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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

136. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, February 18, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan.-Mar. 1965. Top Secret. The source text was attached to a brief covering note of February 18 to Rusk, in which Bundy wrote that it attempted "to reflect the proposal discussed this morning at the White House." Bundy said he was also sending copies to Ball, Thompson, McGeorge Bundy, and, if Rusk wished, to Cleveland. The White House meeting was apparently that held from 12:02 to 1:03 p.m. and attended by the President, William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, Ball, Thompson, and Marvin Watson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS

1. The Secretary to call in Lord Harlech, preferably this evening, and to inform him that we have given thought to the British request that we indicate what we thought they might say to the Soviets as to action by the Co-Chairmen, and that we had further given thought to the British statement that a clear public exposition of our aims would be of great use. In the light of these British views, our suggestion would be that the British approach the Soviets to say that the most useful thing the Co-Chairmen could now do would be to call on other interested governments for an expression of their views on the situation, so that the Co-Chairmen could consider what further action they might usefully take.

The Secretary would tell Lord Harlech that in response to such a request the US Government would state its position fully in a note addressed to the UK and USSR,/2/ and would further state that it would give careful and sympathetic consideration to any proposal the Co-Chairmen might make for action to deal with the essentials of the situation as set forth in our note.

/2/A draft "Note to UK and USSR as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962," drafted by Rusk on February 17, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.

2. We would expect the British to respond favorably to this suggestion, and to take it up at once with the Soviets--as their initiative. If the British then reported that the Soviets agreed, they would combine this with a request for our views, and we would immediately send them the revised note.

3. Any press conference would be timed in relation to the completion of this sequence, since the press conference would not be useful unless it could be the occasion for revealing our note.

4. At whatever time we approach Lord Harlech with this suggestion, we would inform our Embassies in Saigon, Bangkok, and Vientiane of what we were proposing to do, arming them with the necessary arguments to explain it to their governments. Query whether we should immediately have Saigon go to work with the GVN framing a similar GVN response to go alongside our own. Query also whether the approaches to these three governments could take place even before the British had hit the Soviets; I would think there would be much merit to doing so at once, particularly as we might wish to explain to Saigon why we would not wish to have another joint strike until the sequence had been completed. In this respect, the firm tone of the President's statement of yesterday/3/ should serve, as read in Saigon, to leave no doubt that we are going on with strikes, and this is the essential point.

/3/At the conclusion of his remarks to the National Industrial Conference Board on February 17 in the Sheraton-Park Hotel in Washington, the President summarized U.S. purposes and objectives in Vietnam. For text of his remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 202-205.

5. Australia and New Zealand could be fully informed of our proposed sequence immediately after we have told the British. They should also be told that we are going ahead with joint strikes and approximately the desired pace and degree of severity.

6. Canada, India, and U Thant are special problems. Canada could be told exactly what we are doing, but both India and, more severely, U Thant raise security problems in that they might surface the sequence as a US-UK collusion, which we are anxious to avoid to the degree possible,

7. We should hold off on the next strike until the British have gone to the Soviets and have a response. If the Soviets should ask time to think it over, this might, however, cause undue delay. Accordingly, we should consider whether we would then ask the British to seek our views, and go ahead on the basis of this request only without waiting for the Soviets to join in. However, this would somewhat weaken the key element in the sequence, which is to bring the Soviets at least half way aboard in the Co-Chairman role right at the outset.

8. With respect to the UN Security Council, we would still plan to circulate the full printed document of our case, after we had completed the sequence. We would also have the possibility of an additional oral presentation either concurrently, or within a day or two after the written version was sent to the President of the Security Council.

 

137. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, February 18, 1965, 3:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam I. No classification marking.

Ball said they had sent something over to him they had worked up--a proposal to try to use the two co-chairmen--British and USSR to get something started.

The background is Harlech came in late yesterday afternoon/2/ and the British had received a fellow from the Soviet Union about reinvigorating the co-chairmen report. We drafted something/3/ to see if it would not be possible to use the co-chairmen as an approach toward moving this in some kind of a political track with the idea that this would avoid a conference. All we are suggesting is they might do some exploring with various parties. It would avoid going into the Security Council where the Soviet Union would be pushed into the position of being the advocate for the Communist side. If the Soviets are accepted this will give them a chance to avoid getting mixed in deeper because they could say that they are acting as the impartial party.

/2/See Document 135.

/3/Apparently a reference to Document 136.

Ball told McN he went to the WH this morning and had a long session with Mac [Bundy] and the President./4/ The President exposed his own philosophy. The paper took a strong position of any initiative on our side which would involve our making a public approach initiating machinery for settlement. Ball asked McN to think about the possibility of stirring the British up so they could talk to their Soviet colleagues about coming back to both the US and Hanoi with a request for a statement of our positions. On this basis if they chose to do so they could see what they wanted to do but without in any way looking like our initiative. McN asked what the President's reaction had been to this. Ball said he was interested but wanted to think about it. McN thought it important not to be hooked to it because of his strong feeling about initiatives on our part. McN asked what our answer to the press would be if they asked our reaction to the British bringing the parties together. Ball said, if asked we would be glad to make a statement.

