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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

100. Notes on the Congressional Leadership Meeting/1/

Washington, February 10, 1965, 6:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary. No classification marking. Prepared by Lawrence O'Brien. Attending the meeting in addition to the President, were Senators Mansfield, Smathers, Kuchel, Fulbright; Representatives Boggs, McCormack, Albert, Mahon, and Rivers; McGeorge Bundy, Vice President Humphrey, McNamara, Ball, Admiral McDonald, and McCone; and O'Brien, Valenti, and Watson of the White House Staff. For McCone's notes of this meeting, see paragraphs 16-20 of Document 99.

The President called upon George Ball, in the absence of Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara, John McCone, and Mac Bundy to comment briefly and concisely on the problem currently. He called on Admiral McDonald to comment on the military aspect of the problem currently. He solicited views and opened the meeting to questions. Senator Kuchel questioned McGeorge Bundy briefly by way of clarification of Bundy's remarks--was nothing unusual, was rather routine. Senator Fulbright engaged in a discussion that involved Bundy and McNamara in which he questioned McNamara on the feasibility of any retaliatory attack or any kind of military action involving the mainland of China. This was...dismissed out of hand. Fulbright prefaced his question by saying "I'm going to ask what I'm sure will be considered a foolish question," and that was the only spot during the meeting where there was anything in the way of vigorous exchange of views because the President's advisers answered Fulbright directly and completely and objected to any consideration such as he envisioned. The President in turn asked the...oh, Mendel Rivers posed questions to Admiral McDonald on the military action phase of the problem and asked him for some specifics...hardware and procedures that he felt that could or would be followed militarily. He based his questions for the most part on the previous comments that had been made by McDonald in Rivers' Committee./2/ This seemed to be a pursuit of a subject that had been taken up between the two of them at a prior date. The Speaker commented very briefly by way of stating that the President and his advisors were following the right course and the only course. Carl Albert, George Smathers, and George Mahon were asked if they cared to comment. They declined. The Vice President made a brief comment along the same lines as the Speaker's comment. Senator Mansfield was asked if he cared to comment. He declined to comment. He had a memo that was in his hand--I sat next to him, and I thought he would comment off the memo, but he apparently decided at the last second not to bring the memo into discussion at the meeting so he placed it in an envelope and gave it to Jack Valenti for direct delivery to the President./3/ The President urged the group to avoid any discussion of the meeting, and that if it was learned that a meeting took place, they would have to limit themselves to simply saying it was an informal group of leaders gathered to hear a report from McGeorge Bundy on his trip.

/2/Not further identified.

/3/See Document 101.

 

101. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 10, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Vietnam--Mansfield Memo and Reply. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Further Observations on Viet Nam

These observations are in addition to the views summarized in my memorandum of February 8th/2/ which I advanced at the earlier National Security Council meetings/3/ and which remain unchanged. They are directed specifically at the second major Viet Cong attack.

/2/Document 92.

/3/See Documents 76, 77, and 80.

(1) Anticipate that the Communist defenses against air attacks in the North have already been and will continue to be strengthened since the last attack.

(2) Anticipate that another retaliation on our part now will not cool off the situation--that much should now be clear. Rather it is likely to lead to a further Viet Cong response in South Viet Nam. Therefore, it would be unwise to undertake any retaliation without the full expectation of the response.

(3) Anticipate, further, that the next Viet Cong retaliation is not going to be to fly Migs into Hawk missiles--that would be pitting their weakness against our strength. They are not fools and they are not going to play the game as fools. They are going to continue to play their strength against our weakness. Our weakness is on the ground in Viet Nam, where isolated pockets of Americans are surrounded by, at best, an indifferent population and, more likely, by an increasingly hostile population.

(4) Anticipate that we can count on the South Vietnamese people for less, rather than more, help as the tit-for-tat pattern develops. In a matter of weeks or months it will become unlikely that any of the present United States installations outside of Saigon will be really secure against the Viet Cong. If we are to minimize repetitions of the recent American bloodlettings, therefore, the outposts will have to be vastly strengthened by American forces or pulled into and consolidated in the Saigon area. The timing of any further retaliation against the North, if that is the decision, should take cognizance of this factor.

