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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

160. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 24, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, CO 312. Confidential. Copy sent to McGeorge Bundy.

Pursuant to our discussion Friday/2/ about our psychological program in Viet Nam and the question of whether an outside observer like Frank Stanton should have a look at it , I wish to cite a few points that may help you to decide your next step.

/2/On Friday, February 19, Rowan met alone with President Johnson from 6:05 to 6:44 p.m. No other record of the discussion has been found. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

1. First, let me say that we in the Agency would welcome a look at the situation by Stanton. We believe that the program we have developed in the last year is quite impressive--still, we welcome any fresh ideas as to how we might better do the job.

2. Having said this, let me emphasize quickly that efforts to develop among the South Vietnamese people a sense of national unity and a determination to fight off Communist aggression, have not progressed to my satisfaction. As you know so well, this kind of psychological operation cannot be divorced from other problems there such as:

a. Shortcomings in the pacification program and the failure to give lasting physical protection to the villagers we are urging to be brave;

b. The continuing political turmoil that leaves us uncertain as to whom we work with and the Vietnamese people confused as to who constitutes the government we are asking them to rally 'round;

c. Or the widespread notion, voiced even by U.S. congressmen, that we are waging a futile effort in Viet Nam.

3. Despite these difficulties, we have made some psychological headway during the past year, particularly in the Hop Tac areas. Given any degree of political stability in the next year, and barring severe military defeats for our side, I believe our projected program is such that we can anticipate a further significant increase in unity and will-to-win on the part of the Vietnamese.

The Viet Nam Coordinating Committee has discussed thoroughly all the areas where U.S.-GVN programs might be strengthened. It has decided that a working team, including a USIA representative, should go to Viet Nam soon to effect whatever improvements are possible.

4. I mentioned to you Friday such things as my having almost doubled my American staff and reallocated an extra million dollars to the Viet Nam psychological program since I was there 10 months ago. You may be interested in the following brief summary of what we have built in the way of organization in that time:

Under the U.S. Mission Council in Viet Nam there is a Mission Psychological Operations Committee which has representation from all U.S. agencies in Viet Nam and is chaired by the USIS Country Public Affairs Officer, Barry Zorthian. A country-wide psychological operations committee has existed for some time in the Vietnamese Government but has not functioned with full effectiveness due to the continuing political turmoil. In some provinces, however, we have built local structures for waging psychological warfare, and these can now move ahead if there is a reasonable degree of political and military stability.

Under the U.S. Psychological Operations Committee is a Joint Field Services Center, housed at USIS and composed of personnel of USIS, USOM and MACV. In the Field Services Center are thirteen USIS Americans, two USOM employees, five MACV military personnel and seventy Vietnamese employees of USIS (twenty-three of these Vietnamese employees are stationed in provincial offices of the Vietnamese Information Service).

MACV has a total of approximately seventy American military personnel engaged directly in psychological operations and civic action--working under general policy and strategy developed by USIA. More than forty of the MACV Psychological Operations Civil Affairs Officers are stationed full-time in the various provinces. Others serve at division, corps and Saigon level.

In addition to the USIS personnel directly engaged in field operations, five USIS Americans and 57 Vietnamese USIS employees are engaged in producing such products as films, publications and leaflets designed for Vietnamese rural audiences.

Also, 51 third-country personnel, including Filipinos, Chinese and Australians, are engaged in operations closely related to the aforementioned activities. Their work includes civic action, political warfare and radio broadcasting.

One of the most significant developments in recent months has been the formation of Provincial Psychological Operations Committees. Usually chaired by the provincial governors themselves, these committees usually have USOM (AID), MACV and, where possible, USIS representation.

5. Of course, numbers and statistics are not so important as the ideas and their implementation. I am attaching for your perusal USIS Saigon's field message no. 35 of January 26, 1965,/3/ which illustrates some of the ideas and imagination going into the psychological effort. I have underlined some of the more important points.

/3/Attached, but not printed.

6. You asked me who in USIA might go with Stanton to Viet Nam. I believe he should be accompanied by Jim Tull of my staff. Tull is a real expert on Viet Nam who has inspected our operation several times and knows well the strengths and weaknesses of the psychological campaign.

