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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

181. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, March 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Unger and cleared by Green. A note on the source text indicates that copies were sent to Ball, Cooper, Thompson, and Ambassador Taylor.

SUBJECT
U.S. Conditions for a Détente in Viet-Nam

The purpose of the present paper is to try to define how we might take the first political step away from the present confrontation with North Viet-Nam. It concerns itself only with the opening steps in any détente and is not intended to discuss succeeding steps which might be taken in more formal negotiations or an international conference.

If our present combination of political and military actions is successful we will in due course begin to receive indications from North Viet-Nam that they are ready to talk seriously about a détente in Viet-Nam. It is impossible to define in advance what the nature of these indications must be in order to persuade us that Hanoi is serious and to move us from our present position that "the essential element", i.e. their interest in a resolution, is still missing. Nevertheless we should at this time prepare for that moment by defining our own position on conditions. We must also determine the extent to which those conditions--i.e. the corrective actions which must be taken by North Viet-Nam--are to be posed by us as preconditions which must be fulfilled before we would be ready even to talk, directly or through intermediaries.

It is assumed for purposes of this paper that the Communist demands will be first for a cessation of US-SVN air attacks against NVN; they may pose this as a precondition for any kind of talks. They will also press for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from SVN, if not all, then all but a small advisory group, and for an end to U.S. arms supply to SVN. They may well also pose as conditions the neutralization and non-alignment of SVN, its pledge not to call on SEATO for help, and conceivably the inclusion in the Government of SVN of representation from the Liberation Front.

It is recommended that our price for a cessation of air attacks be a cessation of NVN support of the Viet Cong in men and materiel. This should not be a matter of preconditions to talks since it will require talks to work out the manner in which we, the U.S., can be satisfied that such support by NVN has ceased. Until we are satisfied, we should not agree to call off the air attacks since once suspended in an atmosphere of anticipated détente it would be very difficult to resume them.

It will not be an easy matter to decide whether or not NVN has in fact stopped the flow of men and materiel from north to south. Probably the most practicable way to achieve this would be to charge the ICCs both in Laos and in Viet-Nam with carrying on a surveillance over the land and sea infiltration routes and the supply depots and training camps in NVN where the infiltration has its origin. In this process there is one key indicator of NVN intentions: the willingness to instruct the Pathet Lao to permit free ICC circulation and investigation in the PL-controlled areas in Laos. If this permission, which it has been impossible for the ICC to secure since the Geneva Accords were signed in 1962, were to be granted it would give reason to believe that NVN was more in earnest this time. While even with the ICC performing this surveillance some personnel and arms could slip through, North Vietnamese acceptance of surveillance, including on its own territory would probably be an adequate price for cessation of air attacks.

Other means of checking on NVN's compliance in a cessation of infiltration are hard to envisage, although one other possibility might be found in NVN's agreement to the free use of unarmed U.S. aircraft to carry out day and night, land and sea reconnaissance anywhere over NVN territory (or at least over the coast and the land area south of Vinh) and over the Laos panhandle, perhaps combined with agreement that if suspicious activity is noted, the ICC could be dispatched to investigate on the ground.

It might be that NVN would accept no such arrangements without exacting a higher price, such as the withdrawal of the bulk of US forces from SVN. This might be acceptable to us, since US forces could always be promptly deployed again in case of NVN non-compliance, especially if our withdrawal could be staged to postpone any substantial outward movement until a surveillance system in NVN and Laos was in reasonable operation. However, we should not accept unilateral US withdrawal but should insist that it be accompanied by the pulling back to North Viet-Nam of at least the NVN cadres who are leading and directing and providing the technical skills for the Viet Cong effort.

If arrangements somewhat as outlined above could be worked out, we should have moved into a state of détente in Viet-Nam which would considerably ease present international tensions. SVN would, of course, still face major tasks of pacification and internal stabilization but these could be undertaken with our help with much more promise of success than we see today. In working our way toward an effective compliance by NVN of the 1954 and 1962 Accords and some further military disengagement of the U.S. in SVN, fuller and more formal negotiations and perhaps a conference would perhaps be in order. That would be the time to introduce in specific terms the proposals for Mekong Valley or other types of economic development in Indochina, including NVN, which would have the objective of gradually weakening that country's links with Communist China. Such proposals, however, might well be foreshadowed in earlier general public statements.

 

182. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/

Saigon, March 6, 1965, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV, Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Sharp.

MAC 1190. 1. This message replies to JCS 0718-65./2/

/2/Not found.

2. Agree with the substance of the four paragraphs which you quoted from the CIA memorandum./3/ However, I feel that the terms "large gains" and "accelerating" are suggestive of changes which are both massive and rapid. Except for Binh Dinh and Phu Yen, this is not the case. The security situation in I Corps and the bulk of II Corps has been steadily deteriorating since mid-1964. The developments in Binh Dinh suggest that we are approaching a point in the deterioration process which must be recognized as critical.

