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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

171. Editorial Note

On February 27 the Department of State released a report entitled Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam. The report included maps, pictures, and appendixes and was divided into six sections:

Introduction

I. Hanoi Supplies the Key Personnel for the Armed Aggression Against South Viet-Nam

II. Hanoi Supplies Weapons, Ammunition, and Other War Materiel to Its Forces in the South

III. North Viet-Nam: Base for Conquest of the South

IV. Organization, Direction, Command, and Control of the Attack on South Viet-Nam Are Centered in Hanoi

Conclusions

The report, without the pictures and appendixes, was also printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 22, 1965, pages 404-427. Also on February 27, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson transmitted a copy of the report to the President of the U.N. Security Council for the information of the Council's members. The text of his covering letter to the Council's President is ibid., page 419.

The report was a sequel to "A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam," released by the Department of State on December 8, 1961, whose preparation was coordinated by William Jorden, of the Department of State's Policy Planning Council. In its early stages of preparation in 1964, "Aggression from the North" was sometimes referred to as the Jorden Report, but in its final stages, when Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff was its coordinator, it was more often referred to informally as the Cooper Report. For Cooper's views on its preparation and release, see The Lost Crusade, pages 264-266.

 

172. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 27, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIX. Confidential.

Enclosed is a study describing some attitudes and views of the rural population of Viet Nam./2/ The information is based on a series of interviews obtained by USIA field personnel in Long An Province, an area thirty miles south of Saigon./3/ The province is typical of much of rural Viet Nam in that large portions of the province are under Viet Cong control, militarily and politically.

/2/Attached, but not printed. The study was entitled "Facts and Attitudes: Long An Province" (R-10-65), and was issued by USIA in February 1965.

/3/The interviews were conducted during the first seven months of 1964. For an account by one of the USIS officers involved in the survey, see Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province.

The conclusions drawn from the study are not startlingly new and are what we have long suspected--that the principal problems facing us in obtaining the support of the Vietnamese population are inadequate security and ineffective Government. The report, however, is the first of which I am aware, which places into such sharp clarity the key aspects of the overall problem.

The USIA researchers conclude that the population is largely apathetic and is primarily interested in ending the twenty years of war; they care less as to which side will win, although there appears to be a substantial degree of approval of the Viet Cong.

Insecurity from Viet Cong harassment represents the principal obstacle to changing the apathy to active support of the Saigon Government. In addition, the rural population desires evidence that the Government intends to carry out realistic development programs, and has the staff to direct these programs with honesty and efficiency.

In the eyes of the average rural Vietnamese, Saigon neither knows nor cares about his needs and desires.

In contrast, the Viet Cong has exacerbated these shortcomings of the Saigon Government through potent military insurgency, sabotage of governmental development programs, and terror and assassination directed against the better and more energetic local Government officials. Despite these tactics, the Viet Cong's rural presence has been characterized by a careful regard for the peasant's attitude.

I believe you will find the marked passages of the report of particular interest./4/

/4/In a memorandum of February 26 transmitting the report to Ernest K. Lindley of the Policy Planning Council, Director of INR Hughes called it a "highly discouraging account" and noted that Rusk had seen it. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, Vietnam)

Carl T. Rowan

 

173. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, March 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Vietnam

1. Welcome Home./2/

/2/McGeorge Bundy had been vacationing in Florida during the last week in February.

2. I have heard it said that you'll be off and running at the crack of dawn. I hope not. What is needed now is more walking and less running. Perhaps a bit of just plain sitting would be useful. I'll come back to this theme later but let me, first, bring you up to date.

3. On the Political front:

a. The Government seems to be settling down after the Khanh affair. Quat seems to be more sure-footed than his predecessor. Relations (at least as they come through the cables) between the Embassy and the Government seem to be less subjective, more businesslike. Quat's statement that the "war must end"/3/ (quoted out of context by the press) aroused some worry here, but subsequent words and actions indicate determination to press ahead on all fronts.

