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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

109. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-100-65

Washington, February 11, 1965.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Vietnam 381. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
Courses of action--Southeast Asia--First Eight Weeks

1. In response to your request at the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1965, an initial program of military actions against the DRV has been developed./2/ The program extends over a period of eight weeks and is confined generally to targets along Route 7 and south of the 19th parallel. It employs both RVN and US forces and is primarily a plan for air strikes. It also provides for naval gunfire bombardment and for continuation of present activity, including 34A operations, resumption of DeSoto Patrols, and authorization for ground cross border operations. Details as to targets, time phasing, and force requirements are contained in Appendix A and the Annexes thereto/3/ (the weapons requirements for the lettered targets in the Annexes are presently being computed and will be forwarded to you as a matter of priority); 34A operations, DeSoto Patrols, and ground cross border operations are in Appendices E, F, and G, respectively.

/2/No other record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The program of air strikes against North Vietnam was code named Rolling Thunder.

/3/None of the attached appendixes or annexes is printed.

2. It is visualized that the initial overt air strikes of this program will have been undertaken as a retaliation in response to a provocative act by Viet Cong or DRV forces against US or RVN personnel or installations. Successive overt operations to provide sustained pressures and progressive destruction will be continued on the plausible justification of further provocations, which on the basis of recent past experience seem quite likely to exist. As this program continues the realistic need for precise event-association in this reprisal context will progressively diminish. A wide range of activities are within the scope of what may be stated to be provocations justifying reprisal. A list of examples is in Appendix B.

3. The proposed program, with anticipation of extending the effort in intensity and target coverage, provides an initial build-up of forces as shown in Appendix A. This build-up, consisting of an immediate deployment of over 325 aircraft to WESTPAC, provides a visible deterrent to Communist China and the USSR and, together with the alerted forces, improves our capability to cope with possible escalation.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the DRV, Communist China, and the Soviet Union will make every effort through propaganda and diplomatic moves to halt the US attacks. The DRV also will take all actions to defend itself, and open, overt aggression in South Vietnam and Laos by the DRV might occur. In addition, the mere initiation of the new US policy almost certainly would not lead Hanoi to restrain the Viet Cong; Hanoi would probably elect to maintain the very intense levels of activity of the past few days. However, if the United States persevered in the face of threats and international pressures, and as the degree of damage inflicted on North Vietnam increased, the chance of a reduction in Viet Cong activity would rise. They further believe that the Chinese Communists would be reluctant to become directly involved in the fighting in Southeast Asia; however, as the number and severity of US attacks against the DRV increase, they probably would feel an increased compulsion to take some dramatic action to counter the impact of the US pressures. There is a fair chance that Peiping would introduce limited numbers of Chinese ground forces as "volunteers" into North Vietnam, and/or northern Laos, intending to raise the specter of further escalation, to underline its commitment to assist the North Vietnamese, and to challenge the Soviets to extend corresponding support. They also believe that the probable Soviet response to these US courses of action would consist both of a vigorous diplomatic and propaganda effort to bring the United States to the conference table and the provisions of military support to North Vietnam. While the extent and nature of the latter are difficult to predict, it almost certainly would include antiaircraft artillery and radars. In order to provide more effective defense against the US air attacks, North Vietnam would probably press for surface-to-air missiles. The chances are about even that the Soviets would agree to provide some SA-2 defenses, but they would do so in ways calculated to minimize the initial risks to them. By providing the necessary Soviet personnel in the guise of "technicians," the USSR could preserve the option of ignoring any Soviet casualties. In the event the DRV and Communist Chinese openly undertake aggressive actions, the United States and its allies can deal with them adequately. Two possible plans available for use against a Communist offensive are CINCPAC Operation Plan 32-64, which is a plan for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia, and CINCPAC Operation Plan 39-65, which provides primarily for offensive air and naval actions in Southeast Asia and against mainland China./4/ Forces required under these plans are set forth in Appendices C and D.

/4/CINCPAC Operation Plan 32-64, "Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia," November 6, 1963, was attached to JCSM 9-55, November 14, 1963. (JCS Files) Plan 39-65, dated September 5, 1964, dealt with responses to Chinese Communist aggression. (Ibid.)

5. No significant logistic, transportation, or personnel problems are anticipated in the execution of Phases I and II of CINCPAC Operation Plan 32-64. Significant logistic deficiencies, as indicated in JCSM-955-64, dated 14 November 1964, subject: "Courses of Action in Southeast Asia,"/5/ begin to appear with the implementation of Phase III and IV of that Plan and, to an undetermined extent, in the implementation of CINCPAC Operation Plan 39-65. These logistic implications are treated in Appendix H.

/5/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 411.

6. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the program herein proposed will demonstrate to the DRV that continuation of its direction and support of insurgencies will lead progressively to more serious punishment. If the insurgency continues with active DRV support, strikes against the DRV will be extended with intensified efforts against targets north of the 19th parallel.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the proposed eight-weeks program of attacks against DRV targets be approved.

8. While the Chief of Staff, US Army, agrees with the deployments proposed in the plan insofar as they go, he is not in agreement with the adequacy of the ground forces deployed. One US Infantry Division is required in northeast Thailand, as a minimum. A second US Infantry Division in the same area is desirable. It is the view of the Chief of Staff, US Army, that the program of strikes proposed in the Appendix hereto can be supported. However, in SVN and Thailand the logistic support for an effort expanded to the full CINCPAC Operation Plan 32-64, Phase IV, and tentative CINCPAC Operation Plan 39-65 is inadequate to sustain the effort because there are inadequate POL stocks and an inadequate POL distribution system.

9. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, supports the strike program set forth herein and the force movements recommended. He believes, however, that as a further action to the measures proposed herein, the feasibility and desirability of making additional deployments to the Western Pacific area once these forces are in position should be examined as a matter of priority. A follow-on study for this purpose has been initiated.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 11, 1965, 1:54 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved by Ball.

1693. We are working urgently to refine your recommendations and Bundy's, which are very similar, into a systematic course of action constituting in effect a modified Phase II program. The principal differences appear to be that we will justify our actions as responses VC action and that tempo may hopefully be somewhat slower than some versions of Phase II had envisaged.

In our analysis to date, latter point assumes great importance. Ideally, we would like to lengthen the time before we reach a fork in the road at which negotiating pressures become extreme, or dangers of sharp Communist response become substantial, or both, while at the same time maintaining necessary pattern of response and pressure both to strengthen SVN situation and eventually to affect Hanoi attitudes.

Timing and criteria for specific actions thus crucial. Hanoi may force our hand, as it did by Qui Nhon and other actions, so that there is really no choice but to respond at once. However, we remain anxious to keep our response actions controllable and optional to maximum degree possible, and particularly to relate timing to any special factor outside SVN. For example, Kosygin's continued presence in Far East gave us concern yesterday although we concluded immediate action essential.

Thus, we will need to stay in closest touch assessing VC actions against threshold of further response actions. Procedurally, we want to keep maximum discretion here and try to make our own minds up before we become in any degree committed to GVN to specific actions. There may be cases where provocations so extreme that failure to consult immediately with GVN could be construed as hesitancy and have adverse effect on them; night of February 10 was probably such a case, and we accept your judgment. However, we should have general practice of consultation with Washington prior to any GVN approaches which inevitably tend to commit us and could tilt the scales wrongly on timing decisions.

An underlying basic point--and another factor pointing to controlled tempo--is that GVN and South Vietnamese generally should not slide into believing we have taken over the war and they can resume bickering and not go all out in the field. Would appreciate your judgment how far such danger exists as we go along. Your present estimate would also be helpful in next few days./2/

/2/See Document 112.

Ball

 

111. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 10-3-65

Washington, February 11, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, February 1965. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem; Limited Distribution. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of AEC, NSA, and the Departments of State and Defense participated by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

McGeorge Bundy forwarded SNIE 10-3-65 and SNIE 10-3/1-65 (Document 139) to President Johnson on February 19 under cover of a memorandum stating that both estimates "are important enough for you to read in full" and "seem careful and sober to me" and "suggest the wisdom of your determination to act in a measured and fitting way." (Johnson Library, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII)

COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE US ACTIONS

The Problem

To estimate Communist reactions, particularly Soviet reactions, to a US course of sustained air attacks on North Vietnam.