/4/See footnote 1, Document 136.

McN thought there would be some merit in this and he thought we had to move toward negotiation.

Ball said the advantage of this is that it would not get us into a conference and tie our hands.

McN asked about Adlai's two page statement./5/ Ball said Stevenson recommends that Thant take an initiative. This would probably get us into a seven power conference or into a position where the SecGen is asking us to come in to a conference where we would look bad if we did not agree to do so.

/5/Not further identified.

McN thought it better if we went into the Security Council because we know that China and Hanoi are not going to come before the Security Council.

Ball said in the statement that was sent over this morning the first and last paragraphs would be taken out. This was on the assumption that we would make an approach ourselves to the co-chairmen. The central part is a statement of our position. It has been revised a little but it is substantially the same.

Ball said it was possible the President would want to have a talk before the NSC./6/

/6/Ball, McNamara, and Rusk met with the President for about 20 minutes prior to the NSC meeting, which began at 5:25 p.m. on February 18. No other record of this pre-meeting discussion has been found. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

 

138. Editorial Note

At 4:40 p.m. on February 18, Secretary of State Rusk met with British Ambassador Lord Harlech. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No memorandum of this conversation has been found, but in telegram 5222 to London, February 18, Rusk reported as follows:

"I today called in Harlech to suggest that they approach Soviets to say that most useful action for Co-Chairmen at present time would be to call on other interested governments for expression their views on situation, so that Co-Chairmen could then consider what further action they might usefully take. I told Harlech that in response to such request USG would state its position fully in note to UK and USSR, also making this note public, and would further state that it would give consideration to any proposal Co-Chairmen might make to deal with essential problem of situation--which in our note would be fully spelled out as being cessation of DRV aggression in all respects."

Rusk said that Harlech was reporting this immediately to the British Government and had expressed his personal view that the suggestion would be accepted. Rusk said further that U.S. officials hoped that the Soviet Government would also agree and that a request for U.S. views might be made soon enough for the draft reply note to be used immediately following the next air strike. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

 

139. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 10-3/1-65

Washington, February 18, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates File, 10-5, Communist States. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of AEC, NSA, and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of this estimate. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE US COURSES OF
ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

The Problem

To estimate Communist reactions to a US course of sustained air attacks on North Vietnam.

Scope Note

This estimate is intended to supplement, not to supersede, SNIE 10-3-65/2/ on the same subject, dated 11 February 1965. For example, the probable involvement of Communist air forces is discussed in that paper, and not in this.

/2/Document 111.

The Estimate

1. The US air attacks on North Vietnam have added another ingredient to an already intricate and complex situation. Hence Communist reactions to these attacks will not be the product of the attacks alone, but will be governed by numerous factors: the state of relations among the USSR, Communist China, and the DRV; the attitudes and conduct of various free world powers--especially France; developments in the UN; the course of events in South Vietnam; the manner and pace with which the US air attacks develop and the policy of the US itself, not only as this policy may be enunciated by the administration, but also as the Communists may read the influence upon it of newspaper and Congressional declarations and other expressions of diverse views. We cannot estimate with confidence or precision how these factors will interact in weeks to come.

Reactions to the Bombings of Early February or to a Few More of the Same Type, South of the 19th Parallel

2. To establish Communist power in South Vietnam and to unify the country under the Hanoi regime is the primary national objective of the DRV leaders. From the beginning of the insurrection in the South, however, they have consistently admonished their followers to be prepared for a long struggle. Only in the past few months have they occasionally talked in terms of victory being near. This feeling may have been dampened somewhat by the past week's tougher US action.

3. There are probably some among the DRV leadership who would prefer a cautious course. They would urge that collapse of GVN resistance is inevitable in time despite any amount of foreign support, and that it would be foolish to risk destruction of the DRV's laboriously acquired modern economic sector merely to accelerate the pace of victory. However, in the present moment of high emotion in Hanoi they probably hesitate to voice such thoughts.

4. To the militant majority, the recent US air attacks probably appear to be the actions of a foe endeavoring to ward off defeat. These leaders probably reason that if the DRV/VC stand firm or even increase their pressures in the South, they will have to ride out a few more such US attacks, but that the US/GVN disposition to continue the struggle will decline. To these leaders, any display of apparent weakness in the face of the bombing would signal to the US that it had hit upon the way to get what it wants in the area.

5. We accordingly believe that the DRV/VC reaction to a few more air attacks like those of early February would probably be to continue their pressures in the South more or less on the scale of recent weeks--always with an eye upon factors like those mentioned in paragraph 1. At the moment, the Communists cannot be sure whether US actions presage a sustained course of air attack or a "tit-for-tat" program of limited reprisals to specific provocations. It is possible that they would, for a week or two, refrain from direct attacks on US installations, but we cannot estimate that such restraint is probable.

6. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly encourage the DRV in the more militant course. We do not believe that they will intervene in Vietnam with substantial military force during this stage. We see no evidence at present of preparations to do so, although we cannot have full confidence in our ability to detect such preparations.

Reactions to a Declared and Sustained US Program of Bombing in the North

7. Over the past decade the DRV has invested much time, effort, and capital in the development of industry, transportation, and relatively modern military facilities. They will not lightly sacrifice these hard-won gains. Yet a threat by the US to mount sustained attacks on these assets would probably be greeted in Hanoi with mixed feelings of trepidation and skepticism. At the start, the Communists would not be convinced that the US intended really to follow through with this program. They would almost certainly apply a range of pressures in an endeavor to make the US desist. They would maintain strenuous diplomatic and propaganda efforts to organize international influence against the US policy. They would probably threaten dire consequences to US interests in the area. Chinese Communist threats would be more insistent, and Chinese Communist forces would probably be deployed in more threatening postures. Viet Cong attacks would probably continue, though not necessarily at a steady pace.

8. If despite these pressures, the US vigorously continued in its attacks and damaged some important economic or military assets, the DRV leaders would have to reach a decision. They almost certainly believe that, while the US could destroy much in their country by air attacks, these alone would not cause their regime to collapse or prevent them from continuing to support the insurgency in the South. And they may believe that their international political position would improve if they became the object of sustained air attack from the US. Accordingly, they might decide to intensify the struggle, accepting the destructive consequences in the North in the expectation of early victory in the South.

9. It seems to us somewhat more likely however that they would decide to make some effort to secure a respite from US air attack, especially if the US had indicated that such a respite would follow a sharp reduction of Viet Cong activity./3/ We do not know how far they would go in concessions, whether the US would accept what might be offered, or what the international situation might be at such a time. We think it extremely unlikely, however, that Hanoi would concede so far to US demands that it would entail abandoning its support of the insurgency in the South or giving up its intention of unifying Vietnam under Communist control.

/3/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes this course of action less likely than that described in paragraph 8. He considers that Hanoi would feel that any benefits to be gained by such a respite would be more than offset by a loss of momentum at a time when victory appeared near, by a loss of face with the VC, and by the consequent bolstering of US/GVN morale. Hanoi would have in mind that concessions under such circumstances might only invite the US to resume strikes upon any renewal of Viet Cong military activity.

Moreover, the assumed vigorous US attacks on major targets could easily coincide with the probable use over the DRV of Chinese air defense from Chinese bases. If so, US responses would either have been to acknowledge the privileged sanctuary of Chinese bases or to strike the bases in hot pursuit, thus inviting further Chinese military responses. Hanoi's persistence would be reinforced either way. [Footnote in the source text.]

10. The Chinese Communists would almost certainly be willing to support the DRV in even the more militant course of action outlined in paragraph 8. We have set forth in SNIE 10-3-65 (paragraphs 16-18, with State Department footnotes of dissent) the use the Chinese would be likely to make of their own forces.

Possible, but Unlikely Reactions

11. Instead of temporarily easing off or intensifying present levels of pressure, the Communist leaders might actually engage in actions which would change the scale and nature of the war. These would be much more dangerous and aggressive courses and, although they seem to us unlikely in the light of logic and prudence, they are possibilities which cannot be ignored:

a. They might launch a large-scale DRV invasion of South Vietnam and/or Laos. We think it unlikely that they would do this in response to bombings of North Vietnam. They would feel that at best this drastic policy would only accelerate victories in Laos and Vietnam which they are confident they will win before very long through less costly tactics. Such an invasion would virtually require a greater involvement of the Chinese in Vietnam, which is in itself distasteful to the North Vietnamese. The Communists would recognize that to launch such an invasion would be to invite further major destruction upon the DRV and perhaps upon China./4/

/4/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that paragraph 11a is applicable only in the initial stages of bombings in North Vietnam, well below the Hanoi-Haiphong target complex. Once US attacks destroy major industrial and military targets in this complex, however, Hanoi will have substantially lost its hostage and suffered the maximum damage it could anticipate from the air. In this case the DRV, having suffered the destruction of its major military facilities and the industrial sector of its economy, would probably carry on the fight and proceed to send its own armed forces on a large scale to Laos and South Vietnam. Hanoi might assume that the US would be unwilling to undertake a major ground war, or that if it was, it could ultimately be defeated by the methods which were successful against the French.