/3/At the ceremony on February 25 at which General Nguyen Khanh turned over command of the Vietnamese armed forces to General Tran Van Minh, Prime Minister Quat was quoted as saying that South Vietnam was "suffering too much" and "we want to end the war with honor."

b. The Buddhists, while giving at least tacit support to the Government, are causing troubles by unhelpful statements on the part of key venerables in favor of negotiations and U.S. withdrawal (it is not always clear which they want first). A "peace" group, with active Buddhist support if not sponsorship, has been active in Saigon as well as in the Northern provinces.

c. The Catholics are worried about increasing Buddhist influence and, while behaving themselves thus far, may stir things up.

d. The generals (especially Ky, Thi and now-discredited Adm. Cang) have by no means settled down to business. Although they make the proper noises, there is enough behind-the-scene activity to indicate that we have by no means seen the end of their maneuvering.

4. On the Negotiations front:

a. There were some traumatic hours last week as a result of U Thant's press statements/4/ (he tabled "proposals", the American people were not getting the "truth", he had assurances that Hanoi was "willing to talk"). This has calmed down now, but I fear it has badly damaged U Thant's relations with the President and Rusk and that it forced us to talk more and more deprecatingly about negotiations than we may have wished.

/4/See Documents 161, 162, and 164.

b. The UK-Soviet contacts seem to be on dead-center, but apparently still have some life.

c. The French-Soviet conversations appear to have stalled on the issue of preconditions (the Soviets want the U.S. to call off bombing the North prior to a conference). There are signs that France wants to press its role as Negotiators-in-Chief, willy-nilly.

d. Rusk's press conference/5/ went off very well and his repeated reference to the lack of any indication that the Communists are willing to engage in any meaningful talk--"the missing piece" made a wholesome impact in the press.

/5/See footnote 3, Document 157.

5. On the Communist front:

a. Kosygin's speech/6/ was tough, but measured and not excessively shrill. New element was that we should get out of South Korea as well as Vietnam.

/6/A speech given on television that day and analyzed in detail in Hughes' February 26 memorandum to Rusk. (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam INR Studies 64-65)

b. Peiping has been its usually unpleasant self, but nothing momentous to note since the last outburst (made before you left) that we have "erased" the 17th parallel as a demarcation line.

c. Hanoi has generally been shrill, arrogant, and blustering, but has said nothing so unusual as to send analysts back to their drawing boards.

d. There has been no discernible hint out of any of these capitals that would lead even an optimist to feel that "meaningful" talks are in sight.

e. Neither Kosygin's trip nor any other development seems to have done anything to repair Sino-Soviet relations. Rather the reverse.

6. On the Pacification front:

a. Nothing good to report. The situation on the ground in Vietnam is slipping. Nothing new since you left--just more of the same.

b. Taylor has asked that we not send a working-level team from here to look into the situation ("not necessary"). He welcomes visit by Bill Bundy, however./7/ Meanwhile, there has been some talk and some thinking here which is all to the good, but which in itself will butter no parsnips. I will have more views on this by Tuesday,/8/ after a session this afternoon with Unger and Bundy.

/7/See Document 167.

/8/March 2.

c. The President has expressed concern and understandable frustration re this problem. He keeps wondering if we are doing all we can. I have talked at length with Unger on Bright Ideas and Bright Boys. Have resuscitated the Psy War Committee. Have pressed for careful examination by Unger's Committee of all ideas, no matter how superficially kooky they might initially appear. Unger has appointed Bright Boy (Rafferty) to follow through.

7. On South Vietnam Military front:

a. Decision re Marines at Da Nang involves immediate deployment of one battalion for airport security, and remainder of Brigade in increments in due course. This story leaked out of Saigon today.

b. Much activity by U.S. bombers against VC concentrations. Damage (i.e., VC casualties) may well be considerable, but reliable read-out is lacking. The only thing we know has happened is that we knocked out an ARVN regimental command post.

c. No major VC or ARVN victories. Incidents at about average level, mostly ambushes and miscellaneous atrocities.

d. Largest chopper operation of the war (about 170) netted nothing.

8. On NVN Military front:

a. Weather and other over-riding considerations washed out several Rolls of Thunder./9/

b. Attached military roundup/10/ will give you the status of other ops.

/9/For a list of Rolling Thunder missions planned but postponed during late February, see R.C. Bowman's March 1 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. IV.

/10/Not attached and not printed.

9. Miscellany:

a. Advance ROK contingent (600 men) arrived and put in place without incident./11/

/11/Details regarding the arrival of the Korean contingent on February 25 were provided in William Bundy's February 26 memorandum to Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

b. White Paper/12/ published after much anguish.

