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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 2, 1965, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to the White House, DOD, CIA, CINCPAC for POLAD, Bangkok, and Vientiane.

2014. Crisis between government and military is deepening with General Khanh taking harder and more advanced positions amounting to insistence on formal military control of entire government structure.

Prime Minister sent his son Tran Van Dinh to see Johnson late yesterday evening to brief us on situation and express his deep concern, and Johnson also saw Minister of Interior Vien this morning. Both of us have asked to see the Prime Minister this afternoon.

Tran Van Dinh said the Prime Minister was persuaded that Khanh's purpose in taking over was, together with Buddhists, lead country to a neutralist solution. Dinh indicated his father was thinking of the possibility of a "coup de force" by elements of the army against Khanh. Johnson discouraged such concept which would result in fratricidal strife between elements of the armed forces and stated it seemed to him problem of the government was to bring other generals around to point that they would tell Khanh that he was finished and in this way avoid possibility of strife between armed forces elements. During Johnson's call on Vien this morning Vien said that he and Minister Oanh had spent New Year's eve and part of New Year's day at IV Corps with Khanh and number of other high officers. They had held no formal meeting, but Vien and Oanh during "interrupted discussions" with Khanh and others had learned enough of generals' plans to alarm them.

What really concerned Vien, however, was that generals now appear to have gone beyond December 20 action/2/ and to want even more. Vien said that Khanh and number of other officers said they wanted to create new military body to be called "organ of control" (giam sat). This body, to be established at or above chief of state level, would give military control over civilian government. Khanh had made very clear that it was not to serve as government's advisory organ for military affairs, but to have rather opposite function. Initially (New Year's eve) military had said that body would have no civilian members; next morning, however, they intimated that they might envisage some civilian membership but it was clearly still to be under military control. Vien said military even possibly envisaged letting office of chief of state be merged with new organ, but said military would have authority. Vien said that in response to Khanh's observation that this "would prevent coups", he said government acceptance of this would be "the coup."

/2/The dissolution of the High National Council.

In response to Johnson's questions, Vien said that Khanh and Admiral Cang had argued most heatedly for new organ, with other generals appearing less enthusiastic. Vien said he had impression that Cang in particular was behind proposal.

Vien stated that he and Oanh had pointed out to military that neither chief of state nor Prime Minister could create such new body. Suggested that military wait two or three months for establishment of National Congress and then make their proposal to Congress. Khanh had rejected this, saying that military wanted to establish this new organism soon in order to "give maximum stability to government." Admitted that government now in provisional status, but indicated that provisional status could last longer. Establishment of National Congress could wait for five or six months. Vien said that Khanh's main concern now seemed to be to create organ of control, not to establish Congress. Vien said he considered matter "very serious."

In reply to question, Vien said that during discussion of new organ there had been no allusion to US role; re issue between Ambassador and military,/3/Vien said he had impression that this was on road to resolution.

/3/Taylor had expressed strong opposition to the dissolution of the High National Council in conversations with certain Vietnamese military leaders on December 20, 1964, and with Khanh on the following day. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Documents 451 and 454.

Johnson asked whether Vien believed that new body would be intended by Khanh to lead towards negotiated solution possibly including neutralization. Vien replied in rather vague fashion, saying that he had impression from whisperings among Buddhists and others that Khanh might be thinking about neutralization. Noted particularly whisperings to effect that Khanh would not let himself be subjected to foreign (i.e., US) control. Also pointed to activities of Khanh's brother-in-law Phan Quang Tuoc who, Vien said, had returned to Saigon around December 17 from trip to Hong Kong, Paris, and perhaps Germany. Vien observed that Tuoc had close liaison with Buddhist Institute.

