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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
VIII. U.S. Reaction To Events in the Gulf of Tonkin, August 1-10 At 3:40 a.m. EDT (3:40 p.m. Saigon time), August 2, the destroyer Maddox, on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, reported that it was "being approached by high speed craft with apparent intention of torpedo attack. Intend open fire in necessary self defense." (Message 020740Z to Commander Seventh Fleet; Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto Patrols, August) Twenty-seven minutes later, the Maddox reported that it was being attacked by three North Vietnamese patrol craft and had opened fire. (Message 020807Z to Commander Seventh Fleet; ibid.) In the ensuing engagement, the Maddox and aircraft from the U.S.S. Ticonderoga damaged two of the patrol craft which retreated to the North, and left one dead in the water. Reports on the incident reached Washington shortly after 4 a.m.
256. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 2, 1964--9 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto Patrols, August. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 8:46 a.m. 281. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref Maddox incident, most important that we be authorized to give facts to GVN before Hanoi breaks story and falsified version is disseminated. Request official version to be used and, when determined, what action USG expects to take. Please indicate how much of this latter information can be passed to GVN. As you are aware, operational radio traffic relating to this incident was in clear. Taylor
257. Memorandum From the Duty Officer in the White House Situation Room to the President/1/ Washington, August 2, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Operation Pierce Arrow. No classification marking. Printed in part in Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 112. The President recalled that this memorandum was sent to him in his bedroom. Since his Daily Diary shows breakfast at 9 a.m., he must have received it before that time. Mr. President: 1. Early this morning the USS Maddox was attacked by three DRV PT boats while on patrol approximately 30 miles off the North Vietnamese coast in the Gulf of Tonkin. 2. The Captain of the Maddox returned the fire with 5-inch guns and requested air support from the carrier Ticonderoga on station nearby in connection with reconnaissance flights in that area. 3. Ticonderoga jets arrived shortly and made strafing attacks on the PT boats resulting in one enemy boat dead in the water, two others damaged and turned tail for home. 4. The Maddox reports no personnel or material damages. 5. Messrs. Rusk and McNamara have been informed of the incident and present plans are to release a press statement later today either from Washington or Saigon./2/ /2/For text of the statement, released at 10:15 a.m., see Goulden, Truth, p. 23. 6. Additional details on the Maddox encounter will be available later today.
258. Editorial Note At 11:30 a.m. on August 2, the President met at the White House with Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, General Wheeler, and intelligence experts to discuss the Tonkin Gulf incident. Johnson Library, Johnson Daily Diary) The meeting lasted approximately 45 minutes and the President wrote that they studied the latest reports and considered a U.S. response. After concluding that a local North Vietnamese shore commander or a shore station had taken the initiative, the participants decided not to retaliate. They did, however, agree to dispatch a protest note to North Vietnam and to order a continuation of the patrol. (Johnson, Vantage Point, page 113) No other record of this meeting has been found. The meeting is described as taking place "c. 10:30" in Rusk's appointment book.
259. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Washington, August 2, 1964--12:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Maddox Incident. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to MACV, Saigon, the White House, CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, among others. 7680. This is a DeSoto Patrol message. Reference: A. CINCPACFLT DTG 021104Z (NOTAL). B. ADMINO CINCPAC DTG 021255Z (NOTAL)./2/ /2/Reference A stated that it was in the best interest of the United States to assert the freedom of the seas and resume Gulf of Tonkin patrols at the earliest. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto Patrols, August; printed in Goulden, Truth, p. 137) Reference B concurred in these proposals. (Washington National Records Center. RG 219, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11885) 1. You are authorized to continue the DeSoto patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin area in conformance with routes and times specified in reference A, subject to the following: a. Closest approach to the NVN mainland coastline will be 11 miles, repeat 11 miles. b. Air patrol CAP will be provided during daylight hours, however, CAP will be maintained to the seaward of the two destroyers so as to preclude any possibility of overflight of NVN. c. Be extremely watchful for any possible action including possible submarine activity either against the DeSoto patrol or the Ticonderoga task force. d. Avoid close approaches to NVN coast during period when maritime activities related to OPLAN 34A are underway.
260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, August 2, 1964--1:41 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 US-VIET N. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by William McAfee (INR) and cleared with Green, Hughes, and the Department of Defense. 328. Embtel 281./2/ Maddox was engaged in fleet patrol similar to patrols conducted routine basis various parts of world. Ships engaged such activities operate in international waters. For instance ship engaged in patrol along coast Communist China normally remains 15 NM from coast in view Chicom claim 12 mile limit. Observing claimed limits does not indicate recognition of claim. Firing by DRV patrol craft took place in international waters over 20 NM from coast of North Vietnam. Similar destroyer patrol was conducted February-March in Gulf of Tonkin by destroyer Craig. All of foregoing may be passed to GVN. /2/Document 256. FYI. Maddox was on DeSoto Patrol and had been authorized approach 8 NM coast of North Vietnam or 4 NM to certain North Vietnamese islands. Destroyer Craig in Feb-March was authorized approach to 4 NM coast of N VN. Maddox will resume patrol observing an 11 mile limit. In case DRV Department has no record of specific distance claimed by them so approach closer than 12 NM authorized. Just prior to incident Maddox may have approached to about 11 NM of coast. Assume you have seen press release issued Honolulu this morning./3/ End FYI. /3/See footnote 2. Document 257. Rusk
261. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of-Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Washington, August 2, 1964--6:49 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Maddox Incident. Secret; Flash. Repeated to Saigon, MACV, the White House, the Department of State, CIA, and the Department of Defense, among others. 7681. This is a DeSoto Patrol Message. Reference: JCS 7680 DTG 021725Z Aug 64 2 In event US vessels are attacked in international waters (11 miles offshore or more), you will seek to destroy the attacking forces, however, pursuit into hostile waters or air space is not authorized. /2/Document 259. 262. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 3, 1964--11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto Patrols, August. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent to the White House, CIA, and the Department of Defense. Received at 12:15 a.m. 282. Deptel 328 and Embtel 281./2/ Deptel does not address itself to primary question raised Embtel namely what will be U.S. Govt reaction to this attack? Dept [Emb] will appreciate that info. Unprovoked attack against U.S. destroyer in international waters by three illegal North Vietnamese torpedo boats will be received dramatically in current atmosphere Saigon. It is not adequate to local minds (nor indeed to ours) to state that attack was repelled and that patrol will continue. /2/Documents 260 and 256, respectively. This reaction, if it constitutes totality of U.S. Govt intentions, will make it appear that we are prepared to accept regular Swatow harassment in international waters as normal concomitant our normal naval patrolling activities. Such an attitude would immediately be construed in Saigon as indication that U.S. flinches from direct confrontation with North Vietnamese, especially since we apparently did not press home total destruction those vessels which attacked Maddox. To meet this situation, recommend prompt consideration of following actions: a. Announce that Swatows will henceforth be attacked whenever found in international waters and maintain air and/or naval forces in readiness to do so. b. Direct regular air surveillance of Swatows overflying DRV air space as required. c. Mine approaches to Swatow harbors. d. Create a torpedo capability in GVN Navy for use against appropriate targets, such as Haiphong dredges. These are quick thoughts without opportunity for consultation with experts. However, we are impressed with need for prompt reaction and timely private communication of intentions to GVN. Request urgent consideration these matters and advice soonest re statements which we may make privately to GVN. Taylor
263. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 3, 1964--5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret, Priority Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, the White House, ICS, and the Secretary of Defense. 286. As a part of his swing through four provinces July 31-August 1, Khanh asked me to accompany him on the latter day. In the morning we visited Binh Tuy, a relatively small province of about 60,000 situated on the coast--east of Saigon. There is essentially no pacification problem there but the province illustrates the needs of an economically backward area after elimination of VC. Khanh received a thorough briefing on the local situation from an intelligent-looking province chief, then visited a nearby fishing village which turned out in force to greet us. Khanh addressed the villagers with apparently good effect, then made a token presentation of gifts to a few chosen elders, taken from a large pile of gift packages laid out in the square, consisting in the main of frying gear, pots and pans. Khanh and his party then helicoptered from Binh Tuy to Cap St. Jacques where they gave a barbecue for the foreign press at the end of the day. I joined him an hour in advance of the reception to talk business. First, I reported to him matter contained in Embtel 240./2/ He took the news calmly and said that if allegation against Hoach were true he would be "eliminated." /2/Telegram 240, July 28, reported that Minister of State Le Van Hoach had on his own authority been in touch with the Viet Cong concerning a cease-fire. Taylor speculated on the reasons for such an approach and included the possibility that Khanh might be behind it. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) In course of subsequent conversation Khanh asked me (for at least the third time since my arrival) whether US was solidly behind him. I assured him such was the case and intimated some surprise at need for repeating assurance. His reply indicted that he is considering some move against Minh and wanted to determine how USG would react. I took this opportunity to follow guidance contained in Deptel 245,/3/ saying that we Americans had been happy to see Minh brought into government and had hoped that his presence would contribute to creating the national unity so badly needed. It was not Minh the individual who attracted us but Minh the popular symbol with possible utility in the unstable political situation. If, as Khanh insisted, Minh was not a help but a hindrance to unity, we had no further interest in him. However, I asked Khanh whether in fact he had ever asked Minh to do specific things which the latter had declined to do. /3/Document 244. Khanh said indeed he had. He cited failure to respond to invitation to Cabinet meetings. Also, as Head of State Minh has certain duties which go back to time of Bao Dai and include signing of State papers. In this Minh had been tardy particularly in the recent submission of papers to UN bearing on designation of official GVN spokesman. Khanh is plainly fed up and may be expected to take some action against Minh shortly. I asked Khanh whether he had given further thought to the joint planning exercise discussed in Embtel 219./4/ He said he had but then indicated that he had more in mind the declaration of a "state of urgency" (condition d'urgence) than military planning related to NVN. When I mentioned latter he replied that we could talk about it later in Saigon but showed no interest in pursuing subject. In course of entire day, he did not mention "march North" issue or any related matter. /4/Dated July 26, telegram 219 from Saigon requested the best available portfolio of political/military planning papers for a joint contingency planning exercise with the Vietnamese. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-VIET S) Press reception and barbecue were well attended by foreign correspondents. Purpose was purely social-Khanh made no statement to press. Taylor
264. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Agency for International Development/1/ Saigon, August 3, 1964--6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 11:12 a.m. Toaid 555. Joint Emb/USOM message. Ref: Deptel 254./2/ /2/Document 246. 1. We have under intensive examination the questions cited in reftel. Action is anticipated in certain functional areas soonest with others subject to initial review and/or planning. 2. We believe urban areas should share with rural communities in allocation of efforts to bolster confidence in GVN and its program. To that end Saigon-Cholon becomes critical target with its large share of nation's population and total economic activity. At same time current unemployment represents fertile area for VC agitation and action. 3. USOM is therefore initiating action looking towards formulation of comprehensive development program for Saigon-Cholon which could be carried out on time-phased basis over period of years. Initial effort would probably involve slum clearance and extensive housing program. Target date of August 20 set for development of ideas as to how program could be carried forward. 4. USOM also plans move ahead immediately on work necessary to put fifteen hospital suites in operating condition soonest. OICC will supervise project with MOH doing work. Project financing being worked out simultaneously. Concurrent action by GVN in reorganizing MOH and establishing budget required. Close coordination now exists between USOM, Public Health and MOH in all aspects of project. Hope actual work on suites plus water and power supply can be undertaken within 30-45 days, with first suite ready to accommodate next arriving surgical team late fall. Every effort will be made to accomplish this task at earlier time if possible. 5. Re sites for concentrated effort in Kral area or areas, USOM now determining most feasible location for such activity. Findings will be reviewed for strategic or other considerations. When this completed will develop plans with GVN for implementation. Expect plans crystallized in 30-45 days. 6. Greater exercise of selectivity in determining locale of effort to distinguish between GVN-controlled and other areas foremost in our thinking. This makes urban effort doubly attractive. At same time, well drilling and other more far-flung activities being reviewed to examine possibility and feasibility of concentration along lines you outline. 7. We share feeling that formulation and scrupulous conduct of politically attractive and economically feasible land policy has great value to overall effort. This problem being studied and discussions with GVN will be undertaken soon. 8. Ever-present problem in all above matters is need to bring GVN along with our thinking. GVN must in all cases be implementing body with assistance from us. To this problem, major US effort being directed. 9. Outside framework of above matters, we are also considering some one-shot operations involving supply problems that would underscore in appealing way US support for Vietnamese people and their problems. More on this later if preliminary review indicates favorable prospects such action. Taylor
265. Editorial Note On August 3 at 11:30 a.m., President Johnson called an impromptu press conference at the White House and read the following statement: "I have instructed the Navy: "1. to continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Viet-Nam, "2. to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol "3. to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers, and "4. to issue orders to the commanders of the combat aircraft and the two destroyers, (a) to attack any force which attacks them in international waters, and (b) to attack with the objective not only of driving off the force but of destroying it." (Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, page 259)
266. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Vietnam Coordinating Committee (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, August 3, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group files: Lot 72 D 219, Maddox Incident. Top Secret. The source text bears the handwritten notation: "Secretary Saw." SUBJECT We met this morning with Pete Solbert (McNaughton is away on vacation) and his civilian and military staff people./2/ The following information may be of use to you in connection with any meeting the President may have this afternoon. /2/No record of this meeting has been found. I. Present Rules of Marine Reconnaissance At the present moment destroyer patrols are authorized to close within 15 miles of the Chicom coastline, 11 miles of the DRV coastline, and 4 miles from DRV offshore islands. We have only made four destroyer patrols since December 1962, and the distances off the coast have varied depending upon the purpose of the reconnaissance, i.e. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Junk Surveillance, etc. Another patrol is scheduled for the period August 3-7. You probably know that the action against the Maddox took place within the same 60-hour period as an OPLAN 34A harassing action by SVN forces against two islands off the DRV coast, Hon Me and Hon Nieu. It seems likely that the North Vietnamese and perhaps the Chicoms have assumed that the destroyer was part of this operation, although it was attacked some 30 miles away from the nearest island. It is also possible that Hanoi deliberately ordered the attack in retaliation for the harassment of the islands. This suggests to me that we should in the future assure coordination between OPLAN 34A activities, which are controlled in the Pentagon by SACSA, and the destroyer patrols, which are controlled by J-3. Other OPLAN 34A actions are scheduled for August 3-5. II. Rules of Engagement At the moment, rules of engagement for both marine and air units are to respond to any attack and pursue the attacking forces with the objective of destroying them up to a point 11 miles from the DRV coastline. Our units are permitted to fire beyond this point and in the case of destroyers, this means they could reach the shoreline with their guns. III. Additional Thoughts The 11-mile limitation referred to above reflects the fact that NVN probably claims that her territorial waters extend 12 miles off her coast. We do not admit this claim, and the theory is to show this by penetrating it to the extent of one mile. I agree that there is some logic to this position as far as regular patrols are concerned; but I wonder if we should not authorize our people to engage in hot pursuit of NVN attacking forces, both on the sea and in the air, to a distance of three miles from the DRV coast. Another question which has not been thoroughly discussed is what happens if in the course of hot pursuit of an attacking enemy ship or aircraft, our forces are fired upon by landbased aircraft or coastal artillery. Do we engage in suppressive or retaliatory activity against the DRV mainland? I believe that we probably should, but we do not have to make this decision now. I raised the question this morning whether any sort of aerial reconnaissance over the DRV would have any military value in connection with the protection of our coastal patrols. The answer appears to be "no", because the risk of a shootdown is considerably greater than the reconnaissance results we could expect to achieve. But this is a point you might wish to raise. I think we might at least wish to discuss other actions against the DRV associated with their patrol boat activity. I have in mind the aerial mining of the harbor or harbors from which these boats emerge. I understand that this probably could be done effectively by the VNAF, who have been trained in this technique. Another possibility, of course, is an unidentified airstrike against one or more of these harbors. A recent JCS paper includes several such harbors as a possible VNAF target./3/ /3/Presumably the 91 Target List submitted to the Secretary of Defense as an appendix to JCSM-460-64, May 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files) Finally, you have our draft cable to Saigon asking Ambassador Taylor to hand our protest to the ICC for transmission to Hanoi./4/ The issue here is whether to use the ICC for this purpose, since to do so might only stimulate Hanoi to react by demanding an investigation of our destroyer activities in the Gulf of Tonkin. /4/A copy of this draft, which is substantially the same as Document 270, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Maddox Incident. We have considered going through the British, Canadians, Indians or French-all of whom have representation of some sort in Hanoi. We have concluded in the interests of speed that the ICC is the best means for the formal transmission of our protest. We are not asking the ICC to investigate, merely to transmit.
267. Editorial Note On August 3, Secretary McNamara called Secretary Rusk at 11:05 a.m. to say that the President thought it would be wise for them to brief Congressional leaders concerning the Maddox incident. McNamara had already made arrangements for the Secretaries to brief the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees at 3 p.m. and the Speaker of the House and selected Congressmen at 4. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) No records of the briefings have been found.
268. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ Washington, August 3, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret; Sensitive. Received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at 4:49 p.m. The source text bears the stamp "Sec Def has seen." SUBJECT 1. Proposed Meeting. I understand from Mike Forrestal that a meeting this afternoon at the White House may involve review of Ambassador Taylor's cables on the Maddox incident (Tab A),/2/ including our present ship [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reconnaissance instructions, rules of engagement and possible additional actions in response to the Maddox engagement. /2/Tab A contained copies of Documents 256, 260, and 262. 2. President's News Release. Attached (Tab B)/3/ is a news ticker on the President's statement made this morning. /3/Tab B consisted of the text of the statement in Document 265. 3. Present Rules for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Reconnaissance. We understand that these rules vary for each mission. The Maddox was operating under the limitations that it not go nearer than 15 nautical miles to ChiCom territory (not near islands), 8 miles from DRV mainland and 4 miles from DRV offshore islands. Present orders (issued yesterday--Tab C)/4/ require the Maddox on the balance of its mission to keep 20 miles from the ChiCom mainland, 11 miles from DRV mainland and 4 miles from DRV offshore islands. A question may be raised as to the frequency with which these [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missions should be run in the future: chart of mission at Tab D./5/ /4/Tab C contained copies of Documents 259 and 261 and a copy of message 030553Z from the Commander of the Seventh Fleet to the Ticonderoga stating that, if another attack took place, it was mandatory to make a maximum effort to achieve the complete destruction of the attacking units. /5/Not printed. 4. Rules of Engagement. The current rules of engagement provide that ships on patrol will fire back if attacked and will destroy the attacking craft. In attempting to destroy an attacking craft, our ships may not go closer than 11 miles from the DRV mainland. It may be desirable to reduce this limit, though the 5" guns of most destroyers can reach up to and perhaps beyond the coastline from the 11-mile limit (Com7Flt orders permit firing "over-the-line"). Our aircraft should not go much beyond this limit if they are to avoid DRV overflights. 5. Further Actions. The meeting may also consider other actions in response to the Maddox incident. Some suggestions are (a) aerial mining of DRV naval bases or harbors (now under JCS review for 34A); and (b) other 34A missions directed against these bases (probably not feasible with current 34A craft). Ambassador Taylor has also suggested aerial surveillance of Swatows, including DRV overflights as required, destruction of Swatows on the high seas, and creation of GVN torpedo capability. Surveillance flights over the DRV, over and above present flights, would not appear to produce substantial military information and involve risk of escalation, as does the destruction of Swatows at sea. The creation of GVN torpedo carrying capability is being investigated but appears slight. Peter Solbert
269. Editorial Note At 6:35 p.m. on August 3, the President met in the Cabinet Room of the White House with Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, and McGeorge Bundy to discuss Vietnam. (Johnson Library, Johnson Daily Diary) No record of the meeting, which lasted until 7:15 p.m., has been found. A telephone conversation between Bundy and Rusk at 2:45 p.m.. however, previewed the meeting: "B called to see if Sec had message re the 6:15. Sec did. Sec said he presumed it was on the Gulf of Tonkin and B said yes. B supposed we would review the rules of engagement. B said we need a draft reply to Max; since we were not asking any staff, could Sec bring whatever he wanted himself. B said he thought this would all pass over. Sec said Khanh is kicking up, saying we should retaliate." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) The meeting was delayed until 6:35 p.m. because of a reception for American foreign language newspaper editors.
270. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, August 3, 1964--7:48 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Limited Official Use; Flash. Drafted by Corcoran (S/VN); cleared with Green, Forrestal, Harriman, Trueheart, Blouin, McGeorge Bundy, Ball, and others; and initialed by Rusk. The text of the protest is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, p. 258. 335. Please hand the following to the ICC with the request that this protest be passed to the Hanoi regime: "The United States Government takes an extremely serious view of the unprovoked attack made by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats on an American naval vessel, the USS Maddox, operating on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2. United States ships have traditionally operated freely on the high seas, in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations. They will continue to do so and will take whatever measures are appropriate for their defense. The United States Government expects that the authorities of the regime in North Viet-Nam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces." Text will be released in Washington at noon press briefing August 4./2/ /2/Department spokesman Robert McCloskey read the statement to news correspondents on August 4. Rusk
271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, August 3, 1964--8:49 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 US-VIET N. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Forrestal and initialed by Rusk. 336. From the Secretary to the Ambassador. Ref Embtel 282./2/ We have been very sensitive here to the considerations you raise reftel. We would hope that part of the problem has been met by President's public statement today,/3/ which you have already received. We have asked JCS to insure that you receive copies of the implementing orders to the appropriate commanders through military channels. /2/Document 262. /3/See Document 265. Suggestions made in b, c and d reftel are currently being considered in context OPLAN 34A. Significant additions have been made to list of targets for marine operations and these will be transmitted to you shortly. We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi, and Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. We have no intention yielding to pressure. In your discretion you may pass these thoughts along to Gen. Khanh. You may also reiterate to him, but only if you believe it appropriate, our concern that actions against the North be limited for the present to the OPLAN 34A type. We do not believe that SVN is yet in a position to mount larger actions so long as the security situation in the near vicinity of Saigon remains precarious. We are impressed with the fact that a battalion-sized attack could have occurred within 4 miles of Saigon without any advance warning. We would welcome your further comments on Saigon reaction to today's announcement, as well as your continuing assessment of the political temperature there. Rusk
272. Editorial Note At 7:40 a.m. EDT (7:40 p.m., Saigon time), August 4, the destroyer Maddox, on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, reported that an attack from unidentified vessels appeared imminent. The National Military Communications Center in the Department of Defense received the report at 9:30 a.m. in message 041240Z. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto Patrols August) The following entries are taken from a Top Secret chronology of the events of August 4-5 prepared on August 28 and submitted by McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson on September 4: "8:13 AM: First word of a possible attack on the Maddox is received at the Pentagon by the DIA Indications Center over the phone [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. While on the phone, a copy of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] field unit message arrives and copies are delivered sometime about 9:00 a.m. to the Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler. The message states that there are 'imminent plans of DRV naval action possibly against DeSoto mission' gathered from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. "8:36 AM (8:36 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The Maddox establishes its first radar contacts with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. U.S. fighter aircraft are then launched from the USS Ticonderoga to provide the Maddox and the Turner Joy with protection against possible attacks from the unidentified vessels and aircraft, in accordance with the President's previously issued directives. At this time, the Ticonderoga is located approximately 100 nautical miles East North East of Da Nang. (NMCC receives this report at about 10:30 AM.) "9:08 AM (9:08 PM, August 4, Saigon time): The Maddox reports that the unidentified aircraft have disappeared from its radar screen but that the surface vessels are still remaining at a distance. U.S. aircraft from the Ticonderoga arrive and commence defensive patrol over the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy. (NMCC receives this report at 11:04 AM.) "9:12 AM: McNamara calls the President and tells him about the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]/DIA intelligence warning he has just received that the Maddox is on the alert again, with the presence of hostile ships reported." Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Gulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964) The message received in the National Military Communications Center at 10:30 a.m. is 041336Z. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The message received at 11:04 a.m. is 041408Z. (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 719, DeSoto Patrols August) The 9:12 a.m. telephone call from McNamara to the President is described in Johnson, Vantage Point, page 114.
273. Editorial Note At 9:25 a.m., August 4, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, and Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal, Director of the Joint Staff of the JCS, met at the Pentagon. The following account of the meeting is taken from the August 28 Top Secret chronology of the events of August 4-5 submitted to the President by McGeorge Bundy on September 4: "McNamara, Deputy Secretary Vance, General Burchinal, Colonel Jones, and Admiral Mustin of the Joint Staff meet at the Pentagon beginning at 9:25 AM as reports of the attack on the destroyers come in. As the situation grows more intense, possible levels and time of retaliation are discussed, and target folders are examined. High on the list are the PT boats and bases and supporting POL installations, but other targets such as airfields, industrial complexes and bridges are also scrutinized. Captain Miller of the Navy, a mine expert, is also asked to join the meeting and the possibility of mining one or more of the North Vietnamese important Ports is discussed. Here it is pointed out that the mines would have to be brought to the carriers from Subic Bay, the Philippines. McNamara orders that mines be brought to the carriers as soon as possible. Burchinal informs McNamara that a retaliatory attack can take place at first light. McNamara, during this time, calls the President, informs him that a retaliatory attack is being planned, and tells the President that he will call Secretary Rusk and Presidential Assistant Bundy to join him in preparing a number of options to be presented to the President as soon as possible.* "During these discussions, McNamara develops four options for a sharp limited blow and one option for continuous pressure against the North Vietnamese. The four options for the sharp limited blow are: "1. Air strikes against PT boats and their bases. "The option for continuing pressure against the North Vietnamese is to mine important ports along their coastline. "McNamara, about 11:00 AM, summons Rusk, Bundy, and the JCS and they arrive shortly thereafter." Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Gulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964) The asterisk footnote reads: "McNamara made three calls to the President during this period at 9:43, 10:53, and 11:06 AM." For an account of the 9:43 a.m. call, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part 11, 1961-1964 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), page 289. Regarding the 11 a.m. call, see Document 275.
274. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara), Washington, August 4, 1964, 9:55 a.m./1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Carolyn J. Proctor. TELEPHONE CALL TO SECRETARY McNAMARA Sec wanted to be sure there would be as much force as needed. M said Wheeler had called the commandant of CINCPAC and they will put the whole 7th Fleet out there if necessary. M said the President agreed with out position; he was very much concerned about what additional retaliatory steps we should take. Sec said one thing is to go after the boats. M said he would be inclined to do more than that, pick out a target of our own and go after that. M said he would have something for discussion at lunch.
275. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara), Washington, August 4, 1964, 11:10 a.m./1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Proctor. TELEPHONE CALL FROM SECRETARY McNAMARA M said there was a cable [at] 9:36/2/ our time reporting 3 unidentified boats and 3 unidentified aircraft approaching the destroyers; they had just had a phone call from Sharp that the destroyer reported under torpedo attack. M had told the President we were working out retaliatory measures. M asked if Sec could come over as they had all the charts etc. Sec said he would be there in about 10 minutes. /2/Presumably message 041336Z. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) See Document 272.
276. Editorial Note At 11:40 a.m., Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green (William Bundy was on vacation in Massachusetts, where Rusk called him to return to Washington), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at the Pentagon. The following entries are taken from the August 28 chronology: "11 :40 AM: Bundy arrives at JCS meeting. McNamara briefs Bundy. McNamara describes the five options listed on page 5 above. McNamara informs the group that he has issued orders to have mines moved from Subic Bay into Da Nang. There is a discussion of retaliatory measures. McNamara and Bundy discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a sharp limited blow such as air strikes and/or the continuing pressure of mining the North Vietnamese coast. McNamara tells LeMay that the JCS should work up recommendations for immediate action, then recommended actions for 24, 48 and 60 hours ahead, with special emphasis on reinforcements, such as the movement of B-57s into South Vietnam and fighter-interceptors into the Philippines. "12:04 PM: McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Green (State Dept.) and Vance move to McNamara's office, while the JCS continue meeting in McNamara's dining room. At this meeting the options are essentially refined to three: "1. Sharp limited strikes against such target as PT boats, PT bases, oil depots, etc. "2. Continuing pressure, i.e., mining the Vietnam coast. "3. A combination of both. "12:20 PM: McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and Green depart for White House. Vance goes into McNamara's dining room to ask JCS if it would make any difference whether the retaliatory strikes were conducted at first light. JCS tell Vance that the time of attack would make no difference from a military standpoint but that fewer people would be at the PT boat bases and supporting installations at first light. "12:25 PM: Vance departs for the White House. The JCS continue meeting until 1:49 PM. During their meeting, at JCS direction, Burchinal calls McNamara at White House to recommend the sharp limited response option." Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Gulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964) Regarding the five options described by Secretary McNamara, see Document 273. At 12:40 p.m., according to the chronology, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, and Green arrived at the White House where they joined the National Security Council which was discussing the Cyprus situation. McNamara briefed the NSC and the President on the available details of the attack on the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy. Bromley Smith's notes of the 537th meeting of the National Security Council read in part as follows: "Secretary McNamara: North Vietnamese PT boats have attacked the DeSoto Patrol consisting of two U.S. destroyers, the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy, approximately 65 miles off North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin. Presently we believe 9 or 10 torpedoes were fired at the Patrol. Two of the PT boats were reportedly sunk and three to six were fired on. So far, we have no casualties. Nearby U.S. aircraft carriers are providing continuous air cover. "Secretary Rusk: Secretary McNamara and I and the Chiefs of Staff are preparing recommendations but these are not yet ready. "Mac Bundy: In addition to these recommendations we should have an estimate of the reaction to various courses of action we might take." Later in the meeting, the discussion again turned to the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin: "The President: Turning again to the attack in the Gulf of Tonkin, he asked that nothing be made public for the time being. "Secretary Dillon: There is a limit on the number of times we can be attacked by the North Vietnamese without hitting their naval bases." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 19, 8/4/64) Following the NSC meeting, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Bundy, and Vance joined the President for lunch from 1:04 to 2:50 p.m. The August 28 chronology reads: "The President agrees that a firm, swift retaliatory strike must be carried out. Here, a general consensus is formed on the approach finally taken in the JCS message to CINCPAC, developed later that afternoon, ordering the strikes into execution against the PT boats located at bases Port Wallut, Hon Gay, Phuc Loi and Quang Khe and Loc Chao estuary and the oil depot at Vinh. (See the 5:19 PM entry below.) The mining option, as well as an attack on Haiphong, is rejected. The President asks how long it would take to execute the strike. McNamara estimates from the advice he has received that a strike could be launched at about 7:00 PM (7:00 AM, Saigon time). The President suggests that McNamara call the JCS to confirm the time, but McNamara says he wants to work it out carefully with the JCS on his return to the Pentagon." At 3 p.m. at the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began meeting; they were joined by McNamara and Vance who informed the Chiefs that "the President wants the strikes to take place at 7:00 PM Washington time, if possible, and at the following targets: PT boats and bases at Quang Khe, Phoc Loi, Port Wallut, Hon Gay and Loc Chao, and the oil complex at Vinh. The JCS agree with this proposal." (August 28 chronology) The drafting of the strike execute message continued throughout the afternoon of August 4 amid some confusion about the actual course of events in the Gulf of Tonkin. At 1:27 p.m., the Maddox reported that "a review of the action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired 'appear doubtful'. 'Freak weather effects' on radar, and 'over-eager' sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. 'No visual sightings' have been reported by the Maddox, and the Commander suggests that a 'complete evaluation' be undertaken before any further action. (NMCC receives this report about 1-1/2 to 2 hours later.)" (August 28 chronology, the report was in message 041727Z; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) "4:47 PM: McNamara, Vance and the JCS meet to marshal the evidence to overcome lack of a clear and convincing showing that an attack on the destroyers had in fact occurred. They conclude that an attack had taken place. In this regard five factors are considered: "1. The Turner Joy was illuminated when fired on by automatic weapons. "2. One of the destroyers observed cockpit lights. "3. A PGM 142 shot at two U.S. aircraft. "4. A North Vietnamese announcement that two of its boats were 'sacrificed.' [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] "5. Sharp's determination that there was indeed an attack. "Burchinal, at Wheeler's request, tells McNamara that the 7:00 PM strike time will not be met because the carriers are operating on a time which makes 8:00 PM Washington time 7:00 AM carrier time. "5:19 PM: JCS strike execute message is retransmitted Flash precedence as JCS 7720 to CINCPAC. It states that by 7:00 PM EDT (0700 local time) a one-time maximum effort attack against Port Wallut (later cancelled because of weather), Hon Gay, Phuc Loi, Quang Khe, Loc Chao and Vinh, and an armed reconnaissance against PT boats beyond the three mile limit should be conducted. The message cautions that if the weather precludes meeting the above time of attack, the commander is to 'proceed soonest' and to notify the JCS as soon as possible. (CINCPAC receives this message at 5:52 PM (11:52 AM, August 4, CINCPAC time).)" (August 28 chronology) JCS 7720 to CINCPAC is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Gulf of Tonkin, [less than 1 line of text not declassified].
