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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

10. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 6, 1965, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 3:56 a.m.

2055. For the President--Section II of V Sections./2/ Ref. par. 7(1) CAP-64375./3/ I fully understand and appreciate your concern with respect to the problem of dependents. As we see it here, there are two aspects to this--first, the actual physical danger to the dependents themselves and, secondly, the psychological effects both on our friends here and on the enemy of a decision to withdraw them. Although no one can exclude the possibility at any time of accidental or deliberate injury being inflicted upon some of our dependents, for the moment I am most concerned with the latter problem, that is, the psychological effects on our friends and enemies.

/2/Sections I and III-V are Documents 9 and 11-13.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 477.

Immediate withdrawal in the present atmosphere would, I am certain, be interpreted both here and in Hanoi and Peking as a sign of weakness and desperation which could result in panic among our friends and great encouragement to the enemy. (It would also adversely influence our ability to obtain third country assistance from our less sturdy friends.) However, if the withdrawal is directly related to other action against the DRV, it can, if properly handled, be used to reinforce the tonic effects such action will have for our friends and the seriousness of purpose that we will desire to communicate to the enemy. I have, for example, in mind the successful way in which we used the evacuation of our dependents from Guantanamo during the Cuban crisis to reinforce the signals that we were seeking to communicate to both Havana and Moscow.

At the same time, I entirely agree that until the time comes that we want to use mandatory withdrawal of dependents to reinforce wider action we are taking elsewhere, we should seek to do all we can to reduce the size of the problem. We have already done much to reduce their numbers by voluntary and administrative action. For some time USOM has hired no new personnel with small children. MACV has also been reducing the number of positions requiring two-year tours and thus, under present DOD policy, the presence of dependents if desired by their sponsor. All the agencies have also informally discouraged the bringing of dependents and encouraged the voluntary return of those already here. However, we can, and subject to your own thoughts, I propose to do much more.

We could have all agencies immediately initiate a policy of not permitting newly assigned personnel or those returning from home leave to be accompanied by their dependents. We could also initiate a policy of encouraging the advanced departure of dependents whose sponsors are scheduled to leave Viet-Nam permanently or on home leave orders in the next few months. Additionally, all the agencies represented here could take a harder look at their staffing patterns to see whether staff members, particularly those with dependents, could be reduced without impairing our effectiveness. All of this will inevitably result in some publicity but I think that this is manageable.

With respect to the remaining dependents, I would propose that at the time we initiate a retaliatory strike against the DRV or initiate Phase 2 action against the North we simultaneously announce and undertake an evacuation of all remaining dependents. I suggest that such an announcement should be carefully timed in relation to whatever else we will publicly be saying at the time. I believe that an orderly evacuation of the remaining dependents could be carried out at that time over a period of say seven to ten days with minimum personal hardship and risk to them and without the seriously adverse effects of doing it before that.

Needless to say, if at any time civil disorders in Saigon or other developments indicate an imminent and serious risk to dependents, I will have no hesitancy in ordering their immediate evacuation.

All of my principal colleagues strongly agree with the foregoing views except Jim Killen who, while recognizing the political problems of immediate evacuation, favors a complete evacuation initiated now phased over perhaps a two-month period.

Taylor

 

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

/Saigon, January 6, 1965, 2 p.m.

1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 5:38 a.m.

2056. For the President--Section III of V Sections./2/ Ref. par. 7(2), CAP-64375./3/ Since receiving your CAP-64375, General Westmoreland and his staff have made a comprehensive study of the requirements for giving maximum security to U.S. personnel and facilities by utilizing U.S. guards and units. He arrives at the startling requirement of 34-battalion equivalents of army or marine infantry, together with the necessary logistic support. He considers that the total manpower requirement would approximate 75,000 U.S. personnel.

/2/Sections I, II, IV, and V are Documents 9, 10, 12, and 13.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 477.

The reason for this high figure is basically the large number of installations in which we have important U.S. interests. They total 16 important airfields, 9 communications facilities, one large POL storage area, and 289 separate installations where U.S. personnel work or live. Any one of these is conceivably vulnerable to VC attack in the form of mortar fire or sabotage; and any are vulnerable to attack by VC ground forces. To keep mortar fire off any given point, one must secure an area roughly 16 square miles (a circle whose radius is 4,000 yards, the maximum range of 81mm mortar). Thus large airfields would, in the opinion of General Westmoreland, require up to 6 battalions of U.S. ground forces.

Even with such a commitment of U.S. forces, there would be no absolute guarantee against clandestine sabotage or covert mortar attacks. With few exceptions, critical installations are located in or near towns or cities, or in heavily populated farm land. In most of these areas, it is neither practical nor politically feasible to clear away a 4,000 yard-wide belt that could be controlled by U.S. forces. Consequently, U.S. troops would be faced with discharge of guard mission within populated areas and would lack the authority as well as ability to control the movements of population and to execute the search and seizure procedures required by such a mission. It is likely that such an effort to give greater security to our people would bring us into greater conflict with the Vietnamese people and government.