Incidentally, I weighed seriously your good and friendly advice and decided to cancel the trip to Africa. Should you decide not to send Stanton to Viet Nam, I think I should have another look at the situation there myself. I believe I should spend a day at the Far East ambassadorial conference (March 9), talking to our ambassadors about USIA programs and problems in such places as Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, and go on to Saigon for a few days.

Please have me informed at your earliest convenience of your decision regarding Stanton in order that we might assist him to the fullest extent. No one believes more strongly than I that USIA must make a major contribution if we are to succeed in this grim effort, and we do not want to miss any opportunity.

Carl T. Rowan

 

161. Editorial Note

At a press conference on February 24, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant intimated that the U.S. Government was hiding from the American people the truth about the possibility of a negotiated peace in Vietnam. For an extract from the press conference transcript, as well as extracts from a transcript of a subsequent White House news conference at which questions were raised about U Thant's comments, see The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, volume VIII, pages 663-664. The full transcripts are in Princeton University, Stevenson Papers, Box 906, Press Conferences 1965. At 6:30 p.m., February 24, Secretary of State Rusk telephoned the Deputy Representative to the United Nations, Charles Yost (Adlai Stevenson was in Jamaica); see Document 162. At approximately 10 that evening, Rusk called the Secretary-General, apparently at the latter's home, and said that "there had been quite a reaction in Washington to the Secretary General's implication that the truth was being withheld from the American people." Among other things, Rusk told U Thant that his proposals for talks with the North Vietnamese had been "procedural" rather than "substantive." A memorandum of this telephone conversation is in The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, volume VIII, pages 664-665.

In telegram 2083 to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, February 25, the Department of State instructed Yost to call on U Thant that morning and provided the points that Rusk wanted him to raise. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram UNMIS 21, February 25, Yost reported on the conversation with U Thant (Document 164).

After Stevenson returned from Jamaica, the Department of State, in telegram 2114 to the U.S. Mission, February 26, instructed him to raise with U Thant the following day the matter of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. (Ibid.) A memorandum of Stevenson's conversation with U Thant on February 27, with Yost and Bunche also attending, is in The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, volume VIII, pages 717-722. Stevenson's memorandum of March 1, which was sent either to the President or the Secretary of State and in which he recommended the beginning of negotiations in the near future "if they can be arranged without unacceptable preconditions" is printed ibid., pages 722-724.

 

162. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Deputy Representative to the United Nations (Yost)/1/

February 24, 1965, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls. No classification marking. Prepared by Procter. Rusk was in Washington; Yost was in New York. For related information, see Document 161.

TELEPHONE CALL TO AMB. YOST, USUN

Sec said he would appreciate it if Y could make a quiet but prompt call on the SYG and make the following points: 1) we have followed with great interest all indications we have had from Hanoi and Peiping through many channels in addition to their public broadcasts and we do not yet see any indication on their side privately or otherwise that a political channel can be used to bring about the security and safety and peace of these nations of Southeast Asia; 2) any idea that the US should withdraw must be linked with the cessation of infiltration from the North and a withdrawal of infiltrated personnel that the North has sent in to South Viet Nam; this is fundamental, otherwise it would leave the countries of Southeast Asia at the mercy of the Communists; 3) there is no possibility of negotiations the object of which is to have the US withdraw and leave those countries to be overrun by the north; 4) a public negotiation which fails is an exceedingly dangerous development in the situation; therefore there is a real point in quiet diplomacy to ascertain whether any possibility of success exists; 5) this is relevant to his calling a meeting of the Powers in Geneva; it could be very dangerous if there is not sufficient preparatory work; 6) we cannot undertake direct, bilateral contact with Hanoi; we could not do it without the knowledge of our friends in Southeast Asia; there was no indication such contacts would produce results; we do not believe direct contact is desirable or contributes to peace. Y said he would ask what he could do. Sec said if he feels as SYG he wants to try to find out whether Hanoi is prepared to accept the publicly stated American view that our presence there is solely a result of the infiltration of men and material from North to South Viet Nam and if this can be stopped, American forces would go home--he could explore on his behalf but not on ours. Sec said to emphasize very strongly that the idea of American withdrawal in the absence of cessation of this aggression is out of the question. Y will do that. Sec said we were not looking for a face saver; we are looking for the security of 100 small nations around the world including his own of Burma; if he feels as SYG by quiet diplomacy he can find out something, ok. Y said he would see him early tomorrow morning or will try tonight.