The French government has indicated that it would participate in a conference of the 1954 Geneva conferees if it should be called by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the sponsoring powers. We are not members of the 1954 Conference (although we were represented there by an observer) and we should certainly interpose no objections to its being called. Indeed if there is to be another retaliation against the North in response to this latest incident, it may be well to try to make it serve the purpose of bringing about the reconvening of such a Conference. If it is convened, our diplomacy should strive to see to it that the first act of this Conference should be to call for a cease-fire throughout Viet Nam and Indochina. We could then attend the Conference, if we chose, as observers or as participants depending on an assessment of both the military and diplomatic situation at the time.

 

102. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff/1/

Washington, February 10, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Reprisal Program, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
Some Queries on Our Proposed Reprisal Track

In reflecting on Mac's report and its Annex,/2/ I am troubled by some far-reaching questions. Let me be clear that I am not questioning the need for a response to "spectaculars" like Pleiku: my doubts focus on the suggested policy of systematic and continuous reprisals against the North.

/2/Document 84.

1. Have we faced--and has the President faced--the full shape of the risk of Chinese intervention?

As I read them, the estimates/3/ already point to the probability of a Chinese MIG response to U.S. air attacks north of the 19th parallel. Under present DoD rules of engagement our planes are authorized hot pursuit across the Chinese border to the jet bases in South China and suppressive fire against these bases. (The estimates also deem as likely Chinese use of these bases.) Such strikes in South China would very probably bring Chinese ground forces into Southeast Asia. Needless to say, any strikes against Chinese nuclear centers--if perchance such a side-benefit is lurking in anyone's mind--would unquestionably bring a Chinese ground force response.

/3/See the section entitled "What Are The Risks?" in Document 90.

2. This raises a further question: Are we willing--and is the President willing--to face a ground war in Southeast Asia against the combined armies of North Vietnam and China?

This is an old question I know, but it is one that must be faced anew in terms of the systematic reprisal track. It would be folly for the sheer momentum of events (or of actions taken to bolster the morale of our friends in Saigon) to lead us into a land war with China in which our air and naval power would be relatively ineffective.

3. Perhaps more significantly, are the American people willing to face a ground war in Vietnam--a conflict already fuzzed by national doubts far exceeding any that attached to the relatively clear-cut Korean conflict (invasion and "UN" response)?

4. Finally, what has happened to the concept of "negotiation" so earnestly pursued by our more thoughtful journalistic and Congressional critics, and previously pursued by many thoughtful people here and at State? Are we ruling it out, as the Annex suggests? If so, for how long?

In sum, I fear we must very soon face the fundamental question of whether the kind of South Vietnam we would like to see emerge is really worth the high probability of a land war with China, a war in which Soviet neutrality simply cannot be assumed.

I know that these are not new questions; but I would feel utterly negligent if I did not raise them again at this time. It is instructive to remember that the bright promise of our predecessor Administration was early removed by a combination of accumulated momentum and events that led us into the first Cuban episode. I know that Cuba was not worth that price at the time; and I seriously question the higher price we may be forced to pay for Vietnam in Asia and in our relations with most of the rest of the world over the next decade.

James C. Thomson, Jr./4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

103. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson/1/

February 10, 1965, 10:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President , McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII. Secret. Prepared by Bundy on February 15. For Prime Minister Wilson's account of this conversation, along with extracts from a transcript apparently made in London, see Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971), pp. 79-80.

1. The Prime Minister placed the call to the President to propose that he should visit Washington immediately for discussion of the crisis in Viet-Nam. I had already informed the British Ambassador, first on my own and then later at the President's direct insistence, that such a visit would be untimely and unhelpful. Lord Harlech obviously agreed, but his replies made it clear that the Prime Minister was insistent. I tried a further delay by suggesting that the call be deferred until Thursday a.m.,/2/ but the Prime Minister continued to insist that he needed to have a position before he faced his own Cabinet Thursday noon London time. The President agreed to receive the call and, after considerable delay in a vain effort to get the classified circuit going, I completed an open circuit with the Prime Minister, and the President went on the line about 10:15 p.m. My notes cover only the President's side of the conversation.

/2/February 11.

2. The Prime Minister evidently opened with his proposal, and apparently indicated that there was a high level of concern in London, and that he would like to come to Washington to put himself in a better position to deal with that concern.