Long exchange developed over what to do next. Vien said he knew of nothing in particular which US could do to assist government right now, but would let us know. Said he would see Prime Minister and Suu later to chart next steps. Vien thought Prime Minister and Suu would call in Khanh early next week in order to get clear statement on record of what Khanh wants. In response to Johnson's suggestion, agreed it would be good idea to invite other generals also. He thought that Prime Minister and Suu would attempt at meeting to "confront generals with their responsibility"; would tell them to liberate prisoners and would tell them it was necessary to let HNC function, either under other name or with changed membership, would also indicate that government not prepared to accept military control organ. Johnson suggested it was desirable that issue be presented in clear manner and resolved as quickly as possible. From the hardening of the military position it no longer appeared that the passage of time was contributing toward finding a compromise solution. Suggested that if Khanh insisted on demand for control organ, Huong might say that in this event he would have no alternative but ask Suu to relieve Khanh in accordance with provisions of the charter. This would present other generals with clear issue of whether to support government or publicly to take position of insubordination. Johnson did not know how generals would react but issue would have been clearly posed. Vien said he thought Prime Minister's position might be "more flexible". Said government had no power to enforce decision to relieve Khanh. When Johnson noted that government could resign, and observed that he had impression most generals did not want this to happen, Vien said that Prime Minister did not want to give Khanh chance to take power by default by government resignation. Intimated government might prefer force military take over by coup d'etat. Later hinted, however, that government might retire if Khanh and generals did not agree to what Prime Minister and Suu would present to them at their meeting. Johnson said he thought that issue of new control organism was strong one for government. Vien agreed that issue had to be clearly presented, adding that in present situation it was impossible for government to operate and this was increasingly reflected in attitudes of provincial officials./4/

/4/In telegram 1381 to Saigon, January 2, the Department of State noted its surprise that the crisis was deepening, since this contradicted certain recent intelligence reports. The Department observed further:"From this distance problem still seems to be to persuade more moderate generals such as Co, Dong, Thieu and Vien to take lead in pressing for a compromise with government. Realize generals have spent past several days in Vung Tau and may have been inaccessible; but we would be interested in results of any efforts Embassy and MACV officials are able to make to get in direct contact with moderate military elements. Object would be to attempt reverse process of consolidation of military behind Khanh's idea of a military 'organ of control.'" (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)

Taylor

 

2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 4, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a typewritten, undated, and unsigned note apparently addressed to the President which reads: "This was Mr. Bundy's covering memo on that Newsweek article (or was it U.S. News and World Report) that you read the end of last week."

The attached report/2/ has the ring of truth to me, all the way through. The most important thing it says is that our personnel policies in Vietnam are wrong. The Army is running it in a regulation way, and that means that we have too much staff, too much administration, too much clerical work, too much reporting, too much rotation, and not enough action. (I was an Army staff officer for three years, so this is not just imagination.)

/2/An article entitled "Can U.S. Win in Vietnam? An Inside Report," which appeared in the January 4 issue of U.S. News & World Report. The article was in the form of an interview of reporter Sol W. Sanders, who had just returned to Washington after covering the war in Vietnam.

Taylor and Westmoreland are probably the ablest regulation officers we have, but that is not what we need, and in any case much of the trouble is here in Washington, which sets the policy on rotation and reporting and other forms of paper work.

For reasons that are not clear to me, Bob McNamara has always been hesitant about going behind the regulations on this side of the matter. But today I found him more responsive than ever before.

It may be that a real push from you would produce quite new results on the military side now.

It is true that Bob is very much opposed to larger U.S. forces. But when I asked him why, it turned out that what he is against is more of the overhead and administration and general heaviness that the attached report describes. I think he would be responsive to an instruction to develop a new plan for volunteer fighting forces that would proceed with a minimum of overhead and a maximum of energy in direct contact with the Vietnamese at all levels. At the very least it is worth asking him. We plan to have a meeting with you on Wednesday/3/ on this subject.

/3/January 6.

McG. B.

 

3. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

CM-359-65

Washington, January 4, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXV, Memos. Secret. Copies were sent to Vance, McNaughton, the other service Chiefs, and the Director of the Joint Staff.