Scope Note

This US course is presumed to start with a public declaration outlining the new policy and linking it to the entire range of Viet Cong guerrilla and terrorist activity in South Vietnam. This declaration, we further presume, makes it clear that the US means to go beyond specific reprisals for individual major Viet Cong actions and to continue air attacks until the threat to South Vietnam has been reduced to levels which the US regards as tolerable. We consider in this estimate present Communist attitudes and Communist reactions, particularly Soviet reactions, in the period before and during continuing air attacks, and during any period when these attacks are suspended.

The Estimate

The Present Situation

1. Reversing Khrushchev's policy of minimum involvement in Southeast Asia, the new Soviet leaders have over the past several months begun to reassert the USSR's interest, particularly in Vietnam. Kosygin's visit to Hanoi is the latest step in this process. We believe that, in embarking on these tactics, the Soviet leaders hoped to work Hanoi back toward a middle position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, to discourage the US from broadening the war, and to participate in the Communist victory which they expected. To these ends, the USSR probably planned to offer to strengthen North Vietnamese air defenses and to provide equipment for use in insurgency and subversion.

2. The recent VC attacks and US/GVN reprisals probably cut across Soviet calculations. The US course of action under consideration here would further undermine these calculations and force the Soviets to reconsider; indeed, they are probably already doing so. In the meantime, however, they have already reconfirmed their commitment to North Vietnam, albeit in general terms, with a government statement promising "further measures to safeguard the security and strengthen the defensive capability" of the DRV.

3. Soviet public statements after the attacks of last weekend had a cautionary flavor, and we believe that Kosygin's private representatives to Hanoi were of a similar nature. Nevertheless, Hanoi has evidently chosen to maintain a high level of VC pressures in South Vietnam, including attacks against US facilities, perhaps in part to force the Soviets into a stronger commitment. China for its part is almost certainly seeking to sharpen the Soviet dilemma of a choice between support for the DRV, whatever the dangers of confrontation with the US, or a withdrawal which Peiping could portray as confirmation of its case against Moscow.

Key Uncertainties

4. At the outset, the Communists would have to determine how to interpret the new policy declared by the US. We believe that they would understand that the US did in fact intend a course of sustained pressure against North Vietnam. Even at the beginning, however, they would see some chance that their own threats and international pressures could succeed in averting air attacks or keeping them at a low level. Unless attacks continued regularly and frequently thereafter and the US Government displayed a consistent determination to persevere, the Communists would tend to doubt that the US would long sustain this course of action.

5. Another important initial uncertainty relates to timing. In the course of reasserting their interest in Vietnam, the Soviets may have extended specific commitments, including offers of military aid, of which we are not yet aware. Or they may do so between now and the time when the new US policy is announced. In either case, the USSR's freedom to disengage in reaction to the new US program would be reduced, although not entirely eliminated.

Soviet Reactions

6. It is possible that, once the US has demonstrated the seriousness of its intentions, the Soviets would revert to a policy of minimum involvement. But we think it unlikely that they would do so; their commitment to date probably has already carried them past this point. Although the Soviets would perceive military risks in more direct involvement, they would expect to be able to keep these at a tolerable level and far removed from the Soviet homeland. They would also expect difficulties in their relations with Washington, but the new leaders have thus far shown themselves at least as concerned to win support of other Communists and anti-Western radicals as to carry forward a détente with the US.

7. We believe that the Soviet response to the US program of air attacks would consist both of a vigorous diplomatic and propaganda effort to bring the US to the conference table and the provision of military support to North Vietnam. The extent and nature of the latter are difficult to predict. It would almost certainly include anti-aircraft artillery and radars. In order to provide a more effective defense against US air attacks, however, North Vietnam would almost certainly press for surface-to air missiles or even advanced jet fighters. These systems would, at the present time, have to be installed and operated by Soviet personnel./2/

/2/In the case of the SA-2 missile system, the USSR would need two and more probably about three weeks to provide a limited operational capability in North Vietnam after a decision to do so. Advanced jet fighters could be provided more quickly. [Footnote in the source text.]

8. In considering these advanced systems, the USSR would recognize that missile sites and fighter bases in North Vietnam would be highly vulnerable to US attack. The Soviets would appreciate that successful attacks on these targets would face them with a choice of accepting the damage, substantially boosting their involvement in the defense of the DRV, or becoming party to even more provocative escalation. It may be that, rather than open up these dangers, the USSR would refrain from providing SAMs and fighters. Yet a refusal to satisfy North Vietnamese requests for this kind of aid would be costly to the Soviet position, the more so if such aid had previously been promised.

9. On balance, we think that the chances are about even that the Soviets would provide some SA-2 defenses to North Vietnam. Such a move would run counter to the preferred Soviet tactics of increasing their commitments only when the dangers of confrontation have begun to recede. But the present degree of Soviet involvement, plus the political costs of failing to provide support in the circumstances under consideration, might outweigh their caution in the present case.

10. If the Soviets should provide SA-2s, we believe that they would do so in ways calculated to minimize the initial risks to them. One likely way of doing this would be to deploy some SA-2 defenses for the key Hanoi-Haiphong area, hoping that this degree of involvement would serve to restrain the US and still not engage Soviet personnel in actual fighting. SA-2s deployed in this area, however, probably would be used if attacking US aircraft came within their range. By providing Soviet personnel in the guise of "technicians," the USSR would preserve the option of ignoring any Soviet casualties.

11. This would be a fairly limited Soviet involvement, but it would represent a greater commitment to North Vietnam than has obtained in the past. In this situation of increased risks, we believe that the USSR would be seeking means to curb the conflict. This effort would consist both of threats against the US and of attempts to mobilize international pressures on the US to negotiate, probably in the Geneva forum.

12. If these efforts failed, however, the Soviets might in time advise Hanoi to damp down operations in South Vietnam or even to entertain a political settlement on terms not completely unacceptable to the US. This would be a delicate operation for the USSR; the DRV would charge that what was needed was not less Viet Cong aggressiveness but more effective Soviet assistance, and Peiping would almost certainly take the same line. We cannot at this time predict whether the USSR would try this approach nor, if it did, what the results would be.

13. Elsewhere in the world, general Soviet policy would harden against the US. This would tend to preclude moves toward a relaxation of tensions and to increase the USSR's verbal ugliness on other East-West issues. The new leaders, however, have in any event not been inclined to date to move very far toward detente. Nonetheless, we think it highly unlikely that they would react to the US course of action considered here by deliberately provoking a major crisis in some other area of the world, e.g., Berlin or Cuba.

DRV Reactions

14. Initiation of the new US policy almost certainly would not lead Hanoi to restrain the Viet Cong. Hanoi would probably elect to maintain the very intense levels of activity evident in the past few days. Pressures might be stepped up in Laos at the same time. The anger and emotion with which the US program would be received in Hanoi might affect its calculations. In any case, the DRV would wish to avoid an impression of weakness at the outset. Moreover, it would have some doubt about US staying power on its new course and would hope that Sino-Soviet competition would maximize the support provided by both allies. If the US persevered in the face of threats and international pressures, and as the degree of damage inflicted on North Vietnam increased, the chances of a reduction in Viet Cong activity would rise (see paragraph 18).

15. The insurgency in South Vietnam is heavily dependent on support, leadership, and direction from the DRV, but the VC nonetheless has substantial capabilities independent of Hanoi. Thus Hanoi could probably achieve a substantial stand down for tactical purposes and could effect a more lasting reduction. Nonetheless, the insurgency in South Vietnam has a momentum of its own, and some hostile VC action would probably continue, though at reduced levels.

Chinese Reactions

16. China would be equally violent in castigating the new US course. At the outset of the new US program, there is a fair chance that Peiping would also introduce limited numbers of Chinese ground forces as "volunteers" into North Vietnam, intending to raise the specter of further escalation, to underline its commitment to assist the North Vietnamese, and to challenge the Soviets to extend corresponding support. More extreme Chinese reactions--such as introduction of large-scale ground force combat units into North Vietnam or northern Laos--would be possible, though we think this unlikely in the early stages. If the US program continued and inflicted severe damage on North Vietnam, the chances of such a movement would rise. But we still think that China, conscious of the danger of provoking major US attacks against its own territory, probably would not take this step./3/

/3/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the chance of introduction of Chinese ground forces into North Vietnam or northern Laos is considerably higher than is estimated in this paragraph. [Footnote in the source text.]