In connection with guarding U.S. personnel billets and dependent quarters, we are presently conducting a detailed survey of requirements. Under present arrangements, the main burden for security rests upon the Vietnamese police and military services, and we believe that responsibility should remain theirs. However, we have concluded that an additional U.S. military police battalion is required in Saigon area to augment the Vietnamese in order to raise the level of security provided.

Over the past several months and in view of the foregoing considerations General Westmoreland has initiated or has recommended taking the following actions:

A. An increase of the Vietnamese armed forces by approximately 80,000 and the National Police by 10,000 in 1965 in order to provide, among other things, additional forces for the protection of U.S. installations.

B. A long series of unilateral U.S. measures such as the dispersal and revetment of U.S. aircraft, the provision of sandbag personnel shelters where appropriate, provision of additional air and military police for close-in security of U.S. aircraft on major airfields, the augmentation of marine security elements to reinforce company strength for close-in protection of aircraft at the Danang airfield, and the emplacement of counter-mortar and ground surveillance radar near certain sensitive installations.

C. Persuasion of the Vietnamese military to take complementary steps, to include the clarification of command responsibility for airbase defense, the emplacement of additional artillery and mortar batteries at certain airfields, and the establishment of better intelligence systems, particularly around key installations.

We have no illusions that when the foregoing measures have been taken, we will have created complete safety for our installations and for our people. However, we consider that, on balance, our present plans to increase the size of the armed forces of Vietnam, to improve their combat effectiveness, and, in conjunction with an expanded police force, to maximize their contribution to pacification are preferable to the commitment of a large number of U.S. security forces to static guard missions in South Vietnam. We believe that the current program will, in the end, produce that degree of security which is reasonably attainable.

Taylor

 

12. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 6, 1965, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 5:10 a.m.

2057. For the President. Section IV of V Sections./2/ Ref par 7(3) CAP-64375./3/ Because of his wide qualifications, I have leaned heavily on Alex Johnson, assisted by the political section of the Embassy, to respond to your comments with regard to the need for a much wider and more varied attempt to get good political relations with all Vietnamese groups. In his opinion, there is no country in the world in which we have more extensive or deeper communication with the local population as well as the govt than here. Between the Emb and CAS officers, we have some 45 French-speaking and 10 Vietnamese-speaking officers whose primary duty is maintaining such communication. They have literally hundreds of contacts with every important walk of Vietnamese life. Although we would not suggest your reading its entirety, I do believe it would be interesting for you to turn the pages of Embtel 1836/4/ to get an impression of the extent of our contacts with various political groups.

/2/Sections I-III and V are Documents 9-11 and 13.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 477.

/4/Ibid., Document 448.

In addition to the Embassy and CAS contacts, through our integrated USIS/GVN programs, we speak by radio, moving pictures, pamphlets and newspapers to the broad mass of the people. Through the Voice of America, which is very extensively listened to here, particularly in times of crisis, we communicate selectively the views of the US and the world press.

Additionally, we have unusual ability to reach the armed forces of Vietnam and provincial officials through the hundreds of US military officers and USOM field reps who are in intimate and daily contact with their Vietnamese counterparts. They are linked together by a US communications system which allows us very quickly to pass them appropriate guidance on current matters. We have been using them extensively in the current crisis to make known the US position.

On the whole, the quality of our personnel in Vietnam is high and I believe they meet pretty well your description of "sensitive, persistent and attentive Americans." We could perhaps improve on our use of them but we definitely do not need more. The Vietnamese may even be somewhat smothered now by the quantity of US contacts.

In our use of these contacts, there are two aspects of communications with the Vietnamese which we must bear in mind--the long term and the short term. The long term is directed toward influencing the basic attitudes and characters of the Vietnamese people. The short term is directed against working with these Vietnamese as they are today in order to accomplish our immediate purposes. No amount of persuasion or communication is going to make them other than what they are over the short term. Nothing that anyone can say in the short term is going to change their deep-seated suspicions and fears of each other, their political fragmentation and their lack of any true sense of nationhood. The French background and education of most of the elite have caused them to absorb some of the less desirable French characteristics in this regard and, in addition, given them a certain schizophrenia, being torn between the native Vietnamese and the French cultural backgrounds. Thus, they have no single frame of reference in which to react to events--hence the seeming volatility of their attitude and the lack of firm principle to guide their judgment.

