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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
X. Ambassador Taylor's Visit to Washington, September 6-10 Saigon, September 6, 1964--4 p.m. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-161-69. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Taylor. 768. For the Secretary. The following is a review of the situation in South Vietnam, concurred in by the U.S. Mission Council, as it appears at the time of my departure for Washington./2/ I would hope to use it as a basic document in our coming discussions. You will note that I have left the distribution to your decision. /2/At the end of August, Taylor requested a return to Washington for consultations, but the governmental crisis in South Vietnam had precluded it. On September 4, Taylor and Johnson reviewed the local situation and concluded that the time was as favorable then as could be foreseen for the Ambassador to return. (Telegram 744 from Saigon, September 4; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The trip was announced at 6 p.m., Saigon time, on September 5. While we must be disappointed by the political turmoil of recent days, we cannot consider it totally unexpected. The very nature of the social, political and ethnic confusion in this country makes governmental turbulence of this type a factor which we will always have with us. What has emerged from these recent events is a definition within fairly broad limits of the degree to which perfectability in government can be pushed. It should be remembered that the recent fracas started when Khanh sought to make his broad and cumbersome government more tractable and more effective. His motives were of the best even though his methods were clumsy. But now, after this recent experience at government improvement, we must accept the fact that an effective government, much beyond the capacity of that which has existed over the past several months, is unlikely to survive. We now have a better feel for the quality of our ally and for what we can expect from him in terms of ability to govern. Only the emergence of an exceptional leader could improve the situation and no George Washington is in sight. Consequently we can and must anticipate for the future an instrument of government which will have definite limits of performance. At the very worst, it will continue to seek a broadened consensus involving and attempting to encompass all or most of the minority elements with political aspirations until it approaches a sort of popular front. This amalgam, if it takes form, may be expected in due course to become susceptible to an accommodation with the Liberation Front, which might eventually lead to a collapse of all political energy behind the pacification effort. At best, the emerging governmental structure might be capable of maintaining a holding operation against the Viet Cong. This level of effort could, with good luck and strenuous American efforts, be expanded to produce certain limited pacification successes, for example, in the territory covered by the Hoc Tap plan. But the willingness and ability of such a government to exert itself or to attempt to execute an all-out National Pacification Plan would be marginal. It would probably be incapable of galvanizing the people to the heightened level of unity and sacrifice necessary to carry forward the counterinsurgency program to final success. Instead, it would look increasingly to the United States to take the major responsibility for prying the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese off the backs of the South Vietnamese population. The politicians in Saigon and Hue feel today that the political hassle is their appropriate arena; the conflict with the VC belongs to the Americans. We may, therefore, expect to find ourselves faced with a choice of (a) passively watching the development of a popular front, knowing that this may in due course require the U.S. to leave Vietnam in failure; or (b) actively assuming increased responsibility for the outcome following a time-schedule consistent with our estimate of the limited viability of any South Vietnamese government. An examination of our total world responsibilities and the significance of Vietnam in relationship to them clearly rules out the option of accepting course (a). If we leave Vietnam with our tail between our legs, the consequences of this defeat in the rest of Asia, Africa and Latin America would be disastrous. We therefore would seem to have little choice left except to accept course (b). Our previous views on the right course of action to follow in South Vietnam are set forth in Embtel 465./3/ The discussion in this present cable amounts to a recognition that Course of Action A of Embtel 465 no longer corresponds with the realities of the situation. Recent events have revealed the weakness of our ally and have convinced us of the improbability of attaining the level of governmental performance desired under Course A before embarking on a campaign of pressure against the DRV. We are forced back on Course of Action B with certain revised views on timing. /3/Document 319. In the cold light of recently acquired facts, we need two to three months to get any sort of government going which has any chance of being able to maintain order in the cities and to continue the pacification effort of past levels. There is no present urge to march north among our Vietnamese friends; the leadership is exhausted and frustrated following the recent disorders and are not anxious to take on any new problems or obligations. Hence there is no need to hasten our plans to satisfy an impatience to close with the enemy. There is, however, the problem of morale, both civil and military. Both would respond favorably to a visibly sincere effort to improve government and to the successful execution of Hop Tac. Hence these courses of action must be emphasized in our present program which we will continue to prosecute in this period with maximum vigor. At the same time, the DRV needs to be put on notice of our continued vigilance and determination by means of a resumption of 34-A operations and DeSoto patrols and by modest crossborder operations into Laos. Thus, our objective up to about December 1 should be to get going some kind of government worthy of the name while shoring up morale and holding enemy activities in check. Throughout the period, we should have the capability of executing on short notice attacks on Laotian infiltration targets and Category II and III operations under CINCPAC 37-64. We should be ready to exploit any opportunities presented by the Communists (such as the Gulf of Tonkin attacks) to initiate military pressures on DRV under favorable conditions of world opinion. At the end of the period and provided the objective for the period ~had been attained, we would then be ready to begin escalating pressures on the DRV for the purpose of holding the GVN together, of raising morale and of creating conditions required for a negotiated termination of hostilities on favorable terms. Before initiating these pressures, US and allied military forces would be positioned to meet possible Chicom/DRV reaction. Escalating actions would then begin, taking the form of any desired combination of attacks on Lao infiltration routes and/or on targets of appropriate categories in DRV. In Laos, the air forces used could be Lao, VNAF or US; in the DRV, the air effort would be largely US with VNAF operating out of range of the MIG's. The attacks should be orchestrated in such a way as to produce a mounting pressure on the will of the Hanoi high command designed to convince the latter to desist from further aid to the VC and Vietminh and to agree to cooperate in calling off the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos. During this period, we can expect the GVN to do little more than assure the ground defense of the national territory, participate to a limited degree in the air action and to act as the recognized government of SVN. Even if Hanoi should comply with our wishes, there would still remain in SVN many serious political, economic and social problems which would test the ability of the best of governments. To cope with them, any GVN which we can foresee now will require US help for a long time. Thus, even with the acceptance of our recommendations herein and their successful implementation, we see no quick and sure way to discharge our obligations honorably in this part of the world. This forecast is fairly grim but the alternatives are more repugnant. We feel that we should take the offensive generally along the lines recommended herein and play for the international breaks. Taylor
340. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor)/1/ MACJO2 Saigon, September 6, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. In preparation for your trip to Washington, I thought it might be useful to give you my assessment of the military situation. In subsequent paragraphs I outline in some detail the rather substantial progress which we have already made and, more importantly, the great potential for additional progress. I also describe military problem areas. These, as you know, are many; but all are susceptible to solution assuming that political stability can be achieved, and that the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, remains intact and unified in its purpose. Under the present circumstances, however, the continued solidarity of the Armed Forces is in doubt. As all else depends on holding the Armed Forces together, I address this matter first. The Key Military Issue: 2. It seems to me there are certain conditions which must be met in order to preserve the structure and effectiveness of the RVNAF: a. The officers of the RVNAF must be protected against purge, solely by reason of religious or political affiliation. The Commander in Chief, the officers of the Joint General Staff and the Commanders down the line, must be given some assurance that their careers and reputations will not be sacrificed for political expediency to the ambitions or interests of political or religious blocs. b. The officers' corps must be assured that its members will not be punished or expelled from the Armed Forces if they faithfully execute the orders of constituted authority in connection with the maintenance of law and order. They must be assured that their superiors will not accede to the arbitrary demands of pressure groups whose interest it is to destroy the discipline of the Armed Forces and to render ineffective the forces of law and order. 3. If I interpret correctly the events of the past two weeks, neither of these minimum conditions have been met. To the contrary, actions best calculated to destroy the morale, the unity, the pride and confidence of the Armed Forces have transpired in a manner which leads me to believe that a relative free hand has been given to those who aim to destroy the Armed Forces. The demands of the Buddhists for the resignation of the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Staff, Commander of II Corps, the Prefect of Saigon and the Director of National Police, to name a few, appear to be blows directed at the heart of the security forces which stand between the Viet Cong and victory. I cannot believe that it is in the interests of the nation to accede to these demands. To the contrary, I am persuaded that acceptance is a formula for political and military disaster. While aware that the insurgency cannot be overcome by military means alone, I am equally aware that without a strong military foundation no program will ever achieve victory. I am concerned that the Government of Vietnam has already moved some distance down the wrong road in dealing with its Armed Forces. I do not know whether the Armed Forces will collapse or whether, finding the present course intolerable, they will make a desperate move to regain power. Neither course is compatible with the objective we seek. 4. What follows is highly sensitive to the assumption that the provisional government can and will take extraordinary steps to restore morale and rekindle a unity of purpose within the Armed Forces. Favorable Trends: 5. There is room for some optimism about the ability of the RVNAF to execute the military portions of the pacification program. Over the last few months there have been measurable increases in military means and improvements in operational methods; and more are in sight. Thus, the prospect is for a continuing rise in combat strength and tactical proficiency. To be sure, the VC are making gains in these same areas. However, we estimate that the rate of improvement of overall US/GVN military effectiveness will be much more rapid than that of the VC--barring, of course, great escalation of DRV support. There follow certain specifics on which this estimate is based. 6. Manpower and Morale: a. The strength of the Armed Forces has been steadily increasing since May. The Divisions of III and IV Corps have just received a large, and badly needed, infusion of replacements. There are currently some 10,000 regulars in the National Training Centers and [are] reportedly doing well. In the revitalized volunteer program, results have been close to target. Intakes of conscriptees have only been 50% of program--but that program was overly ambitious. It is estimated that the 31 December goals will be achieved in early 1965. b. From January forward, the High Command has developed and implemented a series of policies and programs aimed at improving the morale of the fighting forces. The most important are: (1) Significant pay raises for the Regular and Regional Forces; and reasonable added emoluments for the Popular Forces. (2) A new awards and decorations program featuring additional medals, decentralization, on-the-spot action, and good publicity of presentations. (3) Establishment of a centralized promotion board for officers and senior NCO's; and decentralization of promotions below grades E8 to Corps and Division Commanders. (4) Greatly expanded dependent housing construction program (including some housing for Regional Forces dependents). 7. Strengthening of U.S. Advisory Effort: a. Additional advisors are being introduced at the level of infantry and artillery battalions and armored troops. Also, additional advisors are being placed with the VNAF and VNN. These increases should serve to enhance substantially the overall military effectiveness of the RVNAF. b. [paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified] c. One C-123 squadron and one Caribou Company are also scheduled for deployment in order to provide more effective support for the larger advisory effort throughout the country. 8. Development of a Pacification Focus: a. The Hop Toc Plan (Intensification of Pacification in the Saigon Area) has been accepted and is being implemented by the GVN. The Commander of III Corps has been designated as the coordinating authority and he is being assisted and supported by representatives of various civilian ministries. Emphasis has been given to the role of police; and their quality and numbers are being increased. Hop Toc has served as a vehicle for bringing about better coordination among the elements of the U.S. Mission in support of integrated pacification operations. b. The GVN has ordered certain important troop redispositions which give substance to the priority accorded the Saigon area by the national plan. The 25th Infantry Division is being moved from II Corps into the provinces of Long An and Hau Nghia. This move should increase not only the troop density in this high priority area, but also improve management and direction of the pacification campaign. c. Two additional 18 tube 105mm Howitzer Battalions have been organized and positioned with divisions supporting the pacification of priority areas. 9. Augmentation of Air Capabilities: a. The VNAF will shortly have 4 fully combat ready A-1H squadrons (and has the capability to build up a total of 6 by 1 December 1965). In addition, by the end of December, the 2 Farmgate A-1E Squadrons will be at full operational strength with a total of 50 aircraft. (Present holding is 30.) All 4 VNAF H-34 squadrons will be trained and operational by the end of the year. The efficiency of the VNAF pilots is improving, particularly in night operations. The air-ground operations system is being steadily improved by better communications, improved training, and the provision of air liaison and control teams at regimental level. Finally, procedures, designed to maximize capabilities, have been developed for mutual cooperation and support between USAF, VNAF, and Army aviation. b. Two additional transport helicopter companies will arrive in country by 1 December and they will enhance materially the mobility of ARVN and its capability to react to VC attacks. c. Detailed procedures for quick reaction forces and counter-ambush tactics utilizing aircraft are being developed on a sound and practical basis. 10. U.S. Special Forces are being substantially increased by additional "A" teams; and supervision will be strengthened by the introduction of additional "B" and "C" teams. The present CIDG (Strike Force) strength of approximately 19,000 is programmed to increase steadily until the goal of 30,000 is reached in July 1965. This buildup should lead to greater success in disrupting infiltration routes across the borders and within SVN. In addition, these forces will figure importantly in operations against VC base areas. 