SUBJECT
Evacuation of U.S. Dependents from South Vietnam

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed this date their previous views regarding the withdrawal of U.S. dependent personnel from South Vietnam in the light of the existing military and political situation. They recommend that all U.S. dependents be withdrawn from South Vietnam as soon as it is possible to do so in an orderly fashion. This recommendation applies not only to the dependents of military personnel but to all dependents of U.S. Government or U.S. Government-affiliated personnel stationed in South Vietnam./2/

/2/The military aspects of the withdrawal of U.S. dependents from Vietnam were discussed further in memorandum DJSM-65-65 from Lieutenant Colonel David A. Burchinal, Director of the Joint Staff, to Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, January 18. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 75 D 167, Withdrawal of U.S. Dependents)

Earle G. Wheeler/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.

 

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal, cleared by William and McGeorge Bundy and McNamara (per William Bundy), and approved by Rusk.

Washington, January 4, 1965, 6:48 p.m.

1386. Ref: Embtel 2032./2/ From Secretary for the Ambassador. We view with great concern a head-on confrontation between Huong and generals. From our admittedly limited vantage point the only good card Huong seems to have is evident U.S. support. In the current power equation we do not assess this as being enough to permit Huong to face down the generals with their apparent Buddhist support. If, as seems likely, the generals will immediately and unceremoniously remove Huong and Suu, we would confront, not only a military government which has seized power by force, but one that might have an anti-U.S. bias and, by its victory, lend encouragement to the anti-American manifestations already evident in Buddhist and certain student groups.

/2/In telegram 2032, January 4, Taylor reported the conversation he and U. Alexis Johnson had that afternoon with Huong and Deputy Prime Minister Vien during which they were told that Huong intended to "have it out" with Khanh and his supporters. (Ibid.)

Except as an admirable show of courage, we see nothing to be gained by Huong's proposed action. If there is any hope of resolving the present crisis, it seems to us that continued patient and determined efforts to bring Khanh around or to separate Khanh from the rest of the generals still presents the most advantageous course--as difficult and frustrating as this must be for both the Embassy and Huong. As unpalatable as the present arrangement is, a forceful removal (and possibly the arrest) of Suu and Huong would be even worse.

We are aware that events are moving quickly in Saigon and that you are very much closer and more directly involved than we. However, we felt it might be useful to you to have a consensus of Washington views on this extremely delicate and tricky matter./3/

/3/For the views of Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, see his draft memorandum of January 4 entitled "Observations re South Vietnam" in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 683-684.

Rusk

 

5. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 4, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Comment from Bob McNamara on the State of the Union

1. Bob McNamara called this morning on other matters, and I asked him what he thought of the State of the Union./2/ He said he liked it, but had one worry. He wonders whether the statements on Vietnam on pages 6 and 7 are too strong in the light of our current policy. I said that they were no stronger than things we had said a dozen times before, but I gathered from Bob that he thought they were stronger than our actions. I get the implication that he fears that if we do not intend stronger action, we may regret these sentences.

/2/President Johnson delivered his Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union at 9:04 p.m. on January 4, 1965. For text of the address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1-9.

2. My own view is that, whatever we may decide to do on particular matters in the coming months, it is absolutely essential to maintain a posture of firmness today. I believe that without firm U.S. language, the danger of further erosion in Saigon is bound to grow. I therefore not only approve, but strongly recommend, the language on pages 6 and 7. Nevertheless, I think you should know Bob's worry.

McG. B./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

 

6. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, January 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Vietnam, January 1965. Secret. Prepared by Colby on January 8. The meeting was scheduled for 5 p.m. at the Department of State. Forrestal prepared an agenda for the participants, January 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXV)

SUBJECT
Meeting of the Principals on Vietnam
5 January 1965

PARTICIPANTS
Defense: Secretary Vance, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Wheeler
State: Assistant Secretary Bundy, Ambassador Unger, Mr. Forrestal
White House: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Cooper
CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby

1. Laos Action Program: Mission against Ban Trim was approved. Mission against Ban Ken was suspended until the 9 January meeting because it would involve a considerable stepup in scale. JCS recommendations will be obtained before the 9 January meeting.

2. OPLAN 34-A: Approval was given to the attached cable/2/ authorizing air cover to maritime operations between the 18th and 17th parallels in order to permit maritime operations to be mounted against targets further north than hitherto. Mr. William Bundy, however, declined for the time being to authorize SAR operations by U.S. forces north of the 17th parallel.

/2/Not attached and not further identified.

