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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATESVolume II, Vietnam January-June 1965
Washington, D.C. |
121. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/Washington, February 15, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, February 1965. Secret.
SUBJECT
Some Thoughts on Southeast AsiaAs you suggested after we talked on the phone Saturday,/2/ here are my three points in writing.
/2/February 13.
1. The military weight of infiltration. In addition to documenting the fact of infiltration and its illegality in terms of the commitments of 1954 and 1962, it is important to put into perspective its straight military significance. All guerrilla wars are marked by a vast disproportion between the number of guerrillas and the number of government troops required to control or defeat them. This disproportion stems from the fact that the guerrillas' job is to harass and to destroy; the government's job is to defend a living society. Although the figures vary, the average proportion is ten to one (derived from data on Algeria, Naga, the Irish Rebellion, the French war in Indochina, the present war in South Viet Nam, Malaysia, and the Philippines). This means that by infiltrating (say) 500 to 1,000 men a month the North Vietnamese are throwing into battle the equivalent of 5-10,000 per month so far as the SVN government is concerned. This is an extremely heavy weight to bear for the South Vietnamese. The VC are, in effect, crossing the border each month with a division. In fact, none of the postwar guerrilla conflicts has been won with an open frontier. The frontiers were closed, or virtually closed, in the Philippines and in Malaya. The Greek civil war was won only after Tito closed the Yugoslav frontiers when he split with Stalin. (This whole point is elaborated in more detail, including the critical morale role of an open frontier in my June 6, 1954,/3/ memo which is available to you.)
/3/Not found.
2. The Politics of South Viet Nam. In the face of this almost insupportable military burden, the political and military performance of the South Vietnamese has been remarkable. Militarily, despite very heavy casualties, the regular army has maintained its unity. There has been no going over to the enemy of substantial units with their officers, as was the case in the guerrilla war in China; although this is the critical index to watch, and the defection of lesser units is worrying. The civil guard and self-defense corps have borne very heavy casualties, continue to fight and inflict heavy casualties. Politically we must remember that South Viet Nam has had little time to develop a modern national political life. It was a colony living in an environment of war since 1940. It was not permitted in colonial times, nor has it had the possibility in the past decade, to learn how to develop responsible democratic politics. Neither under Diem nor since his departure has there been an organized political forum in which men could debate, compromise, and come to majority consensus in ways which give minorities a sense of confidence that their view can continue to be heard and there are orderly methods for enlarging their influence and powers. Much of the turbulence we have seen in Viet Nam in recent months reflects a desire of new, younger groups in the society to participate in the political process. It will take time for them to find how to do this while preserving their independence and fighting a tough war. Nevertheless, the fact is that none of the major political elements in the equation of Vietnamese politics wishes to turn the country over to Hanoi (the army, the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Cao Dai, etc.).
3. Neither military nor politically, therefore, have we reason for despair. The decisive element is infiltration and direction of the war from the north. There is every reason to believe that, if these people come to feel that the weight of the northern element is lifted from them, they will see it through within their country, as did the government forces in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the political imperatives of fighting and winning a guerrilla war can prove to be a constructive process in developing an effective modern government that links urban and rural life. The old Malayan war room, built to map rural insurrection, now maps village development programs. It is easy to forget that, at the time the Truman Doctrine was promulgated, there was widespread protest in the United States against our supporting a dictatorial reactionary Greek government. It is easy to forget that there was an endless sequence of weak Greek governments during the prosecution of the guerrilla war, with the military alone a relatively solid element. It is easy to forget that at critical periods in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines, it was unsafe to venture outside the capital cities; and there were obvious Communist assets operating within the capital cities. If our military and diplomatic weight can be applied in such a way as to eliminate the heavy and illegal northern element in the war, we can look forward with confidence to the emergence, despite many vicissitudes, of a viable, modernizing nation in South Viet Nam.
4. Ground Forces on Both Sides and Negotiation. Hanoi has not been behaving as we might think it should behave. We have given it grounds to believe that, if they proceed quietly with infiltration, we would, de facto, accept that condition for the war, aside from some minor harassment in Laos itself. The Tonkin Gulf incident was not linked to infiltration but to our freedom of the seas. Why have they chosen to affront us directly? Why are they pressing so hard when it seems wholly possible for them, via infiltration, to shift the military proportions in such a way as to confront the ARVN with attrition beyond its capacity for replacement? Why do they appear to be forcing our hand when the chances, from our perspective, look good for so discouraging the South Vietnamese about their prospects that the political leadership (including the army) might prefer some negotiation, from a weak position, to the endless pursuit of a stalemated war?
I do not know the answers; but it may be that there are pressures working on them to make the best deal they can in a negotiation fairly soon. These could arise because they are hurting more than we think; because our relative position looks stronger to them than it does to us; because there is a split in Hanoi related to the Sino-Soviet split; or to something else. In any case, if they are driving towards the most advantageous position in a negotiation fairly soon, they will be strongly tempted to play their asset (ground forces strength) just as we are led to bring into negotiating play our asset (naval and air power).
I conclude, therefore, that we must be extremly alert to a land grab, perhaps in the Laos corridor, from which they would negotiate from a position of increased relative strength; and I would commend to us consideration of a preemptive ground force move in that area and on the soil of South Viet Nam, which would also enhance our strength in a negotiating situation. A ground force can sit quietly during a conference until it is negotiated out for something substantive. It will be extremely difficult for us, during a negotiation, to make effective use of our air and naval power because (except sea blockade of Haiphong) it is sanguinary; although we may have to have the nerve and will to use air and naval strikes to make them accept terms minimally compatible with our interests.
122. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 15, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 272, Vietnam (Misc.) I. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Course of ActionFor your meeting at 5:30 today,/2/ I am setting down what I believe to be the serious unresolved questions.
/2/Rusk met with the President at the White House at 5:25 p.m. on February 15, and at 6 p.m. they went to the Cabinet Room for a meeting with McGeorge Bundy, Ball, McNamara, and Thompson. The meeting lasted until 7:15 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion at these meetings has been found, other than McGeorge Bundy's very fragmentary handwritten notes. (Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge Bundy)
1. Saigon 2588/3/ and Bangkok 1129/4/ both argue strenuously that any expressed willingness to talk would raise serious problems in both countries, and could well cause doubts about our firmness. At the very least, this would point to adequate time to consult fully with both governments, and probably also with the Lao.
/3/Document 118.
/4/Not found.
On the other hand, the argument for declaring our willingness to talk remains very strong. Once we have made our case in the Security Council, there is a terribly high probability that some one will generate a resolution calling for discussion among the interested powers on how to achieve cessation of what the Indian Declaration/5/ calls "provocative actions" on both sides, i.e., DRV infiltration and activity in SVN, versus our own activity against the north, probably with a cease-fire in the south and withdrawal of American personnel from the south also thrown up as part of the agenda. There remains great merit in the idea that getting into "preliminary discussions" on a seven-power basis would give us a strong lightning rod against pressures for an immediate conference and would permit us to continue our actions during the prolonged period that such preliminary discussions would take.
/5/Apparently a reference to the Indian Government's public statement of February 8, expressing its "grave concern" over the developments in Vietnam and calling for a "Geneva-type conference." The Indian Ambassador had called on Acting Secretary of State Ball on February 13 to inquire about the U.S. reaction to the February 8 statement and to Prime Minister Shastri's follow-up letter to President Johnson of February 10. (Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, February 10, and telegram 1652 to New Delhi, February 13; both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
As I see it this is the key question. If we decide to continue with Saturday's script,/6/ we must recognize that we have not in fact cleared this in Saigon--or Bangkok, or Vientiane--and that failure to understand our motives and purposes in these quarters could have very serious implications. Saigon in particular is an absolute must, since we must have the Vietnamese with us in the UN and not appear to be jumping ahead of them down what can be construed as a negotiating track.
/6/Apparently a reference to the plan agreed on Saturday, February 13, at the working level and then approved by the President on February 13. See Document 115.
2. Allied Consultation. If we envisage a sequence comprising an additional strike, a public statement within 24-48 hours thereafter, and resort to the UN in another 2-3 days thereafter--(and foreshadowed by the statement), we must consider carefully just when and how fully we talk to our allies. I divide the problem as follows.
a. SVN, Thailand, and Laos: full consultation and clearance.
b. UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada: full consultation, but with the difference that clearance can be expected to be fairly automatic.
c. Japan, Philippines, India, and perhaps France: slightly less full consultation, designed to keep Japan and the Philippines calm and to make India and France at least understand what we are doing.
d. Soviet Union: This too is a special case, and it might be what we would wish to tell them only at once after the next action and just before our public announcement.
e. U Thant: This too is a special case, and I assume you have talked to Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. Cleveland about the possibility that U Thant, unless forewarned, may at some time state publicly that he has been working on an avenue to Hanoi, that Hanoi has agreed (I don't personally know what he means by this) and that we have declined to go ahead./7/
/7/Regarding Stevenson's contacts with U Thant on Vietnam, see Document 145.
As to timing, I would myself be inclined to state that categories a and b above should be fully covered before we make the strike, and that category c might also be considered for such treatment; d and e might wait until the day between the strike and the announcement.
3. Nature and Timing of Operations. This has not been fully thought through, and I have the feeling that the Pentagon still thinks in terms of larger single operations, and more operations in any one strike, than may be wise, particularly during the time that we are actually presenting our case to the world and in the Security Council.
