NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
XII. Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, November 1-December 7 Saigon, November 1, 1964--10:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to CIA, JCS, the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 10:07 p.m., October 31. 1357. VC attack on Bien Hoa/2/ is a deliberate act of escalation and a change of the ground rules under which they have operated up to now. It should be met promptly by an appropriate act of reprisal against DRV target, preferably an airfield. Since both US and GVN have been victims of this attack and since ultimate objective should be convince Hanoi to cease aid to VC (and not merely to lay off US), the retaliatory action should be made by a combined US/VNAF effort. Immediate objective would be to reduce probability of similar attacks on other crowded US facilities such as Danang and Tan Son Nhut and to offset the depressive effect of this action on the new government to which this attack is an affront on its national day. /2/Shortly after midnight, October 31, Bien Hoa airfield came under a mortar attack which killed 4 U.S. servicemen, wounded 30, and destroyed or damaged 27 aircraft. We are considering targets to recommend. Phuc Yen is clearly the most attractive but we are looking at lesser alternatives. Attack should be launched preferably within 24 hours, at latest within 48 hours. I request authority to contact Huong and Khanh to get agreement on principle of combined reprisal. See no need now for further statement in Washington beyond MACV No. 1, 1 Nov to NMCC./3/ Also we should not move dependents at this time or take any overt action which might suggest this intention. /3/This cable transmitted the text of a brief statement given by Westmoreland on the attack at Bien Hoa. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319. HQDA Message Center, Reel 12011) Taylor
394. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 1, 1964--4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to CIA, JCS, the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Johnson and Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 3:23 a.m., November 1. 1360. Embtel 1357, Deptel 976./2/ Following is Embassy/MACV message: /2/Telegram 1357 is supra; telegram 976, October 31, reported that the whole situation and Taylor's recommendations would be considered at a meeting at the highest level at noon on November 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 1. We believe following principles should be applied in our retaliatory action:
A. Tit should be as close to tat as possible. 2. Tit for tat principle clearly indicates Phuc Yen airfield outside of Hanoi. However, presence of MIG's and heavy flak defense does not permit VNAF participation. Unless Phuc Yen is hit at the same time or before any other target in NVN, any aircraft now on Phuc Yen will in all probability be dispersed to several fields complicating the problem of subsequently locating and destroying them. Next most suitable and productive target is Vit Thu Lu barracks (target 36)/3/ followed by other two targets in same general area--Chap Le barracks (target 39) and Xom Bang ammunition depot (target 64). Advantage of these targets is that they are individually within VNAF capabilities with or without U.S. participation. According to our intelligence, Vit Thu Lu appears to be especially and closely related to infiltration. /3/Reference is to item 36 on the 94-target study list, August 24; see footnote 7, Document 331. 3. Thus the combination of maximum effect would be U.S. strike against Phuc Yen (70 sorties) with simultaneous U.S./VNAF strikes against Vit Thu Lu (about 40 sorties) and targets 39 (about 45 sorties) and 64 (about 50 sorties). If attack on Phuc Yen is not approved at this time, I recommend U.S./VNAF strike on Vit Thu Lu and would like to see targets 39 and 64 included. 4. If a favorable decision on striking Phuc Yen is reached at your noon meeting November 1, attack can be made at first light November 3 Saigon time. Vit Thu Lu and targets 39 and 64 require 24 hours between decision and strike to permit adequate VNAF pilot briefing. Foregoing assumes all U.S. strikes to be made by Second Air Division. 5. I strongly urge that any strikes approved be viewed as the inauguration of a new policy of tit for tat reprisals in retaliation for major Viet Cong depredations. I recommend that, immediately following completion of strikes, U.S. and GVN jointly announce that such retaliation will henceforth be the rule, making our statement broad enough to cover major acts of sabotage, terrorism, destruction of industrial facilities, and the interruption of arterial rail and highway communications. Taylor
395. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Washington, November 1, 1964--4:19 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7425, 381 Vietnam. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to COMUSMACV, Saigon, CIA, the White House, and the Department of State. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, p. 587. 1451. Personal for Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland and Ambassador Taylor from CJCS. 1. Highest level meeting to discuss courses of action related to Bien Hoa attack tentatively scheduled for 1300 hours Washington time 2 November. 2. At preliminary meeting same subject this date,/2/ concern was expressed that proposed US retaliatory/punitive actions could trigger North Vietnamese/ChiCom air and ground retaliatory acts. Highest authority desires to consider in conjunction with US military actions, increased security measures and precautionary moves of US air and ground units to protect US dependents, units and installations against North Vietnamese/ChiCom retaliation. /2/The meeting took place at the White House at approximately 12:30 p.m. with the President, Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge and William Bundy, and Ball in attendance. (Johnson Library, Johnson Daily Diary and Rusk Appointment Book) No record of the meeting has been found. 3. JCS are considering the following in connection with proposed US punitive actions against the DRV:/3/ /3/On November 1, presumably before the meeting at the White House, the loins Chiefs of Staff made oral recommendations to McNamara concerning the response to Bien Hoa. They felt that Taylor's "tit-for-tat" was unduly restrictive and limited U.S. initiative, nor did they espouse joint action with South Vietnam. They proposed instead a series of specific actions to be taken in the next 3 days which included air strikes, landing of U.S. forces, and evacuation of dependents. These recommendations were formalized in JCSM-933-64, November 4. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7425, 381 Vietnam) a. Outshipment of US dependents prior to or simultaneous with initiation of US air strikes. b. Movement of SLF afloat to Da Nang airbase and two Army or Marine battalions by air to Saigon area to provide local security to US personnel and installations. c. Movement one Marine Hawk battalion from 29 Palms, California to SVN. d. Movement of [or?] augmentation land-based and carrier-based air required to optimize execution of course of action IA CINCPAC Frag Order 3./4/ /4/Transmitted in CINCPAC telegram 280210Z, October 28, CINCPAC Frag Order No. 3, "Punitive and Crippling Reprisal Actions on Targets in North Vietnam," provided a list of responses in the event that the DeSoto patrol was attacked. Option IA listed airfields, POL, and port facilities to be attacked on the first day. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DeSoto September) 4. In addition to above, JCS are considering military utility of employing US aircraft in South Vietnam in country to augment VNAF and Farmgate. e. Forward movement from CONUS or within PACOM of around, sea, and air units to WESTPAC and alert of additional units in CONUS as might be required to implement appropriate portions of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 and/or CINCPAC OPLAN 39-65./5/ /5/Copies of CINCPAC Operations Plan 32-64, November 6, 1963, entitled "Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia," and CINCPAC Operations Plan 39-65, September 5, which dealt with responses to Chinese aggression, were attached to Document 411. 5. Request comments of addressees ASAP./6/ /6/Sharp replied in telegram 020400Z, November 2, concurring in items 3c-e and 4, noting that the action in item 3b had been started, and deferring comment on 3a to COMUSMACV and the Embassy in Saigon. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol XXI, Cables)
396. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, November 1, 1964--6:28 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and cleared with Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC and the Department of Defense. 978. Saigon for MACV. State-Defense Message. 1. We have weighed carefully your recommendations Embtels 1357 and 1360,/2/ and supporting messages MACV 010359Z and CINCPAC 010501Z./3/ There is no doubt here that this event adds considerably to cumulative factors pointing toward much harder policy in near future. At same time, we would find it hard to portray attack as major act of escalation in itself, since it differs only in degree and extent of damage from such previous incidents as Card sinking/4/ and recurrent attacks on US personnel and equipment playing military roles. We have also been reluctant give any appearance reacting only when US personnel affected. /2/Documents 393 and 394. /3/The former strongly endorsed Taylor's recommendation, and the latter stressed that early action must be taken in retaliation for Bien Hoa and transmitted a list of targets which should be attacked. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) /4/The Card, which was being used as a helicopter and aircraft ferry, was sunk in Saigon harbor on May 2. 2. In addition above reasons arguing against one-shot retaliatory treatment, all of us here, including JCS, are negative on a tit-for-tat policy as basis for real action against the North. Not only is it hard to define such a policy, but all our studies and war games have indicated that in the end it conveys a weak signal to Hanoi and also has maximum disadvantages in wider international sphere. 3. Accordingly we come back to basic point that attack does bring measurably nearer point of decision on systematic wider actions against North. We here are seeking convey to press and public that we take incident seriously but that it must be seen in wider context. 4. At same time we recognize morale and other factors arguing for some early action. In this connection we now need your reading of how upset GVN and key leaders are by attack. As possible early actions that would have right signal level to North, keep up morale, and with gains outweighing disadvantages. we are considering and need your comment on following: a. Releasing US aircraft as such for action against VC. This has disadvantages assuming explicit US combat role for first time and over time involving us in civilian attacks through error that could be adverse psychologically. On other hand, it could add materially your capabilities. b. Sending in security battalions for Bien Hoa, Da Nang, and Nha Trang, or as you and MACV might recommend. This could have desirable appearance securing decks for action. On other hand we not clear how much it would really add to security or whether GVN would welcome and cooperate. Obviously it tends add to our casualties and general exposure. 5. Beyond such action, we need your recommendations, in conjunction with MACV, of preliminary or preparatory actions to secure SVN base and protection US personnel that would be required in conjunction with possible decision for wider action. This involves such factors as air defense key installations (especially Da Nang) against possible air strikes, handling of VC reactions of any character throughout SVN, and of course ground deployments to deter action in North. As you know planning has always included these factors, but we need your current judgment in light changes in overall situation and growing VC capabilities as to all measures we should now include in our planning. JCS covering same point in separate cable to MACV./5/ /5/Document 395. 6. There will be further high level meetings tomorrow and we would appreciate interim reply on above points for use that meeting. Rusk
397. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, November 1, 1964--6:29 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, 1964 Files. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved by Rusk. 979. Literally eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. I want to assure you that reactions reported our longer telegram/2/ reflect most careful possible weighing your arguments for immediate retaliation. In this one case we are inevitably affected by election timing. Quick retaliation could easily be attacked as election device here, and this would play back to Hanoi and greatly weaken intended signal. More basically, we believe such action would in practice commit us to some form of tit-for-tat policy that could only be effective if leading rapidly to more systematic campaign of military pressures on north with all implications we have always seen in this course of action. Such a decision is not one to be lightly taken nor is it wise or perhaps even proper for administration to take it in closing two days of campaign while awaiting firm mandate from people. /2/Document 396. I want to leave you in no doubt that highest levels feel we are reaching point where policy hardening must be acutely considered. We had been pointing to your return about mid-November to look at whole problem and possible decisions, and this attack may accelerate timing particularly if there should be additional VC moves. At same time, desirability of getting GVN fully appointed and firmly established continues to point to original schedule. We will need to keep in close touch on this and will welcome your views at any time. Rusk
398. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 2, 1964--5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 6:07 a.m. 1368. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 978./2/ From Saigon end of line, the Bien Hoa attack looks quite different from the view set forth in reftel. It was unique as an attack directed specifically against US units and equipment under circumstances unrelated to the day-to-day operations in which our forces take their losses incidental to the discharge of the advisory functions within GVN units. It resembled more the Bay of Tonkin incidents with the exception (1) that the enemy were the VC (whom we hold to be the agents of the NVN) rather than the NVN themselves; (2) the event took place on land rather than on sea; and (3) US forces sustained losses and the enemy escaped unscathed. Finally, it demonstrated a new tactic, the employment of surprise attack by massed mortar fire, with such success that the US B-57 capability in this country was knocked out in about 15 minutes. Hence, we cannot view it as a VC aggression which is merely an improved version of similar past conduct. It is clear that Hanoi also views this as something special and expects something from us. /2/Document 396. So much for the Saigon point of view. I gather that, seen from Washington, the problem is to (1) keep up local morale; (2) get some signal to Hanoi, and (3) review preliminary and preparatory military actions. On the first point, with Saigon leaders beset by the problems of forming a government and with a double holiday with few newspapers published, public reaction has been minimal. Khanh took off for Dalat yesterday after making a press release which understates the actual damage suffered at Bien Hoa. Had he been particularly exercised, he would have contacted me on the subject--which he did not. For the moment, I believe no action needs to be considered purely for impact on local morale. However, if there is no US reaction. our prestige is going to sag both with friend and enemy. With regard to a signal to the North, I could make no suggestion without knowing what thought we wish to convey at this time. I see no overall advantage either for morale or signalling purposes in releasing US aircraft for action against VC. We are missing few, if any, lucrative targets now with our present VNAF/Farmgate force and, by December, the number of operationally available VNAF aircraft will be roughly double the present number by virtue of completion of training of the last of the four A1H squadrons. Meanwhile, the disadvantages cited in pare 4a reftel always with us. To place US battalions at such places as Bien Hoa, Da Nang and Nha Trang is likely to convey message that US intends to continue to limit its actions to SVN and to defensive measures--a note I hope we will not strike. I am not sure what effect the presence of such US units would have on SVN. I am sure that our troops would regard static security mission as pretty inglorious business. On balance, I would recommend against this measure under the circumstances presently in mind. My opinion might be different if we were embarked on an escalating program of pressures against DRV. My views on preliminary and preparatory military actions are contained in pare 6 MAC 12962/3/ which is just being dispatched. /3/Apparently an incorrect reference since MAC 12962 contains only two numbered paragraphs. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXI) Taylor
399. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Washington, November 2, 1964--7 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXI, Cables. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Wheeler. Repeated to the White House and the Department of State. 1470. 1. At high level meeting today/2/ considering possible US courses of action in Southeast Asia, thought was expressed that appropriate response to Bien Hoa attack is in order but such response need not be immediate. However, another similar VC attack would require immediate action by US forces possibly on the order of 1B of CINCPAC Frag Order 3./3/ Request that you ensure readiness of your forces to mount such an operation expeditiously. /2/The meeting took place at 1 p.m. at the White House and was attended by the President, Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge and William Bundy, and Ball. (Ibid., Johnson Daily Diary and Rusk Appointment Book) For another brief account, see infra. /3/See footnote 4, Document 395. Action 1B provided a secondary list of barracks, ports, and supply depots in North Vietnam for first day strikes. 2. FYI. Concern was voiced as to adequacy of security measures around air bases and other sensitive US installations. CJCS asserted that COMUSMACV has undertaken with South Vietnamese military authorities upgrading of security to extent practicable. 3. Possibility of reducing congestion on South Vietnamese airfields by relocating certain units to airfields in Thailand was discussed informally. The view was expressed that removal of part of US air elements to Thailand might occasion reactions unfavorable to us in both North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Request your comment.
400. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, November 2, 1964--7:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXI, Cables. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Ball. Repeated to CINCPAC. 988. Saigon for MACV. 1. High-level meeting today reaffirmed general positions stated Deptel 978/2/ Initiated intensive planning operation here looking to earliest possible preparation for later decision of comprehensive scenario for wider action taking account of current circumstances and interim actions required avoid any impression USG determination changing. JCS, CIA, Defense and State will be calling for additional inputs as required. Aim is to have analysis of alternatives and relevant scenarios ready soonest. /2/Document 396. 2. While we still inclined against immediate response related solely Bien Hoa attack, we consider possibilities substantial that Hanoi may be embarking on series provocative actions to test our intentions in what they believe may be period USG uncertainty. Assume you are taking all possible measures particularly for security US airfields and other installations. If other incidents occur we would expect immediately to reopen question of quick related response. Rusk
401. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/1/ Saigon, November 3, 1964--8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to the Secretary of State, the White House, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 590-591 251. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref. DEF 1342./2/ In compliance with request of DOD, I submit the following personal comments to JCSM 902-64 dated October 27, 1964./3/ SNIE-53-2-64/4/ is not available in Saigon and hence has not influenced my views. I assume that a political/psychological scenario is being prepared to support the military actions considered in the JCS study. /2/See footnote 5, Document 388. /3/Document 388. /4/Document 368. As indicated in Embtel 465/5/ and elsewhere, I am in complete agreement with the thesis that the deteriorating situation in SVN requires the application of measured military pressures on DRV to induce that government to cease to provide support to VC and to use its authority to cause VC to cease or at least to moderate their depredations. The evidence of increased infiltration cited in Embtel 1135/6/ is one cogent reason for prompt and effective action. The Bien Hoa incident of November 1, 1964 poses an even more pressing requirement for action under the retaliatory principle confirmed in NSAM-314./7/ /5/Document 319. /6/Telegram 1135, October 14, reported that MACV J-2 had evaluated evidence which estimated infiltration at 5,000 men for the first half of 1964. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) /7/Document 345. Embtel 1357/8/ contains the response to the Bien Hoa action which Embassy-MACV recommended. In effect, this recommendation is for retaliation bombing attacks on selected DRV targets by combined US/ VNAF air forces and for a policy statement that we will act similarly in like cases in the future. If this recommendation is not accepted, I would favor intensifying 34-A operations and initiating air operations against selected targets as an interim substitute for more positive measures. /8/Document 393. With regard to the JCS recommendations for the first five courses of action of Appendix A, they are all being implemented now but implementation has been weak in direct proportion to the ineffectiveness of the local government. This situation is not likely to change for the better in time to effect the situation in the short term. The new government in its likely composition appears to have potentialities for improvement but it will be composed largely of men without governmental experience who will have to learn their trade on the job. It will take three to four months under favorable circumstances to get it functioning well. Item 6 is new and I would have trouble in justifying it. It amounts to a departure for no clear gain from the principle that the Vietnamese fight their own war in SVN. Added air strength in-country is not going to have a significant effect on the outcome of the counterinsurgency campaign. Under Appendix B, I see no advantage in resuming DeSoto patrols except for essential intelligence purposes. If we are seeking an excuse for action, it is to our interest to strike Hanoi for its malefactions in SVN and not for actions in the Bay of Tonkin against the US Navy. We need to tie our actions to Hanoi support of the VC, not to the defense of purely US interests. Hence, the excuse for our actions should ideally grow out of events in SVN and Laos. Such events are available for our exploitation now in the form of infiltration activities in Laotian corridor and the DRV, the Bien Hoa incident and the increasing sabotage by the VC of the Saigon-Danang RY. With these provocations already at our disposal, there is no need to seek others in the Tonkin Gulf where the second incident developed in such a way as to reduce our ability to use subsequent episodes as a credible basis for action. Similarly, I see nothing but disadvantage in further stirring up the Cambodian border by implementing hot pursuit. We don't often catch the fleeing VC in the heart of SVN; I see little likelihood of doing better in Cambodia. Sihanouk does not have much in the way of ground forces but a few counter-incursions from his side could be very awkward in requiring the diversion of further ARVN to cover the frontier. We are presently short of trained SVN manpower and need to conserve it for essential purposes. The present unfriendly frontier is much preferable to one actively hostile. With regard to low level reconnaissance probes, they are not needed as signals of intention if, as I hope, we launch forth on a bombing program, overt or covert, against the North. In the latter case, low level recce should be flown only to meet bona fide intelligence needs. Actions 7, 8, and 10 I tend to view as a package for concurrent implementation. In the aggregate, these actions constitute an attack on a coherent target system all of which may need to be progressively destroyed if infiltration is to be checked. It is another road to reach Hanoi which should be traveled in parallel with the one which arrives by way of reprisal bombing. At some point, both would probably merge into a single pressure vector on the DRV. As a final word, it is well to remind ourselves that "too much" in this matter of coercing Hanoi may be as bad as "too little". At some point, we will need a relatively cooperative leadership in Hanoi willing to wind up the VC insurgency on terms satisfactory to us and our SVN allies. What we don't want is an expanded war in SEA and an unresolved guerrilla problem in SVN. Taylor
402. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Honolulu, November 3, 1964--5:53 p.m. /1/Source, Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 12009. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to COMUSMACV, four other Pacific commands, and readdressed to the White House and Department of State on November 4. 040353Z. A. JCS 001470 DTG 022200Z, B. State 978 to Saigon./2/ /2/Documents 399 and 396, respectively. 1. A basic consideration in formulating a reply to RSS [refs] is an evaluation of the significance of the Viet Cong attack on Bien Hoa. I question the evaluation expressed in pare 1 of Ref B. The VC have had the capability to strike at Bien Hoa for some time. They have the capability to make a similar attack on Danang and probably Tan Son Nhut. There are other major U.S. targets in South Vietnam which are at least as vulnerable to attack as Bien Hoa. For example, the Starcomm facility near Saigon is extremely vulnerable to mortar attack and its loss would disrupt our communications in Southeast Asia. Viet Cong have not attacked a major U.S. installation prior to this because they were fearful of U.S. retaliation. There is ample evidence to indicate that they expected retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack. This attack then was a major decision in HQ but on the course where the insurgency should follow. [sic] I believe, therefore, that the VC now realize that they have been able to launch a successful and very damaging attack on U.S. forces without retaliation. We must assume then that they will be encouraged to mount attacks on other installations in the near future. The VC may delay attacking other installations until the furor from the last attack has died down, but we must be prepared for further attack. 2. COMUSMACV will do all within his power to make air bases and other sensitive U.S. installations secure. However, they are inherently vulnerable, most of them being situated in the midst of populated areas. They can only be secure when there is rigid population control, a measure which must be carried out by the RVN and will take considerable time. Therefore, regardless of the measures we take toward improving security, the bases are vulnerable in the immediate future. 3. Since the air bases in Vietnam are congested, clearly insecure and without dispersal facilities of any kind, we should not expose any more airplanes and American personnel on these bases than are necessary for the immediate mission. Aircraft can be moved readily in and out of RVN as requirements dictate. 4. While it is highly desirable that all forces be iQ place before option 1B is executed, we can initiate a strike with less forces. For example, with one CVA on station off RVN plus the USAF forces now in place in RVN, we can execute option 1B of CINCPAC Frag Order No. 3 but with a considerably less damage level than specified. Within 18 hours all air forces required could be in place. There are several intermediate positions we can assume such as prepositioning F-105s from Kadena to Clark. This reduces air force reaction time to 4 hours after signal is received. If Thai based U.S. forces could be used, this again would improve our capability by 18 F-105s and 10 F-lOOs. The second CVA could be in place in 48 hours. Before any option, other than 1B, is executed, all forces should be in place. [Numbered paragraph 5 (4 lines of source text) not declassified] 6. At present, there are two CVAs stationed off South Vietnam and a third one will arrive in the area on 6 November. It is not desirable to maintain this posture for very long unless we intend to launch heavy air strikes. 7. Lesser actions than option 1B of CINCPAC Frag C)rder No. 3 can be mounted at any time. For example, target no. 36, Vit Thu Lu bks; Target no. 33, Dong Hoi bks; target no. 24, Chanh Hoa bks or target no. 39, Chap Le bks could be attacked effectively with continued strikes from the forces normally in place, with or without assistance from VNAF and Farmgate. 8. If we are not to make a retaliatory attack stronger than option 1B of CINCPAC Frag Order No. 3 in the near future, we should: a. Release Bonhomme Richard to return to waters off Japan. b. Reduce the requirements to one CVA off South Vietnam with a second stationed in the South China Sea, so as to reinforce within 48 hours. c. Not further augment Air Force forces in South Vietnam. d. Release Marine battalions at Okinawa to their normal state of readiness.