/3/Not further identified.

3. The overall situation is assessed as follows.

A. General: Throughout the RVN the Viet Cong hold the initiative. They have had continuing success in their efforts to consolidate political gains in the rural areas; to increase their military strength by a combination of infiltrated cadre and levies on available manpower; and to improve their organization, weaponry, and logistic capability. Through the use of military action, intimidation, and propaganda, they are implanting a sense of the inevitability of VC success. The VC have a propaganda advantage. The GVN combat losses are well publicized, but even larger losses of the Viet Cong are shrouded in secrecy, thus having less impact on the people.

B. The several corps areas:

(1) In I Corps, the VC have continued to extend their influence through the piedmont and into the lowlands despite some successful, albeit limited, ARVN operations, and despite serious VC losses. The VC have, in effect, isolated the centers of GVN strength from access to the rest of the population. In short, they have succeeded in erasing the pacification gains made by GVN prior to mid-1964.

(2) In II Corps, GVN forces are on the defensive and pacification efforts have stopped. The VC are expected to commit more forces in the northern provinces of II Corps in an effort to depress GVN morale further, or, hopefully, force a psychological collapse. Some GVN forces in II Corps are already in a pessimistic frame of mind and are reluctant to engage in offensive operations. Meanwhile, Montagnard situation, while temporarily quiescent, may explode at any time. Five battalions of the general reserve are in the process of being committed in II Corps in order to bolster morale and to prevent any further deterioration of the situation.

(3) In III Corps, an apparent force equilibrium has been reached, the Hop Tac campaign cannot move much further forward without substantial reinforcement. At the same time, the general reserve, on which Hop Tac has heretofore depended for reaction forces and for spoiling operations on the periphery, has been committed to other geographic areas. By contrast, the VC has the capability of upsetting the equilibrium should they opt to commit part or all of their reserves in the critical provinces surrounding Saigon.

(4) In IV Corps while the VC incident rate remains comparatively high, the intensity is low. Only in the contiguous provinces of Dinh Tuong and Go Cong has the GVN made any measurable pacification advances in recent months. There are indications that the VC are regrouping main force elements into regimental formations and, although the GVN has recently inflicted some sharp losses on the VC, they can raise the intensity of military action at any time.

4. To make the forecast which you requested, I have taken the above estimates as a base and have projected the trends we now discern without admitting new factors. I recognize that we have already set in train new actions which can significantly affect the power equation. Nonetheless, I have tried to answer the question, "If we continue the course of action we are now following, what will be the situation six months hence?" I am unable to deal with this subject in 60 day increments as suggested--given all the variables at play, such refinement is just not possible. The forecast for the next six months, made under these limitations, is as follows:

A. The VC, holding the initiative, will increase the tempo and intensity of their activities throughout the RVN, but most particularly in the northern and central parts of the country. At the same time they will be strengthening existing units, forming new ones, and regrouping the main forces into larger formations while re-equipping them with standardized armament. Concurrently, they will be making maximum efforts to consolidate and strengthen their political organization in areas under their control, to extend population control into contested areas, and to penetrate areas held by GVN forces.

B. The bulk of VC military operations will be directed toward driving GVN forces into isolated strongholds--separated from the majority of the population--by denying lines of communications, by encroaching on coastal areas; and by attacking GVN forces wherever found in limited strength.

 

183. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX. Secret; Personal and Sensitive.

Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara, and I spent 2-1/2 hours together last night on Vietnam./2/ The following general conclusions emerged:

/2/Rusk met Bundy at 7:35 p.m. and McNamara at 7:40, and the three men then had dinner together. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book)

1. On the evidence so far our air actions in North Vietnam and Laos have caused somewhat less international reaction than we expected. The propaganda and the demonstrations are inevitable, and so are the reactions of the would-be negotiators, here and abroad. Your own effective work has brought the American reaction under control, at least for the present. We got an inadvertent assist from U Thant on this because his outrageous comments solidified a lot of Congressional opinion. We have not driven the Chinese and the Soviets together, as the Moscow demonstrations and Chinese complaints show. We have certainly not persuaded Hanoi to leave its neighbors alone, but we may have made a beginning. Most important of all, we may be moving, with less friction than we anticipated, toward a situation in which international opinion may regard our actions against the North as a natural reply against Viet Cong operations in the South. If this can be done by continuing our measured and fitting actions over the coming weeks, it will be a new and important change; it will be most helpful to us against guerrilla infiltration over the long run, whatever the eventual result in Vietnam.

