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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
II. U.S. Assessment of the Khanh Government, February 1 - March 4 Washington, February 1,1964--1:53 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted on January 31 by Mendenhall; cleared by Koren, Green, and in draft with Poats and Blouin; and approved by Harriman. 1165. CINCPAC for POLAD. Saigon pass COMUSMACV for Harkins. Priority Actions Vis-a-vis New GVN. We are sure you agree it important to move in rapidly to furnish advice to General Khanh in order to reduce to minimum loss of momentum resulting from change in government and prevent Viet Cong from capitalizing on change. In addition message on military operations sent other channel,/2/ we consider following as high priority matters to urge on Khanh which we know you consider encompassed in general approach to Khanh outlined Para 2, your 1451:/3/ /2/Document 25. /3/Document 24. 1. He should retain all those civilian ministers whom he and Country Team consider capable. This plus your earlier urging of retention of provincial and district chiefs should provide maximum continuity. 2. He should make prompt announcement of government's intention to maintain and continue Strategic Hamlet program. Announcement should make it clear to both local officials and populace importance government attaches to this program as central element in counterinsurgency concept and should be designed prevent Viet Cong from again making kind of inroads against Strategic Hamlets which they achieved after November coup. Also important for Khanh to designate single vigorous, energetic administrator for this program and see that this administrator gets out directives soonest on all important aspects of this program-security, economic and social, political, population and resources control, etc.-to provincial and district officials. 3. Khanh should see to it that immediate steps are taken to assure that farmer will get as good price for rice during current harvest as last year. Separate cable being forwarded on this./4/ /4/In telegram 1167 to Saigon, February 1, the Department suggested that the Embassy encourage the Khanh government to maintain the guaranteed price of rice. While this would mean a rise in the price of rice to consumers in the cities, it would help the new government win support of the peasants in the countryside. (Department of State, Central Files, INCO-RICE 14 VIET S) 4. He should also be urged carry on and expand previous government's efforts to use land reform in manner attract peasant support. Septel on this also will be sent./5/ /5/ Telegram 1171 to Saigon, February 3, in which the Department noted that the present land tenure system, in which many tenants not having paid rent or taxes for 20 years and squatters taking over land, created "major disincentives" to peasant support of the government. Return of government control might bring return of demands on the peasants for rent, taxes, or displacement by owners. The Embassy was instructed to encourage the government to promote land reform which would negate these "disincentives." (Ibid., E 12 VIET S) 5. He should revitalize amnesty program. Imminent approach of lunar new year holiday should provide good occasion for such announcement. 6. He should pay particular attention to desirability attracting support all religious groups including continuation previous government's special efforts directed at Hoa Hao and Cao Dai. 7. He should treat deposed members of preceding government humanely in order preserve his international image. You may have additional thoughts on high priority items to press on Khanh. Would welcome your views./6/ /6/In telegram 1473 from Saigon, February 3, Lodge responded that he "had already made the points which needed to be made immediately," and at the first opportunity, he would work on paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Rusk
29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, February 1, 1964--1:54 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted on January 31 by Mendenhall; cleared by Koren, Green, the substance of paragraph 1 by Blouin, and the substance of paragraph 2 by Stoneman; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to CINCPAC. The White House copy is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 215D. 1166. CINCPAC for POLAD. Saigon pass COMUSMACV for Harkins. Your 1451./2/ /2/ Document 24. 1. New Prime Minister. We inclined toward view that it better unite Chairmanship MRC and Premiership in Khanh as single individual to promote maximum efficiency in conduct of government. If this done, Khanh should appoint separate personalities as Minister Defense and Chief Joint General Staff to insure that each of these important positions is receiving full-time attention by capable individuals. If you or Khanh believes Khanh should not hold Premiership, you might suggest possibility of Tran Quoc Buu, President CVTC, as personality with political savvy and ability to attract popular support to government. 2. French Presence in Viet-Nam. Should be made absolutely clear to Khanh that we are not in position replace French economic, financial, medical, or cultural role in Viet-Nam. Suggest you give Khanh summary your 1416/3/ to drive home full impact of what involved. In view current attitudes on aid in U.S. we are hard-pressed to furnish assistance now required for support of counterinsurgency program in all its aspects. /3/See footnote 5, Document 24. Khanh should therefore be strongly counseled to avoid any actions which would jeopardize French presence in fields indicated./4/ While we realize he has political problem, he should meet it by means which will not lead to strong French retaliation. This might consist of continued refusal agree to French Ambassador or reduction in size French diplomatic establishment. /4/ In telegram 1473 from Saigon, February 3, Lodge "entirely agreed that we are in no position to replace French economic, financial, medical or cultural role in Vietnam and have made this very clear." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Rusk
30. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, February 1, 1964--3 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House, JCS, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and CIA. 1467. CINCPAC for POLAD. Herewith my preliminary assessment of the new government in Viet Nam. It is very much subject to change as we move along. 1. General Khanh's coup was obviously extremely disconcerting at first blush. We felt we were beginning to make real progress here with the Minh government-in the conduct of the effort against the Viet Cong; and in making General Minh into a popular figure. To overthrow a government which was progressing fairly satisfactorily seemed like a violent and disorderly procedure. In a country in which there are so few able men, it seemed a waste no longer to have the services of Minh, Don, and Kim. One wondered whether the coup was anything more than a crude, if skillful, power grab. 2. On second thought, however, one realized that Generals Don and Kim had never at any time foresworn the possibility of a neutral solution at what might seem to them to be the proper time. They had clearly been working, and working effectively, to strengthen the effort against the Viet Cong. But none of us had ever discussed what the next step would be after the Government of Viet Nam had reached a position of strength. Perhaps they did favor the French neutrality solution at that time. We had all concentrated exclusively on winning. Then I remembered an evening at which I had tended to belittle the effect in Viet Nam of what the French were doing and had said that it took more than mere words to stop a program on which the USA and GVN agreed. On looking back on it, I remember a stony look on General Don's face and total silence when he should have said something. Finally, Ambassador D'Orlandi of Italy, who is one of the shrewdest men here, has thought ever since November that the Minh government was actively in support of General de Gaulle's ideas and would turn overtly neutralist at proper time. He had said this to me several times and had made much of the fact that both Don and Kim were still French citizens, had been aides to Marshal de Lattre when he was here, and had actively worked in the French Secret Service in the past. Therefore Khanh's opinion of the French intentions for neutralization coup might be correct. 3. Also the forward steps of history are often not made by one man or group of men. In U.S., for instance, the men who manage a successful campaign for the party nominations are often not the same as those who manage the election campaigns and they, in turn, are not the same as those who occupy the big posts after the election is won. Similarly, the group that ended the Diem regime and cleaned out much of its dry rot has rendered a service and now a new man has the job of winning the war. 4. Finally, in this country it rarely occurs to anyone that an election is an efficient or appropriate way to get anything important accomplished. The traditional way of doing important things here is by well planned, well thought out use of force. What General Khanh has done does not appear to have shocked the Vietnamese. From the Vietnamese who I see every day, that is, my cook, no. 1 boy, and driver, I hear expressions of admiration for the smoothness of the technique. However, numerous Vietnamese have expressed the opinion to members of my staff that it was a pity that General Minh was removed because he is a "good man". 5. The real question is, therefore: Is Khanh able? Will he really supply some drive in connection with the effort against the Viet Cong? The evidence to date is that he is able, that he has got a lot of drive, and that he is not tolerating any delay. General Westmoreland was in Can Tho yesterday morning and reports that none of the officers there feels any lack of a definite policy or definite directive from on top. 1. [6.] If Khanh is able, his advent to power may give this country one-man command in place of a junta. This may be good. We have everything we need in Viet Nam. The US has provided military advice, training, equipment; economic and social help; and political advice. The Government of Viet Nam has put relatively large number of good men into important positions and has evolved civil and military procedures which appear to be workable. Therefore, our side knows how to do it; we have the means with which to do it; we simply need to do it. This requires a tough and ruthless commander. Perhaps Khanh is it. Lodge
31. Editorial Note At a press conference on February 1, 1966, beginning at 3 p.m., President Johnson read to the news correspondents the text of his message to General Khanh expressing satisfaction on their agreement for the need to increase military activity against the Viet Cong (see footnote 2, Document 25). President Johnson then answered questions, two of which were related to Vietnam. Asked if he ruled out the possibility of neutralization of Vietnam as President de Gaulle had suggested (see Document 27), Johnson replied: "If we could have neutralization of both North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, I am sure that would be considered sympathetically. But I see no indication of that at the moment. I think that if we could expect the Viet Cong to let their neighbors live in peace, we could take a much different attitude. But as long as these raids are continuing and people are attempting to envelop South Viet-Nam, I think that the present course we are conducting is the only answer to that course, and I think that the operations should be stepped up there. I see no sentiment favoring neutralization of South Viet-Nam alone, and I think the course that we are following is the most advisable one for freedom at this point." Asked later if President de Gaulle's proposal for neutralizing Southeast Asia interfered with or made U.S. efforts in Vietnam more difficult, Johnson replied affirmatively, and continued: "We think the course of action that we are following in Southeast Asia is the only course for us to follow, and the most advisable at this time. We plan to pursue it diligently and, we hope, successfully on a stepped-up basis." Toward the end of the press conference, President Johnson was asked to elaborate on his statement that he would sympathize with neutralization of both North and South Vietnam and how this idea differed from President de Gaulle's plan for neutralization of Indochina. Johnson responded: "You will have to ask General de Gaulle about the details of his proposal. But as I understand it, the neutralization talk has applied only to South Viet-Nam and not to the whole of that area of the world. I think that the only thing we need to do to have complete peace in that area of the world now is to stop the invasion of South Viet-Nam by some of its neighbors and supporters." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pages 257-260)