With such an unstable audience, the question is what to say in order to influence them in the direction of US policy. No doubt with greater experience we can become more effective, but our overriding problem is the inability up to now to give them any hope for an eventual end to their tribulations imposed by 20 years of war. In the absence of a light at the end of the tunnel, they tend to blame us rather than themselves for the continued darkness.

I realize that the foregoing sounds as if we were saying that we are doing as well as possible in this vital area of political relationships. Rather I would say we do not see how additional reinforcements would help us to do better and that this is not an area in which likely improvement offers a hope of reversing the declining situation. The gains here are likely to be for the long term whereas our immediate problem is to change a situation which is very much with us now.

In order to assure yourself that we are missing no real bets in this political field, would you consider sending someone like Mac Bundy here for a few weeks to look at this particular field? I think of Mac particularly because of his perceptiveness in such matters and the fact that he has been physically detached from the local scene and hence would have an objectivity which an old Vietnamese hand would lack. I can think of no one from the outside who could give you a better first hand report on this subject.

Taylor

 

13. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 6, 1965, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 7:51 a.m.

2058. For the President--Section V of V Sections./2/ Ref para 7(4) CAP 64375./3/ Following is an analysis by Gen Westmoreland and his staff in which I concur, regarding the feasibility of stiffening the armed forces of Vietnam by introducing U.S. and possibly third country ground combat forces (Special Forces, Rangers, Marines, etc.).

/2/Sections I-IV are Documents 9-12.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 477.

1. With regard to an increase in U.S. advisory effort, we have gone about as far down the advisory route as it is practical to go without passing the point of clearly diminishing returns. At the present, there are a total of 5,100 military advisors within RVN, extending thru all echelons from the high command down to battalion and to district (country) level. During the past year the advisory effort measured in terms of manpower has increased by 42 per cent. In addition, there are at present approximately 18,000 U.S. military personnel involved in operational support of various types. Although certain increases and adjustments will be periodically required, the air, helicopter, logistic and communication support provided or planned by the U.S. services is generally consistent with the size of the total force. However, there are some areas, treated later, in which increased U.S. participation and support are desirable.

A. The only significant area where it appears that an addition to advisor effort might be warranted would be at the district level. Advisors are just now arriving for the last of 113 districts. Initial evaluation clearly indicates that the district advisory program is sound and is paying off. If momentum can be maintained another 25 of the regular five-man teams could be used by early summer and will be requested.

B. Our current thinking is that Special Forces teams might be utilized as advisors in remote and least secure districts--perhaps up to 25 more in all.

2. With regard to the use of U.S. or Allied combat ground forces beyond the deployments programmed under SEATO plans and other existing war plans, several alternative concepts have been considered:

A. First Alternative:

Concept: U.S. (or Allied) airborne, Marine and infantry battalions under U.S. command and control to provide reserve striking forces capable of quick reaction to VC attacks and offensive operations against known VC forces and bases.

Forces: We considered both a high and low option and the details have been developed for each. In summary, the high option with 25 bns would provide U.S. quick reaction forces at each of the 9 divisions and certain general reserves. The low option with 8 bns would provide reserves in each of the 4 corps zones. In either case, U.S. air forces and logistical troops are included. The high option would total 60,000 troops--the low option 20,000.

Advantages: Reaction to VC attacks would be under de facto U.S. control, thus increasing the likelihood of rapidity and aggressiveness. VC casualties would increase.

Disadvantages: U.S. would be directly involved in ground combat. It is inevitable that casualties would occur among Vietnamese noncombatants, thus creating adverse reaction by Vietnamese against U.S. which VC would strongly exploit. Command relationships would be difficult. The Vietnamese Army (ARVN) might tend to leave the tougher problems to U.S. troops and thus gradually abdicate its responsibilities. U.S. casualties would be high.

B. Second Alternative:

Concept: Integration of ground combat battalions into ARVN infantry regiments.

Forces: In summary, 31 infantry battalions plus combat and service support troops as well as U.S. fighter and transport squadrons would be required. Total force would approximate 66,000 personnel.

Advantages: Each ARVN regiment would have a trained hardcore U.S. combat unit to lead the way and set the standards.

Disadvantages: U.S. troops would be under the command of Vietnamese officers. As in the first alternative U.S. troops would be engaged in populated areas with many political problems stemming from noncombatant casualties and the appearances of a white man's war against the brown. Again ARVN could develop a tendency to hold back, leaving the U.S. battalions to do the bulk of the fighting. U.S. casualties would be high.

C. Third Alternative:

Concept: Establish three coastal enclaves at locations such as Da Nang, Tuy Hoa and Phan Rang defended by U.S./GVN/multinational forces. These enclaves would be large enough for security of ports, airfields and local population centers. GVN force thus relieved could be available for counterinsurgency operations throughout the country. As a last resort these bridgeheads could be held by free world forces as spring boards for pacification or reconquest and, after massive economic, social and public works, would demonstrate advantages associated with free world and GVN.