4. UN Presentation.
a. The drafting up to this point establishing the case on DRV activity is in very good shape. Our legal justification is also in strong shape, with a good memorandum from L./8/ On the case against the DRV, we have a serious question whether to mention in general terms the existence of the radio net; this came up with Ambassador Stevenson this morning,/9/ and my own conclusion is that we could hold it out of the initial UN presentation, in order to develop it later in the preliminary discussions as a prelude to radio silence as one form of compliance.
/8/Apparently a reference to the paper prepared in the Office of the Legal Adviser, "Legal Basis for United States Actions Against North Viet-Nam," which was attached to a February 11 covering memorandum from Legal Adviser Leonard C. Meeker to Thompson. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/9/No record of this conversation has been found.
b. We do not yet have an exact formulation of the conditions we would set as essential to the convening of a conference. My own view is that at the outset we should insist on a cessation of infiltration and of activity in the south in which the DRV has a hand. However, all of us can see that this would be a very difficult thing to verify for the first part, and practically impossible for the second. We may find ourselves moving toward a trend that would set the cessation of infiltration against the cessation of our attacks against the DRV, and this needs careful weighing as we go along. A cease-fire is another thorny issue, since it would not be advantageous in the south, as we now see it, unless we had freedom of GVN armed forces movement throughout areas where there is still nominal GVN presence.
The complexity and difficulty of these issues argue strongly for not seeking to litigate them in the UN, and this in turn points strongly in the direction of initiating, or accepting, a proposal for early, "preliminary discussions" to work on these issues.
WPB.
123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, February 16, 1965, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2617. For the President./2/ During the past week a great deal of effort was expended in trying to form a new government but, unfortunately, much of this effort came to naught. By mid-week, it appeared that Deputy Prime Minister Vien would be successful but, after completing his entire slate except for the Minister of Interior, he ultimately failed. While there are several versions as to the cause of his failure, it is reasonably clear that Vien and Khanh, supported probably by some of the other generals, could not reach agreement as to Vien's power and authority as Prime Minister. Also, we understand that at some point Tri Quang and the Buddhist Institute leaders made it known that they would never go along with a Vien government.
/2/McGeorge Bundy forwarded this cable to President Johnson on February 16, noting in his covering memorandum that Taylor was "unenthusiastic about Quat" but "happy about air attacks" and "dependent removal." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII)
Only this morning the Armed Forces Council announced that it had chosen Phan Khac Suu to stay on as Chief of State and had named Dr. Phan Huy Quat as Prime Minister. Quat is supposed to announce his government momentarily. We know Dr. Quat reasonably well from his previous tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Khanh Government. We think well of him as an individual but feel he will face monumental problems. As in the case of any Prime Minister, his relations with the armed forces and the Buddhist Institute will be critical. In many quarters, he is suspected of being pro-Institute since Tri Quang is known to have viewed him as Prime Ministerial timber. Regardless of whether he is Tri Quang's candidate or not at the moment, in the short or long run the Institute leaders are likely to put demands upon him which he will find difficult to accept. Then the question will be whether Quat can retain the support of the military in resisting the Buddhists. In the meantime, we expect to do the best we can to develop effective working relations with his government and exploit on the governmental front the stimulus resulting from the air attacks against North Viet-Nam.
These air attacks have been greeted with enthusiasm by all of my military contacts and indeed all articulate, urban Vietnamese opinion appears to be favorable to them and to sense a turning point of some kind in the long war. Excitement generated by them has allowed our dependent evacuation to proceed with little public comment and a degree of public understanding. As of noon today, February 16, we have evacuated 1,456 of our total 1,610. We can easily complete the evacuation within the ten days which you authorized except for a few medical cases which cannot be moved and alien wives of U.S. Government personnel who have passport problems. The evacuation has gone very smoothly with minimum discomfort to the evacuees. We all are very grateful to you for having allowed us to follow this orderly pattern.
The week was not a satisfactory one from the point of view of military action. Although over 500 Viet Cong were killed and about 130 captured, government forces lost over 1,000 weapons. Many of those losses occurred in Binh Dinh Province where the security situation has been steadily deteriorating. The Viet Cong are consolidating their control in four districts of the province while government control is limited to the immediate vicinity of district capitals. The government has ordered reinforcements to the area and a major U.S. advisory effort is under way. The basic cause for the retrogression is the low density of available troops in a province which is both large and populous. We can hope to do little more than stabilize in Binh Dinh until additional military, paramilitary and police forces authorized for 1965 are in place.
Taylor
124. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII. Secret.
SUBJECT
Vietnam decisionsI have been brooding about our discussion of yesterday,/2/ and I think I am beginning to understand where the problem is.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 122.
1. I think that some of us--perhaps mostly me--have been confusing two questions. One is the firmness of your own decision to order continuing action; the other is the wisdom of a public declaration of that policy by you. Let me give you a little background and a recommendation.
2. Rightly or wrongly, those of us who favor continuing military action against the North do see it as a major watershed decision. However much it is based on continuing aggression in the South (as it should be), it amounts to a U.S. decision to mount continuing pressure against Hanoi by use of our air and naval superiority. This is not the same, in operational terms, as what we did last August. And it is not the same as a policy of episodic retaliation for particular attacks against large numbers of Americans. It is very different indeed, and the difference is just what we are counting on as the one possible means of turning around a desperate situation which has been heading toward a disastrous U.S. defeat.
3. Precisely because this program represents a major operational change and because we have waited many months to put it into effect, there is a deep-seated need for assurance that the decision has in fact been taken. When you were out of the room yesterday, Bob McNamara repeatedly stated that he simply has to know what the policy is so that he can make his military plans and give his military orders. This certainly is equally essential if we are to get the necessary political effects in Saigon. If we limit ourselves to reprisals for spectaculars like Pleiku and Qui Nhon, we leave the initiative in the hands of the Communists and we can expect no good result.
4. Thus it seems essential to McNamara--and to me too--that there be an absolutely firm and clear internal decision of the U.S. Government and that this decision be known and understood by enough people to permit its orderly execution. That is one side of the problem.
5. The other side of the problem, as I understand it, is that you do not want to give a loud public signal of a major change in policy right now. This is a position which makes a lot of sense on a lot of grounds. When I talked to Cabot Lodge yesterday, he told me that he had taped a statement for Dave Garroway's "Today" show in which he stoutly and firmly supported your decision not to make loud public statements. Lodge believes, as you know, that action speaks louder than words in this field. Russ Wiggins of the Post has just called me to try to make a luncheon date (I refused), and in the course of listening to him I learned that he too thinks it is right to act against the North and equally right not to boast about it, because such boasting only makes life harder for the Communists. Tommy Thompson also argues the virtue of not rubbing the Communist nose in this mess, at least at your level.
6. So in terms of public statement, I fully understand the forces which were leading you yesterday to suggest that any public comments might be best handled by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Stevenson. Most of the need for public utterance which led Bill Moyers and me to urge a Presidential speech last week can be met just as well by the Secretary, and there is real gain in keeping you out of the immediate military aspect of the matter at this stage.
7. Thus I think it is possible to reconcile the need for a clear decision within the Government with a need to avoid excessive public noise--by a policy of Presidential decision and Secretarial exposition.
8. That leaves us only one problem: which is communication with our Allies. What we tell them is not likely to stay tightly secret, and yet I think it is crucial that they not feel left out or uninformed. In different ways this is as important for London as for Saigon, for Ottawa as for New Delhi, for Bonn as for Tokyo, for Paris as for Bangkok.
9. My solution to this problem would be to give a clear account of our private thinking, with appropriate emphasis for each capital, but without any indication of the size and frequency of planned actions, other than to say that they will be limited and fitting, and that any further escalation will be the fault of the enemy.
10. For this purpose, Taylor's phrasing of the new policy which he gave to General Khanh/3/ is just about right. He described it in the following language:
/3/See Document 119.
"A. Intensification by all available means of the program of pacification within SVN.
"B. Execution of a joint GVN/US program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets in the southern part of DRV./4/ Air strikes under this program will be jointly planned and agreed.
/4/The President crossed out "in the southern part of the DRV." and made a handwritten interpolation to revise the sentence as follows: "We will respond to and deter aggression by the execution of a joint GVN/US program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets."
"C. Announcement of this policy of measured action in general terms and presentation to the United Nations Security Council of the case against the DRV as the aggressor, accompanied by an indication of readiness to discuss ways of bringing the DRV aggression to an end."
11. In summary, what I think we need is internal clarity about the importance and scope of the decisions you are taking, and as much public calm and coolness as possible. For these purposes, Rusk is the ideal spokesman for policy, and Stevenson the ideal defender and explainer (which means, incidentally, that McNamara probably should not undertake a TV program proving that Hanoi is the aggressor--this should be Adlai's job, though that is very unfair because it is Bob who has had all the necessary spade-work done).
McG. B.
125. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, February 1965. Top Secret. Drafted by Cleveland. Copies were sent to Rusk, Ball, Thompson, Read, and Unger. In a brief note of February 16 attached to the copy he sent to Rusk, Cleveland wrote: "Although this has more questions than answers, I think you'll find it worth reading because it deals with a small point of interest in present staff work on Viet-Nam." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET)
SUBJECT
What is a Cease-Fire?1. We spoke yesterday about the need to tie down just what we might be able to live with in the way of compliance by the DRV with various gradations of "leaving their neighbors alone."
