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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume I Vietnam, 1964
Department of State |
III. The McNamara-Taylor Mission To Vietnam and the McNamara Report, March 4-April 3 /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-36-71. Top Secret. Drafted by Taylor. [Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.] 4. He then opened the subject of our coming trip to Saigon and asked what course I was inclined to recommend at this moment. I told him that, in general, I felt our program should consist of two main parts; one, an intensive continuation of the counterinsurgency campaign within South Vietnam and, second, a progressive program of selective air and naval attacks against North Vietnam using means beyond those employed in the past. The other Chiefs expressed themselves generally in accord. They also were of the opinion that it was unlikely that the ChiComs would intervene in strength. However, once embarked on the program the US must carry it to success, cost what may. 5. The President accepted the need for punishing Hanoi without debate, but pointed to some other practical difficulties, particularly the political ones with which he was faced. It is quite apparent that he does not want to lose South Vietnam before next November nor does he want to get the country into war. 6. The President is impressed with the danger of another coup. He feels we must make General Khanh "our boy" and proclaim the fact to all and sundry. He wants to see Khanh in the newspapers with McNamara and Taylor holding up his arms. 7. He directed a check made on all requests from Harkins for help since November to see if any have been rejected or significantly curtailed. He anticipates queries from Congress on this score. 8. He asked that we initiate a State/DOD/CIA/COMUSMACV examination of the realism of Senator Mansfield's plan for a neutralization of North and South Vietnam. He expressed indignation over the Saigon article by Keyes Beech dated 22 February (attached)/2/ which revealed US military thinking on an expansion of the war. He directed me to talk to Harkins about it./3/ /2/Not attached. /3/A handwritten note on the margin reads: "Done, MDT, 13 March '64." Maxwell D. Taylor/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 71. Summary Record of the 523d Meeting of the National Security Council, White House, Washington, March 5, 1964, 4:30 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, Tab 4. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. An attached attendance list indicates that 23 persons attended the Vietnam portion of the meeting. 1. Secretary McNamara's Trip to South Vietnam Secretary McNamara gave an oral summary of what he intends to accomplish by visiting South Vietnam. In a report which he will make upon his return, he will comment on the current strength of the Khanh government, the outlook for the future, and on alternative courses of action which might be taken to improve the situation in Vietnam. He said he would be prepared to make both an oral and a written report. Mr. Bundy commented that the President was not being asked to make decisions prior to the return of Secretary McNamara. Secretary Rusk said he was taking a sober view, even a pessimistic view of developments in South Vietnam. Listing the points of weakness in the situation in Vietnam was a way for us to concentrate on courses of action to overcome these weaknesses. Our attention should be concentrated on what we can do to improve the course we are now on. The President asked whether it was true that all recommendations made by Ambassador Lodge had been dealt with without exception--promptly and generally favorably. Secretary McNamara replied affirmatively, as did Director Bell and Director McCone. Secretary Rusk said the only exception was the proposal which Ambassador Lodge had made with respect to how to handle de Gaulle's support of the neutralization of Vietnam. [Here follows item 2 which was unrelated to Vietnam.] Bromley Smith/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
72. Letter From the President to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ Washington, March 5, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 1470. Presidential Instructions. No classification marking. Dear Mr. Secretary: I am giving you this personal letter instead of any more formal instruction, as you leave on your important mission to Saigon, but I shall be grateful if you will share it with the senior officers who are going with you. I will not ask you now to prepare a formal report, but I do hope that you and your colleagues will work together to bring back the most careful possible assessment of the situation and of the best possible courses of action for improving it. Some of these possibilities have been discussed in a preliminary way here in recent days, but what we now need is an assessment of all the possibilities and needs on the spot. I particularly want your opinions and recommendations to be framed in the light of your discussions with Ambassador Lodge and his colleagues, and with the leaders of the Vietnamese Government. I look to you, as its senior officer, to coordinate the work of this mission. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
73. Letter From the President to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ Washington, March 5, 1964 /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Presidential Instructions. Secret. Dear Bob: One of the most important things you can do for me in South Vietnam is to talk privately on my behalf with Cabot Lodge. I have the highest regard for him as a patriot and a public servant, and I want him to know at first-hand of my determination that we in Washington must do everything we can to back him up as the top American in Vietnam. He is an old friend of mine from the Senate, and the simplest way of emphasizing my high opinion of him to you is to say that I recommended him for your job after the election of 1952. When we had our first meeting with Ambassador Lodge, on November 24,2 I told him that I counted on him to take full charge of our effort there and to press our views as strongly as possible on the Government. I also told him that we would back him up in every part of the country team. We have made all the personnel changes which he has requested, and which it was quite proper for him to request in his effort to discharge his responsibilities. You should make it clear that we mean to continue to be responsive to his needs, and that just as we count on him to insist on first-class performance out there, we have taken fairly energetic steps of our own to ensure that the team in Washington working on Vietnam is as good as we can make it. /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 635-637. I have asked the Ambassador to make sure that we know of any new recommendations and proposals which he or his colleagues may wish to press with us, and on his only specific proposal relating to our own support of the struggle in Vietnam-the support for the military pay raise-I believe we have responded promptly./3/ We are also doing all that we can through Ambassador Bohlen, and here in Washington with Ambassador Alphand, to get across to the French the importance of their own posture in Vietnam, and while Bohlen does not. think we can get the public statements that Ambassador Lodge wants, we have pressed him to do everything that he can in this direction. /3/See footnote 2, Document 53. On March 9, Forrestal prepared for McGeorge Bundy a memorandum assessing "the extent to which we have responded to Lodge's requests." After reviewing the cable traffic since January 1, Forrestal concluded that there were only two major policy requests from Lodge which were still unresolved: the proposed statement from de Gaulle clarifying his call for neutralism of Vietnam, and Lodge's tentative requests for bringing pressure on North Vietnam. Forrestal explained that the need for considerable planning and policy decisions at the highest level were responsible for these requests going partially unanswered. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V, Memos; published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 128C) McGeorge Bundy passed a copy of Forrestal's memorandum to the President on March 11 stating that further action should await McNamara's return and "that I think we are in slightly better shape on both issues than Forrestal makes out." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. II) As I read the messages from Ambassador Lodge, these are the specific areas in which he has asked for our support, but I want you to be sure to tell him that we will rely on him and his associates to keep us fully and currently apprised of their needs as they see them. We may not always be able to achieve what they ask, but we will always try, within the limits of our resources and capacities. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
74. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Members of the McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam/1/ Washington, March 5, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Special Papers. Confidential. Addressed to Bell, McCone, McNaughton, William Bundy, Sullivan, and Sylvester who, with the addition of McNamara and Taylor, made up the mission to South Vietnam. They arrived in Saigon on March 8 and returned to Washington on March 12. SUBJECT The purpose of our mission is to appraise the current strength of the SVN government; to review the political and military trends of the past four months; to estimate the outlook for the future, assuming no change in current US policies; and to evaluate alternative courses of action in the event it appears current policies will not lead to attainment of our objective. I do not propose to submit a final written report to the President immediately following our return. Instead, I shall prepare a draft memorandum from which another report will be made. I hope it will be possible for the senior members of the party to concur in all significant points in the draft memorandum; in the event we cannot agree, the dissenting views will be expressed fully as footnotes to the report. While in SVN, I believe we should minimize both formal and informal contacts with the press. Please review your plans for any such discussions with Arthur Sylvester before they take place and inform him of the substance of the discussions after the event. I do not believe it should be necessary for individual members of the party, while in SVN, to send interim reports to their Departments or Agencies in Washington. If at any time you believe such a report is required, please furnish me a copy of the proposed message. Robert S. McNamara
75. Memorandum for the Record by Brigadier General W.W. Stromberg of the Army General Staff/1/ Saigon, March 8, 1964. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-233-69. Top Secret; US Eyes Only. Stromberg sent a copy of this memorandum to Lodge, Taylor, McNamara, and Harkins. This morning, Sunday, 8 March 1964, I paid a call on General Duong van Minh. A single soldier stood guard behind the closed gate. I saw no other security except possibly three civilian occupants of a white jeep across the street. One of these assisted me in gaining entrance by speaking in Vietnamese to the soldier guard who spoke neither English nor French. At his residence in Saigon, I presented General Minh with a box of orchids and the red canary which was the personal gift of General Wheeler. When I explained to him that the gifts were a token of the high esteem with which he is held in the Pentagon as a soldier and patriot, he was visibly touched. Tam, his son was in the house as was General Kim's son whose name I did not catch. Mrs. Minh joined us for a brief period. She appeared nervous and sad. I attempted to carry out our discussion in English as I had assumed General Minh had continued his English lessons since I had last seen him in 1961, but he quickly reverted to French. Initially, we covered events leading up to the overthrow of the Diem government. He said he regretted terribly to have been obliged to organize the coup as he had the greatest admiration for the President. As the internal situation deteriorated and he saw that Diem was losing the support of the people to ever greater degrees, General Minh said he constantly attempted to influence the President to make the necessary reforms and to rid himself of the influence of his family and other evil people who surrounded him. Finally, when he-saw that Diem would never listen, he decided to overthrow him before the Viet Cong did so. General Minh said he prepared the coup during a period of two years. For all but three months of this period, General Kim was his only confidante. They constantly discussed possible situations, personalities, forces and the risks involved. Three months before the coup went in, General Minh sent Kim to General Don to cut the latter in. (Kim is married to Don's sister Gabrielle.) Don agreed to the coup. One month before the coup, General Minh asked General Dinh, whose III Corps was essential to success, to his home. This was the critical moment. There was some talking around the point on the part of both but finally, General Dinh suddenly said "Big Brother, our country is in danger, tell me what to do." General Minh gave him his instructions. Finally, every key General and agency was brought into the coup except for General Cao's IV Corps and the Navy. General Cao was not brought in as he was pet of Diem's. The Corps Deputy was in on it. Dinh's III Corps was between Cao and Saigon; and besides, plans had been made to control or destroy two essential ferries between III and IV Corps areas. General Khanh, then CG, II Corps was in on the coup but told Minh he would remain at Pleiku. This way Minh said Khanh could stand back and go either way depending on how the coup worked out. General Khiem played an important role. General Minh did not cut the Navy in as they were too unreliable. He charged General Xuan, CG of the Quang Trung Training Center outside Saigon to take care of the Navy whose headquarters was taken with 40 men. Xuan was also given the job of taking care of the Saigon police; a cause of worry to Minh. During the last month's preparation for the coup, Minh was able to reconcile Dinh and Kim. (After the abortive