Alphand that the elections played no role in this. The President had made this quite clear. He had heard the President say "I don't have to be re-elected President, but I have to be President while I am President". Moreover, no U.S. President, before or after the elections, would pull out of Southeast Asia as long as the other side interferes. On the other hand, we would pull out tomorrow if the other side would leave Southeast Asia alone. The Secretary said that his brief trip to Vietnam had convinced him that the country, if it were left in peace, would not only be viable but could be an example to this entire part of the world, thanks to a large extent to what the French had done there in the past. Ambassador Alphand agreed. He observed that the French, while in the area, had always found it necessary to have an agreement with the Chinese. The Secretary said the question was how to get Chinese assent to a solution. He said Soviet assent in Europe had been accomplished through our defensive arrangements. Only when the Soviets became convinced that they would face a major risk in stirring up trouble in Europe did they assent to actual conditions. Obviously, this lesson must be applied in Asia with regard to the Chinese. Ambassador Alphand agreed that Moscow had come to know the risks involved. He was not sure that this applied to China. He did not think the Chinese realized that local actions in Southeast Asia--infiltrations in South Vietnam and Laos--could eventually create the risk of a destruction of China. The Secretary said that the French should make the Chinese aware of the risks. Ambassador Alphand said he thought that this had already been done; on the other hand, the U.S. had not as yet made a statement to this effect. The Secretary said that the appearance of a division of the West with regard to Southeast Asia had a definite bearing on the problem and made a solution more difficult. He said the French should tell the North Vietnamese that they must leave South Vietnam alone and that France will oppose them if they continued their interference. Ambassador Alphand asked precisely what the Secretary would wish the French to convey to the Chinese. The Secretary said France should tell the Chinese (1) that if the Chinese and North Vietnamese leave Southeast Asia alone, France will use its influence to see to it that these countries will not present any threat to China; and (2) that if the Chinese do not leave Southeast Asia alone, France will oppose them. The Secretary asked Ambassador Alphand to put these two points to the French Foreign Minister. He said that it seemed to him that a genuinely non-aligned Southeast Asia was also in the interest of France. A non-aligned Southeast Asia would in all likelihood turn toward Paris. [Here follows discussion of Cambodia.]
228. Letter From the President to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/ Washington, July 2, 1964. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-161-69. Confidential. Taylor was appointed Ambassador to Vietnam on July 1, arrived in Saigon on July 7, and presented his credentials on July 14. The White House copy of this letter is published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 219C. Dear Ambassador Taylor: As you take charge of the American effort in South Vietnam, I want you to have this formal expression not only of my confidence, but of my desire that you have and exercise full responsibility for the effort of the United States Government in South Vietnam. In general terms this authority is parallel to that set forth in President Kennedy's letter of May 29,1961 to all American Ambassadors; specifically, I wish it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate. I recognize that in the conduct of the day-to-day business of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, you will wish to work out arrangements which do not burden you or impede the exercise of your overall direction. At your convenience, I should be glad to know of the arrangements which you propose for meeting the terms of this instruction, so that appropriate supporting action can be taken in the Defense Department and elsewhere as necessary. This letter rescinds all conflicting instructions to U.S. officers in Vietnam. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
229. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 8, 1964-7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State. Central Files. POL 1 US-VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. 56. CINCPAC for POLAD. I called on General Khanh this morning and we had cordial one hour conversation. He expressed satisfaction with new American personnel, saying that Vietnamese morale rose on news of appointments and VC morale fell. Said this might explain recent wave of VC attacks. I replied that President was prepared to commit all resources needed to assure Vietnamese independence. President wished to make clear that Viet-Nam was number one problem and would enjoy top priority. Returning to recent VC attacks, Khanh said VC seems to attack sporadically and it was important for us not to be shaken by spectacular VC successes over a short span of time. He noted that French had lost only 13,000 men at Dien Bien Phu and had force of 400,000 left. But French morale had been shattered by this one blow and war was lost. Said we must avoid reactions like this. Khanh said he could promise me "the frank cooperation of a soldier". He would be seeking man-to-man advice. If he could not meet some request of ours, he would tell us frankly why he could not do so. I thanked him for this and said I would deal with him in same way. Khanh said he was not a political expert but that he believed that one military principle that really applies to politics is flexibility. He would be flexible and would reconsider any decision if this seemed warranted by new facts, by our desires or by evolving situation. I then made point that I believed one of our principal common problems was meshing of our efforts. We had to make certain that the efforts of the two national teams, the Vietnamese and the American, geared. I told him of my decision of yesterday to set up a Mission Council with myself as chairman and drew parallel of council concept to functioning of NSC. Identified members of Mission Council and how it was intended that they would operate. I noted in passing my overall responsibility for American military activities, citing this as evidence of attainment of complete unity of effort on the U.S. side. I offered to show him at our next meeting how Mission Council and its several committees would work. We could then study possibilities of a closer working relation between counterparts. Khanh asked for an organization chart so he could set up an analogous council. Khanh recalled that as he had told Ambassador Johnson, when he commanded I Corps, he believed that Americans should not be merely advisors but should actually participate in making and implementing of plans. We should do this in Saigon as well, between GVN ministries and offices and their American counterparts. Zorthian was already working this way with Information Minister Thai, and results were already impressive. He added that if this cooperation were to be too open or too generally known, "it would be criticized by people too willing to criticize". I acknowledged this danger and observed that in some areas we would need closer and more frequent contact than in others; in some cases we night need even daily contact. I agreed to supply him our organization chart, for whatever applicability it might have, and asked how often he thought we should meet. He suggested once every other week at least at outset. I suggested we set a definite regular day towards which we could plan. We agreed that our first meeting should take place on Friday, July 17./2/ He prefers meeting at Joint General Staff building as more discreet and efficient. /2/A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A-48 from Saigon, July 20. (Ibid.) Khanh then invited me to join him for part of his trip to Danang area July 11 and 12 for two days of Vietnamese Air Force Day celebrations. I will try to spend at least one day with him in the field over the weekend. I told him that I would like to accompany him from time to time on his field trips. Khanh remarked Minh was making field trips now, and I expressed pleasure at learning this. Khanh said he was glad too and that Minh's trips were definitely useful. Neither of us discussed Minh's situation any further. I recalled that last time we spoke (mid-May) religious problem was acute, and remarked that it seemed perhaps less acute now. He agreed that religious situation had improved but said it was still delicate. I asked him which side was the aggressor. Without hesitating he replied the Catholics, and remarked that they were better organized than the Buddhists. I asked what was issue-were they seeking to recover privileges they thought they had lost. He said yes, that in past they had had such special privileges as wood cutting rights, direct delivery of relief goods, etc. This was illegal, and when normal and legal processes were restored Catholics alleged discrimination. I observed that it appeared no religious oppression as such had taken place. He agreed. I asked if the incidents between Buddhists and Catholics might be described as local and vary from place to place. He replied yes, commenting that if two citizens get in a fight and one is Catholic and one Buddhist, it is regarded as a religious incident. I asked if the top leaders of the religious communities had become more reasonable. When he said yes, I asked about Thich Tri Quang. He replied that Thich Tri Quang reasonable when he was in Saigon but less so when in Hue. He noted there was also the matter of differences in temperament of people and regional differences. Whereas Saigon tended to be calm and non-vindictive, in Hue every problem seemed to take more extreme form. Next I asked how recruiting was going. He said better but not as well as he would like. I told him General Westmoreland had described to me the new plan to work out from Saigon in force. I thought the plan looked reasonable but remarked that we must anticipate need for greater forces to hold "cleared" area as we advanced. This was particularly true in this area because paramilitary forces existed to relieve ARVN. Further, if we brought ARVN reinforcements to this critical area, we would be stripping other areas of their defense forces. I made clear that I did not raise this point as an objective [objection] to their plan, but rather as a reminder of mounting manpower requirements. Khanh said that when regular army units left an area, his forces would be replaced with regional forces. He noted that recent changes in pay and other matters had made service in regional forces much more attractive and therefore improved recruitment levels in regional forces. He also noted Vietnamese soldiers prefer to serve near their homes, and this factor also improved recruitment figures of regional forces, usually to detriment of regular army recruitments. He said that as an area was cleared, first the regulars and then the regional forces would withdraw, leaving local forces. He said we must include in our recruitment plans measures to reinforce local and regional forces up to ~the levels necessary for them to meet their new responsibilities as regulars pull out. In general comment on all this Khanh noted that the base of the VC action is the local hard-core group, and added that only the inhabitants of the same region could cope with these local VC elements. I asked Khanh about the desertion rate, whether the figures were correct and if there were not many AWOL being listed as deserters. He said this problem was very complex and stemmed largely from deep-seated desire of Vietnamese to stay near their birthplaces. This desire had plagued population resettlement efforts just as it now influenced desertion rate. Many desertions are for short time; over the holidays desertion rate was particularly high, but most such deserters returned to their units after holidays. The number of deserters who actually go over to the enemy with their weapons is small. I asked Khanh for more information on his policy towards desert~ers, and expressed concern over fact that according to statistics we are losing in desertions as many men as we acquire in recruitments. I asked if this impression were correct. He said it was a complicated question; when one service becomes more attractive than another, men desert from latter to join former. This practice made all the more common because forces keep minimal and unsatisfactory personnel records. I remarked that General Sternberg, MACV G-1, had