2. The Defense Department has done a very good outline on the "DRV compliance problem." But the Defense memorandum/2/ is really addressed to the longer range problem with which we would be faced in attending a peace conference, negotiating a peace settlement for Viet-Nam, and establishing international machinery to ensure compliance.
/2/This undated paper was sent as an attachment to a note of February 17 from Read to Thompson, in which Read wrote that the Defense paper referred to in Cleveland's memorandum was prepared by Allen Friedman in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. A copy of the paper and Read's covering note are ibid.
3. More immediately, whether or not we get into the Security Council as such, any "political track" requires us to be very clear in our own minds about:
a. How much of a stand-down by the DRV we would insist on as a pre-condition to talks about the longer range problem? and
b. How much of a stand-down we would be prepared to live with ourselves as the quid pro quo?
4. The following problems, among others, seem to be crucial. I hope that in the discussions with Defense they can be clarified:
a. We presumably want a halt to the infiltration. But how will we know that the infiltration is halted without some international inspectors on the ground? To discuss international inspectors as part of a precondition for a peace conference would stall progress toward peace talks. (If as things work out we want to stall talks for a while, this would be a credible way to do it.)
b. Can we use, in the pre-condition phase, the concept of radio silence? In this case the "inspection" would presumably be our national capabilities, rather than any international arrangement. There is, however, precedent, in 1958 in Lebanon, for international (UN) monitoring of a military radio system as part of a peacekeeping operation.
c. Do we want a cease-fire in South Vietnam? The answer presumably depends on the definition of "cease-fire".
On the one hand, "cease-fire" could simply mean a stand-still while the talks go on. But if such a stand-still enables the Liberation Front to consolidate its political control in the areas effectively held by the Viet Cong, this would build into the peace talks an incentive for the Communists to stall, since the cease-fire would be working to their advantage.
On the other hand, if "cease-fire" is taken to include the idea that the Saigon Government could "pacify" the Viet Cong areas during the cease-fire, that would be taken by most people as a frivolous proposal, since it would be a kind of "one-sided cease-fire". We cannot, after all, expect to accomplish by political negotiation a great advance over what we can accomplish by military means. If the South Vietnamese army with our American advisers cannot pacify the country-side, it is unlikely that the State Department or our UN delegation will succeed in doing so in a Security Council resolution or at the pre-conference table.
The definition of "cease-fire" will therefore have to be somewhere in between a "one-sided cease-fire" and a simple stand-still order equally applicable to both sides.
d. Under what conditions would we agree to stop bombing the North--or, without an agreement, stop bombing de facto? Can we agree to stop the bombing only in return for a stoppage of the infiltration, leaving the Viet Cong free to continue attacks (including attacks on American installations) in South Viet-Nam?
5. These are all questions, and are not intended to imply the answers. But we clearly need to know what we think the answers are before we get into public negotiations--in or out of the UN--on the issue of how the shooting can be stopped and the talking begun.
6. One alternative we should certainly consider is to start the talking while the shooting (and periodic bombing) continues. Unless we can get a very considerable stand-down by Hanoi and the Viet Cong--perhaps including some actual withdrawal of North Vietnamese from South Viet-Nam as an earnest of good intentions--there may be advantages to talking about a cease-fire but not actually to arrive at one before the peace talks begin. Under these conditions, the "pre-conference" stage (with a strictly limited number of countries involved) would probably turn out to be 90 percent of the peace talks; a "Geneva Conference" could be called merely to ratify more or less permanent arrangements that had already been agreed to at the "pre-conference", spurred by continuation of sporadic fighting and bombing.
HC
126. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, February 1965. Secret. Drafted by Green.
Having read the welter of telegrams that is the price of one day's absence in Washington, I feel that one point needs stressing:
The DRV is not likely to "cave" out of fear of further US/SVN bombing of North Viet-Nam. Tough old characters like Ho Chi Minh have great capacity to take punishment. In this connection I stick to the conclusions we on the Red Team reached during the Sigma exercises./2/
/2/Apparently a reference to the simulated Vietnam war game, Sigma II-64, organized by the JCS Joint War Games Agency in September 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, JCS, War Games, Vol. 2)
What is most likely to cause Hanoi to falter would be mounting evidence that Peiping will not provide Hanoi with the degree of specific support and assurances Hanoi will require if it is to undergo the agony of our bombardment. There is already evidence that Peiping is stepping back from giving the assurances of support that Hanoi seeks. Hanoi is unquestionably troubled over this; and, although Hanoi will not thereby throw in the sponge, Hanoi will obviously be rendered more willing to look for some compromise that would be more acceptable from our viewpoint.
Meanwhile, Phase II operations will intensify international (and even US) pressures for negotiations. As you often say, the trick is to keep these pressures under control. Hence, I conclude:
1. Phase II operations must not be too intense or frequent; else negotiating pressures become unmanageable and we find ourselves negotiating before Hanoi has fully sensed the implications of its "lonely" position, that is, before Hanoi becomes fully aware of Peiping's unwillingness to make the total commitment of support that Hanoi seeks.
2. Also, if we step up the attacks too far, we are more likely to drive North Viet-Nam into widespread attacks against South Viet-Nam either with organized PAVN forces or, as is more likely, by massive infiltration to the south.
3. We should not relieve the ChiComs of any fear they might already have that we will go after their air bases, etc., in the event that their air force attacked ours or that they would have any privileged sanctuary position in the event they became too involved in the Vietnamese fighting. This would have to be done quietly. Public declarations on the subject are out.
127. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Greenfield) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by Greenfield. Rusk's handwritten initials appear at the top of page 1 of the source text.
SUBJECT
Viet Nam and the PublicThe public problem on Viet-Nam currently breaks down into two problems: One, the need for some public statement, either on a Presidential or Secretarial level, that reiterates the United States stake in Viet-Nam and sets the tone for public discussion in this country. Two, the more intricate, detailed and searching investigation by the press of future U.S. aims and actions. These questions are both legitimate and pressing, but at the moment they reflect journalistic rather than public pressure.
Within government the tendency so far is to brush aside the general public statement on the excuse that it cannot include all the details demanded by the press. This argument is not valid.
The Public Statement
A public statement, either Presidential or on a high State Department level, should spell out some of the guidelines which will motivate our future actions in Viet-Nam. But this look into the future need not form the bulk of such a statement.
Instead, the statement should be dominated by a simple, direct restatement of U.S. policy. This restatement should outline the reasons why we are in South Viet-Nam, the nature of guerrilla warfare, the importance of the Pacific area to the United States, the alternatives that the U.S. faces and the consequences for both the U.S. and the free world that would occur if the United States did not carry out its commitment in Asia.
To people dealing closely with the problem this is old-hat, even boring stuff. But it would not be to the American public.
The argument that we have said all this before--and therefore should not repeat ourselves--is equally invalid. The rationale for our actions during the past few weeks was almost entirely dropped from most of the stories that appeared after the first day of bombings. In ninety percent of the stories, the reasons for our actions fell victim to the more dramatic factual news of bombings, Americans wounded, statements, threats and counter threats.
People, I am convinced, have lost sight of many of the past statements (and bits of statements) made in the past on Viet-Nam by the President and the Secretary. Our own two White House statements in the last ten days/2/ shifted emphasis without explanation. Almost no one remembers what the accords of 1954 and 1962 were all about, the rationale upon which they were based, or their applicability to the present situation.
/2/For the White House statements of February 7 and 11, see Department of State Bulletin, pp. 238-239 and 290.
Someone, therefore, should take them back through the essentials of our policy--back through the accords, back through our mounting involvement as this new kind of warfare unfolded, back through our countless statements that we want no bases and no territory for ourselves. We should remind the public that a free Viet-Nam is worth the risks, both because of our obligations to the Vietnamese and to ourselves.
It is not enough simply to say that we are in Viet-Nam because Ike got us there or because the Vietnamese have asked us in, although both facts should be recalled.
Such a statement should end up by a clear declaration that what we seek is peace and as clear a statement as possible as to what we expect from the other side in order to gain that peace.
Such a statement will reassure the country, give it a common starting point to judge future U.S. actions.
The Questions of the Press
It will not, however, satisfy many of the questions being asked by the press such as those listed below. Many of them are currently unanswerable.
1. What is our objective in bombing the North?
-- Is it unconditional surrender?
-- Is it to drive the Viet Cong out of South Viet-Nam?
-- Is it a cease-fire?
-- Is it negotiations: if so with whom, what conditions, how arranged?
2. Why do we think the Viet Cong will give up if we bomb the North?
(Granted they are supplied and directed from Hanoi, but we acknowledge they have a strong local base and large measure of independence.)
3. Under what circumstances will we continue to bomb the North?
--only if major attacks on U.S. facilities continue? (i.e., tit-for-tat: theme of February 8 statement)
--at our discretion irrespective of specific attacks on U.S. personnel or installations? (White House statement of February 11)
4. What are we doing to prevent situation from returning to wasting guerrilla war that we haven't been able to win, with continuation of political instability in Saigon?
5. Any efforts going on to edge confrontation onto political track? What are circumstances under which we would talk to Hanoi, to Peiking, to South Viet-Nam National Liberation Front and/or Viet Cong leadership?
If we won't talk do we have any objective other than complete withdrawal of Viet Cong to north of 17th Parallel?
Conclusion
Either the President or you should make a statement setting forth the fundamentals of our position and relating recent events to those fundamentals. If you hold a press conference you must be prepared to open with a full statement on Viet-Nam, since many of the questions you will get are unanswerable--or better left unanswered.