(Y's office called back to say SYG had left for home and Y would see him first thing in the morning, about 10 am.)

 

163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 25, 1965, 5:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Unger, cleared in substance by Wheeler, McNaughton, Cooper, Stoneman, and Bunce of USIA, and approved by Rusk and William Bundy.

1820. For Ambassador and Alex Johnson from Bundy. As you are aware there is intense interest at highest levels here in maximizing effectiveness pacification program./2/ Regardless of what is accomplished with reference to North Viet Nam and infiltration problem, peace and independence will be secured in South Viet-Nam only through pacification, and there is concern here, which I am sure you share, that in some aspects program falling short of goals. Concepts and definitions forwarded airgram 602/3/ provide us with useful picture Mission thinking and we have also reviewed problem here on interagency basis and are pouching to you questions and proposals for your consideration developed by interagency/group.

/2/See paragraph 2a, Document 131.

/3/Dated February 5, airgram 602 forwarded 15 copies of the U.S. Mission Council-approved "Concept of Pacification and Certain Definitions and Procedures." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Unfortunately McGeorge Bundy visit too brief to permit full examination this problem although it was their conclusion that pacification program requires strengthening, particularly at margin between military action and civilian programs, i.e. in strengthening and closely gearing together security actions, civil affairs and civic action by MACV and RVNAF on one hand and police, provincial operations and economic and social programs by USOM and Ministries on the other. On basis interagency study here we also concerned over gap in pacification process following end of strictly military program and resumption regular civil government. Study also brought out questions concerning selection and training of pacification cadres; adequacy of Vietnamese comprehension of pacification and supporting US programs and objectives; need to assure prompt and flexible funding for province pacification activities; need for maximum of initiative and decision at province level to permit exploiting special opportunities (such as strong province chiefs and secure areas) and adapting to non-typical circumstances; taking full advantage special groups like students, montagnards, religious organizations, labor; etc. You undoubtedly have much longer list of questions and can probably also dispel what may be our misconceptions of incomplete understanding within this highly complicated and crucial field of activity. I feel we should periodically assure we are moving in step.

With this in mind I would like your views on the desirability of my taking several days on my trip en route to Baguio/4/ to consult with you on pacification program. To facilitate our discussion questions and proposals mentioned above are being pouched. Would it also be useful if I were preceded by small interagency team to prepare ground for our discussions and assure follow-up in each agency in Washington? Alternatively would you prefer to defer visit such team and leave decision on this to be made during my visit?

/4/A Far East ambassadorial conference was scheduled to meet at Baguio in the Philippines on March 9.

Rusk

 

164. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/

New York, February 25, 1965, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret.

UNMIS 21. For Cleveland only. From Yost. Ref: Deptel 2083./2/ At meeting this morning at which only SYG, Bunche and Yost were present, latter read full text of instructions with occasional appropriate comment, particularly emphasizing points made in paragraph one. Thereafter, SYG launched into following lengthy explanation of his position.

/2/See Document 161.

He said he had been reading carefully and regularly since 1963 Hanoi broadcasts as reported in USG publication. From these broadcasts he had become convinced that Hanoi was ready to talk peace with US, that it was closer to Moscow than to Peking, and that, indeed, though having to take account of geography, it was clearly not pro-Peking.

His first piece of advice to US had been after Diem ouster when he had suggested to Stevenson that US encourage formation in South Vietnam of broad-based government which would include certain Vietnamese leaders in exile, for the most part in Paris. He had never had any reply to this suggestion and did not know whether US had endeavored to follow it.

His second step had been taken last year when he had become convinced that the situation was deteriorating seriously and that the longer it deteriorated the more likely it was that the Communists would take over South Vietnam. At that time the Hanoi radio was still indicating willingness to negotiate.

He had asked Hanoi through the Soviets whether they would negotiate directly and privately with US. To his surprise, Hanoi had promptly replied in the affirmative. SYG had communicated this fact to Stevenson, emphasizing his belief that we should explore means of drawing Hanoi further away from Peking, taking advantage in this respect of Moscow/Peking rift.

Stevenson had subsequently inquired at what place and at what level these contacts should occur, if we should be disposed to pursue them. As to place, SYG had suggested various alternatives, including Cambodia and Pakistan, but had recommended Rangoon, since both US and DRV had diplomatic representation there. He had sounded out the Burmese Govt as to whether it would offer necessary facilities and GOB had replied it would be happy to do so. This he had passed to Stevenson in Dec./3/

/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 427.