coup of 11 November 1960, Kim, then Commandant of the Military Academy at Dalat, had been arrested by Dinh.) In any case before the 1 November 1963 coup, Kim forgave Dinh in order that the larger interests of their country could be served. The final consideration that encouraged all of them to go ahead with [was] the knowledge of the disenchantment of the United States with Diem's government and that the revolutionary government would probably be quickly recognized and supported. General Minh said it was regrettable that his junta had been overthrown because if people could have been patient, he felt they would have pulled the country back on the road to victory. He said that the situation had been deteriorating for so long and with such increasing acceleration, that the situation was bound to continue to deteriorate for a period under his junta before the effect of their measures could be felt. He said it was like a dive bomber plunging at a target. Even after the pilot pulls back on the stick, there is a period when the plane continues in its original speed and direction. He said one of the main objectives of the junta was to win back the support of the people. One of the important considerations here, for example, was to cease promptly attacks on inhabited areas where the Viet Cong were reportedly holed up. General Minh said that ground and air attacks in such situations which resulted in casualties among the civilians had been causing the government to lose the support of the people. Minh said that the relatives and friends of the victims became embittered. Minh said that, therefore, his junta attempted to get rid of the internal Viet Cong organization in the villages. Once the Viet Cong lost their "guides" who prepared their entry into the villages, the Viet Cong would be afraid to enter. He said maybe Americans could not understand how the Viet Cong could be driven out of the villages but that I could be assured the Vietnamese understood how this could be done. Minh said once the Viet Cong was separated from the villages, they could be isolated and destroyed. In the meantime, the infliction of casualties on innocent people would have ceased and chances of winning back their support would be increased. He also said that the junta had been attempting to find effective province and district chiefs who were natives of the area. Minh said this was essential as it carried along with it a built in information system on [of] old family ties and friendships. He said the junta had been making real progress in this program and cited these successful operations in point. One was the district of Cho Cao where the villagers gave information on the Viet Cong inside the village, disappeared from the village before the attack and enabled friendly forces to gain a victory without harming the civilian population. Minh said General Don was on the spot to verify personally the operation The next operation, the success of which was due to information provided by the people was the destruction of a Viet Cong depot on the Canal Commerciale in the Plaine des Joncs. Don was there also to verify personally. The last operation Minh mentioned was the successful ambush set by a friendly battalion of the 21st Division. The Viet Cong were caught in a canal at Chuong Thien in the IV Tactical Zone. It was the first time in the history of the war that friendly forces had been able to set up an ambush of battalion size. It was made possible by the information furnished by the local people. He said of course the measures which make the people want to give information take a long time to implement. Unfortunately, Khanh and the others were young and impatient. Minh said the junta knew about the 30 January coup one hour before it went off. The other members called Minh and wanted to take immediate action. Minh, however, said they should do nothing and see what would happen as to set Vietnamese against Vietnamese would only play into the Viet Cong hands. Minh said he is absolutely positive that the charges of neutralist and plotting with the French are completely false. He said that although he did not know Kim well before 1959, he had observed him closely ever since. In fact, he had put him to some severe tests of his determination and loyalty and Kim has passed them all. He said that because of his concern over de Gaulle's philosophy of neutralism, he had convoked key French bankers and other businessmen of Saigon whom he knew to his office to inform them how empty and dangerous such a philosophy was. He said these were all official visits. Kim and Don always participated in these meetings. Kim was always the most adamant in denouncing de Gaulle's views to the point where Minh had to remonstrate with Kim about his violent reaction. Minh then stated that he had watched all the other members of the junta closely and worked with them during their three months in power and that all of them were staunch patriots and only desire to defeat the Viet Cong. Minh said so long as these Generals remain under arrest/2/ the Army will be cut by schisms and the war effort will not be pushed vigorously. He said since the coup many officers have talked to him about the situation in a way they would talk to no other officer. They are bitter and frustrated about it. Minh says he calms them down by telling them to following his example and wait for them to be freed which he is sure will be done. He tells them that he, Minh, loves these Generals as much or more than they do. Minh says the problem stems from the fact that all of these officers have a host of loyal supporters. Don was CG, I Corps for five years and the population in I Corps area and the officers who served there admire and support Don. The same applies to Dinh, who served as CG of II Corps for two years and then for two years as CG, III Corps. As for Kim, an intellectual, Minh said, he had been running the schools. Kim has a group of supporters among senior officers dating from Kim's duty as Commandant of the C & GS School. There is also a large group of young officer supporters dating from the time he was Commandant of the Military Academy. Xuan has his supporters stemming from young officers and NCO's who served under him during his long tenure at the Quang Trung Training Center. /2/Generals Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, Ton That Dinh, and Mai Huu Xuan were arrested during the January 30 coup. Minh said that besides the bad morale problem caused by their unjust imprisonment the Army needs badly the experience of these officers. He sited as an example the impossibility of the young and inexperienced Khiem attempting to serve as both Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He mentioned General Duc, recently promoted to CG of IV Corps being both incompetent and crazy. Minh admitted he arranged for Duc to return from France after the 1 November coup but now regretted it. He thought Duc, who had been carrying out a campaign against the Diem regime from outside the country, would be a useful patriotic officer. Minh arranged for doctors care for Duc's crazy tendencies as he believes it comes from some physical ailment. Moreover, Duc proved to be irritable and constantly unhappy about everything. Minh said he believes Khanh gave him the IV Corps job [to] pacify him. As for Khanh, Minh feels that through inexperience, he is trying to develop a climate for politics too fast and that this could be dangerous for the country. However, Khanh believes this makes a good image in the eyes of the rest of the world. Minh said after all there was no party system under Diem. Minh mentioned Khanh's willingness to let the Dai Viet operate, a party formed around 1943 to oppose the Japanese occupation. He cited General Thieu, Chief of Staff of the Joint General Staff and a Catholic, who is a member of the Dai Viet. He says Thieu's brother is Minister of Youth, as I understand it, and is also in the Dai Viet. Minh said the Vice-President also of the Dai Viet, Nguyen Ton Hoan, did not accept that post to remain there indefinitely. He covets the Presidency. Khanh seems happy to have the Dai Viets (Catholics) and the Buddhists in a sort of friendly opposition. In the meantime, try as he may, it will be difficult for Khanh to regain the support of the people. He is putting more and more of the old Diem crowd back in power. He is using the same Diem experts to organize his visit to the countryside and "spontaneous" demonstrations. These tactics, as for Diem, only promote counter-propaganda. Counter-propaganda against the Americans will probably result from "spontaneous" demonstrations such as the one organized for Mr. McNamara this morning at the airport. However, Minh said the number one problem now was to reunify the Army and carry the war vigorously to the Viet Cong. He said we can worry about Khanh's political fortunes later. He said the four generals must be freed and reintegrated into the Army or the war will not be carried through vigorously because so many officers throughout the Army will not have their hearts in it. Minh said Khanh must call these officers in, state there has been a misunderstanding, offer his apologies and reintegrate them into the Army. At this point, I told General Minh that if Khanh refused, and if he or any other group was thinking of a coup, it would be disastrous for both our countries and only the Viet Cong would benefit. Besides, I told him, another coup would just further deteriorate the morale of the Army and destroy the faith of the people. I told him that my superiors in Washington were counting on him to put the interests of his country and his people above his own and to lend his enormous prestige and popularity to support the government, restore the morale of the Army, and prosecute vigorously the war against the Viet Cong. He thought for a long time and replied he would do everything in his power to support Khanh. However, he said he would like Ambassador Lodge, who enjoys tremendous prestige with the Vietnamese people, Mr. McNamara, and General Taylor to force Khanh to reintegrate the four generals back into the Army. He said the Americans have the power to do it and that it was absolutely essential in order to get the war going again. He said that the reintegration process must be handled carefully. If Khanh told them directly Khanh would be dead of old age before they would accept. If Minh can talk to them (he was unable to see them up to this point) he can influence them to accept, as it is a question of prestige and honor. Minh is ready to give his personal guarantee that the four will bury the hatchet in the interest of the country. Minh will also handle their assignments personally, with the concurrence of Khanh, in order to avoid an embarrassing assignment situation as between these older, more experienced officers and the new crop of generals. Then as concerns the Army, Minh said he would do everything possible so as to reunify the Army for the government. He said there was only one man in all of Vietnam who had the possibility of doing it and that was he, Minh. He stated he wanted to emphasize the word possibility. I asked General Minh if he couldn't see any other alternative to the problem of the four generals, such as, for example, freedom and retirement with full benefits. He reacted promptly and vigorously and stated that it wouldn't work and that the only solution for the good of the country was reintegration. He said such a solution would not repair the schisms at all, that the deception of the officer corps would remain. W. W. Stromberg/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
76. Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen)/1/ Washington, March 12, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Confidential. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 211H. Bohlen was in Washington for consultations. A note on the source text indicates that the President saw this memorandum and a covering note. The President met with Bohlen from 6:02 to 6:27 p.m. on March 12. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has been found. Ambassador Lodge had asked some time ago that we endeavor to obtain from General de Gaulle some clarifying statement in regard to French policy towards Viet-Nam. The Ambassador's request, as I recall it, was based, at least in part, upon a desire to restrain the Viet-Namese from breaking with France on the assumption that France was about to recognize Viet Minh. It was also dictated by the bad effect France's unclear position was having on Viet-Namese morale. We gave this request of Ambassador Lodge the most careful consideration in Paris and came to the conclusion that any approach to General de Gaulle on this subject would be fruitless. We also noted and so reported to Saigon that there seemed to be no possibility of any French recognition of Hanoi. I feel very definitely that a request of General de Gaulle to clarify a statement which he had purposely left ambiguous would not only not produce the result desired, but also might offer the General an opportunity to restate his very generalized view of Viet-Nam; namely, that neutralization and unification, and similar vague terms were the only possible bases for a solution there. Furthermore, it would tend, I believe, to convince him that the United States was urgently in need of some French help in the Viet-Namese situation. We should always remember that de Gaulle has stated on a number of occasions directly to American officials, to President Kennedy in May of 1961, and to me, his belief that we could not succeed in the course that we are pursuing. It is also not clear exactly what type of clarification we desired. For all of these reasons, I thought at the time, and still do, that any approach to de Gaulle merely for clarification of French policy would be a very serious mistake and would most certainly not yield the result desired. However, if, as I have reported from Paris, we are able, following Secretary McNamara's visit to devise a course of action in Viet-Nam with a clear political objective, I believe then it would be worthwhile my going to see General de Gaulle to explain this policy and its objective to him and to request the cooperation of France in its achievement. This, of course, is dependent upon our ability to work out some form of coherent policy which I could take to de Gaulle. On the other hand, if there are considerations of which I am not aware which would make it important, even with the certainty of a refusal, to have made an effort with de Gaulle. I am of course entirely prepared to do it. C. E. Bohlen
77. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 13, 1964--1:11 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Taylor described this meeting in Swords and Plowshares, pp. 309-310. 1740. CINCPAC for POLAD. In a conversation yesterday with Secretary McNamara, General Taylor and I on the US side and Generals Khanh and Khiem on the GVN side, General Khanh agreed that actions designed to exert increased pressure on NVN could be a helpful assist to his effort but would be no substitute for successful actions in SVN against the VC. General Khanh said that his "base" in SVN was not strong enough as yet for overt operations against NVN; however. he would like to "redouble" covert operations right away. Lodge
78. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 13, 1964--1:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC. 1744. CINCPAC for POLAD. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation of final meeting between Secretary McNamara and party with General Khanh and GVN representatives on March 12. General Khanh opened discussion by referring to preliminary discussions with Secretary McNamara during trip to Hue on March 11 concerning a proposed National Service Act for SVN. Khanh said his government prepared embark upon program to mobilize all human and material resources to fight VC. As envisaged by General Khanh proposed National Service Act would have two major components: military service and civil defense. Breakdown as follows: Military service comprised of: RVNAF (3 years service; actual strength: 227,000; planned: 251,683). Civil Guard (3-1/2 years; actual: 90,032; planned: 119,636). SDC & hamlet militia (4 years; actual: 257,960; planned: 422,874). Civil defense comprised of civil service corps, cadre corps, National Youth, and political-administration corps. Khanh noted military service component self-evident and, response McNamara's question, confirmed that civil defense component included civil administration corps for work in countryside. Khanh emphasized that in civil defense sector all civilians would be included; for example, in Saigon might be possible assign trained youth to perform some of static police functions while police were pursuing more important police duties. This segment also included civic action teams for hamlets and villages. Khanh emphasized figures were planning figures only and designed give idea of number of military and civilians required and indicate financial implications of plan. Eventual numbers would be flexible in that they would depend on such factors as population in a particular area, whether area was actually in danger of VC attack, and strength of VC in particular area, etc. McNamara stated that US, and he assumed GVN, would wish to study strength figures carefully; however, his first impression was that figure of 422,874 SDC and hamlet militia appeared unduly large and would be difficult to support. Khanh responded that in actual practice total numbers may not reach this level. In fact, number may not exceed 300,000 SDC and hamlet militia actually deployed against VC. Here again figures were flexible and would have be refined depending on actual situation in various areas. General Taylor noted ascending length of service for Civil Guard (3-1/2 years) and the SDC/hamlet militia (4 years) over RVNAF (3 years) and inquired whether it was because the former groups would be operating close to home. Khanh affirmed this, noting soldiers in ARVN have to move often and take their families with them. Now difficult recruit CG and SDC forces for deployment like ARVN troops. Therefore Khanh felt since they stay close to home they could be expected serve a slightly longer period of service. Khanh then asked General Thieu to explain breakdown under civil defense sector of proposed National Service Act. Thieu stated that all men from age 18 through 40 would be required to participate in the national pacification effort. Most of them, such as those in civil service corps and cadre corps (those now in countryside) would serve in same positions they now occupy. Others, such as national youth group up to age 40, would be required serve in city and countryside and would be organized into small groups to assist ARVN and Civil Guard. Category of political-administration corps would consist of cadres planned for assignment to villages and hamlets. General Thieu estimated that 125,000 such cadre would be required. In first instance, GVN will ask for volunteers; if insufficient volunteers come forward, the necessary cadres will be drafted. Time spent in political-administration corps would count against military service. McNamara stated general approach appeared excellent but he questioned whether GVN would need 125,000 cadre. McNamara pointed out this number added to total figures for Civil Guard, SDC and hamlet militia, constituted an extremely large figure. If assumed there are approximately 6 million men of draft age in SVN, ratio of estimated figures to total draft-eligible population appeared disproportionate. While genera] concept was excellent it would be desirable to look most closely at planning figures. Khanh replied that he intended make maximum effort in first instance in 8 critical provinces surrounding Saigon, noting that in certain hamlets now de facto situation exists where people must defend themselves. However, a National Service Act would have a very good effect in Saigon and the other urban areas. McNamara inquired whether upon his return to Washington he could tell President Johnson that General Khanh's government was prepared embark on a program of national mobilization of human and material resources and whether President Johnson in turn could inform the American people that General Khanh has put SVN on the national mobilization basis. Khanh replied in the affirmative and asked for agreement in principle from us to his proceeding with concept as outlined. McNamara indicated that he viewed concept favorably and asked Ambassador Lodge for his views. Ambassador stated that he favored general concept but thought that detailed figures should be looked into carefully. Ambassador also believed that emphasis should be placed first on 8 critical provinces surrounding Saigon. General Khanh expressed his thanks for agreement in principle. General Harkins noted that a mobilization law was in fact in existence but that few people knew about it. He pointed out that ARVN, CG and SDC were not up to their authorized military strengths. Khanh said that he realized this but believed it still desirable to have a new law setting forth a national service or mobilization program. Harkins stated that MACV and other elements of US Mission would like to work closely with Khanh and his chief aides in developing such a law. Khanh replied this well understood. McNamara said it was agreed on American side that general concept was a wise one and that we should proceed on this basis. Khanh then inquired whether it was desirable to raise CG to same relative status as ARVN as regards salary, pensions, survivors benefits, etc. He estimated that total cost would be in neighborhood of one billion plasters. McNamara thought this was highly desirable. General Taylor inquired whether this would involve any change in role or mission of Civil Guard. Khanh replied in negative stating that it was merely question putting Civil Guard on comparable basis with ARVN as concerns benefits he had mentioned. McNamara observed that he felt all agreed in principle on this. McNamara inquired how long Khanh estimated it would take to recruit and train administrative cadre for 8 critical provinces near Saigon. Khanh estimated approximately one month, in any event he believed cadres could be in place by end of April. Khanh said GVN would aim for volunteers for this effort and it was not necessary to await promulgation of National Service Act. In response Taylor's question as to how long Khanh anticipated it would take to draft and promulgate National Service Law, Khanh observed that GVN was a fairly compact organization at present and that law could be ready for his signature in very short time. Taylor pointed to necessity give due regard to democratic forms in developing and announcing a National Service Act. Khanh agreed and said that at same time a major effort was being made to pacify the countryside, he intended to push for concurrent development of democratic institutions and forms. McNamara suggested that when Khanh ready announce a National Service Act that he also re-emphasize related actions already taken and those planned for the future, such as those for expansion of national economy, for increased educational opportunities in hamlets, for increased production of rice, for marketing of fish, and so forth. McNamara believed a well publicized announcement of this nature would find ready response among people and would materially assist Khanh to obtain and hold support of Vietnamese people. Ambassador Lodge agreed and added that, despite statement of General de Gaulle to the effect that we could not win a military war in SVN, Americans were well aware that war here is an inter-related one having political, economic, social and psychological aspects. Memcon being pouched./2/ /2/Not found. Lodge
79. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, March 13, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, Vol. 11. No classification marking. You may or may not want these for night reading, but you should have them available: At Tab A is McNamara's full draft report/2/ of which you got a brief this morning./3/ /2/Not attached, but see Document 84. /3/The President met briefly and individually with McNamara and then McGeorge Bundy between 8:50 and 10 a.m. on March 13. Later in the day from 12:15 to 1:23 p.m., he met with McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, McCone, and McGeorge Bundy as a group. Apparently the President was briefed on the draft McNamara report on one, some, or all of these occasions. Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) At Tab B is his draft White House statement/4/ which both Dean Rusk and I think needs a lot of revision. /4/Not attached. Reference is to a draft version of a White House statement of March 17, printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, vol. 1, pp. 387-388. An undated text of the proposed White House statement and a copy with handwritten revisions by McGeorge Bundy are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. At Tab C is a fascinating document prepared for possible publication in Foreign Affairs by Ambassador Lodge./5/ /5/Not attached, but a draft of the article is attached to a letter from Lodge to Harriman March 3; ibid. For the TV show on Vietnam,/6/ I myself would quietly but firmly spell out the following themes: /6/For the transcript of the President's television and radio interview conducted by representatives of the major broadcast services, March 15, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pp. 361-375. 1. Neutralization of the whole area has been repeatedly denounced by the Communists and is therefore not practicable now. 2. The right of people to choose their own course is exactly what we are supporting, and if foreign interference and subversion should end, the need for our help will end. 3. While the danger of the threat continues, American support will be firm and strong. 4. Secretary McNamara and a first-rate team have made a most careful study which has led to constructive suggestions that are now being reviewed within the Government. 5. We are strong, calm and determined, in a situation which has danger but also hope. 6. The Ambassador is our top man in the field, and you are proud of the U.S. unity which has been developed both here and in Vietnam in the first hundred days. McG.B.
80. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence (Cline) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)/1/ Washington, March 14, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXX, CIA. Secret. SUBJECT 1. In my memorandum to the DCI, 30 October 1963,/2/ just before the "Big" Minh coup in Saigon, I argued against U.S. support for coup plotting on the grounds that: "If a coup succeeds it will result in the kind of dislocation and confusion characteristic of post-coup South Korea and the Dominican Republic." This phenomenon is exactly what we have been witnessing in South Vietnam in the last four months. My arguments, which went for naught, in favor of bolstering the shaky Diem regime are even more compelling toward support of the Khanh regime. It is probably our last chance to halt the spiral of confusion of purpose and defeatism that may destroy our position in Southeast Asia. /2/Not found. 2. The simple question raised in the McNamara report/3/ is whether, with ample U.S. support of counterinsurgency efforts in South Vietnam, the recent trend toward Viet Cong victory can be reversed, and substantial, sustained progress made toward stabilization. I believe the odds are 6 to 5 against this favorable trend setting in within the next 3 to 4 months, as concluded by McNamara, so long as North Vietnamese political, military and logistic support are freely available to the Viet Cong. Furthermore, I think the loss of virtually all U.S. prestige and influence in Southeast Asia is likely if a favorable trend does not set in in South Vietnam soon. Consequently, it seems to me too great a gamble for the United States to rely solely on the measures recommended for South Vietnam during the next 3 to 4 months. Instead, I recommend that the measures recommended by McNamara be supplemented as soon as operationally feasible by adopting steps 1 through 3 of "Possible Later Actions" plus all four actions suggested in your footnote to the conclusion (p. 14) of the report. Personally, I would also recommend the "rejected" course of action of furnishing a U.S. combat unit (perhaps a battalion landing team) to insure the security of U.S. personnel and-implicitly-the Khanh regime's control of the Saigon area. /3/Document 84. Ray S. Cline/4/ /4/At the bottom of the source text, Cline added a postscript on Cambodia, but acknowledged that it went "beyond the scope of the measures intended to save South Vietnam."
81. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, March 14, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President, Vol. II. No classification marking. Although there is no indication on the source text, this memorandum was presumably prepared in anticipation of the interview with the President by broadcast media representatives on March 15. See footnote 6, Document 79. BROAD QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON VIETNAM 1. Why is South Vietnam important to us? First, it is a key element in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia in turn is an area whose size and importance are plain to see-almost 250 million people and a land and sea area stretching from China to Australia, and from the Philippines to India. Second, we have a commitment there in honor and in national interest. Ten years ago President Eisenhower rightly decided to support the new government of South Vietnam and we have continued that support ever since in good times and in bad. Indeed the language of that first commitment reminds me very much of the language we still use (Eisenhower letter to Diem attached at Tab A )/2/ It speaks of our assistance against subversion and aggression. It speaks of the need for effective performance and reform in Vietnam. It speaks of the need to respond to the aspirations of the people of Vietnam themselves. /2/Letter dated October 25, 1954; Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 2166-2167. In recent months the danger and difficulty in Vietnam have increased, but this is no time to quit, and it is no time for discouragement. 2. What are the prospects now? I am working right this week end with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on this problem, and I can tell you that while there have been troubles and difficulties in recent months out there, we are going to keep right on with our basic present program and purpose. I am proud of the improvement in the coordination of the American effort both here and in Saigon, and we expect to take further measures to strengthen our support for the free people of South Vietnam. I am particularly encouraged by reports from the Ambassador and from Secretary McNamara on the quality of the present leadership of South Vietnam. I have had an encouraging personal message from General Khanh, and we are very hopeful that his government will be able to take the strong and effective measures which are needed on every front out there. I am sure the Vietnamese people will respond to this kind of leadership because it is quite foreign to the traditions of the area to give in to pressures which are directed from Peking. (Some deliberate connection of the Communists with China may be helpful in Saigon.) 3. Can this be ended by 1965? 1965 has never been anything more for us than a target for the completion of certain specific forms of technical training and assistance. A struggle of this kind needs patience and determination. We and our friends in Vietnam entirely agree that as time goes on the responsibility for effective work in all fields should be carried more and more by the Vietnamese themselves. No one who is working effectively against Communism need be worried about American determination and persistence. We mean to keep at it out there. McG. B./3/ 3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 82. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw this memorandum on April 2. JCSM-222-64 Washington, March 14, 1964. SUBJECT /2/Reference is to a March 13 draft of Document 84. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the subject memorandum and concur with the recommendations subject to the following comments:/3/ /3/Within the JCS, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Greene and Chief of Staff of the Air Force General LeMay were critical of McNamara's draft report. Greene wrote that the 12 recommendations "offer little more than a continuation of present programs of action in Vietnam," and reiterated the view that if the United States was to stay and win in Vietnam, then that objective should be pursued with the full concentrated power of the United States. Greene stated, "half measures won't win in South Vietnam." General LeMay agreed with McNamara's recommendations to support and stabilize the Khanh government, but took exception with the view that the "military tools of the GVN/US effort" were sound and adequate. LeMay felt that to do the job in Vietnam, the Viet Cong had to be attacked in their Cambodian sanctuaries and North Vietnam's supply and reinforcement lines through Laos could not be left unmolested. General Greene's comments are in JCS 2343/346-1, March 17, and General LeMay's are in CSAFM-263-64 to JCS, March 14; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, JMF 9155.3/3100 (13 Mar 64), as quoted in Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, JCS, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960-1968, Part 1, Chapter 9, pp. 18 and 19) a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that the recommended program in itself will be sufficient to turn the tide against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam without positive action being taken against the Hanoi Government at an early date. They have in mind the conduct of the kind of program designed to bring about cessation of DRV support for operations in South Vietnam and Laos outlined in JCSM-174-64, subject: "Vietnam," dated 2 March 1964./4/ Such a program would not only deter the aggressive actions of the DRV but would be a source of encouragement to South Vietnam which should significantly facilitate the counterinsurgency program in that country. To increase our readiness for such actions, the US Government should establish at once the political and military bases in the United States and South Vietnam for offensive actions against the North and across the Laotian and Cambodian borders, including measures for the control of contraband traffic on the Mekong. /4/Document 66. b. In view of the current attitude of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend authorizing now hot pursuit into that country. c. With regard to the reaction times contained in recommendation 12 of the subject memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the time of reaction for border control and retaliatory actions against North Vietnam should be reduced to 24 hours and the time for the initiation of the program of "graduated overt military pressures" reduced to 72 hours. These times are considered feasible as soon as an aerial mining capability has been established in the VNAF. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor
83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, March 15, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. II. Secret. SUBJECT This memorandum is designed to help to clarify the issues that are likely to be before you at 10 A.M. Monday./2/ As I see it, the problem of our next steps with respect to Vietnam falls into four parts: /2/From 10:12 to approximately 11:15 a.m. on March 16, the President met with McNamara, Ball, Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy in an informal meeting to discuss the McNamara report. No record of the meeting has been found. For the approved report, see Document 84. 1. Action in South Vietnam itself. Following are my comments on each item. 1. Action in South Vietnam itself. I think we have agreement all around on Item 1, which remains the most important of the lot. Bob McNamara assured me today that his twelve recommendations fully cover everything Lodge is asking for within South Vietnam, and then some. He further assures me that Lodge himself spoke of six crucial needs for action in Vietnam, and that all six are more than covered within his recommendations. 2. Action relating to Cambodia and Laos. The McNamara report is so drafted as to leave you leeway in these two areas. It would authorize hot pursuit and ground operations over the Laotian line, but it is noncommittal about operations across the Cambodian border. McCone and Lodge would like to go further, especially with respect to Cambodia, and I find that Dean Rusk is also strongly inclined to move in this direction if the right combination of political and practical steps can be devised. I think there is room here for you to move in a direction which is at once useful to South Vietnam and effective as a response to the Ambassador's own desires. We will not have final plans on this tomorrow morning, but I think the field is a productive one and that a good resolution can be found. I think it is particularly desirable that we should have Lodge work on the practical process of this matter with Khanh directly. 3. Action against North Vietnam. On this one we have agreement between McNamara and Khanh, at least for the present, that overt action against North Vietnam is undesirable. There is also agreement that the covert program should be intensified. As a practical matter, McNamara believes that this program will not amount to very much, and I agree with him, but I believe it essential that we authorize Lodge to strengthen it in any way that he can work out with Khanh. The one specific Lodge request which is still outstanding in this area is his proposal of late February that we warn the North Vietnamese of direct retaliation in response to any terrorist attack on Americans. McNamara tells me that the concern over the lives of Americans had been greatly reduced by the time of his visit last week, and that therefore this is not now a live issue. But at the end of the current deliberations, you will wish to go back to Lodge again. 4. Relations with France. It is now agreed that Bohlen should go to work directly with General de Gaulle, as soon as possible after the General's return from Mexico. This will not be for about another ten days. The Department will be drafting a detailed instruction to Bohlen this week, and Dean Rusk's current intent is to let Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Bohlen both comment on this instruction before it is made final. This seems to us the best we can do to keep all parties in line. There are other questions which need to be discussed tomorrow morning, like the shape of the White House statement to follow the more formal meeting on Tuesday. For internal Pentagon reasons, McNamara is very eager to put out a substantial account of the current situation in terms which are acceptable to his military colleagues. I myself doubt that this should be done at the White House level, and we will have alternative statements for your consideration in the morning. McG.B.
84. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President/1/ Washington, March 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Secret. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 499-510 and published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 148A. On March 16, Bromley Smith sent a slightly revised version of this memorandum to the National Security Council for consideration at a March 17 meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V) A March 2 preliminary draft of this memorandum was prepared by William Bundy over the weekend of February 29-March 1, designed, in Bundy's words, as an "overall vehicle for thought and also designed by Secretary McNamara to serve as a possible framework for his report upon his return." Bundy's covering memorandum and the draft are ibid., Vol IV. They are published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 157A. On March 4, an abbreviated version of the draft was sent to those officials attending the March 5 NSC meeting (see Document 71). This March 4 draft is in Department of State, Bundy Files, WPB Special Papers. An undated White House copy of the abbreviated March 4 draft, received for filing on March 6, is published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 146D. Two additional drafts of the full memorandum, March 5 and March 13, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Important differences between these drafts and the final memorandum as submitted to the President are noted in footnotes below. SUBJECT This report addresses two questions:/2/ /2/The introduction highlighting the two questions to be addressed appeared in the March 13 draft. In previous drafts, the report was introduced as an analysis of problems in Vietnam, possible courses of action, and pro and cons of a program of military action against North Vietnam. 1. What is the present situation in Vietnam? (What is the trend of the counterinsurgency program, how stable is the Khanh government, and what is the effectiveness of our current policy of assisting the South Vietnamese Government by economic aid, military training and logistical support?) 2. How can we improve that situation? (What are the plans and prospects of the Khanh government and what more should they be doing, and what more should the U.S. be doing under present or revised policy, in South Vietnam or against North Vietnam?) To answer the questions, the report will review: I. U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam; II. Present U.S. Policy in South Vietnam; III. The Present Situation; IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action; V. Possible Later Actions; VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected; and VII. Recommendations. I. U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements. Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased. All of these consequences would probably have been true even if the U.S. had not since 1954, and especially since 1961, become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However, that fact accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a nation meet a Communist "war of liberation." Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high. They are increased by domestic factors. II. Present U.S. Policy in South Vietnam We are now trying to help South Vietnam defeat the Viet Cong, supported from the North, by means short of the unqualified use of U.S. combat forces.3 We are not acting against North Vietnam except by a very modest "covert" program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalists)-a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect. In Laos, we are still working largely within the framework of the 1962 Geneva Accords. In Cambodia we are still seeking to keep Sihanouk from abandoning whatever neutrality he may still have and fulfilling his threat of reaching an accommodation with Hanoi and Peking. As a consequence of these policies, we and the GVN have had to condone the extensive use of Cambodian and Laotian territory by the Viet Cong, both as a sanctuary and as infiltration routes. 3 The adjective "unqualified" referring to use of combat troops first appeared in the March 13 draft. The last two sentences of section 11 were also added to the March 13 draft. III. The Present Situation in South Vietnam The key elements in the present situation are as follows: A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN/US effort are generally sound and adequate.4 Substantially more can be done in the effective employment of military forces and in the economic and civic action areas. These improvements may require some selective increases in the U.S. presence, but it does not appear likely that major equipment replacement and additions in U.S. personnel are indicated under current policy. 4 Mr. McCone emphasizes that the GVN/US program can never be considered completely satisfactory so long as it permits the Viet Cong a sanctuary in Cambodia and a continuing uninterrupted and unmolested source of supply and reinforcement from NVN through Laos. [Footnote in the source text that first appeared in the March 13 draft.] B. The U.S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South Vietnamese are in a position to assume the functions is still sound. Its application will not lead to any major reductions in the near future, but adherence to this policy as such has a sound effect in portraying to the U.S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Substantial reductions in the numbers of U.S. military training personnel should be possible before the end of 1965. However, the U.S. should continue to reiterate that it will provide all the assistance and advice required to do the job regardless of how long it takes. C. The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September: 1. In terms of government control of the countryside, about 40% of the territory is under Viet Cong control or predominant influence./5/ In 22 of the 43 provinces, the Viet Cong control 50% or more of the land area, including 80% of Phuoc Tuy; 90% of Binh Duong; 75% of Hau Nghia; 90% of Long An; 90% of Kien Tuong; 90% of Dinh Tuong; 90% of Kien Hoar and 85% of An Xuyen. /5/In the March 5 draft the figure was 30 percent. 2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifference, and there are some signs of frustration/6/ within the U.S. contingent: /6/In the March 5 draft "declining morale" was used rather than "frustration." a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates, and particularly the latter, are high and increasing. b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energetically and effectively. c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of the Self Defense Corps, on which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling. 3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's position has been particularly noticeable. For example: a. In Quang Nam province, in the I Corps, the militia in 17 hamlets turned in their weapons. b. In Binh Duong province (III Corps) the hamlet militia were disarmed because of suspected disloyalty. c. In Binh Dinh province, in the II Corps, 75 hamlets were severely damaged by the Viet Cong (in contrast, during the twelve months ending June 30, 1963, attacks on strategic hamlets were few and none was overrun). d. In Quang Ngai province, at the northern edge of the II Corps, there were 413 strategic hamlets under government control a year ago. Of that number, 335 have been damaged to varying degrees or fallen into disrepair, and only 275 remain under government control. e. Security throughout the IV Corps has deteriorated badly. The Viet Cong control virtually all facets of peasant life in the southernmost provinces and the government troops there are reduced to defending the administrative centers. Except in An Giang province (dominated by the Hoa Hao religious sect) armed escort is required for almost all movement in both the southern and northern areas of the IV Corps. 4. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets disappeared following the November coup. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have been replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three months; one province had four). Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands have changed hands twice since the November coup. The faith of the peasants has been shaken by the disruptions in experienced leadership and the loss of physical security. In many areas, power vacuums have developed causing confusion among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders. 5. North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been increasing: a. Communications between Hanoi and the Viet Cong (see classified annex)./7/ /7/Not found. b. Since July 1, 1963, the following items of equipment, not previously encountered in South Vietnam, have been captured from the Viet Cong: ChiCom 75 mm, recoilless rifles. ChiCom heavy machine guns. U.S. .50 caliber heavy machine guns on Chicom mounts. In addition, it is clear that the Viet Cong are using Chinese 90 mm rocket launchers and mortars. c. The Viet Cong are importing large quantities of munitions and chemicals for the production of explosives: Approximately 50,000 pounds of explosive-producing chemicals destined for the Viet Cong have been intercepted in the 12 months ending March 1964. On December 24, five tons of ammunition, of which one and one-half tons were 75 mm recoilless rifle ammunition, was captured at the Dinh Tuong Viet Cong arsenal. Ninety percent was of ChiCom manufacture. D. The greatest weakness in the present situation is the uncertain viability of the Khanh government. Khanh himself is a very able man within his experience, but he does not yet have wide political appeal and his control of the Army itself is uncertain (he has the serious problem of the jailed generals)./8/ After two coupe, as was mentioned above, there has been a sharp drop in morale and organization, and Khanh has not yet been able to build these up satisfactorily. There is a constant threat of assassination or of another coup, which would drop morale and organization nearly to zero./9/ Whether or not French nationals are actively encouraging such a coup, de Gaulle's position and the continuing pessimism and anti-Americanism of the French community in South Vietnam provide constant fuel to neutralist sentiment and the coup possibility. If a coup is set underway, the odds of our detecting and preventing it in the tactical sense are not high./10/ /8/The observation in the parenthesis was added to the March 13 draft. /9/Mr. McCone does not believe the dangers of another coup (except as a result of a possible assassination) at this time are as serious as he believes this paragraph implies. [Footnote in the source text that first appeared in the March 13 draft.1 /10/In the March 5 draft, a section IV, "The Situation in North Vietnam and Communist China," followed this paragraph. The section concluded that "the Viet Cong operation has been a North Vietnamese show from the beginning and almost certainly remains so," and maintained that Hanoi did not need help from China nor did it want it. While leaning toward Peking rather than Moscow, North Vietnam wanted to win the war in the south "by itself." The section highlighted North Vietnam's vulnerabilities: agriculture, a weak industrial base, and dependence on outside sources for POL. The conclusion was that the North Vietnamese feared U.S. action and "serious pressure could affect Hanoi's determination or at least lead them to throttle back." The assessment concluded that the Soviet Union was presently unwilling to help North Vietnam and that China, despite its encouragement, was unwilling to commit itself to offering significant help. E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons for encouragement in the performance of the Khanh government to date. Although its top layer is thin,/11/ it is highly responsive to U.S. advice, and with a good grasp of the basic elements of rooting out the Viet Cong. Opposition groups are fragmentary, and Khanh has brought in at least token representation from many key groups hitherto left out. He is keenly aware of the danger of assassination or coup and is taking resourceful steps to minimize these risks. All told, these evidences of energy, comprehension, and decision add up to a sufficiently strong chance of Khanh's really taking hold in the next few months for us to devote all possible energy and resources to his support. /11/In the March 13 draft, at this point was the phrase "it is more able than under any previous regime," with a footnote in the source text that reads as follows: "Mr. McCone, while encouraged by Khanh's evident ability, does not believe that we have had enough experience with the members of Khanh's government to be able to make this judgment." IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action A. Negotiate on the Basis of "Neutralization" While de Gaulle has not been clear on what he means by this and is probably deliberately keeping it vague as he did in working toward an Algerian settlement-he clearly means not only a South Vietnam that would not be a Western base or part of an alliance structure (both of which we could accept) but also withdrawal of all external military assistance and specifically total U.S. withdrawal. To negotiate on this basis-indeed without specifically rejecting it would simply mean a Communist take-over in South Vietnam. Only the U.S. presence after 1954 held the South together under far more favorable circumstances, and enabled Diem to refuse to go through with the 1954 provision calling for nationwide "free" elections in 1956. Even talking about a U.S. withdrawal would undermine any chance of keeping a non-Communist government in South Vietnam, and the rug would probably be pulled before the negotiations had gone far.12 12 The March 5 draft contained an extensive discussion of "just what kind of a solution we might be prepared to accept at some point through the path of negotiation." This section suggested refining thinking on possible acceptable points to be included in future negotiations. Essentially, the 1954 Geneva Accords would provide the framework of the U.S. position with the following exceptions: 1) Removal of restrictions on external military assistance; 2) Establishment of an effective guarantee of South Vietnam's borders with a police mechanism more effective than the ICC; 3) An equivalent guarantee of Cambodia's borders and a rewriting of the 1962 Laos accords; and 4) Removal of the 1954 provision for "free elections" in all of Vietnam. The discussion held that neutralization of North Vietnam was unattainable, but could be considered for tactical reasons. It concluded that "the guts of what we are after is that North Vietnam should renew its understanding not to interfere in the South, and that this undertaking should be subject to really effective control this time." B. Initiate GVN and U.S. Military Actions Against North Vietnam/13/ /13/From this point, the March 5 draft differs both organizationally and substantively from the March 13 draft and final memorandum. The reorganization reflects the results of the McNamara Mission. Hereafter only differences between the March 13 draft and the final resort will be noted. We have given serious thought to all the implications and ways of carrying out direct military action against North Vietnam in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam. (The analysis of overt U.S. action is attached as Annex A.)