32. Memoranda of Telephone Conversations Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Manning) and the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, February 1, 1964 /1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Papers: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Mildred Asbjornson. TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. MANNING, 3:45 p.m. Mr. Manning called from the White House and said he was under a handicap since he did not yet have a copy of the Pres's press conference transcript but the Pres had said on the neutralization of Vietnam, we were sympathetic to neutralization of both North and South. Manning said this didn't pose too much of a problem. Pres had said we were opposed to De Gaulle's idea of neutralization. The Sec said the two didn't quite fit. Manning said the French press were dictating stories and tearing this apart. The Sec suggested Manning call Harriman. Manning said he would call Sec back when he got hold of a transcript. TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. MANNING (at the WH), 4:25 p.m. The Sec said he had been watching TV on the Pres's press conference on the question of neutralization of Vietnam and also on what De Gaulle had said. Mr. Moyers got on the phone and asked the Sec if he would dictate to him a clarification of what the Pres had said on these two things. Sec said: "It was obvious from what he said that the President was concerned about the interpretation put on President De Gaulle's discussion of neutralization in Southeast Asia itself. Out there it was taken to mean some sort of neutralization of South Vietnam which will simply expose that country to continued penetration from the north. Since President De Gaulle has not made any detailed proposals, it is easy to see how this interpretation could cause such deep concern in South Vietnam." The Sec said he would not put this clarification in the Pres's mouth but as background clarification from Salinger's office. Moyers asked if they couldn't say that the Pres and the Sec had discussed this matter of interpretation only today. The Sec said they could add to above-"The President had discussed just today with the SecState the depth of concern of the anxiety in South Vietnam." TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. MANNING (from WH), 4:55 p.m. Mr. Manning said we were not completely finished with the clarification. He said in the middle of the two questions in the Pres's press conference a newsman had asked if De Gaulle's proposal interfered with our objectives and the Pres had said: yes. The Pres said that De Gaulle was entitled to his opinion and we had expressed ours. We thought our course was the only wise one and we planned to pursue it on a stepped up basis. Manning said that De Gaulle, in talking about Southeast Asia, was referring to what was formerly Indochina. The Sec said that, just [as] in the classroom, the Pres did not completely [and] accurately understand just what De Gaulle was talking about. We ought to deflect the whole business to what the people in Southeast Asia think De Gaulle is talking about. Manning said we should make ourselves clear that what the Pres was rejecting was the neutralization of South Vietnam. That was what South Vietnam was concerned about./2/ As far as De Gaulle was concerned, let him come up with details. /2/ In telegram 1170 to Saigon, February 1, 7:15 p.m., the Department sent to the Embassy the following information on the President's statements on neutralization: "There may be attempts to distort the meaning of what the President said at press conference this afternoon regarding the de Gaulle neutralization proposal. In order head off conflicting interpretations, you should make absolutely clear in response to any inquiries, or direct statement by you if need be, that President firmly opposed to de Gaulle proposal for neutralization, that this has been and continues to be the position consistently taken by the US Government. It would be incorrect to read any change in policy into the President's remarks. This borne out by letter which Present sent General Khanh this afternoon." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
33. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, February 4, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. 11, Memos and Misc. Secret and Personal. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1975, 175B. SUBJECT South Vietnam Herewith my overnight thoughts for your lunch today:/2/ /2/ Reference is to a luncheon meeting at the White House at 1:04 p.m. among the President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy. The meeting ended at 2:45 p.m. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found, but see Document 34 and Document 35. 1. If Lodge must remain, the military commander must be changed. The President might publicly load Lodge with full responsibility for the whole U.S. effort in South Vietnam, giving him as deputy the ablest, most modern-minded 3-star general we can find. General Westmoreland might fill the bill. He doesn't have to have an extra star, if he is acting as Lodge's deputy. 2. Here in Washington we should get a Manager for South Vietnam. He should be in the Department of Defense at a level which would permit him to deal with the Under Secretaries and the Assistant Secretaries of State and the Aid Agency Administrator. He should be McNamara's man. He should concern himself with operations in South Vietnam and on policy matters he should report to McNamara, Rusk and Harriman. I have in mind someone like Vance, your brother Bill, or possibly Solbert. 3. We should set up immediately a group of about 10 people who would meet together for approximately two weeks, completely free from all other responsibilities, preferably not in Washington but possibly in Honolulu or some reasonably secluded place, to think of specific things which we should do to improve our effort inside South Vietnam. Since we really do not have all of the best people for this job in Washington, we should draw from the following sources: one or two of the best people from MACV; one or two from USOM in Saigon; one or two from the Embassy in Saigon and/or State; one from the CIA; one each from Krulak's shop and ISA; and possibly one from the academic world like Fishel or Lucian Pye./3/ Solbert could be the Chairman of such a group; and we should be ruthless in providing him the time and resources of the best people, regardless of their duties or rank. /3/ Wesley R. Fishel, Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, and Lucian W. Pye, Professor of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 4. There should be another group assembled entirely from Washington which should be working at the same time on diplomatic and military plans for U.S. initiatives in the SEA area as a whole, principally outside South Vietnam. Believe it or not, I would not be averse to having Walt Rostow handling this one, provided he had tough representation from all the schools of thought. Michael V. Forrestal/4/ /4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
34. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, February 4, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides Files, McGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with the President, Vol. 1 [Part 2]. Secret. Bundy wrote the following note on the source text: "P[resident] used all this in lunch with results not yet clear. McGB" SUBJECT Your luncheon with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara You said yesterday that you wanted to talk about South Vietnam and about Africa at this lunch. 1. On South Vietnam There are two kinds of questions here: a. What stronger courses of action can we take? The gut question here is whether and how we can bring pressure on North Vietnam. The working levels of the government are now inclined to argue that we can, but we do not yet have a plan. Such a plan would need a closely interlocked military and diplomatic program so as to lay the widest possible basis of support for an action which will make almost all our allies nervous except perhaps Nationalist China, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand. b. To get any plan and to give it a better chance of success we need improvement in our organization here and in the field. In the field If Lodge must stay then the transfer from Harkins to Westmoreland should be speeded up, and we need to have an intense back-and-forth communication from Washington to Lodge himself. At home We must end the deep-seated lack of confidence which exists between senior people at Defense and the Hilsman office. My own judgment is that government needs a senior officer, accepted as first-rate by all concerned, who will make South Vietnam and related problems his only business. My nominee would be Mike Forrestal, but I would be glad to have him wear a Defense hat or State hat if that would help. I emphasize the role of Defense because that is where the resources are, and McNamara is the man with the heaviest personal commitment. [Here follow recommendations on item 2, Africa.] McG. B./2/ /2/ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
35. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, February 4, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall. A note on the source text indicates Rusk saw this memorandum. SUBJECT Viet-Nam In addition to Deptels 1165 and 1166 to Saigon (attached),/2/ we believe you should be aware of the following in connection with the lunch which you are having with the President and Secretary McNamara on Viet-Nam: /2/ Documents 28 and 29. 1. Khanh's reaction to the President's letter--Khanh has expressed pleasure at receiving the letter President Johnson sent on Saturday. He has issued a press release with the text of the letter and the comment that the U.S. and Vietnamese Governments have an absolute identical point of view on intensifying the war against the Communists (Saigon's telegram 1481, February 4)./3/ /3/ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 US/Johnson) 2. Diemist Revival?--We have a few inconclusive signs that Khanh's coup signifies a Diemist revival. This would lead to political instability because of the strong opposition of the students, Buddhists and intellectuals to a return of the Diemists. There has already been a student demonstration in support of "complete revolution" (and at least partly in support of General Minh-Saigon's telegram 1482, February 4)./4/ /4/ Not printed. (Ibid., POL 23-8 VIET S) 3. Low-level American Advisers--The displaced junta did not give us a final answer on our proposal of assigning American advisers at District level and in other lower level capacities than they now function. We believe this proposal should be taken up with Khanh and at least pushed on an experimental basis. We are inclined to think that the increase in efficiency would outweigh the risk of successful Viet Cong capitalization on American presence at a low level. An experimental approach should prove the validity of our belief. We propose to move a cable to Saigon along these lines. 4. North Viet-Nam--In the present context resulting from France's recognition of Communist China we believe that it is desirable for the U.S. to search for some means of action for recovering the psychological initiative. We are therefore cooperating with Defense and CIA in a new review of possible actions against North Viet-Nam. 5. Laos--We believe that it would be useful and important to supply Prince Souvanna Phouma with existing evidence of Viet Cong use of the Laos corridor for infiltration into Viet-Nam, and taking steps to see that this is done. Such information should be politically useful to Souvanna in dealing with the DRV and also build political support for intelligence collection operations in southern Laos. 6. Reporting--Secretary McNamara may raise the question of reporting from the U.S. agencies in Saigon. This question is now being actively worked on by the Interdepartmental Working Group on VietNam and we expect to send instructions to Saigon shortly. We are reviewing the substance, mode of presentation and frequency of assessment reporting-both overall and by province--as well as the personnel and sources of material for reporting. Defense has urged the dispatch of a State-DOD-CIA team to Saigon to improve reporting, but we have resisted this suggestion on the ground that the first task is for Washington to define what it considers the weaknesses in the reporting. If this can be done it ought to be possible to get a satisfactory response from Saigon without sending still another team out there.
36. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ Washington, February 5, 1964. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 092 Vietnam. Top Secret; Exdis. According to the Department of State copy of this letter, Mendenhall was the drafter. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Dear Bob: I have read with a great deal of interest the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of January 22, 1964, on Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia, which you forwarded with your letter of January 28, 1964./2/ /2/ See Document 17. I share the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in Viet-Nam we must demonstrate to both the Communist and the non-Communist worlds that the "wars of national liberation" formula now being pushed so actively by the Communists will not succeed. The Joint Chiefs have, in my view, correctly remarked that the focus of the counterinsurgency battle lies in South Viet-Nam itself, and the war must be fought and won primarily in the minds of the Vietnamese people. This means that this war, like other guerrilla wars, is essentially political--an important fact to bear in mind in determining command and control arrangements in Viet-Nam. I also agree with the Joint Chiefs that we must follow an integrated U. S. approach in Southeast Asia to achieve our policy objectives. We must determine what the effects will be on the other countries in the area of any major action we take in or with respect to a given country. We must also determine with respect to any proposed action what we can realistically expect to achieve with that action, and balance that against the political and military risks attendant upon that action before reaching a decision. I have noted the list of possible actions which the Joint Chiefs may wish to consider recommending from a military standpoint as the situation develops. The Department of State will, of course, always be prepared to consider promptly, in the light of the factors mentioned above, any courses of action which the Joint Chiefs and the Department of Defense propose. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean
37. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, February 7, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. III, Memos and Misc. Top Secret. South Vietnam General Khanh has discussed with Lodge the composition of his Government (Saigon's 1510)./2/ It looks pretty good. General Minh as Chief of State will be a big help both in South Vietnam and internationally. As the cable points out, it will leave General Khanh somewhat more free to attend to the substantive problems of winning the war. /2/ Dated February 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) The White House copy is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 215C. Lodge had an earlier discussion with Khanh on February 5 during which he expressed concern for Khanh's safety and asked what precautions Khanh was taking against possible coupe. Khanh dismissed the threat, and assured Lodge that he planned to move quickly and vigorously in prosecuting the war. (Telegram 1493 from Saigon, February 5; Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET S. The White House copy of telegram 1493 is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 215A.) The Vice Prime Minister in charge of Pacification, Mr. Hoan is a Dai Viet leader. Carl and I met him here once in Washington, and we were not particularly impressed. I gather he will be in charge of the civilian side of the struggle. He has, however, I believe, a fairly large Nationalist following. Other hopeful signs are Oanh (Carl's friend) as Minister of Finance, Mau (Diem's old Foreign Minister) back in the same job,/3/ and National Defense under Khiem. The Government as a whole seems to include almost every geographic and non-Communist political faction. I am asking State and the Agency to do a more thorough evaluation. /3/ Tran Ngoc Oanh was Minister of Public Works and Vu Van Mau did not have a Cabinet post in the Diem government. [Here follows a summary of developments in Laos.] On top of this,/4/ we have intelligence strongly suggesting that a high level meeting between the North Vietnamese and the Chinese is taking place in a town called Mengtzu near the North Vietnamese border. There has also been a significant movement of Chinese interceptor and bomber aircraft into this area. /4/ Reference is to the worsening situation in Laos and the possibility of a Pathet Lao military offensive. These indications plus the situation in South Vietnam suggest to me that any organizational changes that we make here in Washington should occur quickly, so that we have a strong team to deal with the trouble which I sense will be developing in the months of March and April. Mike
38. Report From the Executive Director-Comptroller of Central Intelligence (Kirkpatrick) and the Station Chief in Saigon (de Silva) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)/1/ Saigon, February 10, 1964. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-75. Alternate Proposals. Secret. The source text is a copy of the report that the CIA sent McNamara on February 10 under cover of a memorandum explaining that this analysis was not being formally disseminated because it was a reply to a personal request from McCone. 1. With regard to the conduct of the war, we must judge that the situation at this moment must be characterized as one in which the population at large appears apathetic, without enthusiasm either for the GVN or the VC sides but responsive to the latter because it fears the VC. The most important single factor continues to be whether or not the rural population will be willing to defend itself against the VC and to support GVN actions against the VC. In this sector, there now seems to be less conviction and resolution, and a more widespread inclination to avoid the problems of opposing the VC, and to play both sides in hopes somehow of getting along peacefully and without personal commitment. 2. Obviously this gradual abrading of the popular will to resistance, if such is indeed taking place as it appears to be to us here in Saigon, is of the most fundamental importance, and constitutes a trend which must be altered and reversed. What is needed in this regard and very soon are a series of GVN successes in the military sphere which would go [far] toward implanting and nourishing a popular attitude that the GVN has the means of bringing security and a sense of ease to the rural population, and is clearly determined to do so on an everbroadening front throughout the countryside. Only within some such atmosphere of hopefulness can the will and the resolve to oppose the VC be strengthened, and it must be if this war is to be won. 3. The new regime will enjoy stability in direct proportion to the degree it galvanizes and energizes the government apparatus and in particular the Vietnamese military establishment in terms of an aggressive and successful prosecution of the fight. If the present regime should give an impression of uncertainty, apathy, or irresoluteness, it would appear logical to assume that its days as a government would inevitably be numbered, and it would also seem logical that its successor would be a regime destined to lend itself to solutions to end the fighting on conditions which we would find highly undesirable. In short, the present regime can be a stable one if it takes the initiative and forces it on a government structure and a population waiting to be led and hopefully still willing to be led in an anti-VC cause. If the regime falters and appears to be failing in this regard, there are undoubtedly elements in Vietnam who will be willing to make their move and seek other solutions. 4. Mr. Kirkpatrick's personal comment is as follows: I agree with the above but must note that even armed with your pessimistic comments following your last visit I have been shocked by the number of our (CIA) people and of the military, even those whose job is always to say we are winning, who feel that the tide is against us. Admittedly this is based on a limited number of discussions here and in Danang in three days. There are ominous indications that the VC are able to mount larger operations than in the past using bigger arms, including anti-aircraft. Vietnamese Government reactions are still slow, defensive and reminiscent of French tactics here a decade ago. There are still really no fundamental internal security measures of any effectiveness such as identity cards, block wardens, travel controls, etc. Extensive use by the VC of the waterways leaves the GVN handcuffed. It is evident that a major factor in VC victories is their superior intelligence based on nationwide penetrations and intimidation at all levels. This also is a factor in their military victories where internal agents turn guns on defenders. Finally, with the Laos and Cambodia borders open, this entire pacification effort is like trying to mop the floor before turning off the faucet.
39. Memorandum From the President's Special Assist3nt for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, February 10, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 1. Confidential. SUBJECT Notes for your meeting with Senator Mansfield today at 6:00/2/ /2/ The meeting took place from 6:35 p.m. to 7:15 p.m., February 10. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. 1. Vietnam On Vietnam he continues to believe in the de Gaulle approach, and we don't, though public finger-pointing at de Gaulle is not your line. I suggest you should say to him that for the present any weakening of our support of anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam would give the signal for a wholesale collapse of anti-Communism all over Southeast Asia. Khanh's government may be our last best chance, and we simply cannot afford to be the ones who seem to pull the plug on him. For this reason you might wish to urge Mansfield himself not to express his own doubts in public, at least for a while. His Vietnamese memoranda are at Tab A./3/ /3/ Document 2 and Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 691-692. You are acting promptly to reorganize the Washington end of our South Vietnamese operations and depending on the success of your conversation with Sullivan, you may wish to tell Mansfield in confidence of your plans. The draft NSAM is attached at Tab B./4/ /4/ Not attached; for the approved NSAM, see Document 46. [Here follow items 2-4 which are unrelated to Vietnam.] McG. B.
40. Editorial Note On February 11, 1966, McGeorge Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 284, "Official Visits to South Vietnam," which directed that official visits by high-ranking military and civilian personnel to South Vietnam be coordinated with the Department of State through the Chairman of the Committee on Policy and Operations in Vietnam. NSAM 284 superseded NSAM 217, January 25, 1963, printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume III, page 63. On January 10, 1964, Roger Hilsman had recommended to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State, Benjamin Read, that NSAM 217 be reissued. Hilsman's memorandum to Read reads in part as follows: "As you know, there has been a constant flow of high-level visitors to South Viet-Nam during the past couple months. I feel quite strongly that we must be careful not to overload this circuit. After all our purpose in Viet-Nam is to get on with the war. To the extent we divert the Generals as well as our own people from this task, we are not helping matters. It is clear that the Generals themselves feel we have been too importunate in the matter of visitors, and I am sure that Ambassador Lodge shares this view." Hilsman asked that the Assistant Secretary of State be given responsibility for coordinating visits to South Vietnam. Read complied, because the draft of NSAM 284 which he sent Bundy indicated Hilsman as the coordinator. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-10 VIET S) The NSAM as issued, however, gave the responsibility to William Sullivan, the newly-designated Chairman of the Vietnam Committee. For Sullivan's responsibilities, see Document 46.
41. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House/1/ Washington, February 12, 1964, 4:30 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, Jan-March, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Willis C. Armstrong. Approved by the Executive Secretary on February 27 and by the White House on February 24. The source text is labeled Part II of a six-topic meeting. British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas Home was in Washington for an official visit, February 12-14. SUBJECT Southeast Asia PARTICIPANTS British Side Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
U.S. Side The President
The President suggested that the Secretary of State comment on the situation in Southeast Asia, and the Secretary remarked that good progress had already been made by representatives of the two governments in a common approach to Southeast Asian problems. He explained the talks of February 10 and 11,/2/ and went on to say that agreement had been reached to have some language in the communique to cover our understanding on Southeast Asia, particularly on Viet Nam and Malaysia./3/ Mr. Butler made the point that Britain supported US efforts in Viet Nam and was quite prepared to say so in the communique, whereas Britain was anxious to have a comparable reference to Malaysia in the same paragraph./4/ /2/ These meetings concerned planning for the Indonesia-Malaysia crisis. /2/ These meetings concerned planning for the Ind/3/This understanding was reached at a discussion between U.S. and U.K. of officials headed by Butler and Rusk, February 12, dealing with Southeast Asian problems in general. (Memorandum of a meeting at the White House, February 12, 3 p.m.; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2369) /4/ The joint communique, February 13, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, pp. 336-337. It did contain references to British support for U.S. policy in Vietnam and U.S. support for British policy in Malaysia. The Secretary reported further that there had been agreement to have a good thorough NATO discussion next week, with the US talking about South Viet Nam and Laos and with the UK speaking of Malaysia and Cambodia. He also noted the intention of the British to consider with the French what they mean by neutrality in Southeast Asia. Mr. Butler referred to the message from Couve de Murville explaining that neutrality for Cambodia was separable and separate from any efforts with respect to Viet Nam. The Secretary emphasized further that a review with Mr. Butler in an earlier conversation had indicated that in general the US and UK were approaching Southeast Asian problems very much in the same way, should keep in close touch with each other, and should move forward along various lines to be mutually helpful./5/ /5/ In a private conversation, February 12, from 11 a.m. to approximately noon, Home gave Johnson similar assurances although he stated that Great Britain "must help quietly because of its peacekeeping role under the agreements of 1954." (Memorandum for the record by Bundy, February 13; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Vol. 1) The Prime Minister said to the President that he thought that the visit of Attorney General Kennedy had been extremely helpful in the harmonization of views on Indonesia and Malaysia./6/ He again referred to British support for US efforts in South Vietnam. The President said this was helpful, because there were always questions in the US as to the extent to which our allies were also committed to support such efforts. The Secretary commented that the object of the NATO discussion on Southeast Asia was to alert all the allies to the problems caused there by Communist forces and to identify their interests. The Prime Minister added that the message from Couve de Murville had indicated a willingness to make a public statement on Cambodia's neutrality, separating it from any question of South Viet Nam. /6/ Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy undertook a 13-day mission to the Far East, January 15-27, in which he represented President Johnson in talks with the leaders of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia concerning the dispute over Malaysia. Kennedy also conferred with officials in Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. For an account of the mission, see Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1964, pp. 239-243. The Prime Minister wondered whether the situation in South Viet Nam was worse, or whether it was holding. The Secretary of State said the situation was worse, since there had been a real increase in the capability of the Vietcong. He noted that the resources, human and material, exist, but pointed out that the local Vietnamese have not been sufficiently vigorous. He said we must see what more can be done to help the Vietnamese to do the job, and that the next several weeks of the dry season are critical. [4 lines of source text not declassified] The President remarked that it was very hard to get a clear picture of the facts in the Vietnamese situation. Mr. Bundy said that this meeting of our two countries and others with other allies could help a good deal. De Gaulle expresses himself, but does not make any contribution otherwise. The change of government in Viet Nam and the press release of General de Gaulle/7/ had both tended to damage confidence, and meetings such as the present one could help restore it. The Secretary remarked that the UK and US were both using the olive branch and arrows in Southeast Asia, but that de Gaulle was using only the olive branch, and his efforts did not improve the situation. The Prime Minister remarked that "none of these fellows" in Southeast Asia fight very well. The Secretary of State said that the South Vietnamese had really done quite well, all things considered. The Prime Minister said he was not happy about the Malays as fighters, or the Thais. He said that Britain was fortunate to still have some Gurkhas in the area. /7/ See Document 27.
42. Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency/1/ Washington, February 12, 1964. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 350.05 Southeast Asia. Secret. Attached to a memorandum of transmittal, February 12, from Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Carroll to Secretary of Defense McNamara. SNIE 50-64, "The Situation in Southeast Asia," is not printed. Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimate File, 14.3 NVN) BRIEF SNIE 50-64, Short-Term Prospects in Southeast Asia This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 12 February 1964. Significant judgments of this estimate are as follows: Certain signs of new North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist military activities, together with an upsurge of Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, recent Viet Cong successes there, and recent Communist advances in Laos, raise the question whether the situations in South Vietnam and Laos may be on the verge of collapse. After carefully reviewing the evidence, we believe: That the situation in South Vietnam is very serious, and prospects uncertain. Even with US assistance approximately as it now is, we believe, unless there is a marked improvement in the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and armed forces, that the South Vietnamese have at best an even chance of withstanding the insurgency threat during the next few weeks or months. That if present trends in Laos are not checked, there will be continued erosion of non-Communist military and political positions there. The Laos situation may deteriorate rapidly, and it could take a turn which would further improve the Viet Cong position in South Vietnam. That dramatic new Chinese Communist intervention in Vietnam or Laos is unlikely. North Vietnam, however, is stepping up its support of the Pathet Lao, and may do so for the Viet Cong-perhaps with some increase of Chinese Communist material assistance. The Communist hope in South Vietnam would be to gain sufficient quick victories before General Khanh's new government could bring its full military potential to bear, to undermine the South Vietnamese will to resist, and to induce the US to consider a negotiated settlement its only feasible option. That developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia, save in Cambodia, have thus far had little impact on those in Vietnam and Laos. However, the outcome of the present war in South Vietnam will have a serious effect on the future willingness of governments in Southeast Asia to adopt anti-Communist, rather than neutralist, stances.
43. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, February 13, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Southeast Asia. Top Secret; For the Secretary Only. Rusk's initials appear on the source text. SUBJECT Southeast Asia The essential points to be made by the President to a conference of Congressional leaders, in asking for a Resolution, are these. They would require coordinated elaboration (as at President Truman's famous conference on Greece and Turkey in 1947)/2/ among yourself, Secretary McNamara, and General Taylor. /2/ Apparent reference to a meeting with congressional leaders, February 27, 1947, described in Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II (Garden City, NY, 1956), p. 103. 1. Southeast Asia is a critical area to the United States and to our world position. The loss of Viet Nam would endanger Southeast Asia. Thailand would no longer rely on U.S. backing. Laos, Cambodia, and probably Burma would go to the Communists. Taiwan's morale would crumble. The Philippines, Korea, and Japan would be insecure. Sukamo would be confirmed in his semi-pro-Communist stance. Malaya would be endangered. The Indian subcontinent would be outflanked. The Middle East and East Africa would be substantially opened up. The credibility of our European stance under the Johnson Administration would be put in question; for our commitments to South Viet Nam are no less explicit than our commitments to Berlin. 2. South Viet Nam is in danger. The internal position in South Viet Nam created by the systematic operations conducted from North Viet Nam is precarious. From outside: the 1962 Geneva Accord and the 1954 Accord are not being respected. North Vietnamese troops are still in Laos; North Vietnamese arms and men are being introduced into South Viet Nam; the war is run by a general staff in the north via a complex communications network; the morale in South Viet Nam (and Southeast Asia) has been weakened by the failure of the West to stop this violation of the 1962 Agreement. 3. Although difficult tasks would still be faced in South Viet Nam and Laos if North Vietnamese compliance with the 1962 Agreement was enforced, we see no possibility of achieving short-run or long-run stability in the area until it is enforced. This is not a new judgment. General Taylor reported to President Kennedy on November 3, 1961: "While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Vietnam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training, and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders. Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of aggression, after the fact of external aggression is clearly established? It is our view that our government should undertake with the Vietnamese the measures outlined herein, but should then consider the broader question beyond."/3/ /3/ Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, p. 477. 4. We have given the 1962 Agreement a chance to work. The time has now come for the United States to use every means at its command, diplomatic and military, to enforce compliance. 5. We believe there is a fair chance that compliance can be enforced without substantial military engagement if there is a united expression of determination by the Executive and Congressional branches of the Government, backed by our people, for these reasons: a. Ho has an industrial complex to protect: he is no longer a guerrilla fighter with nothing to lose. b. Ho does not wish the Chinese in Hanoi. c. The Chinese Communists are militarily and economically weak but committed to split from Moscow and anxious to come out in the world. d. Mao's doctrine has always been: "When the enemy advances, withdraw; when the enemy falters, attack." e. Moscow has ample reasons not to engage its forces in Southeast Asia or elsewhere if U.S. is determined and united. In short, if our objective is compliance with the 1954 and 1962 Agreements--and not the invasion of North Viet Nam or China--we may be able to achieve it without major military operations, but only if we are united, determined, and prepared for any level of escalation. 6. If we do not take this action now, we not only endanger Southeast Asia, but we encourage the Communists everywhere (including the Caribbean) to believe that it is accepted by the West as legal to conduct wars of "National Liberation" across borders, with resistance possible only from within; and that if guerrilla war successfully takes hold, the West surrenders. Obviously, at some stage, we would react; but then we will have to do so with greater violence from a profoundly weakened Western position. 7. Therefore, we are asking Congressional and national support to draw the line in the dust at the borders of South Viet Nam. The essentials of a Congressional Resolution are: a. To call attention to the continued violation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords; b. To reaffirm the United States commitment to Southeast Asia under the Manila Pact; c. To reaffirm the United States commitment, made by three Presidents, to the continued independence of the people of South Viet Nam; d. To call on the President to use all the means at our command to enforce compliance with the 1954 and 1962 Accords. 8. At the time of presentation to the Congress of the case for a Congressional Resolution, we shall be publishing evidence of the violation of the Geneva Accords. 9. In the wake of a Congressional Resolution, we shall: --Move additional forces into the area; --Take a series of diplomatic moves to inform both our Allies and the various Communist regimes of our intention to impose measured, limited sanctions on North Viet Nam, if necessary, to enforce compliance. 10. There will be considerable confusion in the Free World, which will fear a confrontation; and this will be heightened by the Communists, de Gaulle, Lippmann, etc. The chances of not having to drop bombs in the North will depend substantially on whether the Executive Branch and the Congress remain united and resolute. Let us put all other considerations aside and stay together. 11. If we can make this proposition stick in Southeast Asia, our job with Castro will be greatly eased and the long-run prospects for a peaceful world under law enhanced.
44. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, February 14, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. Rusk's initials appear on the source text. SUBJECT Contingency Planning for Southeast Asia Governor Harriman, Alexis Johnson, Roger Hilsman, Bill Sullivan and I will be meeting with you at 4:30 p.m. today./2/ /2/ The meeting began at 4:40 p.m. and lasted until almost 5:30. Robert Johnson also attended. Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No record of the meeting has been found. The purpose of our meeting will be to report to you the results of our individual review of the attached report on Southeast Asia prepared by the Policy Planning Council. A summary of the concept and key issues examined in this report are at Tab A. I recommend you thumb through the table of contents (Tab B)/3/ which will give you an idea of the scope of the paper. /3/ Not attached to the source text. A copy of the table of contents and the draft report is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. I recommend that you give your approval to the following proposals: 1. That the Tuesday Planning Group at its next meeting take on the job of serving as a steering group to provide general guidance and direction to the preparation of a contingency plan for the imposition of measured sanctions against North Viet-Nam. As you know, Governor Harriman and Alex Johnson are regular members of that group. For these purposes we would add others as required, including immediately senior representatives of FE and USIA. 2. That the Planning Group establish a working group under State Department chairmanship to prepare the necessary studies and plans. The objective of the next planning stage is not to produce a recommended policy. It is to produce a complete politico-military scenario which we can lay before senior officers of the Government so that they may judge whether and under what circumstances a forward policy of the kind examined here might prove wise and viable. [Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.] Tab A SUMMARY OF CONCEPT AND KEY ISSUES I. The Concept The paper is not a plan, but an exposition of issues that would need to be examined in preparing a plan. It examines a concept designed to cause North Vietnam (the DRV) (a) to cease its illegal infiltration of men and arms into South Vietnam, its direction of the war in South Vietnam and its supporting activities in Laos; and (b) to withdraw its troops or cadres from both countries and to comply fully with the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. The concept is based upon the assumption that the imposition of graduated political, military and, possibly, economic sanctions on the DRV could cause it to call off the war principally because of its fear that it would otherwise risk loss of its politically important industrial development; because of its fear of being driven into the arms of Communist China; and because of Moscow's, Peiping's and Hanoi's concern about escalation. II. Key Issues 1. The question of how to define operational objectives that will command wide support at home and abroad; provide a reasonably clear-cut basis for measuring Communist performance and not provide undue opportunities for Communist delaying tactics and political warfare; and therefore provide the basis for determining when U.S. pressures should be continued, when halted. As a related matter, how important and how feasible are inspection arrangements or other means of insuring continued DRV compliance? 2. The question of the degree of the U.S. commitment. We must be prepared to withstand, if necessary, possibly great international political pressures which might force us to desist before we have achieved our objective. We must consider how far we are prepared to go in meeting Communist military responses. We must consider the actions that we would take in the event of either success or failure. 3. Against the background of the past, how do we develop a convincing case against the DRV that will command, at a minimum, broad domestic U.S. support and some international support and at the maximum, broad international support? 4. How might the crisis be terminated? Are there acceptable turning off points? Under what circumstances would we be prepared to go to an international conference and for what purpose? 5. We must consider how far we are prepared to go in providing additional commitments of support to South Vietnam, Thailand and, perhaps, the Philippines, and whether, even with such commitments, they will give us their initial and their continued support. 6. We face broad tactical choices: whether we should move quickly or slowly in posing and carrying out our threat to the DRV; whether we should begin on the covert or the overt level and how and when we should move from one level of action to the other. 