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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
XIII. U.S. Response to the Governmental Crisis In South Vietnam, December 8-31 /1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 199. Secret. No drafting or clearance information appears on the source text which is dated December 10. PARTICIPANTS The President The Secretary of Defense The British Prime Minister [Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.] The discussions then turned to the subject of Vietnam and the President asked the Secretary of State to describe the problem there. The Secretary explained that the principal consideration now was to turn Peking and Hanoi around before they had a firm commitment to go South. On the South Vietnam side, the purpose was to get the South Vietnamese to win the war in their own country. The major problem was establishing political unity in the cities and dealing with infiltration from the outside. The U.S. Government had tried to send political signals to Peking and Hanoi, pointing out that if they left their neighbors alone they would have no problem with the U.S.; if they pushed on, there would be trouble. In addition, military actions were being taken--armed reconnaissance in Laos, the Gulf of Tonkin, and the redeployment of units of the West Pacific fleet--to give them additional signals. The Secretary went on to say that the U.S. was appealing to a number of countries for assistance, both for its practical effect as well as for the political impact, to demonstrate to Saigon and Hanoi the degree of free world solidarity. It was the U.S. Government's hope that the UK would put people into the countryside. Engineers, technicians and military were needed. The UK's Mr. Thompson had good ideas, too. Showing the flag was important. In Hanoi, Saigon and here in the U.S., people were interested in what others were doing and how much help the allies were giving. Responding to this, Gordon Walker said the U.S. problem in Vietnam and the British in Malaysia were essentially the same. Only the opponents were different. The British had a major commitment, albeit with smaller forces. They could not put troops on the ground in Vietnam for they had a battle of their own to fight. But the British wanted to help the U.S. in ways that could be publicized-training Vietnamese troops in jungle warfare, providing medics, putting police in Saigon. And publicizing these actions would in fact step up the British commitment. On the policy of signals, the British wanted to help the U.S. in Vietnam and hoped the U.S. would help British in Malaysia. However, Gordon Walker stressed the importance of keeping retaliatory action related to things retaliated against. Disproportionate retaliation would put the British in a difficult position especially since they are co-chairman of the 14-Nation conference. They would not call the conference without U.S. consent and did not want to be forced into a conference against the U.S. will. Concluding, Gordon Walker said it was important that the British be consulted about further steps contemplated in Vietnam so that they could support U.S. efforts effectively. (The Prime Minister told the President he expected to be questioned extensively about the war in Vietnam during the parliamentary debate.) Secretary Rusk thought from a tactical standpoint it was important that all participants understand the degree to which the earlier agreements had been violated. This was intolerable and the U.S. was not prepared to go to a conference which took up where the 1962 conference began. In this connection, he pointed out that Laos was important because it was the place where signals could be exchanged with the other side. He also explained that efforts were being made to clear the atmosphere with Cambodia. But as co-chairman he urged the British to press the Soviets to join them in getting compliance with the 1962 agreements and to stop playing a neutral game in the aggression against South Vietnam. In reply, the Foreign Secretary said the dossier of the violations would be most helpful to him. He also assured the Secretary he would not agree to a conference without U.S. consent. At this point the communiqué was brought in, checked by both sides and approved by the President and the Prime Minister./2/ /2/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 615-616.
442. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 9, 1964--6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Johnson and cleared with Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Received at 6:04 a.m. 1763. Embassy telegram 1746./2/ Westmoreland, Alex Johnson and I again met this morning with PriMin Huong, DepPriMin Vien and General Khanh to follow up on our meeting of Dec 7. I gave them paper translated into French entitled "Actions Designed To Strengthen the Govt of Vietnam"/3/ pointing out GVN problem is one of better performance vis-à-vis its own people and foreign govts, greater appeal to its own people by convincing them of its interest in them, and the development of national and international confidence in GVN. Paper listed eight areas "in which progress beyond present levels would not only have intrinsic importance in pacification area but would be a measure of the effectiveness of the govt": /2/Document 439. /3/A copy of this paper was transmitted as enclosure 2 to airgram A-468 from Saigon, December 15. (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) 1. Attainment of authorized strength for military, paramilitary and police forces and better use of manpower. 2. Establishment of new and higher force goals for military, pare" military and police forces. 3. Better performance by civilian and military officials, including replacement of incompetent and retention of competent. 4. Improvement of budgetary operations, particularly expenditures in provinces. 5. Clarification and strengthening of province chief powers 6. Clarification and strengthening of police powers. 7. More vigor in Hop Tac operation. 8. After considerable time when stability is achieved, reviewing cases of political prisoners from previous regimes. Recognizing that much work was already being done in the foregoing fields, the paper singled out the following nine specific points for which clear responsibility needed to be assigned: 1. Establishment of new 1965 force goals for military, paramilitary and police forces. 2. Clarification of roles of popular forces, police and civil defense. 3. Improved budgetary formulation and implementation to insure efficient governmental operations while guarding against inflation. 4. Clarification and strengthening powers of province chiefs and exercise of those powers. 5. An improved and increased effort in the information field to include consideration of a high-powered radio transmitter for Saigon. 6. An extended rural development program in the provinces to include civil and military resources. 7. Additional forms of economic assistance for industrial urban and rural development. 8. Improvement of certain highway bridges and port facilities. 9. Renewed efforts to attract third country assistance. I also offered to assist in any way govt desired with approaches to minority leaders. Paper closed with statement that foregoing represented an expansion of expenditures, and budget deficit for CY 1965 may be larger than for CY 1964, thus there was compelling need to manage financial and fiscal affairs of govt so as to hold down threat of inflation. Paper was generally well-received and agreed specific joint action responsibilities assigned to be confirmed by paper which I will make available to them tomorrow./4/ /4/A copy of this paper was transmitted as enclosure 3 to airgram A-468. PriMin said that review of cases of political prisoners was "a very delicate" matter indicating that he did not want to commit himself at this time on this point. In response to statement in paper that it was important that the military continue to express public confidence in the govt, Khanh opined that this was "no problem" pointing to Dec 2 communiqué./5/ He said that statement had been delayed until then because he did not want it to be just his personal statement but signed by all the military chiefs. /5/A copy of the communiqué, issued following a meeting at Dalat on December 2 of the corps and division Generals with Khanh, was transmitted in telegram 1732 from Saigon, December 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) Taylor reported on the meeting in telegram 1770, December 10 (ibid., DEF 2 VIET S), as did Westmoreland in MAC J2 15711, December 4. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 12056) In response to statement in the paper that while not giving an impression of submitting to pressure, the govt might consider honorable ways of conciliating most important minority groups, PriMin said that he felt that he had overwhelming support "in the South" (apparent implication was that Northern politicians and elements such as Tam Chau were primary opponents) and that it was clear they commanded very little support. However, PriMin reaffirmed his willingness to make orderly changes in a few Ministers if and when this seemed desirable. In discussion third country assistance, I emphasized importance it also had from USG domestic point of view. In reply to PriMin's question, I said that we did not desire to "internationalize" war such as Korean pattern and agreed with Vien's observation that the question really involved making third country, free world support concretely evident in Vietnam. Khanh suggested a "third country aid headquarters building" in front of which all the third country flags could be flying but recognized problem of those who did not want to seem to be involved in military activities. In response to statement in paper on importance of filling diplomatic posts abroad, the PriMin said that he had already discussed this with FonMin and received in silence Khanh's offer of more unemployed Generals for diplomatic posts. With respect to powers of province chiefs, Khanh insisted that they in fact already had ample powers to be "little presidents" but it was a matter of training and willingness to exercise their powers. He and Vien agreed to work together on this. While expressing appreciation for the offer of a stronger radio, Khanh asked that we also urgently study the question of television, at least on a limited and experimental basis in the Saigon area. He said that in underdeveloped countries such as Vietnam the visual image was especially important and could be a powerful instrument in communication for the govt as well as for education. He said he had heard that under an arrangement with the Japanese, Hanoi was to have television by 1966 and that it was expected Cambodia would also shortly have it. I said we were studying the matter and would be prepared to discuss it further with them. On my offer to be of assistance in dealing with minority elements, both the PriMin and Khanh expressed strong reservations about either Johnson or myself seeing them and urged that even lower level con facts be very carefully managed because of propensity of such elements to misuse and circulate false interpretations of such meetings. However, the PriMin enthusiastically endorsed my proposed meeting with key newspaper editors. All in all it was, I feel, a good meeting and successful in obtaining a reasonably common approach by PriMin, Vien and Khanh looking toward dealing with some of GVN's more concrete problems. Taylor
443. Memorandum of a Conversation, Soviet Embassy, Washington, December 9, 1964, 1 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 16 and approved in the Executive Secretariat on December 30. Gromyko was in the United States to attend the 19th session of the U.N. General Assembly, which began December 1. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. U.S.S.R.