/14/ In summary, the actions break down into three categories: /14/Not found. 1. Border Control Actions. For example: a. An expansion of current authority for Laotian overflights to permit low-level reconnaissance by aircraft when such flights are required to supplement the currently approved U-2 flights. b. Vietnamese cross-border ground penetrations into Laos, without the presence of U.S. advisors or re-supply by U.S. aircraft. c. Expansion of the patrols into Laos to include use of U.S. advisors and re-supply by U.S. aircraft. d. Hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian border and destruction of VC bases on the Vietnam/Cambodian line. e. Air and ground strikes against selected targets in Laos by South Vietnam forces. 2. Retaliatory Actions. For example: a. Overt high and/or low level reconnaissance flights by U.S. or Farmgate aircraft over North Vietnam to assist in locating and identifying the sources of external aid to the Viet Cong. b. Retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids on a tit-for-tat basis by the GVN against NVN targets (communication centers, training camps, infiltration routes, etc.). c. Aerial mining by the GVN aircraft (possibly with U.S. assistance) of the major NVN ports. 3. Graduated Overt Military Pressure by GVN and U.S. Forces. This program would go beyond reacting on a tit-for-tat basis. It would include air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets. The program would utilize the combined resources of the GVN Air Force and the U.S. Farmgate Squadron, with the latter reinforced by three squadrons of B-57s presently in Japan. Before this program could be implemented it would be necessary to provide some additional air defense for South Vietnam and to ready U.S. forces in the Pacific for possible escalation. The analysis of the more serious of these military actions (from 2(b) upward) revealed the extremely delicate nature of such operations, both from the military and political standpoints. There would be the problem of marshalling the case to justify such action, the problem of Communist escalation, and the problem of dealing with the pressures for premature or "stacked" negotiations. We would have to calculate the effect of such military actions against a specified political objective. That objective, while being cast in terms of eliminating North Vietnamese control and direction of the insurgency, would in practical terms be directed toward collapsing the morale and the self-assurance of the Viet Cong cadres now operating in South Vietnam and bolstering the morale of the Khanh regime. We could not, of course, be sure that our objective could be achieved by any means within the practical range of our options. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, unless and until the Khanh government has established its position and preferably is making significant progress in the South, an overt extension of operations into the North carries the risk of being mounted from an extremely weak base which might at any moment collapse and leave the posture of political confrontation worsened rather than improved. The other side of the argument is that the young Khanh government needs the reinforcement of some significant successes against the North and without them the in-country program, even with the expansion discussed in Section C below, may not be sufficient to stem the tide. On balance, except to the extent suggested in Section V below, I recommend against initiation at this time of overt GVN and/or U.S. military actions against North Vietnam. C. Initiate Measures to Improve the Situation in South Vietnam There were and are sound reasons for the limits imposed by present policy-the South Vietnamese must win their own fight; U.S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN actions against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any case, it is vital that we continue to take every reasonable measure to assure success in South Vietnam. The policy choice is not an "either/or" between this course of action and possible pressures against the North; the former is essential without regard to our decision with respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former. The following are the actions we believe can be taken in order to improve the situation both in the immediate future and over a longer term period. To emphasize that a new phase has begun, the measures to be taken by the Khanh government should be described by some term such as "South Vietnam's Program for National Mobilization." Basic U.S. Posture 1. The U.S. at all levels must continue to make it emphatically clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control. 2. The U.S. at all levels should continue to make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are totally opposed to any further coupe. The ambassador should instruct all elements, including the military advisors, to report intelligence information of possible coups promptly, with the decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such information to Khanh. However, we must recognize that our chances would not be great of detecting and preventing a coup that had major military backing. 3. We should support fully the Pacification Plan now announced by Khanh (described in Annex B),/15/ and particularly the basic theory now fully accepted both on the Vietnamese and U.S. sides-of concentrating on the more secure areas and working out from these through military operations to provide security, followed by necessary civil and economic actions to make the presence of the government felt and to provide economic improvements. This so-called "oil spot" theory is excellent, and its acceptance is a major step forward. However, it is necessary to push hard to get specific instructions out to the provinces, so that there is real unity of effort at all levels. A related matter is to stabilize the assignment of province chiefs and senior commanders and clarify their responsibilities and relationships. /15/Not found, but see footnote 3, Document 51. Many of the actions described in succeeding paragraphs fit right into the framework of the Plan as announced by Khanh. Wherever possible, we should tie our urging of such actions to Khanh's own formulation of them, so that he will be carrying out a Vietnamese plan and not one imposed by the U.S. Civil and Military Mobilization 4. To put the whole nation on a war footing--to obtain the manpower for these efforts described below and to remedy present inequities and inadequacies in the use of manpower--a new National Mobilization Plan (to include a National Service Law) should be urgently developed by the Country Team in collaboration with the Khanh government. The present structure of decrees, dating from the Diem government, is haphazard and produces substantial injustices. The new Program for National Mobilization would both greatly increase the effectiveness of the war effort and be a strong visible sign of the government's determination and will. Full attention should be given to the way it is presented so that it appears as a remedy for past injustices; and not as a repressive or totalitarian act. 5. The strength of the Armed Forces (regular plus paramilitary) must be increased by at least 50,000 men. About 15,000 of these are required to fill the regular Armed Forces (ARVN) to their present authorized strength. Another 5,000 would fill the existing paramilitary forces to authorized strengths. The balance of 30,000 men is required to increase the strength of the paramilitary forces, in whatever form these may be organized (see paragraph 7 below). (All of the foregoing strength figures are illustrative and subject to review, which review I have directed General Harkins to make in consultation with General Khanh.) 6. A Civil Administrative Corps is urgently required to work in the provincial capitals, the district towns, the villages, and the hamlets. "Hamlet civic action teams" of five men each are now beginning to be trained, on a small scale, to go into hamlets after they have been cleared, start the rehabilitation process, and train hamlet leaders to carry on. School teachers and health technicians are now assigned to some hamlets, many more are needed, and those on the job need to be retrained to higher competence. Many other types of technicians (e.g., agricultural workers) are needed, in varying numbers. Taking into account the fact that many hamlets are not now secure, and that adequate training is required, the initial goal during 1964 should be at least 7,500 additional persons; the ultimate target, at least 40,000 men for the 8,000 hamlets, in 2500 villages and 43 provinces. The administrators would come largely from the areas in which they serve and would be paid by the national government. The U.S. should work with the GVN urgently to devise the necessary recruiting plans, training facilities, financing methods, and organizational arrangements, and should furnish training personnel at once, under the auspices of the AID Mission. Further, maximum effort should be made to make use of the available trained personnel by assignment to provincial and village administration where needed. Improved Military Forces 7. The paramilitary forces are now understrength and lacking in effectiveness. They must be improved and reorganized. Specifically: a. What remains of the present hamlet militia (and related forces of a part-time nature for hamlet defense) should be consolidated with the Self Defense Corps into a single force compensated by the national government. b. Pay and collateral benefits must be substantially improved at once. A reasonable course of action would be to raise the pay scale of the Civil Guard approximately to that of the regular Armed Forces, and to raise the pay scale of a reorganized Self Defense Corps approximately to the present level of the Civil Guard. In addition, measures should be taken to improve the housing and allowances of the families of both forces, so that they can live decently in areas near where the forces are operating. c. Strength should be maintained and expanded by conscription, effectively enforced, and by more centrally directed recruitment policies. d. Additional U.S. personnel should be assigned to the training of all these paramilitary forces. e. The National Police require special consideration. Their strength in the provinces should be substantially increased and consideration should be given to including them as part of an overall "Popular Defense Force". In expanding and improving the police, the AID Mission should make special arrangements to draw on the advice of the present British training mission under Brigadier Thompson because of its experience in Malaya. (Mr. Bell has instructed Mr. Brent, the USOM Chief, to accomplish this.) 8. An offensive Guerrilla force should be created to operate along the border and in areas where VC control is dominant. Such a force could be organized around present Ranger Companies and ARVN Special Forces and provided with special training and advice by U.S. Special Forces. The force should carry the fight to the VC on their own basis in advance of clear-and-hold operations on the conventional pattern. Additional Military Equipment for the GVN 9. The Vietnamese Air Force should be strengthened at once by the substitution of 25 A-1H aircraft for the present 25 T-28s. The A-1H aircraft has a much greater bomb load and slightly better speed.16 16 Concurrently, the effectiveness of the USAF's Farmgate operation will be increased by assignment of A-1E aircraft in replacement of B-26s and T-28s. Furthermore, in another important area, we are strengthening the U.S. intelligence and reporting system. [Footnote in the source text.] 10. Although there are no major equipment deficiencies in other forces, we should act at once to replace the present M-114 armored personnel carriers by 63 M-113s and to provide additional river boats. Additional lesser deficiencies should also be met at an estimated cost of approximately $10 million. Economic Actions 11. The approved, but unannounced, Fertilizer Program should be particularly stressed and expanded and publicly announced. Its target of 85,000 tons for the present planting season (April-June) should probably be doubled for the next season and trebled the following season, both to provide immediate and direct benefits to peasants in secure areas and to improve the rice crops and export earnings. Estimates are that an additional ton of fertilizer costing around $70 can, if properly applied, produce additional yield of an equivalent two tons of rice, which might be sold for $110 per ton. Thus, the potential export improvement alone could be on the order of $20 million from this year's 85,000 ton input. US and GVN Costs of the Above Actions The above actions will involve a limited increase in U.S. personnel and in direct Defense Department costs. More significantly, they involve significant increase in Military Assistance Program costs and in the budget of the GVN itself, with the latter requiring additional US economic aid. The estimates of additional annual costs are as follows:
/17/Increases in GVN budget expenditures do not automatically require equal increases in U.S. economic aid. As a rough approximation, subject to later refinement, an increase of 5-6 billion piastres of GVN budget expenditures might require an increase of $30-40 million worth of imports financed through U.S. economic aid. Some of the imports undoubtedly could be obtained under P.L. 480. [Footnote in the source text.] Conclusion If the Khanh government can stay in power and the above actions can be carried out rapidly, it is my judgment that the situation in South Vietnam can be significantly improved in the next four to six months./18/ The present deterioration may continue for a part of this period, but I believe it can be levelled out and some improvement will become visible during the period. I therefore believe that this course of action should be urgently pursued while we prepare such additional actions as may be necessary for success. /18/In the March 13 draft, the time frame for improvement was "the next three to four months" and an extensive crossed-out footnote reads as follows: "Mr. McCone believes that the situation in South Vietnam is so serious that it calls for more immediate and positive action than I have proposed. His reasons are: '(1) General Minh is discontented and his attitude will be a drag on Khanh's efforts to activate the military and civilian establishments. (2) Khanh's three Vice Premiers cannot give him the solid help that he needs because two of them, Hoan (an important political figure in Dai Viet Party) and Oanh (a capable economist and professor) have been out of the country for ten years or more and are therefore out of touch, and General Mau is known to be an affable but not a strong figure. General Khiem (Minister of Defense) is not particularly impressive. Parenthetically, it is reported to me that Generals Khiem, Mau and Thieu (Khanh's Chief of Staff) are the trio who conceived the January 30th coup. (3) I have received so many reports that the ARVN, from field grade officers down, lack the motivation and will and/or techniques to confront the enemy that I cannot but accept this as probable truth. This is also present among the middle and lower level civil officials. (4) The morale of the people in the hamlets and villages and countryside is reported as very low. (5) The irregular forces, i.e., Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, are ineffective and the Hamlet Militia have virtually disintegrated. (6) The Viet Cong situation is improving militarily, organizationally, and in their political power over the people of the countryside.'" "He concurs in the actions outlined in the previous pages and in Sections V and V11 below, but states that they are 'too little too late.' In addition he would: (1) Have General Khanh meet immediately with Sihanouk for the purpose of developing a joint South Vietnam-Cambodia program to clear the Cambodian border. And, if there is no successful meeting, General Khanh with U.S. assistance would stop all traffic on the Mekong River into and from Cambodia, and would implement immediately 'border control' item (b) on page 5 above (i.e., Vietnamese patrols, with appropriate U.S. aerial resupply, into Laotian territory). (3) Have Khanh negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek for the movement of two or possibly three divisions into the southern tip of the Delta in order to give impetus and support to the hard-pressed ARVN effort in that area. (4) Implement immediately 'retaliatory' item (a) on page 6 above (i.e., overt U.S. air reconnaissance over North Vietnam). He recommends that the overflights be over populous areas for psychological in addition to intelligence purposes." V. Possible Later Actions If the Khanh government takes hold vigorously-inspiring confidence, whether or not noteworthy progress has been made-or if we get hard information of significantly stepped-up VC arms supply from the North, we may wish to mount new and significant pressures against North Vietnam. We should start preparations for such a capability now. (See Annex C for an analysis of the situation in North Vietnam and Communist China.)/19/ Specifically, we should develop a capability to initiate within 72 hours the "Border Control"/20/ and "Retaliatory Actions" referred to on pages 5 and 6, and we should achieve a capability to initiate with 30 days' notice the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure." The reasoning behind this program of preparations for initiating action against North Vietnam is rooted in the fact that, even with progress in the pacification plan, the Vietnamese Government and the population in the South will still have to face the prospect of a very lengthy campaign based on a war-weary nation and operating against Viet Cong cadres who retain a great measure of motivation and assurance. /19/Not found /20/Authority should be granted immediately for covert Vietnamese operations into Laos, for the purposes of border control and of "hot pursuit" into Laos. Decision on "hot pursuit" into Cambodia should await further study of our relations with that country. [Footnote in the source text.] In this connection, General Khanh stated that his primary concern is to establish a firm base in the South. He favors continuation of covert activities against North Vietnam, but until such time as "rear area security" has been established, he does not wish to engage in overt operations against the North. In order to accelerate the realization of pacification and particularly in order to denigrate the morale of the Viet Cong forces, it may be necessary at some time in the future to put demonstrable retaliatory pressure on the North. Such a course of action might proceed according to the scenario outlined in Annex D. VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected We have considered the following actions, but rejected them for the time being except to the extent indicated below: 1. Return of Dependents. We recommend that the present policy be continued of permitting dependents to return home on a voluntary basis, but not ordering them to do so. The security situation in Saigon appears to have improved significantly, and ordering dependents home would now, in the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon, have a serious impact on South Vietnamese morale. It would also raise a serious question whether tours of duty for AID personnel would not have to be shortened. Thus, unless there are further serious incidents, or unless we were taking more drastic measures generally we believe compulsory return should not be undertaken. 2. Furnishing a U.S. Combat Unit to Secure the Saigon Area. It is the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, that this action would now have serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken. 3. U.S. Taking Over Command. It has been suggested that the U.S. move from its present advisory role to a role that would amount in practice to effective command. Again, the judgment of all senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, is that the possible military advantages of such action would be far outweighed by its adverse psychological impact. It would cut across the whole basic picture of the Vietnamese winning their own war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within South Vietnam and outside. Moreover, the present responsiveness of the GVN to our advice-although it has not yet reduced military reaction time-makes it less urgent. At the same time, MACV is steadily taking actions to bring U.S. and GVN operating staffs closer together at all levels, including joint operating rooms at key command levels. VII. Recommendations/21/ /21/The March 13 draft contains a crossed-out footnote that reads as follows: "Mr. McCone believes that these recommendations, in which he concurs without reservation, are inadequate to meet the `very serious situation confronting us in Vietnam and recommends the additional actions stated in the footnote to the Conclusions to Section IV of this Report for the reasons there stated.'" I recommend that you instruct the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government: 1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control. 2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any further coupe. 3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including a national service law) to put South Vietnam on a war footing. 4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men. 5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged Civil Administrative Corps for work at province, district and hamlet levels. 6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces and to increase their compensation. 7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force. 8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in exchange for the present T-28s. 9. To provide the Vietnamese Army additional M-113 armored personnel carriers (withdrawing the M-114s there), additional river boats, and approximately $5-10 million of other additional material. 10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand it with a view within two years to trebling/22/ the amount of fertilizer made available. /22/In the March 13 draft, the amount of fertilizer to be made available reads "doubled." 11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with Cambodia. 12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam. Robert S. McNamara
85. Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)/1/ Washington, March 17, 1964--9:28 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted in the White House and approved by Rusk. Transmitted as telegram 1454 to Saigon, which is the source text. 1. I have now personally reviewed your cables 1754 through 1757/2/ and have considered them with Secretaries of State and Defense. I am delighted to find that we have a very high measure of agreement. /2/In these telegrams from Saigon, March 15, Lodge commented on the March 13 draft of the McNamara report. Lodge thought that the situation in South Vietnam had been growing worse since May, not September, 1963. He took exception to the view that U.S. officials in Vietnam were any more "frustrated" than was normal "in the tropics dealing with orientals," and noted that CIA "old hands" reported some improvement in the lower Delta. Lodge thought that most former province chiefs were incompetent, did not consider the jailed Generals a threat to Khanh's control of the army, and blamed the poor showing of South Vietnam in reacting to the Viet Cong's challenge on the Diem government's policies and legacy. As for McCone's views, Lodge doubted that a meeting between Sihanouk and Khanh would accomplish much, and he considered stopping traffic on the Mekong bound for Cambodia and hot pursuit of Viet Cong into Cambodia as justifiable because Cambodia was no longer a "bona fide neutral." Lodge opposed the idea of Chinese Nationalist troops in Vietnam, although he thought they and the South Koreans might serve as advisers. He opposed recommendation 12 of the McNamara report, recommended his idea of a "diplomatic carrot-and-stick approach backed by covert military means" in dealing with North Vietnam, and reserved judgment on overt U.S. military action against the North. (All ibid., POL 27 VIET S, except telegram 1756 which is POL 32 CAMBODIA-VIET S) 2. Your comments on various sections of McNamara report/3/ make good sense to all of us, and report has been revised to meet most of your points. Revised version as approved today in National Security Council follows by air. /3/Supra. 3. We have also shortened and amended the White House statement/4/ to reconcile it with your comments. Different people seem to view the past differently, but there is no point in letting such differences worry us as we go forward. /4/See footnote 3, Document 86. 4. Specifically with respect to the comments in your 1757 your whole-hearted support of first eleven recommendations covers our most important efforts which are still in South Vietnam. On your additional comments, I have reached the following conclusions: (1) I think additional actions against Laos and Cambodia should be intensively examined. We have agreed that cross-border ground penetrations should be initiated into Laos along any lines which can be worked out by Khanh and Phoumi with Souvanna's endorsement, and I will authorize low-level reconnaissance there wherever the present high-level flights indicate that such reconnaissance may be needed. The questions of further U.S. participation and of air and ground strikes against Laos raise tough diplomatic issues and I have asked Rusk and McNamara to concert a further recommendation. My first thought is that it is important to seek support from Souvanna Phouma and to build a stronger case before we take action which might have only limited military effect and could trigger wider Communist action in Laos. On Cambodia we find ourselves hard put to keep abreast of the rapid changes Sihanouk introduces into the scene./5/ Our impression is that bilateral GVN-RKG talks may now be in progress and State has sent you some thoughts on those prospects./6/ However, in the event of further deterioration, I would expect to authorize hot pursuit. /5/Sihanouk rejected a proposal for a quadripartite conference on Cambodia, rejected bilateral talks with South Vietnam on frontier differences, and sent a mission to Hanoi to discuss South Vietnamese border matters. /6/Apparent reference to telegram 1452 to Saigon, March 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 8 CAMB) On overt high- or low-level reconnaissance over North Vietnam, we are not ready to make a decision now. I have asked that political and diplomatic preparations be made to lay a basis for such reconnaissance if it seems necessary or desirable after a few weeks, for military or political reasons, or both. (2) As I read your comments on John McCone's points, the main items are those discussed above on Laos and Cambodia. We agree that Mekong traffic is a trump card, and State has already sent you a message on this question./7/ /7/Not further identified. We agree that large-scale Chinese Nationalist incursion would be a mistake, but high quality advisers are different matter and we will send further thoughts on that. (3) I have ordered a review of your paper of October 30./8/ My own inclination is to favor such pressures, short of overt military action. /8/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. v, pp. 656-659. (4) Like you, I reserve judgment on such overt U.S. measures against North Vietnam. Question of direct retaliation for attacks on Americans is more complex. As I understand it from McNamara mission, these attacks are not an immediate present threat, but you are authorized to prepare contingency recommendation for specific tit-for-tat actions in the event attacks on Americans are renewed. Your cable does not mention it, but Bob McNamara has reported your concern about the effectiveness of our representations to the French. I have discussed this matter with Bohlen and we now plan that he will raise these matters with General de Gaulle personally when latter returns from Caribbean. Department is drafting instructions and will circulate them for your comment before they are final./9/ Meanwhile we may wish to consider whether at some point it would be fruitful for you to go to Paris yourself to explain the realities of the situation to the General. In the light of your wartime connection with France, this possibility seems to me to have real merit./10/ /9/See footnote 3, Document 92. /10/Telegram 1454 does not bear President Johnson's signature.