3. DeSoto Patrol: Mr. Forrestal said that this question would be suspended until the 9 January meeting for a review in connection with the overall scale of operations. General Wheeler commented that he expected considerable trouble from Congress if we were to send destroyers into the Gulf of Tonkin on a regular basis. He said JCS will come up with some alternate thoughts. In this connection, it was pointed out that the intelligence from DeSoto Patrols is useful but not compelling and it would only require one patrol every six months or so.

4. It was suggested that a general checklist of increases in the scale of operations against North Vietnam be worked up preparatory to the 9 January meeting, to include such matters as Barrel Roll, 34-A, DeSoto and reprisals. General Wheeler commented that the signal Hanoi is receiving may not be the one we intend. Mr. William Bundy made the point that the basic signal Hanoi seems to have received is that the U.S. decided not to go north after Ambassador Taylor's trip to the United States.

5. Cooper Report on Infiltration: /3/ It was agreed that this should be suspended during the current political crisis in Saigon.

/3/See Document 171.

6. Third Country Aid: The attached memorandum/4/ was circulated on the status of this program. Mr. Cooper and Mr. Forrestal questioned whether Saigon was ready to receive substantial third country contingents, especially on the civilian side. Mr. Cooper also suggested the desirability of an orientation program for third country representatives coming to Vietnam, to be mounted by the GVN with U.S. support. Mr. Forrestal will look into this.

/4/Not attached and not further identified.

7. Binh Gia: General Wheeler gave a detailed rundown of the Binh Gia operation/5/ commenting that the piece-meal commitment of GVN forces seemed to be the main cause for the results. He said the action did not necessarily indicate any move to a new stage of Viet Cong combat, although there were indications of uniformed and steelhelmeted Viet Cong troops. The DCI commented that the attached analysis/6/ did not indicate a move to Stage III. There was then an inconclusive discussion on the effectiveness of GVN operations and intelligence on the enemy, it being stated that both have reasonably improved. However, there is considerable leakage of operational information to Viet Cong intelligence, both through their special intelligence and ordinary intelligence operations. The DCI suggested that a review be made of the ARVN desertion rate in recent weeks and the causes for this increase. Secretary Vance and General Wheeler indicated some surprise and will look into this matter. The DCI again suggested attention to the effectiveness of the psychological effort on the South Vietnamese people and commented that Mr. Zorthian, the PAO, seemed to be unduly tied down by his U.S. press briefing responsibilities. Mr. Forrestal will look into this matter.

/5/In the Binh Gia engagement near Saigon early in January 1965 the Viet Cong killed nearly 200 South Vietnamese soldiers.

/6/Memorandum from Carver to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, January 5, on "The Significance of Binh Gia in Light of Giap's Three-Stage Doctrine," attached but not printed.

8. In parting, Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that he hoped that the Mission in Saigon would not push Huong into a vigorous fight with the Young Turk Generals. It was agreed that this would be unfortunate and that the cautioning notes given the Embassy on this should be continued.

WE Colby
Chief, Far East Division

 

7. Editorial Note

According to Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book, he met with Under Secretary Ball and Secretary McNamara at about 5:30 p.m. on January 5. They were joined by Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy at 5:46, and the meeting ended at approximately 7:20. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) No record of the discussion at the meeting has been found. Prior to the meeting, at 1:05 p.m. that afternoon, McGeorge Bundy called Rusk. A memorandum of part of their conversation reads as follows:

"Re Viet Nam meeting, B wondered whether we were ready to talk to the President at 5 tomorrow; McNamara wanted to have a discussion with just Sec and B first. It was agreed they would meet at 5:30 today, following the larger 5 pm meeting. Sec will arrange with McNamara and have Ball there too." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

For a record of the larger meeting scheduled for 5 p.m. on January 5, see Document 6. Regarding the January 6 meeting at 5 p.m. with the President, see Document 17.

 

8. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/

Honolulu, January 5, 1965, 4:49 p.m.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup, #12. Secret. Repeated to General Westmoreland.

A. JCS 5485-64/2/ eyes only.

/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 479.