been studying this whole problem and hoped Khanh's G-1 would work closely with him. He replied they already working together, and added that the problem lay inside ARVN. He said he must put some more effective officer in charge of all personnel affairs. I remarked that the more I studied the situation here, the more I was impressed by the importance of the personnel problem, in all its ramifications. I next reminded Khanh of President Johnson's interest in the earliest possible appointment of a more extensive Vietnamese representation abroad, and particularly of effective Ambassadors. He replied much as he had on other occasions. He said Ambassadors go out for several years, and once at their posts they cannot be changed like regimental commanders or province chiefs. There was also the problem of suitable wives. He said he could of course please President Johnson by appointing many Ambassadors tomorrow, but they would not be good appointments and it would be better to wait. Better no Ambassador than a poor one. He added that he had to tie these appointments in with his efforts to solve certain internal problems. I acknowledged the truth of all this but said that Viet-Nam was losing much by not having enough Ambassadors to represent its interests effectively abroad. He replied that it was better to leave representation at chargé d'affaires level rather than have a bad Ambassador. Khanh then gave example of totally unsatisfactory proposed nomination made to him by Foreign Minister Quat: Dang Van Sung, "a Dai Viet, of course", to be Ambassador to Laos. Khanh said Sung began to publish a newspaper that attacked government. Khanh said he called him in and asked why he wrote such irresponsible nonsense, to which Sung allegedly replied "so he could sell newspapers." Khanh observed that if such a person became Ambassador, he would be able to sell other things. Another case was Catholic leader of Central Viet-Nam Tran Van Ly. Khanh wanted to send him to Rome as Ambassador, but said that after interviewing him he concluded Ly wanted to be Prime Minister. On taking leave of Khanh I emphasized once more importance of unity. Khanh replied that this difficult of achievement because Vietnamese suffer from French political heritage that makes them individualistic and disunited. I reminded him of the saying about necessity to hang together or hang separately. Taylor
230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 8, 1964--9:09 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Mendenhall, cleared by William Bundy, and initialed and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ottawa. 69. Shenstone/2/ of Canadian Embassy Washington has given us copy July 5 cable from Seaborn/3/ stating it now seems likely ICC will meet in Hanoi about July 14. Seaborn will try see Ho and Giap whom he would ask for comments or reply to message conveyed to Pham Van Dong. /2/Michael Shenstone, First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy. /3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S) Seaborn asked whether any specific further points for him to convey to DRV. We told Canadian Embassy here July 8 that Sullivan/4/ will be in direct touch with Seaborn in Saigon and will let him know whether we have anything further to convey at this stage. /4/William H. Sullivan went to Vietnam temporarily to assist Taylor and Johnson on the understanding he would become Ambassador to Laos in a few months. Events in Vietnam kept him there for 5 months. (William H. Sullivan, Obbligato, pp. 196-197) Forrestal replaced Sullivan as the Special Assistant for Vietnam. On behalf Seaborn Canadian Embassy here requested our comments on Pham Van Dong's position re status and role of National Liberation Front. We told Canadians there is nothing new or surprising about this position as it is generally consistent with DRV public attitude on this question. We drew Canadians' attention however to fact that speeches and resolution of Third Congress of Lao Dong Party in September 1960 placed great stress on "peaceful national reunification" as major aim of "national united front" to be set up in South Viet-Nam. Thus Pham Van Dong was substantially less than candid when he told Seaborn that "neutrality" was not necessarily first step only. We also told Canadian DRV should be in no doubt we regard National Liberation Front as puppet and agent of Hanoi, and we hope Canadians will keep this firmly before DRV leaders. Seaborn stated that he proposes to tell DRV leaders that appointment of Taylor-Johnson team is evidence of seriousness of US purpose but not of bellicosity. He proposes to say there is no change in basic US approach already given to Pham Van Dong. We have confirmed to Canadians that this is correct interpretation and proper line to pursue with Hanoi. Shenstone at July 8 meeting also told us Ottawa feels on basis statement at recent National Assembly meeting in Hanoi of DRV position on South Viet-Nam struggle that DRV is putting forth maximum position. Ottawa suggested therefore it might not serve our interest to appear too eager to get DRV response to message conveyed to Pham Van Dong. While we see nothing new in DRV position, we told Shenstone we agree with Ottawa's view about not appearing too eager. We therefore concur with Seaborn that if ICC meeting in Hanoi does not come off in July he should put off new trip to Hanoi until August. (Latest word from Seaborn is that July 16 is earliest ICC commissioners could leave for Hanoi and apparent Polish lack of enthusiasm may delay date further.) We also told Shenstone we believe that if Seaborn's request to call on Ho and Giap on next visit to Hanoi not readily granted he should not press to see them./5/ /5/In telegram 74 from Saigon, July 11, Taylor agreed with this line and reported that Sullivan would discuss the matter in detail with Seaborn in Saigon after July 13. Taylor reported that Sullivan would offer Seaborn the following advice: "Unless ICC fixes date for early meeting Hanoi, Sullivan will counsel against appearing too eager and will advise August trip rather than July. Will also advise against Seaborn `asking' for comments or reply to message conveyed Pham Van Dong. In our view, ball now in Hanoi's court and their views should be volunteered rather than solicited. Finally, we will reiterate views re puppet nature Liberation Front." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S) In telegram 81 from Saigon, July 13, Taylor reported that Seaborn told Sullivan that the trip to Hanoi was postponed until August. (Ibid.) Ball
231. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to the President/1/ Washington, July 11, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, CO 312 Viet Nam. No classification marking. SUBJECT USIS conducted a study in April and May, 1964, to determine psychological attitudes in the rural Vietnamese province of Binh Hoa. Despite the fact that Binh Hoa is not typical of all rural Vietnamese provinces, findings proved surprisingly consistent with less detailed but significant data taken previously from other areas, and are probably indicative of rural thinking throughout much of the country. The following summary of findings from the study may interest you. 1. Villagers prefer the central government over the Viet Cong. Viet Cong influence was significant in only two of the fifteen villages surveyed. Only in the face of threats did villagers tend to support the VC. Left alone, they looked to the central government for any real help. 2. There is confidence in the Khanh government, but it can only be maintained by fulfilling villagers' desires. Khanh has achieved a considerable measure of respect by meeting certain village demands such as relaxation of taxes and elimination of forced indoctrination sessions. Even among Catholics who felt that Diem gave them preferential treatment, the old regime is no longer mourned. 3. The most common aspiration is for government credit and material aid. Financial and technical help is everywhere sought and needed for construction of public works such as hospitals, schools, and irrigation projects and for private assistance in agricultural developments. 4. Success of the strategic hamlet program is dependent upon several factors. a. Adequate and well-behaved security forces. b. Prompt payment of resettlement costs. c. Free elections. d. Honest, energetic, and socially-responsible government officials and district chiefs. 5. The presence of U.S. advisors is not resented. Generally, people "do not care whether U.S. officers act as advisors or commanders as long as they help in winning the war." Despite some unfavorable comparisons with the French who "got closer to the people," U.S. advisors are judged as "better disciplined." 6. Villagers' uncertainties about their prospects can be reduced by still further improvement of the Vietnamese Information Service. Common complaints were that publications do not reach the people, movie showings are too infrequent, and Vietnamese information officers do not exert themselves enough. Thus, uncertainties about the government can result from lack of information about so uncomplicated a subject as "People wonder what happened to the savings they have poured into the Agricultural Credit Service fund for the last years." The overwhelming need is for reassurances of physical security. For your more detailed information, a fuller report is attached./2/ /2/Not printed. Carl
232. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 14, 1964--midnight. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. 98. Re Embtel 81./2/ Sullivan met July 13 with Seaborn to discuss Seaborn's views re next encounter with North Vietnamese. According currently anticipated schedule, Seaborn does not expect visit Hanoi until first part of August. At that time, on basis previous conversation with Pham Van Dong, he expects have interview with Ho Chi Minh. However, despite his suggestions to Pham Van Dong, he has very little hope of seeing General Giap. /2/See footnote 5. Document 230. In general, Seaborn accepts idea that ball is now in Hanoi court and he will not solicit reaction to his previous approach to Pham Van Dong. His latest cable from Ottawa, which reflects conversations in Washington, suggests that he should refer to his previous conversations only indirectly in his next visit. As for subject matter which he will wish to initiate in his discussion in Hanoi, Seaborn wishes to obtain from us the line we would like to pursue with respect to the National Liberation Front. He wishes to have, by pouch or cable: (A) [garble--latest?] intelligence information we have developed on the Front to demonstrate its DRV control, and which we would be willing to share with him, (B) talking points which we would wish him to use with respect to the Front, and (C) any information which we would like to develop on the Front, and which might emerge from discussions on this subject in Hanoi. In dinner conversation after private meeting, Seaborn and Sullivan were joined by Canadian Brigadier recently returned from Hanoi, who reported considerable continuing anti-air raid precautions being taken in city and camouflage work being done on POL tank farm just outside city. This info being repeated in more detail by separate messages/3/ in order not compromise privacy this series of cables. /3/Not found. Taylor
233. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 15, 1964--4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to JCS and CINCPAC. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this cable to the President on July 16, under cover of a memorandum that reads as follows: "This is a cable which I think Bob McNamara mentioned to you yesterday. The critical paragraph is the last one. I see some advantage in a careful build-up, carefully explained from every point of view, but we obviously cannot make decisions until we get more detailed accounts. Bob and I would expect this matter to be ready for discussion and decision sometime next week, but not before." Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIV, Memos) 108. Dept pass to Director AID. For Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. I have just cleared a cable/2/ which should reach you shortly which raises the estimate of Viet Cong strength in South Vietnam to 23,000-34,000. This is not a sudden or dramatic increase but rather the acceptance of the existence of units suspected for two or three years for which confirmatory evidence has become available only in the last few months. /2/Telegram 107 from Saigon, July 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) This increased estimate of enemy strength and recent upward trend in VC activity in the North should not occasion overconcern. We have been coping with this strength for some time without being accurately aware of its dimensions. As to the heightened tempo of operations in the North, there is considerable reason to believe that VC command thinks we are about to shift larger forces to Saigon area than modest transfer actually planned and that these are holding attacks to pin forces in North. However, taken in combination, both events are a reminder of the growing magnitude of our problems and the need to raise the level of the GVN/US effort. With this need in mind, we are expediting the formulation of additional requirements to support our plans during the ensuing months. This morning I went over the military personnel requirements which Westmoreland is developing for the execution of the pacification plan for the area around Saigon (dubbed Pica I) and for subsequent operations up to about July, 1965. It appears likely that US military strength should increase to around 21,000 in the next six months to meet projected needs. This matter is being studied closely and will result shortly in a recommendation from General Westmoreland supported by detailed justification. I will comment at that time. USOM requirements are more complex and difficult to define but are taking form and will be forwarded by about August 1. Taylor 234. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 15, 1964--9 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, the Department of Defense, and CIA. 115. CINCPAC for POLAD. This is a Mission message. A. The countrywide rate of Viet Cong activity while not as high as that experienced in the peak weeks of the February-April period, has increased over the June weekly average. The period 5-13 July has seen several major actions which have produced fairly heavy losses on both sides. B. Following is furnished in effort to place major military events of the past several days in perspective, point up certain strengths and weaknesses on the part of the RVNAF, and provide some indication of probable course of the war in weeks to come. 1. The spate of press reports regarding PAVN units in battalion size operating in the I Corps area cannot be confirmed. The introduction of regular PAVN forces into the area is regarded as unlikely. Report of initial interrogation of prisoners recently captured indicates that infiltration of drafted native-born North Vietnamese trained in various PAVN divisions has probably increased in the past few months. The extent of this infiltration is not yet clear but there is no evidence that PAVN battalions are moving into this area. 2. Referring to the major specific VC-initiated actions during the past two weeks, the following operational comments supplement the various spot reports, wirenotes, and sitreps which cover these actions. They are intended to provide an insight into current activities and to assist in the assessment of the significance of these activities. A. Actions against Special Forces (Pled Krong and Narn Dong): (1) Attacks took place at camps which for a considerable period previously had been relatively free from VC harassment. VC controls in area had been of a transitory nature. Friendly patrols normally ranged to 10km or more before any contact was made. Camps had been established to recruit indigenous personnel away from VC. (2) Because of lack of previous activity, security apparently was somewhat lax. However, Nam Dong was successful in repelling an attack of over BN size. (3) Local intelligence sources were apparently poor since large VC forces were able to assemble undetected in vicinity. (4) At least one camp appears to have been infiltrated by VC. (5) Reaction forces were not effective since arrival was after VC withdrawal. (6) Apparently VC planning, coordination, and execution were based on detailed knowledge of camps' activities and reaction capability of available reinforcements. B. Vinh Cheo outpost (11-12 July): (1) VC apparently used attack on outpost as bait for reaction. A large VC force, estimated at two battalions, was employed in the entire operation which was obviously well-planned. (2) The VC were disposed in a strong defensive position blocking each column advancing toward the outpost. (3) Sector reacted quickly but had difficulty in maintaining control in part because reaction forces were dispatched at night. (4) The reaction forces initially were five Hoa Hao companies. Two of the units were organized in April, the other three in June. None had unit training. They had very little experience. Leadership was weak. The deputy province chief was the strongest leader. However, he was seriously wounded early in the operation. (5) March security apparently was poor on the moves. (6) Terrain was difficult. For the most part area consisted of rice paddies under three feet of water. This handicapped reaction forces and was advantageous to VC ambush. C. Binh Long ambush (13 July): (1) VC again used two separate forces. At this time, it is difficult to determine whether one was used to lure a reaction force into an ambush or whether the initial encounter was accidental. (2) The convoy ambush appeared to have been well-planned and executed. Some VC were reported to have been disguised as Rangers. lO9mm shells were electrically detonated in the road. The ambush was well-timed and coordinated. (3) Security and march discipline was lax. Vehicles were bunched and the command element was in the first three vehicles. (4) Reaction to the ambush was poor. Two Ranger companies in the immediate vicinity did not react. This may have been due to fact that battalion commander was lost in ambush. Coordination was lacking. Two other companies were helilifted to Chon Thanh but were not committed. (5) Binh Long has significance for the VC as a "corridor" province through which some of their lines of communication are known to run between their national headquarters (COSVN) and the northern provinces and between war zones C and D. While recent VC activity in the province confined itself mainly to interference with traffic on the few highways in that area, ARVN forces have been ambushed there before, and the most recent VC reaction signals their determination to keep ARVN forces out of that area. C. In summary the following observations are offered as possible explanation of VC activity during last two weeks: 1. Possibly in response to publicity during last few months on hardening US attitude toward war, some reports indicate VC issued instructions during the latter part of June 64 to step up the tempo and intensity of their activities during following three months to include the conduct of a series of attacks on forward RVN military bases. Several reports referred to VC instructions for increased activities during July to commemorate the signing of the Geneva Accords on 20 July 1954. There were other reports associating increased activity with arrival of Ambassador Taylor. The Viet Cong clandestine broadcasting station last week announced an increase in VC activity, while exhorting their followers to intensify their efforts. 2. Another possible explanation for increased VC activity is that the VC are putting on the pressure in I, II and IV Corps to prevent or discourage GVN reinforcement in the provinces around Saigon. They are no doubt aware of plans to intensify pacification in the Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Gia Dinh area. 3. The VC seem to make announcements of increased activity only when their reserve strength is ready to accomplish or at least attempt what their propaganda predicts. The VC have sufficient reserves to raise the tempo and intensity of their effort. This is particularly true of VC Military Region 5, comprising the provinces of I Corps and most of the provinces of II Corps, where main force units are known to exist, but are rarely committed. In I Corps tactical zone, recent infiltration of North Vietnamese mentioned above, have added new but relatively inexperienced reinforcements. We have low-level reports of recent infiltration further South via Attopeu province of Laos but these have not been substantiated thus far. 4. Significant recent VC attacks do not depart from patterns established over the past year. The attacks on the CIDG campaign Kontum and Thua Thien were undoubtedly the result of long preparation. CIDG camps because of their very nature are high priority targets for the VC. This was demonstrated by the repeated VC efforts against the Chau Lang camp and the devastating attack on the Kiep Hoa camp in November 63. 5. The attack on Vinh Cheo outpost apparently was a continuation of the same tactics which the VC had attempted to use earlier in Phuoc Thanh province when they inflicted heavy casualties on a 2company Ranger relief force attempting to intervene after a 5-pronged VC action against minor targets. 6. The upsurge of VC activity in the two northern provinces of I Corps during the past several days has not fallen into a discernible pattern but it seems reasonable to credit it in part to a carefully designed VC plan to counter First Division offensive operations into territory that VC consider their base area, negate successful GVN pacification efforts in the coastal regions of the two provinces, and cause the withdrawal of GVN elements working on road projects in the piedmont areas of the two provinces. If these were in fact their goals, they have succeeded to a considerable degree. Some of the increased activity may have been designed to delay or prevent strong ARVN reaction to the attack on the Nam Dong post on 6 July. Finally, stepped up activity in the North probably had a strategic objective, discouragement of GVN intentions to concentrate more troops in the South. In past few days VC activity in I Corps seems to have returned to pattern of weeks prior to 5 July with emphasis continuing to be on the harassment, terroristic and sabotage type of activity. Route 1 is open for traffic. However, Route 9 remains closed west of Ca Lu due to a destroyed bridge. D. However, in general, high level of activity must be anticipated in response to apparent policy decisions on conducting a special campaign during July. Priority targets are likely to be: district towns, isolated posts, and ARVN units entering VC base areas. However, main thrust of VC campaign is expected to emphasize terrorism, harassment and efforts against routes and lines of communications with particular effort in those areas where pacification operations show evidence of progress. E. Deptel 130/2/ just received. We share concerns expressed reftel and agree there are many unknowns in situation. Are making urgent review and will submit Mission views and recommendations in few days. /2/In this joint State-Defense-CIA message, July 14, the three agencies expressed concern about the military situation in the northern provinces and suggested that the Mission in Saigon consider the feasibility of additional air and ground reconnaissance and intelligence collection to obtain hard evidence on the Viet Cong situation there. (Ibid.) Taylor
235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, July 15, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIII, Memos. No classification marking. Here are three interesting dispatches from Max Taylor. The first explains where the bad UPI story out of Saigon came from./2/ /2/In telegram 109 from Saigon, July 15, Taylor reported that General Stilwell held a background briefing with local correspondents in Saigon to eliminate speculation of a North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam. Reporters had received this impression from Khanh and other South Vietnamese officials. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) On July 14, UPI wrote a story based on the Stilwell background briefing emphasizing that the North Vietnamese had stepped up their infiltration of regulars into the South. The President was not pleased with this result, according to telegram 131 to Saigon, July 14. (Ibid.) The second gives the view of the experienced Chinese Nationalist Ambassador on the general situation./3/ /3/Ambassador Yuen Tse-kien's view was guardedly optimistic as reported in telegram 112 from Saigon, July 15. (Ibid., POL 17 CHINA-VIET S; also published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 297A) The third gives perhaps in more detail than you want an account of the effort which has been made to get the Saigon Government to do something serious about help from other countries./4/ I concur in the last paragraph which says that they are doing all they can. /4/Telegram 99 from Saigon, July 14. (Department of State, Central Files, AID VIET S) There is just no comparison between the reporting we get from the Taylor-Johnson team and what we used to get from Ambassador Lodge. These are good examples. McG.B.
236. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC, the White House, Department of Defense, and JCS. Saigon, July 17, 1964--6 p.m. 125. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref: (A) Embtel 108./2/ (B) MACJ-31 6180 DTG 161045 Jul 64./3/ /2/Document 233. /3/Dated July 16. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center. Reel 11854) 1. In separate messages COMUSMACV is recommending force increases of about 2,000 personnel. Added to earlier recommendations still pending approval of CINCPAC and/or JCS and shortages not yet filled, the total increase over current strength on board would rise by approximately 4,200 military personnel over the next nine months bringing the total in country to nearly 22,000. 2. I have reviewed these increases, both pending and recommended, in the light of plans to intensify pacification in certain priority areas and to improve operations throughout the country. 3. Without being able or wishing to comment on line items, I give general over-all support to General Westmoreland's recommendations for the following reasons: a. A substantial improvement in effectiveness of reaction is required at BN level because of an increasing requirement for quicker response in counterambush operations and because the quality and aggressiveness of the VC seem to be rising. b. In order to improve and accelerate the pacification program a major extension of advisory effort at district level is essential. It is proposed to position advisory teams at all districts in the priority provinces and in the most important districts in other provinces. c. In addition to the administrative increases which automatically follow the deployment of another 900 advisors to widely dispersed field positions there is a corresponding need for increased airlift and helicopters. d. Conversion of the Special Forces command to Special Forces group on PCS at full strength minus certain aviation and ~Q elements, will improve and reinforce operations on the border, in the highlands, against the war zones and support special operations. It should be possible to carry on an effective offensive counterguerrilla program--something we have done only to a limited degree in the past. 4. In the absence of presently unforeseen contingencies, the increases presently being sought added to those in process of approval should meet the US military personnel requirement for pacification operations for approximately the next twelve months. I urge prompt processing and action on these recommendations./4/ /4/The Department of State, in telegram 205 to Saigon, July 21, replied as follows: "Highest Authority has approved in principle, subject to further review of details, the requested increase in authorized military strength to approximately 22,000. It has not yet been decided whether or how this augmentation should be announced. Steps should be taken to insure that there is no intentional or accidental release of information on this subject from Saigon until authorized." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Taylor
237. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary of State Rusk's Office, Department of State, Washington, July 20, 1964, 12:15 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Imhof and approved by Rusk on August 10. Copies were sent to FE, EUR, WE, the White House, and the Embassy in Paris. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Alphand said that he now had a message from Couve de Murville in response to a number of points which the Secretary had raised with Alphand on July 1./2/ Ambassador Alphand explained that the delay had been caused by Couve's extremely busy schedule--he had been in Germany, in Sweden and he had chaired the WEU meeting in Paris. Ambassador Alphand then proceeded to read from penciled notes. /2/See Document 227. Ambassador Alphand said he could assure the Secretary the French Government was fully aware that the U.S. had no territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia. The Secretary said that not only do we have no territorial ambitions, we also have no ambition to regard Southeast Asia as our special sphere of influence. Ambassador Alphand said that the French Government knows that U.S. actions in the area are not in any sense directed against France. To be sure, there had on occasions been some activities by certain U.S. services but the French Government knew that U.S. policy was not directed against France. By the same token, the French Government hoped that no one in the United States Government would consider that French policies were directed in any sense against U.S. interests. Ambassador Alphand said that the fact remained that while we had similar objectives, there were serious differences with regard to Southeast Asia about the ways and means to get there. The French Government believed that the best way to stabilize the area was to make certain that there was no outside intervention, neither from the Chinese nor from the U.S. Ambassador Alphand said that he recalled the Secretary's statement on July 1 that we would quickly be back in the area militarily in case the stability of the area were threatened. Ambassador Alphand said that it seemed that this statement indicated that we did regard Southeast Asia as our special sphere of influence. The Secretary said that this interpretation was not correct. We have a commitment to ensure the freedom and the security of the area. We felt the countries had a right to expect outside help in case their security was threatened. Ambassador Alphand asked who would decide whether there was a renewal of aggression. He noted that in the case of the Austrian State Treaty, there was no provision for a unilateral decision that an aggression had occurred. The Secretary said that we considered the current situation in Southeast Asia as an aggression. If Hungary were to put armed bands into Austria, we would have to do something about it. Ambassador Alphand reverted to the question who would define whether an aggression had occurred. The Secretary pointed out that we have jointly registered our interest in the security of Southeast Asia in SEATO. Ambassador Alphand, again reading from his notes, said that France agreed that the Chinese Communist regime had many bad qualities; on the other hand, the Chinese regime was aware of U.S. power and concerned about U.S. bases on the Asian mainland. The Secretary asked whether China understood why we were there. Ambassador Alphand said he felt certain that China did understand. The U.S. had said so directly. He assumed that we had also made the Chinese aware of our position in our direct discussions with them. He said in this situation the French Ambassador in Peiping could add little. Our statements would count far more heavily with the Chinese than anything the French might say. Ambassador Alphand then came to what appears to have been the gist of his instructions. He said that there should be an understanding between France and the U.S. not only on objectives in Southeast Asia but also on the means to get there. Without such an understanding, French possibilities to be of help would be limited. As the French saw it, we had various options. We could extend the war. In this case, France could not play a useful role. We could look for a negotiated settlement. In this case, France could be of help. Ambassador Alphand referred in this connection to General de Gaulle's recent statement to Mr. Ball/3/ that a vast negotiation, including China, the USSR, the UK, France and the U.S., would in itself help to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia by slowing down Communist military actions. A French démarche to Peiping would be useful only at a later stage when an understanding had been reached on the course which we would adopt. An earlier démarche would simply jeopardize the usefulness of a later French intervention. /3/See Document 202. The Secretary asked whether Peiping knew that France disapproved of Chinese and North Vietnamese actions in Southeast Asia. Ambassador Alphand said Peiping was aware that France was opposed to outside intervention in the area and that it wants an agreement with international guarantees. Ambassador Alphand said that Chen Yi had given a bad speech on the occasion of Bastille Day, a speech which had not pleased the French at all. Nevertheless, Ambassador Alphand thought that there was no doubt in Chinese Government circles about French disapproval of outside interference in the area. The Secretary asked Ambassador Alphand whether the French Government had given any indications as to the kind of agreement they expected to come out of such a conference. Ambassador Alphand said that he had nothing specific from Paris on this point but that the hope was that the Chinese will keep out of the area if the U.S. withdraws from Laos and Vietnam. The Secretary said that if that was what the Chinese desired, they could have it tomorrow if they themselves stopped interfering in the area. Ambassador Alphand said that the Chinese required guarantees. It was desirable that others also participated in extending these guarantees. The Secretary said that we had such an agreement in Laos and it had not worked. Ambassador Alphand said he had repeatedly discussed some of our earlier actions in Laos with the Secretary's predecessors. The Secretary said he was specifically referring to the situation after the 1962 agreement. We had taken 600 men out of Laos. The other side had not adhered to the agreement. Ambassador Alphand suggested that the situation in Laos had disintegrated because of the war in Vietnam. He said it was necessary to solve the problem of the entire area. An attempt to solve Laos alone would be fruitless. The Secretary said that on the contrary, a solution of the Laotian problem could facilitate a solution in Vietnam, relieve pressures on Sihanouk, and lead to a stabilization of the situation in Southeast Asia. The Secretary noted that the agreement on Laos was self-contained and not dependent on the situation in South Vietnam. Ambassador Alphand said that the Secretary was right juridically; he believed, however, that a solution had to be found for the problem of the entire area. The Secretary said it seemed to him the question was not so much a new agreement but performance on existing agreements. Ambassador Alphand recalled the Secretary's remark to him on July 1 that while the Soviets had come to realize that aggression would involve the most serious risks for them, the Chinese apparently had not as yet come to realize this. Ambassador Alphand said once a negotiated settlement had been reached, it ought to be possible to make the Chinese understand that any infraction of the agreement would create the most serious risks for them. The U.S. could bring into play its overwhelming power in Southeast Asia. The threat of a nuclear war would have a most sobering and deterrent effect on the Chinese. The Secretary said that the Asians, including even Chiang Kai-shek, were strongly opposed to the employment of nuclear weapons in Asia. He wondered to what extent the Chinese Communists really felt themselves threatened. For instance, did they really think that they are facing a threat from South Vietnam? Ambassador Alphand said he did not know, but he thought that the Chinese were aware of the power position of the United States. Ambassador Alphand said that under present circumstances, his government believed that it was better to await a later time for a French démarche in Peiping. The Secretary asked whether the French Government supported Souvanna Phouma. Ambassador Alphand said that the French Government considered him the Prime Minister of Laos but hoped that he would not allow himself to be integrated among the Right. There should be three factions in Laos. The Secretary said that he did not wish to go into this in detail at this time but that the three factions were not necessarily a permanent ingredient of the accord on Laos.
238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 20, 1964--9:33 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal, cleared by William Bundy, and initialed and approved by Rusk. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 91A. 192. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Realize you fully aware importance keeping General Khanh as far as possible on same track as ourselves regarding possible action against North. Khanh's speech of yesterday plus editorial in Bui Diem's paper suggests to us that GVN may be attempting stimulate pressure for U.S. involvement in such action./2/ /2/Telegram 201 from Saigon, July 24, summarized Khanh's speech of July 19 as a call for liberation of North Vietnam. This telegram also included a summary of press coverage of Khanh's "Day of Shame" rally marking the tenth anniversary of the 1954 Geneva Accords and calling for a "March to the North." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 VIET N-VIET S) You may wish to reiterate to Khanh importance of maintaining parallel position. Talk of this sort tends to distract GVN from first job of getting on with pacification. It also confuses our signals to the North and the rest of the world. If it should become necessary to take such action in response to significant escalation by Hanoi, we would want to be in position of responding to new aggression rather than appear to be carrying out previously planned and publicized offensive. Rusk
239. Memorandum From the Secretary of State 1s Special Assistant for Vietnam (Forrestal) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 22, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIV, Memos. Secret I attach a preliminary summary made here of the anticipated deployments of the additional military personnel requested by General Taylor for Vietnam. The picture is still incomplete, but I think you should note that approximately 1,600 U.S. officers and enlisted men will be assigned to the field, either with battalions or in district headquarters. This will probably mean that American servicemen will accompany more Vietnamese units into combat, increasing their exposure at the battalion level by some 40%. The presence of approximately five U.S. servicemen in each of the critical 45 districts will also have an appreciable effect on exposure, since their job would presumably be to accompany district military forces into combat with the Viet Cong. I think the issue we have to think about is whether it is better simply to let casualties increase over the next few months or whether we should anticipate the possibilities of such casualties by announcing in general terms that we are increasing our advisory presence in the field. My own inclination is still to do the latter, not by talking about specific numbers, but rather by indicating informally to the press that our civilian and military advisory effort is going to be increased as the situation demands and that the result of this will probably be more exposure of U.S. personnel. Mike Attachment/2/ Washington, July 21, 1964. /2/Secret. SUBJECT 1. The request for additional military support from Ambassador Taylor can be broken down into three main categories. These are: advisors and special forces in the field, logistic and combat support personnel, and items of equipment. A general breakdown of the above categories derived from incomplete information follows: A. Advisory Personnel in the Field (approximately 1600)
Bn/Dist Adv--700 personnel Battalion advisors will be increased from 3 per battalion to 5. A district advisory detachment will be assigned to each of 45 districts in the 8 critical provinces. The breakdown will average 5 US personnel per district. The duties of the personnel at district level and the exact number in each specific district has not been determined. The increase in the Special Forces contingent in Viet Nam will include a group headquarters. The Special Forces increase will allow for extension of the program on the border, increased guerrilla type operations and will provide for full A detachments at all Special Forces camps instead of 1/2 A detachments which are now in many Special Forces camps.