/12/See Document 171.

c. Ambassador Lodge, Presidential Consultant on Vietnam, in place (Komer's office)./13/ He has been read in and will get some briefings Tuesday prior to making his rounds. Will be here for about a week.

/13/See Document 166.

10. The Home front:

a. So much for where we stand. The real question, though, is where are we going? We are in a new phase of the war, both as regards the North (Rolling Thunder) and the South (U.S. bombing of VC concentrations). The hope is that we will bang sense (or fear) into Hanoi, and will significantly damage VC capabilities in the South. So far so good. But suppose neither happens at present levels of activity? Do we step them up, or turn them off? Presumably, the former. But there are three factors emerging within South Vietnam that should be ground into the calculations. All of them have been alluded to in earlier paragraphs: The fragile relationship among the generals, the "peace movement", the faltering pacification program.

b. I am aware that we all agreed that our requirements for a central government should be very modest, but this was on the assumption that we had a military chain of command. What might emerge is an acceptable government, but discord among the military. This cannot be shrugged off. One of the Rolling Thunders was cancelled last week because the VNAF had not recovered from the aftermath of the coup.

c. The "peace movement" at the moment appears to be relatively insignificant. But I am not confident that it will remain so. The Buddhist bonzes have been making strange noises lately and are in a position, in the light of their following and the general war weariness, to give it a good shove.

d. Unless we can get cracking fast (i.e., tomorrow), on reversing the trend in the pacification program, our air activity will have bought us considerable risks, but not much else. And I am a little worried that much of our energies here in Washington (and I suspect in Saigon as well) are absorbed in targeting, scheduling, and press releases, rather than the grubby business of clearing and holding.

e. This lugubrious rack-up could add up to a situation where the pressure for negotiations has expanded--internationally (perhaps not very important), in the U.S. (important, but not critical), and in South Vietnam (critical). Meanwhile we haven't gained much purchase for our troubles.

11. Every military plan has (or is supposed to have) an alternative in the event matters do not proceed as planned. For some reason, it is regarded as treasonable, defeatist--or at least chicken-hearted--to do the same kind of "what if--?" planning in the case of a political scenario. But we have a great stake in our present Vietnam policy (greater than ever before). And for our policy to come off we must rely on several factors over which we have little or no direct control. We cannot simply assume things will go as we plan or hope. We should have some alternative course in mind, in the event that the march of events does not proceed according to our plans and desires. Obviously, there are many imponderables, and it would be footless [foolish] to try to out-guess chance or fate. But, and this is my plea, an effort should be undertaken to develop options as we proceed down our present path. Such an effort will not be exerted unless it is ordered on a priority basis by high authority. I know; I've tried. Key people are too absorbed by today's flaps to have time for tomorrow's problems.

12. Welcome back!

CLC

 

174. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/

Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Sharp.

JCS 739-65. Reference MAC 1061./2/

/2/In MAC 1061, March 1, addressed to Wheeler and Sharp, Westmoreland raised several questions about the policies and procedures for combined reprisal strikes. (Ibid.)

1. In all honesty, I must admit that we here recognize the policy and procedural difficulties imposed upon you, your staff, the GVN and VNAF by close control of Rolling Thunder exercised by Washington. Hence, I will not address the several points which you logically raise. Let me assure you that we here, both the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, are doing our utmost to clear away the restrictions which hinder you in carrying out your mission. However, you should understand that there are sizable and vexing domestic and international political problems inherent in our military operations against the DRV. Washington authorities are attempting to steer a careful course which maximizes the effect of our operations both inside and outside South Vietnam, while minimizing the chance of suddenly escalating military action to the point where the ChiComs would become involved. Setting aside the weather problem, the recent visit of Mr. Kosygin to Hanoi and the Communist conference now underway in Moscow have contributed to the political problems being faced here and have had an impact upon contemplated military action.

2. You may ask what does the future hold? Recall that Yankee Team and Barrel Roll missions were subject to the same type of restrictions when these operations were first initiated. Over a period of time, restrictions here have been relaxed as people became used to the idea of conducting recce and making strikes in Laos. We are working toward setting up some such similar procedure for Rolling Thunder; i.e., agreeing upon a bank of targets to be struck by VNAF and U.S. forces at times to be selected by field commanders in accordance with the weather and other operational factors. In this connection, it is most important to get off this next Rolling Thunder to break what seems to be a psychological/political log jam.

