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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
IX. Changes in the Government of South Vietnam, August 11-September 5 Saigon, August 14, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret. Sibley had been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam in 1961. On Tuesday afternoon, 11 August 1964, during a briefing at Tan Son Nhut by General Oden and the Support Command staff, I received a message at about 1500 hours that Khanh wanted to see me at 1545 in his office. His aide took me into his office immediately on my arrival and told me that a couple of correspondents and several others who had appointments were being asked to wait. I met with Khanh from 1540 hours until 1620 hours in his office with Major Kwasigroch present. The entire conversation was in French, of which Major Kwasigroch only picked up a few words. Khanh walked across the room and embraced me when I entered, asked about Ellie, my wife, and said, "We have missed you very much here, Sib." I congratulated him for his having become Prime Minister of his country and he said: "I could not stand by and see my country fall to the communists. After the November coup, there was much relaxation, wining and dining, and little serious prosecution of the war effort. The intelligence organization which I had helped President Diem build up over six years was completely destroyed and many of the hard-core Viet Cong whom we had collected so painstakingly over the years were released by opening a Pandora's box. These two things that are apparatus for learning when and where the VC were going to strike combined with the return of their hard-core leadership just released are primarily responsible for the intensification of their efforts over the last 6 months." (My observation: Evidently, the incident rate has increased from an average of some 50 a week when I was here in 1961 to some 500 odd per week currently.) I asked him what would be the results of the recent U.S. attack on the North Vietnamese bases. He said that the men in the streets of Hanoi reacted to this attack with smiles on their faces. I asked him how he knew this. He said that while his infiltration effort into the north left much to be desired, he was getting enough intelligence to know it and, if I didn't believe him, he told me to ask our own CIA. He said this confirmed his impression that the North Vietnamese people were disenchanted with the hardships and provision under the communist regime and would welcome the unification of North and South Vietnams under his (Khanh's) leadership. He said that he would thus become a kind of Tito. He repeated this several times and I believe that he meant to identify himself with Tito as a national leader, a champion of the people, who would thus be unified as a Vietnamese nation out from under the shadow, as he put it, of "our traditional enemy, the Chinese." He said that the North Vietnamese, including their leaders, are afraid of the Chinese and are resisting their overtures to "help". He said Ho Chi Minh is still there but he is too old to come to the office and that the real power is held by several of his principal lieutenants, two of whom are Moscow oriented communists rather than Peking sympathizers. He said: "Sib, we are not expert in guerrilla warfare in spite of our ranger training center at Duc My and our efforts with your Special Forces. This is a new kind of war in which neither we nor the great powers like you have much experience in spite of our recent efforts to learn. On the contrary, these people in the north are true experts in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, assassination, political subversion, coup d'etat, and all the paraphernalia which has become classic doctrine to them since the time of Marx and Lenin. This is a war against our people and as long as we continue to try to fight their kind of war, they can succeed with only a small force of about 20,000 against the mobilization of our entire manpower to keep this going on forever. Therefore, we must open the war up. We must turn to the kind of conventional military operations which we understand and not continue to try to fight their kind of war which is new to us. If we do this, our people will rally to our cause because they will know that they are fighting for their country and the enemy will be identified to them." "Our penetrations in the north are primarily for intelligence not for sabotage and, while we have achieved some success, we still have much work to do." I asked him whether we could expect a Chinese retaliation for our strike on the North Vietnamese bases. He said: "No, not the kind of retaliation you would expect. They only have Mig 15's and 16's which are Korean vintage aircraft far less capable than the American planes and I have learned that the Russians have recently cut off the supply of spare parts to the Chicom." I challenged him on this one and he said that this was his intelligence. He said the Chicom lack the military capability to intervene militarily in North Vietnam today and that such intervention would be opposed by the North Vietnamese because of their fear of the Chinese. He said, "This is my personal view of free-world strategy and, while I have not studied it out in detail, I will tell you what I think: "For centuries, the great powers--the British, the French, and the Russian empire under the Tzars--have had a traditional enemy, the Chinese. This has been our traditional enemy over the centuries as well. Today the Chinese have massive manpower. We, that is the great powers, have massive firepower. The Chicoms are trying desperately to build their firepower. When they do, it is impossible for me to imagine how we could live with a totalitarian and aggressive regime such as this. It would then be too late for the free world. They would go on the offensive immediately." "You know they are working hard to develop an atomic capability. When they are able to make their first test explosion, although it will not be significant firepower-wise, the psychological effect will rock all Asia. They will become immediately more aggressive. We can't live with such a situation." "Now the South Chinese are tired of the communist regime. I mean those in Canton and the south Chinese provinces. They would welcome Chiang Kai-shek tomorrow and he has the capability of cutting China in two from East to West and liberating the South Chinese. We should first insure that the Moscow-Peking split is effective and then Chiang should split China in two. The South Chinese would be happy and would welcome him. Moreover, he has the military capability of doing this today with perhaps some support from the United States." Khanh again referred to the Viet Minh and the Vietnamese as seeing in him, Khanh, a nationalist leader such as Tito, but I didn't interpret this as implying a Tito in the communist sense but rather in the sense of a strong national leader under whom his people could be reunited. He said that he appreciated the strong support that McNamara is giving him and that he is delighted to have Ambassador Taylor here with his splendid people like General Westmoreland, who he considers the cream of the crop. He reiterated that if we continue the "people's war" there may be no end to it, that we must open up the war, "il faut ouvrir la guerre", unify the people in support of the national effort, identify the VC as the people's enemy and go to conventional military operations which we understand and in which we have experience. I told him I was so pleased to hear that he had just pinned a fourth star on General Khiem at Vung Tau and that I felt he had made an excellent choice in a loyal and very capable officer. He said,"we must have a stronger military organization, Sib, and it must be headed by officers of appropriate rank." I gathered that he had in mind some additional promotions in the near future. He said, "I will not promote myself as I am now up to my neck in this political game." He said, of course with his characteristic modesty, that he felt himself to be uniquely qualified for leadership of his country because of his experience in the political field as President Diem's Chief of Staff as well as his military background. I observed that Diem had kept the military promotions down and had consistently resisted all efforts to achieve unbroken military chains of command in the armed forces because Diem, fearing another coup, interrupted the military chain with political appointments at province chief and higher levels who reported back to him through Nhu. I asked if Khanh still felt he had to counterbalance the military with a civilian organization. He replied that he felt the answer was to have a strong military organization with an uncompromised military chain of command and with leaders who were loyal and whom he could trust. I recalled that he had kept the correspondents and a number of others waiting for nearly three-fourths of an hour and he said that it had been worth it to have a heart to heart chat with an old friend. I asked to take his picture in front of the stuffed tiger in his office and he said, "Why don't we have our picture taken together, Sib?" Major Kwasigroch took a couple of pictures of us. In parting, he sent his warm regards to Ellie and asked me to bring her over with me the next time I came. In leaving the palace, I asked his aide about Generals Don, Dinh, and Xuan, whom I had known very well. The aide replied that he was sure that General Khanh would be delighted to have me call on them in Dalat if I had time during my trip and that they would be delighted to see me. He said that of course they were not in prison, that I would understand that they had to be under surveillance for the time being. I told the aide that I supposed the industrialist, Mr. Buu, whose steamship line and other businesses had been confiscated, would be released from the hospital before long as Vietnam needed strong businessmen of this type. The aide nodded and said he would mention it to Khanh who knew Mr. Buu very well. I left the office at 1625 hours and drove back to MACV Headquarters where I reported the substance of the above to General Westmoreland and, at his suggestion, to Ambassador Taylor later that evening. Alden K. Sibley
310. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 11, 1964--6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, the White House, CIA, and the Department of Defense. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted and initialed for Taylor by Johnson. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) 387. Am disappointed to note from JCS 7828 to CINCPAC/2/ that proposal for further patrol in Gulf of Tonkin not approved at this time. As noted Embtel 364,/3/ we feel that it is important to continue these patrols at frequent intervals. /2/Telegram JCS 7828 is presumably an incorrect reference. Telegram JCS 7827, August 10, informed Sharp that a DeSoto patrol into the Gulf of Tonkin August 12-17 was not approved, but would be considered at a later date. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files) /3/Telegram 364, August 9, reported that OPLAN 34A actions would be suspended until further notice, but that the destroyer patrols would be continued. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Although we know in past such patrols have only been on widely spaced periodic basis, are concerned that both DRV/ChiCom as well as GVN will interpret present action as retreat in face deployment of MIGs to DRV. From standpoint Communists, this may encourage them to resume attacks when patrols begin again at later date. From standpoint GVN and public attitudes here, it will tend to hasten and accentuate drop in morale which received major lift from August 5 action. Insofar as "normal requirements" are concerned, it seems to us presence of MIGs in DRV has raised previously existing requirements for patrols, including necessity closely following by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] development of GCI capabilities in DRV. Taylor
311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, August 11, 1964--7:51 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared in substance with William Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC. 405. Ref Embtel 388./2/ Agree your conclusion removal Quat and Oanh from GVN. Our main concern here is effect reorganization on U.S. opinion. Quat only recently visited Washington/3/ and made rather good impression. Oanh is, of course, well known in both domestic and international economic community, and his removal bound to have some adverse effect on confidence in management GVN economic problems. Realize risks in U.S. intervening too directly in support of individuals, but nevertheless you may wish draw on these points when you see Khanh as well as emphasize need for type of public explanation which best maintains impression of stability. /2/Telegram 388, August 11, received in the Department of State at 8:01 a.m., transmitted a lengthy report on a proposed governmental reorganization. Among the contemplated changes was the removal of Oanh and Quat, both of whom were regarded favorably by the Embassy in Saigon. (Ibid.) /3/See Document 195. Rusk
312. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 12, 1964--11:35 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Although the source text is a Department of State telegram form, the internal structure and references in the telegram (see footnote 2 below) show that it is the text as repeated to CINCPAC. 393. Ref. A. Embtel 189. Ref. B. Embtel 171./2/ Spent an hour with Khanh this morning devoted largely to a discussion of pending changes in government organization and personnel. I introduced the subject by mentioning Thao's visit yesterday to Alex Johnson (Embtel 189) and expressing an interest in his plans if they were ready for discussion. /2/Telegram 189 to CINCPAC is the same as telegram 388 from Saigon; see footnote 2, Document 311. Telegram 171 to CINCPAC (355 from Saigon, August 8) reported Khanh's plans for a provisional government and constitution. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) He indicated some annoyance that Thao has raised these matters before he had had an opportunity to do so but then plunged into a discussion of his intentions using notes which he had prepared for the occasion. A provisional constitution is being drafted, a copy of which will be furnished us on Friday. It will provide for a government generally as reported in Embtel 171, consisting of independent legislative, executive and judicial branches with the MRC remaining as the capstone over the entire structure. The legislative assembly will be composed of 60 appointed military officers (all or most retired), 60 members elected by provincial councils, and 30 appointed from politicians, notables and confessional representatives. Out of the 150 members of the assembly, Khanh reckons there will be about 60 anti-government members to form a loyal opposition. The legislative branch will not have sole lawmaking authority since the executive will have the concurrent power to issue decrees in time of war or emergency. The executive will be headed by a president (Khanh) and a vice-president (Khiem) in charge of military affairs. No mention was made of the appointment of Vu Van Mau (see Embtel 189) to a similar position for political affairs, but this may still be in the cards. The present ministries will be aligned as departments under the presidency. Khanh is planning some changes among present ministerial incumbents to obtain greater unity and competence but was not inclined to discuss personalities. Nonetheless, I took opportunity to put in plug for Quat along line of Deptel 388. He replied that he would probably keep Quat although he was too much of a partisan Dai Viet for Khanh's liking. Khanh's only remark on the judiciary was that it would be independent as in US. Khanh hopes to announce these governmental changes by the end of the week. He still has the problem of Minh and the four Dalat Generals./3/ He intends to offer Minh an ambassadorship; if he declines, then Khanh wants us to take him off his hands by a military or civil school assignment. In any case, he expects Minh to leave the country amicably-otherwise he will release information to public highly damaging to Minh. I urged importance of handling this matter quietly and without a public scandal and he promised to do his best. /3/Generals Dinh, Don, Le Van Kim, and Xuan. Khanh had hoped to salvage Don from the other Dalat Generals but this solution is proving unacceptable to certain unspecified military colleagues of Khanh's. Hence places for all four must be found abroad either in Embassies, US schools. Asked about changes in the military high command, Khanh indicted intention to replace General Xuan commanding I Corps for unsatisfactory performance of duty (possibly outcome of Hue incident reported in Embtel 378)/4/ and General Tri commanding II Corps. Tri is needed to provide Khiem with an operational planner to work with Westmoreland's staff. /4/Apparently an incorrect reference since telegram 378, August 11, refers to two incidents in the central provinces. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) I gave Khanh two general comments, the first being concern over renewed instability which will result from these sweeping changes. Khanh recognized point but insists that the country could never progress under present government. I am afraid that he may think personality problems will [fade?] away if he changes the organizational framework. The second point made was to emphasize the need to explain adequately these changes in advance as a realignment made necessary by the state of emergency. Khanh made note of this point which we will reopen with him on Friday when the Mission Council meets with the National Security Council at Cap St. Jacques. Following that meeting Khanh wants to discuss with us the text of the provisional constitution which we will presumably have seen by that time. Taylor
313. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, August 13, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides Files, McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. 1. Top Secret. The attached memorandum will be the main topic of discussion at the meeting scheduled for noon tomorrow, Friday. In the main, the paper speaks for itself, but you should know of a couple of important issues which it does not state directly. The most important section of the paper begins on page 7 and deals with possible limited pressures forward in the direction you indicated in the Monday meeting. Within this section, on page 8, there is a discussion of cross-border operations into the Panhandle, and you should know that General Taylor and many others would now like to move toward U.S. air operations against the infiltration routes. Bob McNamara is strongly opposed. I think you may want to hear argument on both sides on this issue. Max Taylor's cable giving his view is attached at Tab A./2/ /2/Not further identified. On page 9 there is a discussion of the DeSoto patrol. There is difference of opinion on when this patrol should go back. Most of us here in Washington think it can wait ten days to two weeks (as the memo says on page 1). Max Taylor would like it to go almost right now, on grounds of signal to the Communists and encouragement to our friends. On this one also you may wish to hear argument. More broadly, it occurs to me that this meeting may be a good time for you to emphasize again the priority we put on Saigon. At Tab B is a very private letter from Mike Forrestal to John McNaughton2 which shows that the Army is using rather routine assignment and reassignment methods there. A bit of questioning from you to Wheeler might do a lot of good on this point. Finally, I will give you a one-sheet wrap-up on this before the noon meeting. McG.B. Attachment Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/3/ Washington, August 13, 1964. /3/Top Secret. The source text bears the typed note: "Third Draft." The original draft of this memorandum has not been found, but a second draft, which is the same in format but missing some of the subsections, is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 524-529. A memorandum from Robert Johnson to William Bundy, dated August 12, with comments on the second draft is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199 R. Johnson Chron. NEXT COURSES OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA I. Introduction The next ten days to two weeks should be a short holding phase in which we would avoid actions that would in any way take the onus off the Communist side for escalation. We will send the DeSoto patrol back, will hold up on new 34A operations (continuing only essential re-supply of air-dropped missions, plus relatively safe leaflet drops), but will continue intensive reconnaissance of the DRV and the Panhandle (PDJ if necessary). Within Laos, the attempt to secure Phou Kout would continue (napalm may be used in discretion of Ambassador Unger), as would T-28 operations and consolidation of Triangle gains, but no further military action would be done or indicated. In view of possible Communist moves in Laos, road watch and other intelligence efforts should be intensified accepting some greater risks. We are not yet sure what the Communist side may do in this period. They have introduced aircraft into North Vietnam, and may well send in at least token ground forces. VC activity could step up markedly at any moment. Although the volume of Chicom propaganda and demonstrations is ominous, it does not yet clearly suggest any further moves; if they were made, we would act accordingly. This paper assumes the Communist side does not go beyond the above. II. Essential Elements in the Situation A. South Vietnam is not going well. The mission's monthly report (Saigon 377)/4/ expresses hope of significant gains by the end of the year. But it also says Khanh's chances of staying in power are only 50-50, that the leadership (though not so much the people or the army) has symptoms of defeatism and hates the prospect of slugging it out within the country, that there will be mounting pressures for wider action "which, if resisted, will create frictions and irritations which could lead local politicians to serious consideration of a negotiated solution or local soldiers to a military adventure without US consent." /4/Document 306. In other words, even if the situation in our own view does go a bit better, we have a major problem of maintaining morale. Our actions of last week lifted that morale temporarily, but also aroused expectations, and morale could easily sag back again if the VC have successes and we do nothing further. B. Laos, on the other hand, has shown real military progress--so much so that a Communist retaliatory move is a real possibility. If Phou Kout can be secured, present military areas of control are if anything better for Souvanna than the line of last April. T-28 operations have been a major factor, and really hurt PL morale. Souvanna's internal position is also stronger, though the right-wing generals and colonels could make fools of themselves again at any time. C. Laos negotiations may start to move in the near future whatever we do. Souvanna has accepted a tripartite meeting in Paris, and suggested August 24th. With his gains in hand, he has already indicated he is likely not to insist on his previous precondition of Communist withdrawal from the PDJ before agreeing to a 14-nation conference. The USSR (at least publicly), India, and France--and the UK and Canada only slightly less so--are pressing for a conference or at least clear motion toward one. Souphanouvong's silence and other indicators suggest the Communist side may still not accept an early tripartite meeting or push for a conference, but we must recognize that, if they do accept a tripartite, it will be a real step toward an eventual conference. We can and will urge Souvanna to go slow, but our control will be limited. D. Hanoi and Peiping, as of now, are certainly not persuaded that they must abandon their efforts in South Vietnam and Laos. The US response to North Vietnamese naval attacks has undoubtedly convinced the Communist side we will act strongly where US force units are directly involved-as they have previously seen in our handling of Laos reconnaissance. But in other respects the Communist side may not be so persuaded we are prepared to take stronger actions, either in response to infiltration into SVN or to VC activity. The Communists probably believe that we might counter air action in Laos quite firmly, but that we would not wish to be drawn into around action there. III. Essential Elements of US Policy A. South Vietnam is still the main theater. Morale and momentum there must be maintained. This means: 1. There is advantage in devising the best possible means of action that for minimum risks get maximum results in terms of SVN morale and pressure on DRV. 2. We must continue to oppose any Vietnam conference, and must play the prospect of a Laos conference very carefully. We must particularly avoid any impression of rushing to a Laos conference, and must show a posture of general firmness into which an eventual Laos conference might fit without serious loss. 3. We particularly need to keep our hands free for at least limited measures against the Laos infiltration areas. B. It is in our interest to stabilize the Laos situation as between Government forces and the Communist side, and to reduce chances of a Communist escalating move on this front. (If such a move comes, we must meet it firmly, of course. We should also be stepping up Thai support to deter and prevent any Communist nibbles.) However, Souvanna should not give up his strong cards, particularly T-28 operations, without getting a full price for them. Moreover, we must seek to reduce as much as possible the inhibiting effect of any Laos talks on actions against the Panhandle. C. Basically, a solution in both South Vietnam and Laos will require a combination of military pressure and some form of communication under which Hanoi (and Peiping) eventually accept the idea of getting out. Negotiation without continued military action will not achieve our objectives in the foreseeable future. But military pressure could be accompanied by attempts to communicate with Hanoi and perhaps Peiping-through third-country channels, through side conversations around Laos negotiations of any sort-provided always that we make it clear both to the Communists and to South Vietnam that military pressure will continue until we have achieved our objectives. After, but only after, we have established a clear pattern of pressure hurting the DRV and leaving no doubts in South Vietnam of our resolve, we could even accept a conference broadened to include the Vietnam issue. (The UN now looks to be out as a communication forum, though this could conceivably change.) IV. Timing and Sequence of Actions
There are a number of limited actions we could take that would tend to maintain our initiative and the morale of the GVN and Khanh, but that would not involve major risks of escalation. Such actions could be such as to foreshadow stronger measures to come, though they would not in themselves go far to change Hanoi's basic actions. 1. 34 A Operations could be overtly acknowledged and justified by the GVN. Marine operations could be strongly defended on the basis of continued DRV sea infiltration, and successes could be publicized. Leaflet operations could also be admitted and defended, again on the grounds of meeting DRV efforts in the South, and their impunity (we hope) would tend to have its own morale value in both Vietnams. Airdrop operations are more doubtful; their justification is good but less clear than other operations, and successes have been few. With the others admitted, they could be left to speak for themselves-and of course security would forbid any mention of specific operations before they succeeded. 2. Joint US/GVN planning already covers possible actions against DRV and the Panhandle. It can be used in itself to maintain the morale of the GVN leadership, as well as to control and inhibit any unilateral GVN moves. With 34A surfaced, it could be put right into the same planning framework. We would not ourselves publicize this planning, but it could be leaked (as it probably would anyway) with desirable effects in Hanoi and elsewhere. 3. Stepped-up training of Vietnamese on jet aircraft should now be undertaken in any event in light of the presence of MIG's in North Vietnam. The JCS are preparing a plan, and the existence of this training could be publicized both for its morale effect in the GVN and as a signal to Hanoi of possible future action. 4. Cross-border operations into the Panhandle could be conducted on a limited scale. To be successful, ground operations would have to be so large in scale as to be beyond what GVN can spare, and we should not at this time consider major US or Thai ground action from the Thai side. But for air operations there are at least a few worthwhile targets in infiltration areas, and these could be hit by GVN air. US reconnaissance missions in the Panhandle would of course continue in any event; suppressive missions might be considered at some point, but not until after the GVN has acted in this area. (Our Panhandle reconnaissance does not have the justification of a request from Souvanna, as our PDJ operations do.) Probably we should avoid publicity on air operations so as not to embarrass Souvanna; the Communist side might squawk, but in the past they have been silent on this area. 5. DeSoto patrols could be reintroduced at some point. Both for present purposes and to maintain the credibility of our account of the events of last week, they must be clearly dissociated from 34A operations both in fact and in physical appearance. In terms of course patterns, we should probably avoid penetrations of 11 miles or so and stay at least 20 miles off; whatever the importance of asserting our view of territorial waters, it is less than the international drawbacks of appearing to provoke attack unduly. The 20-mile distance would not appreciably change the chances of a North Vietnamese reaction, while it would deprive them of a propaganda argument (since a great many other countries also assert a 12-mile territorial waters limit.) 6. Specific tit-for-tat actions of opportunity could be undertaken for any special VC or DRV activity. As Saigon 377 points out, the VC have "unused dirty tricks" such as mining (or attacks) in the Saigon River, sabotage of major POL stocks, and terrorist attacks on US dependents. The first two, at least, would lend themselves to prompt and precise reprisal, e.g., by mining the Haiphong channel and attacking the Haiphong POL storage. 7. US Dependents. This has two aspects. If there were substantial terrorism against our dependents, we should consider some specific reprisal against the DRV; however, this has disadvantages in that it might appear that we were reacting only when US nationals were hit, and ignoring the regular pattern of terrorism against South Vietnamese. The second aspect, whether or not there are terrorist attacks, is the possible withdrawal of our dependents. If the situation should reach another intense point, withdrawal might be useful in itself as a signal to Hanoi that we were really getting ready for business. 8. The sequence and mix of US and GVN actions needs careful thought. At this point, we should emphasize both the GVN role in actions and rationales directly relating actions to what is being done to the GVN. Overt 34A actions should be the first moves, and the GVN would go first in air attacks against the Panhandle. But there are advantages in other respects to actions related to US forces. If we lost an aircraft in the Panhandle, we could act hard and fast, and of course similarly for any attack on the DeSoto patrols. Probably the sequence should be played somewhat by ear, with the aim of producing a slightly increased tempo but one that does not commit us prematurely to even stronger actions. Summary. The above actions are in general limited and controllable. However, if we accept--as of course we must--the necessity of prompt retaliation especially for attacks on our own forces, they could amount to at least a pretty high noise level that might stimulate some pressures for a conference. New DRV air and AA capability may also produce incidents. These actions are not in themselves a truly coherent program of strong enough pressure either to bring Hanoi around or to sustain a pressure posture into some kind of discussion. Hence, we should continue absolutely opposed to any conference.