3. The President said he thought it would be a very serious mistake for the Prime Minister to come over; that he thought there was nothing to get upset about, any more than it would be right for him to get upset about Malaysia; and that any visit would be misunderstood here. The President said that our response had been very measured and very reasonable, and that it was not going to be very different whether the Prime Minister came here or not--that it would be a great mistake for us to jump up and down and fly the Atlantic every time there was an issue of this sort. Next week we might be arguing about Sukarno, and another week there might be a threat or two from some Communist. We have telephones and we can always talk.

4. The President went on to make the point that he had tried to be helpful to the Prime Minister on monetary matters and on Malaysia, and that he would be glad to send the Prime Minister an account of the exact situation by classified cable so that he could tell his colleagues just what the U.S. position was.

5. The Prime Minister then evidently said something about his problems in the House of Commons. The President said he had plenty of problems with his own Congress, and he thought it would be a mistake for the Prime Minister to try to use the President as an instrument in the House of Commons, just as he would not wish to use the Prime Minister as an instrument with the Congress. He had to deal with the Congress every day, but he did not pull the Prime Minister into it. He thought the Prime Minister would have to decide what side he was on. The Prime Minister evidently said something about the hazards of escalation, and the President replied he was afraid of escalation, too, but he did not see what was to be gained by flapping around the Atlantic with our coattails out. He thought that such activity would make everybody even more concerned and, instead, he proposed again that he should send the Prime Minister an exact account of the situation and he would be glad to have the Prime Minister's comments as a true ally.

6. The President reminded the Prime Minister that the U.S. did not have the company of many allies in Vietnam. He had spoken to the Prime Minister about the need for British support there and the Prime Minister had told him about his troubles in other areas. The President told the Prime Minister that he was with him in Malaysia with men, money, marbles, and chalk, all the way. Now in Vietnam it looks a little dark and he didn't see what help would come from talk. If the Prime Minister had any men to spare, he would be glad to have them. The Prime Minister apparently returned to the charge, and the President asked him bluntly, "Why don't you run Malaysia and let me run Vietnam?" Would the Prime Minister think it would be good for the President to announce to the American press tomorrow that he was going over to London to try to stop the British in Malaysia? The Prime Minister apparently answered back in some fashion, and the President repeated his comments about the British in Malaysia and our own role in Vietnam.

7. At this point the Prime Minister apparently gave way and reassured the President of his own basic support for our policy in Vietnam. The President replied that that was all right and fine--that we would stand on that--that we understood the British problem--the monetary problem, and the MLF problem, too. [Here follows discussion of the multilateral force.]

8. The conversation evidently moved back to Vietnam. The President said that Ambassador Bruce was here, and that he had talked with him for two hours today/3/ and he would be seeing him further. He would have Ambassador Bruce bring a detailed memorandum on the exact situation to the Prime Minister./4/ The President repeated that he would be glad to share all this information with the Prime Minister and if the Prime Minister had any troops to spare, the President would be glad to have them.

/3/See Document 96.

/4/No copy of such a memorandum has been found, nor is there any indication in Bruce's Diary that he was given such a memorandum for Prime Minister Wilson.

9. The President reaffirmed his basic position: Wherever they murder our people, we are going to react promptly, adequately, and measuredly. The President knew the Prime Minister was going to do the same thing--in Malaysia or anywhere else.

10. The Prime Minister then apparently spoke about the concerns of some other countries. The President replied that he had never considered any of these countries great allies. France was a problem to us, and India had never taken up arms for us. I passed the President a note that our information was that the Indians wanted us to stand firm. The President repeated this comment to the Prime Minister.

11. The Prime Minister then apparently gave further assurances. The President said that he was glad to hear of them, and repeated his view that we ought not to run back and forth across the Atlantic with our shirttails hanging out.

12. The Prime Minister then apparently said something about the difficulty he would have in explaining what he was doing and not doing, and all that he would have to talk about was a call in the middle of the night. The President replied with some sharpness that it was the Prime Minister and not he who placed the call in the middle of the night. The President was just answering it. The President then repeated that the U.S. position was not provocative, not belligerent, not domineering, and that we were not throwing our weight around. But if people came in and killed our men--20 or 30 or 40 of them--our response would be prompt, adequate, and measured. And that's what the President would expect the Prime Minister to do in similar circumstances, and he would have our full support.

13. At this point the Prime Minister apparently gave new assurances of his support and friendship, and the President said that that was fine, and he appreciated it, and that was friendship, and that was the way it ought to be--and he reciprocated.