1. Your 5485-64 year end wrap up of Washington view on Vietnam was very helpful, especially the reasons why our recommendations for action get turned down.

2. I have always deferred to Westy and Amb Taylor's views on retaining dependents in Vietnam because I felt they were best judge of danger to dependents and advantages of keeping them in country. Your message introduces a new factor into this problem.

3. If we are still operating under policy of NSAM 314/3/ and if presence of dependents is a block on decision for action, then I think we should move dependents out ASAP. Realize there are other factors which influence decision makers even if dependents moved, but other factors you mention are less of a positive block. Decision to move dependents should include all, not just military. Since movement of dependents takes considerable time, we cannot wait until we are ready to take offensive action before initiating dependents withdrawal.

/3/For text, see ibid., pp. 758-760.

4. Brink bombing/4/ once again demonstrates that VC have capability to attack dependents any time. Seems entirely possible Saigon could lapse into state of lawlessness under current lack of government control. So, movement dependents justified for other reasons than to facilitate decision for U.S. action.

/4/See footnote 11, Document 9.

5. Announcement of removal dependents should be carefully worded and timed to get most political mileage. Might mention continued unstable political conditions; let them wonder if all U.S. personnel would soon depart.

6. As you know, we are ready to take reprisal action on short notice, if that is required. I recommend against including VNAF in the first strike. They can follow on after Westy gets them cranked up, but they should not be allowed to hold up our forces.

7. On another subject. I concur completely with DIA's assessment of how Barrel Roll is influencing the DRV given in his memo to you of 31 Dec,/5/ which was passed to us. We will have to make a good sized strike on a reasonably important target before the DRV will know that we are doing anything different.

/5/Not further identified.

 

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 6, 1965, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 1:03 a.m.

2052. For the President--Section I of V Sections./2/ Ref A. CAP-64375./3/ B. Position paper on Southeast Asia originally dated December 2, later December 7./4/ C. Instructions from the President to Ambassador Taylor as approved by the President December 3, 1964./5/ C [D]. Embtel 2010./6/

/2/Sections II-IV are Documents 10-13.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 477.

/4/Ibid., Document 433.

/5/Ibid., Document 435.

/6/Ibid., Document 478.

1. In replying to your CAP-64375, rather than to compose a single cable which would be overly cumbersome by its length, it has appeared preferable to prepare a basic cable presenting a coherent report of our views on the overriding issues in CAP-64375 and to supplement it additionally by four supporting sections each addressed to one of the four specific suggestions contained in para 7, reference A. This is the basic cable which undertakes to evaluate the present situation in SVN, to analyze the causes of our troubles and to indicate what we can and cannot do to eliminate or attenuate these causes and closes with our recommendations. We have not repeated herein our views contained in the related cable, Embtel 2010.

2. A description of the present situation needs little amplification beyond the content of Emb cables filed since the military coup de force (the current phrase here) of December 20, read against the background of the report which I made to you and senior officials in Washington in early December. We are faced here with a seriously deteriorating situation characterized by continued political turmoil, irresponsibility and division within the armed forces, lethargy in the pacification program, some anti-US feeling which could grow, signs of mounting terrorism by VC directly at US personnel and deepening discouragement and loss of morale throughout SVN. Unless these conditions are somehow changed and trends reversed, we are likely soon to face a number of unpleasant developments ranging from anti-American demonstrations, further civil disorders, and even political assassinations to the ultimate installation of a hostile govt which will ask us to leave while it seeks accommodation with the National Liberation Front and Hanoi. How soon these developments may occur is hard to estimate. Some might take place tomorrow--anything like a coalition govt is unlikely for several months. In all, however, there is a comparatively short time fuse on this situation.

3. When one looks for the causes of this unhappy state of affairs, they fall generally under three heads: lack of a stable govt, inadequate security against the VC and nation-wide war-weariness. All three are interdependent and react upon one another.

4. Until the fall of Diem and the experience gained from the events of the following months, I doubt that anyone appreciated the magnitude of the centrifugal political forces which had been kept under control by his iron rule. The successive political upheavals and the accompanying turmoil which have followed Diem's demise upset all prior US calculations as to the duration and outcome of the counterinsurgency in SVN and the future remains uncertain today. There is no adequate replacement for Diem in sight.