Forces: The equivalent of one division would be required in each enclave. Air support, logistical support and Navy requirements for coastal patrol would generate a total Allied strength of approximately 75,000.

Advantages: Provide basis for free-world presence in RVN and Southeast Asia; demonstrate visible contrast between free world and Communist economic systems; facilitate application of full range of free world military capabilities should such become necessary; provide future connecting link between free world and people of Southeast Asia.

Disadvantages: Commits U.S. and free world to indefinite direct confrontation with Asiatic Communists; cost in U.S. resources and forces is unpredictable; provides pretext for Communist propaganda charges of U.S. colonialism; multinational support might be difficult to obtain or sustain. It may also be difficult to confine the force to such an enclave in the face of guerrilla attacks which would require ever extending defensive actions beyond the perimeter defense.

D. Fourth Alternative:

Concept: Increase U.S. operations support to the maximum in areas which involve the least political liability. This would include:

Air forces--in-country use of U.S. jet aircraft (including USN) in close support of GVN forces, including the use of CBU-2 munitions.

Naval surface forces--commitment of U.S. naval forces in coordination with the Vietnamese Navy to coastal patrol and blockade as a means of denying supplies to the Viet Cong.

Forces:

Air forces: One squadron equivalent of U.S. jet aircraft is now available. Base loading could accommodate one more squadron on random basis with remainder of support as required from carriers of 7th Fleet.

Naval surface forces: Subject to review by CINCPAC, one destroyer squadron and small carrier from Cambodian border to Vung Tau; one destroyer division south of demilitarized zone; and one destroyer division and sea plane tender from Da Nang to Vung Tau.

Advantages: Minimum adverse political impact. Increased operational effectiveness.

Disadvantages: An extension of U.S. commitment and involvement in combat operations. No assurance that these steps will have any significant effect on the overall situation.

3. In weighing the advantages and disadvantages, only the last alternative appears to be acceptable but none is recommended at this time.

A. It may seem as though we have weighted too heavily the political problems associated with the introduction of U.S. ground forces. However, after much soul searching we have reluctantly concluded that their military value would be more than offset by their political liability. The Vietnamese have the manpower and the basic skills to win this war. What they lack is motivation. The entire advisory effort has been devoted to giving them both skill and motivation. If that effort has not succeeded there is less reason to think that U.S. combat forces would have the desired effect. In fact, there is good reason to believe that they would [have] the opposite effect by causing some Vietnamese to let the U.S. carry the burden while others, probably the majority, would turn actively against us. Thus intervention with ground combat forces would at best buy time and would lead to ever increasing commitments until, like the French, we would be occupying an essentially hostile foreign country.

B. We have reviewed the tactical operations of the past two years for occasions where employment of U.S. ground forces would have been desirable and feasible. We have found such instances to be few and far between. On balance, they do not seem to justify the presence of U.S. units, even disregarding the political problems involved.

C. We are not prepared to recommend that U.S. troops be placed under Vietnamese command and thus reject the second alternative.

D. While the military/political enclaves have some attractive features they will not contribute in large measure to the counterinsurgency war and could be political and financial liabilities.

4. Recommendations:

A. That we adhere to the advisory system improving and expanding it as necessary. Additional district advisors will be required if the GVN presses on with the war.

B. That the U.S. continue to provide only operational support along current lines augmented and reinforced as the situation requires.

Taylor

 

14. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 6, 1965, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 9:17 a.m.

2059. For the President. Embtel 1988./2/ In view of my response/3/ to your CAP-64375/4/ which I have just dispatched, I have very little to add as a weekly report. The political situation still remains an impasse between the government and the armed forces, both sides unwilling to make any major lead toward opening up the situation. While there is little definite progress to record toward reconciliation, I would say that time is starting to heal the rawness of relations which resulted from the events of the week of December 20. For the moment, at least, there seems to be no danger of a knock-down confrontation between Huong government and the military chiefs. We Americans continue to search for ways to bring the contending parties together on a basis which offers some hope for eliminating the present duality within the government.

/2/Telegram 1988, December 30, transmitted Taylor's previous weekly report to the President. (Ibid.)

/3/Documents 9-13.

/4/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 477.

As the American press has made abundantly clear, we have had a bad week in the military field. However, in spite of the losses which occurred in the Phuoc Tuy Province action,/5/ we have not suffered a Dien Bien Phu as some describe it. However, there is certainly no room for complacency in assessing the outcome of this particular engagement. In its simplest terms, it was the piecemeal commitment of government forces against a well organized Viet-Cong task force which had picked its battlefield and had prepared itself carefully for the ensuing actions. The government forces arrived on the scene battalion by battalion and took the inevitable losses of a piecemeal commitment into battle in the presence of the enemy. The losses on our side presently include about 200 killed in action, 190 wounded and almost a hundred missing. This includes 16 U.S. losses (5 killed, 8 wounded and 3 missing). GVN are claiming 140 VC killed.