In January Stevenson had resumed conversation, pointing out great difficulty of US negotiating with DRV without RVN participating. SYG had recognized cogency of this objection but had nevertheless felt that some risks must be taken, that time is wasting and that Hanoi might change its mind about negotiations at all. As alternative to bilateral negotiation, and also to full-scale Geneva conference, they had discussed possibility of meeting of five great powers plus two Vietnams. SYG himself thought this was an excellent idea and suggested Geneva as appropriate locus. He had, however, had hitherto no reply from Washington to this suggestion, and meanwhile, of course, Hanoi radio had become much more militant./4/

/4/See Document 145.

Subsequently, he had through Lord Caradon sent message to Prime Minister Wilson informing latter of his suggestion of bilateral, and later of 5-plus-2 negotiations, and asking Wilson to use his good offices in Washington to bring about acceptance of this idea. He presumed Wilson had raised problem in Washington though he did not know in what form. SYG had also discussed question of negotiations with Couve de Murville during latter's recent visit. Couve had advocated Geneva conference with original composition but SYG said this was impossible and mentioned 5-plus-2 proposal. To this Couve did not comment. (Seydoux subsequently confirmed to Yost that SYG had raised with Couve suggestion of Geneva conference with smaller participation.) SYG added that Couve had expressed opinion that more than half of the population of South Vietnam favors the Viet Cong. Yost contested this vigorously, expressing view that if this were the case South Vietnam would long since have been taken over.

Finally, SYG remarked that he had not mentioned 5-plus-2 idea to Soviets, though they were of course aware of his original idea of bilateral contacts since they had at his request sounded out Hanoi.

SYG concluded his exposition by emphasizing his continued conviction that, while it might already be too late, it is still of utmost importance to find some means of coming to negotiations, first of all because he believes that continuation and escalation of armed conflict will force Moscow to rapprochement with Peking, which would be greatest possible disaster, and second because of his conviction that, on account of highly unstable political situation in South Vietnam, continuance of war will inevitably end in total Communist takeover.

At this juncture Yost repeated several salient points of our assessment of the situation, particularly the fact that we have seen absolutely no sign that Hanoi and Peking are prepared to negotiate in such a way as to take account of security and interest of South Vietnam on the same basis as their own security and interest, or that they have any conception of negotiations other than as a means of facilitating total Communist takeover of South Vietnam. At this point SYG suggested that US prepare proposals or agenda for negotiation, for example, for 5-plus-2 conference, which might be submitted through appropriate intermediary to Hanoi and which would smoke out basis on which they may be prepared to negotiate. SYG said it would not be appropriate for him to put forward any such proposals but implied he would be willing to transmit them as coming from us.

Reverting to SYG press conference, Yost made several efforts to determine what elements of "truth" Thant feels are being withheld from the American public. It was obvious he was embarrassed and unhappy at the reaction which this particular comment of his had provoked. He emphasized he had not meant to accuse the US Govt of withholding info but had merely meant to bring out that in a war situation many elements of truth are ignored or forgotten, such as appeals of Shastri, Ayub, Ne Win and others for negotiations, and such as markedly different way in which Asians and Americans regard many of the questions at issue in this conflict. In other words, it appeared that what he had had in mind was not that facts and background are being withheld from the US public but simply that factors which he considers of utmost importance tend to be swamped and obscured in the volume of day-to-day war news. He admitted that the only "fact" which had not been revealed was Hanoi's private indication to him of its willingness to negotiate bilaterally with US, and that this was largely procedural point since everyone has been aware of their desire for a Geneva conference (without the slightest indication in either case that they are prepared to negotiate even-handed settlement). SYG was relaxed and cordial throughout conversation, obviously firmly attached to basic conceptions on these issues which he has had for many years, but still distressed and embarrassed that what he had said, particularly in regard to "facts" and "truth", had given rise to such deep concern in Washington.

It would appear that SYG considers he has had provisional response to various suggestions he has been making to US in recent months. However, he obviously expects US to continue to consider urgently desirability of early negotiations in one form or another and to hope he may be of service in this connection. The only concrete point on which he might expect some early comment would be whether or not we saw any merit in his idea that we should smoke out Hanoi's intentions by suggesting through him or another intermediary our idea of agenda of meeting in case it should eventually take place.