5. At least we know now what are the basic factors responsible for this turmoil--chronic factionalism, civilian-military suspicion and distrust, absence of national spirit and motivation, lack of cohesion in the social structure, lack of experience in the conduct of govt. These are historical factors growing out of national characteristics and traditions, susceptible to change only over the long run. Perhaps other Americans might marginally influence them more effectively but generally speaking we Americans are not going to change them in any fundamental way in any measurable time. We can only recognize their existence and adjust our plans and expectations accordingly.

6. The lack of security for the population is the result of the continued success of the VC subversive insurgency for which the foundation was laid in 1954-55 and which has since grown to present proportions of an estimated 34,000 main guerrilla force supported by some 60-80,000 local guerrillas. Not only is this a large and well-trained force but it enjoys the priceless asset of a protected logistic sanctuary in the DRV and in Laos. I do not recall in history a successful anti-guerrilla campaign with less than a 10 to 1 numerical superiority over the guerrillas and without the elimination of assistance from outside the country.

7. Obviously neither condition obtains in SVN. With regard to relative manpower, the GVN military-paramilitary-police forces during the last two years have enjoyed only a little over a 5 to 1 advantage in spite of gaining in strength some 165,000 in the same period. Thus, if there is any validity in the 10-1 superiority requirement, in spite of high losses VC strength and a maximum effort to increase GVN forces, there is no likelihood of reaching a satisfactory strength relationship now or at any time we can foresee under current procedures. Nor does it seem reasonable or feasible to look to US or third country sources to fill the manpower gap. (See Section V.)

8. The ability of the VC to regenerate their strength and to maintain their morale is to an important degree the result of infiltration from the logistical sanctuaries outside the country and from the sense of support and confidence this gives them. You have doubtless seen the recent study of infiltration/7/ which estimates a total infiltration of 34,000 since February, 1960, and points to the possibility of 10,000 infiltrators in 1964. While there is much chance for error in such figures, infiltration is an important source of VC recuperative powers.

/7/For text of the study of infiltration dated October 31, 1964, see ibid., pp. 864-872; regarding a report on Aggression From the North, released on February 27, 1965, see Document 171.

9. Apart from inadequate forces and frontiers open to infiltration, the inability to give SVN adequate security is a by-product of the weakness of govt already discussed. Effective pacification calls for an intricate blending of military, economic, social and psychological resources which, thus far, has exceeded the capability of the changing Saigon govts. The Hop Tac experiment/8/ is producing some encouraging results but the country-wide pacification program as a whole has a long time to go--years in fact--before we can hope to bring security to SVN by present methods and at current rates of progress.

/8/Hop Tac (Working Together) was a campaign begun in mid-1964 by the South Vietnamese Government, at the urging of MACV, to pacify the area around Saigon.

10. The third cause of the present situation, war-weariness, is easy to understand. It grows out of 20 years of uninterrupted conflict with the Japanese, the French, the religious sects and the VC. It has increased as the result of disappointed hopes following the overthrow of Diem and the failure of the heralded new revolution. It exists more in the cities and among the intellectuals than in the provinces among the peasants and soldiers. The only cause for surprise is that morale is not worse than it is. There is a toughness in the countryside which is a very encouraging phenomenon. One cannot escape the feeling that there is nothing in the psychological situation here which a few victories, military or political, could not turn around.

11. If these are the causes--unstable govt, lack of security and war-weariness--the next question is what we can do to eliminate or modify these factors and thus change the situation for the better, bearing in mind that we have limited time. Some things we clearly cannot do--change national characteristics, create leadership where it does not exist, raise large additional GVN forces or seal porous frontiers to infiltration. If one accepts such limitations, then it is equally clear that in the time available we cannot expect anything better than marginal govt and marginal pacification progress with continued decline of national morale--unless something new is added to make up for those things we cannot control.