My own view is that if this result is achieved--and Dean says that Ambassador Thompson, who has been skeptical, is now quite hopeful about it--it will be your personal achievement. You alone--against your noisiest advisers--made the basic decision to present these actions within the framework of a continuing policy and a continuing purpose, and not as major new departures. The best and simplest documentary evidence of this is in the amendments which you made to the speech which was never given./3/ I am holding that document for your memoirs.

/3/See footnote 5, Document 108.

2. Two of the three of us think that the chances of a turn-around in South Vietnam remain less than even; the brutal fact is that we have been losing ground at an increasing rate in the countryside in January and February. The air actions have lifted morale, but it is not clear how much, and there is no evidence yet that the new government has the necessary will, skill and human resources which a turn-around will require.

Moreover, our own basic framework for the support of the pacification program leaves a great deal to be desired. (Last night Bob McNamara said for the first time what many others have thought for a long time--that the Pentagon and the military have been going at this thing the wrong way round from the very beginning: they have been concentrating on military results against guerrillas in the field, when they should have been concentrating on intense police control from the individual villager on up. This is a point which Lodge will make in a report/4/ which is to be delivered to you Monday afternoon before your meeting with him on Tuesday./5/)

/4/See the attachment to Document 189.

/5/See footnote 2, Document 189.

We all nevertheless agree that whatever the odds and whatever the difficulties, we must continue to make every conceivable effort in the pacification area. This is the purpose of the Johnson mission, and the results of that mission should be available for discussion with you early next week.

3. There is one particularly tough issue on which we will get comment next week, both from the Johnson mission and the Lodge report. That is the question of the organization and management of the U.S. team in Saigon. McNamara and I, if the decision were ours to make, would bring Taylor back and put Alex Johnson in charge, with a younger man (conceivably John McNaughton) as Chief of Staff. Rusk, McNamara, and I have all learned from separate channels that within the country team it is in fact Alexis who is looked to for leadership and for coordination. Max has been gallant, determined, and honorable to a fault, but he has also been rigid, remote and sometimes abrupt. We all recognize that Taylor has served an enormously important purpose in keeping American opinion from division and criticism, but our inclination would be to bring him back not later than the first of June for a final round of consultation and discussion, and release him from his duties at the end of the year for which he originally contracted. (He took the oath on July 2.)

4. We talked also about our international political position. We all agree that so far we have followed the right course, but we continue to believe that it is important to defend and to insist on our policy in every forum. That is why Dean has agreed with enthusiasm to your proposal for briefings of Ambassadors, and that is also why he has taken on this heavy schedule of public appearances in the immediate future.

5. There remains a real question in our minds as to how much we should open the door to a readiness for "talks". This is a point on which both Dean, and Bob especially, are quite concerned. They both feel, for somewhat different reasons, that it is important to show that we are ready to talk about Vietnam--always on our own terms--in all appropriate international channels. They point out that in one sense that is exactly what we are doing now in our briefings of Ambassadors, and in our tough talk with Dobrynin, and in public statements which constitute diplomatic actions. But Bob goes a lot further. He believes that we should find a way to have real talks in an international meeting. (I think his motivation is that we will need a conference table if things go worse, as he expects.) Dean and Bob both feel that to hold some of our allies we may need to be a little less rigid about "talks" than we have in the last ten days. The particular pressure which is visible today is from the British, who have been made nervous by one sub-Cabinet resignation and a lot of yammering from their own Churches and McGoverns. What the British want is to make some explorations toward the possibility of talks, and to say that they have been in consultation with us. This is not an urgent matter over the week end, if only because Wilson is safely in Bonn. It will be up for judgment early next week.

My own opinion on the general diplomatic front is that we can always get to the conference table when we need to, and that there is no great hurry about it right now. (Dean Rusk agrees, though he wants to keep the British just happy enough to hold them aboard.) I think there is a lot to be said for detailed and careful study of the bargaining problem in all the various forms which it may develop. But for the moment it seems to me that we are exactly right to stick on the line which you have set. The one thing we might add is that of course we are willing to talk about ending the North Vietnamese aggression and that talks on that subject in any forum would always be welcome. Dean's backgrounder yesterday/6/ went a little way in this direction, and I think we would all be helped by knowing your own reaction to the resulting stories by Roberts, Frankel, et al.

/6/Rusk left his office at 5:05 p.m. for the press background and returned at 5:45. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

6. Bob and I pressed upon Dean our feelings that it is important to have contingency planning on what we should do if in spite of our best efforts there is either escalation by the enemy or continued sharp deterioration in South Vietnam. The military planning for reactions to escalation is mostly done, but we do not feel confident that we know just what our actual decisions should be and would be if there were North Vietnamese ground movements over the demarcation line or large movements of Chinese forces into North Vietnam, or both. We estimate both of these as unlikely for the moment, but we have to be ready for them. The crucial question is, in a sense, whether and when you would authorize landings of a number of U.S. divisions in South Vietnam.