/5/Reference is to the battle at Binh Gia, 40 miles southeast of Saigon, which took place December 28, 1964-January 4, 1965, the longest battle of the war to that point.

This action was a serious defeat but not a disaster, and the consequences should not be overstated. However, it is a reminder of the distracting effect upon military actions of the continuing immersion of the generals in politics. Had the senior generals not been closeted during this period in Vung Tau plotting against the Huong government, I am quite sure that the leadership of the action would have been of a higher quality and the outcome might have been quite different.

Elsewhere the progress in pacification as in recent weeks was almost undetectable. The effects of the political impasse in Saigon gradually are making an appearance in the provinces. Civilian officials, in particular, are uncertain how to act and normally follow their instinctive tendency toward timidity when there is not a clear voice of authority to direct them.

The general public is strangely unaware what is taking place. Because of the double censorship in Saigon, first by the government and second by the military, the news is not being published in the local press. Although the word is gradually seeping out that there is a conflict between the civilian Huong government and the military, no one seems to be particularly agitated or anxious to take sides on behalf of either party. An exception are the political monks of the Buddhist Institute who are taking advantage of the opportunity to renew their harassment of the government.

Taylor

 

15. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, January 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, January-March 1965. Top Secret. Printed also in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 684-686.

SUBJECT
Notes on the South Vietnamese Situation and Alternatives

For your meeting this afternoon with the President,/2/ and even though Ambassador Taylor's incoming messages have not been released by the President except to yourself and Mr. Ball, I thought it might be helpful to have notes prepared among Mike Forrestal, Len Unger, and myself.

/2/See Document 17.

1. I think we must accept that Saigon morale in all quarters is now very shaky indeed, and that this relates directly to a widespread feeling that the US is not ready for stronger action and indeed is possibly looking for a way out. We may regard this feeling as irrational and contradicted by our repeated statements, but Bill Sullivan was very vivid in describing the existence of such feelings in October,/3/ and we must honestly concede that our actions and statements since the election have not done anything to offset it. The blunt fact is that we have appeared to the Vietnamese (and to wide circles in Asia and even in Europe) to be insisting on a more perfect government than can reasonably be expected, before we consider any additional action--and that we might even pull out our support unless such a government emerges. We have not yet been able to assess the over-all impact of the continuing political crises and of the Binh Gia military defeat,/4/ but there are already ample indications that they have had a sharp discouraging effect just in the last two weeks.

/3/Presumably a reference to comments Sullivan made during consultations in Washington in October. Sullivan had been serving as an assistant to Ambassador Taylor since the summer of 1964. He was appointed Ambassador to Laos on November 25 and presented his credentials to the Royal Lao Government on December 23.

/4/See footnote 5, Document 14.

2. By the same token, it is apparent that Hanoi is extremely confident, and that the Soviets are being somewhat tougher and the Chinese Communists are consolidating their ties with Hanoi. All three have called for a Laos conference without preconditions but have refrained from mentioning a conference on Vietnam. We think the explanation is extremely simple: that they are not too happy with the way things have gone in Laos, but that they see Vietnam falling into their laps in the fairly near future. At the same time, as to Laos, none of us think that the Communist side would concede in any meaningful fashion on any of the preconditions; they probably hope that Souvanna or we would abandon these preconditions, and they probably share our judgment that for Souvanna to do so would drastically weaken his own position in Vientiane if not destroy it.

3. In key parts of the rest of Asia, notably Thailand, our present posture also appears weak. As such key parts of Asia see us, we looked strong in May and early June, weaker in later June and July, and then appeared to be taking a quite firm line in August with the Gulf of Tonkin. Since then we must have seemed to be gradually weakening--and, again, insisting on perfectionism in the Saigon government before we moved. With all the weakness that we all recognize in the Saigon political situation, the fact is that it is not an unusual or unfamiliar one to an Asian mind, and that our friends in Asia must well be asking whether we would support them if they too had internal troubles in a confrontation situation.

4. The sum total of the above seems to us to point--together with almost certainty stepped-up Viet Cong actions in the current favorable weather--to a prognosis that the situation in Vietnam is now likely to come apart more rapidly than we had anticipated in November. We would still stick to the estimate that the most likely form of coming apart would be a government or key groups starting to negotiate covertly with the Liberation Front or Hanoi, perhaps not asking in the first instance that we get out, but with that necessarily following at a fairly early stage. In one sense, this would be a "Vietnamese solution," with some hope that it would produce a Communist Vietnam that would assert its own degree of independence from Peiping and that would produce a pause in Communist pressure in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, it would still be virtually certain that Laos would then become untenable and that Cambodia would accommodate in some way. Most seriously, there is grave question whether the Thai in these circumstances would retain any confidence at all in our continued support. In short, the outcome would be regarded in Asia, and particularly among our friends, as just as humiliating a defeat as any other form. As events have developed, the American public would probably not be too sharply critical, but the real question would be whether Thailand and other nations were weakened and taken over thereafter.