11. Increased Effectiveness of Naval Forces: a. Recent acquisition of 2 PCEs and early arrival of 4 PGMs will add considerably to the capability of the Sea Forces. b. Thanks to expedited deliveries of 15 LCM8s, by end December the lift capability of the River Forces will have increased by 50% (from 6 to 9 Infantry Battalions). The balance (primarily patrol craft) of the additional River Assault Group, making a total of seven in country, will be on hand by July 1965. c. The first keels of the additional 90 motorized junks will be laid next month. Beginning January, these junks will take their place in the coastal force at the rate of ten per month. 12. Intelligence agencies are exchanging information to a much greater degree and effecting better coordination at all levels down to and including province (sector). In this connection, all sectors have now established operations and intelligence centers; and most are functioning with some success. 13. The RVNAF logistic system is being partially reorganized to improve the logistic support of the paramilitary forces. The Administrative and Direct Support Logistic (A&L) Companies, until now integrated into the Regional Forces for their immediate support and that of the Popular Forces, are being incorporated directly into the ARVN logistic system, increased in strength, and extended to the subsector level by addition of logistic contact teams. 14. Communications are being further developed and are becoming more reliable. An alternate tropo scatter route is opening between Saigon and Pleiku. Southern Aid microwave circuits are now carrying military traffic. Advisors are equipped with mobile communications for field use and for greater flexibility of air-ground operations. 15. Finally, there are perceptible improvements in operational techniques and tactics throughout the fighting forces. For instance, I am encouraged by the better integration of the capabilities of the combined ground arms; by the increasing number of joint ground and naval operations; and by the effectiveness of night operations conducted by certain units. We are beginning to develop sound plans for disruption of War Zones C and D, by both ground and air operations. In this connection, our work with IR, and successful exploitation of this technique, convinces us that it represents a real potential for detecting and hitting the VC in terrain which heretofore has provided him sanctuary. Problem Areas: 16. There are many problem areas under constant study and surveillance by my headquarters and subordinate elements. The major ones include: a. Deficiencies in leadership training and development, particularly of junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Because this is of central importance, it is given special emphasis at all advisory levels, and particularly at the National Training Centers. b. Development of capabilities for conscription and recruitment of manpower to meet the requirements of approved plans and programs. c. Development of a viable paramilitary concept and force structure responsive to security and political requirements. The problems here are equitable division of responsibility between the national government and the local community; the preconditions for community commitment to local defense, and insuring that the two efforts are mutually reinforcing. d. The determination of an optimum deployment and utilization of U.S. Special Forces. A comprehensive study and analysis of this problem is underway which will undoubtedly lead to the redeployment of a number of Special Forces detachments into the areas where they may be expected to be more productive in attacks against VC bases and in the interdiction of actual VC routes, both into and within the country. We are also studying the problem of the legal status of the CIDG forces. We are not yet sure of the impact of giving the CIDG Strike Companies a legal status similar to the Regional Forces. e. Orientation and training of military units for their pacification tasks. A principal requirement is preparation of selected units for participation in various aspects of population and resources control operations. Another is the entire area of peasant/soldier relationships. f. Tactical deficiencies. This runs the entire gamut. We continue to work to improve the rapidity and effectiveness of reaction forces; to develop methods of detecting and punishing VC ambushes; to make ARVN conscious of the essentiality of thorough ground reconnaissance and patrolling; to exploit and increase means of acquiring combat intelligence. g. Continued efforts to improve coordination and integration of effort between the agencies of the U.S. Mission in support of pacification. h. Lack of authority to disrupt the VC infiltration routes and facilities in the Laotian corridor. Status of Contingency Planning: 17. MACV planning for Special, Contingency, and Emergency actions by the U.S. and its Allies reflects more realism than at any previous time. This applies equally to Component and Supporting Commands. a. Special OPlans 37 and 34A have been partially implemented. Planning for further operations is well ahead of anticipated authority to execute. CINCPAC is integrating all his Special Plans (33, 34, 99) for actions in SEAsia into OPlan 37 by 1 November. 34A, 37, and DeSoto actions are either limited or held in abeyance. Unilateral MACV and U.S. component planning is so well advanced that minimum reaction time to execute external combined air operations with RVNAF will be required. Combined US/RVN planning for limited surface operations in Laos has been authorized and is in process. b. Contingency Plans for counterinsurgency (32 Ph II) and for countering DRV/ChiCom aggression (32 Ph III/IV) have been brought up to date by U.S. Component and ZI Commands. Counterpart SEATO plans are comparably up to date. U.S. unilateral plans will be more realistic when bilateral planning with the Thais is completed and when similar planning is effected wit-in the GVN. c. The U.S. Emergency Evacuation and Security Plans (60-64, 61-62) have been thoroughly reviewed, refined, and steps taken to expedite and facilitate execution as may be directed. d. Preliminary combined planning with GVN against DRV aggression resulted in tentative working level agreement on the nature of the threat and a concept of operations. It also surfaced a potentially serious problem in US/RVN command relationships. Continued combined planning with GVN was deferred as the.estimate of possible DRV reaction to the U.S. Golf of Tonkin actions failed to materialize. W. C. Westmoreland/2/ General, United States Army /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
341. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 53-64 Washington, September 8, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Memos, Vol. XVII. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board. Also published in Declassified Documents, 2978, 31A. CHANCES FOR A STABLE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM The Problem To assess the chances for the emergence of a stable non-Communist regime in South Vietnam. Conclusion At present the odds are against the emergence of a stable government capable of effectively prosecuting the war in South Vietnam. Yet the situation is not hopeless: if a viable regime evolves from the present confusion it may even gain strength from the release of long-pent pressures and the sobering effect of the current crisis. Of the men on the scene, General Khanh probably has the best chance of mustering sufficient support to restore a reasonably stable and workable government. Discussion 1. The downfall of the Diem regime released powerful political forces previously suppressed or underground. Religious groups, principally the Buddhists, the students, labor, and the diverse array of intellectuals and politicians both at home and in exile moved quickly to voice their aspirations and make themselves felt. These cross currents were reflected within the military establishment, particularly among the senior officers. The struggle among these various forces can be expected to continue until an acceptable balance is struck, one group proves strong enough to dominate the others, or the fabric of central government is torn apart. 