14. There was then some further talk about what could be said about being in communication, and the President said he surely would keep in touch. The conversation then came to an end, and the President instructed me to send off a message summarizing the current situation to the Prime Minister's office. This I later did./5/

/5/Telegram CAP 65037 to Wright of the British Foreign Office, February 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

McG. B.

 

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 11, 1965, noon.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 12:52 a.m.

2495. Embtel 2445./2/ In the event it is decided to embark upon graduated reprisals program as described reftel it will be necessary as noted therein to engage in more detailed discussions with the GVN at an early date to develop firm arrangements for joint GVN actions and to begin a process of education by which GVN would begin to formulate its war objectives and ultimately reach agreement with us on the framework of demands to be made on the DRV as well as the general negotiating procedures. This education process will take some time. We would hope to bring the GVN along to the point where they would accept a formulation along the lines of our proposal set forth in Embtel 2235,/3/ assuming of course that Washington sees merit in this approach.

/2/Document 93.

/3/Document 32.

In light of the above discussions with GVN and effectiveness of the graduated reprisal program, if adopted, it will also be necessary at some stage to disclose to selected allies and possibly the USSR, US/GVN terms for cessation of our reprisal attacks. (It will be most important to assure that these terms be communicated accurately and fully to Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow.)

The following comprises in broad outline our tentative thinking on how these terms for cessation of our reprisal attacks might be stated. They are implicit in and should be considered in conjunction with Embtel 2235 but are restated in this form for convenience of the Department.

A. Demands

1. DRV return to strict observance of 1954 Accords with respect SVN and the 1962 agreement with respect to Laos--that is, stop infiltration and bring about a cessation of VC armed insurgency. (With respect to Laos strictly observe the 1962 Accords, including the withdrawal of all Viet Minh forces and personnel from Laos and recognize that the freedom of movement granted therein in Laos under those Accords is not subject to veto or interference by any of the parties in Laos.)

B. In return and subject in each instance to a judgement that DRV is complying faithfully and effectively:

1. US will return to 1954 Accords with respect to military personnel in GVN and GVN would be willing to enter into trade talks looking toward normalization of economic relations between DRV and GVN.

2. Subject to faithful compliances by DRV with 1954 Accords, US and GVN would give assurances that they would not use force or support the use of force by any other party to upset the Accords with respect to the DRV.

3. Within the framework of the 1954 Accords, the GVN would permit VC desiring to do so to return to the DRV without their arms and would grant amnesty to those peacefully laying down their arms and desiring to remain in SVN.

C. If and when Hanoi indicates its acceptance of foregoing conditions, careful consideration must be given to immediate subsequent procedures which will avoid danger of: (a) becoming involved in a cease-fire vis-à-vis the DRV and/or the VC accompanied by strung-out negotiations; (b) making conditions so stringent as to be unworkable from practical point of view. Probably best procedure would be to have the GVN and DRV meet in the DMZ at the military level under ICC auspices with US observers to reach agreement mechanics of carrying out understanding while action against the VC and DRV continues, at least in principle. RLG would have to be associated with these negotiations at some point.

We recognize that one of the most difficult aspects as we proceed with the graduated reprisal program, if approved, will be how to establish communications with Hanoi and at the same time not to become involved in direct negotiations with the DRV. One possible formula might be for the US to talk with GVN while USSR talks with Hanoi and with the US and the USSR talking together. Other possibilities will undoubtedly suggest themselves to the Department. Another difficult problem should we reach the stage of GVN/DRV negotiations will be how we can maintain the threat of continued reprisals in order to prevent DRV stalling and achieving a de facto cease-fire and to permit us to verify that DRV is acting in good faith and that VC have not merely gone underground only to arise again. We have no sure fire formulae at the moment but wish to flag these problems for intensive study./4/

/4/The Embassy offered further comments on a graduated reprisal program in telegram 2350 from Saigon, February 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Taylor

 

105. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 11, 1965, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Received in the Department of State at 4:25 a.m.

2501. Deptel 1677./2/ We believe we detect in reftel certain variations from our thinking on recent political events which are worth discussing as they involve an evaluation of the relative weight of important factors entering into the political scene here.