Subsequently, at SC luncheon, Bunche told Yost that he and SYG had discussed the matter further after Yost's departure and had come to the tentative conclusion that it would be desirable to issue to the press this afternoon clarification of those of SYG's remarks which had caused most concern in Washington. Yost said he thought this would be most helpful and further indicated to Bunche his personal view that SYG's ill-considered public comments on Vietnam risk undermining his and UN's possible usefulness in later stages of this problem. Bunche fully agreed. He later drafted press clarification for SYG and accepted several modifications which Yost proposed./5/

/5/Printed from an unsigned copy.

 

165. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 25, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memorandum of Meetings with the President. Secret. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office.

SUBJECT
Discussion with President Johnson, Thursday evening, from 6:15 p.m. for about 10 minutes

1. I handed President Johnson and briefly discussed the following:

a. Memorandum dated February 25th concerning attitude of Hanoi and Peiping towards negotiations./2/ I stated our opinion was that both Communist China and NVN would, under current circumstances and conditions, enter negotiations only on their terms. Moscow on the other hand seemed to have a more lenient approach, as reported by the French, largely through the press.

/2/Apparently a reference to Document 158.

b. Watch Report of February 25th/3/ pointing out the numbered paragraphs concerning indications of Communist movements southward in NVN, movement in Laos, high level of communications, and other indicators. I stated there was a high probability that the NVN, with the VC, were assembling sufficient military strength to cut off the four Northern provinces of SVN. I stated that in June of 1962 Diem and Nhu told me that this was an objective of Hanoi, and for that reason they maintained large forces in the Northern provinces. However, these forces had since been removed because of deterioration in the Delta and other areas of SVN. The President agreed that this seemed to be the objective of the VC and the NVN.

c. Report of February 25th/3/ giving the background of military and political characters remaining in SVN and the status of the various religious sects, political groups, etc. I mentioned considerable suspicion and distrust in Generals Thi and Ky, noting that the former participated in the 1960 coup, fled to Phnom Penh, lived there for three years in close consultation with neutralists and possibly unfriendly forces and, as Commander of the 1st Corps, he was in a most strategic position to collaborate with the VC and NVN in establishing an independent country composed of the four Northern provinces.

/3/Not found.

2. The President asked if Amb. Taylor was fully aware of all of this and I responded that in all probability he was, but I questioned whether he held Ky and Thi in the same suspicion as did I. He then said that it was too bad that Taylor could not "have his own man" running the place.

Action: I would like consideration of a summary of all of the above transmitted to Saigon station with instructions to discuss with Taylor, Johnson and the Country Team. Also, I wish to call attention of McNamara, Vance and Wheeler to all of the above.

3. Prior to this meeting I met privately with Secretary Rusk who was waiting to see the President/4/ and outlined all of the above to him. Rusk took no exception, noted the three documents, and said that he would review them personally with his staff when he returned to his office.

/4/Rusk met with the President at 6:25 p.m. for ten minutes. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

Action: I should call McNamara, Vance and Wheeler concerning the above.

 

166. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, February 26, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX. No classification marking.

Mr. Bundy:

The President asked Henry Cabot Lodge to come in to see him on Friday (for press reasons, Lodge has said he asked to see the President)./2/

/2/Lodge met with the President from 12:30 to 1:15 p.m. on Friday, February 26. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) In a February 25 memorandum to the President, Smith noted that Lodge had been an "advocate of our policy in Vietnam," supporting it recently in a speech in Miami and in interviews in U.S. News & World Report and a French magazine. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX)

During the conversation the President called me, and in Lodge's presence he said that he wanted the proper officials to review with Lodge everything on Vietnam. The President said that Lodge, as a friend and as a former public servant with experience in Vietnam, might have some useful ideas for us to follow up. He suggested that Cooper review the current situation with Ambassador Lodge, and that Lodge also see Mr. McCone, William Bundy, and probably General Goodpaster in Defense. The President said that we should consider him as a Consultant.

I talked to Ambassador Lodge and we have made the following arrangements. We will call him a Presidential Consultant and will pay transportation, per diem, and our maximum WAE of $75 per day. He will return to Washington Monday afternoon (March 1). We will put him in Bob Komer's office so he will have a base of operations. Chet Cooper will lay out his appointments.