5. The alternative of stronger action obviously has grave difficulties. It commits the US more deeply, at a time when the picture of South Vietnamese will is extremely weak. To the extent that it included actions against North Vietnam, it would be vigorously attacked by many nations and disapproved initially even by such nations as Japan and India, on present indications. Most basically, its stiffening effect on the Saigon political situation would not be at all sure to bring about a more effective government, nor would limited actions against the southern DRV in fact sharply reduce infiltration or, in present circumstances, be at all likely to induce Hanoi to call it off.

6. Nonetheless, on balance we believe that such action would have some faint hope of really improving the Vietnamese situation, and, above all, would put us in a much stronger position to hold the next line of defense, namely Thailand. Accepting the present situation--or any negotiation on the basis of it--would be far weaker from this latter key standpoint. If we moved into stronger actions, we should have in mind that negotiations would be likely to emerge from some quarter in any event, and that under existing circumstances, even with the additional element of pressure, we could not expect to get an outcome that would really secure an independent South Vietnam. Yet even on an outcome that produced a progressive deterioration in South Vietnam and an eventual Communist takeover, we would still have appeared to Asians to have done a lot more about it.

7. In specific terms, the kinds of action we might take in the near future would be:

a. An early occasion for reprisal action against the DRV.

b. Possibly beginning low-level reconnaissance of the DRV at once.

c. Concurrently with a or b, an early orderly withdrawal of our dependents. We all think this would be a grave mistake in the absence of stronger action, and if taken in isolation would tremendously increase the pace of deterioration in Saigon. If we are to clear our decks in this way--and we are more and more inclined to think we should--it simply must be, for this reason alone, in the context of some stronger action.

d. Intensified air operations in Laos may have some use, but they will not meet the problem of Saigon morale and, if continued at a high level, may raise significant possibilities of Communist intervention on a substantial scale in Laos with some plausible justification. We have gone about as far as we can go in Laos by the existing limiting actions, and, apart from cutting Route 7, we would not be accomplishing much militarily by intensifying US air actions there. This form of action thus has little further to gain in the Laos context, and has no real bearing at this point on the South Vietnamese context.

e. Introduction of limited US ground forces into the northern area of South Vietnam still has great appeal to many of us, concurrently with the first air attacks into the DRV. It would have a real stiffening effect in Saigon, and a strong signal effect to Hanoi. On the disadvantage side, such forces would be possible attrition targets for the Viet Cong. For your information, the Australians have clearly indicated (most recently yesterday) that they might be disposed to participate in such an operation. The New Zealanders are more negative and a proposal for Philippine participation would be an interesting test.

William P. Bundy/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

16. Paper Prepared by Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff/1/

Washington, January 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, SEA Special Intelligence Material, Vol. III. Secret. Cooper forwarded this paper to McGeorge Bundy on January 6 with a covering memorandum which read: "Attached is a quick and dirty exposition of some of the views I expressed this morning. It might be useful in connection with your meeting later this afternoon." (Ibid.) Regarding the meeting, see Document 17.

Re the War

There are three distinct aspects to the Bombing-of-the-North gambit:

a. Retaliation in kind against major VC terrorism or North Vietnamese actions against U.S. personnel or installations. We should do this with or without a stable government in Saigon, but after evacuation of dependents.

b. Limited, selective attacks against infiltration-related targets. We should do this only if there is a stable government in Saigon and after evacuation of dependents.

c. Large scale bombing of military and industrial targets. We should not initiate this with or without a stable government in Saigon.

We should not underestimate the risk of bombing the North. (A summary of a recent CIA study on Communist military readiness capabilities is attached.)/2/ But aside from the risk of greatly expanded hostilities, there is the considerable risk that the object of the exercise (i.e., forcing Hanoi to call off its dogs in the South and/or to improve our negotiating posture) won't be attainable by this means. The risks involved in retaliation are less than those in the other two categories.

/2/Attached, but not printed.

I assume that our objective in Vietnam is to reduce the insurgency to a point where the GVN can handle the problem itself or alternatively to establish sufficient leverage to achieve by negotiation what we are unable to achieve (at least achieve in a reasonable period of time) on the ground. If this be so, then the war must still be fought and victories achieved in South Vietnam. A major (and well-publicized) military victory a month would do much to convince Hanoi that the cost of the insurgency is high and would entail infinitely less risk than bombing important North Vietnamese installations. Moreover, a few important military victories are now essential for Vietnamese (and U.S.) morale. But how?