Navy Adv Group--73 personnel This increase will provide US Navy advisors with [to] greater number of Vietnamese naval craft
Navy Adv Group--8 personnel This increase will provide additional Marine advisors to Marine battalions in essentially the same number as additional Army advisors provided to Army battalions.
ALO/FAC--149 personnel This increase provides Air liaison officers and forward air controllers. B. Support Personnel (approximately 2100) The additional personnel fall into three categories: additions to MACV staff, additions to logistic support activities and additions to combat support activities. The bulk of the personnel will be provided to fly and maintain the aircraft of one Air Force C-123 squadron (16 aircraft), one Army Caribou company (16 aircraft) and 2 Army UH-1B helicopter companies (total 50 aircraft). The majority of these personnel will probably wind up in the Saigon-Tan Son Nhut area. C. Items of Equipment Major items of equipment required will be 16 USAF C-123 aircraft, and 106 Army aircraft to include 77 UH-1B and 16 CV-2B (Caribou) aircraft, 336 one-quarter ton trucks, 478 radios and medical equipment for a ten-bed field hospital. 2. In summary, the number of US advisors is nearly doubled at the lower echelon and the number of locations of US advisors at the end of communications and supply lines is nearly doubled. The increase of personnel at the lower level coupled with the increase in helicopter units will undoubtedly create a situation in which a great many more Americans will be exposed to hostile fire than are at present. MVF
240. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, July 22, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Rusk saw the memorandum. Copies were also sent to Harriman, William Bundy, Hughes, and Llewellyn Thompson. SUBJECT /2/Reference is to an attached CIA memorandum, OCI No. 2073/64, July 13, entitled "Dialogue on Southeast Asia," which concluded that China and North Vietnam were undoubtedly receiving U.S. messages that the United States considered the situation in Laos and South Vietnam very grave and that it held North Vietnam responsible for the deterioration. The paper also concluded that neither the Chinese nor North Vietnamese believed the United States meant what it said. 1. I thought you might be interested in a brief report on the discussion of Communist views of U.S. intentions in Southeast Asia which took place July 16 in the Thursday inter-agency Planning Group. 2. A substantial--but by no means unanimous--consensus seemed to be that the North Vietnamese believed we were seriously considering the possibility of eventual retaliation against Hanoi, but were not moved by this belief to abate the present level of violence in South Vietnam, and probably would not be so moved until some--but not necessarily all--of the following: (a) The US made concrete military preparations thus indicating that attack was a near-term possibility. (b) Those preparations extended to the contingency of ground, as well as air, attack on North Vietnam, since the Communists might be prepared to endure considerable bombing in order to get South Vietnam. (c) The US gave clear evidence that it was not going to be diverted, at the last moment, by French and other pressures for neutralization, since the Communists may set some store on these pressures as a likely brake on any US military action that may develop. (d) We indicated what specific actions the Communists would have to cease, if they were to dissuade us from attacking North Vietnam. 3. It was agreed that ChiCom and North Vietnamese perceptions might diverge, but there was no agreement as to the implications of this divergence. 4. This is by no means a complete report of the discussion, but I thought these highlights might be of interest. We have checked this memo for accuracy with the INR representative who was present at the meeting. The FE representative who was there is now on leave.
241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 24, 1964--7:51 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 VIET N-VIET S. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House on receipt in the Department of State. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 91B. 235. Saigon pass COMUSMACV. Refs: Saigon's 196, 203/2/ and related CAS messages./3/ /2/These telegrams from Saigon, July 24, described rumors in the capital that Khanh's position as Prime Minister was becoming "shaky." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6-3 VIET S and POL 15-1, respectively) /3/Apparent reference to CIA telegrams TDCS DB-315/00231-64 to DB-315/ 00236-64, all July 24. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIV; published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 94F-95D) Referenced messages have suggested to us following possible explanations for reported attitude Khanh and other members MRC: 1. Khanh may simply be expressing frustration felt by himself and other military, in view of recent military difficulties and consequent feeling war cannot be successfully prosecuted under present concept This mood may be transitory and could be assuaged by reaffirmation of our conviction that pacification program can be successful and must be vigorously pushed, which will be fortified by impending announcement of increase in U.S. military and civilian advisory assistance. 2. Khanh may be reacting against pressures from the neutralist-minded by pushing openly for strong action against the North. His retreat from this tactic may have led some of the military to doubt our continued support of Khanh personally. If you feel that there is indeed slightest doubt about our continued support for Khanh as Prime Minister, you should make every effort to remove these doubts. 3. Recent developments suggest we should watch closely as possible neutralist thinking in Vietnamese circles and specifically watch for any indications of DRV contacts with former junta generals, GVN officials or leading Vietnamese exiles. To avoid generating misinterpretation our interest it might be best alert British to pass us promptly whatever their assets can learn of any such developments. Rusk
242. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 25, 1964--4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 9-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared with William Bundy and McNaughton. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1979, 91D. 213. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtels 180, 184, 185, 186,/2/ 201;/3/ Deptel 235./4/ As our previous reports on the "march to the North" theme (in Vietnamese this phrase actually means "to the North" and does not have same connotation of movement on ground) have indicated Khanh appears to have launched deliberate campaign to associate US with policy of increased military pressure on North Viet-Nam. This decision was taken with full knowledge that GVN campaign would cause embarrassment to US. In our view following interrelated factors are involved in GVN attitude: /2/In these telegrams, all July 23, the Embassy reported that Khanh and other South Vietnamese officials were losing confidence in the pacification effort in South Vietnam and sought to solve the problem of the Viet Cong insurgency by attacking North Vietnam. Also reported was information which indicated Khanh hoped to use his "March to the North" campaign to incite the United States to take military action against the North. (Department of State, Central Files, all POL 15-1 VIET S, except 186 from Saigon, which is in DEF 9-3 VIET S) /3/See footnote 2, Document 238. /4/Document 241. 1) In Khanh's mind need for some dramatic move to raise morale and if possible to bring war effort in SVN to more decisive phase has existed for some time. In May Khanh outlined his rationale to Ambassador Lodge (Embtel 2108)/5/ in which he cited growing war weariness on part of Vietnamese people, slow pace of pacification efforts, continued high casualties sustained in indecisive military actions against Viet Cong, etc. He also raised at that time question as to whether he should make a declaration that state of war exists in SVN in order strengthen his hand in taking necessary measures to more effectively prosecute the war. Khanh also stressed with Secretary Rusk on May 31 that extension of war (for example to Laos or North Viet-Nam) would have effect of producing great national unity, would tend eliminate or postpone internal political quarrels, and would give morale boost to Vietnamese people. Although Khanh appeared recognize serious implications of escalation, it seems clear Khanh has remained personally convinced that something new must be injected in the situation. However, intervening events (such as Honolulu conference, departure of Ambassador Lodge, arrival of new US team in Saigon) have tended to push these thoughts into background. It is also possible that during his frequent meetings at Dalat his Generals have pressed him to take more dramatic action (General Kim frequently espoused similar ideas prior to Khanh's takeover). /5/Document 136. 2. While Khanh tends to lump many of above factors under general rubric of "war weariness" we are inclined to believe that war weariness applies more to leaders in Saigon than to population at large. Rather it is lack of demonstrable concrete progress and achievement and little prospect of things getting better in short term which present naggings doubts. This is particularly so when Khanh sees few people solidly behind him for long pull. These problems weigh heavily on Khanh and his young military colleagues who would probably like to sweep them away with bold military gesture against source of the frustration in North. 3. Khanh is concerned over morale and divisions within military, particularly since he is convinced that military is only real solid instrument in SVN capable of exercising power and directing affairs of state at present time. There are numerous recent reports that Khanh is unable to exert full control over Generals. He told me yesterday that he is currently under pressure from two groups of Generals and as man in middle is being pulled in two directions. Further he can foresee a division existing among general officers permeating down through officer ranks with its potential adverse effects on morale. Further, he is undoubtedly aware, even if only in general terms, of various moves afoot to unseat him and replace him with one or another combination of Generals (FVS 10550, 10551, 10552)./6/ To close these rifts, he may be tempted to try old gambit of turning on a foreign enemy. /6/See footnote 3, Document 241. 4. On civilian side he has been unable to achieve. any real unity of purpose and action among his official family. He is surely conscious of daily sniping at quality of his performance by his Ministers with three Vice Premiers leading pack. While he can take considerable pride in manner with which he has managed numerous problems on civilian front, particularly religious, labor, student activities, he probably realizes that resolution of these problems was based in large measure on forbearance of groups concerned. 5. Politicians whom he considers in any case as contributing little to national effort, are able to exploit any divisions of loyalty within military ranks by playing one group off against another. Press situation permits irresponsible criticism of government with politicians able to make full and often misguided use of press freedom. 6. Recent spate of Viet Cong attacks of battalion and company strength with continued heavy government casualties, difficulty of recruiting sufficient personnel to bring regular forces to authorized strength, undiminished Viet Cong activity and capability must also be disturbing factors. While Khanh is probably convinced that with US support and assistance to GVN Viet Cong cannot take over substantial part of country, prospect for future is still one of painfully slow advances through long years ahead. 7. Developments on international scene have also influenced GVN attitudes. Goldwater's nomination has led many (Embtel 201) to believe that now was opportune moment to apply pressure on US to expand area of conflict. Sino-Soviet split, split between US and French policy toward SEA and de Gaulle's most recent anti-US stance and heavy pressure for neutral solution, US Presidential elections probably all contribute to conclusion on part Khanh and his colleagues that now is opportune time to launch campaign. 8. Influenced by these factors Khanh may have any of three courses of action in mind: a. He may talk "march North" merely to whip up such public enthusiasm as is possible. Conceivably, this might aid recruiting and facilitate putting country more nearly on war footing. He could continue to explain his action privately to us as being necessary to public morale b. He can talk "march North" but really have in mind getting us committed to program of reprisal bombing. Such a limited program could be first step to further escalation against Hanoi. c. He could talk "march North" and literally mean to initiate military actions to reunify country as soon as he felt he has us inextricably involved beyond point of possible detachment. If Khanh has been reasonably sincere in his statements to me his present objective would appear to be b. above. He knows full well he cannot "march North" on ground with his present resources. He does have air capability to put on fairly good show against NVN if US wild keep ChiCom air out of picture. This is course I believe he wants to follow although thus far he has never indicated exactly when he wants to initiate this new line BN action. In sum, Khanh, after nearly six months in office, seems to have reached conclusion that frustrating and ineffective instruments of government at his command are not adequate to master Viet Cong by counterinsurgency means alone. He and his colleagues seem to have decided that they can bring about cessation of Viet Cong harassment only by bringing direct pressure to bear on North. If they are unsuccessful in getting US more directly involved, it is difficult to judge at this stage how strong pressures would become within GVN to seek a negotiated solution. However, there are signs that this possibility cannot be excluded [document number not declassified] (General Lam and aide departed Saigon on July 23 with a ticket to Hong Kong, ultimate destination unknown. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] We are unable to judge how far Khanh and his associates have thought this "march North" through in terms of ultimate consequences, and in terms of solution other than unconditional surrender by Hanoi; but we must assume that they have discussed this in their own councils. Our recommendation on how to approach this knotty problem with Khanh follows by septel./7/ /7/Document 243. Taylor
243. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 25, 1964--5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 VIET N-VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 8:10 a.m. and passed to the White House. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 111, pp. 512-513. 214. The GVN public campaign for "marching North" (reported Embtel 201)/2/ may take several courses. In the face of U.S. coolness and absence of evidence of real grass roots support outside certain military quarters, it may die down for a while although it is hardly likely to disappear completely. On the other hand, the proponents of a "quick solution" may be able to keep it alive indefinitely as an active issue, in which case it is likely to foment an increasing amount of dissatisfaction with the U.S. (assuming that we continue to give it no support) to the serious detriment of our working relations with the GVN and hence of the ultimate chances of success of the in-country pacification program. In such a case, Vietnamese leaders in and out of government, unable to find a vent to their frustration in "marching North" may seek other panaceas in various forms of negotiation formulas. General Khanh may find in the situation an excuse or a requirement to resign. /2/See footnote 2. Document 238. Finally, this "march North" fever can get out of hand in an act of rashness-one maverick pilot taking off for Hanoi with a load of bombs-which could touch off an extension of hostilities at a time and in a form most disadvantageous to U.S. interests. Faced with these unattractive possibilities, we propose a course of action designed to do several things. We would try to avoid head-on collision with the GVN which unqualified U.S. opposition to the "march North" campaign would entail. We would do this by expressing a willingness to engage in joint contingency planning for various forms of extended action against NVN. Such planning would not only provide an outlet for the martial head of steam now dangerously compressed but would force the Generals to look at the hard facts of life which lie behind the neon lights of the "march North" slogans. This planning would also gain time badly needed to stabilize this government and could provide a useful basis for military action if adjudged in our interest at some future time. Finally, it would also afford us an opportunity, for the first time, to have a frank discussion with GVN leaders concerning the political objectives which they would envisage as the purposes inherent in military action against the DRV. We do not really know whether they feel that Viet-Nam can indeed be unified by military action, or whether such action is intended only to introduce a pressure which would be equivalent to Viet Cong terror in order to induce DRV to desist from aiding VC and to improve bargaining opportunities for a political negotiation with Hanoi. It would be important, however, in initiating such a line of action that we make a clear record that we are not assuming any commitment to implement such plans. Therefore, I would recommend that I be authorized to give General Khanh the following written statement: "The United States Government has noted recent public statements by various leaders of the Republic of Viet-Nam proposing military action against the sources of aggression in North Viet-Nam. The reasons which have prompted these statements are clear and the impatience of the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam in the face of continuing subversive warfare from the North is understandable. "In considering ways and means to bring the Viet Cong insurgency under control, authorities in Washington have given serious study over a considerable period to the question of bringing military pressure to bear on the leaders of North Viet-Nam. It has been their conclusion that this is a complex problem involving judgments and decisions in both the political and military fields which neither the United States nor Viet-Nam could take independently. The current activity of the United States Government consists in the provision of massive assistance to your government in the extension of its [garble] approved pacification programs in South Viet-Nam. The question of extending this assistance by the United States Government to a program of action outside the territorial limits of South Viet-Nam has not been seriously discussed up to now, but it is my belief that the time has come for giving the matter a thorough analysis. "In the view of the United States Government, the best method of producing such an analysis would be in the form of a joint contingency planning study, undertaken by appropriate representatives of our two governments, without advance commitments by either side as to subsequent actions. If the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam agrees, the Government of the United States has authorized me to appoint representatives who would be able to meet, under conditions of maximum discretion and security, with representatives of the Republic of Viet-Nam to undertake such discussions." It is my opinion that such discussions, if initiated with responsible Vietnamese officials, would not only develop some of the fundamental political thinking which is currently motivating the Vietnamese leadership, but would also reveal the need for the completion of a number of preliminary actions which should be taken before serious consideration can be given to expanding the war. Such actions should include the absorption of the new A1H aircraft by November 1, the filling of the ranks of understrength ARVN units, air defense measures for urban centers and the establishment of a greater degree of control over the VC than now exists in order to secure the rear and flanks of fighting forces. It would be most helpful if approval for the above statement can be received to permit its use at my next meeting with Khanh scheduled for 1600, 27 July (Saigon time). Taylor
244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 25, 1964--4:18 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority, Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and cleared by Forrestal and Harriman. 245. As part of the problem of making clear our full support for Khanh, we have been concerned that he may have the feeling that USG in past has been pressuring him to maintain Minh's position and go easy with Dalat generals. While we have always felt that Minh's position could be useful in enlisting public support, we believe this aspect may now be secondary to crucial need reinforce Khanh's position in every possible way. Accordingly, you may in your discretion sound Khanh out whether he wishes us dissociate ourselves further from Minh and whether he needs our support in taking tough line against Dalat or other generals. Rusk
245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 25, 1964--4:56 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and cleared by Forrestal, Manning, McGeorge Bundy, and Ball. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 91C. 253. State-Defense message. Ref: Embtels 213, 214,/2/ 215./3/ /2/Documents 242 and 243. /3/In telegram 215, July 25, Taylor requested permission to allow Khanh to make a formal announcement that the United States was increasing its troop levels in Vietnam. Taylor would follow the announcement with a background press briefing. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 1. Analysis your 213 most helpful and persuasive. We note particularly your judgment that sense of frustration and desire for some action particularly strong among generals but perhaps not widespread in people as a whole. 2. Proposal your 215 for announcement personnel increase fully approved. Please let us know soonest what you propose to say in backgrounder so that we can keep backgrounding here fully in tune. As stated our 235,/4/ we do not propose announcement here. /4/Document 241. 3. Re proposal your 214, our objective should be to provide channel for frustrations of Khanh and generals without committing USG to action and with minimum risk of disruptive leaks that might add to picture of US/GVN disagreement, cause wrong signal to Hanoi and Peking, and above all impair our freedom of action and public policy posture. We have impression that Khanh's meetings in Dalat will have been concerned with the pressures he is under from Khiem on the one hand and with reference to Minh's position on the other. Thus, you should first draw him out on results Dalat meetings and on his present position and state of mind. If this part of conversation confirms analysis your 213 and 214 that major pressures and frustrations do exist and that it essential to Khanh's position and our relationship with him to go forward, you are authorized to make following points: a. USG has of course made careful study of problems involved in action against DRV and believes it would be useful pursue this subject in more concrete manner in small and select joint group. b. Vital that such discussions be conducted so that they do not leak in any way. Military security alone dictates this, but you should also emphasize to Khanh that leaks can only lead to same problems of clarifying statements and apparent disunity that we have already had in last week, and that these will if anything make it more difficult USG pursue additional courses of action if and when these become necessary. c. Accordingly, Khanh for such discussions should bring in only very few most needed and trusted GVN officers chosen personally by him for their loyalty and security. d. While we do not believe you should table any written statement or terms of reference as proposed your 214, you should make these points orally and particularly underscore that USG assuming no commitment to carry out such plans. 4. FYI: We concur completely that resulting discussions should highlight need for completing preliminary actions, which may take some time to accomplish. You should be prepared to stress particularly such concrete items as the need for additional A1H aircraft and trained pilots, and Khanh himself may suggest importance air defense measures. However, arguments of under-strength ARVN units and need for greater degree of control over VC may encounter response that these aspects are not going to get any better. Hence importance of stress on military essentials for attack itself. End FYI. 5. JCS considering urgently what additional external measures might be taken, short of attack on DRV itself, that would provide maximum military benefit with minimum risks of escalation or international complications. Request your judgment as to actions you would recommend under this heading. If you think it useful, you could tell Khanh Monday/5/ that you have asked your government to consider such actions and that these could be discussed in same group. Khanh's reaction might produce some suggestion this area that would help to meet basic problem of channel for frustrations. /5/July 27. 6. We remain deeply concerned that even with these restrictions and caveats Khanh's position and attitudes of key generals now such that he or they will feel strong temptation publicize existence such planning exercise perhaps in some tendentious form and with implication USG committed at least in some degree. Our line here in such case would be that USG has not changed policy but has repeatedly made it clear that wider action not excluded. Hence natural that US and GVN should be giving careful study this subject, and such contingency discussions have been underway long period. Rusk