Use of Communist Aircraft

17. A special problem for the Communists lies in the fact that only three North Vietnamese airfields, all located in the northern part of the country, are fully capable of sustaining jet fighter operations./4/ Fighters would thus have difficulty in engaging US/GVN aircraft attacking targets in the southern part of North Vietnam. Furthermore, the Communists recognize that US retaliation against these airfields would be feasible and effective. These considerations apply to the use of Soviet and Chinese fighters in North Vietnam as well as to the interceptors which the DRV might be able to put into the air with Soviet or Chinese assistance. Despite these capabilities, the Communists probably would employ the fighters based in North Vietnam against the US air attacks. If US air attacks reached the northern part of the DRV, China might react over North Vietnam with fighters from its own bases./5/

/4/At Kien An in northern North Vietnam and at Vinh and Dong Hoi in southern North Vietnam, there are airfields on which jet fighters (including MIG-21s) can land and take off, but none of these fields has ancillary facilities sufficient to support sustained operations. Thus, while North Vietnam has six fields with runways adequate for jet fighters, only three (Phuc Yen, Hanoi/Gia Lam, Haiphong/Cat Bi) can support sustained jet fighter operations. [Footnote in the source text.]

/5/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that "might" in this sentence should be changed to "would probably." [Footnote in the source text.]

18. The Communists could react by launching air attacks against South Vietnam from North Vietnamese or Chinese bases. We think this unlikely because of the vulnerability of North Vietnamese bases and China's reluctance to risk retaliation against its own territory.

A Possible Communist Tactic

19. If at some point the Communists had become persuaded of the durability of the new US policy, they might adopt tactics designed to provide a respite. This might come about if US attacks were inflicting severe damage and if, at the same time, the US had made clear an intention to reduce or cease its attacks in return for a sharp reduction of Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam. In these circumstances, the DRV might order such a reduction and use an ensuing period of calm to press for a negotiated cease-fire and an international conference. At the same time, it might use the respite for a major buildup, assisted by its allies. Such a buildup might include extensive SA-2 deployments, additions to jet fighter strength in North Vietnam and southern China, and large-scale deployments of DRV and Chinese ground forces suitable for rapid invasions. The Communists might expect that they could complete these preparations without US interference, and that thereafter the US would be deterred from resuming its program of air attacks when Viet Cong activity was again stepped up.

The Coordination of Communist Policy

20. It is obviously to Communist advantage to appear unified, and they will make great efforts to convey this impression. Heightened military conflict would itself exert strong pressures for effective unity. Nevertheless, we have at several points indicated our belief that the USSR and China act as competitors in North Vietnamese affairs and that they would continue to do so during a period of sustained US air attacks on North Vietnam. We have also pointed to complex and conflicting interests which make for delicate relations--and difficult communications--between Hanoi and both its allies. We think it likely that policy coordination among three Communist countries involved will be chronically imperfect and occasionally quite erratic. Hence, Communist policies and reactions will at times be faltering and uncertain and at others bold to the point of rashness. In any case, since Communist policies will be constantly fashioned and refashioned to meet a constantly changing situation, they will be difficult to foresee very far ahead.

 

112. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 12, 1965, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to DOD, the White House, CIA, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

2530. Reference: A. Deptel 1693./2/ B. Embtel 2445./3/ Paralleling your example, we, too, are developing a proposal for a specific course of action to implement the concept of reference B. We would hope that you will not close your books until we have the opportunity to make our contribution.

/2/Document 110.

/3/Document 93.

In review of the rationale for concept of graduated reprisals, we are of the opinion that, in order of importance, it should have the following objectives: (A) the will of Hanoi leaders; (B) GVN morale; and (C) physical damage to installations having some bearing on the DRV ability to support VC. Of these three, first appears to us by far the most important, since our effectiveness in influencing Hanoi leadership will, in the long run, determine the success or failure of our efforts in both North and South Vietnam. Second objective, effect on GVN morale, is also important and fortunately the requirements for building morale in the South are roughly the same as those for impressing Hanoi leaders with the rising costs of their support of the VC. In this case, what is bad for Hanoi is generally good for Saigon.

Effect of the physical destruction of material objects and infliction of casualties will not, in our judgment, have a decisive bearing upon the ability of DRV to support VC. However, degree of damage and number of casualties inflicted gauge the impact of our operations on Hanoi leadership and hence are important as a measure of their discomfort.

If one accepts the foregoing rationale, one can then pass to a consideration of methods and procedures appropriate to implementation of such a concept. We agree with the Dept that we should keep our response actions controllable and optional to maximum degree possible so that we can act or withhold action when and as we choose. This need for flexibility argues strongly for vagueness in defining criteria for situations justifying retaliation and for retention of freedom of action to make ad hoc decisions in light of our interests at the moment. But in any case, complete flexibility will not be possible for at least two reasons. First the GRV may perpetuate an untimely atrocity like Qui Nhon which we cannot ignore. Second, we will probably receive from GVN more requests for retaliatory strikes in excess of the optimum tempo which we wish to give the operations. To turn down the GVN too often will work against factor of morale which we mentioned at the outset and sour relations which we hope to sweeten. We shall have to take this point into account.

Assuming that we have achieved control and flexibility, we will then need to think of the tempo which we wish to communicate to the retaliatory program, with primary consideration given to effect of the program on Hanoi leadership. It seems clear to us that there should be a gradual, orchestrated acceleration of tempo measured in terms of frequency, size, number and/or geographical location of the reprisal strikes and of related activities such as Barrel Roll and 34-A. An upward trend in any or all these forms of intensity will convey signals which, in combination, should present to the DRV leaders a vision of inevitable, ultimate destruction if they do not change their ways.

The exact rate of acceleration is a matter of judgment but we consider, roughly speaking, that each successive week should include some new act on our part to increase pressure on Hanoi. As indicated at the outset, we are working on a paper/4/ which will contain specific suggestions along these lines.

/4/Not further identified.

We note your comment with regard to avoiding contact with GVN prior to consulting Washington. We can see advantage of first getting the Washington reaction before that of the GVN but would point out the difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining VNAF participation in a strike during the daylight hours following a night atrocity without starting the VNAF wheels turning as soon as retaliatory actions appear likely. This difficulty is not an overriding objection because, in our view, there is an operational need henceforth to stagger our attacks in DRV in order to avoid being trapped in an unchanging pattern of reaction. The three strikes which we have executed thus far have all fallen between 1400 and 1600 of the first day following the atrocity. We are bound to increase the hazards to our pilots if we do not vary our schedule.

We do not believe that our reprisal program will lead the GVN to believe that we have taken over their war and that they can reduce their anti-VC activities. We hope that the opposite will be the effect and the retaliatory actions in the North will give impulsion to the defensive efforts in the South. However, the Dept's fear can certainly not be ruled out and we shall watch closely the GVN reaction to the program as it unfolds.

Taylor

 

113. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 13, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVIII. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam

This memorandum has been discussed with Bob McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Thompson and has been revised to reflect their suggestions./2/ [Except for the major difference in positions set forth on page 10]/3/ it can be taken as representing the generally agreed views of all four of us.

/2/The source text is attached to Ball's note of February 13 to McNamara, in which he stated: "Attached is a revision of my paper for the meeting with the President today at 12:30." Ball added the following handwritten postscript: "You will note that I have flagged on page 10 what I take to be a basic difference of view between you and Bob on the one hand and Tommy [Llewelyn Thompson] and me on the other. This needs discussion before we talk with the President." No previous drafts of the paper have been found. Ball later stated that he and Thompson prepared the paper and reviewed it with McNamara and McGeorge Bundy. (Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 390-391)

/3/Reference is to Part II A. These and following brackets are in the source text.

The memorandum consists of two major parts.