128. Personal Notes of a Meeting With President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965, 1:50-3:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking. The notes were handwritten by Bundy for his personal use and were not an official record of the meeting. No other record of the discussion has been found. Attending the meeting were the President, Rusk, McNamara, Thompson, William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, and Ball. The information on the time and attendance was taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)
[LBJ]: Let's get a review of Embassy episodes. 1) In accordance with expressions we have made to Taylor & what he has said--in case we have disturbance--that can be done, that one is easy. 2) Next thing we get at is how much more do you need to carry out our decision?
RSM: Nothing before end of Wednesday for Friday./2/
/2/February 17 and 19.
LBJ: I don't object to Friday--probably as good a day as any. On assumption of no major spectacular--I understand that. Do you think there'll be many?
RSM: No.
Difference between L.B.J. & R.S.M.
[LBJ]: Give some more thought to what is likely to flow? How many people are going to be on board? Do you want to talk to predecessors? I'm going to talk to some folks outside? I don't want it to be influential on anyone--sure it's not. We must be prepared 1) to grant any request for $ and pacification, 2) possible targets in SVN, 3) make evident--if there is any doubt--to Commies & to SVnese & to our own people. But we can strike measurably and prudently in NVN.
I think that is much more necessary by desperate condition of Gov't. It may be in adversity you can minimize their differences.
We have done it in less spectacular ways. Killing 16000, in less spectacular ways. But bombers--I'm just hoping out of hope they'll draw people in Saigon together. But bombers won't bring 'em to their knees--unless we do something we wouldn't do. We'll be called warmongers--elsewhere & here in U.S. that'll be more pronounced--peacemakers'll be after us.
Line-up forces: Who is with us? Lots of people against us. You can't then wire [?].
This decision we made, I think, in December. Once we do it, let's tell all the boys to take a P beforehand.
Let's evaluate all their views--all the peacemakers. I'm not going to announce a new policy.
We'll have an NSC meeting tomorrow./3/
/3/The National Security Council met on February 18; see Document 140.
My policy with Press is not good. They hit our Barracks. Hit our Hotel & we hit theirs. But Scotty/4/ has a different idea.
/4/Presumably a reference to James "Scotty" Reston's articles in The New York Times on February 12 and 14, in which Reston called upon the President to "go before the country and explain his objectives." This country was "in an undeclared and unexplained war in Vietnam," stated Reston, but "we seem to be standing mute in Washington, paralyzed before a great issue, and merely digging ourselves deeper into the accustomed military rut."
129. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVIII. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
Per your request this afternoon,/2/ Ambassador Thompson and I have done the attached summary of reactions by key countries to our actions in Viet-Nam./3/
/2/Presumably a reference to the meeting recorded in Document 128.
/3/A 13-page memorandum, also dated February 16; attached but not printed.
To summarize briefly, the score card reads:
With us pretty strongly
Thailand Philippines Australia New Zealand Taiwan South Korea Laos Germany With us, but wobbly on negotiations
UK Canada India With us tepidly
Japan Malaysia Italy and otherNATO allies Latin America Skeptical or opposed
France Pakistan Mixed
Africa
We have left out the neutralist Afro-Asian countries, such as Indonesia, most of which are opposed--some vehemently, but some also with an underlying appreciation of what we are doing.
William P. Bundy/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.
130. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Telegram to Ambassador Taylor1. The attached draft/2/ is based on your comments at our 1:30 meeting./3/ It would be desirable to get it out to Taylor tonight,/4/ and also get the same thing out to Bruce for his discussions with Wilson./5/ As you will remember, you promised Wilson a memo on our exact position, and Wilson has been after Bruce to find out in more detail just what our thinking is. This telegram does not tell when the next military action would be, and I believe it is quite safe to let Bruce have it.
/2/Attached, but not printed.
/3/Apparently a reference to the President's meeting on February 16 from 1:50 to 3:30 p.m.; see Document 129.
/4/No telegram to Taylor on this subject has been found.
/5/See Document 131.
2. I call your attention to the alternative language in brackets at the bottom of page 2. You said "prompt and adequate and measured." I believe that for a policy of continuing action the words "adequate and measured and fitting" are better. "Fitting" is the word we used at the time of Tonkin Gulf, and if we are going to continue actions in a situation in which there is no spectacular outrage like Pleiku, I think "fitting" is a better word than "prompt." It may sound like mere semantics, but I think it is quite near the center of the problem of stating your desires precisely. Will you strike out whichever adjective you do not want?/6/
/6/The President struck out "prompt" and left in "fitting."
OK for Taylor as revised/7/
/7/The President checked all three items.
OK for Bruce as revised
Speak to me
McG. B.
131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, February 16, 1965, 9:01 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy, revised and cleared by the President, and approved by William Bundy. For more information on the drafting of this telegram, see Document 130.
5147. For Ambassador Bruce. For your guidance in talking with Wilson, our current thinking is as follows:
1. We have recommended, and we think the President will concur in,/2/ continuing air and naval action against North Viet-Nam whenever and wherever necessary. Our thinking has been and continues to be that any such action shall be limited and fitting and adequate as a response to the continuous aggression in South Viet-Nam directed in Hanoi.
/2/Prior to revisions made by President Johnson in the draft, this sentence opened with the words: "We have recommended, and the President has concurred in." For the President's many other handwritten revisions, see the draft referred to in Document 130.
2. Within 24 hours after the next military action we expect to make a statement. Current plan is that this statement would come from the Secretary of State, but decision is not final. This statement of policy will reflect following elements of our thinking:
a. First and foremost, we shall intensify by all available means the program of pacification within South Viet-Nam. Every/3/ possible step will be taken to find and attack Viet Cong concentrations and headquarters within South Viet-Nam by any and every conventional means available to GVN and US.
/3/The President crossed out the following words preceding "every" in the draft: "The President has directed that."
b. Execution of a joint program of measured and limited air action against selected military targets in the DRV. Air strikes under this program will be jointly planned and agreed. We presently plan to present this program to our National Security Council tomorrow./4/
/4/See Document 140.
c. We plan detailed presentation to UN Security Council of the case against the DRV as the aggressor. We do not expect to touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time.
In execution of item c., above, Ambassador Stevenson will call for a meeting of the Security Council immediately after next military action against DRV and will there present a fully documented demonstration that the basic cause of the trouble in SVN is aggression from the North. Stevenson will keep focus on DRV aggression.
3. Careful public statement of USG, combined with fact of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that military action will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on aggression, not on military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be adequate and measured and fitting to aggression. Each new military action will be reported at once to the Security Council, together with an account of continuing acts of aggression.
4. Concurrently with next military action, the US will inform major friendly governments as well as the Soviet Government of our views as outlined above.
In presenting this position you should emphasize to the Prime Minister the very high degree of secrecy attaching to this plan of action until final Presidential decision and orders have put it into operation./5/
/5/In telegram 3961 from London, February 17, Bruce reported that he had talked with Prime Minister Wilson about the U.S. Government's policy as outlined above. Wilson said that his government would "solidly support" U.S. policy, but he was "deeply concerned," especially in view of domestic pressures and what he felt would be the reaction in many other countries, regarding the second sentence under paragraph 2C. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
132. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, February 17, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan.-Mar. 1965. Top Secret. Drafted by William Bundy, but the source text is neither initialed nor signed by him.
SUBJECT
South Viet-Nam Course of ActionThe key question remains whether to take a talking initiative in your press conference statement./2/ I do not think we can well omit it from the press statement and then make it at the UN; this would seem a weakening of our position, coming so close on the heels of the statement, whereas it can be put all in one bite in the statement.
/2/Stating that he understood that the President had asked Rusk to hold a press conference later that week, Cleveland offered suggestions as to what Rusk might say in a memorandum to Rusk of February 16. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
I would rack up the arguments as follows:
If we do not take a talking initiative:
1. There will be moderate, but bearable, public criticism at home. Even without an initiative, we can go far enough to hold this within bounds.
2. However, the real question is what others will then do.
a. Wilson is very restive and has specifically flagged this very point in his talk with Bruce./3/
/3/See footnote 5, Document 131.
b. U Thant already has the idea of a group of major powers to work on a two-stage process.
c. The Indians have already proposed this on a "cessation of provocations" formula, and the Canadians have expressed their sympathy. Latest word last night is that the two governments are in close touch.
d. The Soviets have already called for an immediate conference, although Hanoi has not taken this up. (This points to Hanoi not showing up in New York, and possibly not playing at all, which would get us off the hook right then and there if we made an initiative.)
The sum total adds to a virtual certainty that either (a) some other power will call for a preliminary meeting, or (b) there will be a move in the SC calling on North Viet-Nam to cease its actions but calling, on an equal basis, for us to stop attacks in the north and withdraw our forces over Geneva limits. In the former case, we would look unwilling to talk even if we accepted, and we would lose much control of the terms of reference of the talks. In the latter case, we would be put on an equal footing with the DRV and this would greatly stimulate "both your houses" feeling all over.
3. The risks of military escalation will be very substantial.
If we take an initiative:
1. We will in any case run some risks of lowering morale in South Viet-Nam and in Laos and Thailand. We must in any case clear exactly what we are doing with them, and this we have not yet done.
2. We will have to fight off efforts in the Security Council itself to frame the terms of the "cessation of provocations." We should not seek to litigate these in the Council, and should if necessary accede to others adding our own actions, or a cease-fire in the south, to the agenda, provided we get a formula that somehow puts the DRV actions in the forefront. (This is another element arguing for an initiative by us, with maximum US control of wording.)