In response to the Secretary's remark that he wished to discuss the situation in South East Asia, Mr. Gromyko said he had also wanted to discuss this matter. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to ask what intentions the U.S. had in that area. As the Soviet Union had stated on a number of earlier occasions, it believed that the U.S. had made a great mistake by getting involved in South Vietnam, because there were no U.S. interests involved in that area. But the U.S. had its troops in South Vietnam and was now increasing them. This was not in accord with the U.S.-expressed desire to reduce tensions in the area. Consequently, the question arose as to what the real U.S. intentions were. The Soviet Union had no troops or experts in the area and had taken no action similar to the actions taken by the U.S. The Secretary observed that on the basis of Mr. Gromyko's remarks, it appeared that there was no problem between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in South East Asia. Unfortunately, Hanoi and Peiping were very active in that area. Our position was very simple: if Peiping and Hanoi left their neighbors alone, there would be no U.S. troops in that area. We had no interests and we sought no bases there, and all we were doing was because of Hanoi and Peiping. The Secretary hoped that there was no difference between our two countries as to the facts of the situation. In 1959, Hanoi had made the decision to go after South Vietnam, and that decision had been made public in 1960. North Vietnam was sending men and supplies to South Vietnam. Hanoi was in control of daily operations, and we knew that command lines went from the Viet Cong to Hanoi. There were constant infiltrations, which particularly increased in 1964. Infiltrators came through Laos. which was a direct contravention of the 1962 accords. There were more and more men in South Vietnam who had been trained in the North Vietnamese forces, and they were North Vietnamese rather than some South Vietnamese who might have undergone training in North Vietnam. Perhaps some people on the Soviet side said that this was a war of liberation, but we regarded the situation as pure aggression. The Secretary repeated that if Hanoi and Peiping left their neighbors alone, we would not be there; otherwise, he stressed, we were in a serious situation. He hoped the Soviet Union would in no way encourage Hanoi and Peiping and would use its influence to restrain them. Again, he could only say that if Hanoi and Peiping left the area alone, we would come home; otherwise, there would be a real scrap. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to point out that the U.S. had prevented elections from taking place in Vietnam as provided for under the 1954 agreement. Thus, the U.S. had blocked the chance for unification. The U.S. had sent troops to South Vietnam and now it could see what had developed. He also wished to point out that U.S. troops had been sent not in response to any action by Hanoi and Peiping; rather, they had been there from the very beginning. The Secretary asked what period Mr. Gromyko was talking about. Mr. Gromyko replied he had in mind the entire period after the 1954 Geneva agreement. He said the U.S. was trying to tell the Vietnamese how to resolve their problems. The Soviet Union knew that the U.S. sympathies were with South Vietnam; on the other hand, the Soviet Union was in sympathy with North Vietnam. Yet the difference was that the U.S. had troops in South Vietnam whereas the Soviet Union had no troops in North Vietnam. If the Soviet Union were to match the U.S., it would have troops in North Vietnam. The Secretary said that as far as the 1954-55 period was concerned, it had become very clear that no free elections were possible in North Vietnam. In that period, Hanoi had asked the Soviet Union for help, and the Soviet Union gave it. South Vietnam had asked for assistance from the U.S., and we met their request. At that time, we had had no troops, but only assistance missions in South Vietnam. In any event, it was clear that no free elections could have been possible. The Secretary noted that neither South Vietnam nor the U.S. had signed the 1954 agreement, although we had accepted it and had said that a violation of the agreement would have serious consequences. But even if, for the sake of argument, one accepted the view that one of the clauses of the agreement had been violated, that was no justification for military action and aggression. He did not know the extent of the Soviet responsibility with respect to Hanoi, but he wished to point out that even though there had been no Soviet troops in Greece or Korea, there was no doubt about Soviet involvement in those situations. The Secretary reiterated once again that the only problem in South East Asia was that Hanoi and Peiping did not wish to leave their neighbors alone. [Here follows discussion on Laos.] He [Rusk] then said he wished to point out that as far as U.S. troops in South Vietnam were concerned, we had fewer troops in South Vietnam than North Vietnam had. He suggested that Mr. Gromyko and he should not tease each other. We knew perfectly well who those personnel were, what routes they followed, etc. The situation was one of pure and cold aggression. Mr. Gromyko suggested the U.S. was committing aggression against North Vietnam. The Secretary said there seemed to be ideological differences on this point between our two sides. Were we aggressors because we helped others defend themselves? Mr. Gromyko inquired who had asked the U.S. for help. There had been several governments in South Vietnam, they changed all the time, and none of them had popular support. The Secretary noted we had been told that policies would continue even if personalities change. Mr. Gromyko commented the methods of change in South Vietnam were rather curious. In any event, the Soviet Government regarded the U.S. policy in South Vietnam as contrary to the interests of peace. He reiterated that elections should have been held in Vietnam. Although he did not know what their outcome would have been, the fact was that the 1954 agreement had been violated. The Secretary asked Mr. Gromyko whether he seriously believed that free elections were possible in North Vietnam. Mr. Gromyko replied in the affirmative. He said the election procedure was set forth in the 1954 agreement and had been developed with U.S. participation. What he thought had happened was that the U.S. had probably decided that the North Vietnamese would obtain a majority. This was the only explanation of the U.S. refusal to accept elections. Thus, the U.S. had one policy regarding elections in Germany, and another policy regarding elections in Vietnam. The Secretary asked whether this was not true in the case of the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko said no, adding that the U.S. had troops in South Vietnam whereas the Soviet Union had no troops in North Vietnam. The Secretary said we were not against peaceful discussion of the South Vietnamese problem. However, North Vietnam should stop its activities and leave South Vietnam alone. Mr. Gromyko again asked by whom the U.S. had been invited to South Vietnam. Was it by the man who had been overthrown and since forgotten? The Secretary said we had been invited by all the governments which had served in South Vietnam. Mr. Gromyko interjected that none of those governments had been supported by the people. The Secretary wondered why Hanoi did not want to leave South Vietnam and Laos alone. Mr. Gromyko suggested that this question be asked of the North Vietnamese Government at the conference. He observed that the Secretary's remarks did not open good prospects for the future. The Secretary said Mr. Gromyko's remarks implied that Hanoi would continue its activities. Mr. Gromyko contended the Soviet Union had no information regarding the presence of any North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Any information about infiltrators or guerrillas from North Vietnam was strictly a U.S. responsibility. He said perhaps South Vietnam and Laos were sending infiltrators in the other direction.
444. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 10, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII, Memos. Secret. SUBJECT This is my initial report covering one of the two matters of current interest to the President regarding Vietnam--the problem of the government's stability. A report on third country participation will be submitted tomorrow./2/ Unless unusual developments dictate more frequent reporting, or unless instructed otherwise, I plan to prepare these reports on an every-other-day basis. Subsequent memoranda obviously will tend to be more brief than these initial efforts. /2/A copy of this memorandum is ibid. On December 14, Cooper and McGeorge Bundy sent to the President the second memorandum in this series. For text, see Declassified Documents, 1979, 221C. 1. Premier Tran Van Huong's five-week old government appears momentarily strengthened by his own exertions and by the firm support of US officials and VN military leaders. Nevertheless, a concerted Buddhist effort to overthrow Huong still seems likely. The Buddhists have been moving cautiously, however, and ten days of quiet in Saigon have permitted an easing of martial law restrictions. Huong's firmness against recent demonstrators, largely schoolboys and hoodlums, has been publicly endorsed by the High National Council and key Catholic leaders and privately by responsible labor leaders. Huong's administrative performance is still spotty, partly through unfamiliarity, but he seems willing to learn. Privately, he has said he is willing eventually to change some of his less able or more controversial ministers, but he will not do this while under fire. 2. External threats to the stability of the government arise from the activities of the Cambodians and the Viet Cong. There have been some hints that Cambodia will recognize the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam as the legitimate government (this in turn would probably result in the Government of Vietnam's recognizing the dissident Cambodian Khmer Serei movement and closing the Mekong River to Cambodian shipping). The Viet Cong have been stepping up their political agitation and have been sending cadres into Saigon to stimulate and intensify anti-government demonstrations. 3. Buddhist leaders have been holding strategy talks in Saigon and gearing up their followers for possible anti-government action. Their foremost strategist, monk Tri Quang, says they have set up a "Struggle Committee" and plan to apply quiet pressure on Chief of State Suu and the US to get Huong replaced constitutionally. Today, however, the Buddhist leadership issued a communiqué announcing opposition to the government and refusal to cooperate with the present cabinet. Huong [Tri Quang?] privately threatens to stage hunger strikes by monks and mass demonstrations if necessary; these, he says, would prove decisive. The Buddhists imply that they are reluctant to oppose the US and they probably fear army reprisals; they have set no firm deadlines and say there may yet be time for a "quiet solution." What Buddhist leaders really want is still unclear-perhaps even to themselves. And though we continue to watch and investigate, we have no evidence to tie them to the Viet Cong or even to indicate that they sympathize with Viet Cong aims. 4. Ambassador Taylor has been meeting with Chief of State Suu; Huong, and his cabinet; the High National Council; military leaders; and the local press. He has made it clear that, while it is US policy to help South Vietnam, an expanded US commitment cannot be justified to the US government and public unless Vietnamese groups unite behind their legitimate government. Other Embassy officers are discreetly getting this message to the Buddhists and other political oppositionists. Taylor, in addition, has provided Huong and his top lieutenants (including Khanh) a list of measures designed to strengthen the government's image domestically and abroad./3/ These suggestions seem to have been well received. /3/See Document 442. 5. Complementing the efforts of the Ambassador to urge unity on the disparate elements of the Vietnamese official community, the CIA Station in Saigon is covertly putting pressure on elements close to Tri Quang to moderate Buddhist opposition to the government. Buddhists in the United States and abroad are being urged to bring their influence to bear, and the possibility of getting the Dalai Lama's brother to visit Saigon with this message is being explored. Covert efforts to generate support for Huong are also being made among the Saigon students, in senior military circles, and among old guard politicians./4/ /4/At the bottom of the source text, the President wrote: "Mac, I like this." CLC
445. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 12, 1964--5:54 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal and cleared in draft with William Bundy and the first sentence cleared in substance with McGeorge Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 1266. For the Ambassador from the Acting Secretary. Meeting today again underscored great concern of highest authority for fullest possible Country Team efforts bring various political groups into support for GVN./2/ Would be helpful if your next status report could cover attitudes of key groups and summarize various U.S. contacts and types of effort with each, indicating how effort coordinated by you or Deputy Ambassador. For this purpose key groups would appear to include Buddhists, military, Catholics, students, sects, and perhaps such groups as Montagnards, indigenous press, civil servants, as you believe these important. /2/Also discussed at the meeting, which was held at the Department of State at 10 a.m. and was attended by William (Chairman) and McGeorge Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Cooper, McCone, Vance, McNaughton, and Admirals Mustin and McDonald, were air operations in Laos, deployment of Hawk missiles to Vietnam, infiltration, third country briefings, and OPLAN 34A. (Telegram 1265 to Saigon, December 12; ibid., POL 27 VIET S, and JCS 2339/164, December 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218. ICS Files) In our discussions, the problem of immediate priority was obviously relations between Buddhists and GVN and Buddhists and U.S. which seemed to be developing into major confrontations. We are particularly concerned that communications between Buddhists and GVN/U.S. are deteriorating. We thought some of the following ideas on the method and substance of communications with the Buddhists which were developed here were worth passing on to you. A. Attempt to get across to Buddhist leaders a sense that, (1) unlike summer 1963, their cause does not now have wide-spread popular support outside Viet-Nam and; (2) A direct confrontation with the Government at this time could, in our judgment, render it virtually impossible for us to undertake some of the measures which we think would be useful in dealing with the VC threat directed and supported from the North. These thoughts might be conveyed by: a. A direct approach to Buddhist leaders by Emboffs at appropriate level. b. Play-back of appropriate U.S. press commentary by VOA. c. Public statements here in Washington. B. Letter from Ambassador Lodge to Tri Quang. Embassy views on what might be said obviously better than our own. Such letter might, however, include thought that essence of democratic government which Buddhists say they want is building of orderly methods of taking political action without causing chaos and collapse of entire structure of government, If this idea seems worthwhile, we will be happy to approach Lodge with Embassy draft. C. In order provide Buddhists with a possible attractive stake in enterprise, we might devise methods of funneling material aid through Buddhist leadership so that they may become involved in supporting their adherents at village and hamlet level in conjunction with pacification effort. Perhaps active Buddhist social welfare organizations could be created, both in Viet-Nam and possibly also in U.S., which could act as brokers between American official and unofficial aid programs and Buddhist laymen in Viet-Nam in same way as Catholic and Protestant missionaries work to support their followers in provinces. Possibly Catholic or Protestant advisor, American or Vietnamese, could be found to help the Buddhists set up program and deal with necessary paper work. D. GVN might seek prominent Buddhist interlocutor who could formulate Buddhist grievances in responsible and respectable manner so that GVN could at appropriate time promptly and publicly give satisfaction in order to cut some ground out from under hard-line Buddhist leaders. [1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified] We would appreciate your comments on these ideas plus any others you may have of your own. We are trying to. develop further specific thoughts on actions which might be taken with other groups listed in Para 1 of this message. Ball
446. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 15, 1964--6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII, Memos. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Attached to the source text was a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, dated December 15, which stated: "We don't get an awful lot of good news from Saigon, and this one is of real interest." The President had written across the memorandum: "I'd like to see this accelerated." 1817. FYI. During the late spring and summer of this year, an experiment was launched in Quang Ngai Province in which the Quang Ngai representatives of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] played important and complementary roles. The common purpose was to try a new blend of psywar, civic action, and intelligence factors in order to get at and root out the Viet Cong apparatus which was rapidly digging itself into the provinces immediately around Quang Ngai City. This original need was first recognized by a Vietnamese official, the Quang Ngai police chief, with American involvement originating at his request. This initial experiment had as its product a team of forty specially trained and specially armed persons, operating directly under control of Quang Ngai Province Chief and, under him, District Chief of the district surrounding Quang Ngai City. The original purpose, as stated above, seems to have been successful to the degree that the local population in area of the team's operation has been changed in attitude from one which was fearful of and responsive to the local Viet Cong, to an attitude which practical experience has demonstrated has made that district difficult and even dangerous for Viet Cong to operate in. Thus success of this experiment, in terms of its objectives, seems to be considerable. In addition to original team, five additional similar teams have subsequently been created and committed to identical work within Quang Ngai Province. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] I feel this kind of activity may have significant impact on problem of rural pacification at the household, village, and district level. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] [1 paragraph (9-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] Minister of Interior Vien, under whose purview province chiefs fall, is totally in support and is eager to endorse this program in whatever province it may be introduced. As initial [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] survey of six provinces in the North, just completed, indicates understanding and receptivity on the part of the province chiefs concerned. Further expansion will take place as rapidly as possible. We have still to [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] avoid raising some of the difficulties encountered in the CIDG program. Taylor
447. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor) to the President/1/ Saigon, December 16, 1964--1 p.m. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-161-69. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Taylor and transmitted as telegram 1826 from Saigon, which is the source text. Embtel 1764./2/ Since returning from Washington, my primary preoccupation has been to meet with the politically important groups in Saigon in compliance with your instructions to make crystal-clear the attitude of the USG toward the minority efforts to overthrow the Huang cabinet and to undertake to offset these efforts. I have stressed our firm intention to continue to support the struggle of SVN but the essentiality of a durable government in order to permit that support to be effective. Among those with whom I have spoken are Chief of State Suu, Huong and his senior advisers, the members of his cabinet, most of the members of the High National Council, the key Generals, and many of the local editors. Key members of the Embassy staff have also been spreading the word to all their contacts. Although there has been little discussion of the views presented in these meetings and no attempt to rebut them, my impression is that these comments have had an effect and are receiving wide currency in Vietnamese circles. /2/Telegram 1764 from Saigon, December 9, transmitted Taylor's report to the President on the activities in Vietnam while Taylor was in Washington. (Ibid.) During the week, the opposition of the Buddhist Institute leadership to the government and to Huong personally took the form of public letters to Chief of State Suu and to me,/3/ castigating Huong and claiming Suu and I bear responsibility for the government. Three Institute leaders carried on a hunger strike against the government, among them Tri Quang who has taken full charge of the anti-GVN campaign. I have deliberately avoided direct contact with the Institute leaders preferring to work through Embassy officers who are regularly in touch with them. The immediate problem appears to establish communication between them and a spokesman for Huong who personally has no desire to talk to the bonzes, much less to compromise with them. /3/Translations of these letters were transmitted in telegram 1790 from Saigon, December 11. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 12) The relatively restrained character of the Buddhist campaign thus far suggests that the Institute leadership is well aware of their lack of a broad base of support even among most other Buddhists and lack of a truly religious issue to use against the government. They appear to be trying to provoke the government to take actions against them which will give them an issue and an appeal to popular sympathy. Needless to say, the Mission is giving this entire matter of the Buddhist opposition its priority attention. General Khanh is the cause of some uneasiness again, not primarily because of any anti-governmental inclination but because of the restlessness of many of the Generals under his leadership. While he continues to be the most able of the lot, he often displays a fundamental lack of principle which eventually erodes the confidence in him of most of his associates. So far as I can see, he is having little luck in unifying the Armed Forces and eliminating the factions, the primary task he set for himself upon quitting the government. There is little newsworthy to report in the other areas of our activity. Except for a rather large action at An Lao in Binh Dinh Province on December 7, military operations have been relatively routine. Pacification progress around Saigon seems to be picking up but probably will not reach all year end target objectives. We had another series of heavy rains which have caused some flooding north of Saigon and south of the area devastated by typhoons last month. Relief action is in progress and the situation appears to be in hand. In response to your expressed interest in the attitudes of minority groups toward the Huong government, I am sending to State today a comprehensive summary of attitudes of the principal minority elements toward the government as we presently appraise them./4/ /4/Infra. Taylor/5/ /5/Telegram 1826 bears this typed signature.
448. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 16, 1964, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. 1836. For the Acting Secretary from Taylor. CINCPAC for POLAD. Pursuant to your request/2/ following is summary of attitudes and our contacts with key groups: /2/Document 445. 1. Buddhists: Despite slight opening for possible compromise indicated in conversation yesterday with Tri Quang (Embtel 1833),/3/ our assessment is that Buddhist Institute leadership still remains intent on confrontation with GVN and at this point will not be greatly swayed by efforts at direct persuasion by us. /3/Telegram 1833, December 16, described a 3-hour conversation between Manfull and Tri Quang which gave the impression that the Buddhist leaders were determined to seek Huong's overthrow despite some slight indications that a settlement short of that might be worked out. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII. Cables) Extent to which they willing to go in reaching compromise will undoubtedly depend far more on their assessment of local strength and support they are able to find (or manufacture) for such confrontation than on our views. Other major factor is their estimate Huong's ability to resist their demands and their necessity to "save face" if Huong's resistance is successful. Therefore, most useful role for us at moment is maintenance our firm position of support for Huong while at same time continuing quiet contact with Buddhist Institute leaders to ensure they understand fully US position and to explore and possibly facilitate establishment of dialogue between them and GVN. Some elements of direct US action with Buddhist Institute leadership as envisaged reftel already being undertaken, while certain other suggestions would seem to have only limited or even no positive effect at this time. With regard to specific lettered paragraphs your message: A.(a) EmbOffs have been maintaining constant contact with Buddhist leaders Tri Quang and to lesser extent with Tam Chau and Mai Tho Trayen. EmbOffs also see various secondary members Buddhist Institute leadership and other Buddhist elements frequently. Gard currently in Saigon and will be assisting us in this effort while he is here. Believe contacts to date have given Buddhist Institute leadership clear idea of US attitude to extent they willing listen to it. It is clear that they have decided to proceed with campaign of pressure on government in full knowledge it contrary to US position. A.(b) Buddhist Institute leadership, like other Vietnamese, believes VOA is voice of USG and while they will interpret playbacks as USG pressure against them, believe it useful to keep before them evidence that foreign observers, particularly local correspondents, view Buddhist Institute campaign of opposition as being without justifiable foundation and a negative exercise. A.(c) Believe that for the present, official statements from Washington directed specifically at Buddhist Institute leaders would likely prove counterproductive. They directly aware of US position. However, they will probably interpret public statements as attacks on them before Vietnamese public opinion, and this would work against our efforts to keep channels of communications open. At same time, statements from Washington on need for political stability and orderly processes of government, such as that proposed for President's press conference,/4/ will continue to be useful. /4/The proposed statement had been sent in telegram 1255 to Saigon, December 11. (Ibid.) B. Believe letter from Lodge might prove useful, but would prefer to hold this one in reserve for time being. At moment, Buddhist Institute leadership still seems intent on confrontation and we doubt that they can be dissuaded until situation develops in manner which will either indicate to them they are playing a losing hand or pave way for reasonable "face saving" compromise that they can accept without achieving their major goal, i.e., ouster of Huong. C. Believe this too might be useful in future. But at present juncture this would be interpreted either as sign of US weakness or as effort to buy them off. US posture of quiet strength more desirable at present and stakes for which Buddhist Institute leadership now playing are for effective control of GVN so that material US aid would at present look like very poor consolation prize. We have discussed this very subject on numerous occasions with Buddhist Institute leadership but in each case they have failed to follow through because of their lack of organization and experience. This continues to be one of our principal aims but Buddhist response to date has been most disappointing. Even concerted direct welfare effort by American wives has fallen on sterile ground. D. As noted above, we believe essential Buddhist Institute aim at present is incompatible with retention of Huong government and little room for maneuver exists. At same time Embassy is quietly canvassing Buddhist opinion in effort to determine extent to which Tri Quang and Tam Chau and followers might be isolated within movement. Mai Tho Truyen has given indication to Political Counselor and Gard, for example, of his dissatisfaction with current Buddhist policy as expressed by bonzes. Theravada leaders have stated that Theravada groups dissociating selves with UBA campaign, which they view as political. Other prominent lay Buddhists expressed similar sentiment. However, there does not appear to be a lay leader on scene who is now capable or willing serve as focus for this discontent and to return direction of Buddhist Institute's political activity to lay leaders. E. Embassy is currently examining this question with Gard. In short, we believe that if correct posture pursued by Huong (combination of obvious fairness and strength) and mistakes by his government can be avoided so as to deny genuinely exploitable issue to Buddhists, and if continuing support can be assured him from Suu, HNC, and the military, we believe essential weakness of Buddhist Institute's position will become increasingly evident and way may then become open to getting Buddhist leaders off hook (should that then appear desirable). At present, therefore, we plan to stand strongly behind Huong and advise him of our views. However, at moment we do not believe Buddhist leadership can be dissuaded from pursuing confrontation until they have more fully grasped unfavorable conjunction (from their viewpoint) of political variables or until face saving device found to get them off hook. Specific suggestions we have envisaged making to Huong include following: 1. That Huong maintain non-provocative course combined with strength and focus public attention on the positive GVN programs. 