All the above actions would be foreshadowing systematic military action against the DRV, and we might at some point conclude such action was required either because of incidents arising from the above actions or because of deterioration in the SVN situation, particularly if there were to be clear evidence of greatly increased infiltration from the north. However, in the absence of such major new developments, we should be thinking of a contingency date for planning purposes, as suggested by Ambassador Taylor, of 1 January 1965. Our present thinking is that systematic action against the DRV might start by progressive attacks keyed to the rationale of infiltration routes and facilities, followed by other selected military-related targets. However, the mix is now hard to foresee and would obviously depend heavily on specific incidents and desired signal strength at any one time.
1. We would wish to slow down any progress toward a conference and to hold Souvanna to the firmest possible position. Unger's suggestion of tripartite administration for the PDJ is one possibility that would be both advantageous and a useful delaying gambit. Insistence on full recognition of Souvanna's position is another point on which he should insist, and there would also be play in the hand on the question of free ICC operations. As to a cease-fire, we would certainly not want this to be agreed to at the tripartite stage, since it would remove Souvanna's powerful T-28 lever. But since Souvanna has always made a cease-fire one of his preconditions, we must reckon that the other side might insist on it before a conference was convened-which we would hope would not be for at least 2-3 months in any case. 2. If, despite our best efforts, Souvanna on his own, or in response to third-country pressures, started to move rapidly toward a conference, we would have a very difficult problem. If the timing of a Laos conference, in relation to the degree of pressures we had then set in motion against the DRV, was such that our attending or accepting the conference would have major morale drawbacks in South Vietnam, we might well have to refuse to attend ourselves and to accept the disadvantages of having no direct participation. In the last analysis, GVN morale would have to be the deciding factor.
314. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, August 14, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, Vol. VI. No classification marking. RE The immediate Southeast Asia situation has not changed since last night. If you have had time to read the paper,/2/ you can say so and reduce discussion by turning attention to specific questions. John McCone would like to open with a few minutes of intelligence briefing and I think this is helpful. The only significant new piece of intelligence is that we have some new [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] photography of Chinese nuclear facilities which raises a question as to whether they are not coming quite near an explosion. The pictures have not yet been analyzed and no direct estimate is available today, but McCone may mention this new evidence on a most important problem. /2/Attachment to Bundy's memorandum, Document 313. You will want to ask Rusk for a brief discussion. The specific questions which I suggest are these: 1. You assume we plan to put these matters succinctly to CINCPAC and to Max Taylor for comment. 2. You understand there is difference of opinion about means of attacking the infiltration routes and especially on the question of U.S. aircraft. You would like to hear argument on this point. 3. Is there any consensus on the timing of the next DeSoto patrol and on its combat instructions. 4. You may wish to repeat to others what you have said to me about following upon Goldwater's assertion that you gave an admonition to commanders to use any weapons, including nuclear weapons. I have been pressing this with many newspaper men and find a surprising reaction--which is that everyone knows Barry is this kind of fool and there is not much news in it any more! My own conclusion is that if you wish to put more light on this folly, you may have to do it yourself in a press conference, and I am working on possible language. 5. You may wish to ask Wheeler if the Army is using all its best--and also its most experienced--men in South Vietnam. The general result of this meeting should be agreement on further study and refinement of a program in which we are free to take appropriate initiatives, together with an instruction to consult further in the Pacific. McNamara will be away all next week, and if the situation does not change sharply, we will probably not wish to make big decisions until his return on Monday, the 24th./3/ /3/The off-the-record meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 12:31 to 1:14 and was attended by the President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, McGeorge and William Bundy, Ball, Vance, McNaughton, McCone, Wheeler, and Ray Cline. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. McG.B./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
315. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/ Honolulu, August 14, 1964--5:51 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11885. Secret; Limdis. 150351Z. Personal for Gen Westmoreland from Sharp. Security of US resources in SVN. 1. I know you share my concern over the vulnerability to possible VC attack of heavy concentrations of recently deployed US aircraft on airfields such as Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut and Danang. I am particularly concerned about the possibility of mortar attacks from locations difficult to secure. VC reaction to Pierce Arrow operation may well single out these and other vital US resources for reprisal, from which they would derive tremendous psychological advantage. This would be in addition to the substantial loss we would sustain from successful attacks of any type. 2. I am sure that you will impress upon RVN necessity for all possible security measures./2/ /2/On August 16, Westmoreland replied that the possibility of attacks on the airfields was "fully recognized." After describing the actions taken unilaterally and with the Vietnamese, Westmoreland concluded: "I believe we have explored all defense possibilities and have organized our resources to the best to meet the potential threat. This matter will continue to be given my personal attention." (MAC JOO 8214; ibid., Reel 11888)
316. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ JCSM-701-64 Washington, August 14, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Vietnam 381. Secret. SUBJECT 1. With reference to the draft policy paper, subject as above, dated 13 August 1964,/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general accord with the policy and courses of action contained in the paper provided that more serious pressures, comparable to those referred to in subparagraph IV B of the paper, be implemented as necessary along with the limited pressures outlined in subparagraph IV A. This will provide for military courses of action, to include attack of targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), as necessary, with the objective of destroying the DRV will and capabilities to continue support of insurgent forces in Laos and the Republic of Vietnam. /2/Attachment to Document 313. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the recent sharp and immediate military action taken by the United States against the DRV, more clearly than any United States action in some time, conveyed to both friend and enemy the measure of US resolution in Southeast Asia. The sudden advantage gained by this military action must be retained. The actions proposed in the draft paper, as modified by paragraph 1 above, if promptly pursued, should sustain the US advantage gained and, at the same time, maintain the higher morale and momentum generated in the Republic of Vietnam as a result of recent US military operations. 3. The next military courses of action in Southeast Asia are now being analyzed as a matter of urgency by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The referenced draft paper will be considered in the development of these military courses of action. Upon completion of this analysis, appropriate recommendations will be forwarded for your consideration before implementing actions are taken on the Bundy memorandum. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 317. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 15, 1964--11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. 415. CINCPAC for POLAD. After August 14 meeting of GVN SC and U.S. Mission Council, I stayed for picnic lunch, accompanied by Sullivan and Manfull (Johnson has been laid up with flu). After lunch, Khanh took us aside and produced a rough English translation of his new constitution. Full text, with notes, transmitted by septel./2/ We found it brusque in language and suggested to Khanh that in present form it would raise criticism in U.S. and in world press. We stressed to him that internal problems of acceptance in Vietnam were his own affair, and we could only offer observations on the objective issue of international reactions. /2/Telegram 416 from Saigon, August 15, 12:10 p.m. (Ibid.) Khanh heard out these observations with apparent understanding and then suggested that we should perhaps meet with the commission which had drafted this document in order to discuss our observations with them. I proposed that Sullivan and Manfull should remain in Cap St. Jacques for this purpose while I returned for commitments in Saigon. Sullivan and Manfull were then taken to province chief's residence while call went out to various villas in Cap St. Jaques to assemble the constitutional commission. When mission arrived at residence, it proved to be headed by one-time P.M. Tran Chanh Thanh, and to be composed of Tran Le Quang, plus five prominent jurists, one of whom had recently been Chief Justice of Constitutional Court under Diem regime. During two and one-half hour frank exchange and after full explanation, accompanied by occasional jocular commentary from judicial experts, Sullivan and Manfull made fol points:/3/ /3/For another account of this meeting, see Sullivan, Obbligato, pp. 205-208. (1) Preamble did not make clear provisional nature of new "charter". (2) Preamble should stipulate that MRC felt compelled to assume authority because of threat to republic, but that this authority should be relinquished as conditions permitted. (3) Chapter II, concerning "bill of rights" was unnecessarily abrupt. Rights should be spelled out in detail, even if charter specified that they must necessarily be curtailed temporarily because of emergency. Comparison was drawn between twenty articles concerning rights of citizens in old Diem constitution, and only two articles in new charter devoted to this subject. (4) Several articles, notably those affecting Council of Govt and High Council of Magistrates, were cryptically obscure in their meaning. (5) Whole document would be considered as unduly permanent formalization of military takeover. Therefore most careful preparation needed in public relations field if this to be done smoothly. In general, constitutional commission accepted all these observations in good spirit. They undertook to convene forthwith and examine means by which any or all of them could be put into effect. Sullivan and Manfull then withdrew, and, by prior arrangement with Khanh, returned to latter's villa for final consultation with him prior their return to Saigon. At Khanh's villa, meeting of top level Military Revolutionary Council reps was in session when Sullivan and Manfull arrived. Khanh withdrew from meeting, listened to recital of observations listed above, and expressed general agreement that these matters should be dealt with. However, he laid great emphasis upon urgency with which action had to be taken. He had, he said, "five days at the outside" and "at the inside", maybe only a couple of days. He therefore wanted all the help he could obtain soonest. He said he and his colleagues would draft a proclamation which they would deliver to Embassy August 15 for our comments and that he would appreciate any advice we could give on public relations handling of this enterprise. He doubted there was time to get professional legal advice from Washington and also questioned whether it would be really useful in these "special circumstances". With this, he returned, very solemnly, to the room where his MRC colleagues, equally solemn, were busily scratching on foolscap, presumably drafting their proclamation. Comment: We conclude that Khanh and his military colleagues have decided that this sort of change is indispensable. It is of course still not determined what Gen Minh's attitude will be. We have considered possibility of seeking legal aid from Washington to review this charter, but feel this would not be useful because this document departs so widely from U.S. experience and because time is so short. We have therefore decided that our best efforts would be devoted to (1) making wording of document less brusque and therefore more palatable both in Vietnam and abroad and (2) assisting in proclamation and other measures of public relations nature explaining necessity for this sort of change. Whether we like it or not, this is the constitutional form which the MRC fully intends to impose, and we see no alternative but to make best of it./4/ /4/The new constitution, sometimes called the Vung Tau Charter, was promulgated on August 16. Taylor 318. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 17, 1964--9 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to the White House, the Department of Defense, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted and initialed by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) 457. There is need for guidance to COMUSMACV in the execution of joint military planning now underway with RVNAF. This planning will involve three contingency areas: (1) cross-border operations into Laos, (2) DRV ground attack against northern provinces of SVN, (3) air attack of targets in DRV by VNAF and/or US air forces. I should like to comment by category with regard to some of the emerging problems. A. Cross-border operations into Laos This kind of operation has already been undertaken with limited success in the form of the Leaping Lena parachute drops. This pattern has the advantage of making reasonably sure that a reconnaissance team arrives at destination and does not turn back at some point before getting there. I do not think that we should be discouraged by poor initial results but should proceed to reestablish the capability for Leaping Lena operations which is currently virtually nil as the result of disaffection of trainees at Nha Trang. In expanding cross-border operations, consideration is now being given to a concept involving the establishment of three "bridgeheads" of considerable dimension in Laos as described in MACV 8213 to CINCPAC1CS DTG 160943Z./2/ /2/An abbreviated text of this telegram is printed in the Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 539-540. As I understand the proposal, it seems to me to be subject to several objections. It is overly ambitious in relation to the forces which could properly be made available without detriment to the pacification effort which should always remain the bread-and-butter preoccupation of RVNAF. Since such diverted forces, in my judgment, should not exceed at this time about 2-3 battalion equivalents additional to present border forces the cross-border operations are likely to be relatively ineffective in stopping infiltration. To achieve any effectiveness, I would agree with the joint planners that US advisors should accompany the ground forces. It is proposed to provide VNAF air support for these ground operations on approval of CINCRVNAF and COMUSMACV. Such air operations would raise some of the questions posed by Ambassador Unger in Vientiane's 160 [170]/3/ to Department and would cause concern in my mind over loss of US control of air actions outside of SVN, which could have great political and military significance to US interests. US Mission is presently studying pros and cons of using US air against Panhandle targets as described in Embtel 236 4 rather than VNAF and results of this study will bear on our position with regard to use of air in cross-border operations. /3/Document 250. /4/Document 251. Notwithstanding these adverse comments, I am in favor joint cross-border planning not because of its probable effectiveness but because us [it?] will have value in letting off some of the steam building up in local military. B. Defense against DRV ground/air attack COMUSMACV has described in following terms the most probable (in view of JCS) offensive ground reaction of DRV in case of military escalation: "Entire units of PACV could be infiltrated on an intensive scale probably with unit designations changed and in VC uniforms but otherwise maintaining unit integrity. This infiltration could take place across the demilitarized zone and through the Laotian Panhandle. Forces equivalent to division strength could be thus infiltered and marshalled in Quang Nam or Thua Thien and could make a sudden and violent descent upon Da Nang and Hue or both, with little or no warning. An attack at Da Nang could be highly destructive and would represent a direct blow against a major US air base." In view of this threat, COMUSMACV recommends holding a BLT on call to land at Da Nang within 6 hours and the remainder of MEF to follow as soon as possible. In addition, he wishes a US brigade available on call to move to the defense of Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa if needed and to provide a general reserve. He also recommends deployment to SVN ASAP logistic, communication and anti-aircraft missile units, the latter for the air defense of Saigon complex, Da Nang and Nha Trang. In summary, COMUSMACV feels that a DRV ground action in I Corps is sufficiently probable to require a BLT to remain indefinitely afloat off Da Nang (with the remainder of MEF on alert presumably at home stations on Okinawa), to keep a brigade available for quick deployment to Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa, and to deploy now the logistic and communications elements necessary to support the additional combat forces and the air defense elements necessary in anticipation of hostile air attacks on Saigon, Da Nang and Nha Trang. There is considerable logic behind the ascribed capability of DRV to create a serious ground situation in I Corps if PAVN units are added to the VC. However, if the form of the attack were the infiltration mode described above, a concurrent air attack on Saigon, Da Nang and Nha Trang seems incompatible with the covert character of the ground action. Nevertheless it is quite clear that an air threat against these crowded bases always exists in any circumstance. The question comes down to the point of deciding whether or not the DRV actions in the Gulf of Tonkin have so changed our evaluation of the capabilities and possible intentions of Hanoi as to warrant preparation against a ground attack in I Corps and the consequent threat to Da Nang by positioning the Marines, alerting the army forces and taking now the air defense/logistic measures mentioned above (including increasing military forces permanently in SVN). Another question arising in joint planning concerns command relationships in case US ground forces are brought into SVN. This question could become an area of futile debate if not brought under early control and should be avoided if possible. If something must be said, COMUSMACV could comment that the Korean pattern of allied command relationship, with appropriate modifications, would probably be favored by US but this matter need not be decided now. C. Air attack of targets in DRV Joint planning will soon give consideration to the air attack of targets in DRV either under the tit-for-tat concept of Category II CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 or the mounting pressure concept of Category III, same plan. Here we are brought face to face with certain new factors which bear on the OPLAN 37-64 concept. It is well to remind ourselves that this CINCPAC plan was drawn up with the idea of applying military pressure in DRV through overt actions of GVN with US participation limited to reconnaissance beyond capability of VNAF and to Farmgate activities to which would be added the contribution of the B-57's. Since this early concept, several new factors have come into play. The DRV attack in the Gulf of Tonkin has required a US posture of readiness reflected in CINCPAC Fragorder 062335Z 5 which calls on US air forces alone to attack NVN targets. The crash requirement for a plan ready for immediate implementation caused the movement of the B-57's to SVN as US, not Farmgate, aircraft. Finally, the appearance of MIG 15/17's at Phuc Yen Airfield, Hanoi, has set definite limits upon what the VNAF propeller planes can do in contributing to OPLAN 37-64. 5 This cable transmitted the fragmentation operations order summarized below (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) These new factors call for a quick review of OPLAN 37-64 to decide what role the US wishes VNAF (without and with Farmgate) to play in any air action against NVN. Emphasize quick review because COMUSMACV needs guidance today as to how to conduct his planning discussions. For example, he will need to know whether VNAF can hope to get jets (particularly the B-57's) and, if so, when and how many. All of these questions do not need to be answered now but we do need to decide in general what role the GVN should be encouraged to play in out-of-country air operations. It will not do to say the role is zero as now implied in CINCPAC Fragorder. This government must be given a significant military role to play which will stimulate enthusiasm without diverting attention from the in-country pacification plan. This is going to be a hard balance to strike. In conclusion, I recommend approving following joint planning guidance for use by COMUSMACV with GVN: A. Cross-border operations (1) Only one area of ground operations to be undertaken at outset, preferably the one offering greatest promise of success. (2) Not more than two battalion equivalents to be committed at any one time (beyond present border forces). (3) Plans for air actions in Laos to make provision for use of either VNAF/Farmgate or US air without prejudice to final decision. (4) All air operations in Laos to be on approval by COMUSMACV (who will obtain necessary US clearances). B. Defense against DRV ground/air attack (1) No planning for landing US ground forces in SVN beyond Marines at Danang to protect airfield in case of clear threat. CINCPAC to have logistic support responsibility for the Marines. (2) No indication of any intention to increase permanent US garrison beyond possible introduction of Hawk units if [unknown amount of source text missing]. (3) Discussion of command relationship to be avoided as long as possible. If necessary, use Korean pattern as basis for planning without commitment. C. Air attack of targets in DRV (1) Include B-57's in Farmgate for planning purposes. (2) Joint planners to examine MIG threat and decide what targets could be safely given to propeller aircraft under current conditions. (3) Eventually assure appropriate participation of VNAF in light of foregoing examination. This message, while bearing on some of the matters contained in Deptel 439,/6/ was prepared before its receipt and does not constitute an answer to it. /6/See footnote 2, Document 319. The foregoing has been discussed in detail with Westmoreland who concurs with the above recommended guidance for joint planning with GVN. He reaffirms his position on military posture as described in MACV 8149 DTG 150123Z./7/ /7/This telegram reviewed the military situation in South Vietnam and proposed various troop deployments to improve it. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Taylor
319. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 18, 1964--7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Taylor. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, Vientiane, and CINCPAC. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp.545-548. 465. Deptel 439./2/ This is a US Mission message. In preparing our reply, we have found it simpler to produce a new paper which undertakes to state the problem in South Viet Nam as we see it in two possible forms and then to provide a course of action responding to each statement of the problem. /2/The text of Bundy's draft memorandum (attached to Document 313), without the last three paragraphs, was transmitted to Saigon in telegram 439, August 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 533-537) The draft memorandum was also sent to Vientiane and CINCPAC for comments. Both replied on August 17. The Embassy in Vientiane expressed doubts about how much action in the Panhandle Souvanna could or would accept and felt that Laos was a holding action until the situation in Vietnam could be resolved. (Telegram 310 from Vientiane; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) CINCPAC stressed the need for increased military pressure, stated that no conference on Southeast Asia should be held before the insurgency was overcome, and commented point by point on the items in the memorandum. (Telegram 170530Z; Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11885) Both replies are printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol III, pp.541-545. Underlying our analysis is the apparent assumption of Deptel 439 (which we believe is correct) that the present in-country pacification plan is not enough in itself to maintain national morale or to offer reasonable hope of eventual success. Something must be added in the coming months. Statement of the Problem--A. The course which US policy in South Viet Nam should take during the coming months can be expressed in terms of four objectives. The first and most important objective is to gain time for the Khanh Government to develop a certain stability and to give some firm evidence of viability. Since any of the courses of action considered in this cable carry a considerable measure of risk to the US, we should be slow to get too deeply involved in them until we have a better feel of the quality of our ally. In particular, if we can avoid it, we should not get involved militarily with North Viet Nam and possibly with Red China if our base in South Viet Nam is insecure and Khanh's army is tied down everywhere by the VC insurgency. Hence, it is to our interest to gain sufficient time not only to allow Khanh to prove that he can govern, but also to free Saigon from the VC threat which presently rings it and assure that sufficient GVN ground forces will be available to provide a reasonable measure of defense against any DRV ground reaction which may develop in the execution of our program and thus avoid the possible requirement for a major US ground force commitment. A second objective in this period is the maintenance of morale in South Viet Nam, particularly within the Khanh Government. This should not be difficult in the case of the government if we can give Khanh assurance of our readiness to bring added pressure on Hanoi if he provides evidence of ability to do his part. Thirdly, while gaining time for Khanh, we must be able to hold the DRV in check and restrain a further buildup of Viet Cong strength by way of infiltration from the North. Finally, throughout this period, we should be developing a posture of maximum readiness for a deliberate escalation of pressure against North Viet Nam, using January 1, 1965 as a target D-Day. We must always recognize, however, that events may force us to advance D-Day to a considerably earlier date. Course of Action--A. If we accept the validity of the foregoing statement of the problem, we then need to design a course of action which will achieve the four objectives enumerated above. Such a course of action would consist of three parts: the first, a series of actions directed at the Khanh Government; the second, actions directed at the Hanoi Government; and third, following a pause of some duration, initiation of an orchestrated air attack against North Viet Nam. In approaching the Khanh Government, we should express our willingness to Khanh to engage in planning and eventually to exert increased pressure on North Viet Nam, providing certain conditions are met in advance. In the first place before we would agree to go all out against the DRV, he must stabilize his government and make some progress in cleaning up his operational backyard. Specifically, he must execute the initial phases of the Hop Tac plan successfully to the extent of pushing the Viet Cong from the doors of Saigon. The overall pacification program, including Hop Tac, should progress sufficiently to allow earmarking at least three division equivalents for the defense in I Corps if the DRV steps up military operations in that area. Finally, we should reach some fundamental understandings with Khanh and his government