3. We will have moved to "half a Geneva" before we have established any real pattern of pressures on Hanoi, and would be in the somewhat novel position of continuing our military actions while some form of talks was going on. But this is what we always thought we would face in weeks or a very few months in any case.
4. We cannot totally control the grouping that would emerge. The present proposal calls for US, UK, France, USSR, Communist China, and the two Viet-Nams. But I hardly see how we can avoid Laos, unless we move separately to convene a Laos Conference on the Article 19 point. A two-ring circus is not without precedent--the 1954 Geneva Conference went for some time with both Korea and Indochina on the agenda--but the merger would tend to obscure the "preliminary" label we wish to retain for the Viet-Nam part.
5. The risks of military escalation will be reduced, perhaps to a major degree. If we feel impelled to increase the pace of our actions, we may find ourselves under a shade more pressure not to. But equally the Communist side might feel somewhat inhibited from drastic responses.
6. Developments within South Viet-Nam will be crucial to whether a decent bargaining position emerges. If the VC continues to gain, we still face the grim choice of hitting the north really hard (most unlikely to do the job at that point) or of waking up one morning to find the GVN has been at the Liberation Front or Hanoi behind our backs. (This too would be in a Geneva patten, for the real deal was made outside the conference, in 1954, between the French and the Viet Minh.) This would put us in a most ungraceful position--but my own view is that the blow to our prestige would be worse than if we had not negotiated and the same thing had happened.
On balance:
I would strongly favor an early initiative./4/
/4/Bundy further elaborated on possible developments in Vietnam and the consequences of certain U.S. actions in an uncompleted draft memorandum dated February 18 and entitled "Where Are We Heading?" (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan-Mar. 1965) The memorandum is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 692-693.
133. Memorandum of a Meeting With President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 17, 1965, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster. For President Johnson's recollections of this meeting, see The Vantage Point, pp. 130-131.
PRESENT
The President
General Eisenhower
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
Mr. McGeorge Bundy (for part of meeting)
General GoodpasterThe meeting, held in the Cabinet Room, began at 1000 and ended at 1230. The President welcomed General Eisenhower, and said he was hopeful he could hear General Eisenhower's thinking concerning the situation in South Viet-Nam. (During two or three minutes prior to The President's entry into the Cabinet Room, General Eisenhower had begun an exposition of his views on the subject.) General Eisenhower began by stating that he viewed our purpose as that of denying Southeast Asia to the Communists. This is a purpose we share with other nations of the Western World, and they should be brought to acknowledge and support this effort. His second point was that the securing of the area could not be accomplished by a "Roman wall," composed of outside forces such as our own. It is necessary to stop infiltration, and the Vietnamese themselves must be the basis for that effort. We can, however, play a major part in destroying the will of the enemy to continue the war.
The next major point was that morale is the key factor. He stressed that he was referring to morale in its broadest sense. To emphasize its importance, he quoted Napoleon as saying that "in war morale is to the material element as three is to one"; his only disagreement is that he would rate it as higher than three to one. The factor of morale applies in several ways. First, our aim must be to destroy the enemy's morale; i.e., to destroy his will to continue the war and attack the south. Second, we must do everything possible to raise the morale of our own side. In his judgment, air strikes against the north cannot deny the ability of the DRV to infiltrate. The strike can, however, discourage the north, and can make them pay a cost for continuing their aggression. He thought that morale is more important in a guerilla war than in a conventional war. In the latter case, the combat could be conducted with elite forces, but in the former the participation, and hence the morale, of the entire population is required.
He regarded it as of fundamental importance that the population of South Viet-Nam wants to be friendly to us. He recognized that there are limits as to how far they can manifest such friendliness to us. If security is lacking in the hamlets and in the countryside, the population will be frightened and unable to cooperate. If they see that if they defend themselves against the Communists their local leaders will be killed and their village destroyed, they will do little. The question is how to build morale. His first point is that success and victory, even if local and limited, begin to build morale effectively. He noted that morale in the south has risen because of the strikes by U.S. and VNAF against the north. The strikes following the Tonkin Gulf incident raised morale, which then suffered when there was no followup. He also noted that the morale of the ARVN, despite the bitter fighting in which they have been engaged, is high. We should ask ourselves what can be done to get the nation to feel the same confidence in itself as the ARVN units feel.
He made a strong plea for proper support for the [U.S.] Information Service. He referred to the lack of Congressional support for this activity in the past, and commented that he had once been told that the Russians spend more on information activities in France alone than the U.S. spends in the whole world. He related this need to the recent attacks on our embassies. He thought too many of the people in the countries involved do not know the probity of our aims. While the participation of Communists in such attacks is to be expected, they could not continue without some public participation, or public tolerance. In stressing the need for better information and propaganda, he said he thought the U.S. could take a half billion dollars out of other governmental programs and put it into this with greater advantage. There is too little understanding around the world of the record of the U.S. through recent years, e.g., from 1920 onward. He thought the information activity should fall into three categories. The first is official; everything done in this way should stick strictly to the truth and be entirely objective, disseminating pure information concerning the activities of our country. The second is such activities as Radio Free Europe, which furnish opinion; these should be supported, and should have more latitude. The third should be clandestine; in this field we should get other friends, governments and organizations to do the actual job.
General Eisenhower than reverted to the needs in South Viet-Nam. There is a need in his opinion for information and inspiration. Also, it is necessary to give security to the population, and to train the local forces in particular for this purpose. He said he understood frequently villagers are threatened and turn over their arms. Mr. McCone had told him that the Viet Cong obtain a large percentage of their arms by capture from the ARVN. He felt that people must want to be saved; otherwise nothing can be done. He added that he believes that the people of South Viet-Nam do want to be saved, but they need a feeling of protection for themselves and their families. They also need a promise of independence and a better life. The French failed to recognize the importance of the desire for independence. We should put great stress on more rice for the people, medical assistance, and local help of many kinds.
Reverting to the question of the air strikes, he said that in his opinion these retaliation actions have helped the situation a great deal. However, he felt it is now important to shift to a campaign of pressure. Targets should be struck north of the border which have an obvious connection with infiltration. He thought such strikes could be well justified before the world.
He commented that he was out of touch with the local political situation there. The changes of government have been bewildering, and it is hard to know whom to deal with. From his experience in the Orient, however, he thought it was important to find someone who is promising and try to bolster him. He commented that he had known Diem well. He recognized the difficulties attending Diem, but recalled that, in the case of France, before De Gaulle came to power, he was anxious to see him gain control. Even though he knew De Gaulle would cause trouble in many areas, he thought De Gaulle was the best hope of saving the situation in France, which was rapidly going to pieces. Diem also was a capable man. Despite his nepotism, he would have been effective, and he felt that the removal of Diem resulted in a great setback for our cause. He reiterated that we need someone to back. He summarized the need for improving the morale of the government, of the population, and of the armed services, particularly the local forces. If morale is up, and with the resources we can make available, there will be progress. We have the basis for this since we are supporting Vietnamese freedom, unlike the French, who would not commit themselves to the freedom of Viet-Nam. He stressed strongly that the U.S. Government must tell our own people just what we are doing in the area, i.e., what our policy is, and what course of action we are following.
He next considered the question of Chinese Communist or Soviet intervention. He said that if they threaten to intervene we should pass the word back to them to take care lest dire results occur to them. He commented on how the armistice was brought about in Korea. Following two years or more of inconclusive effort, shortly after he came to office, he had three messages passed to the Koreans and Chinese, one through Nehru, one through Chiang Kai-shek, and one through officials at lower level who were participating in armistice discussions. The gist of the messages was that if a satisfactory armistice were not signed promptly, we would remove the limits we were observing as to the area of combat and the weapons employed. He thought we should let them know now what we are seeking to do in South Viet-Nam, and that we would act against them if necessary. This should not be done publicly, but rather very quietly. He recalled that at the time of the Suez incident, the Soviets had threatened to use rockets against Britain and France. We had immediately passed the word to the Soviets that, although we were in disagreement with Britain and France, if any action were taken against them by the Soviets, we would respond in their support with all means required.
General Eisenhower said he had a final point on tactics and the conduct of operations. He strongly advised decentralization. The essential is to back a commander and trust him. This requires that policies and missions be defined. The mission can be very broadly stated. He recalled his own as a model--to enter the continent of Europe and bring about the destruction of Germany's war power. He quoted an old adage, "Centralization is the refuge of fear." Our representatives in the field are much more effective if we show that we have confidence in them to do the job. As another tactical point, he said he would not destroy the MIG's in the Hanoi area right away. He would work hard on pacification in South Viet-Nam, and start the attacks in the southern region of North Viet-Nam, in order to begin to charge a price to them for their continued aggression. He would let them and their Communist supporters have no mistaken idea as to our purpose. He would make clear what we are going to do in this regard.
At the President's request General Wheeler commented that the U.S. Government has already started action with the objective of finding ways to strengthen the security of the people of South Viet-Nam. In addition, on the military aspects of General Eisenhower's comments, he stated that in a general way these suggestions have been the approach the Administration has been taking.
The President, after thanking General Eisenhower for his comments, said he could best give the thinking of the Administration by quoting from a message being sent to Ambassador Bruce as a basis for discussion with Prime Minister Wilson of the U.K. The text he read was as follows:
[Here follows the text of Document 131.]
