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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 19, 1965, 3:49 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Corcoran and approved by Unger.

1763. 1. Vietnamese Embassy informed us this morning Ambassador Khiem making statement before U.S. television cameras supporting the military coup. AP ticker subsequently carried Khiem's announcement his full support for "military revolt against General Nguyen Khanh." Item said if coup succeeded Khiem would return to Saigon at invitation coup leaders to give whatever help he could in returning country to stability. Further said Khiem assailed Khanh as "dictator who created disorder in order to stay in power". Added he had received message from Col. Pham Ngoc Thao asking that he get back to Saigon as soon as possible.

2. However coup turns out we hope Quat government can be preserved. This is not to argue any long term U.S. commitment to Quat as individual. However, it would be regrettable to have his government fall so soon after establishment leaving us again with indefinite interim period of disorganization and travail of working out installation successor regime. It obviously to both the US and GVN advantage maintain in place government with which we can immediately carry on common effort. Developments reported your 2674/2/ encouraging in this regard and we know you keeping this important consideration in mind.

/2/In telegram 2647, February 19, Taylor reported that Ky had told Quat that the Armed Forces Council would support the Quat government. (Ibid., POL 23-7 VIET S)

3. We shall approach Ambassador Khiem today along lines your 2667/3/ urging he not try return Saigon until situation more clarified.

/3/In telegram 2667, February 19, Taylor stated that Khiem's return to Saigon would only "add tinder" to a "very explosive situation." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVIII)

Rusk

 

148. Department of State Situation Report/1/

Washington, February 20, 1965, 8 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX. Secret. Prepared by Corcoran.

SAIGON COUP SITUATION

At about 6:40 p.m. EST, February 19, according to MACV, Airborne troops reentered the capital, reoccupied the Radio Station and the Regional Force Headquarters and gave the Fifth Armored Group troops 30 minutes to get out of town.

At about 7:03 p.m. EST, MACV reported General Thieu, with the concurrence of General Ky, was calling an Armed Forces Council meeting at Bien Hoa and had requested U.S. transportation. General Westmoreland authorized this and also the use of T-39 at Da Nang to transport General Thi on space available basis to Bien Hoa.

By 7:10 p.m. EST, MACV reported troops under General Vien of III Corps entering the city from four directions. The coup leaders were attempting to open negotiations. It was not clear just who represented the government or who represented General Khanh. Four Corps Commanders seemed to be together in opposing the coup. General Vien seemed to be in charge of military operations while Generals Ky and Thi presumably were handling negotiations. Khanh was floating in the background issuing orders and appearing to be increasingly in control. However there was a possibility that any meeting of officers convoked to settle the coup could turn against Khanh around the conference table although MACV did not consider this likely on the basis of the past record. General Thi took off from Da Nang for Bien Hoa in a VNAF C-47 at 6:30 p.m. EST.

By 8:15 p.m. EST AP and UPI were reporting that the coup had completely collapsed. Also Radio Saigon announced its return to normal operations and was no longer broadcasting rebel statements.

At 8:55 p.m. EST it was reported that Prime Minister Quat and other civilian members of the government would attend the Bien Hoa meeting. The purpose of the meeting would be to settle the coup. General Khanh was at Nha Trang preparing to preside over a victory celebration related to the capture of the Viet Cong arms ship near Cape Varella. He recommended that journalists and ICC representatives be brought to the scene.

By 11:05 p.m. EST MACV reported the military phase of the coup was apparently over. General Phat and Colonel Ton had been seen changing into civilian clothes and departing in a civilian auto.

At 11:10 p.m. EST MACV reported that the Armed Forces Council meeting at Bien Hoa had voted "no confidence" in General Khanh and that Khanh had left the meeting so that Council members could speak freely. At about 1:15 a.m. EST Prime Minister Quat confirmed to Ambassador Taylor that the Council had voted "no confidence" in Khanh and had also decided that the insurgents should be tried and punished by the military.

Another Council decision, according to Quat, was to make General Nguyen Chanh Thi Commander of the Capital Military District (Saigon) replacing General Pham van Dong. General Dong however is still serving as a member of the Armed Forces Council.

Quat agreed to discuss with Ambassador Taylor the question of naming Khanh's replacement as Commander in Chief, indicating that Phan Khac Suu's decree removing Khanh still stands. The Ambassador is inclined to share General Westmoreland's view that no successor as Commander in Chief is necessary and that it would be preferable to have only a Minister of Defense and a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

Major General Nguyen van Thieu as Minister of the Armed Forces and Acting Commander in Chief appears to be top figure in the Armed Forces Council in the absence of Khanh and the most likely inheritor of leadership of the armed forces.

 

149. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 20, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vietnam Policy File--Cables. Top Secret.

In the NSC meeting on February 18, 1965,/2/ the President gave approval to the line of policy outlined in London 5147 to Ambassador Bruce dated February 16,/3/ with the following exceptions:

/2/See Document 140.

/3/Document 131.

1. The President made no decision with respect to any call for a meeting of the UN Security Council or other discussion in the Security Council.

2. The President made no decision with respect to the means or frequency of reports on U.S. military action.

3. The President made no decision within the meeting with respect to the timing of the next military action.

A copy of telegram 5147 to London is attached as a document of reference. The President read from the document, with the exceptions noted, in presenting this matter to the Council.

McGeorge Bundy

 

150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 20, 1965, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved by Rusk.

1783. Embtel 2685./2/ We concur that next operation should be just as soon as possible, but believe that Feb 22 may be too soon until Saigon situation not only more stable but clearly seen to be so. We particularly concerned ARC press conference indicating Khanh's status may still not be resolved. Question his successor, if any, also not clear.