2. That he consider taking additional steps which, without being labeled as such, will be interpreted by the Buddhist hierarchy as nods in their direction; for example: a) Huong might consider appointing additional members of his cabinet such as a Minister of Defense and a Minister Without Portfolio (for liaison with the HNC and religious and private groups) who would be acceptable to the Buddhists. This can be done without the charge that he is changing his government under pressure. b) Huong might create a citizens' committee for flood relief and appeal again for support of religious and private groups in the flood relief area thus providing the opportunity for the GVN to work cooperatively with the Buddhist hierarchy at the Saigon level. c) Huong might seek to clarify in a future public statement the impression alleged by the Buddhists that he had lumped the Buddhist hierarchy, out-politicians and the VC as sharply the same motives in their opposition to his government [sic]. Longer range steps which the GVN might take are as follows: 1. Arrange for the Dalai Lama, his brother, or other Buddhist leaders from other countries to visit Vietnam to educate Vietnamese bonzes on the perils of Communism and their civil responsibilities. 2. Consider changes in his current Cabinet at the proper time, replacing those Ministers who have not performed well or whose past history is demonstrably open to question. Measures which the US Mission might take in addition to maintaining close contact with the Buddhist hierarchy are: 1. Maintain pressure on them. 2. Continue with a program directed primarily toward Buddhists recently approved by the Mission Council. These measures are designed to foster desired Buddhist views and activities in the following fields among others: (a) Buddhists against Communists, especially Viet Cong; (b) Buddhist responsibility toward political authority and stability for GVN; (c) Buddhist contributions toward social stability, especially through education and social welfare; (d) Buddhist contacts with foreign countries in ways best for GVN-USG interests. Gard is especially working on the implementation of measures (b), (c), and (d) stated above, both in SVN and elsewhere in Asia. 3. Continue our work with students to keep them in classroom. Summary attitudes of other key groups follow: 2. "Out" politicians: Political spectrum of "out" politicians ranges from active oppositionists who desire Huong's downfall to other wing--represented largely by Southerners--which actively supports him. Main body of politicians, such as Sung's Northern Dai Viets, Hoan's Southern Dai Viets, Hiep's Southern VNQDD, who together probably constitute most important mass of politicians in Vietnam, today are essentially opposed to efforts to overturn Huong government by force. Though not personally devoted to Huong or his Cabinet, they nevertheless would view his removal under pressure as blow to efforts to establish orderly political processes in Vietnam, and possibly first step on way toward another military takeover. In total political spectrum there are also numerous irresponsible politicians (such as Hoang Co Thuy, who was involved in exploiting Buddhist memorial services in early November) who see opposition to Huong simply as means to further their own ambitions. Although they have potential for trouble-making, they have little following. Political Counselor and other Embassy officers are in frequent touch with all these political figures. 4. [sic] Civil servants: Primacy of concern for furtherance of their careers renders civil servants circumspect at all times with regard to taking conspicuous positions for or against any incumbent government, and also renders them timid in taking initiatives during periods of instability. They also tend to approve developments which might lead to strong stable government, and Huong's early display of strength has found favor for that reason. Prime Minister Huong has also won approval of many civil servants for his record of integrity and his willingness to accept humble circumstances. In many ways, Huong resembles ideal Confucian government official. On other hand, his reputation for honesty also causes concern among individuals who are uncertain what this reputation might mean in terms of stringent insistence on efficiency and honesty. As known Southern regionalist Huong finds his strongest support among those bureaucrats who come from South, with rather less warmth than those of Center and North. Embassy Political Section has numerous close contacts among upper and middle level of permanent civil service. Other elements of Mission, and notably USOM, have close working relations with Vietnamese bureaucrats at all levels. 5. Press: Since imposition of martial law, press censorship has been enforced. Ten papers have been temporarily suspended and several others have voluntarily folded. These harsh measures have been privately applauded by more responsible journalists who have watched Saigon's journalistic world become more and more chaotic in past year to point where some fifty dailies were being published. Rumors were rife that more volatile papers were infiltrated by crypto-VCs or their sympathizers. Undoubtedly many journalists oppose Huong, but their opposition will be permanent or temporary depending upon amount of success he enjoys. If he proves capable of governing and then succeeds in issuing some sort of reasonable press statute, ranks of journalistic opposition might be thinned to point of inconsequence. At same time, many editors and journalists have ties with political and other groups, and their attitudes toward Huong government will be affected to large extent by actions and attitudes of these larger groups. Embassy maintains frequent contacts with journalists through Political Section, USIS [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified]. Ambassador has had two receptions for selected editors and publishers to discuss political situation and expects to have others in future. 6. Cao Dai: Leaders of Tay Ninh or founding sect of Cao Daiism have expressed full if unenthusiastic support for Huong government. This support is due in part to realization that Huong was choice of Suu, devout Cao Dai coreligionist, and High National Council, whose Deputy Chairman is Cao Dai Archbishop Vinh. There is respectiveness [sic] long known to many Cao Dai leaders, but also concern that he may not provide strong leadership and that security conditions, especially in Tay Ninh, may deteriorate. Nevertheless, Cao Hoai Sang, administrative head of ecclesiastical hierarchy, has issued formal statement backing Huong. Prime Mission contacts include Vinh, Sang, other church hierarchy, and provincial officials, especially Brig Gen. Le Van Tat in Tay Ninh. 7. Hoa Hao: Hoa Hao seem to be hopelessly split rather than incohesive organization, and no overall "Hoe Hao attitude" is discernible. In general, major factions and leaders of sect support Huong and GVN. Chairman of sect's central committee (i.e., religious organization), Luong Trong Tuong, is member of High National Council and reportedly voted in favor of Huong's investiture. Just after late November disorders, Tuong issued statement in favor of Huong and GVN. One Hoa Hao party politician, Phan Ba Cam, has expressed opposition to Huong, but Cam does not enjoy wide prestige in sect itself. Factionalized politically as Hoa Hao are, it would be difficult to envisage any effective political opposition to GVN on their part unless GVN tried to curtail greatly local semi-autonomy many Hoa Hao groups now enjoy in lower Delta. Mission contacts include major Hoa Hao leaders such as province chiefs of An Giang, Chau Doc, and Kien Phong, various district chiefs and lesser officials in these and other provinces, and some Hoa Hao politicians in Saigon, including Truong on HNC. 8. Chinese: Chinese press and leaders of economic elite and Chinese congregations, who view urban unrest as extension of threat which Viet Cong pose to Chinese commercial and social interests, have given full moral support to Huong government. Most of them see activities of Vietnamese Buddhist leadership as disruptive influence in already unstable political situation, and, accustomed themselves to order of contemplative monks, tend to brand leading Vietnamese bonzes as "un-Buddhist." Broad mass of working class Chinese, on other hand, probably are fully engrossed in day-to-day struggle for basic necessities and are little concerned about future of government, Buddhist leaders or Viet Cong. Contacts: Number of Embassy and USOM officers have social and business contacts with Chinese commercial, financial, and educational leaders. There are two Chinese language officers in Economic Section, one who speaks Mandarin, and another, Sino-American, who speaks Cantonese. One political officer is member of Chinese branch of Rotary Club in Cholon, and another, who speaks Mandarin Chinese, maintains social contact with leaders of two of five congregations and with Deputy Chief of Federation of Congregations, as well as with Chinese Embassy officers. Political Section also monitors five of 12 Chinese daily newspapers. 9. Montagnards: Political changes which have occurred in SVN during past year and half have had little impact on attitudes and allegiances of Montagnard people, who have never had feeling of loyalty and attachment to Vietnamese Government. In fact, average Montagnard in both cities and hamlets would like to rid Highlands of Vietnamese settlers and government. At same time, however, vast majority of Montagnards also dislike Viet Cong and seldom provide them willing support. Montagnard rebellion which occurred in September and subsequent Pleiku conference in October did not basically change relationships between Vietnamese and Montagnards but they pose both new dangers and opportunities for GVN program in Highlands. Sincere fulfillment of promises made by General Khanh at conference would undoubtedly do much to win more enthusiastic response from at least some of Montagnards. (Implementation of some of these programs by new Huong government have occurred too recently to gauge Montagnard reaction.) Rebel organization behind Rhade revolt still commands allegiances of CIDG in several Special Forces camps and consequently still poses serious threat to GVN. Demands of this rebel organization are tantamount to request for complete autonomy for Montagnards, and it is clear government's promised program will not satisfy this group. There have been some indications that this group will stage another demonstration and/or revolt sometime in late December if its demands are not met. US Mission is cooperating with GVN in initiation and development of programs aimed at improving economic and social conditions of Montagnards. Mission has urged GVN at various levels to show due urgency in implementation of its programs for Montagnards. At same time, United States is making it clear, as it has in past, to Montagnard CIDG that US stands with Vietnamese Government and will assist it in suppressing rebellious acts which would only benefit Viet Cong in long run. MACV, USOM and Embassy officers maintain regular contact with Montagnard civil and military leaders. 10. Labor: Attitude of great majority of labor leaders and rank-and-file can best be best be described as ambivalent, passively loyal and apathetic. While organized labor's hostility to Communist ideology as such has remained fairly active, its interest in promises of more radical approach to such problems has been increasing rather than decreasing. This is partly attributable to frustration caused by fact that post-Diem governments have not carried out any of revolutionary reforms which fall of Diem made appear imminent. Moreover, as insurgency continues and fatigue of general population increases, labor seems to have begun to doubt in ultimate victory against Viet Cong. Thus, under slogan of "apolitical activities" workers have tended to withdraw from public life, seemingly waiting for outcome of military effort. American presence in Vietnam is perhaps most important factor holding organized labor from jumping on other side of the fence. Labor members realize that without American help economy of country would have suffered and standards of living would not be what they are today. Embassy Labor Attaché has frequent contacts with labor leaders, management representatives, and with senior Ministry of Labor officials. 11. Students: At base of student discontent is disappointment that revolution has not produced leadership with dynamism and charisma. Most students who think about it are uneasy about some of Ministers, but most are unwilling to take violent action--in fact, there is some indication that some student leaders believe Buddhist movement has been discredited and are trying to detach themselves. There seems to have been some increase in regional feelings, with Southerners in general tending toward at least mild support of government. Ones who do not support government feel, apparently sincerely, that urgency of situation does not permit men whose past records have been ineffectual (some Cabinet members) to remain in office. In short run main danger, however, seems to stem from fact that students can be easily used by outside forces, such as Buddhists or politicians. In fact, these outsiders are probably more effective in drumming up student support, especially among high school students, than main student groups themselves. In this context students' capacity for troublemaking should not be underestimated. Most students do not feel they have been properly "called" to service by country: they are in large measure ashamed of appeal of their government and its ineffectiveness. In this sense, there will probably be certain favorable reaction to government which shows itself to be strong, and especially one which shows itself anxious to draw on student participation. However, actual strong measures taken against students on streets have drawn unfavorable reaction and have made good propaganda against government. Students also strongly object to military government and Gen Khanh in particular. Between them various elements of Mission have contact with virtually all surfaced student leaders, and there are frequent exchanges of views with many of them. Beyond this, such multi-agency programs as English teaching and USOM and AID work with student economic projects bring US representatives into contact with students at many levels. The Mission Youth Committee meets once per month under direction of cultural affairs officer. 