12. Thus, we are faced with considering what we can do. We can probably compromise the current governmental crisis in a way which will salvage Huong but will leave him pretty much under military domination. If Huong goes, he will probably be followed by some kind of military government. If it is controlled by Khanh, we will have to do hard soul-searching to decide whether to try to get along with him again after previous failures or to refuse to support him and take the consequences--which might entail ultimate withdrawal. If we can mislay Khanh and get a military chief of state like Co or Dong, we have a fresh option worth trying. But whether a jerry-built civilian government under military domination or a brand new military government, it will not get far unless a new factor is added which will contribute to coalescing the political factions around and within the government and thus bolster its position.

13. To speed pacification, we could consider increasing the U.S. support by increasing the advisory effort or by adding combat units. With regard to the first possibility, during the last year we have already increased our advisory effort by 42 percent. The increase has taken place at several echelons and has involved not only the military but USOM and USIS representation as well. In the military sphere, the positioning of advisory teams at district (county) level and the augmentation of battalion teams account for most of the increase. Americans are now advising all elements of the regular forces down to battalion and a very large part of the paramilitary forces. Americans are also flying all manner of fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and are operating an extensive communications system. By February 1 there will be 23,700 officers and men in country; and, in addition, approximately 750 civilian advisors. We believe that our capability to stiffen further, by advisory means, is very limited; indeed, we have probably reached about the saturation point.

14. The introduction of U.S. ground units to help fight the Viet-Cong is still another question. To take this decision would in effect change the basis of our conduct of the war. This is in itself no argument against such a change, but for the reasons discussed in Section V, we are still of the opinion that we should not get into this guerrilla conflict with our ground units.

15. In the search for some course of action which will help pull the government together, stimulate pacification and raise the morale, I can find only one which offers any chance of the needed success in the available time. This is the program of graduated air attacks directed against the will of the DRV, referred to in reference B as Phase II./9/ The purpose of such attacks would be fourfold: (1) convey to Hanoi the message that it will become increasingly costly to support the VC; (2) eventually create a situation favorable to talking with Hanoi; (3) turn SVN attention from internal feuding to attacking the external source of their troubles; (4) restore U.S./GVN camaraderie through a joint military effort.

/9/Phase II operations referred generally to graduated military actions against infiltration routes in Laos and eventually North Vietnam.

16. I know that this is an old recipe with little attractiveness but no matter how we reexamine the facts, or what appear to be the facts, we can find no other answer which offers any chance of success. The other choices are to continue as we are, making marginal improvements and hoping for the best, to open negotiations with enemy, or to withdraw. Nobody on the spot here believes that any one of these will result in ought but loss of SVN and eventually of SEA. It is true that our recommended course of action offers no certainty of success and carries some risks. We are presently on a losing track and must risk a change. How long it will take to arrive at a denouement if we do not change I cannot say but to take no positive action now is to accept defeat in the fairly near future. Furthermore, the action required goes beyond any mere improvement, necessarily limited, in what we have been doing up to now. The game needs to be opened up and new opportunities offered for new breaks which hopefully may be in our favor. The new breaks may also be unfavorable but scarcely more so than those we have been getting thus far.

17. I have shared your feeling that a stable government in Saigon should be a prerequisite to our undertaking offensive action against DRV. As stated in reference C, the minimum criteria of performance which should be met include the ability of the government to speak for and to its people, to maintain law and order in its principal cities, to make plans for the conduct of operations and assure their effective execution by military and police forces completely responsive to its authority. The present Huong government does not reach this standard primarily because of the uncertain responsiveness of the armed forces to its commands. We will make every effort in adjusting the present governmental crisis to encourage legitimate participation by the armed forces in the government and an acceptance of a degree of responsibility for it. We have some leverage on the generals in the form of the increased aid which I was authorized to discuss with the government upon my return from Washington last month. The most important single item in the package is the matter of joint planning in contemplation of Phase II operations. My present authority permits me now to initiate planning for Phase II with GVN with the understanding that the USG does not commit itself to any form of execution of such plans. Actually, because of the recent climate of our relations, we have not initiated this planning and should not until we are surer of our future course of action. It would be of great assistance in reaching a compromise of the present crisis if I were authorized to state explicitly to GVN leaders that we are prepared to initiate Phase II operations in case the new government meets or shows reasonable promise of meeting your criteria. What I am suggesting is undertaking a conditional commitment that if, in the U.S. judgement, the GVN reaches a certain level of performance, the USG will join in an escalating campaign against the DRV. Hopefully, by such action, we could improve the government, unify the armed forces to some degree, and thereupon move into the Phase II program without which we see little chance of breaking out of the present downward spiral.