Ambassador Lodge's view of his role is that of a person with some experience in Vietnam who, after having read himself into the current situation, might prepare a paper containing his conclusions and recommendations. This paper, if he decides to write one, would conclude his immediate assignment, probably the same week it begins.

The State Department is anxious to have Ambassador Lodge hold General Khanh's hand during the time Khanh is in the U.S. Lodge, an old friend, is anxious to do this and is prepared to have Khanh visit him in Massachusetts for a weekend. He would be quite prepared to do whatever we think would be useful in connection with keeping General Khanh out of trouble during the time he is in the United States.

The attachments/3/ show how the press treated Lodge's conversation with the President.

/3/Not found.

BKS

 

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 26, 1965, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 5:09 a.m.

2767. For Bundy from Ambassador. Deptel 1820./2/ Will be glad to have you visit Saigon at any time, however, we do not feel the need of an interagency team or of an extensive restudy of the theory and practice of pacification at this time. Most of the defects in the pacification program are the result of inadequate security and ineffective government,/3/ and not through a lack of understanding of the requirements of pacification. In other words, our main problem is not theory but execution. All hands here are hard at work trying to get the Quat government in motion and must put first things first in priority of attention. We expect progressively to review and improve methods and procedures of pacification with the new government, bearing in mind the need to avoid interference with on-going programs. We will keep you informed as to our thoughts in this regard.

/2/Document 163.

/3/See Document 172.

In meantime we would be glad to see you here before or after Baguio but I believe you will find your visit here more profitable if you have a look at the entire spectrum of our principal problems.

Taylor

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 26, 1965, 11:52 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Drafted by William Bundy and approved by Rusk.1

1840. Subject to consultations described below, it has been decided/2/ to proceed to land at once MEB command and control element, surface BLT, and one helicopter squadron, and thereafter build up by air and surface movement Marine force by adding second BLT, all in Da Nang area, under terms of reference as indicated in MACV recommendation,/3/ with primary mission of providing security for Da Nang airfield. Execute order will await following consultations.

/2/See Document 170.

/3/See Document 155.

You should consult urgently with Quat, describing proposed deployment and its purposes, and seek his approval and ascertain whether he sees any serious problem. If Quat approves, believe we should also have full understanding and acceptance of Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff, and perhaps most important Thi as Corps commander. All should clearly understand mission, and arrangements with military and particularly Thi should clearly provide for cooperation with local military, leaving them in no doubt this is deployment for a limited purpose and that GVN must continue have full responsibility in pacification program.

Since, assuming GVN concurrence all levels, this will be first US ground deployment of such a unit, request your recommendation as to timing of deployment and form of announcement. Reference to general security duties seems to us best approach, since we do not wish on one hand to give impression pacification mission or on other hand to indicate we alarmed over DaNang security.

We are considering further recommendations for Composite Marine Air Group, third BLT, and remaining elements of tailored MEB, but are deferring decision on these for present.

Rusk

 

169. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 27, 1965, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Tokyo,Vientiane, London, Manila, Seoul, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received in the Department of State at 3:08 a.m.

2780. Embtel 2603./2/ Government of Phan Huy Quat can be characterized as government of "national union" dominated by small, cohesive group of prominent politicians. It is this combination which is new in post-Diem political scene (Khanh's government had broad representation; Huong's government was dominated by tightly knit clique), and which just could provide stimulus to exploit atmosphere created by US/GVN reprisal strikes against DRV.

/2/In telegram 2603, February 15, Taylor reported on a meeting with Khanh in which Khanh commented on a list of proposed cabinet members. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)

Quat government reflects religious, political and regional diversity of Vietnam:

A) Religious--Buddhist (Quat, Do, An, Diem, Thuan); Catholic (Thieu, Hoang, Vinh Tuan); Cao Dai (Tuyen, Hoach); Hoa Hao (To).

B) Political--Dai Viet (Quat, Hy, Diem (northern); Thieu (southern); VNQDD--Tuyen (northern); Hiep (southern).

C) Regional--northern (Tuyen, Diem, Hy, Kien, Hong); Center (Quat, Thuan, Anh, Thieu); southern (Do, Hoach, Hiep, An, Nguyen).