The President made two comments. First, he was planning to meet with the National Security Council later in the day, or the following day, and expected to make his decision at that time./2/ Second, he commented that there had been a good deal of discussion regarding the reference in paragraph 2. c. of the message to negotiations. Some of his advisers were inclined to go further in the direction of indicating a readiness or desire for an early conference. He invited General Eisenhower's comment on this point. General Eisenhower cited President Lincoln's handling of the Emancipation Proclamation. He had had it ready for issuance long before it was promulgated, and in fact had wanted to put it out. He felt, however, that he had to wait for a success, since otherwise its issuance would be taken as an act of weakness if not desperation. He therefore held it during the dreary months of military reverses, but seized upon Lee's retreat from the Battle of Antietam (at which Lee's army might well have been destroyed) as the occasion to issue it. With regard to negotiations, General Eisenhower felt that negotiation from weakness is likely to lead only into deceit and vulnerability, which could be disastrous to us. On the other hand, if we can show a fine record of successes, or real and dramatic accomplishment, we would be in good position to negotiate. He advised not to negotiate from a position of weakness. He commented that Prime Minister Wilson of the U.K. had not had experience with this kind of problem. We, however, have learned that Munichs win nothing; therefore, his answer to the British would be "Not now boys."
/2/See Document 140.
The President read again the text of the messages/3/ concerning Ambassador Stevenson's presentation of the case in the U.N.--it is to be cast in terms of DRV aggression from the north. He read again that military action would continue while the aggression continues. General Eisenhower thought the message was a good one. As to tactics, he would suggest that we should have the VNAF ready so that, if the Viet Cong murder a governmental official, within as little as two hours they could strike with six or eight planes against some targets in the north. This should be done every time there is such an atrocity, and in this case the action should be "blared out" publicly to create an immediate impact and let the DRV know they will not be getting a free ride any longer.
/3/Presumably the February 7 letter printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 240-241.
The President then read from a message received from Ambassador Martin in Bangkok reporting his meeting with the Thai Foreign Minister. The text he read was as follows:
"This morning in my first meeting with Thanat after my return, I found him in a rosy glow over vast improvement in morale throughout Southeast Asia as a result of American and SVN strikes at DRV. He was particularly pleased at the SVN participation. He said he hoped that as result of release of details on extent of DRV infiltration we would realize we had perfectly justifiable rationale to continue such joint strikes at DRV targets connected with such infiltration. Thanat said future strikes need not, therefore, be limited to reprisals for attacks on American installations or personnel.
"He went on to observe that it was quite possible that we had now seen the low point and future progress should be steadily upward. He said the vastly increased hopefulness would quite likely serve as a cement of sorts among SVN factions and said Quat seemed to have best chance since 1954 to create more broadly based regime. He agreed with my observation it quite likely Viet Cong would try more spectacular strikes but thought prompt retaliatory action would soon prove this unprofitable tactic. He made it clear, in response to my request for elaboration his thought 'low point' had been reached, that he well aware struggle would take long time with sharp reverses from time to time but again expressed conviction that psychological turn-around reached if we remained firm. Thanat said he had only one worry. Referring to 15 Feb issue of Paris edition of NY Herald Tribune and NY Times, carrying spate of stories on 'negotiations', he said he was certain Secretary understood now was not the proper moment to indicate any desire to return to conference table. When I pressed him on Thai reaction he said, after considerable pause for reflection, he thought he could bring Thai government to new conference, but only when we had continued pressure on north for sufficient period to make negotiations worthwhile to north to obtain relief from such pressures. This, he said, obviously was quite a bit in the future since Hanoi would undoubtedly need quite a bit of convincing. I said I thought the Secretary had made this position very clear in his reiteration of the necessity for Hanoi to begin observance of the commitments undertaken in 1954 before considering new negotiations. Thanat agreed.
"In response to my question Thanat said he gathered from comments from officials Soviet Embassy here that Kosygin taken completely by surprise at Pleiku attacks. He thought Sovs would confine their reactions to 'noise' and a bit more ink on American Embassy walls throughout the world. He thought Soviet hard-headed appraisal their self-interest almost guaranteed no greater reaction. Similarly, he thought in absence direct threat to ChiCom borders, there would be no Chinese reaction. He did think, however, that Thailand would be subjected to increasing subversive pressures and hoped we could be helpful. I said my consultations in Washington convinced me that specific Thai plans in this regard would find helpful and forthcoming response from U.S. side."
General Eisenhower said this was a fine message, and expressed congratulations to the Ambassador for asking the right questions.
Secretary McNamara picked up the point of not trying to destroy the capability of the DRV to support the insurgency in the south. He thought such an attempt would not succeed. Instead we should try to destroy the will of the DRV to continue their political interference and their guerilla activity. We should try to induce them to get out of the war without having their country destroyed and to realize that if they do not get out, their country will be destroyed. General Eisenhower added that an objective of the strikes is to improve the morale of the people in the south. He cited the example of Mosby's operations in northern Virginia during the Civil War. Mosby could succeed only as long as he had the support of the population. The importance of such support also was shown in Lee's failures; both times he attempted to invade the north and found himself without intelligence because he was surrounded by a hostile population. The morale of South Viet-Nam will rise when the people see the strikes in the north, and when they are given some security in the south. More than this is needed however. There should be inspiration and some positive contribution. In the Orient the radio is an outstanding way to motivate. General Eisenhower referred to his observations in an Indian village where all the people of the village would gather around a single radio in very bad repair to gain contact with the outer world. Help should also be given to the population of the countryside and the hamlets, to let them know that America is with them. In addition, rice, medical attention and many other practical forms of help to the people should be utilized.
The President said he was much interested in General Eisenhower's recommendations concerning the strengthening of the information services and activities. He stated that he had in mind to send Frank Stanton and Carl Rowan out to Viet-Nam in the near future to see what could be done to strengthen these activities. He observed that the air strikes against the north might well have an additional effect, beyond those mentioned, of helping to stabilize the government in the south.
(Mr. McGeorge Bundy joined the meeting at this point.)
The President next said that he wished to make a close analysis of these strikes, to consider how much provocation they would give, and what the effects of various types of strikes might be. He mentioned specifically the "prestige" bridge target. At his request, General Wheeler explained the targeting that has been accomplished, drawing upon the 94 target list,/4/ and indicating the general complex of targets in the south which have been hit and are under consideration for the next strikes. General Eisenhower thought it would be good to confine strike activities to the southern end of North Viet-Nam initially. If the Viet Cong do something big in the way of attacking in South Viet-Nam, then we should "hit them big" in the north. He thought we should do as much as possible with the VNAF. Their airmen are bound to brag about what they have done, and this will give a psychology of accomplishment to the South Vietnamese, with benefit to their morale. He thought the program should be one in which we put the pressure on and keep it on. He would obliterate the facilities the DRV have constructed in the DMZ.
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 331, footnote 7.
The President asked for a judgment as to the likelihood of the Chinese and the Russians coming into the war. General Eisenhower thought the Chinese would react in a much harder way than the Russians. To a question by The President as to whether the Russians might put pressure on Berlin, General Eisenhower felt that, in a matter so serious, they would choose their own course rather than be influenced by what we do. He said he would not fear such a reaction. The President then asked what we might do if Chinese forces were to come south, posing a requirement for eight to ten U.S. divisions in Southeast Asia. General Eisenhower said he would hit them at once with air, picking out the key points along their support routes. He said he would use any weapons required, adding that if we were to use tactical nuclear weapons, such use would not in itself add to the chance of escalation. With regard to starting a bigger war, he felt that the Chinese would not do this unless they had made the decision on their own. He further stated that he believed they would not come in to the war, but that, if they should, he would use some additional ground units against them, but would essentially shift to use of different weapons. He commented that the U.S. must take extreme care never to allow itself to get over-deployed. Our rule must always be to "hit the head of the snake." (As an aside, he commented that in his opinion the U.S. is over-deployed in Europe. The need of the Europeans for U.S. forces there has long since diminished. He acknowledged that many people do not agree with him in this view.) He stated that if our intelligence saw fifteen to twenty Chinese divisions coming into the war, we should hit their LOC with the strongest possible attacks. General Wheeler commented that we have given thought to the possibility of putting one U.S. division south of the DMZ, both to protect and to deter while the strikes against the north go on. General Eisenhower said he would see merit in action of this kind, but would not send in anything like a dozen U.S. divisions, and start a big war of that kind. He would use whatever was needed to immobilize the attacking forces and would secure the key areas in South Viet-Nam, for example, the three major airfield areas which were outlined to him.
At this point members of The President's staff came into the Cabinet Room to ask what might be said to the press, and whether pictures might be taken. The President thought it might simply be pointed out that General Eisenhower was in the city having a monthly physical checkup at Walter Reed, and that he had taken advantage of his presence to meet with him to talk about Europe, Southeast Asia, and other world problems. He asked whether General Eisenhower would care to meet the press, and General Eisenhower said he felt that any statements made concerning meetings in the White House should be made by The President or on his behalf, and that he would simply go out as he had come in, through the south grounds.
General Eisenhower suggested that every one of our ambassadors should be given the substance of the message sent to Ambassador Bruce, and they should be advised to say to the government to which they are accredited that these governments also should take some responsibility for what is being done in Southeast Asia in behalf of the freedom of South Viet-Nam. To illustrate his point, he described how France and Britain had failed to tell their people what stand our government was taking on the Suez matter prior to the invasion. As a result, there was bitter feeling in those countries on the unjustified grounds that we had not given notice we would oppose them.