/2/In telegram 2685, February 20, Taylor recommended, with Westmoreland's concurrence, that the first Rolling Thunder bombing strike be carried out on February 22 since the internal situation in South Vietnam seemed to be stabilizing. In telegram 2665 from Saigon, February 19, Taylor had recommended that Rolling Thunder I, scheduled for February 20, be postponed in view of the attempted coup in Saigon. The Department of State indicated its acceptance of Taylor's recommendation in telegram 1757 to Saigon, February 19. All three telegrams are ibid.

Second factor here is that developments reported Deptel 1744/3/ have taken different turn in last two days. British approached Sovs today with suggestion both governments as co-chairmen join in soliciting expression of views from members 1954 conference, plus ICC members, as to situation generally and also as to views on what conditions for peaceful answer might be. We do not yet have Sovs response and would not wish throw Sovs off this track by drastic action before they make decision, although we believe dramatic boat incident tends minimize possibility such reaction. Moscow had felt immediate further operation might jeopardize Sov reaction, and we have now asked for their judgment as to operation directed in part against naval base and in response VC actions putting boat incident in forefront although also including VC activity since Feb. 11./4/

/3/See footnote 4, Document 135.

/4/This request was transmitted in telegram 2268, February 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

You should not reveal possibility this UK/USSR gambit to GVN for time being. We naturally wish have it appear entirely as their initiative, so that our reply would not be any kind of initiative on our part and would, in its content, make clear how stiff our views are. We of course have no thought holding back on basic program, but do wish for clear assessment at all stages.

In light above factors, we now inclined hold off operation until Feb. 23, so that you would not approach GVN for political clearance until Feb. 22. We expect make decision tomorrow, and fullest continuing flow findings from boat incident will remain most helpful here in accordance your 2690./5/

/5/Not found.

Rusk

 

151. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 21, 1965, 12:30-12:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Unger. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
Discussion with British Ambassador on Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
Mr. Michael Stewart, British Embassy
Mr. Oliver Forster, British Embassy
The Secretary
Ambassador Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Apropos the appearance of Foreign Minister Couve de Murville on TV at the moment of Ambassador Harlech's arrival, the Secretary told the Ambassador that the French appear much more persuaded than we that Hanoi is anxious to work out the difficulties in Viet-Nam. The Secretary remarked that this would no doubt be on Hanoi's own terms even if they are indeed ready to negotiate, and he added that in his view the French are not really deeply concerned with how problems are resolved in that part of the world.

The British Ambassador agreed that the French are out of the area for good. He inquired whether Couve had tended in recent conversations to minimize the importance of the support and direction by North Viet-Nam of the Viet Cong effort. The Secretary said the French had not pressed this point but in any case he had given them at length yesterday the evidence on the North Vietnamese ship just recently captured in South Viet-Nam waters, loaded with arms.

Harlech then referred to UK-Soviet conversations in Moscow and relayed Ambassador Trevelyan's conviction that any public statement made on this subject would promptly blow up the whole effort. The British are persuaded that the Soviets do want seriously to consider the British proposal but insist on no publicity at this stage. It is clear from what Lapin has said that the Soviets are not ruling out some joint public statement at a later date. It is the British assessment that if there were a leak now the Soviets would immediately make a militantly hostile statement ruling out any possibility of a joint effort.

The Secretary assured the British Ambassador that in giving Minister Couve a little background on this subject he had stressed to him the necessity for absolute silence. Couve, he said, had agreed that it would be advantageous if the Russians were prepared to play their Co-Chairman role in the Vietnamese situation./2/

/2/See footnote 6, Document 144.

Lord Harlech then reviewed Ambassador Trevelyan's conversation with Lapin, noting that at the outset the latter had accepted the British formula about the status of the Co-Chairmen with regard to the 1954 Accords on Viet-Nam. Lapin had also promised seriously to study the British proposal even though Trevelyan surmised that there was some disappointment that the British were not suggesting a conference. While Lapin mentioned that the Soviets had already had submitted to them views from the French and North Vietnamese, they were nevertheless ready to consider the British proposal for requesting views from the other countries. Harlech said that his estimate was that there would be a reply from the Soviets in two to three days. He also assured the Secretary that all of the US suggestions about the approach to the Soviets, including the bringing in of the ICC countries, had been accepted and acted on by the British.

Secretary Rusk then referred to the difficult question posed by Trevelyan's judgment opposing any further strikes at this time. The Secretary observed that as long as the current confusion in Saigon exists we would not be inclined to lay on a strike. On the other hand the capture of the North Vietnamese arms ship almost begs for a response. He acknowledged the pressure on the Russians which a strike would represent but emphasized that London and Moscow must not believe that embarking on the Co-Chairman process would be accompanied by a unilateral cease-fire by the US. When the British Ambassador said it was the conviction of London and their Embassy in Moscow that another strike at this time would doom the British initiative with the Soviets, the Secretary added that it was not his expectation that a decision would be made today concerning a further strike and he promised the British advance warning on this subject. He noted nevertheless that we do not regard this connection between a strike and the British initiative in Moscow as a really decisive element in our decision.

Ambassador Harlech said the British saw real value in getting a clear Russian reaction at this time. It is most important to learn what we can of their purposes and get whatever evidence we can of their readiness to play a mediating role and help avoid escalation. He said that his Government urged the US strongly to hold its hand until the British have an answer from the Soviets.