Furthermore, if the DRV should persist in this fashion, Peiping would probably introduce limited numbers of Chinese Communist ground forces into the DRV as "volunteers," both to prepare for further escalation and to make clear Peiping's commitment to assist the North Vietnamese. [Footnote in the source text.]

b. We think it unlikely that the Chinese or DRV would respond to US air raids by air attacks on US aircraft carriers or South Vietnamese air-fields. To do so would invite counterattacks on the vulnerable Communist bases and start the escalation of an air war, a form of hostilities most disadvantageous to the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. A sneak attack on a carrier by an unidentifiable Chinese submarine is a more difficult possibility to weigh, but we are inclined to think the chance is slim; the risks would be fairly high and Chinese confidence in the ability of their inexperienced submarine force to pull it off is probably low.

c. We also think it unlikely that the Chinese Communists would start another major crisis elsewhere on the periphery of China. Faced with the possibility of a full scale war in Southeast Asia, Peiping would want to have the greatest possible strength focused there. Chinese propaganda has, indeed, said that America's "meager force" in Asia is spread thinly over a "long arc from South Korea to Indochina," and that if the conflict were expanded, the "time, place, and scale of the war would be beyond US control." However, we think this is no more than a general warning of the dangers of expanding the war. Peiping is likely, however, to continue talking of war "over a vast front" and perhaps even to stir up alarms elsewhere to keep US power dispersed and deter the US in Southeast Asia. The Chinese Communists might, for example, increase the apparent military threat in Korea, bombard the offshore islands in order to raise tensions in the Taiwan area, or perhaps make threatening moves on the borders of India.

The Soviet Ingredient/5/

/5/Possible Soviet reactions are discussed in SNIE 10-3-65. In the two following paragraphs we consider only the impact of Soviet policies on DRV and Chinese Communist reactions. [Footnote in the source text.]

12. Assuming the fairly limited Soviet involvement which we have estimated, Soviet policy is not likely to have a determining impact on DRV and Chinese policy. The fact that the Soviets have become involved at all, however, almost certainly has some effect on DRV and Chinese calculations. How the Soviet involvement affects DRV reactions will depend upon the extent of whatever Soviet commitment has been given. If the Soviets have urged caution, the DRV might be somewhat more restrained and flexible in its responses to US pressure than we have estimated above. However, we believe it more likely that Soviet promises of aid for DRV defenses, along with the very fact of Soviet reinvolvement will make the DRV leaders somewhat more confident and aggressive. They may hope to benefit in their confrontation with the US from a Sino-Soviet competition in backing them.

13. The probable effect on the Chinese of the increased Soviet presence is certain to be complex and ambivalent. On the one hand, the Chinese are almost certainly upset at an apparent Soviet move to grab a share of credit for any Communist gains in Vietnam and to try to displace some of Peiping's influence over the DRV. On the other hand, they welcome whatever additional deterrent can be laid upon the US by Soviet involvement in the situation. More important, they see an opportunity to force the USSR either to endorse the Chinese line on policy toward the US or to expose itself as faint-hearted in its devotion to Communist duty. Whichever choice Moscow makes, Peiping expects Soviet authority to be undermined, and Chinese influence strengthened, in the international Communist movement.

 

140. Memorandum of Discussion at the 549th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, February 18, 1965, 5:20-6:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret. Prepared by Cooper. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President

State
Secretary Rusk
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Bundy
Ambassador Unger

Defense
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Vance
Assistant Secretary McNaughton

JCS
General Wheeler

CIA
General Carter

Treasury
Secretary Dillon

USIA
Director Rowan

White House
McGeorge Bundy
Chester L. Cooper

The President indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to review developments since the last meeting (February 8),/2/ and to up-date our information. He indicated that his statement to the National Industrial Conference Board on February 17/3/ attempted to state U.S. goals in Vietnam. He reviewed these goals: we have one major objective--to save South Vietnam and to help the South Vietnamese to preserve their freedom. We seek no bases or territory there, and when we have responsible assurance that the terrorism has stopped, we will bring our troops home immediately; and until then, we will do everything we think wise to help the South Vietnamese do what is necessary. The President said that we must expect an increase in Viet Cong aggressive tactics and that we must recognize that our own responses are likely to increase as well. He wants to make it clear that the U.S. is going to continue its efforts to meet and stop this aggression. Our Mission in Saigon should have no doubts whatsoever as to U.S. intent and objectives.

/2/The previous NSC meeting was on February 10 (see Document 98) rather than February 8 (see Document 87).

/3/See footnote 3, Document 136.

Secretary McNamara briefed the Council on the increasing tempo of the conflict. The Saigon Mission and the GVN (Khanh) want to undertake attacks on certain targets in the southern part of North Vietnam, and he agreed this should be done.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that there were daily evidences of an increase in Viet Cong activity in the central and southern part of South Vietnam. He pointed to the Communist "war vessel" that was brought into a South Vietnam port./4/ He said there may well be an increase in North Vietnamese forces in the northern part of South Vietnam. He agreed that strikes this weekend against the North should take place. Secretary Rusk went on to review the international reaction to our strikes. He said that those Asian countries that had a great stake in the security of the area (e.g., Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Australia, UK, Philippines) are with us; some countries (e.g., France and Pakistan) are luke warm; some "unaligned" countries are flatly opposed.