7. We need to reexamine organization for making and implementing policy in the context of an intense and possibly protracted politico-military crisis to insure responsiveness to top-level control without neglect of expert advice and local problems. 45. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ Washington, February 14, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides Files, McGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with the President, Vol. 1, [Part 2]. Secret and Personal. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1977, 109B. SUBJECT South Vietnam I wanted to give you some thoughts for your forthcoming trip to Saigon./2/ I agree that the next four or five months will be critical in the sense that if a favorable political and military trend does not develop in that period, we will slowly lose our position in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia. Thus we have a very short time within which to make the changes in our own organization in the field to produce a coherent effort from the American side. /2/ The McNamara mission visited South Vietnam March 8-12. I have the impression that since last November 1st our own efforts in support of what we used to call the Strategic Hamlet Program have deteriorated badly. I refer to that collection of activities which included the Montagnard program, hamlet militia training, CIDG training, police training, pig and fertilizer programs, etc.; in short, all of the mixed civil and military counterinsurgency programs which about a year ago seemed to be working well. The two coups obviously have affected the GVN's efforts, but I am also worried lest our own organization has deteriorated. We have lost [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a rather large and extraordinarily successful effort with the Montagnards on the Central Plateau. Recent reports suggest to me that what we once thought was a solid program is beginning to fall apart in that region. A [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] memorandum/3/ I have recently read implies that most of the young Vietnamese and tribal dialect speaking Americans who worked in the hill country have been pulled off. /3/ Not found. I don't know what has happened to Trueheart's rural rehabilitation committee, which coordinated the AID efforts with the military, especially in the Delta. I assume it must be functioning under Nes; but we haven't had any word about it. I suspect that Army Special forces, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] have tended to pull their resources away from the populated regions of the High Plateau in an effort to increase their activities along the Laotian border. This may have left the VC behind to attack what we once thought were strong Montagnard hamlets in their rear. These are only impressions that I have gathered from reading the current reporting, which, as you know too well, is voluminous but uninformative. I have four specific suggestions for you to consider while you are in Saigon: 1. Minister for Rural Operations. We should have one manager in Saigon with the responsibility and authority to run that part of the war which lies between Lodge's diplomatic discourses with the highest level of the GVN on the one hand, and Harkins' military responsibility to advise and direct ARVN and conventional U.S. military efforts on the other. He should have the rank of Minister and be responsible to Lodge and Harkins. Nes should become Lodge's Minister for Political Affairs and should perform the traditional functions of DCM in an ordinary Embassy. The Minister for Operations should be a civilian preferably with some military background, someone like Hank Byroade. Such a person would have direct authority over the following parts of the existing U.S. agencies in Saigon: (a) The USOM rural rehabilitation organization (i.e., including the USOM representatives in the various provinces). (b) All USIS psywar-type operations (leaflet printing, films, etc.). (c) Those Army Special Forces units who are engaged in training Vietnamese irregulars who do not leave their home regions (hamlet militia, SDC, and other local paramilitary organizations as distinguished from regular ARVN units). (d) Any vestiges remaining of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] paramilitary functions. He should have a call upon MACV, USOM, the Embassy and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for support where necessary. 2. You might inquire whether the organization of the ARVN itself is well suited to the territorial war. Is the division a useful unit on which to base U.S. and GVN planning and support? Would more decentralization of tactical command, say to the province or district level, tend to tailor military operations more closely to local intelligence and other conditions? I have no expertise at all in such matters; but I should imagine that General Stilwell and Bob Thompson may have some useful thoughts. If you are impressed with Thompson, would it make any sense to associate him more closely with our own efforts-i.e., as an informal member of our country team? 3. Wouldn't it be worthwhile discussing with Khanh the possibility of his instructing ARVN subordinate commanders to take their military advisors more seriously? Could this be done on a "burden of proof" basis? If an ARVN unit commander refused to follow U.S. advice and then failed, he would have the burden of showing affirmatively that his decision was the correct one. Conversely, if he followed the advice and failed, he would be given the benefit of any doubt. 4. The necessity for U.S. liaison with Khanh and his government is greater than ever before. We had no knowledge of this coup; and unless we pull up our socks, we will not ever have the opportunity of dissuading others from starting a new one. The French can be counted upon to stir up trouble. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Lodge has to be persuaded that such people do not represent a threat to his authority, if he chooses to give them guidance. Mike
46. National Security Action Memorandum No. 280/1/ Washington, February 14, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 280. Secret. MEMORANDUM TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Administrator. AID I have today determined that it is essential to establish in Washington a small committee for the management of U.S. policy and operations in South Vietnam. After consultation with the Secretary of State, I have designated Mr. William Sullivan of the Department of State to serve as Chairman of this committee, under the direct supervision of the Secretary of State. I now request that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development nominate to me individuals from their departments and agencies to serve as members of Mr. Sullivan's committee. The officers so nominated will be expected to give an absolute priority to their obligations as members of this committee and as agents for the execution of approved decisions. On this basis, I have already designated Mr. Michael Forrestal to serve as the White House representative on this committee. Major questions of policy and operations will be subject to my approval in consultation with heads of departments and agencies as appropriate. In the execution of approved policy, it is my desire that Mr. Sullivan's committee shall move energetically, and that department appeal from Mr. Sullivan's decisions shall be kept to a minimum. He is being appointed because he commands the confidence not only of myself and of the Secretary of State, but also of senior officials of all agencies concerned. It is my hope and expectation that the establishment of this committee will permit an energetic, unified and skillful prosecution of the only war we face at present./2/ /2/ On February 15, at 11:33 a.m., Rusk called McGeorge Bundy. The transcript of their conversation relating to the establishment of the Vietnam Committee reads as follows: "Re the Viet-Nam task force, Sec. said he put a burr under their tail; told them that their mission is as broad as the problem, top priority, that we have got to win this war. B. thought it important to have the other track explored; Sec. said we were moving full speed on this as an adjunct to the task force." (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) Lyndon B. Johnson
47. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, February 15, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. Secret. Copies were sent to Harriman, Sullivan, U. Alexis Johnson, and Hilsman. Rusk's initials appear on the source text. SUBJECT Ho and Mao The question of Hanoi-Peking relations was raised briefly yesterday./2/ I should like to add a word. /2/ Apparently at the 4:40 p.m. meeting on February 14; see footnote 2, Document 44. I have assumed for some time that, in terms of Bloc relations and policy towards South Viet-Nam, Ho and Mao were coming closer together, although not without some debate in the Communist Party in Hanoi of which there is considerable evidence. I assume further that Ho and Mao are now operating very closely and, indeed, engaged in a plan to warn us of escalation should we move north. Some additional aircraft have been moved to Hainan and into South China, I believe. Moreover, in my view, no plan to inflict even limited damage on the North should proceed without our taking the fullest possible preparations to face any degree of escalation within enemy capabilities. The likelihood of escalation will be inversely proportional to their judgment of our determination and available and relevant military strength. But this is a quite different matter from the important point made in the paper./3/ For centuries all Vietnamese have had as an objective of policy to keep an arms-length relation to China. The Vietnamese Communist Party has maintained control over its own army, secret police, and party apparatus. It maintains that critical degree of independence now. /3/ See footnote 3, Document 44. I do not for one moment believe--nor is there any evidence--that the North Vietnamese are prepared to forego that kind of independence, whatever their present relations with Peking. A substantial war in North Viet-Nam would require the Chinese Communists to introduce into Hanoi aircraft and, perhaps, troops. No Vietnamese would view this event without a certain apprehension that the consequence might be the permanent reduction in their status from junior partner to Chinese province. I continue to believe, therefore, that this deep reservation in Hanoi about relations with China will be one among other constraints on their conduct in the face of the policy we have been discussing; although, to repeat, we should not count on anything but a determination and a capacity to make their present course of action, in violation of solemn Accords, unprofitable as opposed to any other course of action they might adopt. 48. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Secretary of State/1/ RFE-11 Washington, February 15, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, Vietnam. Secret. SUBJECT Hanoi Foresees Victory in South Vietnam--But Only After Long Guerrilla War In view of increasing speculation concerning the designs of North Vietnam in the South, we have analyzed a spate of recent statements from Hanoi which provide an unusually revealing picture of Hanoi's calculations. Abstract A series of authoritative North Vietnamese articles, released on February 10 and 11, reaffirm Hanoi's belief that protracted political and military struggle without open North Vietnamese intervention will be ultimately successful against a militarily superior army. Nevertheless, Hanoi again evinces concern about how Viet Cong morale will hold up in the long run and even reveals the existence of considerable Northern disenchantment about the war in the South. The fullest exposition of these views is an article in the January issue of the elite journal Hoc Tap, by Lt. General Nguyen Van Vinh who, as head of the "reunification" committees of both the party's central committee and the National Assembly, probably has a major role in the formulation of Viet Cong policy. Vinh argues at length against the contention that the conflict carries serious risk of escalation, a view apparently advanced by Moscow and perhaps echoed by some North Vietnamese leaders. In so doing, he warns the United States for the first time that an attack on North Vietnam would involve conflict with Communist China, but he is notably less explicit about the Soviet response. Hanoi appears genuinely concerned that the United States may be considering action against the North. This in part may explain not only these articles but also the recent flurry of related political and even military activity. General Vinh predicts that the United States will remain involved in South Vietnam "for some years" until forced to withdraw in the face of heavier and heavier defeats. He is less precise about the consequences should the United States vastly increase its role, hinting this might necessitate increased North Vietnamese participation (as in Laos). The article implicitly rules out an international political settlement as a feasible course of action, at least under prevailing conditions. Another statement released the same day categorically rejects French President de Gaulle's suggestion (although it was attributed to President Johnson) that North Vietnam might be neutralized. [Here follows the text of the 6-page paper.]
49. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, February 18, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no time of transmission. Received at 10:01 a.m. A note on the White House copy of this telegram indicates that the President read it. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 216A. 1574. For Harriman and Hilsman. I have just seen JCS 4893 to MACV/2/ calling for a plan for "an immediate concentrated counterinsurgency offensive in Long An Province to restore effective GVN control." This is the most discouraging instruction I have seen since joining our Vietnamese effort two months ago. It reveals an almost total lack of comprehension of the character of the Vietnamese problem and of the present situation here. /2/ Dated February 14, this cable transmitted the JCS belief that a counterinsurgency offensive in Long An Province would be a symbol of "revitalized war effort." The JCS requested development of a comprehensive plan in coordination with the Country Team for "earliest possible accomplishment this purpose." Johnson Library, National Security File. Vietnam Country File. Vol. IV. Memos and Misc.) It assumes that: 1. An indigenous Communist insurgency enjoying full external Communist support can be defeated by such an "offensive" in a measurable period of time. 2. The GVN has adequate political cohesion and leadership, centralized control, and local administrative talent and organization to launch a "concentrated counter-insurgency offensive in Long An" or anywhere else. 3. The U.S. Mission here has sufficient influence and control over the GVN to persuade it to do so. None of these assumptions are true in Viet-Nam today. I have suggested to MACV that its reply which will to extent possible receive Country Team coordination include frank statement re utter impossibility of launching "an immediate concentrated counter-insurgency offensive" or of achieving quick success even were such action possible. It is my hope that our reply can convey a more realistic appreciation of our task than instruction which engendered it. Doubtless Ambassador Lodge will have more to say on "quick victory" approach upon his return. In my opinion we face a long hard pull with final success probably dependent more on developments external to Viet Nam than on our counter-insurgency efforts here. On these U.S. Mission is and will continue to exert maximum effort. Nes
50. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms), to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, February 18, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, Memos and Misc. Secret. Signed by Colby for Helms. Also sent to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Taylor, Hilsman, Forrestal, Anthis, Sullivan, Carroll, and others. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1974, 246D. Bundy wrote the following note on the source text: "President read Feb. 18 and so called meeting of Feb. 20 on SVN. McGB." For the results of the meeting, see Document 54. According to a covering note, this was the third report of a group of CIA officers who went to Vietnam to cross-check covertly intelligence information provided by the Vietnamese. The first report, February 14, concluded that while the Vietnamese had been reporting honestly to their American counterparts since November 1, 1963, failings in quantity, quality, and training of Vietnamese personnel and lack of professionalism among Vietnamese sources made their intelligence product difficult to evaluate. A general impression gained by the CIA group was that the momentum of the strategic hamlet program had slowed practically to a halt. Commenting specifically on Binh Long and Phuoc Thanh Provinces, the report concluded that security had badly deteriorated there. The second report, February 14, concentrated on I Corps and concluded that optimism regarding the security of the area was mistaken and based on superficial developments. (Both in Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, Memos and Misc.) The accord report is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 246C. A. Tide of insurgency in all four corps areas appears to be going against GVN. In many provinces team finds VC-controlled areas to comprise better than 50 or 60 per cent of total area. Some provinces (Phaoc Thanh, Binh Duong and An Xuyen) report VC-controlled areas as high as 80 per cent. In Tay Ninh Province American and Vietnamese officials agree VC can attack and enter any village of their choosing, including provincial capital. B. National level direction of all programs appears to be weak to non-existent. This includes ARVN operations, strategic hamlet program. Chieu Hoi program, civic action program, national police program, hamlet militia program, etc. What ARVN operations are being conducted appear to be corps-controlled and corps concepts of action appear to vary even to the point that different divisions with the same corps have a different approach to problems. C. Until 1 Nov coup, strategic hamlet program, while full of faults weaknesses, etc., had certain momentum and full national direction. Since coup, program has been viewed more realistically and many of illusions held jointly by US and Vietnamese have been shattered. Program at present at virtual standstill, as provincial officials, lacking direction at national level, grope for local and varying new approaches to pacification problem. Illustrative of results of current re-evaluation of strategic hamlet program is case of Hau Nghia, where province chief states that of 52 hamlets previously reported as completed, only eight are now considered viable. Province chief estimates that 75 per cent of Hau Nghia VC-controlled. D. There is no evidence of any particular GVN appeal to youth or students and as matter of fact GVN propaganda mechanism in toto is largely moribund. Dissemination and production of propaganda appear to be centered entirely in Saigon and is so poorly operative in many provincial areas that VC were first to inform populace of 30 January coup. There are no newspapers produced outside of Saigon although VC by contrast do produce some regular periodicals which appear to be well read by local populace. (CAS working with GVN in this entire field.) E. Several province chiefs encountered proved to be of high caliber. However, due to frequent personnel changes, present incumbents apprehensive over their tenure and reluctant to exercise initiative. Particularly in newly created provinces, there is lack of qualified subordinate personnel. F. Hamlet militia appear effective mainly in non-critical areas. In critical areas as a rule hamlet militia have been disarmed by province chiefs, overrun by VC, or members have on their own initiative fumed in their arms and resigned. Therefore, in these areas hamlet militia not significant factor in war, brunt of which being increasingly borne by self-defense corps. G. Quality and quantity of VC arms appear to be rapidly increasing. Presence of Russian-designed carbines, Czech sub machine guns, Chinese SKZ recoilless weapons and 7.92 heavy machine guns and increased use of heavy mortars by VC elements have been noted in all corps areas. These better weapons being distributed down to VC guerrilla units and presence of homemade and French weapons in hands of VC decreasing. In one recent case VC left behind in an overrun district headquarters in Quang Tri French weapons which they had brought with them. Progress in rearming VC units probably uneven, but in IV Corps it believed process virtually complete. In number of areas in IV Corps both American and Vietnamese sources assert that friendly forces now both outgunned and outmanned by enemy. (This info has been scattered in various MAC/V statistical reports, but to our knowledge has never been brought home in a clear, explicit, qualitative statement.) H. Presence of improved weapons in hands of VC suggests significant degree of infiltration of new equipment into South Vietnam.
51. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ JCSM-136-64 Washington, February 18, 1964. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 092 Vietnam. Top Secret; Sensitive. SUBJECT Vietnam and Southeast Asia 1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 22 January 1964,/2/ subject as above, which expressed the view that a loss of South Vietnam to the communists would presage a loss of the remainder of the United States position in Southeast Asia. It sets forth a number of actions which the United States should be prepared to take in order to ensure victory. Since submission of that memorandum, mindful of the need to revitalize the counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam, which has been interrupted and slowed by the confusion resulting from recent changes in government, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the situation in South Vietnam with the view of determining additional actions which can be recommended for implementation immediately. /2/ See Document 17. 2. The Government of Vietnam has developed, with the close collaboration of the US Military Assistance Command, a new National Pacification Plan/3/ which provides for the orderly pacification of the insurgency in accordance with a realistic phasing schedule. From a military planning viewpoint, this program should correct many of the past deficiencies of the effort, and it provides for consolidation of secure areas and expansion of them (the "spreading oil drop"). US military assets in Vietnam will fully support this plan. What is now required is implementation of additional actions which will insure an integrated political, socio-economic, and psychological offensive to support more fully the military effort. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Country Team be directed to implement the following actions at the earliest practicable time: /3/On February 18, the Khanh government approved the National Pacification Plan which set forth a combined military, political, and economic offensive against the Viet Cong in two stages. Phase I envisioned a coordinated military and civilian effort to clear territory of the Viet Cong, moving successively from secure and highly populated areas into insecure and less densely populated ones. The concept became known as "spreading the oil drop." In Phase II, Vietnamese military forces would destroy the Viet Cong in their secret military bases and end the insurgency. The first priority of Phase I was the provinces surrounding Saigon and extending south into the Delta with an estimated completion date of July 1, 1965. The next priority was the remainder of the Delta and certain critical provinces north of Saigon, with a completion date of January 1, 1966. All of Corps I and II, with the exception of VC strongholds reserved for Phase II, were to be pacified by January 1, 1965. JCS Historical Division, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The War in Vietnam. 1960-1968, Part 1, chapter 8, pp. 23-24) a. Induce the GVN (General Khanh) military to accept US advisors at all levels considered necessary by COMUSMACV. (This is particularly applicable in the critical provinces where the advisory effort should be expanded and should reach down to the subsector level.) b. Intensify the use of herbicides for crop destruction against identified Viet Cong areas as recommended by the GVN. c. Improve border control measures: (1) Direct border surveillance elements to establish intelligence nets without regard to the existing geographic borders. (2) Exploit smugglers and the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and other border minority groups. (3) Establish denied areas where a "shoot on sight" policy will be followed. d. Direct the US civilian agencies involved in Vietnam to assist the GVN in producing a civilian counterpart package plan to the GVN National Pacification Plan. (Any area in Vietnam can be temporarily cleared of Viet Cong, but it is the GVN civil administration which must win the people and stabilize the area in concert with the military. This plan should support and revitalize the Vietnamese "New Life Hamlet Program.") e. Provide US civilian advisors to all necessary echelons and GVN agencies to provide civil administration "know-how" until a GVN corps of administrators can be trained. f. Encourage early and effective action to implement a realistic land reform program. g. Support the GVN in a policy of tax forgiveness for low income population in areas where the GVN determines that a critical state of insurgency exists. (In some areas the Viet Cong and GVN both levy taxes on the peasant population. Relief of the GVN tax would provide a small monetary relief but, more important, would have psychological value.) h. Assist the GVN in developing a National Psychological Operations Plan and conducting psychological operations to insure an intensive nationwide coordinated propaganda campaign to establish the GVN and Khanh's "images," create a "cause" which can serve as a rallying point for the youth/students of Vietnam, and develop the long term national objectives of a free Vietnam. i. Intensify efforts to gain the support of US news media representatives in Vietnam by exploring with them measures that can be taken to improve this situation. j. Arrange US sponsored trips to Vietnam by groups of prominent journalists and editors. k. Inform all GVN military and civilian officials through various means, to include their US advisors and counterparts, that the United States (a) considers it imperative that the present government be stabilized, (b) would oppose another coup, and (c) that the United States is prepared to offer all possible assistance in forming a stable government which will eliminate the necessity for another coup. In this instance, all US intelligence agencies and advisors must be alert to and report cases of dissension and plotting in order to prevent such actions. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the implementation of the foregoing measures will not be sufficient to exercise a decisive effect on the campaign against the Viet Cong. They are continuing study of the actions suggested in the memorandum of 22 January 1964, as well as other proposals which require further study, and will recommend to you progressively the execution of such actions considered militarily required. Among the subjects to be studied as a matter of urgency are the following: a. Intensified operations against North Vietnam to include air bombings of selected targets. b. Removal of restrictions for air and ground cross-border operations. c. Intelligence and reporting. d. US organizational changes. e. Increased US Navy participation in shore and river patrol activities. f. Introduction of jet aircraft into the Vietnamese Air Force and the US Air Commando unit. g. DOD-CIA relationship changes. h. Reduction of test and evaluation activities. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor/4/ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff /4/ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature. 52. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam (Nes) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)/1/ Saigon, February 19, 1964. /1/ Source: Department of State, William Bundy Files, WPB Special Papers. Secret; Official-Informal. Hilsman sent a copy of this letter to Forrestal for his information with the following handwritten note: "Another old Burma hand you have to deal with!! R.H." On March 5, Green sent this copy to the newly-designated Assistant Secretary of State for Ear Eastern Affairs, William Bundy, stating that the letter with its enclosure "presents views you will be interested in." Dear Roger: I am sending along to you for what it is worth my personal views on Where We Stand in Viet-Nam conveyed to Ambassador Lodge in the enclosed Memorandum. They vary in several important respects from those held by many high ranking American officials far more experienced with the Vietnamese scene than I. In defense of the judgments I have reached, I can only say that I approached VietNam with little previous knowledge but with an open mind and no vested interest in past counterinsurgency policies or operations. My most disillusioning experience has been with the MACV-MAAG operation which seems to be tailored largely toward providing the U.S. military establishment, within the framework of World War II Conventional Doctrine, organization and weapons, a fertile field for the utilization and promotion of its senior officers rather than as an instrument to deal with guerrilla war. I have an idea that were you and I, with our Burma experience, to take over from the nineteen General officers we have out here, we might put some realism into the military side of our operations against the VC. I will have a great deal more to say about our Vietnamese adventure as time goes on but you may rest assured that I will say it only through channels, i.e., to you and to Ambassador Lodge. Sincerely yours, David [Enclosure] Memorandum From the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy (Nes) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/2/ Saigon, February 17, 1964. /2/ Secret. SUBJECT Where We Stand in Viet-Nam The following are my personal views and with particular reference to the French assessment of the SEA situation as conveyed in Deptel 1232, Paris Embtel 3907 to Dept., and as seen by the British, Paris Embtel 3873 to Dept./3/ /3/ These telegrams, February 13, 13, and 14, respectively, described the rationale of the French for their campaign for neutralism of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM, POL 16 CHICOM, and POL VIET S, respectively) 1. Although I have only been directly associated with this area for some two months, my reading of developments over the past year and recent experiences here lead me to fear that General De Gaulle may be right in his belief that we are faced with the choice between accepting the possible collapse of our counter-insurgency efforts here or the escalation of the conflict toward a direct military confrontation of the DRV and China by the U.S. 2. Nothing that I have seen or heard thus far in Saigon leads me to believe that against the background of recent Vietnamese history our counter-insurgency efforts can win through so long as the Viet Cong is backed politically and psychologically and to a lesser extent militarily by Hanoi and Peking. 3. The peasants who form the mass of the South Vietnamese population are exhausted and sick of 20 years of civil conflict. During this entire period they have never and are not now receiving either political leadership or orderly and just administration from the central authorities of the GVN. They have enjoyed little if any social or economic betterment. 4. On the other hand, the Viet Cong represents a grass roots movement which is disciplined, ideologically dedicated, easily identifiable with the desires of the peasantry and of course ruthless. The fact that the VC has the full backing of China is perhaps its most powerful asset in presenting itself as the inevitable winner. 5. I do not see in the present military regime or any conceivable successor much hope in providing the real political and social leadership or the just and effective country-wide administration so essential to the success of our counter-insurgency program. I think we would be naive in the extreme to believe that any number or quality of American advisors can succeed in changing within a reasonable period of time the attitudes and patterns of thinking of senior Vietnamese military and political officialdom. 6. In developing a large conventional World War II Vietnamese military establishment organized into four Corps and 9-10 divisions with other equally sizable supporting units, we may, in fact, have a Frankenstein on our hands which on the one hand serves little purpose in dealing effectively with the Viet Cong and on the other provides a perfect framework for spawning successive coups and so perpetuating the current political malaise. 7. Against this pessimistic appraisal, I do believe that were the VC to be totally deprived of all outside support, both material and psychological, we would be graced with the most important factor of all in a counter-insurgency effort-namely time. I would estimate very roughly that so deprived, and assuring continued and massive U.S. support for any and all anti-communist regimes which might emerge in Saigon, we might see the VC movement wither away in 5-10 years time. 8. At the same time, if General De Gaulle could be persuaded to change his view re our willingness to escalate our conflict with the Communists throughout SEA, I think his sponsorship of neutralization of South Viet-Nam might also be modified. 9. Finally, should our readiness and willingness to escalate toward a direct confrontation of Hanoi and Peking become obvious by our overt actions throughout the area, I think the tendencies toward neutralism here would rapidly disappear also. 10. In brief, it seems to me that De Gaulle has correctly analyzed the SEA situation if his assumption is correct that we will do no more than continue our present counter-insurgency efforts in South VietNam--these being concentrated on a large team of American military and civilian advisers working through whatever anti-communist regime exists in Saigon and in massive economic and military aid programs extended through such a regime. After two years of the most strenuous efforts by the U.S. along these lines, De Gaulle quite correctly feels that we have achieved little more than a precarious stalemate which in the next weeks, should further coups occur, could disintegrate very rapidly. This is also the conclusion of SNIE 50-64./4/ /4/ See Document 42. 11. Should this in fact happen, we will be faced either with turning the SEA ball game over to De Gaulle in the hope that his policy can salvage something from the wreckage or of rapidly escalating our efforts toward a final military showdown with China. Recommendations: 1. That we seize every opportunity to warn Washington that escalation may be the only alternative to inevitable neutralization, i.e., the loss of the U.S. political and military position in SEA. 2. That we recommend that De Gaulle be informed in the frankest terms that we will not leave SEA and that we are ready to face a conflict with China to preserve our position here. 3. That we urge the acceleration and expansion of OPS Plan 34A-64./5/ /5/ See footnote 2, Document 4.
53. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President/1/ Saigon, February 19, 1964--6 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 1583 from Saigon to the Department of State, where it was received at 7:21 a.m. and passed to the White House at 8:30 a.m. Telegram 1583 is the source text. 1. In reply to your 1256,/2/ I believe persistent and patient execution of current civil and military plans will bring victory-provided external pressures would be about as they were when I got here last summer. These pressures come from Communist China, North Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia and France, and I believe they have been increasing, although I cannot prove it. Effective steps to lessen, and perhaps eliminate, these pressures would be most helpful. /2/ In telegram 1256, February 18, from the President to Ambassador Lodge, Johnson reminded Lodge that it had been 2 weeks since he delivered the President's personal message to Khanh (see footnote 2, Document 25). The President asked for a report for his own guidance on any further steps the United States should take to be of assistance and, in particular, any additional military or economic assistance Lodge might need to carry out existing or recommended policies. (Ibid., POL 23-9 VIET S) 2. Believe that within Viet-Nam, U.S. is giving enough economic and military assistance with one exception: an increase of funds to pay for the increase in the pay of the Army and of paramilitary forces./3/ /3/ In telegram CAP 64047 from the White House, February 20, Johnson responded that the request for increase in pay would be addressed immediately. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Lodge/4/ /4/ Telegram 1583 bears this typed signature.
54. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, White House/1/ Washington, February 20, 1964, 12:17 p.m. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, Memos and Misc. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal. Copies of this memorandum were sent to Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, McCone, Bell, and Sullivan. Prepared for this meeting, which lasted 1 hour, was an agenda, annotated by McGeorge Bundy, which reads as follows: "1. Situation Briefing (5 minutes); 2. Intelligence and Reporting, (A) Cooper Activities, (B) French Activities; 3. Operations, (A) Response to Lodge Message, (B) Policy on Dependents [Bundy wrote at this point "P[resident] prefers"], (C) Other Matters; 4. Diplomatic Problems, (A) Cambodia, (B) Laos, (C) Others; 5. North Viet-Nam, (A) Intelligence [Bundy wrote "increase efforts"], (B) Propaganda [Bundy wrote "increase"], (C) Operations; 6. Planning, (A) Johnson Subcommittee [Bundy wrote "Speed up"], (B) Question of Time Phase." (Ibid.) SUBJECT South Vietnam The President met today with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary Ball, Director McCone, and the members of Mr. William Sullivan's committee on policy and operations in South Vietnam. After an intelligence briefing on the current situation and a full discussion of the work of the committee, the President directed the following actions: 1. Any requests for assistance or other Washington action from Ambassador Lodge should be given prompt and sympathetic response. Such staff work as may be required to back up such requests in Washington should be given the highest priority, so that decisions can be reached quickly. 2. Contingency planning for pressures against North Vietnam should be speeded up. Particular attention should be given to shaping such pressures so as to produce the maximum credible deterrent effect on Hanoi. 3. For the time being, American dependents in Vietnam should be encouraged to accept voluntary repatriation. Early next month, the Secretary of Defense will consult with Ambassador Lodge on whether dependents should be evacuated and will make appropriate recommendations to the President and the Secretary of State upon his return. 4. The Department of State will explore in a positive manner the possibilities opened up by the recent proposals of Prince Sihanouk for a conference in Phnom Penh on the problem of Cambodian neutrality./2/ /2/ See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 847, footnote 7. M V Forrestal
55. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President/1/ Saigon, February 20, 1964--8 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 1594 from Saigon which is the source text. A note on the White House copy of this telegram indicates that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV, Cables) This is in further reply to your 1256./2/ /2/ See footnote 2, Document 53. 1. I believe various pressures can and should be applied to North Viet Nam to cause them to cease and desist from their murderous intrusion into South Viet Nam. I have made detailed recommendations in a memo dated October 30, 1963,/3/ of which Under Secretary Harriman has a copy, and to which I believe I referred briefly to you when you received me on November 24./4/ /3/ Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 656-659. Sullivan sent a copy of Lodge's paper of October 30, 1963, to McNamara on February 24, 1964. (Memorandum from Sullivan to McNamara, February 24; Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Special Papers, I of II, 1963) /4/ See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, p. 635-637. 2. In light of recent terrorism against Americans in Saigon,/5/ I believe North Viet Nam should be told secretly that every terrorist act against Americans in South Viet Nam will provoke swift retaliation against North Viet Nam. /5/ Thus far in February, there had been 15 terrorist attacks against Americans, including bombings of a U.S. theater and a softball game in which 5 Americans were killed and over 50, including official dependents, were wounded. 3. On the basis of knowledge available to me, I do not think this will bring on nuclear war with ChiComs or with anyone. It simply puts U.S. and South Viet Nam on a par with ChiComs and North Viet Nam in the struggle against the Viet Cong. At present, we let them have a sanctuary from which they operate against us, whereas we not only have no sanctuary, but do not operate against them in any significant way. 4. If the above recommendation is adopted, we should consider announcing just before undertaking it that we are evacuating all U.S. dependents. Our announcement should make it crystal clear that this step is being taken because we are cleaning the decks for action and intend to make things tougher for the V.C. Evacuation should not appear to be a frightened response due to Viet Cong terrorism. 5. Believe the South Vietnamese expect us to be brave and that there are big advantages to be gained by not disappointing them. 6. My present policy regarding American dependents is that any American who wishes to leave Viet Nam and return to the U.S. be allowed to do so. I reckon that only a few will want to go but that those who are unhappy here should not be required to stay. 7. In regards U.S. children in Saigon, I am in close touch with parents' organization whose present attitude is not to close school. They have question under constant review. General Khanh told me this morning he hopes to move school very soon to a more secure location. 8. In answering your telegrams, I am most anxious to keep you fully informed, and at the same time, not give you too much to read. If you wish my wires to be different in length and format, please advise. Lodge/6/ /6/ Telegram 1594 bears this typed signature.
56. Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/ Washington, February 22, 1964--5:28 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as telegram 1281 to Saigon, which is the source text. McGeorge Bundy sent a draft of this telegram and the text of Lodge's message, supra, to Palm Springs, California, where the President was vacationing. The text of Bundy's covering cable to the President reads as follows: "Next two following messages are an incoming from Lodge on enlarging our effort in North Vietnam and a draft response for the President. I send these now because of the President's desire to be very quick and effective in responses to Lodge's messages. The draft answer is being cleared with Rusk and McNamara, and we can get it out as soon as we have the President's own comments." "The memorandum to Harriman which Lodge refers to [see footnote 3, supra] is sensible but tentative in form, and does not show strong advocacy of anything different from what we have been doing. My own notes on the President's November meeting with Lodge show nothing significant on North Vietnam. We therefore believe that the draft answer is fully responsive, and we assess the incoming message as sincere and reasonable, as far as it goes." (Telegram CAP 64050, February 21; Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. IV) I appreciated your 1594/2/ which corresponds to much of my own thinking. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, with my approval have already begun preparing specific plans for pressure against NVN, both in the diplomatic and military fields. Secretary McNamara will be visiting you early in March to review with you that subject and other aspects of the counter-insurgency campaign. Then or very soon thereafter we should make definite decisions. /2/ Document 55. I agree that any announcement of the evacuation of dependents must be made in such a way as to show we are getting tougher, not softer, and Bob McNamara will take this up with you also. In the meantime, the policy you have suggested in your paragraph 6 is just what I have already instructed the Departments to implement. I value these direct exchanges with you on top policy matters. We should keep them up./3/ /3/ Telegram 1281 does not bear President Johnson's signature.
57. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/ Washington, February 21, 1964. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, Vietnam 092. Top Secret. Attached to the source text was a covering memorandum from William Bundy to McNamara, February 21, which reads as follows: "The attached memorandum, prepared in response to your request, will obtain JCS views on a number of critical questions affecting our actions in Vietnam. The answers will also be helpful to the work of the Sullivan Committee. We have coordinated this request with the Joint Staff." SUBJECT Vietnam As you are aware, one of the alternatives which is now being reviewed with respect to the situation in Vietnam is a carefully planned program designed to exert increasing military pressures upon the government of North Vietnam, with a view to inducing that government to terminate its support and encouragement of the insurrection in South Vietnam and curtail Pathet Lao activities in Laos. The military pressures which might be applied extend from relatively minor covert activities, which you are already examining, to open GVN or U.S. air or sea non-nuclear attacks upon the DRV. There are a number of military uncertainties which must be resolved, to the extent possible, before political decisions affecting such military actions can be taken. Accordingly, I should like to have your views upon the following matters: 1. The overall capabilities of the DRV and of the Chinese Communists for military action, with specific reference to: (a) The types and magnitudes of actions which are possible, taking into account current Communist logistic capabilities. (b) The geographic areas within which such actions might be undertaken. (c) The time period within which the enemy forces could be brought to bear. (d) The enemy capability for concurrent reactions, as for example, reactions both in Southeast Asia and in Korea and/or Taiwan off-shore islands. 2. What military actions against North Vietnam, employing air and naval power, but not ground forces beyond the scale of smallscale raids, might be: (a) undertaken by the GVN and within the plausible range of GVN capabilities (b) assertedly undertaken by the GVN, even if outside the plausible range of GVN capabilities; (c) undertaken by the U.S. without public acknowledgment; (d) undertaken by the U.S. along with, or after, a public declaration by the U.S. of an intent to exert military pressure upon the DRV with a view to forcing a termination of the insurrection in the South? What targets would be most effective to attack from the standpoint of: (a) specific effect on DRV capability against Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand; (b) interdiction of main communication routes between the DRV and Communist China, plus interdiction of sea communications into North Vietnam; (c) more generalized target patterns designed to inflict damage on key installation in the DRV but to minimize the effect on the civilian population as a whole? While the assessment of the impact of possible courses of action on DRV continued support of operations in South Vietnam and Laos is in large part an intelligence question that should be addressed by intelligence authorities as well, I would appreciate the views of the JCS as to the courses of action under one or more of the above headings that would in your judgment be most likely to bring about cessation of DRV support for operations in South Vietnam and Laos and at the same time be least likely to lead to stepped-up conflict and adverse reactions in third countries. 3. Assuming that, in response to the attacks upon the DRV, the DRV and/or the Chicoms undertake large scale troop movements over the border into one or more of: (a) South Vietnam (b) Laos (c) Thailand or Burma (d) South Korea (e) Taiwan What U.S. effort, air, sea, and land, would be required to contain such an invasion? If intelligence indicated that such a movement were contemplated by the enemy, what actions against North Vietnam and mainland China would be likely to deter such a response? In each of these circumstances, or any likely combination of them, to what extent could the U.S. effectively counter such actions through air and naval responses only (without the use of ground forces other than those presently deployed) utilizing each of the following means: (a) conventional ordnance only: (b) conventional ordnance plus classified non-nuclear munitions. The degree of increased effectiveness to be expected from the latter should be specified along with the considerations for and against employment. [Subparagraphs (c) and (d) (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] 4. Assuming that the Chicom reaction included air action from mainland bases (either against SVN or other air bases, or supporting aircraft carriers) to what extent could this air threat be countered by: (a) actions against enemy aircraft only, without attacks upon mainland bases, or (b) selective attacks upon the Chinese bases and air defenses utilizing: (i) Conventional ordnance (plus classified munitions if significantly more effective) [Subparagraph (ii) (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] [Subparagraph (c) (2 lines of source text) not declassified] 5. What modifications must be made in existing contingency plans in order to provide for U.S. reactions which would depend primarily upon air activities rather than the intervention of substantial U.S. ground forces? In view of the broad scope of these questions, I believe that the JCS will wish to create a special planning unit that can devote itself exclusively to these problems on a continuing basis. I appreciate that a detailed response may require a longer time, but believe that we must have your preliminary judgment on these questions for consideration prior to our anticipated departure for South Vietnam about 4 March. Accordingly, I would appreciate it if a preliminary response could be available for discussion with me not later than Monday, March 2. Our review at that time will almost certainly uncover additional questions and refinements that would form the basis for the next phase of the examination. Robert S. McNamara
58. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harking) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/ Saigon, February 21, 1964--4:15 p.m. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Vietnam. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The JCS sent copies of this cable to McNamara, Gilpatric, Anthis, and William Bundy. MAC 665. Subj: CAS third appraisal./2/ Ref JCS 734, DTG 182258Z Feb./3/ /2/ Document 50. /3/ In this telegram, the Joint Chiefs requested Harkins' views on the third appraisal. (National Archives and Records Administration. RG 213. ICS Files) 1. Except for the spectacular and eye catching lead sentence, I have no quarrel with most of the statements contained in the CAS survey team appraisal. Where the statements are clean-cut, the supporting information was usually provided by my field personnel and reflected in reports already sent to Washington by this headquarters. Where the statements are sweeping, they are based on opinion or an unfortunate penchant for generalizing from the specific. My detailed comments follow and are geared to the specific paragraphs of the CAS message. A. Area vs. People. Since August there has been a steady, gradual erosion of GVN control of territory, this erosion has become progressively worse and more noticeable subsequent to 1 Nov 63. In 23 RVN provinces the VC dominate in over 50 percent of the area. Report is in error where it states Binh Duong is 80 percent VC controlled; degree of control by VC is 45 percent. However, Phnoc Tuy in which the area is over 80 percent controlled by the VC is not mentioned in the report. All this has been reported by MACV. It is still considered here that GVN control is complete or predominant over 70 percent of the people in the rural area, while VC control is complete or predominant over 18 Percent. There is another 3 percent over which neither GVN nor VC have dominance. Then there are also the 1,687,000 in the major cities which are definitely under GVN control. B. National level direction of most, but not all, programs has been weak since 1 November. It is difficult to have direction without an effective government. Khanh, however, is meeting now with [regarding?] a national pacification plan today or by Monday. The effectiveness of military operations may be low but they do proceed according to the national plan and are certainly not without direction. It is logical for the corps to do the derivative planning within assigned areas and to direct and control the operations of its major subordinate units. The divisions within a given corps face different problems in terms of terrain, enemy and population. As regards military civic actions, the program began to get excellent backing in early January to include directives to the field and addresses by top members of the MRC. In a sharp departure from prior practices, twenty million plasters were allocated to the corps for military civic actions. Officials charged with administering the Chieu Hoi program are convinced it will become functional again under General Khanh's leadership. C. E. F. Concur with contents. In this connection; see US Mission monthly status reports for December and January respectively; Section V and Annex X thereto of US Mission quarterly evaluation for period ending [end?] of December, and pare 6E, MACV headway reports since 8 January./4/ /4/ None found. D. The experienced Embassy official assigned to monitor and support youth activities states it is not entirely accurate to say that GVN is inactive in their appeal to youth since active programs are carried on by USIS and USOM with the active cooperation of appropriate ministries of GVN. It is true there are no programs carried on to the vast extent of the Cong Hoa or Combatant Youth under the Diem regime. As a matter of fact, GVN propaganda mechanisms are quite active. The statement that "no newspapers are produced outside of Saigon" is not only ill-advised, but false. For example, 183 village district newspapers are operating (of the 200 programmed by USOM). The average circulation per newspaper is 450 three times weekly. These are widely read as demonstrated by requests received last week from Kien Giang, Kian Hoa, and Chaong Thzen for additional paper supplies to increase circulation. Kien Quoc, a provincial newspaper, is produced in four different editions weekly for the key provinces of Quang Ngai, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong and Long An with a provincial circulation of 35,000 each. Periodicals are numerous; for the population alone, USIS produces Huong Que (Rural Life-125,000 copies monthly) and Gioi Tu Do (Free World-150,000 copies monthly) aimed at the student population. G. The statement "presence of Russian-designed carbines" is misleading. It is true that originally the carbine was Russian-designed--20 years ago. However, the weapon in question is ChiCom PE 53 carbine, which is obsolete in the Chinese Communist army. No knowledge here of Czech submachine guns. Reference is probably to ChiCom 7.62 mm modified K-50 submachine guns. ARVN has a habit of calling this weapon Czech. No information available in this headquarters regarding VC abandonment of weapons during the incident in Quang Tri; it is very unlikely this happened, since VC are not that fat in weapons. The friendly forces are not outmanned & outgunned by the enemy in IV Corps, although certain VC elements in this area such as the 96th and 306th Battalions are considered well trained, aggressive and competent units and they have given good accounts of themselves in several instances. The VC through massing of forces can achieve temporary numerical superiority in areas of their choosing but overall they cannot approximate the RVN strength in either manpower or materiel. The heaviest weapon of the VC is the 81 mm mortar. The VC [have] no 105 or 155 howitzers, no APC's or armored cars, no support aircraft and no heavy river craft. H. Concur. 2. As a general comment this message appears to be a combination of rehashing old information previously reported, plus the reporting of unevaluated individual observations not necessarily in consonance with an overall analysis of the situation in a division tactical area. I am concerned over the disregard of the terms of reference for this group that is demonstrated by the scope of this report. JCS message 362-64 [?] January 1964,/5/ indicates that the role of this group is to "assist in developing techniques to improve [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] intelligence collection." This example of unilateral reporting on matters outside their quarter and competency, without the benefit of the advice of this headquarters and other interested agencies can only be detrimental to the achievement of a joint, inter-agency intelligence effort and more important, is likely to introduce misleading, if not incorrect, information into the national decision making process. /5/ Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files) We have nothing to hide but do have updated info on many of the problems covered by the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] team report, and feel that such reports should be coordinated before being dispatched.
59. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President/1/ Saigon, February 22, 1964--2 p.m. /1 |