The Secretary pointed out that the Soviets may come back and state that the end of US strikes is a precondition to their playing the Co-Chairman role as suggested by the British. In this case the Secretary assumed that the British would make sure that into the ensuing consideration there would also be the demand for North Viet-Nam to put an end to infiltration. In this regard the Secretary referred to the British position in Malaysia which would envisage reaction against Indonesia in response to rather less provocation and he emphasized how the arms ship illustrates the nature of the North Vietnamese role. In conclusion, however, he stated again there would be no strike today or tomorrow.

Lord Harlech acknowledged that the US cannot agree to a unilateral cease-fire and he also referred, himself, to the arms ship as "straight aggression."

 

152. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House/1/

Washington, February 21, 1965, 4:50 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Repeated to the Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Military Command Center. Received at the White House at 4:51 p.m.

CIA 86906. The following is CIA/OCI Situation Report for Vietnam as of 1600 hours EST, 21 February:

1. General Khanh is resisting his ouster as Commander-in-Chief, officially announced by Saigon Radio today, and is attempting to rally behind him whatever forces he can muster. Late Sunday night/2/ (Saigon time) some 15 tanks and two truckloads of rangers, apparently acting on Khanh's behalf, occupied Saigon's airfield of Tan Son Nhut. The situation has been characterized chiefly by maneuvering and confusion, and is still far from certain how much actual support Khanh might secure in a showdown. Khanh is at his seaside command post at Vung Tau, southeast of Saigon.

/2/February 21.

2. The Armed Forces Council has issued an ultimatum to Khanh to leave the country immediately. General Thi, I Corps Commander, who is emerging as perhaps the most powerful of the young Turks, has warned that any forces attempting to reinstate Khanh would be subjected to air strikes.

3. A field appraisal of the loyalties of key military commanders shows an almost complete lineup against Khanh. General Dong, Military Governor of Saigon and strongly anti-Khanh, estimates that Khanh might at most be supported in the capital by three airborne and one marine battalion. However, as in the case of the 19-20 February attempted coup, there always exists some danger of split loyalties developing among individual field units.

4. Yesterday, the Armed Forces Council deputized General Co, II Corps Commander, to find Khanh and tell him of its no-confidence vote. When Co finally caught up with Khanh upcountry in Nha Trang, Khanh refused to accept the message. He claimed that the vote was taken at a rump session of the Armed Forces Council, and he insisted on the right to defend himself before the total membership.

5. On the afternoon of 21 February, the Armed Forces Council voted to name Major General Tran Van (Little) Minh, erstwhile Chief of Staff, as temporary armed forces commander. A formal decree to this effect was signed by Chief of State Suu and broadcast Sunday night.

6. Of the key military figures, only Navy Commander Admiral Cang at latest word is remaining with Khanh at Vung Tau, and Cang's intentions and loyalties are not clear. General Quang, Special Forces Commander, earlier thought to be on Khanh's side, now says he wants out and has asked for a plane to take him from Vung Tau. General Ky is arranging transport. Thus, while the situation is still subject to sudden change, the trend seems to be running against Khanh.

 

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

Saigon, February 22, 1965, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and the Department of State.

473. Ref: JCS 161601Z./2/ The ref cable requests CINCPAC, MACV and Ambassador's views as to requirement for force deployments to this area in view of security situation of SVN. General Westmoreland and I agree that there is no need to consider deployments to SVN at this time except possibly for protection of airfield at Danang.

/2/Not found.

As I analyze the pros and cons of placing any considerable number of Marines in Danang area beyond those presently assigned, I develop grave reservations as to wisdom and necessity of so doing. Such action would be step in reversing long standing policy of avoiding commitment of ground combat forces in SVN. Once this policy is breached, it will be very difficult to hold line. If Danang needs better protection, so do Bien Hoa, Ton Son Nhut, Nha Trang and other key base areas. Once it becomes evident that we are willing to assume such new responsibilities, one may be sure that GVN will seek to unload other ground force tasks upon us. Increased numbers of ground forces in SVN will increase points of friction with local population and create conflicts with RVNAF over command relationships. These disadvantages can be accepted only if there is clear and unchallenged need which can be satisfied only by US ground forces. Turning to possible uses for additional Marines in Danang area, I can see several which are worth examining. First, they could be used to reinforce protection of Danang Air Base against Bien Hoa-type of attack by fire or against combined VC fire and ground attack.

More ambitious mission would be readiness to engage in mobile operations against VC in Danang area to keep VC units at distance from base and make positive contribution to pacification of area. Such US forces would concurrently be available to join in conventional defense of area if DRV Army moved southward in resumption of formal hostilities.

In defense of the Danang Airbase against surprise attack by fire, it would be necessary for Marines to be in place on ground in considerable strength. (MACV has estimated that about six battalions would be necessary to keep 81mm mortar fire off large airfield.) Even if whole MEB were deployed, they could not provide complete assurance that surprise mortar fire by small groups attacking at night would be kept off field. Protection of field against VC ground attack would be considerably simpler and would require fewer Marines. It is hard to imagine an attack on field by more than VC regiment and even an attack in those numbers would be extremely risky in face of superior friendly air and ground fire. To meet such an attack, battalion of Marines supported by local ARVN forces should be sufficient. On other hand, as indicated above, effective perimeter defense against mortar fire would require at least whole brigade of Marines.

It has been suggested that an ancillary benefit to deployment of additional Marines to Danang would be freeing of ARVN units for use elsewhere in mobile operations. While some ARVN troops on order of battalion might be so relieved, number would not be sufficient to constitute strong argument for bringing in Marines. Generally speaking, Marines would be performing task which has not been done adequately in past.