/4/A report of this event was transmitted in telegram 2462 from Saigon, February 18. In telegram 2710 from Saigon, February 22, the event was described as the discovery off the coast of South Vietnam on February 16 of "an armed ocean-going, steel ship carrying large quantities of Communist bloc arms and ammunition." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

The Secretary indicated his misgivings with respect to an approach to the UN at this time. He doubted that a debate in the Security Council would be the best way to deal with the situation. The USSR is the only Communist country represented there, and would have a special responsibility to defend the DRV actions and thus might adopt a less forthcoming stance than it might in another forum. The Secretary felt that we should make our White Paper/5/ available as soon as possible. He felt the ICC may be able to play a useful role, but we are still investigating how best to use the ICC machinery.

/5/This paper was released on February 27 and entitled "Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam"; see Document 171.

The Secretary felt that, in the course of the next week, it may be necessary to make another strong statement on our aims and objectives, stating that we will move our troops as soon as we know the aggression has stopped. He said there are many who think "negotiation" is a magic word, but felt it would be a mistake to indicate prematurely our desire to enter into negotiation; unless there was some prospect that negotiations would be meaningful, it would be a very dangerous situation. A negotiation that failed would indicate that we had taken the case to the higher court and it was unable to deal with it. This would be the worst possible situation.

The Secretary indicated that "political antennae" all over the world are waiting for signals that the Communists are ready to engage in meaningful negotiation. Thus far no significant signals have been received. It is extremely important, in this respect, that the GVN itself is ready to stand up against this aggression.

The President said that he would rather talk than fight, but nonetheless it was terribly important that the GVN not get the wrong impression that the U.S is seeking negotiations prematurely. Under these circumstances Saigon might begin its own negotiations very quickly and without our knowledge or participation.

The President read the text of an outgoing message, from Secretary Rusk to Ambassador Bruce, which spelled out our proposed policy./6/ He asked the members of the Council for their reaction. All agreed.

/6/See Documents 131 and 149.

The meeting adjourned at 6:05.

CLC

 

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 19, 1965, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, and Vientiane. Received in the Department of State at 2:20 a.m.

2654. A coup d'etat began at about 1300 today, 19 February which apparently was tactically directed by General Lam Van Phat and reportedly includes most of the participants of the 13 September coup group/2/ less Duc. The principal organizing power behind the coup said to be Tran Van Don who is supported by the followers of Ambassador Khiem.

/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 347.

Foregoing information comes largely from CAS officer in contact with liaison officer of Don.

Phat is at Tan Son Nhut which he at least partially controls. Tanks are reported at several places in town to include Khanh's house, Suu's house, and Gia Long Palace. Ky is reported under arrest.

Khanh is at Vung Tau from which he has just telephoned Westmoreland. Khanh reports having seen tanks at Tan Son Nhut upon departure and is plainly caught by surprise. PTT telephone lines cut throughout city.

Will continue to report as situation becomes clearer./3/

/3/A further report, including a brief summary of Taylor's conversation that afternoon with Prime Minister Quat, was sent in telegram 2657 and received in the Department of State at 4:27 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S)

Taylor

 

142. Memorandum to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 19, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVIII. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text and it is unsigned. A handwritten note at the top reads: "Sent to the President Per Bundy."

Mr. President:

This is the latest information from General Westmoreland on the attempted coup in South Vietnam./2/

/2/A situation report on developments in South Vietnam as of noon (EST) on February 19, prepared by Corcoran, is ibid., Nodis-LOR, Vol. I.

The coup d'etat in Saigon was undertaken by military group headed by Generals Phat and Tran Van Don. The composition of the group is apparently essentially the same as that which attempted September 13 coup less Gen. Duc.

Announced target of coup leaders (who speak for an organization called Forces For The Protection of the Country) is to remove Gen. Khanh from the scene but highly probable that group desires also to change the present government headed by Prime Minister Quat.

Coup group has support of militant Catholic elements at the moment. To date, Quat's government has kept aside from coup activities treating it as an intramural struggle among military.

Ambassador Taylor, with concurrence of Prime Minister Quat, has suggested to Air Commodore Ky that he attempt to call urgent meeting of the Armed Forces Council at Bien Hoa this evening if possible, if not, earliest possible time tomorrow morning. Taylor also suggested that Ky inform corps and unit commanders of his call for meeting and urge a standstill of troop movements in meantime.

Impossible to judge this moment amount and degree of support for Phat/Don group and for Gen. Khanh.

U.S. military advisors have been counseled to take the following position with their counterparts:

a. Emphasize the necessity to avoid armed clashes and bloodshed among Vietnamese Government Forces.

b. Emphasize that call for Armed Forces Council meeting is a sound approach to solving difficulties. In the meantime, there should be a standstill on troop movements headed for Saigon.

c. Deny that the U.S. was informed concerning the coup attempt but otherwise maintain a neutral position insofar as the contending factions are concerned.

d. Stress that the coup attempt following on recent U.S./GVN joint air attacks on DRV is most unfortunate in terms of its effect on U.S. and Free World opinion.