3. In furtherance of my cable reporting on 26 February high-level meeting,/3/ we are putting together here a list of possible actions in country which will improve the over-all situation. On the list is the proposal by you to give field commanders full authority to utilize jet aircraft in the area as required to support the war effort against the VC. Another is to do away with the Farmgate concept as you also suggested. I cite these items only as evidence that we understand and sympathize with your views, and we are doing our utmost to untie your hands.

/3/Document 170.

4. As noted above, I have already received a number of ideas from addressees concerning future helpful actions and programs to further our cause in Southeast Asia. If any others occur to you, please let me have the benefit of your thinking.

 

175. Editorial Note

On March 2 the first Rolling Thunder mission to get off the ground (Rolling Thunder V) was carried out by 104 U.S. Air Force B-57's, F-100's, and F-105's and 19 South Vietnamese Skyraiders against the Xom Bang ammunition depot just north of the DMZ and the Quang Khe naval base. Six of the U.S. aircraft were downed by anti-aircraft fire. Five of the six pilots were rescued.

No announcement was made in Washington or Saigon concerning the air attack. For text of a statement of March 4 by the Soviet Government protesting the air strike, which Foreign Minister Gromyko presented to Ambassador Kohler in Moscow, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 841-842 .

 

176. Draft Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)/1/

Washington, March 2, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX. Top Secret. The source text is labeled "2nd draft." No copy of the first draft has been found. For William Bundy's point-by-point reaction to these proposals, see his March 2 memorandum to McNaughton. (Ibid.)

POSSIBLE ACTIONS WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. General

1. Send General Johnson to Vietnam for as long as necessary to review thoroughly with Westmoreland the present use of all DOD assets and to determine what additional forces and techniques, if any, can be of value.

B. Air Strike Operations

2. Remove all restrictions on use within South Vietnam of any US land- or sea-based aircraft, including the restrictions requiring Vietnamese personnel in Farmgate aircraft.

3. Organize large-scale air attacks on Viet Cong base areas, including night and day pattern bombing in such areas as the VC Do Xa base area. B-52s based on Guam could be used to supplement other aircraft.

4. Increase the frequency and effectiveness of Barrel Roll operations in Laos.

5. Increase night aerial activity over known infiltration routes in South Vietnam. Include use of infra-red and night photos.

C. Ground Operations

6. Organize massive use of all surveillance-type aircraft on a grid basis to cover VC movements in selected areas of Vietnam, with a capability to call for rapid ground and air attacks.

7. Employ ranger-type ARVN and/or US Special Force-controlled CIDG units in extended offensive guerrilla operations in VC-controlled areas.

8. Support ARVN with US mortar units to increase accuracy of mortar fire.

9. Use small patrols with long-range radios to report on VC movements and locations.

10. Use up to a division of Korean combat units.

D. Naval Operations

11. Immediately send out additional small Navy craft for operation by US and/or Vietnamese crews for coastal patrol and other duties.

12. Implement promptly the recommendations of the Navy team now considering methods of creating US-GVN sea and air patrols for coastal- and river-security as near watertight as possible.

E. Tailored Incentives and Actions

13. To increase the numbers and to improve the morale of South Vietnamese forces, provide a subsistence allowance "in kind" to the regular and irregular troops and to their dependents in such a way as to provide a massive increase in compensation (for example, 50%).

14. Put teeth in the draft law.

15. Make it profitable to be on the side of the government--for example, reward and publicize heroes, businesses, villages, etc., who contribute to the war effort.

16. Send assassination squads after VC leaders.

17. Establish a program of substantial bounties payable for turning in Viet Cong, particularly their leaders.

18. On a selective basis use rewards to top leaders to induce them to accept US instructions regarding actions required to unify leadership in the country and regarding the timing of and attitude toward negotiations.

19. Carry out expeditiously reforms required among Montagnards.

F. Psychological Operations

20. Send Carl Rowan to Vietnam to review the information and propaganda program for influencing the South Vietnamese.

21. Give Zorthian and the USIA a blank check on funds and equipment for operations within South Vietnam.

22. Develop and promote a simple and multi-point positive program to propagandize.

23. Improve methods of reporting combat operations and contacts.

G. US Organization

24. Increase tours of duty of US key personnel now in South Vietnam by 3-6 months.

25. Shift the police responsibility to MACV.

26. Place USOM and CAS under MACV.

27. Immediately fill all USOM shortages with military personnel.

28. Substantially expand USOM staff, especially in the provinces and districts, with military personnel wherever required.