403. Editorial Note Following the meeting with the President on November 2 (see Documents 399 and 400), William Bundy was asked to chair a working group to review U.S. policy on Vietnam. Sometimes called the NSC Working Group and at other times the Executive Committee or Excom, the group comprised officers at the Assistant Secretary level including Vice Admiral Lloyd M. Mustin, Senior Operations Officer of the JCS; Harold Ford, Senior China-Asia Officer at CIA; John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and McGeorge Bundy from the White House. The first meeting took place on November 3 and, based on the discussion, William Bundy drafted a Project Outline. This outline presented nine topics for which various members of the working group were responsible. Section I, "Situation in South Vietnam," was to be prepared by the intelligence community, while Sections II and III, "U.S. Objectives and Stakes in South Vietnam" and "Southeast Asia and the Broad Options," were to be prepared by William Bundy assisted by CIA and JCS papers already drafted on these topics. Under Section III, Bundy presented three options: "A. Continue on present lines. "B. Present policies plus a systematic program of military pressures against the north, meshing at some point with negotiation, but with pressure actions to be continued until we achieve our central present objectives. "C. Present policies plus additional forceful measures and military moves, followed by negotiations in which we would seek to maintain a believable threat of still further military pressures but would not actually carry out such pressures to any marked degree during the negotiations." Section IV, "Alternative Forms of Negotiation," was to be drafted by the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State assisted by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Section V analyzed Option A and was put aside in the beginning. The JCS and Department of Defense were tasked with drafting an analysis of Option B (Section VI), while Section VII, an analysis of Option C, was deferred until the papers for Sections VI and VII were ready. Section VIII, "Immediate Actions in the Period Prior to Decision," was to be done by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs at the Department of State with the implication that it might not be included in whatever paper was finally devised. Section IX would present the conclusions and recommendations and would be done at the very end. For full text of the Project Outline, see Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume III, pages 588-590. On the following day, November 3, Bundy revised the Project Outline, providing details for some of the sections, adding a new Section VIII, "Actions in Reference to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand," which he would prepare, and renumbering Sections VIII and IX of the first Project Outline as IX and X in the revised draft. (Department of State, Bundy Files, Working Papers, November 1964, Vol. I; published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 002148) In the following two weeks, the working group met frequently to consider the various drafts of individual sections and to comment on proposals raised by the participating agencies. At a meeting on November 7 at 11 a.m., it discussed the preliminary drafts and Ball's October 5 memorandum (see Document 370). By November 17, Bundy had completed a 100-page draft which considered all aspects of the Project Outline and a 20-page summary of this larger draft. Further consideration of these documents is presented in the documentation that follows.
404. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 6, 1964--9 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, London, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 10:53 a.m. 1414. Following is offered as preliminary assessment of new government in context general political situation, in full recognition its policies and programs as yet only broadly outlined in PriMin Huong's presentation before High National Council. Promulgation of provisional charter and election of Pham Khac Suu as Chief of State and Tran Van Huong as PriMin represent major stage in political evolution which was sparked by popular reaction to Khanh's promulgation of Vung Tau charter in mid-August and followed by dramatic deterioration in governmental authority in late August and September. We hope it also represents beginning, albeit slow and painful, of mending of SVN's battered body politic. Looking back over month it is indeed remarkable that decisions taken by MRC in late August to return power to civilian govt have in large measure been adhered to so far. That they have is attributable in part to negative factors: 1) widespread fear of recurrence of August mob violence; 2) temptation of Khanh and military leaders generally to let civilian govt make mess of running country to show Vietnamese people that only military are capable of directing country at this grave juncture; and 3) growing concern at rapid deterioration in security situation. Embassy also actively encouraged support for this first effort in recent Vietnamese history to arrive at a consensus on a govt by an orderly process of consultation among reasonably representative groups. However, more positive and commendable factors can also be found: civilians whom military charged with drafting provisional charter and selecting Chief of State and PriMin accepted their heavy responsibilities and, despite frequent waverings and evidence of timidity, performed creditably under strong diverse pressures. Moreover, despite Khanh's temptation, and indeed efforts, to discredit High National Council, in end he correctly read danger signals which these tactics produced and decided wisest course of action for present was to return to military and wait for more auspicious opportunity to retake power. Finally, religious leaders and "out" politicians, also reluctant to see recurrence of demonstrations and violence, were willing to give High National Council a chance, despite its lack of broad popular base. Thus, on first anniversary of Diem regime's demise, political prospects are at least faintly encouraging. However, it is premature to judge whether present situation is only breather in political turbulence or whether in fact workable political solution has been found. Following factors contribute to present clouded crystal ball: 1) Pham Khac Suu is widely respected and well regarded among Southerners as long-standing revolutionary against French and antiDiem oppositionist. However, both general popular acceptance of him as Chief of State and his effectiveness in that position likely to be tempered by fact his years of prison have left him with little dynamism and in ill health. 2) Tran Van Huong, while not enjoying the great reputation Suu does, is also respected as honest, hardworking man. Like Suu, however, he is not well man (has heart condition), and same reservations apply to him that apply to Suu in this regard. Encouraging indicator is Suu's claim that Huong appointment was subject to wide consultation among major groups (religious, military, political) and that Huong is acceptable to all. 3) Team that Huong has collected around him is made up of men with reputations for honesty and competence. They are in large part, however, not political figures but men with professional or civil service experience, and are likely to be criticized soon by "out" politicians as technicians without stature (like Minh-Tho govt). Many politicians and qualified technicians were reluctant to accept positions in new govt which they believed would have only short life span. Another reservation is new govt's predominantly Southern complexion--whether Northern refugees and center populace will sit still for this for long remains to be seen (criticism in this view [vein] already being heard). 4) Power balance in military establishment is confused at present. Buddhist-led violence in August and unsuccessful Sept 13 coup attempt provided Khanh with opportunity to rid himself and army of virtually [all] remaining potential competitive leadership factions, and brought to fore new military leadership group ("Young Turks") which since mid-Sept have been generally loyal to him. However, High National Council's ninth-inning switch to Pham Khac Suu left General Minh with no place to go except back to army and into competition with Khanh. (Minh had been mentioned most likely candidate for Chief of State in the early maneuvering within the High National Council.) This combined with Khanh's earlier surprise move in reintegrating Dalat Generals back into army, may have created potential sources of friction within military. There are already reports that Young Turks resent return of Dalat Generals. Problem of Minh is at least temporarily postponed by his decision to take a trip abroad. 5) In drafting provisional charter and electing Chief of State, High National Council members have shown themselves vulnerable to pressures from many quarters and suffering in many cases from personal political ambition and rivalries. Whether these centrifugal tendencies can be controlled and HNC can continue momentum toward selection of national assembly remains to be seen. Close personal relations between several members of HNC and Suu and Huong are favorable factors. 6) Buddhists are in somewhat precarious state. Split between Tri Quang and Tam Chau factions has waxed and waned during month, but at month's end both factions opposed Khanh's retention of premiership. Since beginning of Nov, however, there have been growing number of reports that Buddhists displeased that Huong selected instead of Nhut. Most gratifying Buddhist development has been firm anti-Communist statements made publicly both by Tam Chau and Tri Quang, although there were undoubtedly internal tactical considerations which played part in issuance such statements. 7) Working relationship between Suu and Huong also a question mark. High National Council has made clear in public statements that intent was to create symbolic, ceremonial Chief of State, leave PriMin as action officer of govt. Provisional charter is unfortunately not quite so clear and leaves Chief of State with major powers which if wielded by an ambitious man, might bring him into conflict with PriMin. Essential, therefore, in the interests of smooth governmental operation that both Suu and Huong on same wave length. Taylor
405. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 6, 1964--9 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, Vientiane, Bangkok, and CINCPAC. Received at 2:06 p.m. 1416. CINCPAC for POLAD. I saw Huong at 1700 today at his request. First DepPriMin Vien also present. Huong had nothing pressing to discuss and our conversation was in the nature of a progress report on his part. Huong said that his govt was now fully inslalled, he personally had assumed duties of MinDefense this morning. While he had not had benefit of a thorough briefing on military situation from General Khanh and the military, they had covered high spots this morning. Huong hopes to have detailed military briefing when Khanh returns in a few days from his two-day trip to Camau. With some prompting from me, Huong referred to reports of Buddhist dissatisfaction with his govt and to rumors that students might demonstrate tomorrow. Huong dismissed Buddhist complaints as being their traditional maneuver to attempt to obtain Buddhist ministers who could serve as their "eyes and ears" inside the govt. He anticipated continued pressure from certain Buddhist factions but did not appear deeply concerned. With regard to the students, he indicated that he had already issued orders that the police and the military are to maintain law and order. He showed a quiet determination not to knuckle under to pressure from these quarters. Huong said that Council of Ministers had met today to discuss short-term objectives and programs--those which could be completed by end of year. Vien said that each Ministry had been charged with preparing a statement of short-term and long-term objectives for discussion by the Council of Ministers next Wednesday, Nov 11. I mentioned that we were going through a similar exercise on US side. Vien said govt would be in a position to discuss these objectives and programs with us the following Friday. Huong commented that goals should be realistic and people fully aware of what the govt intends to do and what will be accomplished. Huong commented that his govt was composed of men who were honest and dedicated to the good of country and would form a good team. While he did not underestimate size of the task, he believed that with US assistance substantial progress could be made. Huong discounted importance of resignation of Chu,/2/ Vice President of the High National Council, noting that Chu had personally requested him to accept resignation from position on two occasions and had warmly supported his investiture by the High National Council. He characterized Chu's action and those of Quat and Tran Van Do as last minute efforts for their own partisan political reasons to embarrass him in the formation of a govt. In this connection I noted heavy burden placed upon High National Council in months ahead and fact that the effective membership of this body had been reduced to about a dozen people. I inquired whether it would be feasible to increase membership of the Council in order spread the burden and render it more representative. Vien replied that enabling decrees establishing the Council made no provision for increasing its size. nor even for replacing individuals who resign or were incapacitated. However, it was clear that Huong and Vien saw merit in suggestion and will give it further consideration. They also picked up quickly suggestion that a new Chef de Cabinet be found to replace Pham Dang Lam in the of fice of Chief of State Suu. /2/Chu resigned on November 5; Quat and Do chose not to serve at about the same time. Comment: It was evident that Huong and Vien share mutual confidence and trust (almost alien commodities here) and should work well in tandem. Huong is down-to-earth, to the point, and determined (at least at this stage) to steer his own course and not give in to the various pressure groups. Taylor
406. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 6, 1964--9 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, JCS, Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC. 1415. SEACORD met Saigon November 5 and discussed agenda items transmitted to Dept in Saigon's 1290 to Dept info CINCPAC 708./2/ In addition to representatives from Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon, the meeting was attended by representatives of CINCPAC. /2/Dated October 27. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) [1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified] Group reviewed accomplishments of T-28 operations in corridor and post-strike photography has shown serious damage has been done to many installations. It was agreed that this was a generally commendable performance as far as it went, although it appears from post-strike photography that damage on several targets was slight. MACV and Vientiane will exchange info on target photography holdings to resolve current differences in assessments and to obviate those that might arise in the future. Additional T-28's now scheduled for Vientiane will allow photo reconnaissance planes to accompany strike aircraft and eliminate major source of differences. Group also supports Vientiane's need for more T-28 strike aircraft to meet additional requirements now being refined. Requirements for additional aircraft include armed recce. It is anticipated that the RLAF is capable of generating 200 sorties in the Panhandle during the month of November to strike interdiction targets to the degree that close support requirements permit. From a list of 39 targets in the Laos corridor (22 USMACV recommended targets; 17 USAIRA Vientiane targets), the RLAF attacked 13 of the USMACV targets during the period 14 October-2 November. Three additional interdiction targets not on the target list were also attacked at RLAF initiative. Post-strike damage assessment indicates re-strike against 10 of these targets is necessary to achieve the desired 80-90 [%] damage. These re-strikes and initial attacks against 8 other targets on the combined list are currently planned by the RLAF during November and will fully utilize RLAF capability. AmEmbassy Vientiane reports that the RLAF has additional potential corridor targets under study. Cross border operations: unilateral planning for cross border operations both on the US and GVN side has continued in order to minimize the time lag when operations are approved by Washington for implementation. By cable MAJ3 10906 DTG 090015Z/3/ MACV advised that a reevaluation of a starting date would be made when significant changes occurred in the political and military situations inside Vietnam. The cable also advised that it was unlikely that we could contemplate any significant cross border operations prior to January 1, 1965. However, under present conditions it is now estimated that cross border operations under concept set forth in Saigon telegram 913/4/ could begin between 1 December and 1 January in central area if authorization is received 15 days prior to execution. When authority is given to execute cross border operations, the group is still of the unanimous opinion it would be preferable to have no publicity with regard to operational details and no comment made in response to questions and accusations. /3/Not found. /4/Document 346. In addition to renewing recommendation for approval Yankee team strikes against fixed targets, group also discussed additional action that could be taken against increasing scale of VC infiltration through corridor. In this connection group discussed desirability increased US air participation in striking both fixed targets and targets of opportunity in Laos Panhandle. It was recognized that such increased US activity in Laos would raise political problems re US relations with Laos and US posture toward Geneva accords. Various formulae were discussed that might reduce such problems. For example, it was felt consideration could be given to modifying rules of engagement for US aircraft providing CAP and escort for RLAF to permit such aircraft to provide frequent or routine escort for T-28 missions. This would involve additional authorization for US aircraft to retaliate against hostile ground action. Vientiane and Bangkok may wish to submit further views in this regard. There was considerable discussion of the Route 9 improvement concept and general agreement that it deserved further consideration by all three posts with the view of additional discussion at the next meeting. Saigon will transmit by septel,/5/ summary of concepts discussed and suggestions to provide a basis for discussion at the next meeting. /5/Telegram 1434 from Saigon, November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Based on a proposal by General Westmoreland, the group considered the requirement for a military coordinating committee. In view of the political-military composition of the SEACORD committee and in light of experience to date, it was determined that there is no need for a military committee. Experience has indicated that ad hoc military staff back-up to SEACORD deliberations will suffice. Accordingly proposed terms of reference of the military committee/6/ will be withdrawn. The group requests that the matter of a military coordinating committee will be dropped from further consideration. /6/Transmitted in COMUSMACV telegram 191420Z, October 19. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11966) In summary, recommendations are as follows: [Numbered paragraph 1 (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] 2. T-28 operations in corridor. a. MACV and Vientiane exchange info on target photography holdings to resolve current differences in target assessments and to obviate those that might arise in future. Action Saigon and Vientiane. b. Support Vientiane's need for more T-28 strike aircraft to meet additional requirements, including armed recce. Action Washington. 3. Cross border operations can now begin between 1 Dec-1 Jan in central area 15 days after Washington authorization. Action Washington. 4. Yankee Team strikes. a. Renewed recommendation for approval of Yankee Team strikes against fixed targets. Action Washington. b. Desirability increased US air participation in striking both fixed targets and targets of opportunity in Laos Panhandle. This would involve additional authorization for US aircraft to retaliate against hostile ground action. Action Vientiane and Washington. It was agreed that the next meeting will be held December 2-3. Taylor
407. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, November 8, 1964--1:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bundy and Forrestal and cleared in substance with Rusk. 1034. For Ambassador from Secretary. Our working group is intensively preparing alternatives for action. The present high-level tendency, not yet discussed at highest levels, is to adopt an immediate program, extending for 4-6 weeks, of a clearly tougher public and private stance accompanied by somewhat expanded actions within present policy, including reprisals against any repetition of spectacular VC action in the south along the lines of the Bien Hoa attack. Concurrently, we would propose to decide very soon that, if such an immediate program does not produce a change in Hanoi behavior, we would initiate in January a program of slowly graduated military actions against the North in conjunction with negotiating moves in which we would seek throughout to keep alive a clear threat of additional action if the Communist side does not modify its position./2/ Such a course of action would be less drastic than the programs sometimes suggested in the past of full and relentless attacks on the ninety-four targets and inflexible insistence that we would negotiate only on a basis of full acceptance of our maximum objectives. /2/The Working Group met at 11 a.m. on November 7 to consider among other things a McNaughton paper, "Action for South Vietnam," 3d draft (ibid., Bundy Files, Working Papers, Nov 1964, Vol. I; printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 601-604) and a William Bundy paper, "Immediate Actions Over the Next Few Weeks," both dated November 7. The position elaborated here is a summary of Bundy's paper. No record of the Working Group's meeting has been found, but it is referred to in a covering note to the McNaughton draft and in Rusk's Appointment Book. The above is for your personal information. We would particularly welcome your own planning thoughts for possible use. As to timing, we hope to have useful papers to send to you urgently about the middle of this week. Thereafter, we are tentatively thinking in terms of you and Admiral Sharp returning here about November 19 for consultation, during which we expect to arrive at a government decision firmly laying out the immediate program and deciding on our long-range course of action. A key element in either the immediate program or the long-range course of action will be the nature of our discussions with the GVN. Sullivan has impressed on us the seriousness of SVN doubts as to US intentions, and this may suggest your taking up whole question with Huong, Khanh, or others even before you return and we reach final decisions. More basically, we believe no course of action can succeed unless we are able to stiffen the GVN to set its house in order and take every possible measure for political stability and to push forward the pacification program. This point too might be made in the immediate future by you, to be followed by even more specific and firm discussions after the decision is taken. We would particularly appreciate your comments on these two points. Rusk
408. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 9, 1964--7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1-1 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) 1440. CINCPAC for POLAD. This is a U.S. Mission cable. Ref. A-337, October 30, 1964./2/ It is apparent that the next few months will be critical to the success of the new government and to our efforts to bring about some degree of stabilization in the internal political situation of SVN. The members of this government are generally inexperienced in public life and have never worked together as a team. It is the consensus of the Mission Council that under favorable circumstances it will require three to four months to get this government to function with any degree of effectiveness. By that time an assembly may have been formed and unless its performance has been acceptable in SVN eyes the government will face the hazard of removal. /2/This airgram transmitted a paper entitled "Action Program for Vietnam," which proposed political, economic and social, military, and psychological programs which the United States might undertake with the new South Vietnamese Government. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 1-1 VIET S) To avoid waste of effort in uncoordinated activity, it is essential for the government to establish a series of short-term objectives which are reasonably attainable and which, if attained, will provide a point of departure from which we can later undertake more ambitious projects, military and civilian, inside and outside SVN. Such subsequent projects would include combined and increased military political-economic pressure on DRV, intensification of the in-country anti-VC effort, expansion of force goals for military and police forces, and the initiation of medium-term economic, social and psychological programs. For planning purposes, we are taking February 1, 1965 as the target date for the short-term objectives (Annex 1). However, we are in doubt as to the feasibility of even approaching these objectives without finding some means in the immediate future for sustaining morale and encouraging a despondent country grown tired of the strains of the counterinsurgency struggle. We have only one reasonably certain way to provide this stimulant--by military actions (we are thinking primarily of air strikes) against the DRV which will do damage to the sources of VC strength along the infiltration routes and to a limited degree in NVN itself. For maximum morale effect, the existence and results of these actions need to be known, at least in part, in SVN. Furthermore, some U.S. participation is required to impart sense of U.S. willingness in future to share in necessary action to stop DRV support and direction of VC. (This also important as corresponding signal to Hanoi.) It is a delicate matter, however, to execute such operations because of the danger of premature escalation at a time when the new government is inadequate to provide leadership to the country and to use its resources to contain the probable VC-DRV reaction which might result from any significant air campaign against DRV. Our partial solution to this dilemma is to introduce into the short term military program an expansion of 34-A operations to include limited air strikes against North, an intensification of the actions against infiltration targets in the Laotian corridor, and reprisal strikes for major VC depredations as required. There are presently only 10 qualified VNAF pilots available for such covert air strikes so that their scope would necessarily be limited. Our thought is that the Laotian Air Force should continue to play the leading part in air attacks in the corridor but we would get agreement for increased U.S. participation from Souvanna in order to indicate the U.S. commitment needed to encourage the GVN, as well as perhaps the RLG. (Some thoughts on this were contained in Embtel 1415/3/ reporting on last SEACORD meeting.) /3/Document 406. Since the new Cabinet is already at work on short-term objectives, I propose to make suggestions at once to Huong and Vien, along the lines of Annex 1, for inclusion in their programs. I would like authority as soon as possible to discuss the short-term military program (expanded 34-A, attacks in corridor, reprisal air strikes) with Huong, Vien and Khanh to obtain their reaction. Depending on their response, it may be desirable to indicate the broadened pressure program against the North which we are willing to consider after the government has made adequate progress. Throughout this scenario, it must be recognized that the GVN may well not make what could be considered even reasonable progress, and that we may be forced even between now and February 1 to make the hard choice as to whether we should undertake the broadened pressure program against the DRV in the face of a deteriorating situation in SVN Annex 1 Program Objectives To Be Reached by February 1, 1965
1. Establish effective articulation of GVN/US agencies for optimum cooperation; action in this field to include establishment of a war cabinet to meet weekly with the U.S. Mission Council; the organization of a Ministerial Council of Economic and Financial Affairs to mesh with USOM organization; joint programming at ministerial levels in the military, economic, social, administrative and information fields. 2. Review governmental organization with a view to streamlining. Consideration to be given to a reduction or regrouping of Ministries and to the establishment of a Bureau of the Budget reporting to the Prime Minister. 3. Develop and initiate a national information plan as a means of improving communication between the GVN and its people.