The President said he would like to revert to the subject of negotiations. General Eisenhower said there are two requirements in his view. First, the enemy must want to come to us, which means that we must be in the position of strength. The second is that any agreement reached must be self-enforcing, or we must be able to put our own people into the area in order to verify performance. He asked in this regard what the Russians are doing about their recent nuclear tests, which "vented" in violation of the treaty. Mr. Bundy reviewed the exchange of notes with the Russians, and indicated that the dialogue is still going on. He also indicated that the treaty is not precise on this score, and that if the Russians take the view that very small amounts of debris should be disregarded, we may be able to use such latitude ourselves in the future. General Eisenhower saw merit in such a position.
The President next referred to the Resolution/5/ the Congress had passed following the Tonkin Gulf incident, giving him authority to act. He asked General Eisenhower whether he thought that Resolution was strong enough, and ample to fill the need. General Eisenhower said that it had sounded to him very much like the Formosa Resolution which had left a large area of discretion and flexibility to The President, and that he thought that this is the way it should be. The President commented that the Formosa Resolution had been the model for this one.
/5/See ibid., p. 664.
At The President's request Mr. Bundy reviewed very briefly the observations he had made on his recent trip to South Viet-Nam. Two out-standing points were the lack of security for the population in the countryside, and the little experience of government which South Viet-Nam has had. The President commented that steps are being taken to try to strengthen the government and to seek some rapprochement with Khanh. He said he is considering the possibility of trying to get some good U.S. reporters and TV people to go out to the area for a period of thirty to ninety days, in order to introduce greater responsibility in the handling of the political reporting. Mr. Bundy made the point that the Buddhists have had no experience in taking responsibility. Theirs has been an opposition role. Also he stated that Khanh is very Asian and devious politically. He added that General Westmoreland had said that, in the military matters on which he deals with Khanh, the latter had never deceived him.
The President said he saw great importance in developing a sense of participation on the part of the South Vietnamese. We should find targets they can really hit, and should work the VNAF hard. General Wheeler reviewed the "MAROPS" program of unacknowledged attacks from the sea conducted by the South Vietnamese. General Eisenhower said he thought these operations were valuable. The President reiterated that we should get as many South Vietnamese as possible in sea and patrol operations.
(At this point The President and General Eisenhower went into The President's office to have pictures taken, and Mr. Bundy left the meeting.)
When the President and General Eisenhower returned, Mr. McNamara asked for further comment on how General Eisenhower would advise responding to escalation, and what he had in mind regarding tactical nuclear weapons. General Eisenhower said he would make use of our carrier strength in the area for instant retaliation. For this purpose it should be kept in constant readiness. He would pass warnings to the Chinese Communists. Pick out the two or three key points in South Viet-Nam, such as Saigon and the air bases, and guard these strongly. General Wheeler identified these as Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa. General Eisenhower said tactical nuclear weapons should be used when the enemy comes in large strength as organized formations. lf they have strong forces these will have depots which can be struck. General Wheeler commented that there are bridges very important to such a campaign over the Red River north of Hanoi. General Eisenhower commented that this would be in effect a new war. We should be sure that the enemy does not lack an appreciation of our stamina and determination to keep nations free by whatever means required. He thought that if they find we are ready, they will not come in in great strength. He referred to the Chinese in Korea. There was a gentlemen's agreement between us and our allies after the very early days of the war--well known to the Chinese--that we would not cross the Yalu or even strike the bridges on the Yalu, nor would we use nuclear weapons. With regard to South Viet-Nam, we should let it be known that we are not bound by such restrictions.
The President asked General Eisenhower what he could tell him about the course of events in Korea. General Eisenhower said that in 1949 severe cuts were made in the U.S. military budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time (with himself presiding as chairman at The President's request) reached the view that in a global war Korea would not be important, although it was important in a cold war situation. As a result of the cutback of the budget and of the armed forces, it was necessary to withdraw our units from Korea. Secretary Acheson made a public statement at that time that Korea lay outside our security perimeter. Soon thereafter the Communists invaded the country. Mr. Truman initially attempted to meet the attack, using only naval and air forces. General Eisenhower said once we had committed ourselves to the war, he had advised Mr. Truman that we must use whatever force was needed. He had told him that we must succeed, and that if ground forces were required they should be put in. The President said he is concerned regarding the North Vietnamese, and the possibility that war in Viet-Nam might follow the same course as the war in Korea. General Eisenhower said the U.S. has put its prestige onto the proposition of keeping Southeast Asia free. Indonesia is now failing. We cannot let the Indo-Chinese peninsula go. He hoped it would not be necessary to use the six to eight divisions mentioned, but if it should be necessary, so be it. He would warn the Chinese in advance through many channels.
The President asked just what General Eisenhower had done in 1953 to bring the war in Korea to a close. He said he had had the word passed through the three channels he had previously mentioned, telling the Chinese that they must agree to an armistice quickly, since he had decided to remove the restrictions of area and weapons if the war had to be continued. General Eisenhower said that the greatest danger in his judgment in the present situation is that the Chinese get the idea that we will go just so far and no further in terms of the level of war we would conduct. That would be the beginning of the end, since they would know all they had to do was go further than we do. The President asked how such information might be gotten out, i. e., that we think the situation would be most dangerous unless the Chinese understood that we will do whatever is required. He and General Eisenhower discussed the possibility of approaching Ayub on this matter. They agreed he is a very fine man with whom we are having some difficulties at the present time. The President is considering what can be done to improve our ties with him. General Eisenhower described this problem as one boil in the whole world system. We must look at the effect of our actions on the whole world. When we say we will help other countries we must then be staunch. It is, of course, necessary to work out our tactics, and we should not be unnecessarily provocative.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
G.
Lt. General, U.S.A.
134. Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 17, 1965.
/1/Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Vietnam, 1965-1968. No classification marking. An earlier version, drafted by Hughes of INR and dated February 15, is printed in Humphrey's Education of a Public Man, pp. 320-324. The source text, which incorporates numerous revisions of the earlier version, including the addition of section "B," is unsigned but appears on formal Vice Presidential stationery and is captioned "Memo to the President From the Vice President.
"Humphrey later told Hughes that President Johnson saw the memorandum, but there is no record of it in the White House files at the Johnson Library. Moyers has stated that Humphrey gave him a copy that he passed on to Johnson. (Gittinger, ed., The Johnson Years, pp. 51-52; William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part III, pp. 92-95; Charles L. Garrettson III, Hubert H. Humphrey: The Politics of Joy, p. 181)
SUBJECT
VietnamI would like to share with you my views on the political consequences of certain courses of action that have been proposed in regard to U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. I refer both to the domestic political consequences here in the United States and to the international political consequences.
A. Domestic Political Consequences.
1. 1964 Campaign.
Although the question of U.S. involvement in Vietnam is and should be a non-partisan question, there have always been significant differences in approach to the Asian question between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. These came out in the 1964 campaign. The Republicans represented both by Goldwater, and the top Republican leaders in Congress, favored a quick, total military solution in Vietnam, to be achieved through military escalation of the war.
The Democratic position emphasized the complexity of a Vietnam situation involving both political, social and military factors; the necessity of staying in Vietnam as long as necessary; recognition that the war will be won or lost chiefly in South Vietnam.
In Vietnam, as in Korea, the Republicans have attacked the Democrats either for failure to use our military power to "win" a total victory, or alternatively for losing the country to the Communists. The Democratic position has always been one of firmness in the face of Communist pressure but restraint in the use of military force; it has sought to obtain the best possible settlement without provoking a nuclear World War III; it has sought to leave open face-saving options to an opponent when necessary to avoid a nuclear show-down. When grave risks have been necessary, as in the case of Cuba, they have been taken. But here again a face-saving option was permitted the opponent. In all instances the Democratic position has included a balancing of both political and military factors.
Today the Administration is being charged by some of its critics with adopting the Goldwater position on Vietnam. While this is not true of the Administration's position as defined by the President, it is true that many key advisors in the Government are advocating a policy markedly similar to the Republican policy as defined by Goldwater.
2. Consequences for other policies advocated by a Democratic Administration.
The Johnson Administration is associated both at home and abroad with a policy of progress toward detente with the Soviet bloc, a policy of limited arms control, and a policy of new initiatives for peace. A full-scale military attack on North Vietnam--with the attendant risk of an open military clash with Communist China--would risk gravely undermining other U.S. policies. It would eliminate for the time being any possible exchange between the President and Soviet leaders; it would postpone any progress on arms control; it would encourage the Soviet Union and China to end their rift; it would seriously hamper our efforts to strengthen relations with our European allies; it would weaken our position in the United Nations; it might require a call-up of reservists if we were to get involved in a large-scale land war--and a consequent increase in defense expenditures; it would tend to shift the Administration's emphasis from its Great Society oriented programs to further military outlays; finally and most important it would damage the image of the President of the United States--and that of the United States itself.
3. Involvement in a full scale war with North Vietnam would not make sense to the majority of the American people.
American wars have to be politically understandable by the American public. There has to be a cogent, convincing case if we are to have sustained public support. In World Wars I and II we had this. In Korea we were moving under UN auspices to defend South Korea against dramatic, across-the-border conventional aggression. Yet even with those advantages, we could not sustain American political support for fighting the Chinese in Korea in 1952.
Today in Vietnam we lack the very advantages we had in Korea. The public is worried and confused. Our rationale for action has shifted away now even from the notion that we are there as advisors on request of a free government--to the simple argument of our "national interest." We have not succeeded in making this "national interest" interesting enough at home or abroad to generate support.