2. The convulsions of recent weeks have surfaced and exacerbated these deep-seated divisions and strains. They have intensified reciprocal suspicions between the military leadership and segments of the populace, at least in urban areas, increased disunity within the military establishment itself, and produced serious discord, including religious strife, among the civilians. The present situation is far more serious than that of November 1963, for the Viet Cong are now stronger, and in 1963 popular enthusiasm over Diem's ouster gave his immediate successors a degree of general support and period of grace the present shaky government does not have. Furthermore, the events of the past nine months have inevitably increased sentiments of war weariness and frustration, and probably caused "neutralism" (i.e., an end to the constant struggle) to appear increasingly attractive to many. Also, the factors inherent in the US/GVN relationship have caused some rise in anti-American feeling, which probably will grow. 3. The situation is fragile and vulnerable to attack or exploitation from all sides. It affords obvious opportunities to any person or group reckless or ambitious enough to undertake a coup. There are indications of such plotting by at least two groups: disgruntled Dai Viets allied with officers who presently command key military units, and another group influenced by Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao. Among the civilian population some Buddhist and Catholic leaders appear to be trying to avoid new violence, but the spectre of religious strife has not been laid to rest. Recent Buddhist demands have alarmed the Catholics and militants of either persuasion may provoke fresh crises. While some civilian politicians wish to play a constructive role, most remain more concerned with personal power and prestige than national unity. The students seem to be calming down, but this volatile group remains vulnerable to manipulation from various quarters, including the Viet Cong and, perhaps, the French. 4. The present governmental arrangements are likely to undergo several changes during the next few weeks. The shaky solution evolved amid riot and discord--a sixty-day caretaker government headed by an ostensible triumvirate of rival generals--was patently a stopgap. Some other arrangements will be tried-perhaps in connection with the proposed National Congress. Beyond the immediate crisis over governmental arrangements, however, there is the question of whether any stable regime can emerge, capable of effectively prosecuting the war. On present evidence, chances of this outcome must be rated as less than even. 5. The situation in South Vietnam is so fluid and complex, however, that those developments which appear most likely will not necessarily occur--as, indeed, they have not on many occasions in both ancient and recent Vietnamese history. There is a chance, even if it be slight, that the experiences of the last week or so may ultimately prove salutary, that the situation had to get worse before it could get better. In the political chaos and conflict, some longstanding pressures have been released, some smoldering grievances and quarrels have been aired and possibly ameliorated, and the dangers implicit in continued drift have been made more real. It is not impossible that adroit leadership could turn these conditions to advantage in convincing influential figures of the need for national unity under available leaders, imperfect as they may be. 6. The real relationships of the persons and groups involved in the present situation are obscure./2/ It is not clear how much power General Khanh actually retains or what role he will play in forthcoming weeks. In some respects, recent events have damaged him politically. At least some of his military colleagues are obviously unhappy at what they regard as his weakness in the face of Buddhist and student disorder. On the other hand, his manifest reluctance to use force against protesting civilians may lay to rest longstanding civilian suspicions that he is a neo-Diemist anxious to reverse the verdict of November 1963 and restore a Can Lao dictatorship. His courageous willingness to stand alone and unarmed amidst demonstrating crowds won him personal respect. /2/See Annex. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is not printed.] 7. In the context of present realities Khanh probably has a better chance than any other obvious figure of providing the leadership around which a stable government could be built. His success in this venture, however, is far from assured. Even if he himself shows the necessary astuteness and willingness to tackle the task his success will depend to a great degree on the willingness of other influential figures (e.g., General Khiem, General Minh, and Tri Quang) to lend him support or, at a minimum, to refrain from working actively for his downfall. General Minh in particular probably retains enough prestige so that a government which did not have his participation, or at least his approval, would have considerably lessened chances of survival. 8. There are, of course, several possibilities other than a government in which Khanh plays the paramount role. Some new figure may arise or some already prominent personality may prove to have hidden talents or unsuspected support. However, at the moment every likely alternative candidate has individual drawbacks or enough known opposition to cast serious doubt on his ability to provide unifying leadership. Several groups or figures seem strong enough to exercise what amounts to a de facto veto in the business of creating a government. Although it is possible that some individual or faction may succeed in overthrowing the present government, none--other than Khanh--presently seems capable of holding power. 9. The longer the present unstable situation lasts, the more difficult it will be to form a government which can preserve even the appearance of unity and determination. In such circumstances, neutralist sentiment would almost certainly increase, together with the danger that a loosely organized coalition would emerge which could take advantage of frustration and war weariness to seek a neutralist solution. In the prolonged absence of firm central direction from Saigon, the morale and effectiveness of individual unit commanders in the field will decline, and there is even the danger that some might make their own accommodations with the Communist enemy. There is also a chance that some province or region will secede, and there are already rumors of separatist tendencies in Hue. 10. On the other hand, except for tensions in Hue, there is as yet little sign of the imminence of such dire developments. Furthermore, in weighing the situation in South Vietnam it is important not to focus exclusive attention on events in urban areas. During the past month, the war in the provinces has been carrying on, the army shows no signs of slackening its efforts and, indeed, has recently scored two major successes. Local officials have probably adopted the traditional Vietnamese wait and see attitude rather than taking actions which might jeopardize their own position. Prolonged discord in the cities will inevitably affect the rural pacification effort, but so far the limited momentum which the counterinsurgency effort had in the provinces has not diminished. 11. The Viet Cong obviously are not indifferent to South Vietnam's current troubles. Hanoi and Viet Cong propaganda emphasizes that the Communists expect victory to come primarily from South Vietnamese political failures and instability. There is no evidence that the Viet Cong triggered the recent actions which led to urban upheaval, but the Communists have almost certainly been actively encouraging discord and violence (eleven of those arrested as directly responsible for the worst of recent disorders in Saigon were claimed by the police to be known VC agents). Militarily, recent weeks have been marked by an actual decline in VC attacks, though this "lull" is probably a normal phase and there are signs that the VC may now be preparing to step up their activity. Judging from past experience, it will take some time for the VC to ready themselves to take full advantage of recent developments. Also, the Communists may wish to avoid the risk of increasing the obvious VC threat to a point where it might unify anti-Communists presently engaged in internecine political strife. 12. Some of the recent agitation against Khanh's government has had anti-American undertones. In some circles there is a belief that the US prodded Khanh into attempting to eliminate Minh as chief of state and into resuming the kind of tight controls formerly exercised by Diem. Minh himself is manifestly resentful of what he regards as US undercutting of his position (though Khanh too has been uneasy about what he considers US endeavors on Minh's behalf). There has been a growing anti-American feeling among some Catholics who blame the US for Diem's overthrow and resent what they consider US favoritism of the Buddhist cause. In some military quarters (e.g., General Khiem) and probably in some civilian circles as well there is resentment at what is inevitably viewed as US "meddling" in internal Vietnamese affairs. 13. Communist--and possibly also French--agents have encouraged and exploited anti-US sentiments. The idea is also being circulated that South Vietnam is really a battlefield on which two alien powers, the US and Communist China, are waging war by proxy. It is likely that anti-American sentiment will grow.
342. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, September 8, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XVII, Memos. Secret. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 561-562, and Pentagon Papers: New York Times Edition, pp. 357-359. SUBJECT The attached memorandum (Tab A) records briefly the consensus which has been worked out with Max Taylor in recent days./2/ This course of action is the best we can design for the central purpose of thickening the thin fabric of the Khanh government in the next two months. Everyone regards this as the first priority task, and the American actions are all framed with this as their primary purpose. Our consensus now runs against any plan to force substantial escalation before October, at the earliest. My own guess is that unless there is a very marked change in Saigon, we will still be cautious a month from now, although Bob McNamara is a little more aggressive than the rest of us. /2/The meetings took place September 7 at noon and September 8 at 11:05 a.m. Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge and William Bundy, Manning, Taylor, and Wheeler attended both, while McCone was present at the second. Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) The first meeting is described in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book IV, pp. 25-27; and Taylor summarized both meetings briefly in Swords and Plowshares, pp. 320-321. In his diary, Taylor also notes that there was general agreement on the recommendations in telegram 768 (Document 339), but "there was a rather sharp debate over the timeliness of provoking North Vietnamese action." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69) This paper does not discuss long-range actions, but you should know that in the longer perspective nearly all of us are agreed that substantially increased pressure against North Vietnam will be necessary if we are not to face the prospect of a gradual but increasingly inevitable break-up of our side in South Vietnam. I also attach at Tab B a Special National Intelligence Estimate which was approved today./3/ /3/Document 341. McG. B. Tab A COURSES OF ACTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM/4/ /4/Secret. Drafted by William Bundy. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 561-562. For an earlier draft, also dated September 8, see ibid., pp. 560-561. In anticipation of Taylor's return and in response to the deteriorating situation in Saigon, McNaughton and William Bundy had begun drafting papers on Vietnam on September 2. McNaughton's first and second drafts, dated September 2 and 3, of a seven-point "Plan of Action for South Vietnam" are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XVII, Memos. The second draft is also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 556-559. Bundy's paper, "Possible Courses of Action for South Viet-Nam," initially drafted on September 3 and revised on September 5, was similar to McNaughton's but had only five sections: Analysis of the Present Situation, Actions To Be Taken in Any Event, Major Additional Action We Might Consider Within South Viet-Nam, Major Additional Courses of Action Outside South Viet-Nam, and Summary and Conclusions. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XVII, Memos) Both papers were pessimistic about the situation in Vietnam and presented a range of possible U.S. actions to improve it. The text printed here represents the consolidation and revision of the Bundy and McNaughton drafts in light of the discussions on September 7 and 8. The Situation 1. Khanh will probably stay in control and may make some headway in the next 2-3 months in strengthening the government (GVN). The best we can expect is that he and the GVN will be able to maintain order, keep the pacification program ticking over (but not progressing markedly), and give the appearance of a valid government. 2. Khanh and the GVN leaders are temporarily too exhausted to be thinking much about moves against the North. However, they do need to be reassured that the US continues to mean business, and as Khanh goes along in his government efforts, he will probably want more visible US effort, and some GVN role in external actions. 3. The GVN over the next 2-3 months will be too weak for us to take any major deliberate risks of escalation that would involve a major role for, or threat to, South Vietnam, However, escalation arising from and directed against US action would tend to lift GVN morale at least temporarily. 4. The Communist side will probably avoid provocative action against the US, and it is uncertain how much they will step up VC activity. They do need to be shown that we and the GVN are not simply sitting back after the Gulf of Tonkin. Courses of Action We recommend in any event: 1. US naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin should be resumed immediately (about September 12). They should operate initially beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly dissociated from 34A maritime operations. The patrols would comprise 2-3 destroyers and would have air cover from carriers; the destroyers would have their own ASW capability. 2. 34A operations by the GVN should be resumed immediately thereafter (next week). The maritime operations are by far the most important. North Vietnam is likely to publicize them, and at this point we should have the GVN ready to admit that they are taking place and to justify and legitimize them on the basis of the facts on VC infiltration by sea. 34A air drop and leaflet operations should also be resumed but are secondary in importance. We should not consider air strikes under 34A for the present. 3. Limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor areas of Laos should be undertaken in the near future, together with Lao air strikes as soon as we can get Souvanna's permission. These operations will have only limited effect, however. 4. We should be prepared to respond on a tit-for-tat basis against the DRV in the event of any attack on US units or any special DRV/VC action against SVN. The response for an attack on US units should be along the lines of the Gulf of Tonkin attacks, against specific and related targets. The response to special action against SVN should likewise be aimed at specific and comparable targets. The main further question is the extent to which we should add elements to the above actions that would tend deliberately to provoke a DRV reaction, and consequent retaliation by us. Examples of actions to be considered would be running US naval patrols increasingly close to the North Vietnamese coast and/or associating them with 34A operations. We believe such deliberately provocative elements should not be added in the immediate future while the GVN is still struggling to its feet. By early October, however, we may recommend such actions depending on GVN progress and Communist reaction in the meantime, especially to US naval patrols. The aim of the above actions, external to South Vietnam, would be to assist morale in SVN and show the Communists we still mean business, while at the same time seeking to keep the risks low and under our control at each stage. Further actions within South Vietnam are not covered in this memorandum. We believe that there are a number of immediate impact actions we can take, such as pay raises for the police and civil administrators and spot projects in the cities and selected rural areas. These actions would be within current policy and will be refined for decision during Ambassador Taylor's visit. We are also considering minor changes in the US air role within South Vietnam, but these would not involve decisions until November.