1. Bring the armed forces to authorized strength. 2. Review performances of key commanders, replacing the incompetent and stabilizing the remainder. 3. Bring all units to full combat effectiveness. 1. Fill up the police to targeted strength. 2. Clarify the police mission and elevate its prestige. 3. Give the police a strong commander. 4. Clarify police powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation. 1. Complete the first phase of Hop Tac and be ready to pass into the second phase. 2. Review performance of province chiefs, replacing the incompetent and stabilizing the remainder. 3. Review the vital functions of corps commanders. 4. Carry out a sanitary clean-up of Saigon. 5. Initiate a program for the improvement of the port of Saigon and the Saizon River channel. 6. Institute measures to effect population and resources control with emphasis on Hop Tac area. Taylor
409. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 10, 1964--1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) 1445. For the Secretary from Ambassador Taylor. Ref: A. Deptel 1034. B. Embtel 1440./2/ Reference A was received just before dispatch of Reference B which, I believe, goes far toward meeting your request for our planning thoughts for use in the development of your papers. As I read Reference A, you would appear to be considering something like the short-term military program of Reference B for the period roughly from end November until January. At that time, we would move into an overt series of graduated military actions combined with political pressures-generally speaking, the "subsequent projects' mentioned in the second paragraph of Reference B. /2/Documents 407 and 408. We have had a great deal of discussion here as to the minimum level of government required to justify mounting military pressures against the North. I would describe that minimum government as one capable of maintaining law and order in the urban areas, of securing vital military bases from VC attacks, and gearing its efforts with those of the USG. As Reference B indicates, we do not expect such a government for three to four months-perhaps not then if the current attempts to chip away at the Huong government continue. Question: Do we withhold all action against the DRV (except those of the morale sustaining type) until we get this minimum government? What if we never get it? My own answer would be that it is highly desirable to have this kind of minimum government before accepting the risks inherent in any escalation program. However, if the government falters and gives good reason to believe that it will never attain the desired level of performance, I would favor going against the North anyway. The purpose of such an attack would be to give pulmotor treatment for a government in extremis and to make sure that the DRV does not get off unscathed in any final settlement. In the final paragraph of Reference A, it is suggested that I might take up this question of direct action against the DRV with Huong, Khanh and others before I return and before the USG reaches final decision. I do not see how I could do this except in the most general terms until we know ourselves what we intend to do. I have already suggested vaguely to Khanh and Huong that we could give consideration to various new courses of action once a reliable government is established. With regard to stiffening the GVN to set its household in order and to press for political stability and the proper execution of the pacification program, I know of no words of eloquence or of persuasion which have not been tried in the past. At the moment the problem is not so much with the government, which means well, as with major outside groups such as some Buddhists, Catholics and politicians who refuse to give it support and are trying to tear it down before it even has a chance. Quat's refusal to serve in the government is symptomatic of this attitude. We have gone so far as to suggest that this government may represent the last chance for a common victory. I point to articles in the American press showing clearly that the American people are becoming impatient with the politicking in Saigon with enemy at the gates of the city. My Vietnamese listeners never argue back but sadly acquiesce in the validity of such judgments. Unfortunately, they do not know how to remedy the situation, except at some damage to what they feel are their personal interests, and for all too many Vietnamese this is unthinkable. Nevertheless we cannot abandon this enterprise. In spite of their inability yet to find a way of governing themselves, there is still much on which to build in the way of an individually capable and courageous people who do not want to be run by the North. There is also a surprising amount of vitality and resiliency in the country as a whole which remain generally unaffected by the political turmoil in Saigon. Thus we must hang on, doing our best in the hope that out of this welter some real leadership will eventually emerge, and play for the breaks. Taking the initiative against the North is one way to force the breaks. In summary, the approach which I would like to make now to the GVN is that contained in the final paragraph of Reference B. We shall be very much interested in receiving your draft papers when they are ready. Taylor
410. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 14, 1964--10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 10 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 000533. 1502. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref: Deptel 1065; Embtel 1490./2/ As indicated in Embtel 1490, floods in central provinces constitute a serious disaster but, to the eye, are not comparable to the 1961 flood in the Mekong Delta. I saw latter at its height and recommended that US logistic units with combat support be brought into SVN for flood relief operations. This recommendation was not accepted and proved to be unnecessary as the flood waters drained rapidly and the area was restored within a few months by GVN with USOM assistance. This experience leads me to doubt necessity for additional US logistic or combat forces by reason of the present floods. Such units would make no direct contribution to alleviate conditions of human misery which can best be made by local relief organizations backed by US supplies and transport. They could, however, expedite the restoration of the many washed out highway bridges, particularly along Route 1, and could also be of assistance in reopening the railroad although the latter has suffered more from VC sabotage than from the flood. /2/Telegram 1065, November 12, asked for Taylor's comments on the political implications of introducing U.S. military engineering and logistic forces to help alleviate conditions in the flooded central provinces. (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8; published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 001257) Telegram 1490, November 13, reported that Taylor had taken Huong on an aerial reconnaissance of the flooded provinces and noted that relief organizations seemed to be coping well with the problem. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 10 VIET S) The question is whether this accelerated repair of communications is worth the introduction of additional US logistic forces which in all probability would require US combat troops in some numbers to provide close protection. Apart from expediting the restoration of communications, our willingness to bring in a new form of military support would undoubtedly be a source of encouragement for the Government and people of SVN. On the other hand, it could also suggest that the US is prepared to take over more of the responsibilities of GVN, and hence temper local initiative. As US troops are certain to be the target of VC harassment, we can expect increased casualties resulting from this further increase of the US presence which in numbers already threatens to exceed the ceiling estimates of a few months ago. Weighing these pros and cons in the light of present knowledge, I would advise against these additional US forces. I would, however, recommend using this situation as a means of trying to obtain third country military engineer aid largely for bridge repair on the lines of communications damaged by the flood. An Asian third country contribution for this purpose has all of the advantages and none of the disadvantages cited above. Among the countries which might be approached are the Philippines, Korea, Australia and Taiwan, where the retired services engineering administration is reportedly a highly skilled servicemen's organization capable of the technical work we have in mind. Given about two more days to survey the bridgebuilding requirement, we will be able to indicate the size and type of help which might be sought from third country sources. We would appreciate knowing the Department's reaction to this suggestion./3/ /3/The Department of State responded later in the day that its reaction to the suggestion of third country assistance was favorable, and urged Taylor to encourage the South Vietnamese Government to issue a call to which third countries might respond. (Telegram 1085 to Saigon; ibid.; published in Declassified Documents, Z988, 001259) Taylor
411. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ JCSM-955-64 Washington, November 14, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, Working Papers, Nov 1964, Vol. IV JCS. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. This memorandum has been prepared as a result of the meeting in the White House on 2 November 1964/2/ on this subject at which an examination in detail was requested of the possible Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)/Communist China (CHICOM) military reactions to US air strikes against North Vietnam. The examination is contained in six Appendices/3/ to this memorandum which include an analysis of the threat and possible enemy reactions, our response to such reactions, and the preparatory measures which we should undertake prior to mounting an attack so that we could defer a CHICOM response or, failing that, respond in a timely effective fashion to any enemy initiative. This memorandum summarizes the examination in the Appendices. The underlying objective remains that of causing the DRV to cease supporting and directing the insurgencies in RVN and Laos. /2/See Documents 399 and 400. /3/None printed. Included among the six appendices (lettered A-F) were CINCPAC Operations Plan 32-64, "Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia" (Annex A to Appendix C), and CINCPAC Operations Plan 39-65, which dealt with responses to Chinese aggression (Annex B to Appendix C). 2. On 4 November 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by memorandum, JCSM-933-64,/4/ formalized their recommendations made orally to you on 1 November 1964 in relation to the mortar attack on US forces at Bien Hoa Airfield, South Vietnam, which occurred on 1 November 1964. The specific actions recommended at that time are repeated here. Although these actions were recommended for the attack on Bien Hoa, they comprise an option equally applicable and available for immediate implementation in the event of other serious provocations in Southeast Asia. /4/See footnote 3, Document 395. "a. Within 24-36 hours, Pacific Command (PACOM) forces take initial US military actions as follows: "(1) Conduct air strikes in Laos against target #3 (Tchepone Barracks, Northwest), #4 (Tchepone Military Area), #19 (Ban Thay Military Area), #8 (Nape Highway Bridge), and the Ban Ken Bridge on Route 7. "(2) Conduct low-level air reconnaissance of infiltration routes and of targets in North Vietnam south of Latitude 19 degrees. "b. Prior to air attacks on DRV, land the Marine Special Landing Force at Da Nanz and airlift Army or Marine units from Okinawa to the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut/Bien Hoa area, to provide increased security for US personnel and installations. "c. Use aircraft engaged in airlift (subparagraph b, above) to assist in evacuation of US dependents from Saigon, to commence concurrently with the daylight air strikes against the DRV (subparagraph d, below). "d. Assemble and prepare necessary forces so that "(1) Within 60 to 72 hours, 30 B-52s from Guam conduct a night strike on DRV target #6 (Phuc Yen Airfield). "(2) Commencing at first light on the day following (1) above, PACOM air and naval forces conduct air strikes against DRV targets #6 (Phuc Yen Airfield) (daylight follow-up on the above night strike), #3 (Hanoi Gia Lam Airfield), #8 (Haiphong Cat Bi Airfield), #48 (Haiphong POL), and #49 (Hanoi POL). "(3) Concurrently with subparagraph (2) above, the VNAF will strike DRV target #36 (Vit Thu Lu Barracks). "(4) Combat Air Patrols (CAP), flak suppressive fire, strike photographic reconnaissance, and Search and Rescue (SAR) operations are conducted as appropriate. "(5) The above actions are followed by: "(a) Armed reconnaissance on infiltration routes in Laos. "(b) Air strikes against infiltration routes and targets in DRV. "(c) Progressive PACOM and SAC strikes against the targets listed in the 94 Target Study./5/ /5/See footnote 7. Document 331. "e. Thai bases be used as necessary in connection with the foregoing, with authority to be obtained through appropriate channels." 