277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/ Washington, August 4, 1964--6:03 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 US-VIET N. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared with Ball, and initialed by William Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC. 171. In view further attacks today on US Destroyer Maddox President has decided air strike should be carried out at once against torpedo boat bases and a fuel installation in North Viet-Nam. You should be prepared on receipt further message repeat on receipt further message, to notify Thanom and call emergency SEATO meeting to announce action and reasons therefor. Slug reply Nodis-Pierce Arrow. Rusk
278. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 4, 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 20. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. Gulf of Tonkin Attack Secretary McNamara: The North Vietnamese PT boats have continued their attacks on the two U.S. destroyers in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. No enemy aircraft was involved. Our efforts to learn the exact situation and protect the Patrol have been complicated by a very low ceiling. One of the two destroyers was fired on by automatic weapons and was lit up by search lights. Secretary Rusk: An immediate and direct reaction by us is necessary. The unprovoked attack on the high seas is an act of war for all practical purposes. We have been trying to get a signal to Hanoi and Peking. Our response to this attack may be that signal. We are informing NATO, SEATO, and the UN. As an indication of Hanoi's intentions, this second attack was a more serious decision for the North Vietnamese than the decision to make the first attack. Secretary McNamara: We have agreed to air strikes on two bases in the north of North Vietnam and two base complexes in the south of North Vietnam. A fifth target has been deleted because it is close to Communist China. In addition, any North Vietnamese PT boats and Swatows found off Vietnam outside the three-mile limit will be attacked as part of an armed reconnaissance program. (The execute order as actually set is attached-JCS 7720.)/2/ /2/See Document 276. CIA Director McCone: The proposed U.S. reprisals will result in a sharp North Vietnamese military reaction, but such actions would not represent a deliberate decision to provoke or accept a major escalation of the Vietnamese war. (The text of Mr. McCone's estimate of probable North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist reactions to our reprisal is attached.)/3/ /3/Not found. The President: Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? Director McCone: No. The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their off-shore islands. They are responding out of pride and on the basis of defense considerations. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war. They are raising the ante. The President: Are we going to react to their shooting at our ships over 40 miles from their shores? If yes, we should do more than merely return the fire of the attacking ships. If this is so, then the question involves no more than the number of North Vietnamese targets to be attacked. Secretary McNamara: Our intelligence officers report that a Chinese Communist air regiment is moving to North Vietnam. USIA Director Rowan: Do we know for a fact that the North Vietnamese provocation took place? Can we nail down exactly what happened? We must be prepared to be accused of fabricating the incident. Secretary McNamara: We will know definitely in the morning. As of now, only highly classified information nails down the incident. This information we cannot use and must rely on other reports we will be receiving. Secretary Rusk: We should ask the Congressional leaders whether we should seek a Congressional resolution. (The draft resolution read by Secretary Rusk is attached.) This short and clear draft is similar to the Mid-East resolution. Secretary McNamara: In addition to the air strikes, we plan to send major U.S. reinforcements into the area. These include ships, men and planes. (A detailed listing of these forces is attached.)/4/ /4/Not printed. A draft statement for the President was revised./5/ It is to be made public by the President as soon as the U.S. attack planes are over target. /5/See Document 286. Bromley Smith Attachment DRAFT JOINT RESOLUTION ON SOUTHEAST ASIA/6/ /6/Top Secret. There is no indication on the source text of the drafter. Whereas warships of the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam have committed a series of unprovoked armed attacks in international waters against naval units of the United States; Whereas these attacks are a part of a continuous, deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression and subversion carried on against free nations, and particularly against the peoples of Southeast Asia, by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam; Whereas such Communist aggression and subversion constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security and is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations; Whereas the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has flouted its obligations under the Geneva Accords of 1954 and has engaged in aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Viet-Nam by carrying out a systematic plan for the subversion of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, by furnishing direction, training, personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare within the Republic of Viet-Nam and by the ruthless use of terror against the peaceful population of that country; Whereas in violation of its undertakings in the Geneva Agreements of 1962 the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has engaged in aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of Laos by maintaining forces on Laotian territory, by the use of that territory for the infiltration of arms and equipment into the Republic of Viet-Nam, and by providing direction, men and equipment for persistent armed attacks against the Government of National Union of the Kingdom of Laos; Whereas at the request of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the United States is assisting the people of that country to maintain their independence and political integrity with no territorial, military or political ambitions of its own, but solely to assure that the peoples of Southeast Asia will be left in peace by their neighbors to work out their destinies in their own way, Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled: That the United States will not tolerate unprovoked and illegal armed attacks on its forces, that it will take such measures as may be necessary to prevent such attacks and otherwise to protect its forces and that the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia, including the preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of the nations of Southeast Asia, is required by the national interest of the United States; Sec. 2. To this end, the Congress supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States: (a) to respond instantly with the use of appropriate force to repel any unprovoked attack against the armed forces of the United States and to take such other steps as may be necessary to protect these forces and (b) upon request from any nation in Southeast Asia, to take, consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, all measures including the use of armed force to assist that nation in the defense of its political independence and territorial integrity against aggression or subversion.
279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, August 4, 1964--6:35 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto Patrols, Aug. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis; Pierce Arrow. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared by William Bundy. 341. For the Ambassador. In view of two Maddox incidents and certain responses which are now being developed here, you should see Khanh as soon as possible to be sure he has accurate account of NVN actions against our two destroyers. You should tell him that President will shortly be announcing U.S. responsive measures against NVN including actions against NVN naval craft wherever they may be found on the high seas, U.S. air strikes against four torpedo boat bases on NVN coast, air cover for these operations which will engage any unfriendly aircraft. These actions are expected to take place approximately 1830 Washington time. You should enjoin Khanh to keep this information strictly secret. We expect to have a Presidential message out to you in the next few hours. We will also insure that you are informed through military channels of results of U.S. action which you may also pass on to Khanh in your discretion. Our position is that this deliberate and unprovoked attack on U.S. vessels in international waters cannot go unanswered. On the other hand, we have limited our response to the offending boats and supporting facilities in order to avoid forcing escalation. We want to keep Khanh as fully informed as possible, consistent with operational security. In meantime you should forcefully advise Khanh to take no independent action external to SVN and avoid public statements during this critical period. You may wish, however, to suggest to him precautionary and alerting measures against possible NVN retaliation. We leave these to your judgment. When these actions have become public, they may help you in your efforts convince military and politicians that drastic changes in GVN leadership must not be considered at this time. Slug all future messages this subject "Pierce Arrow." Rusk
280. Notes of the Leadership Meeting, White House, Washington, August 4, 1964, 6:45 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, August 4, 1964. No classification marking. Drafted by Walter Jenkins of the President's Staff. Attached to the source text were two notes dated August 24 and 25 concerning its drafting. One of these reads: "Put that on my desk--I'll need it every day. LBJ:JRJ 8/27/67." In addition to the participants, Senator Kuchel and Representatives Vinson and Morgan were present. A 3-1/2-page summary of the meeting is ibid. President: I want to counsel with you. It is dangerous to have the leaders come here. The reporters see they are coming and they go back and report all over the Hill. Some of our boys are floating around in the water. The facts we would like to present to you are to be held in the closest confidence and are to be kept in this room until announced. Halleck: I did not tell a damn person. President: I know no one did, but it is on both tickers anyway. We have to be very careful. Please don't discuss what goes on in this room. I have asked Secretary McNamara to brief you and it would be unjustifiable to refer to it at all. McNamara: The first indication we had of another attack on the destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy, was received at 7:30 A.M. today. President: I asked the Secretary of State to give us a report on the political situation. Rusk: For months and months we have been trying to get to them a signal, etc. This was a serious decision to attack our vessels on the high seas. It was planned to take place forty to sixty miles away from port on the high seas. We should not look on anything as accidental and they look for us to come back in a relevant fashion. At the source of the trouble we would run the great risk that they would misinterpret what the positions are in South East Asia. We must make it quite clear that we are resolved not to overlook the threat that is posed to our forces. We would propose to call for the Security Council and also report to our Allies. President: The Security Council of the United Nations. Rusk: We would make it clear as we can that we are not going to run out of South East Asia, but that we have no national ambitions nor either in a war to the north. They made the choice themselves. They will have some doubts there if it comes to choice, but if we go back in a limited fashion, there would still be a showing that we want to limit the escalation. We have not had time to consult our Allies. President: I would like to ask Mr. McCone to give us his estimate of enemy action--what their responses would be. Russell: Mr. McCone, I notice you did not mention the submarine. Does anybody know what kind of anti-submarine warfare there is in that area? McCone: We discussed that today. Our forces there have ample forces to take care of it. We expect to move close to the China Seas. McNamara: They can be there before any submarines can. The carriers can take of themselves. President: We do not seriously anticipate that. Russell: It would more likely be through the air. Rusk: They can disguise their air power by pretending they are Viet Namese. Russell: The submarine can come nearer disguising itself. Hickenlooper. Do I understand the reasoning behind your analysis on one phase is that if we do not do something here then the Communist forces will be in a position to deal from strength in any proposed settlement? If we do react, it may put us in a position to deal from strength. Russell: That is part of the problem. It is possible we would be giving up the right to sail through the Gulf. If we did that, psychologically our prestige possibly would be seriously affected in Hanoi and other places. They might come to the wrong conclusion about what we are willing to do, which would be much more serious. Hickenlooper: They attacked and we will deal from here on out and we are trying to counteract. Rusk: We are trying to get across two points: (1) leave your neighbors alone and (2) If you don't, we will have to get busy. Hickenlooper: May I ask if there is a comparison between Cuba and this? Cuba was a bold and dangerous operation as far as Washington is concerned. No one knows what would have happened had we not reacted. Is it possible this follows the same route? If we don't react, what kind of position does it put us in with the North Viet Namese? Rusk: What the Russians learned in Cuba could have an influence on the entire world. Speaker: There is no question but what it is an act of war-an attack on American vessels. Deliberate from our angle. In the lives of Nations you must take calculated risks. If we don't take some action, what would flow from it? Inaction may be more important than action. Bolton: Ammunition available to the ship was not powerful enough to do the job. McNamara: We have the most modern ammunition available anywhere. Saltonstall: The Secretary said they are going to protest to the Security Council tomorrow. Rusk: I will get the notes for you on this issue. Saltonstall: If you ask for action and did not get. it, wouldn't you be in a weak position? Rusk: Our preliminary thought is that we are in a stronger position to make it if we do not ask the Security Council. Aiken: Get Mr. McCone to give us a report on the Chinese. McNamara: I do not think they will join in any physical reaction and I do not think that there will be any other reaction. Halleck: Could they think that they could withdraw from the Bay to ease tension? President: Maybe you would want to consider that General Taylor follow the instrument. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have gone over it all. General Wheeler is here. I would like for him to report on the recommendations of General Taylor in Viet Nam. (General Wheeler then explained the recommendations.) Rusk: We do expect to be in contact with the co-chairmen of the 1954 settlement. We want to get the main hand in disengagement and try to keep it under control. Russell: Are you sure you have enough stuff to do this job? We don't want to do it half way. McNamara: We have two carriers and definitely enough power to do the job. We do propose to use bombers. Russell: You will have to make more than one strike. How many sorties do we have planned? McNamara: We have issued orders for only a single night's action. These orders are already in being. Russell: Is it daytime over there? McNamara: Our attacks will be in daylight hours. Russell: I hope you will keep going until they get the last one of them. We had a Formosan type resolution in the Middle East. It was taken before the positive action--or subsequent to the positive action. President: I think they were taken before this debate was critical of Korea. Felt they would come and see the seriousness of the situation. If I recall, ____/2/ speech would have said he had supported it. /2/As on the source text. Halleck: That is tantamount to a declaration of war. Speaker: I think the fleet was pretty well in preparation. All plans were made. Hickenlooper: It seems to me there should be no desire to have a confrontation. There should be no doubt as to whether the President should have the right to order the Armed Forces into action. Should not have to quarrel for weeks as to whether he had the authority or not. It is my own personal feeling that it is up to the President to prepare the kind and type of resolution he believes would be proper. It is up to Congress to say whether they will pass it or not. I have no doubt in my mind that concrete action would be taken. President: I had that feeling but felt I wanted the advice of each of you and wanted to consult with you. We felt we should move with the action recommended by the Joint Chiefs, but I wanted to get the Congressional concurrence. I think it would be very damaging to ask for it and not get it. (Rusk then discussed Laos and Cambodia) Russell: Does that include Burma? Rusk: We considered specifying certain countries but felt we could not do this without getting into problems. Saltonstall: The only comment I have is this: How far does it go and where does it go from there. President: We thought there were two decisions to make after we were attacked yesterday and today and nine torpedoes were shot at our destroyers 40 miles on the high seas. We had to answer that attack. There are four bases. There have been many discussions and recommendations by people in the country that we go into the northern area and not allow them to murder us from bases of safety. These boats came from these bases and have been shooting at American ships. I think I know what the reaction would be if we tucked our tails. I thought I should get the Security Council and get the Leadership and after the orders are executed I would plan to make a statement something like this. (The President then read the proposed statement.)/3/ /3/Not found. For text of the statement as delivered at 11:36 p.m., see Document 286. Saltonstall: Three times in that little statement you use the word "limited." Why not use the word "determined" and let the limitations speak for themselves. If you will use the "limited" maybe we won't go any further. Turned for the time being. President: That is why we use it. We want them to know we are not going to take it lying down, but we are not going to destroy their cities. We hope we can prepare them for the course we will follow. Saltonstall: I agree with what you are doing. If you put it in, someone will pick it up. Bolton: I would do it. Keep them a little bit in the dark on what we are doing. Rusk: I think there is some advantage in not leaving it in but that we are using this as a pretext for a larger war. With the time factors involved I have not had a chance to discuss this with all the governments that will have to be consulted. We can cut down the emphasis. Hickenlooper: I agree that the word limited should not be used three times. I wonder if the connotation is that we are limited at this time. President: We say our response for the moment will be limited. I suppose if you look at the paragraph phrase it could include Burma, but we don't consider Burma would be involved. Humphrey: Better get a little task force to put the fine points to it. Saltonstall: Just ask the Secretary to show me that paragraph again. Doesn't ask any other Nations to join us at all. We would have to go alone. Other Nations could say-go to it. Rusk: We can't tie ourselves to what they could do. Halleck: We thought you ought to consider the words and phrases. President: We will probably make some changes in it. Maybe we will say "desirable" action. I don't ask you to draft the message or any bill we want. We have taken the resolutions you have had in the past. I don't think any resolution is necessary, but I think it is a lot better to have it in the light of what we did in Korea. Speaker: I think Congress has a responsibility and should show a united front to the world. Halleck: The President knows there is no partisanship among us. Are we getting fouled up here on something we could put off? There was never any hesitation when we had the deal about Cuba. I was the first to speak up and say-Mr. President, count me in. President: I would hope we could pretty well work out a resolution which is good with a minimum of doctoring. I wanted to see if you felt it was the wise thing to do. Hickenlooper: I think the resolution is appropriate and proper, but I doubt you should mention the resolution in your remarks this evening. President: I did not plan to mention it tonight. Fulbright: Are they expected to urge these provocations? Rusk: Maybe you have seen some of the broadcasts. They are highly inaccurate. They have not talked about what did happen but what did not happen. Actions of that sort are a low level minimum we have to take seriously. Fulbright: What bases do you plan to destroy--Haiphong? McNamara: No, we will not destroy any in the Haiphong area. Aiken: You spoke of airplanes. Do you conclude they are airplanes? Viet Nam has no combat aircraft. Communist China will move combat aircraft in shortly. Russell: There are some Chinese here [there?]--perhaps in the nearby area. McCone: There are four bases in North Viet Nam. Russell: Aren't there some in ____/4/ Island? /4/As on the source text. McNamara: Two of them. Mansfield: When the call came I looked at the ticker and I suppose you want us to be frank. I don't know how much good it will do. I would point out as far as the Island of Kinon is concerned, it is fortified. There is a sharp question between this and Cuba, Russia, and the United States. In this instance, Russia is remote. China is not involved directly. May be getting all involved with a minor third rate state. Then what is to come in response, if not Korea for China? The Communists won't be faced down. A lot of lives to mow them down. President: Do you give me a formula? Mansfield: Two, make them isolated acts of terror. Three, the United Nations, four, call on 54 countries to consider it a matter of urgency. Rusk: Principal problem, however, is that China has not committed itself. It would be wonderful if she could get them to pull away. Cuba is quite different in a number of respects. If we concentrate in a limited fashion on the source of the attack, it gives the other side a chance to pull away. Mansfield: In North Viet Nam there are jet airfields. In addition, have you considered actions that might happen in Formosa. Russell: What purpose do we have for drawing China into this? I am sure you will give some thought to it. If we have to fight them, we will whip them. But I would like to know [if?] you have come to some assumption. Rusk: Some Chinese were planning to come in in any event. The general reaction to mounting pressures and to impress the seriousness of their whole attitude. Fulbright: The point the Secretary has made is that the provocation is important. It could go on for several days. I think you ought to leave it in for the moment. Dirksen: If I had it to do I would put our references to the word "limited" in deep freeze. It connotes we would be like sitting ducks. We should make it clear we would meet every enemy threat. I have one other observation--at 3 P.M., three of the most responsible reporters say we got word out of the Pentagon. They could tell me six particular shots were involved. They knew much more about it than I did. Maybe there is some whispering going on. McNamara: I heard the same story and have some idea of where it came from. I am sure you understand what we told you last night/5/ has to be kept [secret?] because the North Viet Namese could use the boats and their defenses could be alerted. /5/Regarding the briefings by Rusk and McNamara on August 3, see Document 269. Halleck: If we are going to have it, it has to be overwhelming. (He indicated a desire to hear from the Speaker and the Majority Leader.) President: I have told you what I want from you. Fulbright: I will support it. Mansfield: It will go before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Saltonstall: I hope you make the United Nations a little more effective. Russell: I share that hope. Halleck: I think it will pass overwhelmingly as far as I am concerned. I have made my position here clear in all cases. Aiken: By the time you send it up there won't be anything for us to do but support you.
281. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions/1/ Washington, August 4, 1964--9:41 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis; Pierce Arrow. Drafted by Green and Robert Creel (EUR) and initialed by William Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Sent to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Paris (for the Embassy and USRO), and Rome and repeated to the other NATO capitals and Madrid. Similar messages were sent to 14 other capitals at 11:01 p.m. (Circular telegrams 222 and 223; ibid.) and at 11:02 individual messages were sent to New Delhi and Karachi. (Telegrams 266 and 136; ibid.) At 9:12 and 10:32, the U.S. representatives to NATO and SEATO were instructed to call sessions of their organizations to report on the U.S. position (Topol 198 and telegram 175 to Bangkok; ibid.) 218. For the Ambassador or Charge. The following personal message from the President to the Head of Government in your country should be delivered as soon as possible to the FonMin or senior available official: Begin Verbatim Text: I am asking my Ambassador to convey to you a statement I am making in Washington tonight/2/ with regard to deliberate attacks which have been made by Communist North Viet-Namese torpedo boats on American vessels operating on the high seas. /2/See Document 286. As I am sure that you will agree, these attacks could not go unanswered. The response we are making is, however, limited and fitting. I hope that it will make clear to the North Viet-Namese regime the dangerous character of the course they are following in Southeast Asia. End Verbatim Text. Text of Presidential message as well as Pentagon announcement/3/ being sent to you Septel and via USIS wireless file, respectively, and should accompany this personal message. Slug future messages this subject "Pierce Arrow". /3/Presumably reference is to News Release 570-64, a brief announcement describing the attack on August 4. (Washington National Records Center. RG 330, Pentagon Papers Files: FRC 75-0062, News Releases) Rusk
282. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Macmillan/1/ Washington, August 4, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 US-VIET N. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pierce Arrow. Transmitted to the Embassy in London in telegram 861, August 4, 9:41 p.m. with the explanation that the message had been sent to the Prime Minister by a separate channel. Telegram 861 is the source text. I tried to reach you earlier by phone to inform you of a serious development concerning North Vietnam. Two of our destroyers, the Maddox (which had already been subjected to attack on August 2) and the C. Turner Joy were today attacked on the high seas some 65 miles from the North Vietnamese coast by a number of PT boats which launched a number of torpedoes. Fortunately neither of our ships suffered any damage. They engaged the attack craft vigorously and, according to still unconfirmed reports, three were sunk. In view of this further unprovoked attack against U.S. war ships on the high seas by the North Vietnamese Naval Forces, I gave orders that air strikes should be immediately carried out on the four PT bases and the accompanying POL installations. Two of these bases are located in the Southern part of the coastline and the two others in the Northern area. I have called the leadership of the Congress to meet with me at 6:45 this evening, our time. We will make a report to a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council at 3 p.m. European time tomorrow, Wednesday. I am also considering whether to send a personal message to Chairman Khrushchev in order to inform him of this further attack and of the reasons why I am determined to take all measures necessary to prevent such attacks and to protect our forces. At the same time, I would assure him that our objective remains the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. I will of course continue to keep you informed of developments as promptly as possible and attach the greatest importance to our keeping in closest touch with each other. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson/2/ /2/Telegram 861 bears this typed signature.
283. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Khanh/1/ Washington, August 4, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis; Pierce Arrow. Transmitted to the Embassy in Saigon in telegram 342, 9:47 p.m., for delivery to Khanh with President Johnson's statement (see Document 286). Telegram 342 is the source text. I am asking Ambassador Taylor to convey to you personally a statement I am making in Washington tonight concerning the deliberate attacks which have been made by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats on American vessels operating on the high seas. The measures I have ordered are intended to make it unmistakably clear to the Communist leaders in Hanoi that the United States defends its rights and that our commitment to assist your country in preserving her freedom and independence cannot be shaken. The Hanoi regime has embarked upon an adventure which can have the gravest consequences for world peace, and I believe that you and I have responsibilities which extend beyond our own borders. For this reason our response to North Vietnamese provocation has been, for the present, limited in the hope that the Hanoi regime will recognize the dangers which flow from increasing violence in Southeast Asia. It is of the utmost importance therefore that our two countries continue to plan and act in the closest consultation during the very critical days ahead. Ambassador Taylor will always be prepared to communicate your thoughts to me, and I will keep in close touch with you through him./2/ /2/Telegram 342 does not bear President Johnson's signature.
284. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Honolulu, August 4, 1964--9:53 a.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11885. Secret; Priority. According to another copy, this telegram was repeated by the JCS to the White House, CIA, NSA, and the Department of State at 8:47 p.m. and was received in the Department of State at 10:26 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 032353Z. DeSoto Patrol rules of engagement. A. JCS 7680 DTG 021725Z. B. JCS 7681 DTG 022349Z. C. OPNAVINST 03300.8. D. JCS 2084/80. E. SM-1431-62./2/ /2/JCS telegrams 7680 and 7681 are printed as Documents 259 and 261; the other three documents have not been found. 1. A United States ship has been attacked on the high seas off North Vietnam. The Maddox quite properly repulsed the attackers and one of the attacking boats was destroyed. Now, our friends and enemies alike will await what additional moves the United States will take. 2. Refs A and B appear to be a retreat at a time when aggressive measures are necessary. Ref A now prohibits an approach by DeSoto Patrol closer than eleven miles to the North Vietnam mainland coastline. Ref B prohibits hot pursuit into hostile waters and refers to international waters parenthetically as eleven miles offshore. Does this mean that hot pursuit must stop eleven miles offshore? If so, we are drastically reducing the time and space available to our ships and aircraft for destroying the attackers. 3. Although the terms hostile waters and hostile airspace are used in the rules of engagement contained in refs C through E, no clear definition of the terms is set forth and it must be assumed that they are synonymous with territorial waters and territorial airspace of the offending country. 4. In the event of unprovoked attack, our forces should be authorized to take aggressive action to destroy the attackers. This action has traditionally included hot pursuit into the territorial waters and airspace of the hostile country. If we are to be prohibited from pursuing into territorial waters and airspace, we should be allowed to pursue to the three-mile limit where territorial waters commence, in accordance with standard U.S. policy. 5. Recommend that: a. The terms territorial waters and airspace be used in lieu of hostile waters and airspace. b. DeSoto Patrol be permitted to approach within eight miles of NVN coastline, thus keeping five miles clear of territorial waters. c. Hot pursuit into territorial waters and airspace of the hostile country be authorized. d. If hot pursuit into territorial waters is not authorized, then authorize pursuit to the three-mile limit.
285. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Stevenson) in New York, August 4, 1964, 10:40 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Proctor. TELEPHONE CALL FROM AMB. STEVENSON, USUN S said the earliest possible would be noon; Yost is notifying U Thant. Sec said President will make his statement at 11:15; there were some changes in the text. Sec said the key thing and we must make it very clear up there tomorrow is that this is limited action appropriate to the nature of the intolerable kind of attack; we do not want a big war, in no sense is this destroyer a pretext to make a big thing out of a little one. S asked if this were self-defense under Article 51/2/ Sec said he thought so; we cannot have our vessels operating in danger of being torpedoed; we are not going into any general assault, just after these boats. They discussed whether U Thant visit should be postponed;/3/ they did not think so but it was possible. Sec said he did not think a resolution would be introduced tomorrow; this was basically a reporting situation. S asked in the event they ask for North Viet Nam to be seated, should we ask for South Viet Nam. Sec said yes, but he doubted they would. S asked if we had any info about the boats. Sec said they were built in Chinese yards, but have been in North Viet Nam for some time and for all practical purposes are North Vietnamese. Sec said we should concentrate on the fact that they are North Vietnamese, so that we do not force the Chinese into it. /2/Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides that nothing in the Charter impairs the right of self-defense, if an armed attack occurs against a member, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security. /3/U Thant was scheduled to visit Washington on August 6.
286. Editorial Note At 11:20 p.m., Admiral Sharp telephoned Secretary McNamara to confirm that that the Ticonderoga "got her planes off at 0243" or 10:43 p.m., Washington time, and 10:43 a.m., Saigon time. Sharp indicated that it would take the aircraft almost 2 hours to reach their targets. After discussing the matter with General Wheeler, McNamara called President Johnson to inform him. (August 28 chronology; Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Gulf of Tonkin Misc. 1964) At 11:36 p.m. on August 4, President Johnson addressed the nation from the White House over radio and television. He summarized the events since the attack on the Maddox on August 2 and informed the nation that "air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile operations." The President told the nation: "In the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Viet-Nam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America. "The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war." He concluded his statement with an acknowledgement of his "solemn" responsibility in ordering the military action, but he considered that "firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace; that firmness will always be measured.'' The President's statement is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pages 927-928, and Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, page 259.
287. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 5, 1964--noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis; Pierce Arrow. Received at 11:58 p.m., August 4. Drafted by Taylor. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to CINCPAC, CIA, and the White House. 303. Deptel 341./2/ In company with Alex Johnson and Westmoreland I saw Khanh at 0930 Saigon time and gave him information and advice contained in reftel. Khanh was delighted with news and asked permission to tell Cabinet which was meeting at 1000. As execution of attacks had not been confirmed, I authorized communication of information less indication of targets. /2/Document 279. At same time, I urged Khanh and he agreed to stress to Cabinet seriousness of situation and need to close ranks and achieve greater unity. There followed considerable discussion of precautionary measures to take in SVN in view of possible hostile reaction. Khanh was inclined to put out something to public warning people (of Saigon in particular) of danger of air attack. We persuaded him not to do so, pointing out danger of panic and got his agreement to say nothing publicly now. Later, following President's statement not yet received here, he will want to make some statement explaining situation and urging national unity. It was agreed that an alert should go out through military channels warning of possible VC reaction and air action against targets in I and II Corps, particularly the air field at DaNang and the 34A marine base. Westmoreland is meeting with DefMin Khiem to work out detailed alert plan./3/ /3/Westmoreland transmitted a report on his meeting with Khiem at 11:30 a.m. in MAC JOO 7425 from Saigon, August 5. Johnson Library, National Security File. Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIV, Memos) General Khanh stated that his air force would like to participate in this action against NVN. I told him that I understood his desire to join forces but that now was not the time. He should keep his military guard up and await outcome of events in progress. Khanh mentioned that in case of air attacks on Saigon he was prepared to move to emergency CPs which he had prepared at Cap St. Jacques, Dalat and Nha Trang. In view of fact that something might happen to him, he suggested giving me a paper asking US intervention and take over of command if he disappeared. I acknowledged this might be a desirable thing but let matter drop. (I would appreciate advice on attitude to take on this point.) Khanh also indicated that he still regards Khiem as his successor. Westmoreland informed Khanh that he was seeing General Minh shortly for purpose of introducing General Throckmorton and got Khanh's agreement to tell Minh the same things which Khanh was about to tell Cabinet regarding events in Tonkin Gulf. I informed Khanh on leaving that US would increase the number of F-102s presently in SVN and he expressed thanks while reminding us that US has the only means for air defense of his country. Taylor
288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations/1/ Washington, August 5, 1964--1:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by Cleveland. 282. For Ambassador Stevenson. Subject: Security Council meeting on torpedo boat incidents. Following is general guidance and suggestions for SC meeting Wednesday morning. Additional memo on legal aspects in septel./2/ /2/Not found. 1. We are coming to the SC to report a threat to the peace, and to report the action we have felt necessary to take as a responsible member of the world community. Although an attack on a U.S. destroyer in international waters is clearly an armed attack on our nation within the meaning of Article 51, our case for UN concern rests more broadly on Charter doctrine that all governments have responsibility to refrain from aggression and armed attack. We are not angry, but sorrowful. It is not (as one TV commentator tonight called it) "a drastic retaliatory action", but rather a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that U.S cannot be diverted by military action from its obligation to help its friends establish and protect their independence. 2. We hope you can encourage other friendly members of SC to make appropriate statements of support. It seems to us that there are five clear votes (US, UK, GRC, Brazil and Bolivia) against any unsatisfactory proposition, but that seven votes are probably lacking for condemnatory res. French, who as usual are swing vote, may take occasion to plug for Geneva Conference; desire to heat up atmosphere in order to get a Geneva Conference may indeed be one of Hanoi and Peking motivations in this affair. 3. In the event North Vietnamese ask to be heard, suggest you not oppose but try to arrange so that they are heard under Rule 39 (under which SC "may invite.../3/ persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence"). In these circumstances, believe Government of South Viet-Nam should also be invited to appear, not under Rule 39 but as government of non-member state concerned. /3/Ellipsis in the source text. 4. As in Cambodian border case, every occasion should be taken to emphasize (a) general context of Geneva Agreements violated by communists and (b) our desire for enforceable peace and assured independence as only motive our military assistance to SVN and our military activity in the area. 5. We do not see any need for seeking formal action of SC and would be satisfied to have SC conclude with no resolution. However, following is suggested draft resolution for possible tactical use in event hostile resolution proposed by Soviets or some other SC member. It is too early to make any definitive judgment as to whether, in absence of hostile resolution, it would be politically desirable to put forward such a resolution, since this would depend in part on amount of support we could get from other Council members as well as what counter-measures, if any, other side may take in response to our retaliation. We recognize that resolution put forward by others would undoubtedly include evenhanded appeal to both sides to refrain from any action which might exacerbate situation. For this reason, we have included in suggested resolution paragraph along these lines which would be acceptable to us and avoids fixing blame on United States. Text of resolution follows: "The Security Council Noting that the North Vietnamese have launched unprovoked attacks on American naval vessels in international waters, Having considered the complaint of the United States, Noting further the measures taken by the United States, Concerned that the continuation of the present situation could lead to a serious threat to peace in the area, Condemns the attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. ships; Calls on the Hanoi regime to respect the freedom of use of the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations, and to cease and desist from any further hostile and provocative acts; Calls on all concerned to refrain from any actions which might further exacerbate the situation." Rusk
289. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 5, 1964--5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret Immediate; Exdis; Pierce Arrow. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to CINCPAC, CIA, and the White House. Received at 6:09 a.m. 310. Delivered President's letter and public statement/2/ to Khanh at 1600 local 5 August. He was pleased to receive letter and expressed complete agreement with it. He understands that it is confidential and not to be released. I took opportunity to stress importance of getting on with our joint military planning which is being initiated today by General Westmoreland and DefMin Khiem. /2/Documents 283 and 286. I gave him in general terms our US plans for reinforcing SEA area of which the introduction into SVN of 2 squadrons of B-57's and 1 squadron of F-102's was a part. He responded that his country was open to US forces at any time and no permission for introduction need be sought, particularly if time presses. I cited danger at time like this to neglect the counter VC campaign and urged him to keep pressure behind the operations in progress. He stated that he had already issued instructions to this effect. He has decided to make Cap St. Jacques his alternate command post. Westmoreland is looking the facilities over today, particularly the signal communications. We decided to postpone the GVN National Security Council-US Mission Council meeting scheduled for tomorrow, 6 August. Still no news here on results of Seventh Fleet strikes. Khanh most interested (as am I). Taylor
290. Memorandum for the Record of the White House Staff Meeting, Washington, August 5, 1964, 8 a.m./1/ /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-202-69. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by William Y. Smith. 1. Mr. Bundy presided. 2. Southeast Asia. Much of today's session was spent discussing various aspects of the Southeast Asia situation, and the entire waterfront was covered. Before getting into specifics, I should state that the general tone of the remarks, especially Bundy's, was that thus far everything the US had done was well in hand. As to possible future developments, there was uncertainty, the feeling being that both friendly and unfriendly reactions would become better known during the day. Bundy began by saying that it is difficult to understand the DRV motives in attacking US warships. He said there obviously was some relation between the recent covert attacks on DRV maritime bases, but how much was not clear. Further, he recognized the DRV might have feared stepped-up US actions against them and decided to act. Still it was difficult to conceive what kind of image they had of the US to think we could stand for such attacks. Later in the meeting I came back to the point of DRV intentions by asking what steps we were taking to find out what Hanoi was thinking. I recalled that at one point we were trying to cultivate the Canadians to perform this chore. Bundy responded that things were being done but he chose not to mention them specifically. He added that one problem was that even after an outsider talked with Hanoi, it was difficult to determine what the DRV had in mind. Wilson of USIA asked what evidence we could offer publicly that the attacks had taken place. Bundy replied that Rowan had stressed last night/2/ the importance of making the evidence public, and he was right. On the first attack, the evidence wou1d be pretty good. On the second one the amount of evidence we have today is less than we had yesterday. This resulted primarily from correlating bits and pieces of information eliminating double counting and mistaken signals. This much seemed certain: There was an attack. How many PT boats were involved, how many torpedoes were fired, etc.--all this was still somewhat uncertain. This matter may be of some importance since Hanoi has denied making the second attack. /2/At the NSC meeting at 6:15 p.m., August 4; see Document 278. Douglass Cater, sitting in at his first staff meeting, raised a question about the Congressional resolution on SE Asia. He said he had not thought it through completely, but the logic behind the resolution troubled him somewhat, and he also questioned use of the Middle East precedent--that turning out a not too successful venture. The logic that troubled him was how an attack on US forces specifically justified a resolution in favor of maintenance of freedom in SE Asia. Bundy, in reply, jokingly told him perhaps the matter should not be thought through too far. For his own part, he welcomed the recent events as justification for a resolution the Administration had wanted for some time. Other points of interest mentioned: Bromley Smith thought it prudent to emphasize that our attacks were reprisals. Thus he thought that restrikes or follow-on air attacks should not continue over an extended period of days. He asked who would approve restrikes. After the meeting I confirmed what Bundy thought: that authority for restrikes would come from Washington, at least from McNamara and probably from the White House. In the same vein, Bromley Smith also thought we should emphasize that "iron" bombs are being used, not nuclear ones. No one thought this a problem: this word is out already. Someone asked what would happen if the ChiComs brought their air power on the DRV. Bundy cautiously said that our people thought we could handle them. He then looked at me and said, "General LeMay doesn't think in terms of the enemy, does he? He assumes they won't be there." I made some response to the effect that General LeMay assumes some of his people will take care of the enemy for him; he doesn't have to worry too much about that. All this was said in good humor, and the matter dropped. Referring to the President's meeting with the Congressional "leadership" yesterday,/3/ Bundy commented that "leadership" was a funny word in this case, in that there was little Congressmen could do in the way of leading in a situation in which the President's role was so primary. 3 See Document 280. [Here follow brief discussions on Cuba, war games, and Daniel Ellsberg.] 6. President's speech. The President originally was to speak of the dangers of nuclear war at Syracuse today He first, among others, decided today was the wrong day; so a new subject was chosen. SE Asia will be covered, to some extent, at least. W.Y.S./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
291. Record of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, Washington, August 5, 1965, 9:15 a.m./1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147. Secret. Drafted by Richard T. Davies, Deputy Executive Secretary. Governor Harriman presided./2/ /2/Secretary Rusk was at a breakfast with Senators Fulbright and Saltonstall and Representatives Morgan and Arends to discuss the Congressional resolution. Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) 1. INR (Mr. Hughes) After reviewing the results of the U.S. strike in the Gulf of Tonkin, Mr. Hughes said that, while there was no official reaction from the CPR, diplomats in Peiping reported the CPR was taking a very grave view of the development. The U.S. strike would vastly increase chances of a direct Sino-U.S. confrontation in their view. There was continuing CPR silence on the original incident of August 3. Japanese reaction was moderate and the Japanese were looking forward to the Security Council meeting. DRV domestic radio has broadcast a statement attacking U.S. sabotage and subversive actions as well as an alleged U.S. air attack on a North Vietnamese village. The Maddox was alleged to have infringed DRV territorial waters on August 2, 3 and 4, and Hanoi radio claimed two U.S. planes have been shot down and three others damaged. The British reaction was relatively favorable. There was no official French reaction yet. Governor Harriman said that, while South Vietnamese vessels have operated in DRV waters, participants in the meeting should tell their embassies in Washington that no U.S. vessels have done so. Mr. Hughes said that Soviet comment so far was quite moderate. [Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.] 2. FE (Mr. Green) It looks as though the Tonkin Gulf action was very effective: about one-half the Swatows and PT boats were destroyed or badly damaged and the oil dump in Vinh has undergone 90 percent destruction. Various redeployments of U.S. forces are going on. The SEATO meeting was satisfactory. 3 The Japanese reaction has been surprisingly positive. 3 A brief report on the special SEATO Council meeting on August 5, which indicated that most of the Council representatives had privately expressed their satisfaction with the U.S. actions, was transmitted in telegram 141 from Bangkok, August 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) [Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
292. Editorial Note At 11:30 a.m. on August 5, President Johnson spoke at the dedication ceremonies for a new journalism building at Syracuse University. After reviewing the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, he told of the U.S. reprisals and the referral of the question to the United Nations. He then reviewed U.S. policy in Vietnam since 1954 and the aggression of North Vietnam toward its neighbors. Later in the day, the President sent a special message to Congress asking for a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting the peace in Southeast Asia." Both the address and the message to Congress are printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pages 928-932, and Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, pages 260-263.
293. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy), Washington, August 5, 1964, 2:22 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by June M. Robinson of the Operations Staff. TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. WM. BUNDY [Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.] B. asked about the resolution--Sec. said Mac Bundy and Ball were now going over the final touches--it was a good resolution and only minor changes were made on the Hill. There is also a short statement which Sec. just went over with the Pres. Sec. said there will be Hearings in the morning--House and Senate. Sec. would like B. and his boys together with McNaughton to put together a ten minute statement to start off and it should among other things analyze the resolution--Sec. said start off with the purpose of the resolution--the purpose of our policy in Southeast Asia and the importance of maximum unity and making unity clear and end up a little bit on the same note.
294. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, August 5, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/UN. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Cleveland and sent to Rusk through S/S. SUBJECT The first session of the Security Council dealing with the North Vietnamese attack on our vessels and our response could hardly have gone better today./2/ After a procedural hassle in which the Deputy Soviet Representative, Morozov, made a pro forma protest at holding the session today without an opportunity to get instructions from Moscow, Ambassador Stevenson delivered the statement essentially as you approved it in the wee hours this morning./3/ /2/Discussion of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin before the U.N. Security Council began at 3 p.m. on Wednesday August 5 and continued at the same hour on August 7. For records of the discussions at these sessions, see U.N. docs. S/PV.1140 and 1141. Ambassador Stevenson's statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, pp. 272-274. /3/A draft of this statement, which is essentially the same as U.N. doc. S/PV.1140, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Despite his allegation of unpreparedness, Morozov replied to Stevenson immediately at some length and introduced a resolution requesting the DRV be heard. While fairly long, the Soviet statement seemed largely improvised and based on press accounts. By normal Soviet standards, Morozov's statement was moderate. He pleaded lack of factual information about the incidents. He said, in general terms, that the Soviet Government expects the United States to put an immediate end to military activities against the DRV, adding that if this were not done, the United States "shall bear heavy responsibilities for the consequences." One almost had the impression that he was not defending a fellow Communist regime, or at least not his kind of Communist regime. The only other speakers delving into the substance of the issue were the UK and China, who fully supported our action as justifiable self-defense within the UN Charter. The French Representative professed inability to speak on substance at this point and merely supported hearing of [from?] the DRV. However, like several other Council members, he believed this could and should be arranged without a formal resolution such as the Soviets had requested. Pursuant to your guidance,/4/ Ambassador Stevenson intervened a second time to say that the U.S. did not object to someone from Hanoi explaining their aggressive acts to the Council, but he pointed out that since these attacks were an extension of the war against South Viet Nam, a representative of the Republic of Viet Nam should also be invited. /4/See Document 288. The session concluded when the Council President, Nielsen of Norway, found a consensus in favor of scheduling no meeting for tomorrow and permitting the day to be used for consultations both on the manner in which North and South Viet Nam would be invited, and on the date of the next meeting. In the absence of further hostilities or serious Communist threats the Security Council deliberation will resume, probably on Friday, in less of a crisis atmosphere and with a possibility that the sessions will be extended over a long period. We now need to consider with you where we want to go in the UN forum from here on in. The debate will inevitably broaden--particularly when and if representatives from Hanoi and Saigon appear. Now that we have discharged our reporting responsibility, we must reflect in longer range terms what if any UN action we can usefully seek to help cope with the vexing problems facing us in Southeast Asia. I very much hope that Ambassador Stevenson's presence here tomorrow will provide an opportunity for us to review this question with you. Late Bulletin: In a corridor conversation after the Council meeting, the Soviets have displayed uncertainty as to whether DRV would accept the invitation to appear in New York, even if it is tendered. Apparently, this feature of the Soviet role today was also improvised.
295. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, August 5, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. The Russian text of the signed original, which was handed to Ambassador Kohler at 9 p.m. on August 5 is ibid. Presumably this translation was made in the Embassy in Moscow. Dear Mr. President: I deem it necessary to personally inform you about the concern that we feel in connection with the events unfolding in the Gulf of Tonkin. From the very outset I want to mention that we know about these events solely from those statements which have been made these days in Washington, from the published orders to the American armed forces, from the reports of the news agencies and also from the statement, just published, by the spokesman of the High Command of the Vietnamese People's Army concerning the incident on August 2 in the Gulf of Tonkin./2/ We do not have other information as yet. One thing is indisputable, however, the situation there has sharply deteriorated and military conflicts are taking place near the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Chinese People's Republic, in which warships of the U.S. Navy are participating as well as military planes--based on American aircraft carriers. Also obvious is the seriousness of these developments--indeed, it is impossible to rule out that they may mushroom into such proportions and turn in such a way that it will be difficult to say where they will stop. /2/Not found. We do not know exactly now just what has happened there. But even irrespective of this the fact remains that the warships of the U.S. Navy have entered the Gulf which cuts deeply into the territories of the DRV and the CPR, and that it is from these ships that fire was opened and aircraft are being launched which according to the latest reports, are making strikes against objectives on the territory of the DRV. Suffice it to look at the map to convince oneself that except the DRV and the CPR there are no other states the territories of which adjoin the Gulf of Tonkin and that, consequently, the very fact of introduction of American warships in that Gulf under any circumstances cannot be viewed in any other way but as a military demonstration, as a challenge to the states whose shores are washed by that Gulf. With all frankness I must say that if these actions of American warships and air forces pursue the aim of strengthening somehow the position of the corrupt and rotten South Vietnamese regime which exists--and this is no secret to anyone--only because of the foreign support, then such actions will not achieve the given aim. But to increase the danger of a serious military conflict--they can. A question arises before me: have not clouds been deliberately darkened around the developments in the Gulf of Tonkin? Is not the influence felt here by those quarters and persons who do not conceal their desire to inflame the passions, to pour oil on the flame and whose militant frame of mind one should regard with great caution and restraint? But if this influence is indeed real and if it has an ear, then another, more serious question arises--where the present developments can lead to? It would be unnecessary to speak in detail now about the enormous responsibility which our two powers bear, you personally as President of the United States and I as Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, in keeping the peace, in ensuring that dangerous events whichever area of the globe they begin with, would not become first elements in the chain of ever more critical and maybe irreversible events. I believe that you should agree with this. And if this is so, then at this moment it is most important to draw from this necessary practical conclusions and proceeding from this lofty responsibility to look at the circumstances around the developments in the Gulf of Tonkin with maximum objectivity and to again and again weigh possible consequences. I would not like here to give play to feelings although this, in all appearance, is justified by the situation. Because of lack of reliable information I confine myself to expressing those thoughts which follow from the main and undeniable fact, namely, that the warships and air forces of the United States have taken military action in the Gulf of Tonkin area. I want to emphasize that no one has asked the Soviet Government to address you in connection with the developments near the coast of the DRV and the CPR. If there appears a threat to peace, I am deeply convinced that we should not wait for requests or appeals from anybody but must act so as to remove that threat without delay. I would like to hope that on your part there will be shown necessary composure and restraint in order to remove the military tension and stop defiant actions of the American armed forces in the Gulf of Tonkin area which may lead to an appropriate response from the other side. Sincerely, N. Khrushchev/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
296. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, August 5, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. Initialed by Rostow and sent to Rusk through S/S. The source text bears the handwritten notation "Secretary Saw." Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 92C. SUBJECT 1. The Setting. The North Viet Nam PT-boat attacks occurred against a background marked, in recent weeks, by divergent tendencies as seen from Hanoi: a. Their military and political prospects in South Viet Nam have substantially improved, and this fact was appreciated and reflected, for example, in General Giap's speech of July 26. b. On the other hand, the U.S. commitment to the defense of Southeast Asia and support of peripheral offensive actions increased both in Laos and in Viet Nam. The covert moves against North Viet Nam and the discussion of the possibility of more direct action against North Viet Nam have been, evidently, taken seriously despite the evident desire of President Johnson to limit the terrain of conflict. They may have reckoned that this danger would rise in the months ahead, notably after our election. It is out of this mixed setting of simultaneously enlarged hopes and fears, with perhaps a sense that time might not be their friend, that they took a course extremely difficult to explain by attacking directly units of the Seventh Fleet. 2. Alternative Theories. The following four major hypotheses might explain the action. a. The least likely, that the attacks on the Seventh Fleet were an effort to seek a response which could be used as a provocation for a previously planned massive military assault on Laos and South Viet Nam either by the overt use of ground forces across frontiers or by forces previously secreted in those areas. b. More likely, Hanoi may have concluded, on the basis of its assessment of SVN politics, that a U.S. failure to react sharply to these attacks might have persuaded the Khanh government that further reliance on the U.S. was unprofitable and that Saigon should seek the best terms it could find with Hanoi. The incident may have been linked in its timing to such a planned or hoped for cave-in by the GVN. c. The attacks could be a device for so raising the international noise level and anxiety about war in Southeast Asia as to force the U.S. into a conference in which the issue of the violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords would be obscured; that is, they could have regarded the move as a device to place us in a position of negotiating under conditions where it would be extremely difficult for us to continue to increase direct pressure on the North, while they continued their military and political campaign in the South, hoping, as in 1954, for a Dienbienphu during the conference. U.S. acceptance of a conference on such terms would be assessed in Hanoi as a damaging, if not mortal, blow to GVN morale. d. The attacks may have been intended as a limited reaction to covert intrusions into the North, and the raised level of our support in SVN and Laos, probably designed to make us back off or to deter us from conducting further operations of this type or from continuing to expand our commitment in the area. 3. Comment on the Hypotheses. We know of no evidence to justify the view that a massive ground force attack by the Communists in Southeast Asia is planned. However, a heightening of all forms of intelligence collection on Communist troop dispositions and movements in Southeast Asia does appear justified. The hope that the U.S. might respond so passively as to trigger a cave-in or coup inside Saigon is a more tenable hypothesis; although the political evidence available from South Viet Nam does not make a connection clear. What is clear, however, is that a failure to react vigorously by the U.S. might, in fact, have had the result of inducing Khanh to throw in his hand. One likely strand in their action was a felt need to make a show of force in the face of our increasing involvement in the area. So far as a conference is concerned, what is clear is that a direct U.S.-Hanoi confrontation may prove a more effective way of forcing us to the conference table, in their view, than a focusing of attention on the state of the 1954 and 1962 Accords, taken by themselves. In short, we cannot give a straight, confident answer to the question: Why did they do it? The most likely elements appear a desire to make a show of force against us; a desire to force us to the conference table on unfavorable terms; and the hope that we would so behave as to weaken the political base in Saigon. 4. The Next Stage. On the whole, it is likely that they did not count on a response as substantial as that now under way. From their point of view, the U.S. strike will appear a rather massive countermove, however limited it may be judged by us. It will create a new situation. Specifically, we would agree in general with the memorandum of August 4 to you from Tom Hughes,/2/ suggesting that they would feel impelled to increase their actions in South Viet Nam and, perhaps, in Laos; that they would seek to bring us to the conference table on unfavorable terms; and that the Chinese Communists might make some move of limited support in air defense, at least. /2/Published ibid., 92A. As a contingency matter, however, we should be prepared for the possibility that Hanoi will feel itself so cornered or humiliated as to feel impelled to engage their ground forces, which constitute their major unused asset, more overtly and substantially in Laos or, even, in South Viet Nam than the Hughes memorandum suggests. This might be more likely if Hanoi interpreted the military deployments we will now be making in the Pacific for deterrent purposes as the prelude to massive attack. Lacking lucid communication from us, they may undertake what they would regard as preemptive action on the ground. 5. Policy Consequences. The Tonkin Gulf incidents, taken as a whole, are likely to have a momentum of their own which we should seek to direct for our own purposes. Specifically, they will tend to shift the vision of the problem out of the context of a struggle for control over Southeast Asia by local Communists, with the U.S. as marginal defenders of the area, to one of direct U.S. confrontation with the Asian Communists. As we suggested to George Ball and Harlan Cleveland last night,/3/ this requires of us, in our Security Council presentation, to ensure that the Tonkin Gulf incidents do not become the exclusive focus for discussion but are kept in the larger perspective of purposeful Communist violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords. It also would make advisable that we strictly discipline our public reporting on the air strike against North Viet Nam to portray the action as an essentially limited retaliatory move, minimizing the details of military reporting, ancillary damage, etc. /3/The only record of a meeting at which Rusk, Ball, Rostow, and Cleveland were present on August 4 is an entry in the Secretary's appointment book for 5:30 p.m. (Johnson Library) The fundamental issue raised by these incidents, however, is the following: (a) if a limited Communist response permits, should we seek to treat these incidents as closed by our action, while we carry forward substantially our present policy on Southeast Asia; or (b) should we take the occasion of these incidents and the perhaps transient unity they bring about in U.S. public opinion and the Congress, to move on to force Hanoi to cease its aggression and to return, essentially, to compliance with the 1954 and 1962 Accords. I believe it is to this fundamental choice that you and the President may wish to address yourselves as the hour-by-hour events of the occasion unfold. Public opinion at home and abroad will require prompt decision and continuing leadership if the Tonkin Gulf incidents are not to result in confusing debate which could gravely weaken our position in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Although the Communist response to our retaliatory strike may determine the choice for us, we should seek to guide the forces set in motion by the Communist attacks on our fleet, to the maximum extent possible. In any case, as we go forward from these incidents and try, by whatever route the President chooses, to move towards a settlement which would restore the 1954 and 1962 Accords, we shall have to shift focus quite rapidly from the |