Thus far, U.S. military advisers at Division level and above have had virtually no significant influence on the planning and execution of major military operations. We advise period. In large part this is because we have been understandably reluctant to go beyond this. In large part, too, ARVN officers resist relying on U.S. advice at this level because of (not unnatural) regard for face and pride. Thus we find ourselves critiquing rather than executing a Binh Gia-type operation.

Simply, briefly, crudely we have, or think we have, the best staff officers in the world; our intelligence on VC operations and concentrations, while still not good enough is improving; regular ARVN forces are nothing to be ashamed of. What is needed is to undertake the kind of top-level strategic and tactical planning using ARVN forces that we would be using if it were indeed our war. This will take some new arrangements with the GVN, some additional high powered U.S. staff officers and a willingness to assume the risk of authority and responsibility for failure as well as success.

Re Evacuation

Depending on accompanying and subsequent U.S. moves, the evacuation of U.S. dependents can signal determination or weakness. My own feeling is that we should pare down sharply. We have more use for MPs than to ride school buses; the presence of so many women and children in Saigon is an inhibition, conscious or subconscious, on action. To wait until we have to evacuate in haste and possibly in confusion would be folly.

Re the Government

All we need--and all we should press for--is a government that is in charge, that is prepared to continue the war, that is receptive to our advice, and that has enough support or at least acceptance among the various political groups to stay in power for a couple of years--or, at least, have its personnel shuffled and structure modified only in reasonably orderly fashion. Whether it's a military, civilian, democratic or autocratic government is beside the point now.

Developments in the last day or so indicate that there may be a thaw in the relationships between Huong and Khanh and Khanh and the Embassy. This is fine and we should move forward carefully and gently rather than worrying about the fine print of any Huong-Khanh confrontation.

However, we still confront the Buddhists, who will continue to retain the power to move [make] any government unworkable, even if they cannot actually topple it--a fact of contemporary Vietnamese political life we will simply have to accept and reckon with. The problem is that the Buddhists--or, more accurately, the militant bonzes who now control the "Buddhist movement"--don't know what they want, in a positive sense. The Buddhist leadership enjoys the exercise of political power but prefers to veto rather than propose. It does not want the responsibility of office or, actually, direct participation in the governmental process. This leadership is hypersensitive to affronts to its honor or present political position, and to any recrudescence of what it considers "Neo-Diemist" or "Catholic" authority. The leadership is also divided among itself and jockeying for primacy within the Buddhist movement in a manner such that no contender for politico-ecclesiastical power can afford to let another appear more militant than he. (In many ways the Buddhist movement in SVN bears striking analogies to the Civil Rights movement in the U.S.)

At the moment the Buddhist leaders, particularly Tri Quang, are calling for Premier Huong's ouster. Actually, this demand may be a bargaining counter. When Huong came to power, Tri Quang was ready to accept him, but anti-Huong "out" politicians got the ear of Tam Chau in mid-November and persuaded Tam Chau to lend his tacit support to anti-Huong demonstrations. To prevent Tam from usurping the mantle of militancy, Tri Quang moved to the head of the anti-Huong parade.

The Buddhists can probably be placated and Huong simultaneously kept in office but only if there is a juggling of personnel in Huong's cabinet and in the make-up of the compromise body which emerges to replace the HNC. To keep the Buddhists on the reservation it will be necessary for discreet overtures to be made to Tri Quang and to other leaders to flatter them by soliciting their views and, more importantly, to sell them on the need for not opposing Huong and Suu, if only to maintain the appearance of governmental continuity. In turn, however, their advice will have to be sought on the composition of the successor to the HNC and on cabinet changes. These soundings would have to be undertaken by both Vietnamese and Americans. The process will be delicate and time is fast running out. If started at once, however, and if reasonable Buddhist personnel demands are met, they can perhaps be kept in line during the critical days ahead.

On the US side, such soundings might perhaps best be taken by a special Washington emissary. His presence and functions would obviously have to be carefully coordinated with Ambassador Taylor, but such an emissary could play a useful role as a lightning rod, a soothing balm to hypersensitive Vietnamese pride, and a communicator between presently contending elements in Saigon.

 

17. Personal Notes of a Meeting With President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 6, 1965, 5:03-6:44 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking. These notes were handwritten by McGeorge Bundy for his personal use and were not an official record of this meeting. No other record of the discussion has been found. Present at the meeting were the President, Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Ball. The information on the time of the meeting and the attendance is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

1) Basic Prognosis
2) Reprisals Plus
3) Max to stay?
4) Dependents
5) Lansdale et al.
6) Fraley--Melvin--Lansdale etc. forced out 1 year--relationship with VC generals.