29. Shift AID emphasis from long- to short-term objectives with quick payoffs--for example, more housing, more junks, higher pay, more "pigs and fertilizer" programs.

30. Assign the "Lansdale Irregulars" to Vietnam, perhaps assigning them to a specific section of the country./2/

/2/In a letter of February 23 to the President, Senator Thomas Dodd (D-Conn.) suggested that a special team headed by General Lansdale be sent to Vietnam to establish better liaison with the leaders "of various sectors of the Vietnamese community." Dodd's letter, along with the President's brief acknowledgment of receipt dated February 24 and Cooper's March 1 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy commenting on Dodd's suggestion, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXX.

 

177. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 2, 1965, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

2817. For the President. There was a perceptible feeling of relief in Saigon when General Khanh finally left town last Thursday./2/ However, up until the time he was airborne, there were many who felt he would make some last dramatic effort to regain his lost power. I would not write him off now because he is certain to return to local scene at some time in the future, probably choosing a moment of particular awkwardness for the government in being at the time.

/2/February 25.

Khanh's departure does not end the problems in the officer corps where there are many seeds for future trouble. General Thi is already maneuvering for Khanh's position of military strongman, utilizing his apparently solid political and military base as I Corps Commander in the Hue-Danang area. He is not as clever as Khanh but may be able to compete with him as a troublemaker. Fortunately, his ambitions are apparent to most of his military colleagues who have their guard up.

A noteworthy development in the political field has been the upsurge in "peace" talks. Several Buddhist Institute leaders, including Tri Quang and Tam Chau as well as secondary leaders, Ho Giac and Quang Lien, have been publicly quoted in vague and fuzzy statements as favoring an end to the war and the withdrawal of foreign forces. (Tri Quang recently told an Embassy officer close to him that he had been misquoted and explained his views in a way which sounded very close to U.S. policy in South Vietnam.)/3/ Concurrently, there has been a flurry of "peace" propaganda calculated by groups, some of which have been heard from for the first time. According to the police, some of these groups are Communist front organizations; others apparently are simply parroting Viet Cong propaganda. It is too early to tell what all this amounts to or whether the Buddhist Institute is preparing a new campaign to plague the Quat government and to press Quat into negotiations. The greatest significance discernible for the moment in the flurry of "peace" propaganda is the fact that it has occurred openly in Saigon, rather than in the intrinsic strength of the organizations involved. In any case, in his press conference yesterday, Quat attempted to put "peace" talk, whether of external or internal origin, into perspective. He pointed out that South Vietnam was defending itself against external aggression, that true peace for South Vietnam required an end to this aggression and effective guarantees, and that the Vietnamese Government rejects any international solution which has not received the agreement of that government and of the Vietnamese people.

/3/This conversation was described in telegram 2808 from Saigon, March 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)

Viet Cong activity was up somewhat and caused further deterioration in the security situation in the northern portion of II Corps where there are strong indications of the presence of new Viet Cong main force units. General Westmoreland's headquarters is continuously reviewing the available intelligence and will probably raise the estimated in country Viet Cong main force strength now at 34,000 to something over 40,000. One consequence of this increased Viet Cong strength in II Corps has been to drive nearly 56,000 people into refugee centers in Binh Dinh province, thereby developing an acute refugee problem.

As you know, we have recently made two important departures from former policy in authorizing the use of U.S. aircraft under certain conditions to strike Viet Cong targets in South Vietnam and in deciding to introduce Marine combat units for the defense of the Danang airfield. While I accept the justification for these actions, I am concerned that we not rush in and take over the conduct of the war from the Vietnamese. I think that it would be a political and psychological mistake to change our past position that this is a Vietnamese war in which we are helping in areas where the Vietnamese cannot help themselves. While increased involvement of the U.S. directly in the war in South Vietnam along with the strikes against the North will tend to solve some immediate problems arising from eroding morale and from the shortage of available Vietnamese forces, in the long run we will have the problem of avoiding any sense of the part of the Vietnamese that they thus have less responsibility for maximizing their own war effort.