 

143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 19, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, McGeorge Bundy Correspondence. Secret.

SUBJECT
Your meeting with Couve de Murville at 11:30 this morning

1. Obviously the dominant topic is Southeast Asia and especially South Vietnam. Couve takes the immediate military disturbance calmly, although he obviously feels that it reinforces his own conviction that there is not, and cannot be, any workable government in a situation of "American occupation." He professes to think there is a possibility of such a government after a political settlement and an American withdrawal, but he produces no evidence whatever to support the notion that such a government would be anything but Communist.

2. Couve told me that he thought we had decided on "escalation" and that he was very fearful of the results. This is what he has told others and I think it is what he honestly believes. I pointed out that no one had more experience of negotiation and of the settlement of political differences than you, and that our current lack of interest in negotiation should not be construed as willful insistence upon a violent solution. Couve readily admitted--and indeed volunteered--the opinion that you are a very prudent man and that you have made no mistakes since November 1963--"a remarkable achievement."

3. I pointed out to Couve that just a year ago today he had suggested to Bohlen in a private talk that we might have to take further military action before we would be in a position to negotiate. He did not deny that he had said this (the cable is at Tab A)./2/ He simply said that he thought it was now too late for such measures. In his own view the dangers of action beyond the 17th Parallel outweighed any possible return, and he thought we would do better to limit our attention to the South. I told him that you more than any other man in the government were insistent upon a maximum effort in the South, but that we also had to take account of the very heavy role and responsibility of Hanoi and of the problem of morale which is created when there is increasing violence against our people and the Vietnamese, and no visible response.

/2/Not attached and not found.

All this was standard back and forth. I then tried to make a more important and less obvious point--without much success. I told him that we did not think it was helpful for the French to make public calls for a conference. He said that this was no more than a restatement of their own well-known position. I said that any restatement was a political act, especially at a moment of tension. I told him that I thought the French might have to choose between having a real private diplomatic role in these matters and taking the posture of public disapproval of what an ally was doing. I did not see how they could do both. Couve said that France aspired to no private role and that we could not object if the French stated their honest opinion. This was the only sign of heat which he displayed in the whole meeting.

My conclusion is that Couve honestly does not think we can avoid defeat in South Vietnam. This is of course a comforting conclusion for a Frenchman for obvious reasons. He is not troubled by the shifting of the power balance in Southeast Asia because France has no ambitions there, and he is a Frenchmen through and through. He does think there is real danger in any "escalation", and since this danger might affect Europe and France, his worry is not pretense. He will be reassured by anything you choose to tell him about your own care and watchfulness. I think you will also see the value of the argument that anything we do now will be designed to be essentially continuous with our policy of insistent support for action in the South and very careful and moderate and measured naval action, air patrol, and so on in other areas.

McG. B./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

 

144. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 19, 1965, 11:35 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Drafted by Tyler, approved by the White House on March 5, and by the Office of the Under Secretary of State on March 9.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President

Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Bohlen
McGeorge Bundy
William R. Tyler

France
Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister
Ambassador Alphand
Charles Lucet, Foreign Office

After preliminary courtesies, during which the Foreign Minister conveyed General de Gaulle's best wishes to the President, President Johnson referred to this morning's events in Saigon. He had told some Senators only yesterday evening/2/ that you could never tell when there might be a new government in Saigon and this morning it had happened again. There had been something like ten governments in South Vietnam in the last few years.

/2/Presumably a reference to the Congressional briefing at the White House the previous evening. (Ibid.)

Couve said this did not surprise people any more and that it illustrated the basic problem in South Vietnam, which is a political one.

The President said the Secretary of State had told him about the good talks he had had with General de Gaulle. He was glad the Foreign Minister had been able to come. He admired de Gaulle for being able to get away with few press conferences. He himself had held forty-six of them, whereas President Kennedy had held twenty-one, and yet he had been told that wasn't enough.

At Mr. Ball's suggestion, the Foreign Minister described his talk in Paris on Saturday, February 13, with the Communist Chinese Ambassador, who had just come back from Peiping. After the usual accusations against the United States, he had said that the thing to do in Southeast Asia was to go back to the Geneva Agreement of 1954 as a basis for negotiations. Couve had told him this was the French position, too, but the negotiations would have to be without preconditions, because their objective was to achieve a cease-fire and see what could then be developed. The Chinese Ambassador had not said exactly that he agreed, which would have been asking too much. However, as the Ambassador left, Couve had summarized their talk according to his own understanding, and had asked if the Ambassador objected to any part of it, to which the Ambassador had replied in the negative./3/ Couve said that France had some commercial relations with North Vietnam but no political relations, since France had diplomatic relations with South Vietnam. He said the French government did not see any difference between the North Vietnamese and the Chinese, except that the former are more anxious to negotiate.