The use of Marines in mobile counter-VC operations has the attraction of giving them an offensive mission and one of far greater appeal than that of mere static defense. However, it would raise many serious problems which in past have appeared sufficiently formidable to lead to rejection of use of US ground troops in a counter-guerrilla role. White-faced soldier armed, equipped and trained as he is is not suitable guerrilla fighter for Asian forests and jungles. French tried to adapt their forces to this mission and failed; I doubt that US forces could do much better. Furthermore, we would have vastly complicating factor of not running war and hence problem of arranging satisfactory command relationships with our Vietnamese allies. Finally, there would be ever present question of how foreign soldier would distinguish between a VC and friendly Vietnamese farmer. When I view this array of difficulties, I am convinced that we should adhere to our past policy of keeping our ground forces out of direct counterinsurgency role.

If there were any great likelihood of DRV forces crossing the demilitarized zone in conventional attack, there would be no question of need for strong US ground force to assist ARVN in defense of coastal plain. However, this situation would not arise suddenly and we should have ample time to make our deployments before situation got out of hand.

In view of foregoing considerations, I conclude that only mission worth considering now for additional Marines in Danang area is to contribute to defense of base against mortar fire and ground attack. However, to defend against mortar fire would require at least full brigade and I do not believe threat and possible consequences of mortar attack are so great as to warrant pinning down so valuable force in static defensive mission. However, in view of General Westmoreland's understandable concern for safety of this important base, I would be willing to recommend placing in Danang Marine battalion landing team. Such force would strengthen defense of base and, at same time, would be manageable force from point of view of accommodating it on base and absorbing it into Danang community. Such force with those Marines already present should remove any substantial danger of VC ground attack and in conjunction with available ARVN forces provide an acceptable level of security against attack by fire.

If Washington decision is to introduce additional Marines into Danang, it should, of course, be made contingent upon getting concurrence of GVN. It would be useful and, I believe, not difficult to get GVN to initiate request for additional forces to which USG could then accede./3/

/3/In telegram MAC JOO 5515, February 22, General Westmoreland recommended that a Marine expeditionary brigade "be deployed to Da Nang on a phased basis as soon as political clearance is obtained." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Taylor

 

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 23, 1965, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 8:58 a.m.

2720. For the President./2/ This has been the most topsy-turvy week since I came to this post: A new government installed, a coup attempted against the Commander-in-Chief, the coup suppressed, the Commander-in-Chief deposed by those who had put down the coup. The coup attempt itself was an ill-considered, ill-timed move against Khanh by a group of officers and former officers, many of whom had already been discredited by their earlier unsuccessful attempt against Khanh last September 13. One might have expected that General Phat, the coup leader, would have done better on a second go but he again misjudged the temper of the military commanders having effective military strength in the Saigon area. Phat's unsuccessful effort did have the effect, however, of breaking Khanh's spell over his colleagues in the Armed Forces Council and of bringing them to a decision to unseat him. This action appears to have been successful and Khanh's appointment as Ambassador-at-Large/3/ has just been announced. I understand that he will depart Saigon for Hong Kong on 25 February: but one cannot exclude the possibility of his making another last minute maneuver to save himself.

/2/In a telephone conversation with Rusk at 12:15 p.m. on February 23, Bromley Smith indicated that he was sending this telegram to the President at his request. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

/3/Taylor and U. Alexis Johnson's conversation with Quat on February 22 regarding Khanh's future status was reported in telegram 2700 from Saigon, February 22. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S)

With Khanh, the troublemaker, removed from the scene, we hope that the Quat government can get under way with our joint programs. We believe that the government has considerable potential but its basic strength will not be known until put to the test. That test is likely to be a challenge by the Buddhist Institute where Thich Tam Chau is presently making pro-Khanh anti-Suu noises. It is hard to see what objection the Institute can find in the Quat government, the members of which were carefully chosen with a view to their acceptability to the Buddhists.

The excitement over the coup tended to divert attention somewhat from the Viet Cong munitions ship sunk off the coast of Phu Yen Province. The cargo of this ship furnishes by far the most dramatic evidence of Hanoi involvement yet uncovered in the war. An incomplete count of the cargo and nearby caches indicates that some 4,000 weapons, large quantities of ammunition and some 500 pounds of medicines were captured. The weapons and ammunitions were [from] the USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Communist China; Hanoi packing slips were found in the medical containers, which include supplies manufactured in North Vietnam, the USSR, Communist China, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Japan. This discovery is particularly timely in terms of justifying the US/GVN air strikes against North Vietnamese military targets.

Viet Cong activity was down during the week but pacification conditions remain unsatisfactory in many provinces, particularly in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. The deteriorating security situation in this latter area has required a cut back in our economic programs, since USOM representatives are generally unable to leave the principal towns. We can hardly expect to reverse the situation in central Vietnam until the Quat government is able to increase its operational military and paramilitary strength.

Taylor

 

155. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/

Saigon, February 23, 1965, 8:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Repeated to CJCS, the White House, and the Department of State. Received in the National Military Command Center at 1:52 p.m.

MAC JOO 5633. Personal for Adm Sharp and Gen Wheeler from Westmoreland. A. MACV 5515, DTG 220743Z Feb./2/ B. Embtel Saigon to JCS 473, 22 Feb./3/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 153.

/3/Document 153.

1. Reference A recommends MEB (minus) tailored to security requirements at Da Nang be deployed on phased basis as soon as political clearance is obtained. Reference B states Amb Taylor would be willing to recommend placing a Marine BLT at Da Nang.

2. In view of the great importance of the Da Nang air base to current U.S. strategy, augmentation of U.S. security forces is desirable soonest. Before the Marine engineers can start preparations for Hawk battery on hill 3un [garble] security of site is mandatory. Adequate VN forces are not available for this purpose without detracting from other important missions.