Part I is a discussion of the probable risks inherent in a program of gradually mounting military pressure on the North. In spite of these risks, we are in general agreement on this program.

We have taken account of these risks in connection with the military actions already taken. As we move--step by step--up the scales of military action you will certainly wish to appraise the level of risk at each point--although admittedly your ability to control exposure to risk is likely to diminish as the scale and intensity of military pressure increases.

Part II of the memorandum is a program of political action. Such a program is an essential accompaniment to the military program. It is needed for several reasons:

a. To make clear to the world that our objectives are peace and freedom;

b. To minimize the danger of MIG engagement and Chinese and Soviet involvement, giving the Soviets an alternative to support the Chinese militancy;

c. To pre-empt a probable peace offensive by the Communists;

d. To enable you to opt for a political settlement at any point where you determine that the risks of further military pressure have become prohibitive in the light of our over-all interests.

PART I

The Risks of Our Military Program

A. Nature and Objectives of the Proposed Military Program

The course of action we are now proposing to follow (subject to refinement by exchanges with Saigon and further staff work here) envisages continued air attacks, on a joint United States/South Vietnamese basis, against military targets directly related to North Vietnamese infiltration. It also contemplates attacks on targets such as railroad lines, in response to Viet Cong attacks on corresponding targets in the South.

We would continue to justify such air attacks as responses to Viet Cong action in the South. Viet Cong attacks on United States personnel and installations would call for practically automatic responses. Other Viet Cong activities would be assessed continuously, and the criteria for response left as flexible as possible.

Since we would seek to justify our attacks as responses to Viet Cong actions we might not be able fully to control their tempo. However, we would seek to keep as much flexibility as possible.

We envisage that the attacks would slowly increase in scale.

We propose to mount strikes at roughly weekly intervals unless our hand is forced by dramatic VC actions.

The fundamental objective of this program is to increase United States bargaining power, vis-a-vis Hanoi and Peiping, to the point where a satisfactory political solution becomes possible. Hopefully these attacks should also tend to improve morale and increase stability in Saigon while impairing the infiltration efforts of the North Vietnamese.

B. Risks of War with Communist China

1. We cannot long continue air strikes against North Viet-Nam without facing the likelihood of engagement with the 53 Chinese MIGs sent to Hanoi to defend North Viet-Nam. The danger of encountering these MIGs will increase as we strike targets closer and closer to Hanoi.

In our air strikes to date, we have hit targets up to sixty miles north of the 17th parallel. At some point--if we close the remaining gap of 250 miles to Hanoi--engagement by United States planes with the 53 MIGs sent to Hanoi will become inevitable. We recommend delaying the chances of MIG involvement by continuing for the next eight weeks to confine our strikes to targets below the 19th parallel. Such targets lie outside the effective range of the ground control center of the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.

2. Once our planes have been engaged heavily by MIG aircraft, you will be compelled--in order to prevent unacceptable losses--to face the decision to mount an air effort to eliminate the major MIG base at Phuc Yen, near Hanoi. This base is heavily defended. Some parts of the base are near populated areas. Any effective strike against it would require a massive air effort.

2a. If we hit targets in or approaching the Hanoi-Haiphong area, it will be likely at some point to trigger a DRV ground force move South. The DRV can support an invasion of 125,000 troops (20-50,000 through the DMZ; balance through Laos). There is no current estimate of what US response would be needed to stop this action. It would clearly require substantial increases of US ground, air and naval forces.

3. Last November, the United States intelligence community unanimously agreed that, if the United States attacked above the 19th parallel, "Chinese Communist aircraft operating from Chinese bases would probably assist in defending North Viet-Nam against the United States attacks"./4/ Perhaps the involvement by Chinese air would first take the form of "volunteers," but it might shortly be followed by direct engagement of Chinese planes operating from the sanctuary of Chinese territory. There are now approximately 350 Chinese jet fighters deployed in the Hainan area of South China--within striking distance of North Vietnam.

/4/The Feb. 11 estimate is that this "might" occur. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to Document 111, paragraph 17.]

4. Once Chinese aircraft entered the conflict you would be under considerable pressure to order United States forces to knock out offending Chinese bases--and even to strike at Chinese nuclear production installations.

5. If Chinese air bases were hit, some of our intelligence experts believe it likely that China would move massive ground forces into North Viet-Nam, and subsequently into Laos, South Viet-Nam, and possibly Thailand. Other experts assess the chances as being lower. All agree that such a movement would be entirely possible.

6. If Chinese ground forces were to move into Southeast Asia, we would be compelled to make a major effort to stop them. The only way that this could be done through conventional means would be by introducing substantial United States ground combat forces into South Viet-Nam. The magnitude of the required effort would almost certainly mean that you would have to call up reserves.

7. It is estimated that the Chinese have the logistical capacity to support 14 Chinese divisions and 8 North Vietnamese divisions in a movement into Laos, Thailand and South Viet-Nam (without taking account of United States and Allied interdiction operations). In order to counter this movement, we would be required to bring in 5 to 8 United States divisions with a total troop strength (including supporting elements) of 300,000 men.

8. The confrontation of Chinese ground forces by American ground forces would induce debate in the United States as to the need to use nuclear weapons--although DOD does not believe there would be a military requirement for such weapons. Recalling the Korean experience, some Americans would argue that United States ground forces should not be asked to fight large numbers of Chinese troops without resort to nuclear weapons, in which the United States has a clear advantage.

9. To use nuclear weapons against the Chinese would obviously raise the most profound political problems. Not only would their use generate probably irresistible pressures for a major Soviet involvement, but the United States would be vulnerable to the charge that it was willing to use nuclear weapons against non-whites only.

10. Peiping's decision whether or not to intervene may well turn upon its estimate of the extent to which it can expect Soviet support. Unless we provide the Soviets with a political alternative they can support they will be in a weak position to bring pressure on the Chinese Communists to move toward a settlement. Without such a political option they will also find difficulty in resisting Chinese pressure to provide assistance in the event of a United States-Chinese military conflict. Such a political option is suggested in Part II of this paper.

C. Chances of Conflict with the USSR

We cannot be certain at this time what the Soviets will do if we continue our air strikes against North Viet-Nam--particularly if these strikes lead to direct conflict with the Chinese. The Soviets may want the Chinese and us to bloody our noses, but we doubt they would be in a position to exploit this desire. In the last analysis, the Soviet stake is the leadership of the Communist Bloc. Competition for that leadership would probably force the USSR in the direction of increasing its aid and involvement. On balance, we think it highly likely that--if the war should continue and escalate--the Soviets would feel compelled to extend an increasing amount of assistance to the North Vietnamese and Chinese.

1. Kosygin's trip has already resulted in a commitment by the Soviets to give increased defense assistance to Hanoi. We do not know what form this increase will take. The United States Intelligence Community thinks "the chances are about even" that ground-air missiles--probably with Soviet missile crews--will be included. The likelihood of increased aid commitments will grow as our raids extend northward to Hanoi.

2. If we should become engaged directly with the Chinese, the Soviets would be faced with a painful dilemma. Under the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty (which is fifteen years old on February 14) the Soviets are obligated to come to China's assistance if China is attacked. The Soviet Union could avoid this commitment only by claiming that China's actions had caused the attack. Under existing circumstances, this would be tantamount to denouncing the treaty.

3. Since China is rich in manpower, the Soviets would probably seek to limit their contribution to advanced military equipment. But, again, the contribution to Soviet missile and other personnel or volunteers could not be excluded.

4. Soviet harassment of United States interests elsewhere might well be another step in this sequence of events. Ambassador Kohler pointed out on Thursday that "...the Soviets will be intrigued with possibilities inherent [in the] somewhat less enthusiastic support of our policy in Southeast Asia by [the] majority [of] Western European countries and may think that by presenting them with [a] nasty flareup in central Europe and exerting pressure on us to temper actions in Viet-Nam, they have [a] real opportunity of causing serious intra-alliance friction."

5. At the very least, progress toward improvement of United States-Soviet relations would be severely set back. Moreover, we could look forward to a substantial deterioration in the evolution of the Bloc toward a reduction of tensions and the development of a system more compatible with that of the West.