18. With regard to your feeling that this guerrilla war cannot be won from the air, I am in entire agreement, if we are thinking in terms of the physical destruction of the enemy. As I conceive it, the Phase II program is not a resort to use bombing to win on the Douhet theory/10/ (which I have spent considerable past effort in exposing) but is the use of the most flexible weapon in our arsenal of military superiority to bring pressure on the will of the chiefs of the DRV. As practical men, they cannot wish to see the fruits of ten years of labor destroyed by slowly escalating air attacks (which they cannot prevent) without trying to find some accommodation which will exorcise the threat. It would be to our interest to regulate our attacks not for the purpose of doing maximum physical destruction but for producing maximum stresses in Hanoi minds.

/10/Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) was an Italian military theorist and proponent of strategic air power and strategic bombing.

19. Thus far I have not specifically discussed reprisal bombing in response to some major VC atrocity such as the Bien Hoa attack or the Brink bombing./11/ I gather that the decision not to react to the Brink affair resulted from a combination of considerations such as the political turmoil in Saigon at the time, the initial uncertainty as to the authorship of the job, the feeling that the local security had left something to be desired and that, when all considerations had been taken into account, too much time had elapsed to warrant making a reprisal. Without undertaking to discuss each one of these points, I would say that the problem looks quite different here than from Washington. If we are so unfortunate as to have another atrocity warranting consideration of reprisal bombing (and I feel sure that we will), we think this event should be viewed as an opportunity to strike DRV appropriately which should be welcomed. It would not only signal Hanoi but would give the local morale a much needed shot in the arm and should dampen VC enthusiasm for terrorism especially against Americans and thus aid in protecting our people. If, as is usual, the investigation to ascertain the facts takes some days, that delay should be no bar to retaliation. Our intent will be perfectly clear when we act and the advantages derived therefrom will be unaffected. We think here that our policy should be to retaliate promptly after receiving Presidential approval for each case. To justify a reprisal, the stability of the GVN (or lack thereof) at the time appears to us to have much less importance than in the case of the deliberate initiation of Phase II bombing.

/11/On October 31, 1964, the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa airfield with mortars, killing 4 U.S. servicemen and wounding 30. On December 24, 1964, a bomb exploded at the Brink Hotel in Saigon, killing 2 and injuring 50 people.

20. The matter of the evacuation of dependents is closely linked to the foregoing considerations. Because of its importance and your personal interest in it, I have given it separate treatment in Section II which follows. In brief, the study concludes that the flow of dependents should be stopped now. Numbers presently here should be reduced by administrative measures but the order to evacuate all dependents, because of its political impact, should await a decision to execute a retaliatory strike against the DRV or to initiate the Phase II program.

21. If the foregoing reasoning is generally accepted, then we should look for an occasion to begin air operations just as soon as we have satisfactorily compromised the current political situation in Saigon and set up a minimal govt in accordance with the procedure of para 17. At the proper time, we can set the stage for action by exposing to the public our case against infiltration, and by initiating aggressive DeSoto patrols. We can be ready with prompt reprisal bombing in response to further VC terrorism. As an earnest of our intent, we can open joint planning with the GVN against the North and stop the flow of our dependents. When decided to act, we can justify that decision on the basis of infiltration, of VC terrorism, of attacks on DeSoto patrols or any combination of the three.

22. In conclusion, I would request authority to act in accordance with para 17 in order to establish as soon as possible a govt meeting the minimum criteria for justifying the extension of air strikes against the DRV in accordance with the Phase II concept. In the meantime, I would hope that, regardless of GVN performance in respect to the criteria, the USG would be ready at any time to approve reprisal strikes to respond as appropriate to major VC terrorism.

Amb Johnson and Gen Westmoreland concur in this cable.

Taylor

[end document]

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Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
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