3. To avoid further delay, I recommend at this juncture the immediate deployment of one reinforced BLT augmented by a small headquarters to assume control of all Marines ashore to include MTU 79.3.5 now at Da Nang, the Hawk Battalion, and the BLT. Reinforcement would consist of the helicopter squadron of MEB to provide support for the Marines as well as GVN forces as required.

4. I will review the situation after the deployment of the recommended force and make further recommendations as necessary.

5. Brigadier General Karch of 9th MEB with small staff visited here yesterday and conferred with General Throckmorton and MACV staff and subsequently made reconnaissance at Da Nang. He is developing a tailored force to meet minimum requirements. Information will be forwarded after review.

 

156. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, February 23, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan.-Mar. 1965. Top Secret.

FRENCH DISCUSSIONS WITH HANOI AND PEIPING

1. Source of Information. On February 2, the French Foreign Office filled us in on French contacts with Hanoi and Peiping, mostly in Paris, but on one occasion in Peiping. A similar fill-in was given on February 17, just prior to Couve's departure for Washington, and this covered Couve's talk with the ChiCom Ambassador on February 13, to which Couve referred in his talk with the President on February 19th. The reporting cables are Paris 4295, 4390, 4445, and 4692,/2/ as supplemented by Couve's talk with the President./3/

/2/All four cables are ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.

/3/See Document 144.

We have no information of any other French contacts with either Communist country in recent months. Our supposition is that the French have informed us fully, although there are significant differences in interpretation from one French talk with us to another. Notably, Couve in his talk with the President was much more optimistic about ChiCom views than the French Foreign Office source who reported to us separately on the same February 13 conversation.

2. Dates and Places of Contact. The French talked in Paris with the Hanoi economic delegate, Bo, on December 22 and January 20. They have talked to the ChiComs in Paris on December 17, January 15 and 25, and February 13, and the French Ambassador in Peiping talked to ChiCom Foreign Minister Chen Yi on January 9.

3. French Talks with Hanoi. The French have put three questions:

a. Would Hanoi accept and join in guarantees for a neutral and completely independent South Viet-Nam?

b. Would Hanoi agree to knock off political and military subversion in South Viet-Nam?

c. Would Hanoi accept some control mechanism more serious and with wider checks than the present ICC?

The French have reported that Bo showed considerable interest in a and c but was evasive on b.

As to a, Bo was quoted as saying that such a settlement would require bilateral negotiations and the resumption of relations between the two Viet-Nams, as well as wider international guarantees and a control mechanism.

As to b, Bo has refused to admit Hanoi's activities in South Viet-Nam, but has said that "what was needed was an honorable compromise based on real forces present in Viet-Nam." For some reason, the French interpret this statement--which would seem much more likely to mean legalization of the Liberation Front--to indicate some sympathy with a bilateral withdrawal of external forces from South Viet-Nam as the basis for settlement.

The Hanoi representative has at no time stated that he was speaking on instructions from Hanoi. The French have pressed him for an official statement of Hanoi's position, but he has not produced it. The French Foreign Office, in its last briefing to us, nonetheless believes (for some unstated reason) that Hanoi in fact approved Bo's replies on points a (affirmative but general) and c (affirmative but avoiding any specifics). The last French report on February 17 indicated that the French Foreign Office "believes further clarification Hanoi position required."

It is extremely hard to make anything of Bo's reported comments. The lack of Hanoi express authority for his statements, plus the fact that there have been no reported contacts since February 7 and 11, make the reading from these contacts extremely obscure at this time. It certainly cannot be said that the contacts--which were apparently at French initiative--have produced any serious indication of Hanoi's attitude or terms. Nonetheless, because of their interpretation of Bo's statements, as indicated above, the French have told us they think Hanoi's position is somewhat more forthcoming than Peiping's.

4. French Talks with Peiping. The French have stated that these were initiated by the Chinese.

Initially, the ChiCom representative called for a unilateral withdrawal of the US from South Viet-Nam as the only basis for settlement. They also attacked the position the US had taken in the Warsaw Talks as purely propagandistic.

On January 15, the ChiCom representative, on instruction from Peiping, had asked whether France would assume a more active role in Viet-Nam and would approach the US with a view to discussing a negotiated settlement. In both of the first talks, the French put to the ChiCom representative the same three questions they had addressed to the Hanoi representative. The ChiComs had evaded any precise reply to these, and the conversation since then has apparently revolved around whether there might be a reconvened conference and whether any preconditions were required for this purpose.

On this point, in the January 15 conference the ChiComs allegedly did not reject the idea of a conference but said that US bellicosity and desire to extend the war made it impossible to propose a conference. (They also complained of the Korean troops going to SVN.)

On February 13, the ChiCom Ambassador--to Couve--pointed to the US attacks as showing US bellicosity and contradicting the French assurance that the US did not wish to extend the war.

Couve replied that the French still thought a conference should be convened without prior conditions and that its first task should be a cease-fire. The ChiCom Ambassador allegedly responded "positively" but went on to say that the US had now introduced a new element by attacking North Viet-Nam and that a halt to this aggression constituted a new prior condition for a conference.

The French believe that the ChiComs were thus moving away from their propaganda position that there must be a total US withdrawal from SVN before negotiation. (This same theme was apparently covered between the French Ambassador and Chen Yi on January 9, in which Chen Yi had said that such a total US withdrawal was not a prior condition to negotiation but might be a goal thereof.)