343. Memorandum of a Meeting, White House, Washington, September 9, 1964, 11 a.m./1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. For the President's account of this meeting, see Vantage Point, p. 120. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 129B. PRESENT WERE The meeting began with the President's review of a memorandum, "Courses of Action for South Vietnam," dated September 8, 1964 (attached)./2/ Initial attention was concentrated on the four specific recommendations in this paper. The Secretary of Defense reported that these recommendations, with minor adjustments, had the approval of the Joint Chiefs,/3/ but he reported also that there was an important division among the Chiefs, in that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps believed that it was now necessary in addition to execute extensive U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. General Wheeler explained that these two officers now felt that the situation would continue to deteriorate unless such drastic action was taken now. He said that he and the other two colleagues were persuaded by the argument of Ambassador Taylor--the man on the spot--that it was important not to overstrain the currently weakened GVN by drastic action in the immediate future. General Taylor repeated that this was indeed his view, but he emphasized that he also believed that in the long run the current in-country program would not be sufficient. He had held this view for many months, but it had been reinforced by recent events in the field. /2/Not attached to the source text, but see Tab A, supra. /3/For text of the JCS views, CM-124-64, September 9, see Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, p. 564. A copy of CM-124-64 is also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, DeSoto Patrol. The President pressed General Taylor as to the reasons for his current unreadiness to recommend larger action. Under this questioning General Taylor made it clear that he and General Westmoreland were in agreement on this question of timing. The President indicated that he had gained the impression in an earlier talk with Ambassador Taylor that the Government now might in fact be somewhat strengthened by recent events, in that General Khanh had eliminated some people who were good riddance./4/ Ambassador Taylor agreed that this was a real possibility, at the more optimistic end of the spectrum, and that perhaps also General Khanh would now have more true support in the country as a whole. But he could not be sure of this, and on balance he thought the government was in a more uncertain condition than before. /4/According to Taylor's diary, he had seen the President at the end of the preceding day and explained the situation in Saigon. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69) No record of this meeting has been found. The President asked whether the U.S. had given any encouragement to General Khanh in his August 16 effort to concentrate power in his own hands, and the Ambassador replied in the negative. We had tried to encourage Khanh to include a bill of rights and to lay a careful groundwork for any actions he might take. He had accepted the first point, but had not had time to carry out the second before his plans were overtaken by protest. The President asked Director McCone for his opinion and the Director replied that in the judgment of his Agency the four recommended actions were appropriate, and that a sustained air attack at present would be dangerous because of the weakness of the GVN. Such an attack might also trigger major increases in Chinese Communist participation. The Agency remained very gravely concerned by the internal situation in South Vietnam, which the Director estimated a shade more pessimistically than Ambassador Taylor. The President asked the Ambassador whether we could stop internal feuding. The Ambassador replied that it was very difficult with a group of men who turned off their hearing aids in the face of appeals to the public weal. These people simply did not have the sense of responsibility for the public interest to which we were accustomed, and regularly estimated matters in terms of their own personal gains and losses. The President then asked the Secretary of State for his judgment. Mr. Rusk said that a major decision to go North could be taken at any time--"at 5-minutes' notice." He did not recommend such decision now. He thought we should take the four recommended actions and play for the breaks. The split in the Communist bloc was deepening and would probably be sharpened by the forthcoming December meeting./5/ As that split grew more severe, there might be real inhibitions upon adventures by Peking and Hanoi in Southeast Asia. /5/Reference is to the International Conference of Communist Parties to be held on December 15. The President asked what could be done to strengthen the Government in South Vietnam. Ambassador Taylor replied that this was very difficult, but that one thing he would try to do would be to discourage Khanh from excluding all military men. I said that this was the common judgment of all of us, and that the Government needed what talent it could get whether military or civilian. The President said that in his judgment the proper answer to those advocating immediate and extensive action against the North was that we should not do this until our side could defend itself in the streets of Saigon. We obviously wanted to strengthen the GVN. We believed it could be strengthened. But what specifically were we going to do in this direction? Ambassador Taylor replied that we needed to move on in meshing our team with the GVN. This had been well started before the unrest of August. The problem was not in planning but in execution, and in the quality of the individuals in the GVN. Nevertheless we should continue to seek better individuals and continue to strengthen our cooperative effort with them. The President accepted this as a first purpose and then asked whether we needed additional equipment as well. Ambassador Taylor said that while the additional U.S. advisers would be helpful, there was currently no equipment need beyond that which was being supplied. Secretary McNamara emphasized the importance of politico-economic action in the urban areas, along the lines of the recent Rand report,/6/ to lower the level of student and Buddhist pressure and increase the political base of support for the GVN. Mr. McCone endorsed this judgment. He further expressed his opinion that Hanoi and Peking now believed that they were doing very well and that they were not having second thoughts about their basic policy (an implied disagreement with the Secretary of State). The Agency was also disturbed by the prospect that internal movement toward negotiations might be increasing, and that there was some sign also of anti-American feeling in South Vietnam. It could happen that the President would find that the purposes originally set forth in Eisenhower's 1954 letter/7/ were no longer supported by the people of Vietnam themselves. /6/"U.S. Economic Assistance in Vietnam: A Proposed Reorientation," R-430-AID, July 1964, was prepared by the Rand Corporation for the Agency for International Development. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Rand Report. /7/Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 1239-1241. Secretary Rusk asked Ambassador Taylor if it could be said that the key leaders had looked at the dangers of recent weeks and might be sobered toward responsibility. Ambassador Taylor said there were some such factors at work. The recent events had proven that for the present, at least, General Khanh is indispensable, and on paper, at least, he now had a broader backing than before. The President asked what would happen if our proposed efforts did not strengthen the government and if instead it got weaker and weaker. Ambassador Taylor replied that as long as the armed forces are solid, the real power is secure. It was vital to be sure of the armed forces. And he believed that these forces would be reliable as long as they had confidence that we were with them. The President asked who might come in if Khanh went out. He said that he hoped that it would not be "Mac's friend Mr. Oanh of Harvard," and was pleased to hear that this assumption was right. Ambassador Taylor indicated that it might be such a man as Quat, or General Khiem, or perhaps Vu Van Maul But he emphasized that this was a very uncertain game of prediction. Ambassador Taylor further recommended that we should make every effort to execute the sound Hop-Tac plan. This plan for clearance around Saigon would make ministers work, but work was good for the ministers. The President asked whether the situation was better or worse than when Ambassador Taylor went out. Ambassador Taylor said he thought it was somewhat worse, but made it clear in response to a further question that this weakening was political, not military. Ambassador Taylor also emphasized his belief that sooner or later we would indeed have to act more forcefully against the North. He simply did not think now was the best time. The President asked if anyone doubted whether it was worth all this effort. Ambassador Taylor replied that we could not