C [D]. Negotiating Pressures and World Reactions

1. In many major capitals there are already signs of deep concern at the present state of the conflict and the dangers of escalation. U Thant, the French, and India have already called for some form of negotiation. The British have advised us that they are under public pressure to take a negotiating initiative. Labor back-benchers can be expected to increase this pressure with any rise in the intensity of military operations. The Canadians have also told us that they are considering proposals that would lead to negotiation, although both they and the Indians do not propose an immediate conference.

2. More generally, Ambassador Stevenson has reported that there is substantial sentiment in the United Nations favoring negotiation. This could conceivably lead to negotiating initiatives.

3. Any escalation--even the repetition of air strikes at the present level of intensity--will increase these pressures. If we found ourselves engaged with the MIGs and particularly if we were compelled to strike Phuc Yen, the Soviets, Indians, Canadians, British, and others would almost certainly bring strong pressure for immediate negotiations. Many would call for an immediate conference with no preconditions--before we had built up sufficient bargaining power.

4. Up to this point, we have the public support of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. We have, at least, the understanding and acceptance of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and our NATO allies generally--except for France. On the other hand, we must recognize that even such an ally as Japan has expressed its strong opposition to any systematic program of air strikes against the North.

5. Even the continuance of military pressure against North Viet-Nam at the present level would probably arouse sharp hostility among the Afro-Asian nations. Indonesia would be of particular concern, since by stepping up its actions against Malaysia it could create a two-front conflict. The general attitudes of Afro-Asian and neutralist nations need not be a serious drawback in themselves, but they would contribute to an over-all world atmosphere highly critical of our position.

PART II

Outline of a Political Program

A. Our Objectives in South Viet-Nam

McNamara and Bundy differ from Ball and Thompson as to what the United States should realistically expect to achieve in South Viet-Nam and the degree of risk we should assume.

McNamara-Bundy Position/5/

/5/McGeorge Bundy wrote in the left-hand margin of the source text next to this paragraph: "not our view." Ball later recollected that before the February 13 meeting with the President, Bundy called him to correct Ball's statement of the views attributed him. Bundy, according to Ball, said he did not believe that the United States had to increase military pressure "to the point where Hanoi is prepared to agree not only to stop infiltration from the North, but effectively to call off the insurgency in the South and withdraw those elements infiltrated in the past." (The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 504-505)

McNamara and Bundy believe that we must pursue a course of increasing military pressure to the point where Hanoi is prepared to agree not only to stop infiltration from the North, but effectively to call off the insurgency in the South and withdraw those elements infiltrated in the past. To achieve this objective, they would accept the risks of substantial escalation, including the acceptance of ground warfare with Red China--although they believe it likely that we can achieve the desired objective without such a war. This view is shared by Maxwell Taylor.

Ball-Thompson Position

Ball and Thompson believe that--short of a crushing military defeat--Hanoi would never abandon the aggressive course it has pursued at great cost for ten years and give up all the progress it has made in the Communization of South Viet-Nam. For North Viet-Nam to call off the insurgency in South Viet-Nam, close the border, and withdraw the elements it had infiltrated into that country would mean that it had accepted unconditional surrender.

Ball and Thompson believe that Red China would be extremely reluctant to permit Hanoi to suffer such unconditional surrender since it would mean the collapse of the basic Chinese ideological position which they have been disputing with the Soviets. Peiping would thus be under great pressure to engage the United States on the ground as well as in the air.

Ball and Thompson believe that the Chinese decision to intervene on the ground would, in the final analysis, probably depend largely on the extent to which Peiping felt assured of Soviet support. There is no way that we can safely predict whether or not such support would be forthcoming. They are convinced, however, that the risks of Chinese ground intervention would be great and the costs of such intervention tremendous--particularly since the very taking of this step by Peiping would presumably imply substantial Soviet involvement, perhaps even to the point of a large-scale Soviet-US confrontation.

Ball and Thompson have supported the air strikes that have so far taken place and they would support a program of gradually increasing military pressure. They believe that only in this way can the United States achieve a bargaining position that can make possible an international arrangement that will avoid a humiliating defeat to the United States. They do not believe, however, that we can realistically hope for an international arrangement that will effectively stop the insurrection in South Viet-Nam and deliver the entire country south of the Seventeenth Parallel to the government in Saigon free and clear of insurgency. They consider that the most we can realistically expect from any international arrangement are measures to stop the infiltration so that we may be able, over time, to reduce our commitments. Hopefully the military actions preceding such an arrangement would have created a sufficient sense of unity in Saigon to make it possible for the South Vietnamese Government--with diminishing United States help--to clean up an insurgency that had become manageable by the shutting of the borders.

In all events, Ball and Thompson recommended that you must be prepared and alerted--whenever it appears that military conflict may have reached the level of intensity where Chinese ground intervention seems likely--to accept a cease-fire under international auspices short of the achievement of our total political objectives.

B. Elements of a Political Program

The political program we propose consists of four parts:

(a) The issuance of a joint US-South Viet-Nam statement of aims;

(b) Based on this statement, the submission of the South Vietnamese problem to the Security Council and full discussion in the Security Council of all aspects of that problem;

(c) Negotiation of the conditions for a conference to be conducted among a group of countries consisting of the United States, Great Britain, France, South Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam, Red China, and the Soviet Union; and

(d) Negotiations at the conference.

(a) Issuance of an Agreed US-South Viet-Nam Statement of Aims

Ideally, the United States and South Viet-Nam should jointly issue a statement of war aims as a prelude to the submission of the South Viet-namese case to the Security Council. Because of the action of U Thant in issuing a statement of his own, we may find it necessary for the President to outline our objectives to the world over the weekend, without waiting for a full South Vietnamese concurrence.

A joint US-South Vietnamese statement of aims would include these elements:

1. The two governments intend to continue to take all necessary military measures to stop the Communist aggression against the Republic of South Viet-Nam.

2. Our joint and sole aim is to secure and maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of South Viet-Nam so as to permit it to develop its institutions and live in peace with its neighbors free from outside interference.

3. The independence of South Viet-Nam requires the cessation of the guerrilla activities in South Viet-Nam directed and supplied from the North, the stopping of infiltration from the North, and the withdrawal of Viet Cong cadres previously infiltrated into South Viet-Nam.

4. South Vietnamese independence, which is the birthright of every nation, large and small, should be internationally guaranteed.

5. Such a guarantee must be reinforced on the ground by peace- keeping machinery with enough strength and a sufficient mandate to assure that all parties to the agreement abide by their promises.

6. This machinery can best be established under the aegis of the United Nations.

7. Once these arrangements are carried out, the United States is prepared to withdraw its military forces from South Viet-Nam. [It must, of course, be made clear that any final arrangement should include the right of South Viet-Nam to call in assistance at a moment's notice if the United Nations' guarantee should prove inadequate.]

(b) Submission to Security Council

As soon as possible--and we do not think that this can be delayed at the most for more than a week--the United States should bring the Viet-Nam issue to the United Nations Security Council. Conditions at the moment are propitious since the Security Council has the most favorable composition in years--the five permanent members, plus Bolivia, Uruguay, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Jordan and the Ivory Coast.

1. In proceedings in the Security Council, the United States would:

(i) Present all available evidence to establish that the insurrection in South Viet-Nam is not an indigenous revolt but an insurgency imposed, directed, supplied, and inspired from North Viet-Nam. [The effective establishment of this proposition may require some compromise of existing intelligence. We should be prepared to do this.]

(ii) Call for the establishment of peace in South Viet-Nam under conditions that will assure its independence. These include the halting of infiltration and the stopping of the direction and encouragement of the revolt from the North.

(iii) Call for a meeting with representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, USSR, Communist China, North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam to discuss arrangements for a cease-fire, the cessation of infiltration, and the establishment of peace in South Viet-Nam.

(iv) Suggest that the Hanoi regime as well as the Republic of Viet-Nam be invited to join in the deliberations of the Council.

2. It is unlikely that Hanoi would send representatives to New York. Most probably both Hanoi and Peiping would scornfully reject the Security Council proceedings--at lease in the first instance. But taking the problem to the Security Council and calling for peace negotiations--while stepping up our military efforts and our military buildup--would increase the pressure on the Soviets to help put an end to the crisis by joining in a call for a cease-fire and a conference.