In summary there has been no Chinese response to the basic three points, and it is by no means clear that the ChiComs are not insisting on a cessation of attacks on the DRV as a precondition to any conference. In his talk with the President, Couve said that the ChiCom Ambassador could hardly have been expected to agree verbally with the French position for a conference without preconditions, and Couve seems to draw the conclusion that the ChiComs would in fact now accept a conference. However, it seems absolutely clear that their objective in such a conference would be, at a minimum, to obtain total US withdrawal from SVN, and there is no indication in any of the French contacts with the ChiComs that they even admit North Viet-Nam's role or would set up its cessation as an acceptable quid pro quo for US withdrawal. The Chinese position, as stated to the French, seems to be that we must stop attacking the DRV before there can be any negotiation, and that we must agree, in any negotiation, to get out of SVN. This is hardly a very promising or forthcoming position!

5. References to US Position. The French tell us that they have not purported to speak for the US in any of these contacts. However, they have made clear to our Embassy that they believe they understand the US position correctly, as being acceptable to a neutral SVN with adequate assurances and solid guarantees. Prior to the two most recent Chicom contacts, the French indicated that they had read with great care the reference to negotiations in Mr. William Bundy's speech of January 23./4/ Since this may now be the basis of French representation of US views, the relevant paragraph is as follows:

/4/See footnote 2, Document 48.

"As to the basic alternatives, so long as South Viet-Nam is ready to carry on the fight, withdrawal is unthinkable. A negotiation that produced a return to the essentials of the 1954 Accords and thus an independent and secure South Viet-Nam would of course be an answer, indeed the answer. But negotiation would hardly be promising that admitted Communism to South Viet-Nam, that did not get Hanoi out, or that exposed South Viet-Nam and perhaps other countries of the area to renewed Communist aggression at will, with only nebulous or remote guarantees."

 

157. Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, February 23, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX. Top Secret. The source text is not signed and includes no drafting information, but in a memorandum transmitting it to President Johnson on February 23, Bromley Smith stated: "Secretary Rusk was reading from this paper during the meeting with you this afternoon." Rusk, together with NcNamara, Ball, William Bundy, and Thompson, met with the President from 5:30 p.m. to 6:23 p.m. on February 23. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the discussion has been found, but see footnote 1, Document 158, for more information on the meeting. The source text bears an indication that the President read it.

VIET NAM

It seems desirable and timely for me to put down an outline of my own thinking about a comprehensive approach to our effort to assure the security of South Viet Nam. I am convinced that there is no single miracle-working approach which can get the job done. I am convinced that it would be disastrous for the United States and the free world to permit Southeast Asia to be overrun by the Communist North. I am also convinced that everything possible should be done to throw back the Hanoi-Viet Cong aggression without a major war if possible. We cannot accomplish this result without the risk of major escalation; but the other side, too, must face and worry about the same risk.

I. Stable and Unified Government in South Viet Nam

The highest possible priority must be given by us and the South Vietnamese to the establishment of a government and leadership which not only is stable but looks stable. Without the elementary platform, other efforts in the military and political field are likely to prove fruitless. Political confusion in Saigon (a) diverts military leaders away from their main job of fighting the Viet Cong, (b) undermines the capacity of administration throughout the country to take effective action in pacification and the non-military measures required to organize the countryside, (c) undermines the morale and sense of purpose of the American people, (d) frustrates our effort to obtain increasing help from other free world countries to South Viet Nam, (e) most important of all, convinces Hanoi and its Communist allies that if they persist in their present course of action, they have every prospect of victory, and (f) finally, political confusion in Saigon makes it almost impossible to activate political processes which have the prospect of resulting in the security of South Viet Nam.

It is not easy to prescribe from Washington what further steps the United States can take to bring about greater unity and stability in the GVN. If General Khanh does in fact leave the country, it would be timely for Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland to interview all of the principal political and military leaders and to obtain from them a pledge to demonstrate both publicly and in their actions that, at long last, they are prepared to put aside personal rivalries and work together for the security of South Viet Nam. Every effort should be made to obtain public declarations of support from any and all of the existing non-governmental groups, including Buddhists, Catholics, labor, students, business, or anyone else whose voice can add to a chorus of unified determination.

II. Increased Effort by the South Vietnamese

The gravity of the present situation in South Viet Nam, as well as the gravity of the decisions with which the United States is faced, calls for maximum effort on the part of the South Vietnamese. The slightest acceptance of a "business as usual" situation is not consistent with the possibility of an explosion into larger hostilities nor with the experience of other guerrilla actions in Greece, Malaysia and elsewhere. Apart from the governmental question, discussed above, the South Vietnamese should undertake (a) additional measures of mobilization, (b) the organization of the civilian population into a pacification effort, with emphasis upon information and intelligence, (c) vigorous execution by the South Vietnamese of agreed psychological warfare programs, on which the South Vietnamese have been dilatory and ineffective, (d) sharply increased international diplomatic and political effort, (e) intensified military and pacification effort on the basis of a 24-hour day and 7-day week. It should be made clear that intensified South Vietnamese efforts should not be limited by budgetary considerations or US financial and material support.