Government, however, is dominated by small group of prominent politicians (Quat, Do, Tuyen, Diem and Thuan) which is heavily weighted in favor of Centrists, northerners and Buddhists, and is unanimous in its "anti-Diemism." As far as we can determine, this group coalesced last fall in effort to form lay Buddhist party which would seek to use the influence wielded by Buddhist Institute leadership and Buddhist mass as political base, but would enable that leadership to stay out of direct political activity. This group through Thuan and Bui Tuong Huan--had support of Tri Quang, and appears to have remained entirely separate from group of civilians around Tam Chau; Thuan and Huan were in fact furious with Chau for having embroiled Buddhist Institute in confrontation with Huong government. From all we can gather, Quat's group has over past several months remained cohesive, despite differing religious, regional and political backgrounds. Group is made up of intelligent, educated, articulate, imaginative men. One might even say that group represents first nucleus of political entity in post-Diem South Vietnam to emerge out of country's present political turmoil and needs and not held together (or divided) by issues of past eras.

Now that group is in power it faces its biggest test: Will it be able to provide dynamic leadership and remain together in face of monumental problems and pressures which confront it? Odds in its favor are not good.

While membership of new government and of dominant clique within it compares favorably with any other group in sight, it has had little chance to date to demonstrate its abilities having been faced with a coup attempt shortly after investiture. Its ability to exercise leadership in facing problems of war effort will depend in large measure on its success in relieving pressures of contending political power factors, most important of which are UBA, Catholics, and military. Each of these elements has power at the very least to generate pressures which would force GVN to devote self to putting out brush fires and prevent GVN from achieving record of accomplishment which will be vital to its retention of political control.

As noted above, GVN starts with support of UBA's dominant faction, Centrist group led by Tri Quang and Thien Minh, and in fact represents government which this element has apparently wanted. Remains true, on other hand, that UBA leadership has never yet supported any government for very long; furthermore, we suspect that Tam Chau probably feels that he has gotten little satisfaction in make-up of cabinet. Only man that can be identified with Chau is Minister of Chieu Hoi Tran Van An (Khanh's efforts for An may indicate that old Khanh-Tam Chau alliance retained force, supposition which receives support from rumor that Khanh and Chau met in Phu Yen on February 20 during failing hours of coup attempt). Khanh's exile may accentuate Chau's unhappiness, since it deprives him of one more source of strength.

However, it is not clear that Chau is in much of position to act against new GVN, if government retains support of Quang faction. In any case, GVN has taken steps to satisfy some UBA desires. Buddhist bete noire Tran Thanh Ben has been replaced as director of national police, and GVN has announced release of all individuals who had been arrested for participation in anti-Huong demonstrations. Current question on UBA policy therefore is whether they will press other demands (e.g. replacement of Capital Military District [Commander] Pham Van Dong, closure of newspapers which had taken line hostile to them, withdrawal of license of rival general Buddhist association) and whether they intend proceed to develop "peace" campaign.

On Catholic side, there has been apprehension of growing UBA influence. Militant northern refugees suspect Quat of being in UBA's pocket, and these fears are being fed by concessions already made and would be accentuated by further concessions. Furthermore, many Catholics fear themselves compromised by February 19 coup manque leadership of which was heavily Catholic and which indicated nostalgia for Diem regime thus giving new impetus to fears that Catholics will suffer from Buddhist reaction. Most important, should Buddhists push "peace" theme, Catholic fears that Communist take-over being facilitated might well become extreme. GVN has shown awareness of importance of quieting Catholic fears that government may be hostile to them, but possibility remains real that if GVN shows self too solicitous toward Buddhists, or if UBA continues to mount political pressures, Catholics may go over into opposition.

Final major element in position to create great political problems for GVN is military. Removal from scene of General Khanh has eliminated one major source of instability, but other candidates for this role remain within AFC. Despite protestations of a desire to return to fighting the war, we can expect further political turbulence from this quarter. AFC is still clearly prime mover of government structure today (despite AFC's retention of provisional charter), and has direct representation both in GVN (Thieu, Vien and Hong) and in new legislative council. AFC appointed Suu as Chief of State and (contrary to charter) named Quat as Prime Minister. Before Quat's government was officially announced, AFC had issued policy declaration (Embtel 2620)./3/ Moreover, that declaration stated clearly that AFC had watchdog role over government until latter could be based on popular choice. Seems clear that Quat government will be plagued by AFC looking over its shoulder and Quat group could even be discredited individually and collectively as puppets of military. Although in wake February 19 coup attempt AFC has reaffirmed its support for Suu and Quat primacy its position remains unimpaired.