(c) Preparatory Meeting of the Six Countries

The proposed prepatory meeting would provide the forum for really serious negotiations. By debating the conditions under which a conference might be called--while at the same time continuing our military activity--we might be able to push the other nations in the direction of our objective.

(d) The Conference

If we should ever get to a Geneva-type conference we would presumably have concluded most of the bargaining in the earlier proceedings. The conference could, however, be the mechanism for arranging for UN guarantees and a UN presence. Moreover, it would probably be desirable to include a Laos settlement in such a conference as well.

Need to Preempt Security Council Initiative

We must be aware that the Soviets may take the initiative to bring us into the Security Council as the defendant rather than the prosecutor. Moreover, the pressure on the Secretary General to call the Security Council into session under Article 99 of the Charter will also increase; so far, he is restrained from acting by his own caution and our negative advise. We cannot negotiate a settlement of the issue in/6/ the Security Council, because Hanoi and Peking will not be willing to do it there. But we can start the process there, and thereby secure the political initiative in our own hands.

/6/A note on page 13 of the source text, which begins with paragraph 2 above and ends with the footnote reference, reads: "Revised page Mr. Bundy."

George W. Ball

 

114. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce)/1/

Washington, February 13, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327, January-March 1965. Secret.

In George Ball's office at 10 a.m. I went over papers on Vietnam, to be submitted later today to the President. [Here follow two sentences unrelated to Vietnam.]

At 1:30 I met Bob McNamara, Mac Bundy, Tommy Thompson and George Ball in the Situation Room at the White House, before we went up to see the President./2/

/2/The President's Daily Diary shows that he met from 1:56 to 4 p.m. with McNamara, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Bruce. Thompson is not listed as present, but Bruce's Diary suggests otherwise. (Johnson Library) No other record of the discussion has been found. Apparently the President reviewed Ball's memoranda of February 13 at that meeting (Document 113 and footnote 2 thereto). Ball recalled that in a meeting with Bundy and Thompson, the President read Ball's memorandum quickly, asked Ball to go through it point-by-point, and returned the memorandum without comment. (Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 391-392)

The President was cross about newspaper leaks. He said his decisions were announced in the New York Times before he made them. He wanted his principal officers to enforce rules against divulgences from their Departments, also to report to him the gist of conversations they had with journalists on substantive matters.

He told us of his telephone conversation with Harold Wilson,/3/ in the course of which he remarked "We've got no time to be flying back and forth across the Atlantic with our shirt-tails hanging out."

/3/See Document 103.

[Here follows a paragraph unrelated to Vietnam.]

After much exposition, the President agreed to the next steps of Vietnam policy. The three salient provisions were: (1) Intensification of the pacification program; (2) Measured, but effective, action below the 19th parallel, against military targets in North Vietnam--to be reported to the United Nations Security Council. Action will cease when aggression stops; (3) U.S. will press for talks to bring an end to aggression. Ambassador Stevenson will take this up with the Security Council.

It was decided to instruct Max Taylor to secure the support of the South Vietnam Government to the above. The President is to explain the policy in a speech next week, probably on Thursday./4/

/4/The speech was not given; see Document 124, paragraphs 5-7.

[Here follows information unrelated to Vietnam.]

 

115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 13, 1965, 6:54 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in the White House, presumably by McGeorge Bundy, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Ball. Printed in part in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 428-429.

1718. The President today approved the following program for immediate future actions in follow-up on decision he reported to you in Deptel 1653./2/

/2/Document 91.

1. We will intensify by all available means the program of pacification within SVN.

2. We will execute a program of measured and limited air action jointly with GVN against selected military targets in DRV remaining south of the 19th parallel until further notice. FYI. Our current expectation is that these attacks might come about once or twice a week and involve two or three targets on each day of operation. End FYI.

3. We will announce this policy of measured action in general terms and, at the same time, we will go to UN Security Council to make clear case that aggressor is Hanoi. We will also make it plain that we are ready and eager for "talks" to bring aggression to an end.

4. We believe this 3-part program must be concerted with GVN, and we currently expect to announce it by Presidential statement directly after next authorized air action. We believe this action should take place as early as possible next week.

5. You are accordingly instructed to seek immediate GVN agreement on this program. You are authorized to emphasize our conviction that announcement of readiness to talk is stronger diplomatic position than awaiting inevitable summons to Security Council by third parties. We would hope to have appropriate GVN concurrence by Monday/3/ if possible here.

/3/February 15.

In presenting above to GVN, you should draw fully, as you see fit, on following arguments:

a. We are determined to continue with military actions regardless of Security Council deliberations and any "talks" or negotiations that may ensue, unless and until Hanoi has brought its aggression to an end. Our demand would be that they cease infiltration and all forms of support and also the activity they are directing in the south.

b. We consider the UN Security Council initiative, following another strike, essential if we are to avoid being faced with really damaging initiatives by the USSR or perhaps by such powers as India, France or even the UK.

c. At an early point in the UN Security Council initiative, we would expect to see calls for the DRV to appear in the UN. If they failed to appear, as in August, this will make doubly clear that it is they who are refusing to desist, and our position in pursuing military actions against the DRV would be strengthened. For same reason we would now hope GVN itself would appear at UN and work closely with US.

d. With or without Hanoi, we have every expectation that any "talks" that may result from our Security Council initiative would in fact go on for many weeks or perhaps months and would above all focus consistently on the cessation of Hanoi's aggression as the precondition to any cessation of military action against the DRV. We further anticipate that any detailed discussions about any possible eventual form of agreement returning to the essentials of the 1954 Accords would be postponed and would be subordinated to the central issue.

For your private guidance, the following draft language is under consideration for Presidential announcement:

"The aggression has continued. It has continued against the Vietnamese, and it has continued against Americans. In support of the independence of Vietnam, in the service of our nation, and in fulfillment of the solemn public obligation of our nation, and in our individual and collective self-defense, the Government of the United States, with the Government of Vietnam, has now decided that further action must be taken.

The actions we have agreed upon are three.

First and most important, we will continue and we will intensify still further our campaign against terror and violence in South Vietnam itself. The establishment of civil peace and the disarming of the Communist forces are the first order of business for both our Governments. Our military and police actions will be increasingly energetic and effective. We will also strengthen and enlarge our efforts to move forward with the peaceful development of a society set free from fear. We will never make the mistake of assuming that there is any substitute for victory against aggression where it shows its open face--inside the borders of South Vietnam itself.

Second--and at the same time--we will carry out measured but effective actions against military targets in North Vietnam. These actions will be reported to the United Nations Security Council under the Provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter/4/--and each such report will include a full account of the continuing acts of aggression which make our actions necessary. These actions will stop when the aggression stops.

/4/Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reads as follows:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." (Charles I. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, vol. III, p. 1165)

Third, we will press with urgency for talks designed to bring an end to the aggression and its threat to peace. I have today instructed Ambassador Stevenson to seek such action urgently, in the Security Council of the United Nations, and if that body should be hamstrung by any veto, we shall then press for talks in another appropriate forum. We believe that in any such talks the first object must be an end of aggression, and we believe that the government in Hanoi must be brought to the conference room. Our common purpose--and our only purpose--is to restore the peace and domestic tranquillity which others have so savagely attacked."

Ball

 

116. Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 14, 1965, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Repeated to Bangkok exclusive for Ambassador Johnson. Received in the Department of State at 10:59 a.m.

2583. Ref. A. Deptel 1718./2/ B. Embtel 2572./3/ We have received Ref. A with deep enthusiasm and will rally all our resources to carry out our part of the President's program. Meanwhile we have a few preliminary observations which we would like to contribute and would welcome Department comment and guidance.

/2/Document 115.