III. US Effort in South Viet Nam

We ourselves should consider whether there are additional steps which we ought to take in South Viet Nam. Apart from the political results which increased efforts might achieve, we should think of the importance of conveying a signal to Hanoi and Peiping that they themselves cannot hope to succeed without a substantial escalation on their part, with all of the risks which they would have to face. I would favor the immediate stationing in Da Nang of a Marine battalion combat team, to be reinforced promptly to a brigade if the security situation calls for it. I would also favor the use of US Naval forces, particularly destroyers, to reinforce counter-junk operations and to ensure that there are no repetitions of seaborne Viet Cong supply similar to the recent ship discovered in Vung Ro Bay. US destroyers could assist GVN junks and other craft in systematic surveillance of those portions of the seacoast not securely in government hands. They could act as command ships for flotillas of smaller craft to intensify and tighten surveillance of junk traffic coming both from the North and Cambodia. Our military authorities should be asked to be certain that every possible step is being taken for the security of key installations, such as intensive patrolling and the dispersal of the living quarters of American personnel. The military should be asked to look again at the applicability of our most sophisticated conventional weapons, some of which are still highly classified and have not been used. We should continue to permit US aircraft of all types to engage in direct action against the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam./2/

/2/On February 24, the Embassy in Saigon issued a statement announcing a strike that day by U.S. jet aircraft from Bien Hoa and Da Nang, at the request of the South Vietnamese Government, against Viet Cong forces in the mountain pass between An Khe and Pleiku in South Vietnam. (Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1965, pp. 371-372) In a February 25 memorandum to Reedy, Cooper provided background information on the use of the U.S. jet aircraft, pointing out that this was the first time that U.S. jets had been used for something other than reconnaissance in South Vietnam. (Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312)

IV. Strikes into North Viet Nam

For the present, strikes into North Viet Nam should be considered as serving the political purpose of indicating to the North that they cannot expect to rely upon a sanctuary in the face of their increased infiltration and operations in South Viet Nam.

In this respect, they play their part alongside of MAROPS and our air missions in Laos. The more air strikes against North Viet Nam can be directly linked to specific events in South Viet Nam, the better from a general political point of view. If, at a given moment, there are political reasons for deferring a strike (such as political confusion in Saigon or a major international political contact), we should not bind ourselves to a specific schedule. A strike directly related to the full examination of the evidence of the ship at Vung Ro Bay would involve smaller political difficulties than one not so related. To the extent that strikes can be specifically related to events in South Viet Nam, the responsibility for major escalation will continue to rest with the other side.

V. Political Possibilities

Obviously, the United States should be ready to take advantage of any political possibility of bringing the fighting in Southeast Asia to an end consistent with the security of South Viet Nam and of Laos. The international political objective should be to bring about a cessation of infiltration and the repatriation of those previously infiltrated. This would include, of course, assured compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos. Negotiation as a cover for the abandonment of Southeast Asia to the Communist North cannot be accepted. This is a weakness of President de Gaulle's attitude. A formal and public negotiation at this time which would simply register the impossibility of a peaceful settlement would add even greater dangers to the present situation. Our problem is to bring about a combination of circumstances in which negotiations can achieve the abandonment of aggression by Hanoi and Peiping. We have no reliable evidence that Hanoi and Peiping are prepared for any such result. The attitude of the Soviet Union is somewhat more equivocal and it should be a major effort on our part to keep the Soviet Union from complete solidarity with Hanoi and Peiping about Southeast Asia. I will discuss orally the various contacts and possibilities as they shape up at the present time.

VI. Reiteration of Policy

There is some danger that protracted periods of silence on our part can lead to an impression either of indecision or of discouragement and nervousness. Although the essential elements of our policy have been stated many times, reiteration is necessary to remind public opinion here and abroad of the essentials as we see them. I would consider these essentials to be the following:

(1) The right of the nations of Southeast Asia to be left alone by their neighbors to work out their own national life and their own international policy without interference by others;

(2) The systematic and large-scale infiltration of trained personnel by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam contrary to the Geneva Agreements and international law;

(3) The large scale and illegal infiltration of arms by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam;

(4) The absence of any US desire for a national military presence in Southeast Asia, whether in the form of bases or in the form of the continuing presence of American military personnel;

(5) Our commitment to the settlements of 1954 and 1962;

(6) The absence of any desire on our part to destroy by military means the regimes in North Viet Nam or Mainland China;

(7) Our receptivity to political action which would achieve a result consistent with these essential elements./3/

/3/Rusk restated these points in greater detail at a news conference on February 25. For text of his statement as well as a transcript of the question and answer period which followed, some of which dealt with Vietnam, see Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1965, pp. 362-371.

 

158. Memorandum From the Office of Current Intelligence to Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/

OCI No. 0930/65

Washington, February 23, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 29. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Rusk called McCone at 1 p.m. on February 23 and told him that, in anticipation of a meeting the President might call that afternoon, a "wrap up" was needed of any evidence regarding Hanoi's and Beijing's interest in negotiating a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict. McCone called Rusk back at 5:07 p.m. to tell him that CIA had produced a memorandum but it was still in draft form. Rusk asked McCone to get it to Bromley Smith's office right away, since the President was holding a meeting on that subject at 5:30 p.m. McCone replied that he might not get it there by then and summarized the memorandum's principal conclusion. Whether a copy reached the White House in time for the meeting has not been determined. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) For more information on the meeting, see footnote 1, Document 157.

THE CURRENT POSITION OF HANOI AND PEIPING ON A
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM

1. According to press reports from Paris the Vietnamese Communists have recently urged the French to step up their efforts aimed at arranging a negotiated settlement of the war in South Vietnam. These accounts are probably leaks of discussions between French officials and Asian Communist representatives which began in December and continued on into February.

2. Our only information concerning these talks is what the French have chosen to tell us. This has been short on specifics and long on speculation. We have seen nothing in Communist statements or in Communist behavior which would support the contention that either Hanoi or Peiping is interested in a conference solution except on its own terms.

3. All indications are that the DRV is no more flexible now than it ever was in regard to a negotiated settlement. On 10 February Hanoi specifically reiterated its standard demands, stressing the two key concepts on which the Communists have always insisted--the necessity for withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam and the initiation of bilateral negotiations between the Communist Liberation Front (NLSV) and the government in Saigon. DRV officials, moreover, have privately taken the same line in conversations with Western diplomats in Hanoi.