concerning war aims. We must make clear that we will engage in action against North Viet Nam only for the purpose of assuring the security and independence of South Viet Nam within the territory assigned by the 1954 agreements; that we will not join in a crusade to unify the North and South; that we will not even seek to overthrow the Hanoi regime provided the latter will cease its efforts to take over the South by subversive warfare. With these understandings reached, we would be ready to set in motion the following: (1) Resume at once 34A (with emphasis on Marine operations) and DeSoto patrols. These could start without awaiting outcome of discussions with Khanh. (2) Resume U-2 overflights over all NVN. (3) Initiate air and ground strikes in Laos against infiltration targets as soon as joint plans now being worked out with the Khanh Government are ready. Such plans will have to be related to the situation in Laos. It appears to us that Souvanna Phouma should be informed at an appropriate time of the full scope of our plans and one would hope to obtain his acquiescence in the anti-infiltration actions in Laos. In any case we should always seek to preserve our freedom of action in the Laotian corridor. By means of these actions, Hanoi will get the word that the operational ground rules with respect to the DRV are changing. We should perhaps consider message to DRV that shooting down of U-2 would result in reprisals. We should now lay public base for justifying such flights and have plans for prompt execution in contingency of shoot down. One might be inclined to consider including at this stage tit-for-tat bombing operations in our plans to compensate for VC depredations in SVN. However, the initiation of air attacks from SVN against NVN is likely to release a new order of military reaction from both sides, the outcome of which is impossible to predict. Thus, we do not visualize initiating this form of reprisal as a desirable tactic in the current plan but would reserve the capability as an emergency response if needed. Before proceeding beyond this point, we should raise the level of precautionary military readiness (if not already done) by taking such visible measures as introducing US Hawk units to Danang and Saigon, landing a Marine force at Danang for defense of the airfield and beefing up MACV's support base. By this time (assumed to be late fall) we should have some reading on Khanh's performance. Assuming that his performance has been satisfactory and that Hanoi has failed to respond favorably, it will be time to embark on the final phase of Course of Action A, a carefully orchestrated bombing attack on NVN, directed primarily at infiltration and other military targets. At some point prior thereto, it may be desirable to open direct communications with Hanoi if this has not been done before. With all preparations made, political and military, the bombing program would begin, using US reconnaissance planes, VNAF/Farmgate aircraft against those targets which could be attacked safely in spite of the presence of the MIG's, and additional US combat aircraft if necessary for the effective execution of the bombing programs. Pros and Cons of Course of Action--A. If successful, Course of Action A will accomplish the objectives set forth at the outset as essential to the support of US policy in South Viet Nam. It will press the Khanh Government into doing its homework in pacification and will limit the diversion of interest to the out-of-country venture. It gives adequate time for careful preparation estimated at several months, while doing sufficient at once to maintain internal morale. It also provides ample warning to Hanoi and Peking to allow them to adjust their conduct before becoming over-committed. On the other hand, Course of Action A relies heavily upon the durability of the Khanh Government. It assumes that there is little danger of its collapse without notice or of its possible replacement by a weaker or more unreliable successor. Also, because of the drawn-out nature of the program, it is exposed to the danger of international political pressure to enter into negotiations before NVN is really hurting from the pressure directed against it. Statement of the Problem--B. It may well be that the problem of US policy in SVN is more urgent than that depicted in the foregoing statement. It is far from clear at the present moment that the Khanh Government can last until January 1, 1965, although the application of Course of Action A should have the effect of strengthening the government internally and of silencing domestic squabbling. If we assume, however, that we do not have the time available which is implicit in Course of Action A (several months), we would have to restate the problem in the following terms. Our objective should be action at once which will hold the government together and will avoid the possible consequences of a collapse of national morale. To accomplish these purposes, we would have to open the campaign against the DRV without delay, seeking to force Hanoi as rapidly as possible to desist from aiding the VC and to convince the DRV that it must cooperate in calling off the VC insurgency. Course of Action--B. To meet this statement of the problem, we need an accelerated course of action, seeking to obtain results faster than under Course of Action A. Such an accelerated program would include the following actions: Again we must inform Khanh of our intentions, this time expressing a willingness to begin military pressures against Hanoi at once, providing that he will undertake to perform as in Course of Action A. However, US action would not await evidence of performance. Again we may wish to communicate directly on this subject with Hanoi or await the effect of our military actions. The scenario of the ensuing events would be essentially the same as under course A but the execution would await only the readiness of plans to execute, relying almost exclusively on US military means. Pros and Cons of Course of Action--B. This course of action asks virtually nothing from the Khanh Government, primarily because it is assumed that little can be expected from it. It avoids the consequences of the sudden collapse of the Khanh Government and gets underway with minimum delay the punitive actions against Hanoi. Thus it lessens the chance of an interruption of the program by an international demand for negotiation by presenting a fait accompli to international critics. However, it increases the likelihood of US involvement in ground action, since Khanh will have almost no available ground forces which can be released from pacification employment to mobile resistance of DRV attacks. Conclusion: It is concluded that Course of Action A offers the greater promise of achievement of US policy objectives in SVN during the coming months. However, we should always bear in mind the fragility of the Khanh Government and be prepared to shift quickly to Course of Action B if the situation requires. In either case, we must be militarily ready for any response which may be initiated by North Viet Nam or by Communist China. Miscellaneous: As indicated above, we believe that 34A operations should resume at once at maximum tempo, still on a covert basis. Similarly, DeSoto patrols should begin at once, operating outside 12-mile limit. We concur that a number of VNAF pilots should be trained on B-57's between now and first of year. There should be no change now with regard to policy on evacuation of US dependents. Recommendation: It is recommended that USG adopt Course of Action A while maintaining readiness to shift to Course of Action B. Taylor
320. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Desk Officer of the Vietnam Working Group (Furness) and the Vietnamese Charge (Rau), Washington, August 21, 1964/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Drafted by Furness on August 25. SUBJECT Mr. Rau asked me for lunch on August 21 and discussed various aspects of the political situation in Viet-Nam and a few other subjects. Political Situation in Viet-Nam We first discussed the recent elevation of General Khanh to the presidency of Viet-Nam. Rau indicated that he had gained the impression from conversations with other State Department officers that Khanh had actually consulted with the Embassy as to whether or not he should take the office of President. I indicated to Rau that it was my understanding that while Khanh had told Ambassador Taylor and others that he was planning to reorganize the government and might assume the office of Chief of State himself, I did not believe that he had ever told us that he was planning to take the office of President. I told him that Khanh had shown us his first draft of the new provisional constitution and that we had been able to make changes in it. Rau indicated that he believed that Khanh's taking of the office of President created resentment among Vietnamese. Rau felt Khanh's future depends on how effectively he operates in the future and only if he is able to win the cooperation of other political figures in Viet-Nam. Rau indicated that as far as he knew, the Vietnamese see no great distinction in the fact that Khanh calls himself "Chu-Tich" instead of "Tong-Thong" and that they were immediately reminded of the Diem regime when Khanh assumed the office of President. Rau said he has received very little information from the Foreign Office (he says he gets monthly reports about two months late); I indicated that we would do our best to keep him informed of new developments. He asked if we had any information as to the composition of the new cabinet; I told him we did not know who was to be appointed to the new cabinet but that we did have an idea as to how it would be organized. I described the cabinet structure and Rau remarked that it was very much like the organization under Diem. I told Rau I understood that Khanh was considering appointing former Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau, now Ambassador to London, as Vice President and that this office would be, in effect, the executive of the government. I asked Rau whether he thought Mau would be a good appointee for this position. Rau said he thought Mau might do a good job but wondered if he would be willing to accept the position. Rau said Mau might feel he would not be given sufficient authority by President Khanh, given the experience of the previous Deputy Prime Ministers under Khanh. I asked Rau what other civilian might make a good Vice President if Mau did not accept, but Rau made no suggestion. Rau said he knew very little about Lt. General Tran Thien Khiem, except that he was apparently one of the few thoroughly "clean" senior officers. In response to a question, Rau said he believed Khiem had been given his extra star "to keep him happy", but made no further comment. Rau described Do Mau as an intriguer and a danger. Action Against North Viet-Nam Rau indicated that he had learned through a friend who had just returned from Saigon that the Vietnamese populace had been greatly encouraged by the U.S. strike against North Vietnamese PT boat bases, but that our failure to follow-up on this action has caused a let-down. He said the lack of any response by the North Vietnamese and Chinese indicated we could have done considerably more. I said that I believed that our ordering the strikes was a new departure in our policy and that we had made it clear that our response was limited and related to the fact that the U.S. destroyers had been attacked by the North Vietnamese patrol craft and not related directly to the war in South Viet-Nam. Rau stated, however, that he believed it would be extremely difficult to win in South Viet-Nam without bringing the attack to North Viet-Nam. I said that while this question was continually being studied, Assistant Secretary Bundy and others had indicated we should concentrate on trying to win in South Viet-Nam but had not excluded the possibility of taking action against the North if Hanoi's actions made this necessary. I said that I believed that we should try to make our counter-insurgency operations in the South more effective, and only if we found that this strategy failed, should we try further attacks against the North. I also pointed out the danger of escalation leading to land war with China and possibly nuclear war. Rau seemed disappointed and I had the impression that he believes there is not time left to concentrate only in operations in the South. Activities of the Front Rau said that he had learned that a film on the Liberation Front had been seized by Customs on the East Coast but that another copy of the film was circulating on the West Coast. Rau said he would like to view the film, and hopes we will impede its circulation. I said that I would attempt to find out about it. He also said that many Vietnamese who had left North Viet-Nam in the 1930's, now living in the United States and in Paris, Cambodia and Thailand and elsewhere, looked to Ho Chi Minh for allegiance, though they were not Communists and that the Front would probably find a fertile field among these individuals. He gave me the name of a former ship's cook who came to the United States in 1953 or 1954, who falls into this category and who is circulating Front literature from California. Rau said that about 100 people had left his own village in North Viet-Nam to go South in the 1930's and that many of them look to Ho as the leader of the country even though they are living in the South. I mentioned to Rau that we thought that the Front might try to capture prominent politicians living in exile and use them to try to attract allegiance of non-Communist Vietnamese. He thought that Tran Van Huu, Phan Van Giao and Nguyen Van Xuan were all has-beens and would not have much appeal. General Nguyen Van Hinh would probably not be interested as he has a high-ranking job in the French Armed Forces (Chief of Staff). Rau said we should watch particularly Nguyen Ngoc Bich and Nguyen Huu Chau. Miscellaneous Rau asked if we could provide him a copy of a report prepared by Professor Milton Sachs in 1949 entitled Political Alignments of Vietnamese Nationalists as well as any other information on current political parties in Viet-Nam. I said I would try to find the above report and see if I could work anything up on the political parties. Comment I have subsequently learned that Political Alignments of Vietnamese Nationalists is misleading and inaccurate and not for distribution outside the Department. I plan to inform Mr. Rau that it is out of print, but that I will try to find him information on current political groupings.
321. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 22, 1964p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. 520. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embassy contact close to both Tri Quang and Nguyen Ton Hoan came to Embassy yesterday to report on recent conversations these personalities. Claimed he was acting as emissary for both. In conveying substance his conversation with Tri Quang, source reviewed line of reasoning being pushed by Buddhists that Gen Khanh is in fact captive of other Generals at present time. Source believes Tri Quang sincere in his belief that apparatus exists within government inimical to Buddhist interest-this group led by Generals Khiem and Thieu and comprised of ex-Can Lao members, Catholics, and certain key Dai Viets. According to source Tri Quang believes Catholics in fact control Dai Viet party. Tri Quang mentioned following personalities as members Can Lao-Catholic-Dai Viet combine: Generals Khiem, Thieu, Lam, Phat (Interior), Cao (Khanh's Chef de Cabinet), Dzu (ex-Commander Second Division), Col. Ben (Chief of Police), Col. Phuoc (Chief MSS), Col. Huyen (Information), Xuong (Head Popular Forces) and Dr. Truong (Minister of Health). Tri Quang feels Buddhists must neutralize or destroy this organization. According to source Tri Quang has informed Gen. Khanh through intermediaries that Gen. Khanh has choice to throw in his lot with above group or with the "Buddhists and the people". Tri Quang believes that with Buddhist support Khanh would be able to neutralize or eliminate the Khiem/Thieu faction. However, if Khanh does not opt for Buddhists, Tri Quang intends launch campaign of passive resistance. Tri Quang would not resort to demonstrations or to violence but would call on Buddhist faithful not to cooperate with government. Non-cooperation campaign on part of Buddhist faithful would proceed in three phases: 1) in general population; 2) in civil service and bureaucracy; and 3) in army. No timing was indicated by Tri Quang as to when he expected reply from Khanh to Buddhist demands, nor did he indicate nature his specific demands. According to source, Hoan shares view that Khanh merely frontman for Khiem and Thieu. Hoan informed source that Khiem and Thieu were real leaders of, and had Dai Viet support for, January coup and at last moment decided push Khanh forward as "leader". Hoan claims Khanh has sought destroy Dai Viet organization since that time and this is why Hoan has consistently opposed Khanh since his return to SVN. Hoan fears that Khanh, with Buddhist support, will seek consolidate his personal position, neutralize Khiem/Thieu group and destroy Dai Viet party at the same time. Hoan believes Khiem content to have Khanh serve as lightning rod and pick up pieces after Khanh is brought down. Source claimed Hoan had commissioned him to try arrange meeting with Tri Quang soonest to explain basic Dai Viet position as not anti-Buddhist nor pro-Catholic. Source says Hoan would be prepared accept position President of National Assembly if offered. However, if major confrontation between Buddhist leadership and Hoan's faction of Dai Viets should ensue, Hoan would likely leave country. In subsequent meeting last night with EmbOff, Tri Quang confirmed all above points attributed to him, although denying source had been commissioned as his emissary. Tri Quang unwilling indicate precisely what he is after beyond destruction of above "cabal" of Can Lao-Catholics-Dai Viets. Tri Quang added that he was not personally against Khanh per se nor was he personally in favor of General "Big" Minh, whom he still considers to be of little capacity. Today, Thich Tam Chau's liaison officer with Embassy invited Political Counselor and EmbOffs to joint meeting tonight at An Quang Pagoda with Tam Chau, Tri Quang, and Thien Minh. Will probe intentions and at same time attempt steer Buddhists towards less negative pursuits and towards more positive support of Khanh, making it clear we do not intend to act as intermediary between him and Khanh./2/ /2/Taylor reported that at the meeting on August 22 Tri Quang presented the official Buddhist position essentially along the lines described here. The Embassy officials stressed the unfortunate effect continued divisive actions had in the United States and emphasized the duty of the Buddhists to deal directly with their government. (Telegram 528, August 23; ibid.) Taylor
322. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 24, 1964--9:20 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 12 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 10:42 a.m. 541. CINCPAC for POLAD. Accompanied by Alex Johnson and Manfull, I called on Khanh at Vung Tau this afternoon to impress on him our view of seriousness of situation arising from the student-Buddhist demonstrations/2/ and to encourage him to take certain actions. The outcome was agreement to the following actions which conform generally to our recommendations: /2/On August 23 and 24, students and Buddhists in Hue, Da Nang, and Saigon demonstrated against the Khanh government and the August 16 constitution. At the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting on August 24, Hughes stated that they were "quite serious and have definite anti-American undertones." (Ibid., Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147) In a memorandum to the President on the same date, Ball characterized them as "near-riots," but not as serious as the ones against Diem the year before. (Ibid., President's Reading File: Lot 74 D 164) 1. He will endeavor to announce his government on Thursday/3/ following Vu Van Mau's return on Wednesday. He hopes that Vu Van Mau will accept the vice presidency; if he declines, the announcement of the government may be delayed. /3/August 27. 2. He will meet the Buddhist leadership to hear their complaints and seek enlist their help in forming government. They will be told the time schedule Khanh is working on to preclude drawn out discussions. Khanh has invited and offered his plane to Tam Chau. Thien Minh and Tri Quang to meet with him this evening at Vung Tau for this purpose. While he had an agreement with them "in principle", he would prefer to have them actually present at Vung Tau before making any announcement of the meeting. However, if they fail to show, he will announce that he has made the offer. 3. Khanh will announce this evening steps he is prepared to take to meet certain student demands, such as limiting press censorship (freedom of press, etc.) and relaxing curfew hours. 4. Khanh will issue orders to police to prevent further violations of law by the students but he intends to proceed with utmost caution to avoid a physical clash with the students which might produce unwanted martyrs. 5. GVN will proceed urgently with mobilization decrees under which Khanh could draft into military service a selected number of students. However, these decrees will not be issued until after new government is installed. 6. Khanh will return to Saigon tomorrow afternoon and remain in Saigon until current situation abates. Khanh reluctant return Saigon because he claims he unable work with constant incursions on his time. However, in view public and press comment, he would return tomorrow afternoon following his meeting with members of MRC at Vung Tau. For our part, we undertook to explain to Washington that the situation here, while serious, is not falling apart and to pass the word to Buddhists that we have no sympathy for their divisive machinations. Full report on above and other items discussed follow by septels./4/ /4/The full report was transmitted in telegram 545 from Saigon, August 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) Taylor
323. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, August 24, 1964--6:51 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared with William Bundy and McNaughton. Repeated to CINCPAC and Munich. 507. CINCPAC for POLAD. Munich pass Ambassador Lodge. Although probably too early make accurate assessment significance past two days events, following is our current thinking which we are using on background basis in answer official and press inquiries: 1. This is end academic year lycées and universities when students, under pressure examinations; are not attending classes. As in past they tend to let off steam in demonstrations at this time. So far size and scope demonstrations do not equal those of last year. 2. Buddhists still wrangling over assault on pagodas last August and have picked anniversary date to revive old fears oppressive government actions, but their activities are still more restrained and under control than was case last year. 3. Although certain elements among both students and Buddhists have made anti-Khanh and anti-U.S. statements, this does not appear to be widespread. GVN has not reacted violently to demonstrations, and appears to be undertaking discussions with leaders student and Buddhist factions. We note that you are indirectly in touch Tri Quang, Chau, and Hoan; and are no doubt making point violent activities could lead to complete breakdown resistance aggression from North, and thus make it extremely difficult U.S. maintain its stepped up efforts bring pacification program to early conclusion. Report Embtel 541/2/ that Khanh plans early announcement members new government including Vu Van Mau seems excellent step. You might consider suggesting early establishment National Assembly, where prominent Buddhist personalities could let off steam in debate rather than on streets. /2/Document 322. In view of attacks by students on Catholic villagers in Da Nang area, would it be possible to cast any police action there in terms of protecting innocent peasants? We have no plans for USG statement on merits dispute, but we stand ready to give quick and favorable consideration any suggestion you may make as situation develops. Finally, we unable determine here whether these political disturbances could in any way reflect Hanoi or VC campaign mounted as reaction Tonkin Gulf incident. Would appreciate your comments. Rusk
324. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 25, 1964--4 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Cables, Vol. XVI. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 7:38 p.m., August 24. 542. Khanh requested that Johnson, Manfull and I meet with him at 1 am this morning to inform us of his meeting with Buddhist del. Khanh said he was unable to meet with Buddhist del at Vung Tau and returned to Saigon. The Buddhist del, composed of Tam Chau, Thinh Minh, and Tri Quang, filed with him written prepared statement of their demands substance of which follows: 1. The Aug 16 charter to be annulled or at the minimum its application immediately suspended. 2. The charter to be replaced by provisional constitution drafted by "juridical authorities." 3. The MRC to elect the pres (under new provisional constitution) and then MRC to disband itself, the pres to form provisional govt from "patriotic and capable elements". 4. The pres to appoint committee to draft permanent constitution and electoral law to go into effect by Nov 1, 1965. 5. The pres to call for national religious council that would include all religious groups. 6. Council for press censorship to be formed of MinInfo and reps of the press. 7. All those guilty of crimes to be severely punished. 8. All Can Lao elements to be dismissed "even if wearing Dai Viet labels". Buddhist statement concluded by statement that if above demands not met Buddhists would embark on campaign of passive resistance "without collaborating with any other group". In presenting statement, Buddhists asked Khanh to make proclamation accepting their demands which Buddhist leaders could refer to at demonstration At central market scheduled for 0800 Aug 25. Khanh stated that he had informed Buddhists that he could not give them immediate answer. Subsequently he discussed matter with General Khiem. According to Khanh, Khiem said it was Khanh's decision but suggested Khanh discuss problem with Americans, and if Americans agreed that Khanh should go along with Buddhist demands, then Khiem would support him. Khanh said he specifically requested Buddhists not publish their written statement. Khanh appeared disposed to accept Buddhist demands. Khanh then requested my views as to how he should proceed. In response I stressed we were in no position give him any advice in any official capacity, but as interested third party could give him my tentative personal views. It was his responsibility to decide his course of action. On this basis I said I thought a mistake to give in to pressure from minority group on an issue of this importance, particularly to an ultimatum with short deadline. To do so may only create further demands. I suggested he inform Buddhist leadership that he would consider their demands carefully along with ideas and suggestions from other minority groups. I added that he could assure Buddhists that he was willing to sit down with them and attempt reconcile points of view over next few days but final decision must also accommodate legitimate aspirations and concerns of other groups. I said it appeared to me useful for him to emphasize throughout that charter was provisional in nature, was subject to modification or amendment with experience and not final definitive constitution. He should stress that in time of war it is essential that govt be formed quickly. I informed Khanh that I intended to return Tam Chau's call on Aug 25 and, without ref to current conversation, inform Chau that US was against shortsighted actions by any group which promoted disunity and divisions within the country. Khanh emphasized throughout his fear of religious war or failing this extreme development, an extended conflict between Buddhist and Catholic groups which would inevitably sap the morale of armed forces. He also seemed attracted by possibility of eliminating the MRC from the picture. In reply to question, he said there would not be any ambiguity in identifying "Can Lao" elements, they being well known. In conclusion Khanh said that he agreed with informal comments we had made and that he had in fact drafted his own proclamation along following lines, prior to seeing Buddhists, which was designed to assuage certain concerns of both students and Buddhists: 1. He is now in process of consulting religious groups and politicians form govt of capable honest men. 2. He intends to ease restrictions on censorship and to modify existing curfew (note: to meet student demands). 3. He is willing to modify provisional charter as necessary (note: Khanh made point that this was to "modify" but not to "suspend" provisional charter as demanded by Buddhists). 4. Crimes including terrorism will be quickly punished by military court (note: Khanh considers this another nod to the Buddhists). 5. Recent incidents and demonstrations have destroyed public and private property and have killed innocent people. These activities must cease. 6. Only VC and neutralists profit from activities which create disunity and divisive forces among the people. 7. Current critical situation does not permit people to engage in activities which aid the VC and he appeals to patriotism of Vietnamese to rally behind govt. In sum Khanh believed that such proclamation would meet certain concerns of students and some of the legitimate concerns of the Buddhists. However it was still clear that he found certain attractions in the Buddhist demands. Taylor
325. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 25, 1964--8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 9:18 a.m. 555. CINCPAC for POLAD. Following the meeting of the MRC on 25 August, the following proclamation was made: "The MRC meeting on the morning of 25 August 1964 at the office of the ARVN Commander in Chief has resolved the following: 1. To revoke constitution of 16 August 1964. 2. To call an urgent meeting of the MRC to elect a new Chief of State. 3. Following the election of a new Chief of State, the MRC will be dissolved and will return the powers of leadership to the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam in order to oppose Communism, neutralism, colonialism and every form of treacherous dictatorship. 4. The new Chief of State will be entrusted with the responsibility of calling a national assembly in order to develop the national structure in going along with the aspirations of all the people in a position which will oppose Communism, neutralism, colonialism and each form of treacherous dictatorship and reconstruct the nation in democratic freedom. 5. In the meantime, the work of managing the nation will be carried out by the present government. Saigon, 25 August 1964 I called on Khanh at 4:00 pm to obtain his interpretation of recent events to include the meaning of the very general language of the foregoing proclamation. He gave me the following information. The new Chief of State will be elected by the MRC at a meeting in Saigon, 10:00 am, 26 August. All Generals, including the four Dalat Generals, have been invited to attend. Khanh asked me if I would pass the word to Minh that his presence would be appreciated in the interest of national unity. I agreed to do so. Khanh explained that with the dissolution of the MRC there will be no political body above the president who will appoint the members of the executive, the key figures of the judiciary and the members of the national assembly. Although the exact composition of the assembly is still under study, Khanh is thinking in terms of 300 members representing the various political and religious groupings. He feels that it will take at least a couple of weeks to get the assembly going whereas he expects to round out the executive by the end of this week. With regard to the executive, he intends to have a civilian vice president and Vu Van Mau is still the front running candidate. The heads of executive departments will be largely civilian; in fact, Khanh (who seems to have no doubt that he will be elected president a second time) intends to have only the Department of Defense headed by a military incumbent. Khanh stressed that all of this arrangement was provisional and that, within a year, he hopes to have drawn up a permanent constitution and be in a position to hold general elections for a permanent assembly. For the next few days, the government will continue to function as at present. We then discussed some of the factors which have been in the background of recent developments. Khanh says that he had no particular trouble getting the Generals of the MRC to agree with this sweeping concession to Buddhist demand which results in the dissolution of the Council. (This easy acquiescence is hard to believe.) He anticipates some trouble with the Dai Viets but feels it will be manageable. He is particularly incensed against Deputy Premier Hoan who, in the midst of yesterday's events, published a letter critical of Khanh. The master mind behind these incidents has been Buddhist leader, Tri Quang. His control of the student rioters was proved by the quickness with which order was restored in Saigon today after Khanh agreed to his demands. Tri Quang and his Buddhist colleagues have promised to endorse Khanh's actions and to come out publicly for the first time against Communism. Now the question is whether the Buddhists will keep their word and Khanh is clearly anxious. Khanh asked if I or other Embassy representatives could see Tri Quang and urge upon him the essentiality of living up to his part of the bargain. He described Tri Quang as a "type special", more of a politician than a bonze for whose power he, Khanh was obvious respect. I pressed Khanh hard on the question of whether this was going to be a Buddhist government or a national government, whether he would be Buddhist president or a national president. He fought back hard on both points insisting that he knew the importance of a national government and the impossibility of winning the war without broad national support. I asked him whether he feared a Catholic reaction at this time and I received a negative reply. He would like to discuss his plans with the Catholic leaders but unfortunately Archbishop Binh is out of town and the new Papal Delegate, Palmas, has not yet presented his credentials. I expressed the view that in spite of these circumstances he should explain his position to the Catholics at an early date. In closing, I asked Khanh how I should interpret these events to Washington where they were being watched with deep concern. He replied that today's decision marked the withdrawal of the army from politics. Any other alternative would have resulted in the use of armed force against fellow citizens, a solution which he, Khanh found was intolerable. If the Buddhists make good on their word, the counterinsurgency program can proceed apace. If they do not, Khanh sees no military solution to bring the war against the Viet Cong to a successful conclusion. Taylor
326. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency/1/ Saigon, August 25, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Cables, Vol. XVI. Secret. Neither the time of transmission nor receipt is legible on the source text. The CIA sent copies to the White House for Thomson at 10:39 a.m., to the Department of State for Forrestal, and to DIA for Carroll. The source text is the White House copy. The following is dated August 25 for your background use. 1. Ambassador Taylor had long meeting with General Khanh afternoon 25 August which is being reported in considerable detail in Embtel 555 to Department of State./2/ After you have read that telegram, you will note that Khanh, even if his most optimistic views obtain, has in effect put his government completely in the hands of Tri Quang, and by so doing has similarly bound over to Tri Quang's safekeeping our own government's equity, commitment, and policy in this country. /2/Document 325. 2. The alternatives to Khanh's continuing in normal power would seem to be, at this point: a. The reappearance of Big Minh again as a figurehead nominally leading a government acceptable to Tri Quang. b. Rejection of the Buddhist demands by a new junta headed by Khiem, with further domestic convulsions to follow. c. Some other kind of impasse with results difficult to anticipate. In any event, a new and dangerous period has begun, and the effects of the current upheavals have not yet shown themselves in terms of popular or military morale, but the prognosis of [on?] this side is not optimistic.
327. Summary Notes of the 541st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 25, 1964, 12:35 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 23 Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. [Here follows discussion of Cyprus.] William Bundy: As to South Vietnam, Prime Minister Khanh has suspended the constitution and the Buddhists have made their demands on the government. The Military Council will meet tonight to elect a new President. A new National Assembly is to be called. President Khanh has told Ambassador Taylor that he expects to be reelected. These developments are the result of some kind of a bargain between President Khanh and the Buddhists. Two major uncertainties are apparent: A. Will the Buddhists carry out their part of the bargain and come out against the Communists? B. Does President Khanh have sufficient military support to be reelected? The generals may not sit still for a downgrading of the Military Council. Some very tough decisions will have to be made soon, but none right now. After the election of the new Assembly, we will have to support whoever comes out on top. It is a messed up situation. Secretary Rusk: We should not call off Ambassador Taylor's planned trip to Washington. We have a strong team in the field and we don't know when would be a better time for him to come. Bromley Smith
328. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 26, 1964--11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CIA, the White House, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 12:16 a.m. 559. After events Aug 25,/2/ and despite fact that MRC publicly endorsed Khanh's capitulations to Buddhist demands, it became soon clear that major elements of MRC were happy [unhappy] with outcome and wished upset results. Those officers centered around Khiem and Thieu immediately began politicking during evening and night of Aug 25 with primary purpose of ousting Khanh from presidency. Khanh, in meantime, had gone to Vung Tau in order "get some sleep" and presumably to withdraw himself from central arena of bargaining. /2/Taylor's diary describes the events of August 25 as a "rump meeting" of the Military Revolutionary Committee "with only the corps commanders and Chiefs of Staff present." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69, Box 55) In early evening Aug 25, Khiem and Thieu sought out Big Minh, gave him a somewhat biased account of day's events and apparently left Minh with impression that he, Minh, would be a strong candidate in Aug 26 MRC elections for president. Other pro-Khiem elements of MRC, especially Lam, were busy making contact with MRC members, reportedly sounding them out on voting possibilities. I had sent Westmoreland to see Khiem and sent Stilwell to see Thieu during evening to sound out their state of mind. During night, Lam had insistently sought info from his MACV adviser, wishing to know US Govt opinion of possible change from Khanh to some other General as President. I had also sent a note to Big Minh encouraging him to attend MRC meeting and cast his vote there. On morning Aug 26, I received word that Minh wished see me at 9:00 am (elections were scheduled for 10:00 am). I also had received reports re politicking activities during night of Aug 25. I therefore decided upon and took following actions. (1) I went to see Minh (detailed report by septel)/3/ and told him US wanted no change in govt. Our candidate was Khanh. /3/Telegram 561 from Saigon, August 26, noon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) (2) I sent De Silva to see Khiem to convey same message to him./4/ /4/A report on De Silva's meeting with Khiem was transmitted in telegram 564 from Saigon, August 26, 4 p.m. (Ibid., POL 15-1 VIET S) Following receipt of telegrams 561 and 564, the Department of State cabled Saigon that it fully concurred in the line taken with the Generals. The Mission was instructed to continue its efforts along these lines as long as deemed appropriate. (Telegram 521, August 26; ibid.) (3) I sent Gen Lam's MACV adviser to see Lam and tell him we had no alternate candidate to Khanh. (4) After these events (at about 9:40) I telephoned Khanh, reported my conversation with Minh, assured him of our support, and wished him good luck in elections. It was my conviction, in taking these actions, that US could not possibly afford confusion that would result from loss of Khanh, that internal maneuvers had to be stopped somewhere, and that Khanh is indeed the best bet we have in current circumstances. I am now awaiting report on results of election./5/ /5/At the end of the day, Taylor and Johnson met with Khanh, who reviewed the MRC sessions. Khanh reported that the going had been hard and that the Dai Viet were not above attempting a coup. A variety of organizational changes were discussed, but nothing settled. Khanh also reported that he had received a letter from Tri Quang pledging his support. (Telegram 572 from Saigon, August 27, 12:30 a.m.; ibid., POL 15 VIET S) Tri Quang had informed the U.S. Embassy about the letter at noon. (Telegram 570 from Saigon, August 26, 9 p.m.; ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Taylor
329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain/1/ Washington, August 26, 1964--5:55 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US (LODGE). Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Breckon, cleared with William Bundy, and initialed by Forrestal. 188. For Ambassador Lodge. Concur in line you have taken in private and public conversations that present unrest in South Viet Nam cannot deter us from primary goal of resisting Communist aggression and achieving stability in that country. Buddhist and student demonstrations which have forced Khanh to abrogate August 16 Constitution spring from continuing religious tension which is one of numerous critical problems GVN must meet in order to preserve its independence. We do not intend to make any public statement here today on the subject of whom we favor in the current crisis. We are taking line that it not appropriate for US Government to comment while Military Revolutionary Council still in session. We are pointing out that Khanh is still head of GVN, and as we have stated many times in past, we continue to support GVN. FYI: Ambassador Taylor has made clear to Generals Minh and Khiem that we strongly favor General Khanh's continuance as head of GVN. August 26 meeting of MRC was inconclusive, and next MRC meeting scheduled to begin 0100Z August 27. End FYI. We shall continue to pass you most important messages from Saigon on situation. Rusk
330. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 27, 1964--5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 13-2 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Manila, Tokyo, London, Paris, Rome, and CINCPAC. 577. Rome for Lodge. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 507/2/ While we cannot be sure that we have all the facts nor that the so-called facts we have are fully reliable, we are inclined to view the events since about August 21 up to noon today in the following light: /2/Document 323 The government which Khanh put together after the coup of January 30, 1964 achieved a tenuous equilibrium which fundamentally satisfied no single activist element in Vietnam politics, but which did not dissatisfy any significant political group enough to cause the outbreak of intractable opposition. At the same time, the government itself proved to be little more than a collection of individual personalities and ambitions which proved unable to work effectively together or to address themselves consistently to problems of national interest. Khanh from the start seems to have lacked confidence in most of the politicians in his cabinet (as well as they in each other) and to have refrained from assigning them other than token responsibility. His incompatibility with his cabinet deepened and he came to rely to an ever growing degree upon the instrument of the armed forces, and especially on General Khiem (who had apparently played an important role in bringing Khanh to power), to accomplish whatever efforts the government was able to muster in the campaign against the Viet Cong. Even in this quarter, however, he had less than complete confidence and received less than wholehearted support. And, rightly or wrongly, he came to feel that General Minh was to some extent responsible for his military and political problems. He therefore concentrated a great measure of his attention, in the past several weeks, upon the problem of getting rid of General Minh in a manner which would not disrupt the army. Also, he developed general feeling that pacification programs were too slow and achieved at high cost in lives, and sensed, or thought he sensed a general malaise demanding dramatic developments on solutions. In casting about Khanh hit on the "march to the North" theme and with the August US attack on DRV he seized the favorable climate thus created to attempt emergency solution to perennial problems as well as opportunity he felt this gave him to remove Minh. The scheme he hit upon to eliminate Minh along with certain unwelcome ministers was the creation of a provisional constitution which simply pulled Minh's position out from under him. As early as May Khanh had begun to toy with this project, talking in terms of a "de Gaulle-Pompidou" system as well as straight presidential system. He had talked to various politicians such as Tran Van Do regarding the form it should take. It is quite certain that it was discussed in great detail with Khiem, who was Khanh's greatest assurance of maintaining army unity. Khiem's own role in this development is somewhat obscure and there are some indications that he found the scheme ill-advised, particularly the elimination of Minh. However, disregarding our advice Khanh failed to lay either the necessary political or public groundwork and when the new charter emerged under forced draft over a weekend and its authors became identified, it was recognized by many that former Can Lao elements (such figures as Tran Chan Thanh, Tran Le Quang and General Cao) had had a major role in drafting it. It also seemed probable that many of these Can Lao figures hoped to play a key role in the new government to be established under the new charter. Moreover, after it emerged in its final version from the MRC, it was evident MRC had put more of a strait jacket around Khanh, limiting the independence of MRC he had sought through his own first draft. Thus, though the charter in no way changed fundamental relationship of MRC asserting supreme power, with Khanh as leader of government, the charter did provide focal point and catalyst in bringing discontented elements to surface. Khanh, therefore, in his concentration on the problem of Minh, had conjured up a whole new set of problems while attempting to solve an immediate one. The Buddhists and students, who have been feeling their political oats since their successes against Diem, felt they had suffered a set back in the January 30 coup that put Khanh in power and now saw further setbacks in prospect. Goaded by the militant Tri Quang, they saw the specter of Diemism in the combination of the predominantly Catholic MRC and the old Can Lao. It should be emphasized it was only a specter as at no time had there been any evidence of a government policy of mistreatment of Buddhists. The students, nettled by such petty annoyances as an 11:00 pm curfew and censorship of the press, and fearing the prospect of a much more effective National Service Law, saw the end of some of their teahouse leisure and were amenable to leadership of Tri Quang and Buddhists. (There is considerable evidence of concert between Buddhists and students although all the points of contact are not yet established.) The Dai Viet, troubled by Khanh's effort to upset the post-January governmental equilibrium were probably uncertain regarding his real motives and interpreted the charter of August 16 as possibly directed against them. All three of these groups, plus dissident out-politicians began to agitate. Just how much and how deeply the Viet Cong were able to influence these events is difficult to say; but it can be taken for granted that they have been very bush [?] indeed. Khanh, faced with these circumstances, found himself at the vortex of a perplexing mixture of forces. The two most extreme elements he had to deal with were the Buddhist/student militants, personified by Tri Quang, and the Can Lao-Catholic military not entirely logically personified by General Khiem. In between were a whole array, such as Hoan and the Dai Viet, General Xung and Thi of I Corps, and the Catholic clergy. Although we pointed out to him the dangers in appearing to capitulate to the ultimatum of a demagogic Tri Quang who represented only one element in the country, he seemed willing to let the Buddhists and students display their strength, perhaps in an effort to convince Khiem and the other Generals that the MRC did not control all of the levers of power. In his first meetings with the MRC he seems, at least superficially, to have been able to play this factor. As he told us, he faced those members of the MRC who were assembled Aug 25 with the choice of "shooting their own youngsters" or making concessions to satisfy the forces led by Tri Quang. Given this decision, and knowing that Khanh spoke with the tremendous asset of continued tangible US support, the MRC (really a rump version) nominally accepted an arrangement which was essentially a capitulation to Tri Quang's demands. At this stage, however, a "backlash" set in. When the full MRC (which is predominantly Catholic and pro-Dai Viet) assembled in Saigon Aug 26, there was considerable grumbling about the decision on dissolution taken by the rump session on August 25. Many of the senior Generals, who had participated in the decision Aug 25 reversed themselves and sought not only to renege on the decision re dissolution but also to oust Khanh. The groupings within the MRC who came to this persuasion were not clearly identified. Some obviously were associated with Minh, others (perhaps the majority) were closer to Khiem and the Catholics. As matters now stand, the Catholic crowds have taken to the street. Whether Khanh will be able to cope with this confusion and emerge as the continuing symbol of authority is questionable. His greatest single asset--perhaps as of the moment at least equal to all those possessed by his potential rivals for power--is the continued, tangible support of the US for him personally. Therefore, he remains very much a significant element of force in the power struggle. The other significant individual who has emerged is Tri Quang. He appears to be the most effective and potentially dangerous politician in Vietnam and having achieved this new victory cannot be expected now to retire into the shade of Bo Tree. There are some indications that he may have ambitions extending beyond Vietnam with talk of his desire to lead a neutralist Buddhist grouping in SEA that would also have room for Moslem Malaya and Indonesia. We obviously have to learn much more about him and must see what we can do to influence him. The Generals who make up the MRC, because of the bickering among themselves, have along with Khanh obviously lost prestige and [sic] in their demonstrated unwillingness or inability effectively to use their power to maintain public order and keep the government functioning. Their confrontations within the MRC will undoubtedly reinforce divisive tendencies among the military and tend further to polarize factions which previously existed but were dormant. Who among them will emerge as the dominant figure is unclear at this writing. Taylor
331. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ TCSM-746-64 Washington, August 27, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 381 Southeast Asia. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol III, pp. 550-552. SUBJECT 1. In their memorandum to you dated 14 August 1964,/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that they were analyzing the next military courses of action in Southeast Asia and that appropriate recommendations would be forwarded for your consideration before implementing actions are taken on the Bundy memorandum dated 13 August 1964./3/ They also reiterated the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, less the Chairman, of 2 June 1964/4/ that military courses of action should include attack of targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRY) with the objective of destroying, as necessary, the DRV will and capabilities to continue support of insurgent forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and Laos. /2/Document 316. /3/Attachment to Document 313. /4/Document 191. 2. In analyzing courses of action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the views of CINCPAC and Ambassadors Taylor and Unger. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also noted the DIA assessment dated 7 August 1964/5/ of Asian communist capabilities and 15 probable courses of action following the 5 August retaliatory attack on North Vietnam and the current US buildup in the Western Pacific. This assessment indicates that the most likely course of action would be stepped up actions in RVN and Laos with attendant increased flow of men and supplies. /5/Not found. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered Ambassador Taylor's statement of objectives and courses of action./6/ In recognition of recent events in SVN, however, they consider that his proposed course of action B is more in accord with the current situation and consider that such an accelerated program of actions with respect to the DRV is essential to prevent a complete collapse of the US position in Southeast Asia. Additionally, they do not agree that we should be slow to get deeply involved until we have a better feel for the quality of our ally. The United States is already deeply involved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that only significantly stronger military pressures on the DRV are likely to provide the relief and psychological boost necessary for attainment of the requisite governmental stability and viability. /6/See Document 319. 4. Recent US military actions in Laos and against the DRV have demonstrated our resolve more clearly than any other US actions in some time. These actions showed both force and restraint. Failure to resume and maintain a program of pressure through military actions could be misinterpreted to mean we have had second thoughts about Pierce Arrow and the events leading thereto, and could signal a lack of resolve. Accordingly, while maintaining a posture of increased readiness in the Western Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the US program should have as concurrent objectives: (1) improvements in South Vietnam, including emphasis on the Pacification Program and the Hop Tac plan to clear Saigon and its surroundings; (2) interdiction of the relatively unmolested VC lines of communication (LOC) through Laos by operations in the Panhandle and of the LOC through Cambodia by strict control of the waterways leading therefrom; (3) denial of Viet Cong (VC) sanctuaries in the Cambodia-South Vietnam border area through the conduct of "hot pursuit" operations into Cambodia, as required; (4) increased pressure on North Vietnam through military actions. As part of the program for increased pressures, the OPLAN 34A operations and the DeSoto patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin should be resumed, the former on an intensified but still covert basis. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, however, that more direct and forceful actions than these will, in all probability, be required. In anticipation of a pattern of further successful VC and Pathet Lao (PL) actions in RVN and Laos, and in order to increase pressure on the DRV, the US program should also provide for prompt and calculated responses to such VC/PL actions in the form of air strikes and other operations against appropriate military targets in the DRV. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that defining what might constitute appropriate counteroperations in advance is a most difficult task. We should therefore maintain our prompt readiness to execute a range of selected responses, tailored to the developing circumstances and reflecting the principles in the Gulf of Tonkin actions, that such counteroperations will result in clear military disadvantage to the DRV. These responses, therefore, must be great |