Taylor

 

178. Telegram From the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, March 2, 1965, 2:07 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and released by Vance. Printed in part in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, p. 337.

DEF 6181. Exclusive for Ambassador Taylor signed McNamara. After meeting with the President this morning,/2/ we believe it wise for General Johnson to go to Saigon to meet with you and General Westmoreland. He proposes to leave at 2100 EST on 3 March, ETA 0830 Saigon time, 5 March. Purpose of trip is to examine with you and General Westmoreland what more can be done within South Vietnam. He will bring with him a list of additional actions which has been developed here for your consideration./3/ Would appreciate your developing a similar list for discussion with him./4/ In developing list, you may, of course, assume no limitation on funds, equipment or personnel. We will be prepared to act immediately and favorably on any recommendations you and General Johnson may make. The President is continuing to support such action against North as is now in progress but does not consider such actions a substitute for additional action within South Vietnam. The President wants us to examine all possible additional actions--political, military, and economic--to see what more can be done in South Vietnam. Carl Rowan will accompany General Johnson for urgent review of psychological warfare and information programs./5/

/2/The President held an 8:25 a.m. breakfast meeting in the second floor dining room at the White House with McNamara, Rusk, Vance, and General Harold Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found, but see Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 125.

/3/Apparently a reference to Document 176.

/4/No record of a similar Embassy list has been found.

/5/In telegram 418 to Saigon, March 2, Rowan informed Zorthian of the purpose of his visit and with whom he wanted to meet. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, A/ORG 2-6) See also Document 160.

 

179. Editorial Note

A mission headed by Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson, which included U.S. Information Agency Director Carl Rowan and Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, left Washington on March 3 and arrived in Saigon the morning of March 5.

The Johnson party met with the U.S. Mission Council for about 3 hours the afternoon of March 5 primarily to discuss what was retarding the pacification program. For a summary of this discussion, see Document 186. The morning of March 6, Johnson, Rowan, McNaughton, and Taylor paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Quat, which was described in telegram 2877 from Saigon, March 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Memoranda of conversation held March 8-10 between members of the Johnson party and various members of the Vietnamese Government, along with a memorandum for the record of General Johnson's field trip of March 11-12 to Vinh Long, are in the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Johnson Papers, Miscellaneous.

The Johnson party left Vietnam on March 12 and arrived back in Washington on March 14. Johnson's "Report on Survey of the Military Situation in Vietnam," to which was appended a copy of telegram 2879 from Saigon (Document 186) and Westmoreland's "Military Estimate of the Situation in Vietnam" that he submitted to Wheeler on March 6 (see Document 182) were transmitted to McNamara and the other Service Chiefs under cover of a memorandum of March 14. In the covering memorandum, Johnson wrote he had considered the recommendations of the Service representatives and representatives of the Joint Staff who had accompanied him, but the report "in its entirety is representative of my viewpoint alone." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 333 Johnson) McNaughton sent an outline of the Johnson report to McGeorge Bundy on March 15 (Document 197).

 

180. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/

Washington, March 4, 1965, 11:54 a.m.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV, Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Sharp.

JCS 791-65. A. JCS 718-65./2/

/2/Not found.

1. I do not wish to harass you, and I recognize that the request made in cited message imposed a sizable task of analysis and study. Moreover, I understand the time-consuming activities falling to the lot of field commanders. Nevertheless, as set forth in reference and in other messages over the past several months, there is growing concern here that VC inroads--territory-wise, population-wise, and psychological--are in fact destroying the fabric of SouthVietnam. Those at highest level here wonder whether this erosion is reaching the point where, regardless of our actions against the DRV, the country will fall apart behind us.

2. COMUSMACV's request/3/ to use U.S. jets in Binh Tuy province cites the deterioration over the past several weeks in that area. Intelligence reports3 cite similar inroads in other areas, particularly in the North.

/3/Not further identified.

3. To put the question bluntly:

Has the situation in Vietnam deteriorated to the point where there is reason to fear collapse of the GVN war effort in the foreseeable future? I suggest that you use as a baseline from which to project your replies that we will continue our support to the war effort, both within and outside Vietnam, at approximately the present scale and tempo.

[end document]

Continue:
Initiation of a program of air strikes against North Vietnam;
Introduction of U.S. ground combat forces,
February 11-March 8
Documents 181 through 188