4. From a political viewpoint, the American people find it hard to understand why we risk World War III by enlarging a war under terms we found unacceptable 12 years ago in Korea, particularly since the chances of success are slimmer.
Politically, people think of North Vietnam and North Korea. They recall all the "lessons" of 1950-53:
a. The limitations of air power.
b. The Chinese intervention.
c. The "never again club"--never again GI's fighting a land war against Asians in Asia.
d. The Eisenhower Administration's compromise which represented a frank recognition of all these factors.
If a war with China was ruled out by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations alike in 1952-3, at a time when we alone had nuclear weapons, people find it hard to contemplate such a war with China now. No one really believes the Soviet Union would allow us to destroy Communist China with nuclear weapons, as Russia's status as a world power would be undermined if she did.
5. Absence of confidence in the Government of South Vietnam.
Politically, people can't understand why we would run grave risks to support a country which is totally unable to put its own house in order. The chronic instability in Saigon directly undermines American political support for our policy.
6. Politically, it is hard to justify over a long period of time sustained, large-scale U.S. air bombardments across a border as a response to camouflaged, often non-sensational, elusive, small-scale terror which has been going on for 10 years in what looks like a civil war in the South.
7. Politically, in Washington and across the country, the opposition is more Democratic than Republican.
8. Politically, it is always hard to cut losses. But the Johnson Administration is in a stronger position to do so than any Administration in this century. 1965 is the year of minimum political risk for the Johnson Administration. Indeed it is the first year when we can face the Vietnam problem without being preoccupied with the political repercussions from the Republican right. As indicated earlier, the political problems are likely to come from new and different sources if we pursue an enlarged military policy very long (Democratic liberals, Independents, Labor, Church groups).
9. Politically, we now risk creating the impression that we are the prisoner of events in Vietnam. This blurs the Administration's leadership role and has spill-over effects across the board. It also helps erode confidence and credibility in our policies.
10. The President is personally identified with, and admired for, political ingenuity. He will be expected to put all his great political sense to work now for international political solutions. People will be counting upon him to use on the world scene his unrivalled talents as a political leader.
They will be watching to see how he makes this transition. The best possible outcome a year from now would be a Vietnam settlement which turns out to be better than was in the cards because the President's political talents for the first time came to grips with a fateful world crisis and so successfully. It goes without saying that the subsequent domestic political benefits of such an outcome, and such a new dimension for the President, would be enormous.
11. If on the other hand, we find ourselves leading from frustration to escalation, and end up short of a war with China but embroiled deeper in fighting with Vietnam over the next few months, political opposition will steadily mount. It will underwrite all the negativism and disillusionment which we already have about foreign involvement generally--with direct spill-over effects politically for all the Democratic internationalist programs to which we are committed--AID, UN, disarmament, and activist world policies generally.
B. International Political Implications of Vietnam.
1. What is our goal, our ultimate objective in Vietnam? Is our goal to restore a military balance between North and South Vietnam so as to go to the conference table later to negotiate a settlement? I believe it is the latter. If so, what is the optimum time for achieving the most favorable combination of factors to achieve this goal?
If ultimately a negotiated settlement is our aim, when do we start developing a political track, in addition to the military one, that might lead us to the conference table? I believe we should develop the political track earlier rather than later. We should take the initiative on the political side and not end up being dragged to a conference as an unwilling participant. This does not mean we should cease all programs of military pressure. But we should distinguish carefully between those military actions necessary to reach our political goal of a negotiated settlement, and those likely to provoke open Chinese military intervention.
We should not underestimate the likelihood of Chinese intervention and repeat the mistake of the Korean War. If we begin to bomb further north in Vietnam, the likelihood is great of an encounter with the Chinese Air Force operating from sanctuary bases across the border. Once the Chinese Air Force is involved, Peking's full prestige will be involved as she cannot afford to permit her Air Force to be destroyed. To do so would undermine, if not end, her role as a great power in Asia.
Confrontation with the Chinese Air Force can easily lead to massive retaliation by the Chinese in South Vietnam. What is our response to this? Do we bomb Chinese air bases and nuclear installations? If so, will not the Soviet Union honor its treaty of friendship and come to China's assistance? I believe there is a good chance that it would--thereby involving us in a war with both China and the Soviet Union. Here again, we must remember the consequences for the Soviet Union of not intervening if China's military power is destroyed by the U.S.
135. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, February 17, 1965, 2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Meade. The meeting took place in Rusk's office and lasted until 3:15 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
SUBJECT
South VietnamPARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Frazier Meade, EUR/BNAUK
The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
Michael Stewart, British Minister
Oliver G. Forster, First Secretary, British EmbassyThe British Ambassador said that he wished, on instructions from his Foreign Secretary, to discuss Vietnam. The Foreign Secretary's instruction stemmed from a conversation the British Ambassador in Moscow had with Lapin on February 16. In response to Lapin's reference to North Vietnam's message to the co-chairman for Vietnam,/2/ the British Ambassador had reviewed what he understood was the Soviet position, to wit that the Soviets had no desire to reactivate their role as co-chairman and that they had no authority to do so under the 1954 agreement. Lapin said that he agreed that the 1954 agreement did not give specific authority for the co-chairmanship role but said that when there is a fire the firemen should not argue about their authority to act. It was important to use all means to help the victims of U.S. aggression in Vietnam. The British Ambassador in Moscow surmised that the changed Soviet attitude resulted from North Vietnam's pressure on Kosygin. The Ambassador requested instructions from the Foreign Office on 1) reviving the co-chairmanship role in Vietnam, 2) rebutting Soviet arguments about the North Vietnamese as victims of aggression, and 3) positive action that the co-chairman might take to accomplish a peaceful settlement.
/2/See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 833.
Lord Harlech said that the Foreign Secretary believed that we should try to provide ammunition to the Ambassador in Moscow, and had asked him to consult with the U.S. on what answer should be provided. Lord Harlech then read from the Foreign Secretary's suggestion as to how to reply to point one, stating in essence that the British thought it would be desirable to revive the tradition of informal voluntary Anglo-Soviet cooperation on Vietnam's problems. Lord Harlech handed Secretary Rusk a copy of the Foreign Secretary's position./3/
/3/Not attached to the source text, but the document given Rusk by Harlech apparently was Foreign Secretary Stewart's cable of February 17 to the British Embassy in Washington, in which Stewart explained the British position. A copy is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294, UK/Rusk Correspondence 1964-65.
The Secretary agreed that it was important to consider how we should respond to the Soviet initiative. On a tentative basis, he and Mr. Bundy concurred that it would be useful for the UK to continue its co-chairman role with the Soviets in Vietnam. The Secretary said that they would review this proposal in detail and inform Lord Harlech.
Lord Harlech then said that the Foreign Secretary felt it was difficult to make any response to the Soviets without more evidence of U.S. intent. He thought it would be advantageous if the U.S. would define publicly its objectives and the conditions which would enable it to negotiate the Vietnam problem. Lord Harlech said he personally thought it would also be useful to make clear in any statement that the U.S. had no designs on North Vietnam. Without a clear public statement of U.S. intent, it would become even more difficult for HMG to continue in Parliament to support the U.S. or even to justify continuing the co-chairmanship role. The Foreign Secretary felt that the need for a clarification of U.S. policy existed prior to Lapin's remark. Lapin's remarks added urgency to this.
The Secretary inquired whether HMG did not think it desirable to tie down the details of the Hanoi attack. Lord Harlech said HMG agreed there was a need for such an explanation but that it should be supplemented by an outline of U.S. policy. The Secretary then said that apart from the necessity of gaining a common acceptance of the elementary facts of the situation, we should be certain the Soviets are under no misunderstanding of the facts as we see them. They need not, of course, be required to agree with our interpretation. In addition, it would be useful to determine whether the Soviets were ascribing difficulties purely to South Vietnam or whether they agreed that it was a problem of the North Vietnamese as well.
The Secretary then explained the difficulties of making a public statement on our policy towards Vietnam. If we were too precise about the problem, we could reduce our maneuverability. For the Ambassador's private information, however, the Secretary stated he was thinking of making a press statement this week.
Lord Harlech stressed the Foreign Secretary's feeling that we had moved into a new phase on the Vietnam problem and that it was consequently essential to have a new statement of U.S. policy. The UK would have an increasingly difficult time holding the line unless it could point to a U.S. position which the British could support. Without such a guide, more and more suggestions would be made as to how other people or organizations could solve the problem. The problem would become particularly difficult for the UK if it continues in its co-chairman role.
The Secretary noted that we would not consider negotiations unless we felt there was some possibility of a meaningful conclusion to them. It was conceivable that if we made a formal proposal to negotiate on such and such conditions that it would be rejected at the outset by the other side. On the other hand, if we met without any reasonable prospects of success and failed, where could we go from there? The Secretary said he would inform Lord Harlech shortly of our reactions to the British Foreign Secretary's proposals./4/
/4/In telegram 1744 to Saigon, February 17, drafted by Rusk, the Secretary of State informed Taylor of his conversation with the British Ambassador and remarked that "assumption of 1954 co-chairmanship by two governments would imply that they might themselves explore with interested governments possibilities of solution, which we would encourage or otherwise as we see fit." (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
[end document]
Continue:
Initiation of a program of air strikes against North Vietnam;
Introduction of U.S. ground combat forces,
February 11-March 8
Documents 136 through 146