Saigon Political Situation

DR reports on CFR meeting/2/

/2/Rusk met with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 5. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book)

UN? might take 2 days to deal with Morse.

DR--we can't fail to make every effort to change the situation on the scene. Because the alternatives are so grim. More optimistic than others.

RSM--We should do all we can in DR's terms--but it won't be enough unless we do more. Lansdale has some ideas: better contact w/Vietnamese. Conein/3/ contact w/Khanh lost--lack effective contact w/students. Lack effective relations w/Buddhists. Free-wheeling one-man band. When Richardson was thrown out by Lodge,

/3/Colonel Lucien Conein.

RSM reads from Max's famous conversation with the four generals./4/ (Which I sent to the President last night.)

/4/Apparently a reference to telegram 1870 from Maxwell Taylor, December 20, 1964; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 451.

Alexis Johnson's cable showing

LBJ: Don't you think that effect of withdrawing Taylor? Whatever pretense.

RSM: If we're heading for a plateau; then Max can come back w/some success.

McGB: on Taylor vs. Alexis Johnson

DR: He/5/ could well be used up politically--that happens. Letters of quite junior officers show Alex as load-bearing wall. Mistake to return him/5/--but you could put him in CIA.

/5/Reference is to Taylor.

Geo Ball: The only answer was a strong man--not a country--a piece of one--damned tired after 20 years. Regime has got smell of death. You can't pin em together. Options are all bad. Risks of escalation too great, if regime remains slippery. We sh'd make heroic effort--but not delude ourselves. We sh'd be looking at diplomatic tracks to a bad end. We can do all manner of Lansdale things--but this doesn't get to root of it. Do we take diplomatic initiative. Do we risk escalation. Keep on till we get asked out.

DR: We in Asia have made bricks w/o mortar for 25 years.

RSM: On Killen--a minor problem

DR: House Committee

LBJ: You haven't.

McGB: Phase II--Planning--strong road to negotiations--public reprisal policy & withdrawal of dependents.

Geo Ball: Be aware of assumptions 1) If we escalate the war it will strengthen base.

LBJ: Skeptical of view that escalation can help us in morale.

Geo Ball: Escalation can bring two-way activity, we must be ready to talk.--Larger responses are possible.

McGB: We all agree.

DR: Gulf--reprisal specifics are one thing--but Phase II is quite another.

LBJ: What is it they want? How can we go down the reprisal road without being ready.

LBJ: 1) Never have thought reprisals would help stabilize the government. 2) They're not sufficiently effective to bring you to conference table--because escalation is dangerous & pulling out is dangerous. 1) Starting out on getting people out--now 2) now we are going to have reprisals 3) may help to give more stability 4) carefully selected [illegible] retaliation--hope you realize this may cost you your vacations--great feeling for Taylor in a tough position.

Charley Bartlett.

LBJ: Dean Rusk talks to Bill Fulbright, and then "a static dumb crowd." 1-1/2 billion Ed. 1-1/2 Poverty. 1 billion Health.

We're off on leaks.--

RSM: Definite policy of using leak.

 

18. Editorial Note

In telegram 1408 to Saigon, January 6, McGeorge Bundy informed Maxwell Taylor that his series of cables received earlier that day (Documents 9-13) had been "carefully discussed at the highest level." Bundy indicated that the President had asked him to express his warmest thanks to Taylor as well as his intention to give Taylor a reply by the morning of January 8 (Saigon time). (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Under a covering memorandum of January 7 McGeorge Bundy sent the President a draft reply to Taylor's messages for discussion at a White House meeting scheduled for 4:30 that afternoon. Bundy wrote:

"You can ignore the underlinings--I sent a first and even sketchier draft to Rusk, McNamara, and Ball, and these underlinings are simply for their convenience in noting the suggested changes."

The attached draft, which is labeled "Draft 2 (changes from Draft 1 underlined)", bears several revisions in President Johnson's hand. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, NODIS-LOR, Vol. I) The reply as sent to Taylor is Document 19.

In telegram 1418 to Saigon, January 7, the Department of State noted that further messages in the series initiated by CAP-64375 should henceforth bear the slug "LOR" to "facilitate prearranged highly restricted handling." Such messages were to be addressed only to the Secretary of State, "since messenger delivery will be utilized here except in most urgent cases." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1420 to Saigon, McGeorge Bundy informed Taylor that his recommendation that CINCPAC be included in the distribution of high-level cable traffic on Vietnam had been discussed. Bundy remarked:

"We agree that before final decisions are taken, he should be cut in. But recent leaks in Washington have redoubled determination here that preliminary analyses and decisions be private. For this reason it has been decided that we need to hear your reactions to President's message of today before circle is enlarged." (Ibid.)

[end document]

Continue:
Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
Documents 19 through 30