246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 25, 1964--5:41 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Forrestal, Poats, and Montgomery and cleared by William Bundy. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 297A. 254. Joint State-AID message. At highest level meeting today,/2/ concern was expressed that despite many desirable AID contributions to economic and social progress in rural areas, the pacification effort is not offering the Vietnamese peasant a sharply contrasting alternative between life under the VC and a clearly better deal with the GVN. It was proposed that US undertake with GVN a dramatic and intensive social and economic effort on a single project or area which would highlight as quickly and effectively as possible the opportunity for progress after pacification. This objective also could be furthered through more discriminating provision of benefits of present nationwide AID programs, with denial of benefits to disloyal or VC-dominated villages. /2/The following persons met with the President at the White House from 11:34 a.m. to 12:29 p.m. on July 25: McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, William Bundy, Forrestal, Wheeler, McNaughton, Colby, and Harriman. The meeting was off the record. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) At this meeting, Wheeler was asked to prepare a list of possible military courses of action designed to support the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam and relieve the current frustration of South Vietnamese leaders. Highest authority has asked for Country Team's most imaginative thoughts on what might be done toward this objective. US would be prepared to make an all-out effort to produce rapid and visible impact on popular psychology. Possibilities which initially occur to us for CT consideration include: A. Area projects such as irrigation works and related agricultural production and processing development in the Phan Rang valley. Understand Japanese completing feasibility study of irrigation system using runoff from Da Nhim dam which might irrigate 20,000 hectares. This water presently going to waste, it would seem. Suggest consideration of creation of joint GVN-US body functioning somewhat like JCRR in Taiwan for overall accelerated development of area. Joint body would have assured commitment of US and GVN funds and special authorities to establish or improve cooperatives, assure equitable land distribution, draw on GVN and AID agricultural and industrial development assistance. Suggest this area may be small enough to serve as manageable model and large enough to have important demonstration effect. It is relatively pacified and defensible. Success there could lead to similar area projects elsewhere on chronically dry central coast. B. Nationwide programs: 1. The intensive village water wells and cisterns program now being launched, might be announced with numerical targets and with emphasis on provision of potable water to cleared and loyal villages and hamlets. Plans for future CI fertilizer distributions restricted to a discriminatory award and punishment approach might be announced. 2. Full scale windmill irrigation program, based upon recent experiments, might be announced, as grant assistance to established or new cooperatives and confined to secured hamlets. 3. While recognizing complexities of the problem, we continue to believe a bolder GVN approach to land reform and rural debt-waiver would strike a telling blow at VC, particularly if restricted to cleared and cooperative villages. If payments to land owners and creditors could be made in form of equity shares in productive enterprise rather than cash, benefits would be multiplied. Imaginative CT action in this field welcome. Emphasize foregoing are informal ideas to add to CT's consideration. Further suggestions may be offered later. Rusk
247. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Secretary of State/1/ INR-27 Washington, July 25, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam, INR Studies, 1964-1965. Secret. SUBJECT Although little official response has so far emerged to President Charles deGaulle's proposal for an international conference to neutralize the Indo-China peninsula, the recent actions of relevant governments support the following speculation concerning their likely reaction. Abstract DeGaulle's July 23rd press conference went beyond his earlier proposals for international neutralization of the Indo-China peninsula chiefly in detail./2/ Noteworthy was his proposal that four powers, France, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, agree "no longer to be committed there." In addition to his earlier rationale, deGaulle may have been prompted to this move by a sense of increased risk that hostilities would escalate, on the one hand, and a feeling of greater Communist receptivity to his proposals, on the other hand. Asian Communist reaction is likely to be more favorable than to his January statements, as indicated by statements from representatives of Hanoi and the Viet Cong. Peiping's attitude remains ambiguous but the regime appears to have taken some steps, especially in the diplomatic sphere, to anticipate this proposal. Soviet reaction is likely to be favorable, if only to keep the proposal alive. Pakistan's increasing support for Communist China's position on Southeast Asia may foreshadow explicit support for deGaulle's policy, thereby effectively shattering the SEATO front. In Saigon, the official reaction will certainly be negative but the proposal will further promote destabilizing factors and undermine morale. /2/For text of de Gaulle's statement at the press conference, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 977-978. [Here follows the text of the five-page paper.]
248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos/1/ Washington, July 26, 1964--6:21 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by McNaughton, cleared in draft with Wheeler and William Bundy, and initialed and approved by Forrestal. Repeated to Saigon. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 111, p. 514. 89. Vientiane for Ambassador Unger. Saigon for Ambassador Taylor for information only. No other distribution whatsoever. 1. Primarily for reasons of morale in South Viet-Nam and to divert GVN attention from proposal to strike North Viet-Nam, we are considering proposing to Ambassador Taylor that he discuss with Khanh air attacks on VC supply lines in the Laotian Panhandle. For meeting of Secretaries, request by 0600 our time Monday your views on such operations, your estimate of reaction of Souvanna and other Lao leaders, and your advice as to best way to obtain Souvanna's acquiescence. 2. Our preliminary views as to possible air attacks are as follows: a. The military objective would be to interdict and destroy facilities supporting infiltration into SVN. (It is possible that the political objective might be achieved by fewer targets and/or sorties than indicated below.) b. Initial targets, which would be programmed for moderate to severe damage, would probably be Muong Phine army barracks (12 sorties), Ban Thay military camp and 4 AAA gun emplacements (18 sorties), Ban Na Nhom military camp (12 sorties), Tchepone army barracks (68 sorties), Muong Nong military area (10 sorties), and Ban Trim barracks and supply area (34 sorties). Also considering Mu Gia border control point just inside North Viet-Nam (14 sorties). At same time, attacks of opportunity would be carried out on lines of communication by armed reconnaissance. c. Aircraft would be either A1H with only GVN pilots, or A1H plus A1E with American instructors also aboard in case of AIEs. Our present thinking does not include use of Lao T-28s. d. Armament would be napalm unless politically unacceptable, in which case armament would be less effective conventional bombs, rockets and 20 mm. e. Estimate that attacks could begin in early August and could, without serious degradation of air support for pacification in SVN, be carried out at rate of 20 sorties a day. Our proposal, however, may be that strikes be conducted on intermittent basis at a slower rate than indicated depending on political requirements. f. Estimated aircraft losses at less than two per cent in early stages, meaning that some planes will probably be downed in Laos during attacks on initial targets. g. We may recommend certain readiness measures in Laos and Thailand to cope with possible communist reaction or escalation (e.g., PL moves on Panhandle towns or even toward Mekong). h. It is assumed that attacks would promptly become known and responsibility would be acknowledged by GVN, that if US instructors are on board, US would acknowledge this fact; that operation would be justified on grounds of infiltration of personnel and supplies through corridor in violation of Geneva Accords; and that we would publicize relevant evidence from photography and POW interrogation. We would hope Souvanna would publicly support such a rationale but at minimum would do or say nothing to undermine it. 3. As you know, joint US-GVN planning is underway not only for air attacks but also for ground operations up to battalion size in Panhandle. We may be querying you shortly for your reactions regarding such ground operations. Rusk
249. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 27, 1964--10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash. Repeated to CINCPAC, the White House, and McNamara. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this cable to the President under cover of a memorandum, July 27, which reads as follows: "We have just received this report of Max Taylor's interview today with Khanh. Underneath is the outgoing which went to him after our Saturday meeting. The tickers are beginning to carry Khanh's announcement of U.S. reinforcement, and for the moment Khanh's positron seems somewhat strengthened. Nevertheless, the first paragraph of Taylor's message shows that the underlying problem of Khanh's mood persists." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File. Vol. XIV; regarding the Saturday meeting, see Document 246) Bundy added the following handwritten end note: "We will discuss this general problem again on Tuesday at lunch." 232. Deptel 253./2/ Alex Johnson and I called on Khanh at Dalat at 1500, 27 July and discussed alone with him a wide range of topics. We were uncertain in what mood we would find him as we had reliable information that the previous day he had been grumbling about the uncertainties of US policy and his unwillingness to adjust himself to a puppet role. /2/Document 245. On arriving we asked him about his day and a half of conferences which he was having with his senior Generals. The question elicited no immediate response other than that numerous subjects had been discussed. Some of the subjects came out in the subsequent discussion reported elsewhere in this message. I opened the matter of a press release by him covering the US military personnel increase. He saw at once the advantage of his putting out such a release and accepted our text with one modification. He preferred to change reference to "advisors at the district level" to "advisors throughout the provinces" saying that the mention of the district suggested an undesirably deep US advisor penetration of the government structure. It was agreed that we would take the statement back to Saigon where we would be met by one of Khanh's officers who would arrange for the immediate release. He understands the necessity to avoid public statements of ultimate end strengths and agrees to conform to our request for secrecy on this subject. There was a short discussion of press leaks generated by the quick appearance in the press on July 23 of our joint conference arising from General Ky's statement on penetrations of North Viet-Nam./3/ Mr. Johnson told him that a Saigon US pressman had said that the leak was from the Vietnamese side. We agreed that, whoever the culprit, the incident is a reminder that there are unfriendly elements here and elsewhere anxious to drive a wedge between our two governments in general and between Khanh and Taylor in particular. We all agreed to be watchful in the future. Khanh made a note to investigate leak. /3/On July 23, Ky told news reporters that South Vietnamese planes had airdropped combat troops into North Vietnam for sabotage operations. (Telegram 172 from Saigon, July 22; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Khanh said press stories on alleged US correspondence with Peking through Ayub had been raised at Cabinet meeting. We replied that this is just type thing that hostile elements will use to create suspicion and distrust between us. Facts were exactly opposite from those in press stories. Facts were that we had asked certain countries having relations with Peking, particularly SEATO countries, to make clear to Peking (and where possible to Hanoi) that