4. The DRV's terms which have not changed substantially since they were first put forward in 1963, include:

A. Withdrawal of US military personnel and equipment is a precondition for any serious negotiations.

B. The South Vietnamese government must abide by the military provisions of the Geneva agreements: refrain from any military alliances, permit no foreign military bases or foreign military personnel in South Vietnam.

C. The South Vietnamese people must be permitted to settle their internal affairs without outside interference in accordance with the program of the Front. This is interpreted as the formulation of a coalition government with Front participation.

D. Consultation must take place between the two zones looking toward eventual reunification.

E. As of July 1964 Hanoi has included as a further condition an end to US "provocations" against DRV territory.

5. The recent activities of North Vietnamese agents in Paris suggest Hanoi is seeking to stimulate French pressure for a US withdrawal as the first step toward a negotiated settlement of the "impasse" in Indochina. These maneuvers by the Communists appear designed mainly to encourage opposition in France and elsewhere in the Free World to continued prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong and to possible further US attacks against the DRV.

6. Such motives were suggested by the North Vietnamese response to French initiatives during the Paris conversations. Although there was no give in the position taken by the DRV representative, he stressed an interest in continuing the discussions, doubtless with a view to keeping French hopes for a negotiated settlement alive. Similar objectives probably lie behind the recent propaganda from Hanoi, which has reported without comment the substance of French and Cambodian calls for a new international conference on Indochina. There is, however, no evidence available to us that the North Vietnamese are giving serious consideration to a conference.

7. The Chinese have consistently backed Hanoi's hard line concerning negotiations and do not appear interested, at this time, even in the kind of talks which might be exploited under some circumstances to give Communist forces a breathing space.

8. The Chinese Communists are almost certainly optimistic concerning developments in South Vietnam. The conversations initiated by the Chinese in Paris were apparently designed to obtain a better reading on these questions, and at the same time to stimulate new French pressure on the US to withdraw quietly from the "hopeless" impasse in Indochina. In this endeavor Peiping is playing skillfully on French ambitions for a larger role in Southeast Asia as mediators of the Sino-US conflict.

9. The remarks of the Chinese Charge in Paris, as reported by the French, make it clear that Peiping--like Hanoi--has no desire for any agreement except on Communist terms. The Chinese continue to insist that a unilateral US withdrawal is the only basis for settlement.

10. Peiping's latest public statement on the question of possible negotiations ridicules the idea of talks. A key paragraph of the People's Daily editorial on 19 February claims that the US is hoping to gain at the conference table what it cannot win on the battlefield and then dismisses the notion as "too much wishful thinking." The Chinese go on to say that peace can be had in Vietnam at any time but only after the "US aggressors have withdrawn" to permit the people in Vietnam to "settle their own problems."

 

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 23, 1965, 9:47 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved by Rusk.

1805. Subject to final execute instruction tomorrow, we believe next strike should take place Feb 26/2/ and that you should seek political clearance Feb 25.

/2/This planned strike was designated Rolling Thunder IV.

We believe departure of Khanh essential before either clearance or strike and that Saigon situation generally should appear to have settled down as completely as possible. In this connection it would be a great help if generals and Quat, with other leaders if possible, could join in statements of solidarity and resolve to prosecute war firmly. We are also concerned over possibility Buddhist demonstrations or other action contributing to picture of unsettled situation.

You will get through military channels suggestions to have operation consist of two naval targets, one to be struck by VNAF and one by US./3/ This is to focus operation heavily on boat incident although we agree with your excellent suggested draft release/4/ stressing other VC operations also as warranting response. FYI: One object in stressing naval rationale is to reduce risks serious flare-back on gambit described Deptel 1783,/5/ which remains active. As you can see, this gambit continues to have great broad policy importance. Secrecy on it remains essential, although stories today from London have given us grave concern whether it can be preserved. End FYI.

/3/Not further identified.

/4/The Embassy's proposed text of a press release was transmitted in telegram 2710 from Saigon, February 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

/5/Document 150.

In response to concerns Embtel 2706/6/ (which we did not pass to other addressees as they had not received our 1718 and 1724)/7/ you are correct that we have been reconsidering sequence and forum of public statement and presentation of case against DRV. Not clear yet just how these will work, and we hope for clearer picture by tomorrow. In any case, developments do not yet warrant any new statement to Quat other than to say that we still contemplate public statement our purposes and objectives and also presentation of case, but timing on these not yet firm.

/6/In telegram 2706, February 23, Taylor reported that it appeared from recent Department of State cables that the U.S. Government was considering modifying the procedures agreed for the previously planned Rolling Thunder missions regarding the announcement of the strikes and the raising of Hanoi's aggression in the U.N. Security Council. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S)

/7/Documents 115 and 117.

Let me take this opportunity to congratulate you, along with Alex, Westmoreland, and your whole mission, on your expert handling of the recent semi-coup. It had all sorts of dangers whether US hand might be charged, and Thao and his friends certainly did their best to implicate us. But we seem to have come out relatively untouched, and perhaps the results will be for the best./8/

/8/In telegram 1815 to Saigon, February 24, the Department of State instructed Taylor to seek political clearance on February 25 for an air strike against North Vietnam on February 26. In telegram 5327 to London, February 24, the Department informed Ambassador Bruce of this decision and also indicated that Ambassador Harlech had been informed of the decision earlier that day. Both telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Bad weather, however, forced further postponement of this first Rolling Thunder mission.

Rusk

[end document]

Continue:
Initiation of a program of air strikes against North Vietnam;
Introduction of U.S. ground combat forces,
February 11-March 8
Documents 160 through 170