afford to let Hanoi win, in terms of our overall position in the area and in the world. General Wheeler supported him most forcefully, reporting the unanimous view of the Joint Chiefs that if we should lose in South Vietnam, we would lose Southeast Asia. Country after country on the periphery would give way and look toward Communist China as the rising power of the area. Mr. McCone expressed his concurrence and so did the Secretary of State, with considerable force. The President indicated that the reason for waiting, then, must be simply that with a weak and wobbly situation it would be unwise to attack until we could stabilize our base. Secretary McNamara added that the price of waiting was low, and the promise of gain substantial. Ambassador Taylor pointed out that General Khanh himself wants two months simply to organize his own government. The Secretary of State asked what the situation was in the countryside. Ambassador Taylor replied it was not too bad. He had constantly asked Khanh if he was keeping things quiet in the provinces and had regularly been assured of Khanh's concern on just this point. The President asked Ambassador Taylor to compare Khanh and Diem in the people's affections. The Ambassador replied the people did not care for either one. The Secretary of State asked if television could be used to give Khanh more contact with the people. Ambassador Taylor said the matter needed further study. Secretary McNamara asked if it were clear that money was no object, and returned to the importance of carrying out the kind of program recommended in the Rand report. Ambassador Taylor replied that recommendations from Saigon were likely to be more conservative than the Rand report. Mr. Killen felt that our program had been too much a U.S. program, and too little a matter of real intent and planning by GVN officials. Mr. Killen felt that to make a government you had to make it do its own work. Secretary Rusk said he very much hoped money would not be regarded as the ceiling, and felt that it would be worth any amount to win. He adduced the example of the costs of the anti-Communist struggle in Greece, which worked out at $50,000 a guerrilla. Secretary McNamara repeated that the Rand report said we had been penny-pinching and that we should make sure that our people in the field understood that these were not normal circumstances and that normal attitudes would not be helpful. Ambassador Taylor replied that the country team would ask for any money it needed. The President emphasized his own continuing conviction that it was necessary not to spare the horses. He pointed out that this had been his constant view and that he wondered what the Rand report was talking about. Secretary McNamara and I said in reply that the report was talking of the attitudes of second- and third-level officials in the field, and not about the efforts of people in Washington to get everybody to do whatever would be helpful. The President reemphasized his own position and asked Ambassador Taylor directly if he felt pinched. The Ambassador replied "no." The President said that what disheartened him was that we had our best team out there for 60 days and had lost ground. Ambassador Taylor replied that the President might have a wrong impression. The Ambassador believed that in the field we were indeed doing better--that General Westmoreland, if present, would report real strengthening of the pacification effort, that tactics and performance were improving--that at least in half the provinces the over-all program was going well. The Ambassador believed that progress was being made at the grass roots, and that our current problem was political. The President asked Mr. McCone why things were quiet on the enemy side after the Gulf of Tonkin. Mr. McCone replied that the enemy was waiting and watching and probably felt that the current political unrest was working in his interest. The President asked if anyone present had a different view from the basic recommendation of the attached paper. No differing view was expressed. Secretary McNamara said that we could try other things later on. Secretary Rusk concurred. General Wheeler said that of course a clear-cut incident might require appropriate action at any time, and there was general agreement with this thought. The President then turned to what would be said, and Mr. Manning made brief suggestions emphasizing our concern for security and stability in South Vietnam, as well as for the pacification effort. The President discussed briefly the plan for a meeting with the Leadership,/8/ saying that we should take every occasion we could to bring them in normally in these matters. Mr. Bundy pointed out the problem of Congressional delegations going to South Vietnam, and the President and Ambassador Taylor agreed that it would be useful for Ambassador Taylor to point out that one reason for his regular return to this country was to avoid the advantage given to enemies of the GVN government by U.S. types coming out all the time. We would emphasize to the Leadership our hope that Congress would let the government get stabilized, and that at this delicate moment when the government is fragile we should have only one spokesman on the scene--the Ambassador. /8/At 3 p.m., the participants in this meeting, with the exception of Manning, McNaughton, and William Bundy, met with congressional leaders and reviewed the situation in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, Johnson Diary and Rusk Appointment Book) In his diary, Taylor noted: "To my surprise, there was no heckling." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69) No other record of this meeting has been found. During the afternoon of September 10, Taylor also appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to brief the members on the situation in Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 46, Records of the U.S. Senate; scheduled for publication in the 1964 volume of Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) The President then approved the four courses in the attached memorandum, reemphasized that money was no object, and asked General Wheeler to explain to his colleagues in the JCS that we would be ready to do more, when we had a base. The President did not wish to enter the patient in a 10-round bout, when he was in no shape to hold out for one round. We should get him ready to face 3 or 4 rounds at least. There was a brief discussion of a draft letter to General Khanh,/9/ and the President directed that a revision be prepared for his consideration. /9/A copy of this draft and a revised draft, dated September 10, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Heads of State Correspondence. A copy of the 2-paragraph letter as signed by the President on September 10 is ibid. McG.B./10/ /10/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 344. Memorandum From the Director of the Operations Mission in Vietnam (Killen) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor)/1/ Saigon, September 9, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Rand Report. Secret. SUBJECT 1. The Forrestal-Oanh talks in the spring of this year/2/ envisaged a sharply increased level of expenditure by the GVN during CY 1964 and 1965 for the military, counter-insurgency, and developmental purposes. This increased level of spending would be financed by overdrafts at the Bank of Vietnam. It was agreed that excessive inflationary pressures which might be engendered thereby should be ameliorated by increases, as required by import demand, in AID-financed import levels. This policy would be pursued so long as the current emergency situation prevailed. /2/Forrestal transmitted a summary of his discussions with Oanh in telegram 2252 from Saigon, May 19. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-VIET S) A summary of the results of the talks and a memorandum of understanding are in telegrams 2296 and 2297 from Saigon, May 27. (Ibid., AID(US)VIET S) 2. The Rand Report,/3/ submitted pursuant to an extended on-the-ground examination of the current politico/economic problems in Vietnam and the effectiveness of U.S. economic assistance in dealing with them, called attention to a number of needed revisions in the character of U.S. aid and made recommendations relating thereto. /3/See footnote 6, Document 343. 3. During the past months, since the Forrestal-Oanh talks, expenditures for the cited purposes, while above the level of the previous year, have failed to meet the projected levels due to a number of factors endemic to the GVN administration. The failure of the GVN counter-insurgency effort to achieve the hoped-for success in the intervening period, plus the weakened structure of the GVN itself, heighten both the need for and the urgency of a renewed effort to make government more effective and to engender in the Vietnamese people a greater sense of confidence in the capacity of the GVN to be responsive to their economic and social needs. 