3. In addition to the deployments and actions above, there are additional actions which should be taken at the time of decision to improve capabilities to conduct the program of air strikes against the DRV. These actions include the deployment from the CONUS to the Southeast Asia area of two additional USAF tactical fighter squadrons and additional tactical reconnaissance and tanker capability, as well as bringing the attack carriers in the area to a total of three. (Appendix A hereto treats the actions in more detail.) No significant logistic or transportation deficiencies are anticipated in carrying out the attacks against the targets listed in the 94 Target Study. 4. An analysis of the enemy threat and possible enemy courses of action is contained in Appendix B. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the DRV and the CHICOMs will make every effort through propaganda and diplomatic moves to halt US attacks directed against North Vietnam. Although the DRV will take all actions to defend itself, the DRV and CHICOMs would be unlikely to expand the conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that Communist China would be very reluctant to become directly involved in the fighting in Southeast Asia lest this be taken by the United States as a cause for major retaliation against the Chinese mainland. However, as the severity of US attacks against the DRV increases, the CHICOMs would feel an increased compulsion to take some dramatic action to counter the impact of the US pressures. This CHICOM response may take the form of the deployment of ground forces into northern Laos, ostensibly at the invitation of the Pathet Lao, or some similar action short of direct confrontation with US forces. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese Communists probably would not openly engage US forces unless they felt it was necessary to prevent collapse of the communist regime in North Vietnam. Therefore, there would not be high risk of the introduction of large-scale Chinese ground/air force combat units unless major US/GVN ground units had moved to occupy areas of the DRV or communist-held territory in northern Laos, or unless the Chinese had committed their air or naval power and had subsequently suffered attacks on CHICOM air force bases in China. Nevertheless, there is always a chance that Peiping might intervene either for reasons that seem irrational to us or because they miscalculated the objectives of US moves and US resolve to remain in the area. The probability that the CHICOMs would engage US aircraft over North Vietnam would increase in proportion to the number and severity of the attacks and the closeness with which they approached the CHICOM border. Direct CHICOM military intervention would call for US military operations against mainland China. 5. An analysis of nine possible enemy courses of action and appropriate US/allied responses thereto including objectives, forces, deployments, and timing where feasible is contained in Appendix C. The salient conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is that the United States and its allies can deal adequately with any course of action the DRV and/or CHICOMs decide to pursue. 6. Appendix D contains preparatory actions for the deployment of forces, proposed preliminary logistic authorizations, and the alerting of forces necessary to deal with large-scale communist aggression. 7. A study of the logistic capability to support US/allied military undertakings in response to enemy reactions is contained in Appendix E. Bottlenecks and shortfalls of logistics and personnel are identified in Appendix F. There are no significant logistic, transportation, or personnel problems short of those required to deal with the upper scale of action within the DRV/CHICOM capability. When approaching full implementation of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64, Phase IV, and to a lesser extent in Phase III thereof and in CINCPAC OPLAN 39-65, deficiencies begin to occur. These require some mobilization consisting primarily of Air Force reserve transportation units and Army reserve combat service support units and the extension of terms of active duty service. However, it is improbable that the DRV or Communist China will adopt a course of action requiring full implementation of plans of this magnitude, and in view of the vast preponderance of over-all US strength, risks involved are considered to be more acceptable than the alternatives of continuing the present course or withdrawal from Southeast Asia. 8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff herein be reflected by the Secretary of Defense in the joint State-Defense report being prepared on this subject. b. That the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be forwarded to the President./6/ /6/On November 17, McNamara sent a memorandum to Wheeler stating that he had noted these views and that they would be presented to the President when the Working Group's report was presented. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 381 Southeast Asia) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
412. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ Washington, November 16, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA (Admin) Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret; Personal. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 632-633. Rostow sent a similar, but more extensive memorandum to Rusk on November 23. For text, see ibid., pp. 645-647. SUBJECT Following on our conversation of last night/2/ I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send. /2/No record of this conversation has been found. The signal consists of three parts: a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 Accords; b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded. Four points follow. 1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind: a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures. b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore, the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground, at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out. c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they may be planning a preemptive ground force response to an expected US retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack. 2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to retaliatory attack in the north for continued violations of the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal a shift from the principle involved in the Tonkin Gulf response. This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat. 3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly: a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct [air?] and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required; b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount on the ground; and c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting off China as distinguished from the force in the South China Sea. 4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to land immediately in the Red River Delta, in China, or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.
413. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor) to the President/1/ Saigon, November 17, 1964--8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 1536 from Saigon, which is the source text. According to another copy of telegram 1536, it was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 6:21 p.m. Embtel 1466./2/ Huong's government has survived its second week and, although still under attack by special interest groups, maintains its precarious position, and the fact that it is kept alive lends it slightly more authority. By his refusal to be pressured into changes in his recently announced Cabinet and his use of troops in Saigon over the weekend to restrain student demonstrations, Huong has continued to demonstrate his determination to maintain law and order and not to succumb to minority pressures. Thus far, the factions opposed to some of Huong's Cabinet do not appear able or perhaps willing to force the issue. In the press, in spite of some attacks on the Cabinet, there are numerous moderate voices urging that the Huong government be given a chance. /2/Telegram 1466, November 11, transmitted Taylor's previous weekly report to the President. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) We continue to receive expressions of fear by responsible GVN officials that General Khanh is maneuvering to maintain a position independent of the government and may even be encouraging some of the anti-Huong forces. I have seen no hard evidence of its truth, but in view of Khanh's past behavior, it is not surprising that the suspicion is about. Aside from the continuing political crisis, the government's energies were heavily engaged in dealing with the typhoon disaster in Central Vietnam. Although it now appears the early reports, as is usual in such situations, were very much exaggerated, there is no doubt that at least six provinces in Central Vietnam have suffered severely. The Prime Minister and I surveyed the stricken areas by air on Friday/3/ and were briefed in Danang on the damage and relief efforts. I must say that the Vietnamese response to this challenge has been most encouraging and has produced examples of community spirit which contrast sharply with the lack of national unity which we have been seeing in Saigon. All US agencies are very much involved in assisting the flood relief and I say that their conduct has been exemplary. /3/November 13. On the military and pacification fronts, again there is little to report this week. The floods held down both friendly and enemy activity in the I and II Corps areas. We have reason to hope that the floods may have been relatively more disastrous to the Viet Cong and their exposed supplies than to our side. Elsewhere Viet Cong casualties were high totaling 255 killed in action during the week. There may be some significance in the increase in incidents in the tier of provinces just south of those affected by the flood where in the past the level of Viet Cong activity has always been quite low. Throughout this area, the Viet Cong appear bent on driving a wedge to separate economically the Northern provinces from those of the South. Early in the flood crisis, I was queried from Washington with regard to the need for additional US logistical troops and the combat forces to protect them./4/ I was not inclined to favor such action at that time and now as the estimates of the flood damage diminish, I am quite certain they are not needed. If, as may be possible, outside engineering assistance is eventually needed to help in reconstructing bridges and other engineering works destroyed by the flood, I would hope to receive that aid from third country sources. /4/See footnote 2, Document 410. Taylor/5/ /5/Telegram 1536 bears this typed signature.