86. Summary Record of the 524th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 17, 1964, Noon/1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. A full attendance list for this meeting is ibid. REPORT OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S TRIP TO VIETNAM In response to a request from the President, Mr. McCone reported that there was nothing new out of Vietnam this morning worthy of mention. Secretary Rusk said that we had preliminary information about what might become an important new development, i.e., that Sihanouk of Cambodia is turning away from North Vietnam and is prepared to work out an understanding with South Vietnam. Secretary Rusk presented the recommendations on pages 17 and 18 of Secretary McNamara's report on Vietnam (attached)./2/ He said that no one could guarantee that the proposed program would ensure success, but that if the situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate, the proposed recommendations provided for readying forces which could be used if it were decided later to take the war to North Vietnam. /2/Document 84 Secretary McNamara said he had no additional comments to make but asked General Taylor to present the military actions discussed in the report. General Taylor began by commenting that highlevel overflights of North Vietnam are now possible, but if we required low-level reconnaissance, we will have to use U.S. planes overtly. General Taylor then covered the sections of the report, including border control actions, retaliatory actions, and the graduated overt military pressure program. He said that the kinds of military actions he described would produce strong reactions in Cambodia and in North Vietnam including, as a final act, asking the Chinese Communists to come to their support. Risk of escalation would be greatest if we undertook the overt military pressure program, and before doing so, we would want to improve the readiness of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. General Taylor said the Chiefs support the McNamara report. They favor readying forces now which would be required if it were decided later to take further military action than that recommended in the report. The Chiefs also want to examine the possibility of reducing from 72 to 24 hours the prior notice required to undertake actions against North Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said that each Department and Agency concurs with the recommendations which fall in its area of responsibility. Ambassador Lodge agrees with all the recommendations except for his views on the need for overt reconnaissance of Cambodia. Mr. McGeorge Bundy pointed out that Ambassador Lodge's recommendation on Cambodian reconnaissance has been overtaken by events. No decision on this matter can be taken until we have further information about the conversations which are taking place between Khanh and the Cambodians. The President said it was his understanding that Ambassador Lodge approved all the recommendations in the report except the one which has been overtaken by events and which he can be told lies in the area of unfinished business. The President then asked Secretary McNamara to summarize all twelve of his recommendations. Secretary McNamara said as to cost, the program proposed would involve an expenditure of between $50 million and $60 million by the South Vietnamese, but that the actual cost to us would be approximately $30 million. Some of the cost will be covered by PL 480 funds and the remainder will come from reallocation of funds to meet the new plans. No supplemental budget request will be necessary. Secretary McNamara covered very briefly all twelve recommendations. He agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should study the proposal to reduce the 72-hour notice proposal contained in Recommendation 12. He agreed that this time should be reduced if it is possible to do so without resulting in the maldeployment of our forces in the Pacific. The President asked Secretary McNamara if his program would reverse the current trend in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara replied that if we carry out energetically the proposals he has made, Khanh can stem the tide in South Vietnam, and within four to six months, improve the situation there. The President summarized the alternatives to the recommended course of action, i.e., putting in more U.S. forces, pulling out of the area, or neutralizing the area. He said the course we are following is the only realistic alternative. It will have the maximum effectiveness with the minimum loss. General Taylor said the Chiefs believed the proposed program was acceptable, but it may not be sufficient to save the situation in Vietnam. He commented that the Chiefs' interest in military action against North Vietnam was based on their belief that action against North Vietnam might be necessary to make effective the program recommended by Secretary McNamara. Secretary McNamara commented that Khanh had told him that he opposed taking the war to North Vietnam now because he felt that the South Vietnamese need a more secure base in the South before undertaking expanded military action. The President said the McNamara proposals did not foreclose action later if the situation did not improve as we expected. He asked whether anyone present had any objections. Hearing none, he said the recommendations were approved. The President, accompanied by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, USIA Director Rowan, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, went to his office where a draft press statement was revised and later issued. (Copy attached)/3/ /3/The final statement is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, pp. 387-388. Attached to a Department of State copy of the McNamara report of March 16 was a draft of this statement with handwritten revisions. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meetings, 3/17/64) Bromley Smith/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
87. National Security Action Memorandum No. 288/1/ Washington, March 17, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs. Secret TO SUBJECT 1. The report of Secretary McNamara dated March 16, 1964 was considered and approved by the President in a meeting of the National Security Council on March 17. All agencies concerned are directed to proceed energetically with the execution of the recommendations of that report. 2. The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has designated the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to coordinate the execution of the recommendations in the report. McGeorge Bundy
88. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan), Washington, March 17, 1964, 5:15 p.m./1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Carolyn J. Proctor of Secretary Rusk's staff. TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. ROWAN R said in terms of our broadcast into North Vietnam, we are confused as to whether we should play up North Vietnam as tool of Chinese or that they are caught between Moscow and Peking. Sec said he would think the theme should be their leaders are leading them into an unnecessary and fratricidal struggle with their brothers and this is eating up their own resources and threatening them with unnecessary dangers. Sec said he would think R should draw the line between Hanoi leadership and their own people; and then the Chinese business; Sec said not to get into the Moscow-Peking aspect. [Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Vietnam.]
89. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 18, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. Secret. SUBJECT I have read Bill Smith's two memoranda on Vietnam/2/ with great interest. These support in appropriate cautious language some of the things which I have been hearing myself. It may be worthwhile for all of us if I commit to paper some additional evidence in support of Bill Smith's worries. /2/In March 17 memoranda to Bundy, William Y. Smith of the NSC Staff reported "undercurrents" of pessimism within the Department of Defense over the situation in South Vietnam. The belief was that there was no alternative to Khnah, yet he did not have the ability to rally the army. Furthermore, Smith reported that some feared that the Johnson administration was not taking forthright action because of the upcoming Presidential campaign. In his second memorandum, Smith drew an analogy between the missile gap issue in the 1960 campaign and Vietnam in 1964. Smith suggested that the Johnson administration should avoid the mistakes made by Eisenhower in 1960 by briefing opposition candidates on Vietnam and by making sure that the administration spoke with one voice. (Ibid.) Before Sullivan left for Saigon, he attended a meeting of the JCS with Secretary McNamara and General Taylor. Sullivan reported to me that he was impressed by the vehemence of opinion in the JCS for strong overt U.S. action against the North. Admiral McDonald was particularly outspoken, but the other Chiefs appeared to support his views. General Anthis (who is Krulak's successor) told me after a rather wet working dinner at Ray Cline's office that he felt if we couldn't "make the high jumps in South Vietnam, then we should pole-vault into the North". After the mission's return from Saigon, Sullivan tells me that McNamara's report was very strenuously criticized by some officers in MACV and some of his own team. Yesterday a correspondent from Time Magazine (Cook) told me he was convinced that the decision not to attack the North was made because President Johnson did not wish to face a domestic political crisis before the election. He said that his Pentagon sources were convinced that the correct decision in Vietnam was avoided for this reason. I told him this was hogwash and could not come from responsible officials and certainly not anyone who was associated with the top-level team representing all interested agencies who accompanied the Secretary. So I agree with Bill Smith that there may be a problem developing here, but I don't think it is quite like the missile gap issue in 1960. The difficulty then apparently was that the Eisenhower Administration felt it could not safely disclose enough of the facts to permit a reasonable explanation of the Government's position. I don't think quite the same problem exists with respect to our policies in Southeast Asia today. The question of whether or not overt U.S. forces should be used against the North depends upon an assessment of factors which are, in most instances, currently discussed in the press. Against the history of the Bay of Pigs and the October Cuban crisis, the advantage in political debate, I think, lies with the Administration. Prudence and caution are really more popular stances, I believe, than loud demands for war. The thing to avoid is too flat an impression that we have stopped thinking about all the possibilities. I agree with Bill Smith that responsible officials in the Government should be encouraged to speak quite frankly about our current estimates of the position in South Vietnam and the rationale supporting McNamara's recommendations. In speaking about the North, it should be emphasized that the situation is constantly being reviewed by Defense and State to see if further actions need be taken. Actually, I am somewhat more worried by those who argue for a bugout in Southeast Asia than I am by the adherents of Rostow. Mike
90. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President/1/ Washington, March 18, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. V. No classification marking. Attached are two parting memoranda from Roger Hilsman to Dean Rusk which are worth your attention when you have a chance to read them. With exceptions, I think they are a good and clear assessment of the basic view of the matter which this Government has had right along. Roger is a better analyst than administrator, and this is the sort of thing he has done best. His specific proposal that we put some troops in Thailand is more attractive to State Department and White House staff than to the Pentagon, because its object is political and not military. I think you may hear more of this proposal in coming weeks. McG. B. Attachment Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State/2/ Washington, March 14, 1964. /2/Secret. The letter was not attached to the covering memorandum from Bundy to the President. Hilsman sent copies of this letter and the attached memorandum to McNamara, McCone, Harriman, William and McGeorge Bundy, and Forrestal. Dear Mr. Secretary: As I leave Government service and the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, I thought it might be useful for me to set down my thoughts on the persistent and stubborn problem of Southeast Asia, which has plagued us for the past decade. Although our ability to control the course of events in Southeast Asia is inherently limited, I think the root of our present troubles there--in South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and even Thailand--lies primarily in the gnawing doubts of both the Southeast Asians and the Communists as to our ultimate intentions in the region. Since the fall of Dienbienphu, all Asians have wondered about our determination to fight in Southeast Asia, should fighting become necessary. Given the facts of life in a nuclear world, they are not impressed with the totality of our power even though the strategic balance tips heavily in our favor. Both free and Communist Asians scrutinize our actions and words for signs of U.S. determination to use appropriate force, tailored to the essentially limited political objectives we seek in this part of the world-that is, free and independent nations rather than bastions of anti-Communism. But of such determination they seem to feel they have seen few signs. The alacrity with which the Communists fell into line after we introduced troops into Thailand following the fall of Nam Tha illustrates the effectiveness of such moves as well as the fact that the Communists continue to worry that we might well fight if they push us too hard. It seems to me that these doubts about our ultimate intentions are fundamental and recurrent wherever you look in Southeast Asia. We all say that Sihanouk is misbehaving because he feels that we are losing in South Viet-Nam. But even Sihanouk understands the extent of American power, and what he means by his statement that Communism is the wave of the future is most probably that he feels the United States is not prepared to do what is necessary to preserve Southeast Asia as a whole. Generosity, maturity, and restraint have not worked with Sihanouk. But so far it must seem to him that we are acting from weakness, and he might respond quite differently if he thought we were acting from strength. In Laos, the Communists have pursued a two-track policy. They scratch away at the neutralist and conservative positions with one hand, pausing on each occasion to assess our reaction. With the other hand, they continue to toy with talks about a Government of National Union and implementation of the Geneva Accords. Quite clearly, they are keeping both lines open-ready to go ahead with implementing the Geneva Accords if and when they finally become convinced that we are both able and determined to permit them no other honorable alternative, and ready to nibble our position away completely if we appear indecisive. The Thais, with infinite patience, are merely waiting. Although their indecision shows occasionally in reminiscences about their past successes in balancing off the rivalries of Great Powers, most Thais are prepared to be stubborn: they will match what they think is vigor with vigor and what they think is indecisiveness with indecisiveness. The South Vietnamese are equally concerned. DeGaulle, Lippmann, and Mansfield have set the neutralist hares running with self-fulfilling prophecies that dishearten those who wish to fight and encourage coup-plotting among both the true neutralists and the simple opportunists. But what gives these lofty, unrealistic thoughts of a peaceful neutralist Asia their credibility is, again, fundamental doubts about our ultimate intentions. A corollary to the preceding analysis is that we have so far failed as a Government to mesh fully the many different instrumentalities of foreign policy and thus to obtain full benefit from mutually reinforcing actions. This is true throughout Southeast Asia, but especially in South Viet-Nam. It applies to all instrumentalities of foreign policy equally, but it can best be summed up by Clausewitz's dictum that war is politics pursued by other means. We must learn better how to tailor our military might, aid, etc., to political purposes and, most important, to orchestrate military power more neatly with diplomacy and politics. If we can successfully convince our friends and allies as well as the Communists and those, such as de Gaulle and Sihanouk, who tend to serve the Communists' purposes, that we are determined to take whatever measures are necessary in Southeast Asia to protect those who oppose the Communists and to maintain our power and influence in the area, we will have established an atmosphere in which our problems in Laos, Viet-Nam and Cambodia may be amenable to solution. In such an atmosphere, the Communist side |