/3/Couve de Murville's conversation with the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China on February 13 was one of several contacts the French Government had with the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam during the previous few months. For a summary and analysis of the discussions, see Document 158.

The President said our information on what was happening in Southeast Asia was limited. He said we did not have the best of sources available. We had always felt that in order to have useful negotiations, the other side must want to negotiate. We had not seen any sign of this, in fact our information reflected quite the contrary. (At this point the President read several passages from an intelligence report on the attitude of the North Vietnamese government which we had received through a private source.)/4/

/4/Not further identified.

Couve said it was normal that Hanoi should speak in this vein for propaganda purposes, but he did not think that this was the real position.

The President said that in the last fourteen months he had watched problems of concern to our allies very closely and very carefully, and that he had always been very cautious and had taken care not to throw our weight around. Illustrating his point with reference to an occasional bean ball thrown in a baseball game, he said that when these had come his way he had moved his head out of the line of fire and had refused to engage in quarrels with people. He had always told our own people that we didn't want to get into fights needlessly. The President pointed out that President Eisenhower and President Kennedy had told the people of South Vietnam that we wanted to help them help themselves. This had always been our position and he wasn't about to run out on our commitment. There were two or three thousand incidents a month in South Vietnam and he didn't have to tell the French what this meant as they had had plenty of experience out there themselves. As the character of these incidents gets more serious we respond in kind in order to make our purpose clear, e.g.: when the North Vietnamese PT boats had been sent out against our destroyers, we had bombed their bases on the North Vietnamese coast. We had also shelled the attacking craft with our ships. Then the Viet Cong had been sent into a US compound and had killed a number of our boys. The President was not going to write them a thank-you note for this. There had been up to 78 such incidents. The President wondered what de Gaulle or Erhard or Wilson would do in similar circumstances. What we had done was to bomb certain of their staging and assembly points. Then the following night they had come and blown up a hotel and killed some more of our soldiers. So our planes went back and "sprinkled them a little." The President said he didn't think we had killed many of them. In fact he thought that our action had probably caused more concern in certain other parts of the world than it had in North Vietnam. The President said that whenever de Gaulle says something on the Vietnamese problem, the President asks the Secretary of State or Ambassador Bohlen to go and find out exactly what de Gaulle said. Then he is told that the suggestion is that we ought to have a political solution. The President said that he was all in favor of this but the question was how to bring it about. The President said that the press would like him to talk more than he does but he didn't want to. He noticed that some of his colleagues talked to the press and he could tell which ones had done so from little lines here and there in the articles. The President repeated that our policy was to help the people of South Vietnam to help themselves. We would leave tomorrow if anyone would provide effective guarantees of the independence of South Vietnam. He said we would pull our men out tonight if we could achieve this. The President said that we were not going to give the other side a privileged sanctuary as in Korea, or tell them what weapons we would use or not use against them. We were going to keep them guessing and use appropriate means in response to their aggression. We don't want to move to escalation, but if the others do it, we will do whatever is required on the basis of the wisest military judgment. We would like to have everybody else's help in our efforts and we haven't had much help from others. The President said that he had greatly valued President de Gaulle's stand and help at the time of the Cuba crisis, and had taken it into account in our relations with France. He said that until we get support we will never be able to explain our alliances satisfactorily to the American people. He said that we might have to leave South Vietnam for some reason but we hoped not. We welcomed the help and the counsel of everyone. If the North Vietnamese think that they hold all the trump cards and that they have the backing of world opinion, then they are misjudging the situation and us, just like Hitler and the

The Foreign Minister said he fully understood the feelings expressed by the President. The essential problem was: how to get out. He felt that there was a complete contradiction between our respective information on the thinking of the Chinese and North Vietnamese. The French Government's information differed from ours.

The President said he had heard that General de Gaulle says what we ought to do. He said de Gaulle is a great man, and that we are grateful that there are not as many changes of government in France as in SVN. The President said he would like to hear from him what he thinks we ought to do, with points a. b. c.

(At this point there was some comment by the President on what General de Gaulle really recommended with regard to the use of strength. Ambassador Bohlen explained this point to the President.)

The Foreign Minister said that the statement which the President had read was pure propaganda, and was too stupid.

The Foreign Minister said the French government believed in a political solution. According to its information, the other side wants to negotiate. On the other hand, US information is that they don't.

Mr. Bundy asked whether the position of the other side was that the United States should withdraw first and then negotiate.

The Foreign Minister replied in the negative. He said that US withdrawal was their ultimate objective, but they said that we should all go back to the 1954 Geneva agreements first, in order to negotiate. They did not ask for withdrawal as the first step. The Foreign Minister said that the role of the ChiComs was far more important than that of the DRV.

The President asked if it was the feeling of the Foreign Minister that if we got an agreement it would be worth anything.

The Foreign Minister answered that the most important factor was what kind of a government there would be in South Vietnam. He admitted that this was a risk which one would probably have to take. It was not possible to tell what the nature of a South Vietnamese government would be.