/3/Dated February 16. (Ibid.)

On positive side of ledger, increased direct role of US air power in struggle will give both GVN and population as whole psychological lift which will both provide momentum for GVN to mount program and may also serve to damp down factional pressures.

In sum, we believe Quat government has potential, whether it will live up to that potential or not cannot yet be judged. It appears to have ridden out successfully its first storm, thanks largely to fact that coup plotters were widely unpopular within military establishment.

Taylor

 

170. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/

Washington, February 27, 1965, 4:52 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup #13. Top Secret. Also sent to Westmoreland.

JCS 736-65. At highest level meeting held evening 26 February Washington time/2/ to explore Vietnamese problem the following decisions were taken:

/2/The President discussed Vietnam in a meeting from 7:05 to 8:35 p.m. on February 26 with Rusk, Ball, McNamara, and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found.

A. Phased deployment ashore at Da Nang of two BLT's and a helicopter squadron of 9th MEB was approved. Deployment of 3d BLT and remainder of command and support elements (including fixed-wing aircraft component) was deferred for future decision.

B. Medium level photo recce of the southern part of North Vietnam in conjunction with Rolling Thunder IV was approved. Separate Blue Tree message refers./3/

/3/Not further identified.

C. Recognizing that Rolling Thunder probably could not be executed on 27 February for weather reasons, execution on 28 February or as soon thereafter as weather permits was favorably considered. You will, of course, be advised by separate messages of strike approvals.

2. It was made clear that U.S. policy is as follows:

A. Do everything possible to maximize our military efforts to reverse present unfavorable situation.

B. In accordance with A. above, increase substantially our military efforts in South Vietnam. More on this in subsequent paragraphs. Increase tempo and effectiveness of our strikes against DRV being careful to avoid pushing them to the extent of forcing ChiCom intervention.

C. In view of lack of interest exhibited by Hanoi and Peking in negotiations at this time and the weakness of the GVN/U.S. position at the Council table, refrain from early negotiations. In this connection it was recognized that the preliminaries to any realistic negotiations would require at least three to six months to produce results, making it even more necessary for us to take positive action to reverse the unfavorable situation in South Vietnam by all means available.

3. On the military side, the following items were discussed in an exploratory way centering about the desire to determine what military actions can be increased or what new actions can be taken to improve the over-all situation.

A. Provision of additional U.S. advisors at the fighting unit level.

B. Measures to improve intelligence so that VC installations and concentrations can be detected and struck from the air.

C. Provision of more helicopters for both surveillance and fire support.

D. Increased use of U.S. jet aircraft in South Vietnam to support the conterinsurgency effort. In this connection, COMUSMACV's recommendations/4/ are being processed by the Joint Staff.

/4/Not further identified.

E. Increased use of light observation type aircraft, perhaps with a photo capability, to find VC targets.

F. U.S. naval augmentation of efforts of Vietnamese Navy to prevent infiltration of material from the sea. In this connection, CINCPAC's present proposals and actions4 were noted. In addition, the idea was advanced that low-level helicopter reconnaissance patrols along selected VC dominated coastal areas might be used effectively to augment surface patrol and fixed-wing air patrol.

G. Note was taken of actual and prospective removal of military commanders and province and district chiefs by Little Minh, Ky, and Thi. There was concern that these actions represent continuing and dangerous friction in the higher military levels and that this attitude plus the removals themselves, will further weaken the already fragile military and government control.

4. The entire conference reflected determination to press forward despite difficulties to achieve the limited objectives set by the U.S. in Southeast Asia. At the same time, there was evident concern that we are not doing enough to achieve these objectives. All present were invited to present ideas in their respective fields which will enhance our efforts. In turn, addressees are requested to comment as they desire on the above items and to put forward other ideas.

5. In view of the sensitivity of certain portions of this message, request that it be handled on a close-hold basis.

[end document]

Continue:
Initiation of a program of air strikes against North Vietnam;
Introduction of U.S. ground combat forces,
February 11-March 8
Documents 171 through 180