/3/Telegram 2572, February 13, described Taylor's meeting that evening with Quat regarding the difficulties in forming a new government in South Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Our first problem here is how to obtain authentic GVN concurrence in the condition of virtual no-government which exists in Saigon today. You can see from Ref. B that Quat probably has a considerable way to go to form a government and, in the end, may be no more successful than Vien. Hence, short of a miracle, my approach tomorrow must be to "Jack" Oanh in his capacity as a lame-duck Acting Premier who will probably not be in the new cabinet as it seems to be taking shape. My present thought is to suggest to him to have Khanh, Thieu and Vien present when we meet. (If Quat has made real progress overnight he, too, might be included.) Thus, the GVN concurrence would be a consensus of the Acting Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief, and Second Vice Prime Minister of the caretaker government (and perhaps the new Prime Minister-designate). In any new government, Khanh will be at least Commander-in-Chief; Thieu is expected to remain Vice Prime Minister; and Vien will, we hope, have some place in the cabinet.

Because of the importance of the matter I shall raise, the GVN representatives may wish to consult the National Security Council or the Armed Forces Council. I would not agree to such consultation on ground of danger of leaks.

The presentation of this program is sure to evoke many GVN questions. One will be the degree of joint U.S./GVN agreement in the various steps in the program. For example, will GVN concurrence be sought for Presidential announcement? (As I read Ref. A, I am not to discuss proposed text of Presidential announcement at this time.) Will all strikes be joint and is there a reciprocal veto right for each party? Will the decision to move north of the 18th parallel be taken jointly? Another question, always difficult to answer among ourselves, will be the ways of determining that Hanoi has brought its aggression to an end. I hope I can make clear that we will insist not only that Hanoi cease actions in DRV in support of VC but that Hanoi collaborate in obtaining cessations of VC insurgency in SVN.

It will be interesting to observe the effect of our proposal on the internal political situation here. I will use the occasion to emphasize that a dramatic change is occurring in U.S. policy, one highly favorable to GVN interests but demanding a parallel dramatic change of attitude on the [part of GVN?]. Now is the time to install the best possible government as we are clearly approaching a climax in the next few months. The U.S. Mission and the GVN will have serious problems to work out together, many of them complicated matters in the field of foreign affairs where the GVN must strengthen its [omission in the source text] we need the first team and we need it fast.

There is just a chance that the vision of possible victory may decide Khanh to take over the government at this juncture. Alternatively, it may create some measure of national unity which will facilitate the task of Quat or of any other Prime Minister who succeeds in forming a new government.

Our comments on the text of the proposed Presidential announcement and the tactics related to it will follow by separate cable./4/

/4/Apparently before Taylor had time to send the cable promised here, the Department of State provided further instructions to him; see Document 117.

Taylor

 

117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 14, 1965, 6:08 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Ball.

1724. Ref A--Deptel 1718./2/ Ref B--Embtel 2583./3/

/2/Document 115.

/3/Document 116.

1. Your proposed procedure Ref B approved. Stress avoiding leaks in strongest manner.

2. Do not discuss text Presidential announcement or even fact such announcement contemplated. Most you should say is that we expect to make joint policy public in some manner probably following next operation.

3. You may state all strikes would be jointly planned and agreed. Avoid question of reciprocal veto if possible but if necessary make clear USG will retain veto including question when to move north of the 18th Parallel.

4. As to coordination of diplomatic actions you should avoid getting into position that GVN would have veto our actions. If absolutely necessary, you could point out we have basic responsibility holding off international negotiating pressures and will have to be best judges of how do this, consulting fully with them whenever possible, and hoping for full joint participation.

5. Re last sentence fourth para Ref B, slightly prefer formulation in sub-para b Ref A but effect appears to us exactly same.

6. While we agree climax may be approaching in next few months, hope you can continue stress vital importance maximum pacification effort under best possible government. Hard slugging is ahead in SVN no matter what we do outside and degree of progress made could have decisive impact on Hanoi willingness accept our basic objectives. In effect, progress in SVN is just as much part of total pressures on Hanoi, if not more, than proposed action program.

Ball

 

118. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 15, 1965, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. McGeorge Bundy forwarded Taylor's telegram to President Johnson on February 15 noting in his covering memorandum that there was "an issue between him and us" over "the exact noise to be made in the first round in the Security Council. As I understand it, this is a question in your mind too." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII)

2588. Ref: Deptel 1718;/2/ Embtel 2583./3/ Following are comments promised Embtel 2583:

/2/Document 115.

/3/Document 116.

I welcome decision for us to take initiative in bringing question into UNSC and to do this as early as possible before others take initiative away from us. However, I am concerned, both from point of view of overall negotiating tactics and political considerations here, that the formulation in last paragraph of Presidential announcement makes us appear impatient to get to the conference table. Such eagerness, expressed at the start in the UNSC, would in my view only compound pressure on US for premature negotiation. The immediate Soviet reaction and that of many of our allies, for example, would be to call for reconvening Geneva Conference. It seems to me instead that we should seek to divert pressure for negotiation from us to Hanoi and its partners.

If our reasonableness and our willingness to negotiate is played properly here it could have a positive political effect, particularly if as we hope we have a new civilian government headed by Quat. However, any impression of great eagerness to negotiate on our part following hard on the heels of evacuation of dependents is likely to be interpreted by large segments of Vietnamese opinion as confirming suspicions of a US decision to pull out, despite the expression of our determination to continue joint air strikes in southern part of DRV. It particularly important in my view to hold the question of talks open until we have worked out a common approach with the new GVN.

I am also concerned that our announced haste to get to conference table may spark upsurge in VC efforts designed to achieve the maximum negotiating advantage, since Hanoi and Peking may interpret our eagerness as a sign of weakness. We should remember the example of the ChiCom attacks in Korea just before the signing of the armistice.

Finally, I strongly believe that the Lao and the Thai should be brought on board before we seem to be inviting reopening of a Geneva Conference. If we fail to do this, much of the effect of our present course of action will be lost on them.

I recommend, therefore, elimination of any reference to willingness to talk in final paragraph of proposed Presidential announcement/4/ or in initial presentation in UNSC and that we preserve basic approach contained Embtel 2235,/5/ particularly paragraph 14 re how we state our demands on DRV and nature of negotiations. Our willingness can well be brought out in UNSC debate. While some form of negotiations is obviously our ultimate objective and UNSC discussion could eventually lead to such negotiations, we should in my judgment divert and focus these pressures for negotiation in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow and maintain a posture of firmness and determination.

/4/In a February 15 memorandum to Rusk Harland Cleveland took issue with Taylor's recommendation, proposing instead that the announcement "make a specific proposal for preliminary talks based on specific pre-conditions of our own choosing." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, February 1965)

/5/Document 32.

I recommended following revision of final paragraph of Presidential announcement:

"I have today instructed Ambassador Stevenson to seek urgently a meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations to explain the reasons leading to the joint decision of the USG and GVN and to inform the UNSC members of the history of DRV aggression which makes this course of action necessary. Our common purpose--and our only purpose--is to restore the peace and domestic tranquility which others have so savagely attacked."

I also recommend the following additional changes in the announcement:

A) In the first paragraph, insert the following new sentence between the present third and fourth sentences: "These actions will continue until lawless elements are either destroyed or driven from the country."

B) At the end of the second "action" paragraph add "and not before."

Taylor

 

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 15, 1965, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 9:22 a.m.

2602. Ref. A. Deptel 1718./2/ B. Deptel 1724./3/ This cable reports my meeting with Acting Prime Minister Oanh, General Khanh and General Thieu for the purpose of obtaining GVN agreement to the US program outlined in paragraphs 1 to 3 inclusive of reftel A. I was accompanied by General Westmoreland and Mr. Manfull.

/2/Document 115.

/3/Document 117.

At the outset, I indicated that I was approaching the GVN on instructions to obtain concurrence for a joint GVN/US program in extension and replacement of the one which we had previously discussed on December 7/4/ and January 25./5/ To facilitate the discussion, I distributed the following top secret unsigned memorandum:

/4/Regarding this discussion, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 439.

/5/Apparently an inaccurate reference. Taylor was presumably referring to his discussion of the reprisal program with Huong on January 23, which is described in Document 33.

"The USG proposes the adoption of the following program for immediate future actions:

"A. Intensification by all available means of the program of pacification within SVN.

"B. Execution of a joint GVN/US program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets in the southern part of DRV. Air strikes under this program will be jointly planned and agreed.

"C. Announcement of this policy of measured action in general terms and presentation to the United Nations Security Council of the case against the DRV as the aggressor, accompanied by an indication of readiness to discuss ways of bringing the DRV aggression to an end."