Mr. Ball asked whether France felt that any government likely to emerge would be dominated by Hanoi.

The Foreign Minister replied that nobody could say.

Ambassador Alphand interjected that Belgrade was not Moscow.

Mr. Ball referred to the problem of the other states in the general area of Southeast Asia: Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia.

The President said that success by the Chinese would be likely to increase their appetite.

The Foreign Minister said that the main issue was the question of relations between the United States and China. China could not fail to be impressed by the immense power of the United States.

Mr. Ball referred to his talk with General de Gaulle on June 5, 1964./5/ He thought that a major difference between our two governments was in our respective assessment of the intentions of Communist China. France thought that it was preoccupied with major internal problems and thus looked inward on itself, whereas we think that the Chinese are aggressive and land hungry.

/5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 464-470.

Mr. Bundy said that another difference was that France seems to think that there can be no solution to the problem of stable government in South Vietnam while the United States remains there, while we think that there can be no solution if we leave.

The Foreign Minister said that government stability was impossible to achieve in a period of hostilities, but that if a cease-fire could be achieved, then, with the US staying in South Vietnam, internal conditions could be expected to change.

Ambassador Bohlen commented that another difference was that France thinks that negotiations would last a very long time, whereas we thought that a conference would be likely to break up.

The Foreign Minister said that in estimating the probable course which the Communist Chinese government would take, it was useful to look at the Soviet example. He recalled that the Soviet Union had stayed quiet until World War II and had only started its expansionist policies at that time.

Mr. Ball said that Chinese expansionism had already been active in Africa. The Foreign Minister said this was different: before the war there had been activity in other countries by the Communist parties.

Ambassador Bohlen said that Communist China proclaimed its belief in militant support of indigenous movements, and that this raised the question of how it could be expected to retreat.

The Foreign Minister said that if the Chinese once agreed to come to the negotiating table, it would then be harder for them to resume fighting.

The President asked what was the French evaluation of the Soviet thinking on these matters.

The Foreign Minister answered that the Russians had the same evaluation as the French, and that they constituted a moderating element. The Russians didn't want to see the Communist Chinese expand, and would support North Vietnam against China.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

In conclusion, the question of press guidance was discussed, and it was agreed that the Foreign Minister would say that he had talked about various subjects with the President, including South Vietnam. The Foreign Minister said that in reply to any further questions he would refer the press to the White House.

The meeting ended at 12:30 p.m./6/

/6/A memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Couve de Murville on February 20, during which they discussed several topics related to Southeast Asia, is in Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan.-Mar. 1965.

 

145. Editorial Note

Since August 1964, United Nations Secretary-General U Thant had been attempting through U.S. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson to arrange private talks in Rangoon between North Vietnamese and American representatives. See Walter Johnson (editor), The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, volume VIII, pages 661-666, and the Editorial Note in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume I, Document 427.

The U Thant-Stevenson discussions were resumed in January 1965. On February 16, Stevenson met with U Thant, who suggested that the U.S. Government prepare a paper stating its position on Vietnam for circulation in the U.N. Security Council. Stevenson's memorandum of this conversation, which includes a brief introductory section recapitulating his contacts with U Thant, is in The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, volume VIII, pages 700-702.

Stevenson also sent a memorandum to President Johnson on February 17, in which he suggested that the President prepare an early statement of the U.S. position on Vietnam for distribution in the U.N. Security Council as U Thant had suggested. (Ibid., pages 702-704) McGeorge Bundy advised against a Presidential statement in his memorandum of February 19 (Document 146).

 

146. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII. Secret.

Washington, February 19, 1965.

SUBJECT
Answer to Adlai Stevenson's memo

I asked George Ball to answer Adlai's memorandum of February 17 (Tab A)/2/ and here is my own suggestion as to what you might say to him if you wish to telephone him. In the current situation, I do not think such a phone call is urgent.

/2/See Document 145.

1. Stevenson suggests an early Presidential statement. Your answer is that you believe in all necessary statements of our policy and objectives--that you have stated them repeatedly--and that you have told the Secretary of State to hold a press conference or issue a statement at any time in the next days or weeks that he may think it necessary. You yourself do not wish to heat up the national or international atmosphere by making a very loud noise right now, although you are free to change your mind if the situation requires it.

2. You do not wish to indicate our "readiness for exploratory talks" at this time. Our position is not one in which we should now look as if we were hunting negotiations. Both the Communists and our friends in Saigon would interpret such a proposal as a sign of weakness and readiness to withdraw.

3. You share his view that we do not wish to get into the Security Council right now.

4. You do not think that we would now wish to organize a meeting of the US, UK, France, China, the Soviet Union, and North and South Vietnam. Such a committee would be weighted against us, and there is no reason today to offer the French the mediator role in this conspicuous way.

McG. B./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

[end document]

Continue:
Initiation of a program of air strikes against North Vietnam;
Introduction of U.S. ground combat forces,
February 11-March 8
Documents 147 through 159