our commitment to SVN was firm, they should not make mistake of thinking we [would?] abandon SVN under any circumstances and it would be dangerous for Peking and Hanoi to make any assumption to contrary. Ayub had apparently made same representations to Peking and had a reply./4/ This was far different from us entering into negotiations with Peking thru Pakistan. We had not and would not negotiate over SVN behind back GVN. It was essential Khanh be absolutely clear on this. We would expect the same from him. He expressed understanding and said we must appreciate Vietnamese sensitivities on this after their experience with French. He mentioned there were even rumors that because of Johnson's previous background of negotiation with ChiComs, he had somehow been sent here to negotiate. Johnson replied that his previous experience of negotiating with ChiComs was just reason that he personally had no desire repeat experience. /4/The representations made by Mohammed Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, to the People's Republic of China in May concerned primarily the withdrawal of Pathet Lao troops from the Plain of Jars. We then invited Khanh to speak frankly about his views on US policy toward Vietnam-was he as unhappy about it as reported? He answered indirectly by explaining his views about the need for pressure on the North. He again spoke strongly about national warweariness and the need to bring hostilities to a prompt end. Once more it came out clearly that he is thinking about reprisal tit-for-tat bombing rather than a movement North with land forces or massive bombing to effect total destruction of Hanoi and all its works. He wants to do this reprisal bombing to encourage his people and to hasten Ho Chi Minh to conclude that the support of the VC should end. He recognizes that at some time he will need the cooperation of Ho Chi Minh to end the Viet Cong activities in the South. This discussion opened the way for me to comment along the lines of Deptel 253. I observed that we have never had joint discussions up to now as to the forms of action that might be considered against the Laos Panhandle and NVN and the problems which might arise therefrom. The keen interest he is displaying in the subject suggests that it may be timely now to start a joint study or studies of possible initiatives which might be considered. He did not jump at the proposal which plainly caught him unprepared but was pleased to receive it and asked to think it over for a few days. I stressed the need for any such planning to be kept within a very small group and he agreed at once. He mentioned himself, Khiem and Thieu (plus possibly a civilian) as the probable participants, at least at the outset. It was left that he would indicate to me when he wants to resume the discussion. Among miscellaneous matters touched on were the following: a) Our intention to have a MACV J-2 background briefing to acquaint press with latest estimate of increased VC strength. b) My intention to visit IV Corps on July 29. c) The recent outbreak of indiscipline in the Special Forces camp at Nha Trang and need to change the commanding officer. At the end, Khanh again raised question of reorganization of government a la de Gaulle-Pompidou. He had no answer as to who could be civilian Pompidou. We replied that organization was secondary to personalities and most of what he had in mind could be accomplished in present organizational structure by giving more responsibility to vice ministers. Question was his having ministers in whom he had confidence. We also said changes that seemed to be far-reaching could have demoralizing effect domestically and disturbing effect abroad. He agreed but did not seem to abandon idea. From discussion it appeared some way of disposing of Minh may be principal motivating force as well as Khanh's desire avoid present burden of detail and responsibility. Khanh also said they would shortly be ready with a decree declaring a national "state of emergency". This would give them greater power to deal with a number of problems such as press, travel, etc. We urged there be good explanation and rationale to foreign and domestic press at time of issuance to avoid charges of dictatorship, etc. He agreed and said would consult with us before taking action. During course of discussion he said he had given up project of declaring "state of war" (see Embtel 184)/5/ as he recognized could not have this without "declaring war against someone". /5/See footnote 2. Document 242. When we went to leave, Khanh seemed to be in very good spirits saying that his morale had received a lift from our discussion. Taylor
250. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State/1/ Vientiane, July 27, 1964--5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon. Passed to the White House, Department of Defense, and CIA on receipt in the Department of State. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 111, pp. 515-517. 170. Deptel 89./2/ Saigon for Ambassador Taylor. No other distribution whatsoever. Air attacks on Viet Cong supply lines in Laotian Panhandle, while helping morale South Vietnam and diverting government there from its proposals to strike North Vietnam, would have only marginal effect on problem of infiltration via Laos and would greatly complicate Laotian situation which already threatens get out of hand as result Soviet threat withdraw from co-chairman role. /2/Document 248. When various cross-border actions proposed earlier, also including air strikes, I pointed out fundamental attitude of Souvanna, which generally shared by Lao, that use of corridor, even though involving Lao territory, not primarily their problem, and anyway they have their hands full trying to protect heart of their country for defense of which corridor not essential. Our creating new military as well as international political conflict over corridor will be regarded by them as another instance Laos being involuntarily involved in struggle among big powers on matter outside Laos' own prime interests. There is also Souvanna's view (no doubt nurtured by French) that GVN is fighting a hopeless war. Souvanna Phouma and other Lao leaders want help in immediate present to assure they can continue in secure possession of present territory of free Laos. If any new military initiatives are contemplated with attendant risk of escalation they would wish above all that they be directed at retaking Plaine des Jarres. More immediately they want maximum effort be made to cut Route 7 and they also wish be assured of fullest support for Muong Soui if again actively threatened, to say nothing of protection of routes toward Mekong if Muong Soui falls. Likely reaction to proposals for air attacks in corridor would be: Why complicate our problem and risk creating dangerous military threat in central and southern areas where it does not now exist; why does not US apply its power to source of problem and bomb Hanoi or move effectively in some other way against North Vietnam? North Vietnam is cause of trouble and ought to be target; moreover we are not bound by international agreements there as we are in Laos. Department will recall this line of thinking has been pressed by King and Souvanna Phouma and is undoubtedly view even more strongly held by right-wing leaders. In this connection, wish point out with respect pare g reftel that there are virtually no uncommitted Lao resources to deal with whatever PL/VM reaction may be. Energies and staff capacity as well as troops and planes are tied down in Operation Triangle and literally only reserve in country is two DNC pare battalions which for political reasons unlikely leave Vientiane. Therefore "preparedness measures in Laos" would have to be taken by US. Thus if we proceed with projected action Panhandle we must be prepared also to meet any responsible Lao request for help in defending what they regard as heart of their country. If we hesitate under such circumstances Souvanna's occasional dissatisfaction with what he has regarded as foot dragging by us will be greatly accentuated and arguments on our part that certain actions should be avoided because of international complications or risks of escalation will not carry much weight. Nothing could illustrate point better than question napalm, which being proposed for use in corridor operation at same time I am obliged turn down request from Souvanna to use it in area he considers vital for defense his country. In view foregoing I believe proposed action would probably bring to an end possibility our preserving even facade of government national union under Souvanna and Geneva Accords, keeping open possible road back to peaceful solution and avoiding resumption full-scale civil war. There certainly has been no sign from Pathet Lao, DRV or ChiComs of any change in their attitude to encourage us to believe they are ready to start living by Geneva Accords and end their interference in Laos. Nevertheless it has been our hope that our recent assumption of stiffer political posture and careful application of stronger military measures would at least bring nibbling to an end. However, as result initiatives in corridor we may find ourselves turned entirely away from guiding principles of last two years under which we have accepted uneasy equilibrium of de facto division of Laos as best we could get for present and better than resumption large-scale fighting. Following strikes in Panhandle we might even find ourselves being pressed hard into a major military effort aimed at pushing North Vietnamese out of Panhandle (when it becomes clear air attacks do not halt infiltration) and eventually entirely out of Laos and reestablishing authority of RLG throughout country. I realize proposed action envisages employment primarily GVN personnel but from international point of view we must be prepared accept full responsibility. Action will also solidly link questions Laos and South Vietnam which at earlier date we appeared to be intent on keeping separate as possible, at least in context any international discussion. From here it is difficult to see what all international repercussions of projected Panhandle action might be but I can foresee serious complications with British and Canadians, on whom we depend for cochairman and ICC help. They may well ask us to demonstrate that the installations to be hit have some important connection with infiltration problem and that strikes will appreciably improve situation South Vietnam. On other hand they will be most apprehensive about dangers of escalation as well as major complications in handling international aspects of problem as illustrated by Soviet note just received. Souvanna's acquiescence in proposed action [may?] not be enough. If we proceed he will undoubtedly be besieged by press and posture of PriMin of Laos can hardly be acquiescence in other countries' taking action on his territory. If we are to make effort to bring him along, his position would have to be fortified in advance by buildup of public evidence of use of corridor and its aggravation of problem in SVN. Public indications that corridor problem really much less than represented (for example see July 26 Wireless File story by Robert Brunn, C S Monitor) must also be overcome. Against this background we might try sell Souvanna on line that action against corridor is fundamental to resolving what is basic cause of Laos' present plight, namely war in South Vietnam. In other words, block corridor so that GVN can again resume full authority over its territory at which point DRV can make no further use of corridor. Unless Souvanna can be persuaded action in Panhandle really serves his cause more than it endangers it, his support will be very hard to secure. Even if support is squeezed out (perhaps only as result of right wing pressure), his remaining on the job becomes problematical. Specific comments follow: (1) Delete Muong Phine from target list pare 2b because of probable presence there of C-46 survivors. (2) Foregoing reservations do not apply to Mu Gia control point or other points inside North Vietnam. (3) Attacks of opportunity on convoys (if related to recce flights) and responsive strikes to ground fire would be less objectionable than proposed action, and this would be even truer of T-28 strikes. In summary, I believe it would be exceptionally difficult to persuade Souvanna Phouma to approve stepped up military actions in Panhandle without triggering virtually irresistible pressures for similar escalation in this part of Laos, involving increased commitments here of sort we have thus for shied away from. Perhaps we can successfully withstand these pressures, but more likely outcome, in my judgment, would be heightened political instability and a situation in which we might well lose Souvanna and the international recognition his government commands, ending up with albatross around our neck in form of rightist regime lacking in international support and able to survive internal and external pressures only with our outright military support. Unger
251. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 27, 1964--6 |