/2/In telegram 1677, February 10, the Department of State contended that any South Vietnamese Government that did not take into account the power of both the military and the Buddhists was not likely to last very long. (Ibid.)

We agree that two predominant elements in the political picture are the military and the Buddhist Institute leaders (not Buddhists in general), but would stress that they are by no means of equal importance. The Institute leaders have limited ability to stir up trouble and raise mobs, particularly in the Hue area. The armed forces, on the other hand, have the physical means to put down any such demonstrations and to maintain law and order if their senior generals are determined to do so. During the recent period of demonstrations, we have found no signs of deep grassroots support for the Buddhist Institute and continue to believe that except in Hue area their strength essentially superficial. Huong had them on the ropes and would probably have survived their attacks had the military stood by him.

Nonetheless, we entirely concur that any govt here must reflect power realities. While military and Buddhist Institute are, as Khanh has called them, "most turbulent elements;" Catholics, particularly northern elements, who have thus far remained quiet, cannot be ignored. We also should not ignore the larger mass of Vietnamese people who, while thus far have not been organized and who do not yet have an articulate spokesman, are stoutly opposed to the increasingly neutralist trend of the Buddhist Institute. As we have previously pointed out no formula will be entirely acceptable to the Institute that does not give de facto control over the govt. Such control is entirely incompatible with effective prosecution of this war. A govt acceptable to both military and Buddhists, as well as to Catholics and other non-Communist elements, is hardly possible for it means the reconciling of virtual opposites. Nevertheless we of course entirely agree that we should not encourage the formation of a govt which is unnecessarily provocative to the Buddhist Institute. Given Khanh's predominant role in the formation of the govt and his predilection for seeking deals with the Buddhist Institute, we have simply been seeking to assure that a reasonable balance be maintained.

Vien's present slate (FVS 11,341)/3/ offers considerable [?] to the Buddhist Institute. It will be noted that Tran Van Do, Phan Huy Quat and Pham Quan Dan are all being considered for Minister of Cultural and Social Affairs which is important to Buddhist Institute. Generals Thi, Ky and Nghiem are also all acceptable to the Buddhist Institute. Buddhist Institute likely to oppose Vien himself and General Thieu. However, regardless of attitude Institute takes toward govt, it is certain they will press hard for removal of Colonel Ben, Head of Police and Colonel Dong of Capital Military District simply because both have effectively kept order in Saigon. Removal of Colonel Ben would destroy morale of police and much of progress that we have been able to make in building up police structure. It seems to us that we must continue to resist such moves even though it incurs the wrath of the Institute.

/3/Not found.

In closing, we do not feel that this Embassy has ever tried "to shore up a govt besieged by both military and Buddhists." We did support the Huong govt which, until Jan 26, successfully resisted the Buddhists with the support of the armed forces. When, between Jan 25 and Jan 26, Khanh and company pulled the rug from under Huong, there was no shoring up to be done since his govt or any other would necessarily fall with the withdrawal of military support. The latter is indespensable for the continued existence of any govt in South Vietnam; the support of the Institute leaders is not, as long as the military are willing to stand up against them.

Thus we feel that our primary objective should be to encourage the formation of a govt headed by a resolute PriMin, civilian or military, who has the full support of the armed forces and the will to maintain order against all comers. Our efforts should be discrete and invisible to the naked eye since no VN official will thrive long who can be accused of being a U.S. puppet.

Taylor

 

106. Editorial Note

During the early afternoon of February 11 (between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m. Washington time), U.S. and South Vietnamese aircraft attacked the military barracks at Chop Le, North Vietnam, as part of a retaliatory air strike codenamed Flaming Dart II. U.S. Navy aircraft from the USS Hancock, USS Coral Sea, and USS Ranger also hit Chanh Hoa just north of the DMZ. A chronological summary of the planning and execution of Flaming Dart II covering the period from 6:20 p.m. (Washington time) on February 10 through 8:35 a.m. on February 11, apparently prepared by Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Reprisal Attack, Feb. 11, 1965.

After the strikes, a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese statement was released in Saigon. The text is in Department of State Bulletin, March 1, 1965, page 291. Shortly afterward, at about 8 a.m Washington time, the White House released a statement. The text is ibid., page 290. Documentation concerning the wording and timing of these two releases, including telegraphic correspondence between the Department of State and the Embassy in Saigon, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.

[end document]

Continue:
Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
Documents 107 through 108