12. Summary of military attitudes toward Huong government: Since transfer of power from military to civilian government, VN military has taken public position of full support for such transfer and of somewhat ambiguous support for Huong government. Following December 2 Generals' meeting at Dalat communiqué was issued (Embtel 1732),/5/ signed by Gen Khanh and highest ranking military officers which promised "to support without reservation civilian government working for people" without specifically mentioning Huong government. Position of Gen Khanh himself, both publicly and privately has been something less than forthright and has led to fears in many circles that he is harboring ambitions to take over government again. These fears are based on such Khanh statements as that carried in local press on November 30 that "troubled political situation in Saigon should not drag on" and remarks to Political Counselor (Embtel 1752)/6/ that he would stay out of politics "until time is ripe". Misgivings concerning Khanh also based on his precipitate action before relinquishing post of Prime Minister to grant sizeable across-the-board pay increases to military and civilian personnel, to reinstate Dalat Generals, and to make last minute promotion or transfer of number of Generals. /5/See footnote 5, Document 442. /6/Telegram 1752, December 8, reported on a reception Taylor had given for senior Vietnamese officials and Khanh at which the Ambassador briefed them on his trip to Washington. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII, Cables) Finally, under Huong government Khanh has attempted, with some degree of success, to transfer authority from civilian show [side?] of government to RVNAF High Command or to himself. Khanh has obtained authority to appoint most general officers, to make promotions up to rank of Colonel, and for expanded mobilization authority for the High Command. He is currently attempting to obtain greater promotion and budgetary authority. Khanh's moves have been countered by recent action of "Young Turks" who ostensibly called Dalat meeting in order to obtain active expression of support for Huong government and inaugurate certain reforms in military services. In fact there is evidence that "Young Turks", rather than seeking more support for Huong, are trying to curb Khanh's personal power and even that some (notably I Corps Commander Gen Thi) may have ambitions of replacing Khanh as Commander in Chief. There is also some indication that Sub-Brigadier Generals who were last to review [receive?] their promotions under Khanh may be rallying around him as counter-balance to "Young Turks". In terms of practical support, military has put its full weight behind Huong's thus far successful efforts to curb demonstrations and maintain government's authority. This was demonstrated by actions of troops assigned to handle demonstrations, obtaining of authorization to draft demonstrators, and by forthright expressions of determination to preserve law and order on part of Saigon Commander, General Dong. There are two dangers against which we must remain alert: First an outright military attempt to seize power, and second greater erosion of governmental control over military from civilian to military hands. We have made number of attempts to influence latter. Ambassador interceded directly with Huong and Khanh (Embtels 1452 and 1460)/7/ to obtain modifications of proposed reorganization of armed forces which would have confused chain of command and given Chief of State stronger position than that intended in charter. He has impressed on Khanh and other Generals, most recently following his return from Washington, the necessity for full support for Huong (Embtel 1760)./8/ In addition Gen Westmoreland and his staff are monitoring closely current military organizational efforts and attempting to prevent any being adopted which are unsound and would erode Huong government's authority. We will continue our efforts along these lines. /7/Telegram 1452, November 10, transmitted a report on a meeting with Huong on November 9 to discuss the reorganization of the armed forces. Telegram 1460, also November 10, reported on a similar meeting with Khanh on November 10. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) /8/Telegram 1760, December 9, transmitted a report on a dinner that Westmoreland had given for Vietnamese military officers at which Taylor reported on his trip to Washington. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIII, Cables) Taylor
449. Letter From the President to Senator Mike Mansfield/1/ Washington, December 17, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Names File, Mansfield. No classification marking. Drafted by the President and McGeorge Bundy. Senator Mansfield was the Senate Majority Leader. DEAR MIKE: I want to thank you for your memorandum of December 9,/2/ which I read with care. I asked Mac Bundy to comment on it, and in particular to see which of your policy suggestions we could fit into our current program. He has written me a memorandum of comments, which I enclose as of possible interest. /2/The memorandum [4 pages of source text] was not declassified. (Ibid.) I think we have the same basic view of this problem and the same sense of its difficulties. The one suggestion in your memorandum which I myself would take direct issue with is that we are "overcommitted" there. Given the size of the stake, it seems to me that we are doing only what we have to do. That we could always do it better is clear, and it is in that spirit that I greatly welcome your memorandum on the subject. Sincerely, LBJ Enclosure Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/3/ Washington, December 16, 1964. /3/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy. Secret. SUBJECT 1. Senator Mansfield's memorandum is characteristically thoughtful. There is a difference in emphasis between him and us, but certainly no difference in fundamental purpose. I think he agrees with us that the most important task is to try to help in getting a more effective and better supported government in Saigon; of course this is a point that you have hammered on in every meeting in recent months. And we certainly agree with him "that American and Western interests are best served by the frugal use of American resources to forestall Chinese political and military domination of the area and to keep open an opportunity for the development of native institutions of national independence, regional cooperation and popularly responsible government." What seems frugal to us may seem too much to him, but this is not a difference in principle. 2. Senator Mansfield's memorandum makes seven policy suggestions and I comment on them in order: (1) We think it would be a mistake to make a commitment against any U.S. action of any kind beyond the borders of South Vietnam. On the other hand, you have repeatedly said that we seek no wider war and intend no reckless action. I myself do not see the grounds for the flatness of the Senator's recommendation, given the facts of infiltration and of North Vietnamese control over the Communists in the South. (2) There is a lot of force in the Senator's recommendation that we avoid entanglement on the Cambodian border. But Communist infiltration across this border is a fact, and it is hard to see how we can impose the stringent restrictions on the Vietnamese which the Senator suggests. As a practical matter, we do agree that there are other areas of higher priority, and this position is being urged on the Vietnamese authorities by the country team. We do not fully share the memorandum's very high judgment of Sihanouk, but we agree that it is important to negotiate differences if possible. I myself would suppose that negotiation implied some give on both sides, and we do not find much give in Sihanouk's current position. (3) We agree on the importance of supporting Souvanna Phouma; this has been our position for two years. We do not quite agree that the initiative in these relations should be "his totally" because that seems to us not a good way of conducting relations which involve U.S. commitments and responsibilities. Souvanna himself has given repeated indications of his satisfaction with our current policy in Laos. Souvanna, indeed, is considerably more favorable to U.S. action outside South Vietnam than the Senator's memorandum, so that if we followed all his advice we could not follow all of Senator Mansfield's. (4) We do not currently share the view that we should stand aside entirely from those who are trying to increase their contacts with Hanoi. We do recognize the advantages of detaching Hanoi from China, but at the moment we have also the quite tangible problem of what Hanoi is doing in South Vietnam. This seems to us to argue against a present policy of Free World friendliness to North Vietnam. (5) We agree with the general purpose of this recommendation, but it is not clear to us that peaceful unification of all Vietnam is the best slogan for a government which has all it can do to deal with its own immediate problems. Nevertheless, this suggestion is worth further consideration and it is being reviewed with the State Department. (6) No matter what course is taken, it seems likely to us that we face years of involvement in South Vietnam, though not necessarily "a vast increase in the commitment." The Administration has regularly insisted that this problem is not one which will be solved tomorrow, but it may well be important to make this point still more clear to the American people. In general, the Administration's policy seems to correspond to the view of most thoughtful Americans: We do not want a big war out there, and neither do we intend to back out on a 10-year-long commitment. (7) Right now we do not see how we can have useful exploratory talks with the Chinese, in the light of the extraordinary virulence of their public and private comments about the U.S. It takes two to conduct a conversation, and everything we currently know about Peking suggests that there is no interest there in a serious conversation on any terms that are remotely acceptable to us. Recent reports from leaders of the British Labour Party, who have been in touch with the Chinese and who might be expected to sympathize with suggestion No. 7, only confirm our current pessimistic assessment of this possibility. McGeorge Bundy/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
450. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 19, 1964-6:10 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis; Ivory. Drafted by William Bundy; cleared in draft with McGeorge Bundy, McNaughton, and Forrestal; and initialed by Harriman. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC. 1312. High-level meeting today/2/ reviewed Ops program for next two weeks which will be covered by septels through military channels./3/ Agreed to continue information policy of no comment in event of Hanoi charges, with any aircraft loss being handled from Washington according to circumstances. Reviewed third-country aid situation as covered septels. /2/In addition to Operations Plan 34A and infiltration, the meeting, which was held at the Department of State at 10 a.m. and was attended by William (Chairman) and McGeorge Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Vance, McNaughton, Cooper, Rowan, McCone, Mustin, and others, discussed Laos and third country aid including the formation of an international force. (JCS 2339/166, December 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files) /3/These telegrams have not been further identified. Main discussion centered on question of surfacing infiltration evidence. Our feeling is that press both here and in Saigon now accepts increased infiltration as fact but that formal GVN/US release could be misinterpreted and become vehicle undesirable speculation. Accordingly, we believe we should handle this in two ways: a. General background briefings both here and in Saigon should continue to indicate infiltration has increased without getting into specifics. b. If Saigon continues to be pressed for more precise information, but in response to such pressure rather than on our initiative, Saigon could have one or more deep background sessions with American press to indicate general nature and thrust of information now available. Such backgrounders should draw on Cooper presentation as revised/4/ emphasizing 1964 increase rather than revision estimates for earlier years, and should avoid specific numbers game except as tentative orders of magnitude and should stress that picture constantly being adjusted to reflect latest information some of which necessarily subject considerations military security. In other words, we would be seeking to get general picture into survey stories such as Grose article of November 1/5/ rather than as spot news commanding wide attention. FYI: We would anticipate senior officials here will testify to Congress this subject perhaps in late January and would then give as specific figures as possible stressing that they are estimates and in response to Congressional inquiry. End FYI. /4/On December 4, Cooper had sent to William Bundy a memorandum attaching a summary statement and detailed discussion of Viet Cong infiltration, a list of questions and answers that could be used in connection with its release, an explanation of past low estimates, and a list of supporting evidence. On December 9, Bundy attached Cooper's presentation to memoranda to Rusk, McNamara, McCone, McNaughton, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy. Cooper's and Bundy's memoranda are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. The attached four documents have not been found. /5/For text, see The New York Times, November 2, 1964, p. 1 Saigon 1866/6/ received after meeting concluded. In view above decision on formal infiltration briefing, we accept your judgment resumption your periodic background meetings now desirable. It remains important, however, to avoid sensitive areas and even generalized discussion of plans related to infiltration problem. We believe line should be that we obviously concerned this problem but that any discussion specific actions not useful. Our impression here is that knowledgeable press now simply assumes we are doing more but fully accepts that we are not talking about it. Naturally you could use your own discretion in discussions GVN political situation and on plans for action within SVN. /6/Telegram 1866, December 19, reported that relations with the press in Vietnam had improved in recent months, but failure to provide information on infiltration either in briefings or at backgrounders would jeopardize the situation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Re Vientiane 904 and Bangkok 798/7/ both posts should take cue from Saigon on information given to RTG and RLG. Saigon should inform in advance when and if background sessions scheduled to permit simultaneous oral handling in other posts but avoiding transmission written document. /7/In these telegrams, December 16 and 19, respectively, the Embassies reported that they had received Cooper's report on infiltration and wanted to present copies of it to local officials. (Ibid., POL 27-3 LAOS-VIET N and POL 23-7 VIET S) Ball
451. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 20, 1964--5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, London, Paris, Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC. Received at 9:20 a.m. 1870. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1869./2/ Alex Johnson and I immediately saw Huong this morning while General Throckmorton and General Moore went to JGS to persuade military group to hold up on press conference scheduled for 0900./3/ /2/Telegram 1869, December 20, 2 p.m., reported that a newly-formed Military Council had met late on December 19 and decided to dissolve the High National Council. Huang and Suu were informed about 2 a.m. on December 20, but Khanh, who had agreed to inform Taylor, failed to do so. (113id.) /3/Reports on this meeting were transmitted in MACV 005, 200520Z, and 008, 200750Z. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 12056) Briefly Prime Minister had no information beyond that he had been given when Khanh and the ten Young Turks called on him at 2:00 a.m. this morning to inform him of the action that had been taken and to ask that he remain as Prime Minister. He said that he was not asked to nor did he concur in dissolution of High National Council (although he told us he agreed that there were some problems with its composition) and told military delegation he would only remain if military did not constitute itself as a "state within a state," if the authority of the state were respected by all, and if those arrested who were not Communists would be released in due course. He said the military group had told him that Chief of State had accepted what they had done but the officers asked that if Chief of State did resign Huong also take over Suu's position in addition to remaining PM. Huong indicated his belief that although Chief of State was very weak and "soft" it was preferable that he remain but that if he did leave, Huong would be willing to accept the position if the military would truly support civilian government. He asked for our advice as to what he should do and that we should make clear to the military our view on the proper role of the military with respect to a civilian government. In reply to my questions he said he was not really sure who controlled the military, he felt the "Young Turks" were loyal to him but he had a question about Khanh and agreed that Khanh was perhaps not in real control. I said that I was not able to give him any advice until I had talked to the military group and had a better idea of what had happened. I would do this and get in touch with him later in the day. Meanwhile I observed that he seemed to have preserved his freedom of action and therefore was in a strong position to impose the conditions under which he would be willing to remain as Prime Minister. I also thought it important the government get out some statement later today. Immediately upon our return from seeing Huong we met at the Embassy with Ky (VNAF), Thieu (IV Corps), Thi (I Corps), and Cang also accompanied by General Throckmorton, General Moore and General Rowland./4/ /4/The meeting took place from 12:09 to 1:25, and the Embassy transmitted a summary of it as an enclosure to airgram A-493, December 24. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 433D) For other descriptions of this meeting, see Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 330-331; Ky, Twenty Years, pp. 53-55; and Johnson, Right Hand of Power, pp. 418-419. Recalling my conversations with them immediately following my return from Washington on the importance of government stability I very forcefully expressed my disappointment in the action they had taken, made it clear they had jeopardized US support in everything they had been seeking and asked for their explanations. Ky acting as spokesman gave long involved explanation revolving around point that action had been designed to remove disruptive elements in High National Council and allegedly strengthen unity. Only concrete point of complaint was the HNC had intervened in matter of officer retirements which designed to promote unity in armed forces. Took position that having taken action military now withdraw and return power to civilians, giving to Suu the legislative powers formerly exercised by HNC and especially the task of preparing for assembly elections. In response to my questions they alleged that Military Council was advisory only to General Khanh as C in C and that decisions were in fact taken by General Khanh. I pointed out that they had in fact usurped power which had been transferred to HNC and government last August 27 and all the world would interpret action simply as military coup. They had destroyed charter and whole basis for orderly development of government started last August 27 and which had so greatly encouraged US and rest of world. If Huong and Suu remained in office under these conditions it would make a mockery of civilian government, it being obvious they remaining only at sufferance of military and at best were military puppets subject to removal any time military displeased with them. Having now taken this action they had to accept responsibility and could not just wash their hands to [of] the affair and say it was up to the civilians to straighten it out. I strongly urged that they seek some way of walking [taking] back their statement of the dissolution of the High National Council and cancel press conference scheduled for this afternoon or if they unwilling to do this at least retain flexibility of action and not slam doors. If they did not make claim of having dissolved HNC perhaps some way might be worked out salvage the mess into which they have gotten themselves. They seemed somewhat impressed and left to see Khanh. I asked them to make an appointment for me with Khanh for 3 p.m. with whom they were lunching. Khanh called later and alleged inability to see me at that time because of press conference which he said had to take place. Thus I have not seen Khanh on this subject up to present moment. Taylor
452. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 20, 1964--7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, London, Paris, Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC. Received at 9:19 a.m. 1874. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1870./2/ Alex Johnson and I have just again seen Prime Minister Huong./3/ Deputy Prime Minister Vien was also with him. He said no one from the military had contacted him since the 2:00 a.m. call on him last night reported reftel. However, Huong had seen Chief of State Suu and they had decided that it was important for both of them to remain with the Chief of State taking over the legislative functions of the High National Council and the government taking on preparations for the formation of the assembly. They would thus stay on provided that there were a solemn undertaking by the military, confirmed by secret vote of each General, not again to "interfere in civilian affairs". /2/Supra. /3/The meeting took place at 4:30 p.m. I outlined my conversation with the four Generals (reftel), pointing out that in spite of my urgings on them, as well as on Khanh, they had nevertheless just held a press conference (Embtel 1871)/4/ at which, also in spite of my urgings, they had formally announced by a "Military Council Decree No. 1" the dissolution of the HNC. I said that it seemed to me the Prime Minister had only two choices, either to accept the action of the military or to denounce it. If he accepted the completely illegal action of the Military Council, situation would clearly be one of military dictatorship with only a civilian facade. Obviously his government would have no power and would be operating only in the shadow of the military. This would present us with an entirely new situation and I could not predict the attitude of my government. However, it could certainly jeopardize the possibility of our continued support, including everything I had discussed following my recent return from Washington. It was impossible for me to see how govt could accept the validity of a "decree" by the Military Council. (It was evident that up to this time neither he nor Vien had focused on the fact that the Military Council had issued what purported to be a decree and finally were impressed by the problem this presented.) /4/Telegram 1871, December 20, 5 p.m., transmitted the text of Military Council Decree No. 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) The text of the proclamation read at the press conference was transmitted in telegram 1872 from Saigon. (Ibid.) I said that it seemed to me that he was in a strong position to exact conditions from the military, and that as a price for remaining in office he should do so. I suggested that these conditions should be: 1. That he not accept the legality of the Military Council decree purporting to dissolve the HNC; in rejecting it, he might use some face-saving words about the favorable intentions of the Generals. 2. That he agree in consultation with Suu, Vinh (Vice President of HNC) and Huyen (HNC member who seems to be respected by the military) to revamp the membership of the HNC (or an analogous committee under a different name). 3. That military immediately release to the custody of the government all prisoners they had taken; and 4. That there be a specific undertaking by the military to support his government, including a willingness to participate in it and share responsibility by accepting a Cabinet post, such as Ministry of Defense. Huong and Vien agreed to these conditions, expressed intention of immediately seeing Khanh and then having a Cabinet meeting later this evening. They will promptly inform us of results. I told them they could say bluntly to Khanh and the military that we have lost confidence in either a true military dictatorship or a military dictatorship behind the facade of a civilian government and under such circumstances there was real doubt USG could continue support SVN. Will report further developments soonest./5/ /5/At 10:06 a.m. on December 20, the Department of State transmitted a flash telegram drafted by William Bundy which reads: "Entirely agree with line you are taking. We are following closely." (Telegram 1313 to Saigon; ibid.) Taylor
453. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 20, 1964-11 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CIA, the White House, and JCS. Received at 2:43 p.m. 1877. For Secretary Rusk. DOD for McNamara. White House for Bundy. CIA for McCone. JCS for Wheeler. At the end of an active day, it may be well to record a few personal impressions of the events which began in the middle of the night of 19-20 December and which are still in progress. It is fairly clear that the Generals had been developing for some time a growing antipathy for certain members of the HNC because they were considered hostile to the interests of the armed forces or because they were partisans of Big Minh or for both reasons. Apparently it was the opposition of the HNC to the retirement proposal (Embtels 1857 and 1858)/2/ which would have ousted Minh from active service which brought matter to a head. There seems to have been some unexplained feeling of urgency that action had to be taken last night "to avoid a mutiny in the armed forces" as one of the Young Turks described the situation to us. In the background, there was also the impatience with civilian politicians which is constantly on the lips of the military. /2/Telegram 1857, December 19, reported on a conversation between Taylor and Huong on the draft administrative retirement order. Telegram 1858, also December 19, described a conversation with Suu on the retirement proposal. (Ibid., POL 1 VIET S) The action taken against the HNC and the round-up of some of its members along with certain offending politicians seem to have received the approval of all (or a vast majority) of the Council of the Armed Forces which. in turn. includes most of the influential Generals. However, its authors did not look much beyond the pleasure of striking at their civilian adversaries and certainly gave no serious consideration to the consequences which they are now beginning to perceive with some dismay. Apparently they had hoped to break the political crockery and then retire to the more congenial task of fighting the VC. How to continue the work of the HNC in forming the national assembly without a HNC was considered only to the extent of hoping to pass the responsibility to Chief of State Suu who, everyone knows, is utterly incapable of discharging this responsibility even with extensive staff assistance. One may suspect that the Generals are trying to build up Suu's powers because of the ease of manipulating him. Suu certainly not capable of resisting the military; Huong is capable only with strong US encouragement. At the outset of our meeting this evening (Embtel 1874),/3/ he was quite prepared to accept the fait accompli presented by the Generals and stay in office pro bono publico until Alex Johnson and I pointed out some of the implications. It was Armed Forces Council Decree No. 1 announcing the dissolution of the HNC which Huong only saw as we arrived which convinced him of the need of some kind of understanding with the military before agreeing to remain in office. /3/Supra. Another outstanding point in the situation is that the Generals have felt no reluctance in acting without consultation with US representatives and in disregarding our advice on important matters once we became aware of developments. I specifically asked Khanh to put off a press conference if possible or, if one were held, to avoid reference to the dissolution of the HNC. Nevertheless, the conference was held and Armed Forces Council Decree No. 1 was issued. Perhaps most serious of all is the deliberate disregard of the message which I brought from Washington and personally transmitted to most of these Generals that continued and increased US aid for SVN depended upon governmental stability and evidence of national unity. We are not yet clear as to whether Khanh has lost control of the "Young Turks" or is using them to his own ends. As I see it at this moment, we are faced with four possibilities: a. Huong, despite our advice, may agree to continue in office without obtaining adequate concessions from the Generals. In this case, he will be the prisoner of the Generals and thus his government unable to speak with any authority or to cooperate effectively with us in the prosecution of the war. Every governmental official will be looking over his shoulder to see if the military headsman is watching him. b. Huang may attempt to impose conditions on the military for his remaining in office, fail and resign. Suu may then persuade some civilian politicians to form a new government but it would be even more impotent than Huong under the situation of subparagraph a. above. c. Huong may resign and the military may move in and reestablish a military dictatorship such as existed up to last August. If Khanh were the head, the government would have little chance of improving on Khanh's former sorry performance. Under another General, we might hope for better things--depending on the General. After flaunting US advice in the present circumstances, any military government is likely to give us even greater problems--if the Generals get away with it this time. d. Huong may make his conditions stick with the Generals. This will be good news and the ensuing government will be worth a serious try. As the tenor of the foregoing analysis indicates, I can see good only in the last possibility and will do everything possible to realize it. If any of the other developments occur, we will have to give serious consideration to some shock treatment to restore a sense of responsibility to the leadership of this unhappy land. Taylor
454. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor) and the Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese Armed Forces (Khanh), Saigon, December 21, 1964, 10:30 a.m./1/ /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69. Secret. U. Alexis Johnson, the only other participant, presumably prepared this record. The source text indicates the meeting took place at Khanh's office at the JGS. For other accounts of the meeting, see Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 331, and Johnson, Right Hand of Power, p. 418. SUBJECT (Following is a more complete account than that contained in Embassy telegram 1881/2/ of the foregoing conversation based on notes made at the time by Mr. Johnson. It was from these same notes that the conversation was recounted to Prime Minister Huong immediately following the meeting with General Khanh.)/3/ /2/Telegram 1881, December 21, transmitted a summary of this conversation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) /3/Taylor reported on his conversation with Huong, which immediately followed that with Khanh, in telegram 1880 from Saigon, December 21. Among other things, Taylor told him that he had received word from Washington agreeing entirely with the position that he had taken with both men. (Ibid.) We met General Khanh in his office at the JGS at 10:30 a.m., December 21. He was alone. The conversation was entirely in French. As usual, General Khanh had a large pad with him and, on occasion, took notes during the conversation. General Khanh was very self-possessed and the atmosphere throughout was very calm, matter of fact and straightforward. Ambassador Taylor opened the conversation by asking who was responsible for the action of December 20, recalling that the previous day the four Generals had stated that the Armed Forces Council was only advisory to Khanh and that the final responsibility was his./4/ /4/Regarding Taylor's meeting with the Generals, see Document 451. General Khanh replied that it was "a decision of the Army", a decision by all of the Armed Forces Council including himself--"It is not my Army". He said that it was not only his decision but that of everyone else. However, "I am responsible--je suis responsable." He said that as Commander-in-Chief he must listen when the great majority of the officers express their opinion. The decision was taken to "limit the deterioration of the situation". Under the Charter, the High National Council had only two missions--that is, to act as the legislative branch during the interim and to provide for the formation of a National Assembly. It had exceeded its authority. Ambassador Taylor asked what was the authority for taking action against the High National Council. General Khanh replied, "Those fellows in the Council are not good-ces yens ne vent pas bons", citing Quyen as a Communist. General Khanh then referred to the proposed retirement of the nine generals and other officers and said that "Mirth's people" in the High National Council had opposed this. This was an "unconstitutional" act by the High National Council. Now that the matter has been taken care of, "We will return to our position". Suu had been given the responsibility for the legislative functions of the High National Council and, if necessary, Suu could form a Committee of Lawyers (Conseiller des Juristes) to assist him. However, there was little in fact to be done as the laws for the election of the National Assembly were already completed. Ambassador Taylor then asked whether this meant the re-entry of the Army into politics to which General Khanh replied that, "It would remain in its role--reste dans son role". Ambassador Taylor then inquired as to whether the Armed Forces Council replaces the High National Council to which General Khanh replied that the Armed Forces Council was not the MRC. After taking this "sole" decision, it returns to its military role. Ambassador Taylor inquired as to whether General Khanh thought the Government could, in fact, govern after the events of December 20. The Ambassador recalled his conversations following his return from his last trip to Washington on the importance of stability in the government and having a loyal ally with whom we could work with confidence. He did not feel that the act of December 20 was consistent with this. In effect, there would be a civilian facade with the military shadow hanging over them. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to cooperate with such a setup. General Khanh replied that loyalty was a reciprocal matter and that Vietnam was not a vassal of the United States. Ambassador Taylor said that he could not but say that he had lost confidence in General Khanh. General Khanh replied that the Ambassador should keep to his place as Ambassador and, as Ambassador, it was really not appropriate for him to be dealing in this way with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on a political matter nor was it appropriate for him to have summoned some of his Generals to the Embassy yesterday. Ambassador Taylor replied that General Khanh had faced him with a fait accompli without even the courtesy of informing him until long after it was all over. General Khanh replied that he had not wanted to disturb the Ambassador during the middle of the night and had informed "Colonel Miller", asking that he inform the Ambassador. The Ambassador said that informing "Colonel Miller" was not informing him. General Khanh finally appeared to admit that he should have taken better steps earlier to inform the Ambassador. General Khanh then said, "I am ready to quit." He asked the Ambassador whether he thought this would be helpful in the situation to which the Ambassador replied in the affirmative. He indicated that he was thinking of possibly taking command of a Corps or retiring from the Army and becoming a civilian. What would the Ambassador think of that? The Ambassador replied that this was entirely a matter between General Khanh and his government, but that he saw no objection if, as a civilian living in the country, Khanh was loyally supporting the government. The Ambassador said that he had previously heard that General Khanh was thinking of taking a trip abroad--did he have any thought of this--to which General Khanh replied in the negative. General Khanh then referred to Diem saying the U.S. had not been very "loyal" to him. The Ambassador replied that some Americans may have perhaps done things that they had no authority to do. General Khanh then indicated that he was attracted by the thought of leaving the country and asked what our views would be if "his generals" did not agree, or the Prime Minister would not accept his resignation. The Ambassador said these were entirely matters between him and his government. General Khanh asked how long he had to reach a decision to which the Ambassador replied that he was certainly not setting any time limits and felt that General Khanh should give serious consideration to a prompt resolution of the problem that had been created. As we left, he again referred to the possibility of leaving the country and said that he would get in touch with the Ambassador./5/ /5/Following the meeting, Taylor reported that Khanh was prepared to step down and asked for funds to allow him to travel. (Telegram 1890 from Saigon, December 22; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Department of State agreed that Taylor should accept Khanh's offer (telegram 1321 to Saigon, December 22; ibid.), but its telegram informing Taylor crossed with another Taylor message stating that General Khanh was reconsidering his offer to step down. (Telegram 1897 from Saigon, December 22; ibid.)
455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 21, 1964--8:36 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared with Westmoreland and McNaughton, and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC. 1319. State/Defense Message. Continue to believe line you are following entirely sound. We have talked over situation with Westmoreland and throw out following possible ideas for bringing military back into line and at same time making gestures that would ensure their support for Huong both basically and against possible Buddhist threat. We naturally continue to rely on your discretion whether or how any of these ideas should be applied. 1. Appears important that Huong himself get credit for dismissing Khanh and Westmoreland thinks such action would probably have favorable reception among most senior officers particularly Young Turks. 2. Perhaps even before announcing such action Huong might consult with members Armed Forces Council collectively or individually and indicate that he seeking their advice on appointment of successor, making clear that decision must be his and that officer appointed must necessarily have full powers as commander-in-chief. (Westmoreland believes Council members accept necessity basic unity of command and avoidance any semblance committee decision as opposed to advisory function to commander-in-chief.) 3. Hopefully such discussion might produce consensus on candidate. As we understand it, Ky has indicated to Westmoreland his own preference stick with Air Force and has told Westmoreland natural leader might be Thieu. However, latter is Catholic and Dai Viet, and appointment might give Buddhists issue. Our judgment is that Thi less stable than Ky himself, and Westmoreland suggests Dong or Co as possible dark horses, who have avoided involvement in politics. Criteria would appear to be most complete possible acceptance by senior officers but also not giving Buddhists any easy issue. We gather Ky not popular with Buddhists but suppose that would be equally true of any general prepared to act firmly in support of Huong Government. 4. Huong might express willingness, after new commander-in-chief appointed to discuss disposition of senior officers and to assure proper system for promotions and appointments throughout armed forces. He might offer handle question of senior officers by review of individual cases and possibly by retiring some to accept appropriate senior civilian government positions for which they qualified. 5. Above possible actions would all be aimed at strengthening Huong's personal position, which seems cardinal objective, while at same time meeting all reasonable desires senior generals. In effect above steps would be aimed at compensating Armed Forces Council for rescinding decree about HNC. Questions of replacing some HNC members and of their release are separate but might of course become integral parts of total package. Rusk
456. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 21, 1964--8:39 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal and William Bundy, cleared with McNaughton, and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC. 1320. In support of your efforts to persuade military at least partially undo damage Saturday's/2/ actions, we have also been considering possible leverage we might apply in the event you concluded it was necessary. /2/December 19. If dispute continues unresolved, most obvious action might be withholding approval any pending US assistance actions and letting this become known. You are in best position evaluate whether these would impress generals or conversely hurt Huong's position. In addition, following steps aimed more specifically at military have occurred to us: 1. Suspend Operation Barrel Roll. We not clear whether this would have significant effect on attitude of generals, and whether they are aware of our operations and value them at least psychologically. We also concerned suspension might give wrong signal to Hanoi. On other hand, publicity or aircraft loss under present circumstances might have adverse effects both here and in Saigon. Since next operation not scheduled until 24 December would appreciate your comments for further review this possibility. Obviously, any action in this connection should not be discussed with generals since this might imply commitment to resume or increase if they behave. 2. Instruct all or selected corps and division advisors make known [to] their counterpart our dissatisfaction with blow by military at structure civilian government, perhaps suspending for the time being further contacts with their counterparts. 3. Stand down temporarily Farmgate. 4. Suspend logistical airlift where critical supply shortages do not exist. On balance, we inclined believe none except possibly first and second steps would produce desired results. Obviously any would hamper over-all war effort, especially if continued for very long. We have also considered and rejected possibility of cutting essential POL and direct military supplies. Similarly, we do not favor suspension or interruption CPI, since it would primarily affect civilian confidence in Huong Government. We are prepared consider any other suggestions which Mission may have on means of bringing home to Armed Forces Council necessity of restoring reality of civilian government. Rusk
457. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 22, 1964--7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House and CINCPAC. Received at 7:43 a.m. 1895. CINCPAC for POLAD. FYI. Following is text of a statement which is being made available to MACV advisors and other Mission personnel to use as background for discussions of recent events in Saigon and USG position. MACV advisors down to division level are being encouraged to initiate discussions in their discretion. Sector advisors will use it to respond to discussions initiated by their counterparts. Zorthian is using text as basis for background statement at this evening's press conference: The United States Govt appreciates the motives which led to the actions that were taken by the Armed Forces Council last Sunday but feels that the consequences were not fully appreciated. The armed forces gained much credit and stature, not only in Vietnam but throughout the world, by their statesmanlike decision of last August to provide for an orderly transfer of power to a civilian govt and an orderly method of establishing that govt and its institutions. While progress in establishing that govt and preparing the way for a national assembly had not been perfect nor satisfactory to everyone, the record was very creditable and unique in the history of Vietnam. All of the friends of Vietnam were much encouraged and, as the Ambassador of the United States has publicly stated, the United States was prepared to move forward with additional help for Vietnam, including help in dealing with the problem of infiltration from the North. Although it is realized that this was probably not the intent, the action that was taken last Sunday was immediately and understandably interpreted by all the world as another military coup, setting back all that had been accomplished since last August and again demonstrating the political instability of Vietnam and raising serious question as to the reliability of Vietnam as an ally. It is inescapable conclusion that if a group of military officers could issue decisions abolishing one of the three fundamental organs of the governmental structure, that is, the High National Council, and carry out military arrests of- citizens, that group of military officers has clearly set themselves above and beyond the structure of government in Vietnam. Even though those officers might profess that they would not do the same thing again, the fact is that there would be nothing to prevent their similarly seeking to change the Prime Minister or the Chief of State. Thus, even though the armed forces have expressed their support of the Prime Minister and the Chief of State, these civilian officials would have no real power, nor would they be able to speak authoritatively for Vietnam. They and other govts with which they are dealing would always be conscious of the fact that they are holding office only at the sufferance of the military and are subject to removal at any time by them. Thus in fact two govts would be set up, a civilian govt acting simply as a facade with no real authority with a "government" of military officers hovering over them at all times. There would thus be the image of a puppet govt under the domination of military leaders who had no real responsibility but who actually exercised the power. As far as the United States is concerned, this would present a most difficult situation for the United States Government which would not know where to find the authoritative voice of Vietnam. The United States would not be able to rely on the commitments of the civilian government and thus would not have an effective government with which it could deal on the host of matters of common interest. The United States reps in Vietnam are naturally concerned over the situation which has arisen and are seeking ways to assist in finding an honorable solution. Taylor
458. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 22, 1964--10 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Confidential; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. Received at 10:14 a.m. 1900. Embtel 1896./2/ From reftel and subsequent tels it is evident Khanh has thrown down gauntlet. /2/Telegram 1396, December 22, 3 p.m., transmitted the text of a statement which Khanh had read over Radio Vietnam at 7 p.m. and had circulated in Vietnamese, French, and English. The statement gave his reasons for the dissolution of the High National Council and included the following phrases: "We make sacrifices for the country's independence and the Vietnamese people's liberty, but not to carry out the policy of any foreign country." "All of us are determined to fulfill our duty as the sons of our time. Better to live poor but proud as free citizens of an independent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of the foreigners and Communists." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) In order immediately dissuade him from any illusion that he can turn this into personal vendetta between myself or Embassy and himself, strongly urge that Dept issue formal statement, if possible at noon briefing, drawn heavily from background statement contained Embtel 1895./3/ Hope such statement could also be given heavy play by VOA. /3/Supra. Taylor
459. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, December 22, 1964--12:58 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXIV, Cables. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CIA, and the White House. Rusk's Appointment Book shows that he met with William Bundy and Forrestal at 11:22 a.m. and 12:40 p.m., and with Forrestal alone at 1:10 p.m., presumably to discuss the drafting of this telegram. (Ibid.) 1324. From Secretary for Ambassador. Your 1900/2/ received too late for us to arrange for statement at noon briefing, particularly since President and SecDef are in Texas, and I feel that on a matter of this importance there must be full consultation. /2/Supra. I expect, however, that by the end of the day we will be able to send you by flash telegram a draft of a statement which we could put out here and which could be carried by VOA during the day in Saigon./3/ /3/See footnote 3, Document 462. I badly need your advice on several points which I feel have to be considered in charting our future course. 1. What is your best judgment as to the support Khanh can mobilize among his military colleagues? Westmoreland and Ambassador Khiem have indicated that Khanh's position is weak, but under the existing circumstances, we need to be as sure as we can of degree of significant military support he may have been able to muster. 2. Who are the most likely candidates to replace Khanh and what do we expect would be their relationship with political groups in Vietnam, with the Huong Government and with ourselves? 3. We must attempt downplay personality issue between USG and Khanh which risks coalescing anti-US sentiment Should we not measure all our steps in terms of encouraging unity among the Vietnamese, stating that this is the main objective of U.S. policy. That unity can best be achieved by a process of consultation among the important political groups, including the military, so as to restore effective government commanding broad support where no one group dictates to the others. I should like to emphasize, as I see it, that political unity within the South Vietnamese leadership is the utterly fundamental object of our policy and a basic condition for any prospect of success in South Vietnam. Every step, whether concerning the future of a particular South Vietnamese personality or otherwise, should be measured by its effect upon strengthening or weakening unity. There are several circumstances which could face us with the elementary decision as to our role in South Vietnam. But, because of the far-reaching consequences of any such decision, we must do our best to create circumstances in which that issue does not arise. I wish to compliment you on the vigor with which you have pursued this issue of unity since your return from Washington. I would much appreciate any further thoughts you have on the relation between this present crisis and the issue of unity. I shall be available this afternoon and evening, and you may wish to arrange a telecon in the early morning your time for further discussion. Rusk
460. Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 23, 1964--6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House. Received at 6:01 a.m. 1915. For Secretary from Ambassador. Deptel 1324./2/ This cable responds to questions 1 and 2 of reftel. Since his collapse before the Buddhist pressures last August, Khanh's standing with his military colleagues has been low. On several occasions, they would have dropped him except for the understanding that he had U.S. support. /2/Supra. His position now is somewhat different. Insofar as the current issues are concerned he seems to have the full support of the 20 Generals of the Council of the Armed Forces who include the "Young Turks" and the corps commanders who accept responsibility with him for the illegal acts of December 20. Since they are all out on the same limb, that uncomfortable position imposes considerable unity in the ranks. Khanh is smart and will try to hold them in line by using anti-American themes and reminding them how offended they have been by U.S. disapproval of their actions. However, in the long run, he will probably fail to retain their support because of the normal tendency to bickering and disunity within any VN group and because of his personal unpopularity with most of the Generals. As to likely candidates to replace Khanh, I can only mention a few who seem to us the best qualified. General Nguyen Huu Co, now commanding II Corps, seems to be an able soldier who commands the respect of the Vietnamese and Americans close to him. So far as we can see, he has thus far stayed clear of politics. General Pham Van Dong has handled himself very well in his sensitive assignment as CG, Capital Military District, and has the confidence of Prime Minister Huong. Although one of the oldest and most senior officers in length of service, he works closely with the Young Turks. General Nguyen Van Thieu, commanding IV Corps, is usually included in our list of possible candidates. He has had wide experience including that of Chief of Staff, Armed Forces and I know General Westmoreland thinks well of his military ability. However, he has two political strikes on him--he is a Catholic and a Dai Viet, hence a target for the Buddhists. I am not putting Big Minh on the list. Even if he were not lazy and generally incompetent, he is too controversial a figure in the officer corps to consider for Commander-in-Chief. With regard to their relationships to the political groups, Dong is not liked by the turbulent elements of the Buddhists or of the students because of his execution of the orders of Huong to put down demonstrations. Thieu would have the disadvantages cited above. I do not know of any political counts against Co. Of the three, I believe that Huong knows only Dong and likes him. I have no reason to believe that Co and Dong could not work well with the Huong government. However, Thieu, having many of Khanh's characteristics, would have much greater difficulty. As to desirability from U.S. point of view, General Throckmorton, speaking for MACV, would rate the three in this order: Co, Dong, Thieu. If General Westmoreland is still available, I suggest you get his personal opinion. Before signing off, I must point out that, while Khanh is definitely dispensable, no officer in the RVNAF stands out like a light as his possible successor. Any choice will involve some risk as we will never fully know his capability and limitations until we try him. In any event, the choice will by no means be entirely with us. Taylor
461. Message From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor) to the President/1/ Saigon, December 23, 1964--6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Transmitted as telegram 1916 from Saigon, which is the source text. According to another copy, the telegram was drafted by Taylor. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-157-69) Telegram 1916 was received in the Department of State at 8:33 a.m. Embtel 1826./2/ As you have seen from our recent cables, we are in the midst of another first-class governmental crisis in Saigon. The infighting is going on on three fronts: the govt versus the Generals, the Generals versus the US Ambassador and the Buddhists versus the govt. /2/Document 447. On the first front, negotiations are now in progress between PriMin Huong and General Khanh to find way to patch up the situation precipitated by the acts of the Generals on December 20 in undertaking to abolish the High National Council and in arresting some 22 officials and politicians. We are urging Huong to drive a hard bargain with the military, insisting at a minimum on refusing to recognize the validity of the abolition of the High National Council, on the release of the political prisoners to the govt and on a public declaration of support by the Generals for Huong govt and statement of their willingness to cooperate with and participate in it if requested. At the moment Khanh is insisting on acceptance of the abolition of the High National Council and is acting as if he intended to hold the prisoners hostage until the govt gives in. I am doing my best to keep Huong bucked up but it is hard to put starch into him because he believes the Buddhist threat is his foremost problem and thus feels he cannot afford to alienate the military at this time. I have assured him that he has an important trump in his ability to threaten resignation if his conditions are not met. I have the feeling that General Khanh and the other Generals are most anxious to keep him in office and have no satisfactory replacement for him. With regard to the Generals versus the Ambassador, the former are acting greatly offended by my disapproval of their recent actions privately expressed to four of their number/3/ and resent our efforts to strengthen the Huong govt against their pressures. One unfortunate effect of our action in opposing the Generals has been to drive them closer to Khanh who senses the opportunity to solidify his military position by pursuing an anti-Taylor, anti-US line. Although it is to neither of our interests to conduct public quarrel, I am afraid that Khanh intends to make publicly offensive statements which it will be hard to ignore. Once the immediate heat has subsided and the Generals have reverted to a more reasonable mood, I shall try to restore normal relations with them. /3/See Document 451. The Buddhist front has been relatively quiet. Indeed, we have received intimations they are deliberately laying off the govt while it is being threatened by the military. Although Huong has always suspected some collusion between Khanh and the Buddhists, our contacts among the latter indicate nothing but dislike for him. However, the Buddhist issue is still with us and may flare up again at any time. In summary, we still do not know the outcome of the political events of the weekend. We are telling Huong that he has only two choices which are acceptable: (1) To stay in office after imposing hard conditions on the Generals or (2) to resign and force the military to take responsibility for their actions. I am afraid he may be tempted to temporize and carry on with the challenge of the military unanswered; but if he does so, it will be only to postpone the showdown and will leave us with a cowed government which cannot make decisions with any assurance of being allowed to carry them out. Particularly since such situation would further aggrandize Khanh, who is already pretty insufferable, it would be very difficult for us to work with such a lineup. Taylor/4/ /4/Telegram 1916 bears this typed signature.
462. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 23, 1964--8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. Received at 9:19 a.m. 1919. This afternoon I called on Vice Premier Vien and Chief of State Suu in that order to discuss with them their meeting this morning with Khanh (see Embtel 1914)./2/ Vien's account of the meeting was essentially the same as one given me by Huong with one important exception. He anticipates that the events of the next few days will take the following form: after three or four days Khanh, he hopes, will release the prisoners taken over the weekend, after which the government will then reassemble the available members of the HNC and set them to work again at their old stand in Gia Long Palace. Thus, without any announcement, they will nullify in effect the attempt of the Generals to abolish the HNC. At the same time, the government will announce its intention of overhauling the membership of the Council. /2/Telegram 1914, December 23, 6 p.m., reported that Huong had invited Taylor and Johnson to his office to report on a meeting with Khanh held earlier in the day. Huong indicated that the meeting had "gone very badly" but that Khanh would accept the four conditions for Huong and Suu remaining in office (see Document 452), except for the restoration of the High National Council. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) I told Vien that this was all very well except for the possibility that Khanh may hold the prisoners as hostage until he gets agreement with the |