414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, November 17, 1964--6:51 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-5 US-VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Forrestal, cleared with William Bundy and the White House, and initialed by Rusk. 1113. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Re Deptel 1074./2/ It has now been decided that you should plan arrive Washington the 26th in order to start intensive, top level meetings on Friday, the 27th./3/ Meeting with President is tentatively scheduled for December 1st. Our thought is that you should arrive early enough on the 26th in order to have as much rest as possible. You may, however, prefer the day of rest in Hawaii, but you can make that decision later. /2/Telegram 1074 to Saigon, November 11, suggested that, subject to his and the President's approval, Taylor return to Washington on November 21. (Ibid.) Since the President's schedule did not coincide with this plan, his return was delayed. /3/This decision was taken at a meeting of the Working Group held at 11:30 a.m. at the Department of State and attended by Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, McCone, William Bundy, McNaughton, and Forrestal. At this same meeting, a 100-page report by the Working Group and a 20-page summary by Bundy were distributed. (Department of State, Bundy Files, Manuscript, ch. 18, p. 10) Regarding the report, see Document 403. Forrestal will be leaving evening Wednesday, November 18th directly for Saigon. You can, on the basis of his report to you, decide on makeup of small group to accompany you. We will make following announcement at noon press briefing here tomorrow unless you see objection: "Ambassador Taylor is scheduled to return to Washington for consultations with the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other government officials, beginning Friday, November 27th. Ambassador Taylor will be here for five or six days." You may wish to confirm this announcement in Saigon Thursday morning your time./4/ /4/On November 18, Taylor cabled that he had no objection to the press release (Telegram 1537 from Saigon; Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-5 US-VIET S) We are looking forward to seeing you. Regards. Rusk
415. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 18, 1964--9 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 10:10 a.m. 1550. CINCPAC for POLAD. Yesterday, November 17, I sent Prime Minister Huong a letter proposing methods for integrating U.S. Mission efforts with his new government (text of letter being dispatched by airgram)./2/ I called today to find out his reaction to the letter and to discuss other related matters. /2/Not found. His first words were to express regret over the bombing incident at the Tan Son Nhut restaurant at noon today which caused 18 U.S. casualties. He then added words of thanks for the quick response of the USS Princeton in bringing relief supplies from Hong Kong. With regard to the letter and its proposals, he indicated that he was discussing the matter with Deputy Prime Minister Vien and some of the Cabinet this evening. He said at first reading he found nothing in it to cause disagreement. He then launched into a discussion of his governmental troubles, particularly those arising from the continuing criticism of minority groups. He classified these groups as generally inconsequential in size and number but later admitted to growing concern over the Buddhist opposition. He feels sure that Tam Chau and many of the leaders of the Buddhist association have neutralist or even Communist backing. He further feels there is some understanding between General Khanh and the Buddhists, mentioning reports that Khanh has said that the Huong government will fall if it alienates the Buddhists. We then discussed Khanh's attitude. I told him that Khanh had repeatedly indicated to me his sincere desire for the success of the Huong government and his intention to support it. Huong added that Khanh's expressed attitude toward him had also been thus but nonetheless he was afraid that Khanh was indulging in maneuvers with the Buddhists. I suggested that he try to pull Khanh more into the inner councils of his government and see whether such treatment might not get him into the family. Huong concedes that the army has responded readily to his requests for reinforcements to deal with the student disorders over last weekend. We discussed the High National Council with which Huong is completely out of patience primarily because of the investigation committee it has set up to examine the composition of his Cabinet. He recognizes this action as a device for keeping alive the criticism of some of his Cabinet members. Huong recognizes the critical importance of the manner [matter?] setting up the national assembly and feels that it should be the prime concern of the High National Council. The latter, as we know, is divided between those who insist on elections and those who would be satisfied with some method of nominating assembly members. Huong is dead against elections as a general method, feeling that they are impossible in some areas and dangerous in others. The primary danger which he sees is the infiltration of neutralists and Communists in the course of the elective process. I told Huong confidentially of my departure date for Washington and restated my need for an immediate discussion with him and some of his ministers with regard to their programs. Washington, I indicated. would have many questions with regard to his hopes and aspirations and I would need his assistance in preparing the answers. He agreed to a meeting probably on Friday/3/ with his principal ministers and I added the suggestion that an additional meeting with him, Vien and Khanh might also be necessary for a discussion of particularly sensitive topics. /3/November 20. At the close of our meeting, I invited him and his Cabinet to a reception on December 7 at my residence to meet with senior American officials of the Mission. He seemed happy to accept. Taylor
416. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Ehrlich) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, November 18, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Courses of Action in Southeast Asia, Book One. Top Secret. SUBJECT Mr. Bundy has circulated the attached papers concerning "courses of action in Southeast Asia" to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone, and General Wheeler./2/ A meeting with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, you, and McGeorge and William Bundy to review these papers is scheduled for next Tuesday. 3 After further meetings next Thursday and Friday, a meeting with the President is scheduled for December 1. /2/No papers were attached to the source text. Regarding the paper Bundy circulated at the November 17 Working Group meeting, see Document 403. /3/November 24. I think that the approach taken in these papers will cause you serious concern. Three "broad options" are considered. First, to "continue present policies of maximum assistance with SVN and limited external actions in Laos and by the GVN coherently against North Viet-Nam;" and, possibly, specific individual reprisal actions. "Basic to this option is the continued rejection of negotiation in the hope that the situation will improve." Second, "present policies plus a systematic program of military pressures against the north, meshing at some point with negotiation, but with pressure actions to be continued until we achieve our central present objectives." Third, "present policies plus additional forceful measures and military moves, followed by negotiations in which we would seek to maintain a believable threat of still further military pressures but would not actually carry out such pressures to any marked degree during the negotiations." These papers conclude with a proposed recommendation to the President that we follow "a program of immediate actions within the next few weeks" and that, "if the Communist side does not respond favorably" to these actions, we adopt the third alternative early next year. The "basic ingredients" of the "immediate actions during the next few weeks" would be: (1) "talking tough;" (2) "vigorous actions within our current policy" including: (a) a strong 34-A MAROPS schedule; (b) continued strong air activity in the Panhandle area of Laos, including at least a few United States armed reconnaissance strikes; (c) continued strong air activity in central Laos; (d) perhaps a DeSoto patrol early in December; and (e) "consider explicit use of US air in South Viet-Nam if a lucrative target appears;" (3) reprisals in the event of future serious incidents; (4) "consultations with the GVN to improve its performance;" and (5) "miscellaneous actions clearly foreshadowing stronger actions." Nowhere in these papers is there a consideration of your proposal for negotiations within the near future and without increased military action (although with the threat of such action). In fact, the first option (to continue present policies) specifically excludes negotiations. Furthermore, although the outline of the papers calls for a separate section concerning "alternative forms of negotiation" no draft of this section was prepared./4/ Rather, "various working papers on negotiations... /5/ have been woven into" the other sections. /4/The paper Bundy circulated on November 17 stated that no paper on Section IV, "Alternative Forms of Negotiation," was included since information on negotiations had been included in Sections V-VII. However, S/P had drafted a paper specifically for Section IV on November 4 and revised it on November 6. Copies of these drafts are in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Vietnam. /5/Ellipsis in the source text. I think there are a number of significant gaps in reasoning and questions unanswered throughout these papers. As we have discussed, the third option is full of dangers-I do not believe that they have received sufficient consideration in these papers. Most serious, however, is the lack of any real analysis of a negotiating track. In my judgment, at the very least, a paper on this track should be prepared as a fourth option. I am particularly concerned because policy proposals like these seem quickly to develop a bureaucratic life of their own unless immediate action is taken. As the attached memorandum from Ben Read states, a noon meeting with the President will be held tomorrow to discuss the schedule outlined in Ben's memorandum as well as other items including Congo policy. As to the schedule, both you and the Secretary will be away on December 1, the proposed date for a meeting with the President to decide which option to adopt. For obvious reasons, I think that the proposed date of the meeting should be changed. TE
417. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, White House, Washington, November 19, 1964, 12:30 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia--Vietnam, 1964 General. Top Secret. Drafted by Thomson on November 24. According to an agenda and list of participants, in addition to those mentioned in this memorandum, Humphrey, McCone, Vance, Ball, and Bromley Smith were present at the meeting. (Johnson Library National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Misc Mtgs, Vol. 1) SUBJECT The Secretary of State reported on the work in process regarding South Vietnam and the timing of the President's consideration of this problem. He noted that Ambassador Taylor would be returning to Washington on the 27th. Mr. Rusk explained that the working group was preparing a full examination of the South Vietnam situation, including its internal and external ramifications: the role of the Viet Cong, of North Vietnam, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and other nations. The working group had examined U.S. objectives and stakes in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, as well as the various contingencies that might arise. The planners had focused on three broad alternatives: first, a negotiated settlement on any basis obtainable; second, a sharp increase of military pressure on North Vietnam which might perhaps lead at some future date to negotiation; and third, an "in between" alternative of increased pressure on North Vietnam but simultaneous efforts to keep open the channels of communication in case the other side was interested in a settlement. These alternatives would be accompanied by attempts to deal with adjacent problems: to diminish Prince Sihanouk's "fever" and to improve our position in Laos. Mr. Rusk stated that we are faced with serious and grave decisions. A first essential is to receive first-hand from Maxwell Taylor his view of the situation in South Vietnam and his judgment as to what we must require of the South Vietnamese themselves. Following such consultations with Taylor, we would plan to submit our recommendations for a thorough review and decision by the President by December 1st. The President asked for a re-statement of the three alternatives. Mr. William Bundy outlined them as follows: Option A: to continue as at present, but to add to our current efforts reprisals against the Viet Cong and North Vietnam for any further "spectaculars" of the Bien Hoa variety; Option B: to apply a "hard/fast squeeze", i.e. a systematic program of attacks of increasing intensity against North Vietnam during which negotiations would not be our immediate goal but would not be ruled out: Option C: to apply a slow, controlled squeeze on North Vietnam in order to bring about negotiations, increasing gradually our present level of operations against the North. Mr. Bundy noted that this third option was a complex and sophisticated alternative that would require a high degree of control. Mr. McGeorge Bundy noted that the Government might profit from the President's guidance at this juncture in one respect. At the working levels the focus of attention was increasingly on Option C. Unless the President indicated otherwise, the present thrust towards C would undoubtedly continue. Mr. McNamara added that although all the planners were indeed leaning toward Option C, work was also well advanced on Option B. Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that work had not advanced on the "devil's advocate" exercise, the preparation of a persuasive case for negotiation and withdrawal under present conditions. Mr. Rusk and Mr. William Bundy responded that the "devil's advocate" exercise had made some progress under Mr. Ball. It was noted, however, that Mr. Ball had been preoccupied with other assignments. Mr. Rusk assured the President that we would not permit irresistible momentum to develop in favor of any one option to the exclusion of the others. Mr. McGeorge Bundy added that while we were inviting Ambassador Taylor to participate in the discussions next week, we were not for the present including the various military figures of our Pacific Command. The President expressed the hope that no firm decisions would be made without participation by the military; he could not face the Congressional leadership on this kind of subject unless he had fully consulted with the relevant military people. Mr. McNamara assured the President that the military were already deeply involved in the planning, that the JCS had been working for weeks on this problem, and that General Wheeler would be present at all the discussions with Ambassador Taylor. The JCS was now preparing written comments on the present working group drafts. Mr. Rusk said that books and papers on Vietnam planning would be sent to Texas during the President's absence from Washington. James C. Thomson, Jr./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
418. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Working Group/1/ Washington, November 21, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, Master Files, Late Nov 1964. Top Secret. Drafted by William Bundy and McNaughton. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 111, pp. 656-666. The first draft of this summary, prepared on November 17 by Bundy (not found), was revised following the November 19 meeting (see supra) and dated November 21. No copy of the full text of the November 21 draft has been found, but the text printed here is the same as that draft except for changes on seven pages, made on November 26. (Memorandum from Bundy to the NSC Working Group; ibid., Working Papers, Nov 1964, Vol. 1) These changes are indicated in footnotes below and were made as a result of the discussion at the Working Group meeting on November 24 (see Document 424). Summary
COURSES OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA I. Intelligence Assessment: The Situation in South Vietnam A. South Vietnam. The political situation remains critical and extremely fragile. The security situation in the countryside has continued to deteriorate. It is possible that the new government in Saigon can improve South Vietnamese esprit and effectiveness, though on the basis of current indications this appears unlikely. It is also possible that GVN determination and authority could virtually give way suddenly in the near future, though the chances seem better than even that.the new GVN can hang on for this period and thus afford a platform upon which its armed forces, with US assistance, can prosecute the war and attempt to turn the tide. Even under the best of circumstances, however, reversal of present military trends will be extremely difficult. B. The VC and the North Vietnamese Role. The basic elements of Communist strength in South Vietnam remain indigenous, but the North Vietnamese (DRY) contribution is substantial and may now be growing. There appears to be a rising rate of infiltration. We believe any orders from Hanoi would in large measure be obeyed by Communist forces in South Vietnam. US ability to compel the DRV to end or reduce the VC insurrection rests essentially upon the effect of US sanctions on the will of the DRV leadership, and to a lesser extent on the effect of such sanction on DRV capabilities. US-inflicted destruction in North Vietnam and Laos would reduce the elements of DRV support and damage DRV/VC morale. It might give the GVN a breathing spell and chance to improve. However, it would almost certainly not destroy DRV capabilities to continue, although at a lessened level. If the DRV did in fact remove wholly its direction and support to the VC, the South Vietnamese could in time probably reduce the VC threat to manageable proportions. But if any DRV "removal" were superficial only, the South Vietnamese probably could not develop the capability to establish and maintain a workable and free government in South Vietnam./2/ /2/According to Bundy's memorandum to the Working Group, Section 1, which comprised pages 1-2 of the summary, was revised following the November 24 meeting. II. US Objectives and Stakes in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia A. US Objectives and the Present Basis of US Action. Behind our policy in South Vietnam and Laos have been three factors, all closely related to our over-all policy of resisting Communist expansion: 1. The general principle of helping countries that try to defend their own freedom against Communist subversion and attack. 2. The specific consequences of Communist control of South Vietnam and Laos on the security of other nations in Asia. 3. The implications worldwide of South Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, Laos as test cases of Communist "wars of national liberation." Essentially, the loss of South Vietnam to Communist control, in any form, would be a major blow to our basic policies. US prestige is heavily committed to the maintenance of a non-Communist South Vietnam, and only less heavily so to a neutralized Laos. Yet we must face the facts that (a) there is some chance that South Vietnam might come apart under us whatever' course of action we pursue; (b) strong military action necessarily involves some risks of an enlarged and even conceivably major conflict in Asia. These problems force us to weigh in our analysis the drawbacks and possibilities of success of various options, including the drawbacks of accepting only the fall-back objectives set forth below. B. Possible Alternate US Objectives. Our fall-back objectives in South Vietnam would be: 1. To hold the situation together as long as possible, so that we have time to strengthen other areas of Asia. 2. To take forceful enough measures in the situation so that we emerge from it, even in the worst case, with our standing as the principal helper against Communist expansion as little impaired as possible. 3. To make clear to the world, and to nations in Asia particularly, that failure in South Vietnam, if it comes, was due to special local factors--such as a bad colonial heritage and a lack of will to defend itself--that do not apply to other nations C. Consequences of Communist Control of South Vietnam. 1. In Southeast Asia. The so-called "domino" theory is over-simplified. It might apply if, but only if, Communist China entered Southeast Asia in force and/or the US was forced out of South Vietnam in circumstances of military defeat. Nonetheless, Communist control of South Vietnam would almost immediately make Laos extremely hard to hold, have Cambodia bending sharply to the Communist side, place great pressure on Thailand (a country which has an historic tendency to make "peace" with the side that seems to be winning), and embolden Indonesia to increase its pressure on Malaysia. We could do more in Thailand and with the British in Malaysia to reinforce the defense of these countries, but the initial shock wave would be great. 2. In Asia Generally. The effects in Asia generally would depend heavily on the circumstances in which South Vietnam was lost and on whether the loss did in fact greatly weaken or lead to the early loss of other areas in Southeast Asia. Nationalist China (shaken already by the Chicom nuclear explosion and the UN membership crisis), South Korea, and the Philippines would need maximum reassurance. While Japan's faith in our military posture and determination might not be shaken, the growing feeling that Communist China must somehow be lived with might well be accentuated. India and Iran appear to be the Asian problem cases outside the Far East. A US defeat could lead to serious repercussions in these countries. There is a great deal we could still do to reassure these countries, but the picture of a defense line clearly breached could have serious effects and could easily, over time, tend to unravel the whole Pacific and South Asian defense structures. 3. In the World at Large. Within NATO (except for Greece and Turkey to some degree), the loss of South Vietnam probably would not shake the faith and resolve to face the threat of Communist aggression or confidence in us for major help. This is so provided we carried out any military actions in Southeast Asia without taking forces from NATO and without generating a wave of "isolationism" in the US. In other areas of the world, either the nature of the Communist threat or the degree of US commitment or both are so radically different than in Southeast Asia that it is difficult to assess the impact. The question would be whether the US was in fact able to go on with its present policies. 4. Summary. There are enough "ifs" in the above analysis so that it cannot be concluded that the loss of South Vietnam would soon have the totally crippling effect in Southeast Asia and Asia generally that the loss of Berlin would have in Europe; but it could be that bad, driving us to the progressive loss of other areas or to taking a stand at some point where there would almost certainly be major conflict and perhaps the great risk of nuclear war./3/ /3/The Joint Staff believes that early loss of Southeast Asia and the progressive unraveling of the wider defense structures would be almost inevitable results of the loss of South Vietnam in any circumstances. [Footnote in the source text.] D. Attitudes of Other Nations Regarding US Actions. 1. Major US Allies. We must maintain, particularly to our key NATO allies, the picture of a nation that is strong and at the same time wise in the exercise of its power. As for France, we are damned either way we go. Both Britain and, to a lesser extent, Germany sympathize in principle with our whole policy of seeking to restrain Communist Chinese expansion, and the British recognize their own specific parallel stake in the closely related problem of Malaysia. All European countries could be affected in their view of the US and their willingness to accept continued US leadership by the way we handle Southeast Asia. Despite the fact that their Far East "experts" tend to believe that Western influence in Asia is on the wane in any case, our key European allies probably would now [not?] understand our applying an additional measure of force to avoid letting the ship sink; but they could become seriously concerned if we get ourselves involved in a major conflict that degraded our ability to defend Europe and produced anything less than an early and completely satisfactory outcome. 2. "Nonaligned" Nations. In these countries, the issue is our continued ability to exert influence on these countries, to keep the peace in and among them, and to keep the waverers from wavering clear over to Communist answers. The "nonaligned" nations, with the possible exception of India, would by and large be opposed to any stronger action we might take. Indeed, they cannot be expected to support any course of action we follow in South Vietnam arid Laos. A program of systematic attacks against the DRV would find many of these nations supporting a condemnatory resolution in the UN. But, as we saw in the Cuban missile crisis, the nonaligned and Afro-Asian nations will accept and even admire and be grateful for actions that achieve the result we want in a strong and wise way. 3. Summary. As for likely foreign reactions to our three possible courses of action in Part III below, it appears that Option A (continue present course indefinitely) would cause no adverse reactions but if it failed it would leave a considerable after-taste of US failure and ineptitude; Option B (fast unyielding pressure) would run major risks of sharply expressed condemnation, which would be erased only if the course of action succeeded quite clearly and in a reasonable time; Option C (progressive pressure-and-talk) would probably be in-between in both respects. III. The Broad Options There are three broad options available to us: A. Option A would be to continue present policies indefinitely: Maximum assistance within South Vietnam, limited external actions in Laos and by the GVN covertly against North Vietnam, specific individual reprisal actions not only against such incidents as the Gulf of Tonkin attack but also against any recurrence of VC "spectaculars" such as Bien Hoa. Basic to this option is the continued rejection of negotiations. B. Option B would add to present actions a systematic program of military pressures against the north, with increasing pressure actions to be continued at a fairly rapid pace and without interruption until we achieve our present stated objectives. The actions would mesh at some point with negotiation, but we would approach any discussions or negotiations with absolutely inflexible insistence on our present objectives. C. Option C would add to present actions an orchestration of (1) communications with Hanoi and/or Peiping, and (2) additional graduated military moves against infiltration targets, first in Laos and then in the DRV, and then against other targets in North Vietnam. The military scenario should give the impression of a steady deliberate approach, and should be designed to give the US the option at any time to proceed or not, to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or not. These decisions would be made from time to time in view of all relevant factors. The negotiating part of this course of action would have to be played largely by ear, but in essence we would be indicating from the outset a willingness to negotiate in an affirmative sense, accepting the possibility that we might not achieve our full objectives. IV (old V). Analysis of Option A Option A is a continuation of present policies, with the additional element of deciding to have reprisal action not only against another Gulf of Tonkin incident, but against any repetition of a spectacular attack by the VC within South Vietnam, particularly but not solely an attack involving US forces or installations. As far as they go, Option A actions are in fact common to all three Options, and would be pursued with equal force under Option B or Option C. It is basic that the situation in the south be improved by all possible means whatever else we do. A. Actions within South Vietnam. There is a great deal that can be done to improve GVN performance and to strengthen the whole pacification program. We must continue to seek additional third-country contributions (though these will probably remain limited). We are working to improve the key police program, military tactics, the air effort, the economic program including a stronger emphasis on the cities, etc. We continue to reject the introduction of US combat forces or a US taking over of command-but short of such changes in policy we are working as hard as we can on all major avenues for improvement. The point is that the effectiveness of all such measures depends on having an increasingly effective GVN, with sustained government and popular morale. We do not yet have this, though we have hopes that the present government will settle down and become effective over a period of 2-4 months. The issue is whether this can happen if we do no more than Option A over this period. B. Actions Outside South Vietnam. We would in any event continue and intensify the various covert forms of action against North Vietnam, and the various Lao and US actions in Laos, adding GVN air and ground action in Laos on a limited scale. We would also conduct reprisals as indicated above. C. Prognosis. The above actions will not physically affect the DRV scale of infiltration, nor do we believe they would affect Hanoi's determination and will. They might, however, keep the DRV from engaging in further spectaculars, and thus keep the scale of the conflict in the south within some limits. The question is whether the GVN could start to make real and visible headway on these terms, with no indication on the US side that we were prepared to go further. We think that reprisal actions would tend to lift GVN morale and performance for a time, but their lifting effect would decline with each successive case. For a period of time, perhaps some months, this Option might keep the GVN afloat and even get it moving slowly toward effectiveness. Most of us doubt that it can do more than that. D. Negotiating Avenues. We ourselves would be rejecting negotiation, as at present, at the outset. But this still leaves the chance that the GVN itself, or individual South Vietnamese in potentially powerful positions, might at any time start discussions with Hanoi or the Liberation Front. If the situation continued to deteriorate, the chances of this taking place would increase. If it did, Hanoi might not insist on early US withdrawal, but the way would be paved for a Vietnamese |