4. The U.S. Government is prepared to vigorously support the efforts of the GVN to these ends. The USG is prepared to collaborate fully with the GVN in the formulation and financing of programs and activities which will readily contribute to these ends. At the same time, in order for these ends to be effectively served, such programs and/or activities must clearly appear as GVN-originated efforts, rather than as the product of U.S. conception and sponsorship. Further, the successful implementation of such programs requires a reasonable (but wholly possible) self-help effort of the GVN in certain current problems of budget management and economic policy, both of which impinge heavily on the opportunity to effectively marshal indigenous resources so essential to an accelerated input of U.S. resources. 5. The achievement of the interdependent U.S. security and political objectives in Vietnam requires vigorous and successful action by the GVN on both the "pacification" and socio/economic development fronts in both rural and urban areas. Actions are currently underway to greatly strengthen the U.S. support for pacification--in military, pare-military, and civilian activities. On-going programs in rural areas are directed towards both pacification and developmental targets, each of which seeks to associate the rural community with the GVN in action and attitude. Much less has been undertaken in urban areas with their greater potential for adverse political and social activities which thwart the ability and the determination of any GVN to carry out its normal and essential functions of government. (An exception to this generalization is the already initiated action to have the Doxiades Associates of Athens, Greece, and Washington, D.C. develop by the end of calendar 1964 an urban development plan for the Saigon metropolitan area which envisages a fully comprehensive and multi-year action plan for that community.) 6. Given the widespread unemployment and underemployment in both urban and rural areas, a major economic and political objective would be the creation of jobs, more jobs, and still more jobs. This underscores the importance of developing indigenous sources for materiel, e.g., cement, roofing, nails, lumber, glass, and all other goods for which basic raw material needs can be met from within-country sources. To have these materials provided from offshore sources would dissipate a major, if not the major, benefit that should accrue from the total effort. It is recognized that some time would be required to tool up for expanded internal production and during the interim recourse would necessarily be made to imports. But for the longer-term and maximum political benefit, local resources must be exploited soonest. This underscores again the importance of the second group of GVN actions mentioned in paragraph 7. 7. The USOM/VN therefore proposes to initiate with the GVN, during the immediate future, a series of talks looking towards agreement on a substantially expanded socio/economic action program which aims to induce a greater sense of popular confidence in both the GVN and the future of the country. An accompanying objective will be to obtain maximum possible public participation in both the planning and implementation of all components of such a program. It would envisage prompt action by the GVN on three main fronts: first, the construction of new and widely-desired social and economic facilities, e.g., low-cost housing, schools, public services, and industrial facilities; second, the removal or correction of present deterrents to popular support for, and confidence in, the GVN, e.g., excessively low government salaries; the failure of the GVN to pay promptly for goods or services provided by the private sector; the failure to make funds available promptly through Bank of Vietnam overdrafts, in the first instance, and through normal funding approval procedures, in the second; the excessive "control" actions which thwart private investment (this is particularly important where a critical need for the expanded production of building materials impedes the envisaged construction program); and the failure to utilize existing facilities in the Vietnamese private sector for functions critical to the war effort. Under this program the U.S. would provide maximum financial and technical support in any and all ways which would make effective contributions to success. The third area of GVN action would represent positive steps (in addition to those cited above) to induce greater popular support for this total approach, e.g., greater decentralization of authority to village and hamlet officials to utilize land taxes for paid public works or other useful purposes; the possible establishment of a system of student scholarships for both intermediate and university level studies; possible grants-in-aid to various politically influential groups for educational or other approved purposes; and other similarly motivated activities. 8. All these activities would be so carried out as to seek to the maximum degree a clear distinction between the benefits afforded people in GVN controlled (or nearly controlled) areas and those available (or not available) to people in areas where GVN control is not pervasive. 9. It is desirable, indeed almost imperative, that understandings on these matters be reached with the GVN soonest. The USOM proposes to utilize, in addition to its own staff, such other personnel in the joint USOM/GVN formulation of this program as may be available and competent to assist. Once the elements of agreement are reached, the general content of the program should be announced in a suitable context by the GVN as its own decision, plan and product. The U.S. role should be played in the softest key possible. The timing of the announcement should be determined against the background of political developments in Vietnam so as to maximize the popular support for and the political appeal of the program itself and its GVN sponsorship. Of particular importance in timing is the political decision as to whether we wish the current interim government to get the credit-or whatever successor government emerges. James S. Killen/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
345. National Security Action Memorandum No. 314/1/ Washington, September 10, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 314. Top Secret. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 565-566. The differences between the numbered paragraphs of NSAM 314 and the "Courses of Action for South Vietnam" (Tab A to Document 342) reflect the views of the TCS as indicated in CM-124-64, September 9. See footnote 3, Document 343. TO The President has now reviewed the situation in South Vietnam with Ambassador Taylor and with other advisers and has approved the following actions: 1. U.S. naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin will be resumed promptly after Ambassador Taylor's return. They will operate initially well beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly dissociated from 34A maritime operations. The patrols will comprise two to three destroyers and would have air cover from carriers; the destroyers will have their own ASW capability. 2. 34A operations by the GVN will be resumed after completion of a first DeSoto patrol. The maritime operations are by far the most important. North Vietnam has already publicized them, and is likely to publicize them even more, and at this point we should have the GVN ready to admit that they are taking place and to justify and legitimize them on the basis of the facts of VC infiltration by sea. 34A air drop and leaflet operations should also be resumed but are secondary in importance. We should not consider air strikes under 34A for the present. 3. We should promptly discuss with the Government of Laos plans for limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor areas of Laos, together with Lao air strikes and possible use of U.S. armed aerial reconnaissance. On the basis of these discussions a decision on action will be taken, but it should be recognized that these operations will in any case have only limited effect. 4. We should be prepared to respond as appropriate against the DRV in the event of any attack on U.S. units or any special DRV/VC action against SVN. 5. The results of these decisions will be kept under constant review, and recommendations for changes or modifications or additions will be promptly considered. 6. The President reemphasizes the importance of economic and political actions having immediate impact in South Vietnam, such as pay raises for civilian personnel and spot projects in the cities and selected rural areas. The President emphasizes again that no activity of this kind should be delayed in any way by any feeling that our resources for these purposes are restricted. We can find the money which is needed for all worthwhile projects in this field. He expects that Ambassador Taylor and the country team will take most prompt and energetic action in this field. 7. These decisions are governed by a prevailing judgment that the first order of business at present is to take actions which will help to strengthen the fabric of the Government of South Vietnam; to the extent that the situation permits, such action should precede larger decisions. If such larger decisions are required at any time by a change in the situation, they will be taken. McGeorge Bundy [Continue with the next documents]
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