Following the guidance contained in reftels, I then proceeded to comment on each one of the foregoing three points. With regard to the intensification of pacification, I noted the danger both in SVN and in the US that this air program would be regarded as a cheap and easy way out of the pacification problems in SVN and that it behooves both parties to allay this misapprehension by intensified attention to pacification and by strong statements to the people and the armed forces of SVN that the in-country program must be carried forward with increasing vigor.

Khanh agreed with this evaluation but cited the unspectacular nature of pacification operations and the requirement to keep a strong central reserve of military units to cope with possible major attacks by VC on provincial centers. He asked my opinion about the need for a partial mobilization, to which I replied that now was the time to be sure that all national resources were brought into play as we appeared to be moving toward some kind of climax.

With regard to the second point, I stressed that on our side we would like to impart a vigorous rhythm to the operations against the North but that much would depend upon the ability of the Vietnamese Government to maintain its end. There would be much more in the program than the military aspects; in particular, there would be a need for a prompt strengthening of the foreign office, the UN delegation and information activities. Overall, there was the pressing need for a strong, permanent government.

Khanh then asked what we meant by the phrase "selected military targets in the southern part of the DRV"? I explained that it meant the area in which we had conducted our recent strikes and would extend over, at least, as much of south DRV as could be reached with safety by VNAF. I then made the point that, not covered by this proposed agreement, were the US air operations in Laos, the 34-A program which should continue to be conducted as at present, and any CINCPAC operations of the nature of the Tonkin Gulf affair. I explained that the initial limitation of strikes to this southern part of the DRV would not necessarily be permanent as, in the course, we would probably want to edge north to give signals to Hanoi of increasing danger.

On the subject of point three, the approach to the UN, I explained the need for preemptive action and for taking the initiative from those countries who might wish to call us before the UN bar as the guilty party. It was most important to present the strongest possible case against Hanoi and we must work closely together [to] this end. I emphasized that we expected to continue air strikes throughout the duration of the discussions which might last several months. I closed with a summary of our objectives which are to oblige Hanoi to cease infiltration and all forms of support of VC and to collaborate in obtaining cessation of VC insurgency.

Khanh and Oanh consulted briefly and Khanh indicated that they were completely in accord with the three-point program. I indicated that I would report GVN concurrence to Washington.

Before we broke up, Khanh expressed concern over the statements appearing in the world press which suggested that our recent air strikes had been in retaliation solely for US losses on US bases and indicated that this kind of talk caused him trouble in SVN. I told him that we appreciated his difficulty and would also like to stress the mutuality of our defensive actions. I reiterated, as I had in my meeting with Prime Minister Huong on January 23, that retaliation should take place whether the victims were Vietnamese, US nationals or both. Khanh's comment is a reminder to us that in all government statements we should recognize the GVN partnership and the mutual responsibility to protect the nationals of both countries.

Later when I queried Khanh privately as to whether he has considered bringing Quat into the meeting per our suggestion, Khanh replied that it would have been improper to include Quat since he was not officially installed as Prime Minister. However, Khanh said he would bring Quat up to date immediately following Quat's investiture. Earlier we had informed Quat without mentioning subject of meeting that we would suggest to Oanh and Khanh that he participate but of course decision rested with them.

Taylor

 

120. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 15, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in the Office of the Ambassador at Large, presumably by Thompson himself, on February 15.

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

I told the Ambassador that I wished to talk to him a little further about the situation in Viet-Nam, I said we were convinced and, in fact, had evidence that the Viet-Cong were controlled from Hanoi and we were convinced that the recent escalation had been deliberately triggered by Hanoi. I said we did not have evidence that Peking had ordered the recent increase in activity and the outrages against our people, but since it was only Peking that stood to gain, we could assume that they were involved.

Dobrynin asked if this was a message from the President, and I replied that the President had asked me to speak to him but had not instructed me specifically what to say, but I thought I was reflecting his thinking. When he asked whether this was a reply to the message from his Government/2/ or whether there would be a separate communication, I said I frankly did not know.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 82.

Dobrynin said he had no instructions from his Government and could only give me his personal views. He said that not only he but the members of his staff had reacted very strongly at our action in bombing North Viet-Nam, which they thought was deliberately related to the Kosygin visit. He could assume that reactions in the Soviet Union were similar.

I again assured him that when we had learned of the Kosygin visit, we had taken a number of steps, including calling off a DeSoto patrol in order not to, in any way, embarrass Mr. Kosygin. It was not we, but the other side that had started these new developments. When Dobrynin said we could have taken some other action than the bombing of the country which his Prime Minister was visiting, I asked him to put himself in our place. I said, for example, that if the West Germans had been conducting operations in East Germany similar to those which North Viet-Nam was conducting in South Viet-Nam and that during a visit of President Johnson to West Germany a lot of Soviet personnel in East Germany had been blown up in a sneak attack, what would they have done? He said I can assure you we would not have bombed West Germany.

Dobrynin several times asked to know what the course we had embarked upon was leading to and what our ultimate objectives were. I said our objective was to get out of South Viet-Nam. I pointed out that we had reached a settlement of a similar problem in Laos and that we had actually withdrawn our troops. His Government had complained about a few alleged technical violations but the fact was that we had really carried out the agreement. The other side had not and had prevented any international machinery from operating effectively. I said we would like to see this agreement effectively implemented.

Dobrynin said he still did not understand what we were driving at. From the Soviet point of view, we had intervened to put down an indigenous movement which was very strong and the fact that even if one accepted our statements of some infiltrators from the North, the South Vietnamese had some three hundred thousand men, in addition to the sizeable American forces, engaged, and they were unable to put down the rebellion, which showed that it was basically an indigenous movement. He said that simply for the sake of argument, if one accepted our statements about the North Vietnamese role, what would happen if they agreed to stop any intervention and did so? There would continue to be incidents and he wondered what he would do then.

I said that we had firm evidence of the command and control of these operations by Hanoi and said we could produce our evidence. I did not dispute that there was some indigenous rebel activity but said that after the Geneva Accords the North Vietnamese had left personnel in South Viet-Nam to carry on these operations and had brought in tens of thousands from the North after the Accords. These people were highly trained and would go into villages and force the villagers to supply them with personnel under threat of destroying the village. If the village did not comply, they carried out their threats.

Dobrynin interjected that there was plenty of evidence of the South Vietnamese Government using similar methods. I went on to say that if Hanoi stopped its intervention and withdrew its people, we would know about this and in this event we were sure that the situation could be stabilized. I said it was important to realize that North Viet-Nam was trying to take over South Viet-Nam but we were not endeavoring to take over the North. I said we considered our actions defensive.

Dobrynin pointed out that Shastri, de Gaulle, and U Thant had raised the subject of negotiations/3/ but the State Department had said no. He said that I knew his country and must know how they were reacting and the possibility that they would become involved. He asked if it were true, as he had inferred from press articles, that there had been some negotiations started indirectly between us and Hanoi. I replied that I had not heard of any.

/3/Regarding the Indian Government's public statement of February 8 calling for negotiations, see footnote 5, Document 122. For text of U Thant's appeal on February 12 for a dialog among the principal parties involved in Vietnam, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 832-833.

In discussing Soviet/American relations, Dobrynin said that the Soviet Government had made several gestures toward the improvement of relations, not that they felt President Johnson needed them, but they were genuine. He emphasized that contrary to press statements, the Soviet Government was not in a position of having any need to improve relations, although they thought this was in the mutual interest of both countries. He said it was not a question of desiring to worsen them, but was simply one of fact that if our present policy continued, our relations would be adversely affected. I said I could recognize this fact but it seemed to me they were attempting to use the threat of worsening relations as a deliberate move to affect the Vietnamese situation. I pointed out that after the Cuban affair we had been able quickly to resume our progress in bettering our relations.

Dobrynin emphasized that he had been speaking personally and I again said that I was simply trying, at the direction of the President, to give him some understanding of the way we looked at the problem.

[end document]

Continue:
Initiation of a program of air strikes against North Vietnam;
Introduction of U.S. ground combat forces,
February 11-March 8
Documents 121 through 135