A closely related question on escalation is whether it would be useful right now to get a substantial allied ground force in place in the central and northern part of Vietnam. Max Taylor is doubtful about this, but in the heat of discussion last night Rusk, McNamara and I all thought it worth serious further exploration. A force which had Australians, Filipinos, Thais, Koreans and conceivably even Pakistanis would also have a substantial braking effect on any possible Communist escalation. We will be asking for your thoughts on this one too.

7. Finally, on the subject of contingency thinking for sharp deterioration, we agreed, in spite of Dean Rusk's reservations, that such thinking should be done--but very, very privately. Rusk points out that when men even look as if they were planning for defeat, they make defeat more likely, and he is right. So our current plan is that there should be no paper work on this subject at all, but simply some intensive discussion limited completely to the three of us and one subordinate each. There will be no papers, and this mission will not exist anywhere except in this memorandum.

8. I need not tell you how helpful it will be to have your reactions to this discussion. There is nothing in it that makes it urgent for you to respond today or tomorrow, but I will be right here if you want to comment.

McG. B.

 

184. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-160-65

Washington, March 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin File: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Farmgate Restrictions in the Republic of Vietnam (C)

1. Over the past several months, there has been a series of messages, letters, and discussions regarding the status, markings, mission, and Vietnamese participation in the operation of the two US Air Force air commando squadrons in South Vietnam. You are aware of the long history which accounts for their mission, the VNAF markings on these aircraft and the ground rule which requires VNAF observers on each mission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the restrictions placed upon air commando operations and believe that these ground rules have been overcome by events.

2. The mission of the air commando squadrons clearly has changed. Originally, they were in the RVN for a combination of combat and training purposes with the emphasis on training. Because of operational necessity their combat contribution has increased until they are now over 80 per cent combat committed. In this respect, their mission is US support of the RVNAF in exactly the same way as US Army and Marine helicopters, US Air Force and Army transport aircraft, and more recently US Air Force tactical fighter and light bomber squadrons. The Government of Vietnam seeks this support and there should be no adverse propaganda results since the Viet Cong have long been charging that the entire air war is conducted by the United States.

3. Information from COMUSMACV reveals that difficulties are continually encountered in locating VNAF personnel to fly in the A-1Es at critical times. A typical example occurred on 27 February 1965 in which an air strike was requested in Kontum Province while the VNAF was either committed or standing down in preparation for other operations. Four air commando aircraft were alerted and prepared to meet the operational request, but no Vietnamese observers or pilots could be located to accompany the aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it is a matter of operational necessity to relax the requirement of VNAF personnel to be aboard air commando aircraft.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe also that it is logical and proper to change the markings on air commando aircraft to identify US units with our own insignia. COMUSMACV reports that the Vietnamese prefer it. No adverse press reaction is anticipated when this is evaluated against the background of US jet strikes both within the RVN and against targets in the DRV. The press would find it difficult to believe that any important policy decision was involved.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the training mission of the air commando squadrons is clearly the lesser of its responsibilities. However, the training mission is essential to the development of the VNAF 5th and 6th A-1H squadrons. Consequently, the air commando training mission will be essential for at least another year. There is no reason why this training cannot or should not be conducted with US Air Force markings.

6. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:

a. The task of the air commando squadrons include:

(1) Training as necessary in support of the VNAF.
(2) Combat operations in support of the RVNAF.

b. Air commando A-1Es be permanently marked with US Air Force insignia for both in and out of country operations.

c. Air commando A-1Es be authorized to conduct combat operations without VNAF personnel aboard.

d. The action proposed in the attached draft message/2/ be approved.

/2/Attached, but not printed.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler

 

185. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/

Honolulu, March 6, 1965, 12:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV, Message Files Top Secret. Repeated to COMUSMACV.

CINCPAC 062235Z. A. COMUSMACV MAC 1190 DTG 060500Z./2/ B. CINCPAC 050401Z./3/

/2/Document 182.

/3/Not found.

1. General Westmoreland's commander's estimate in Ref A is the best analysis of the situation in Vietnam which I have seen. So far as the estimate itself is concerned, there is nothing that I can add.

2. However, I should like to reemphasize certain of his observations in order to give even stronger support to recommendations I have already made in Ref B as to:

A. The increased use of air in RVN.

B. The necessity for much tighter control over coastal shipping.

C. Requirement for use of U.S. forces in security missions within Vietnam.

D. The need for a U.S. logistic base within country.

3. In Westmoreland's estimation the war has moved out of the purely guerilla phase and into a more formalized military conflict. It is essential, therefore, that we recognize this transition and react immediately and with our best tactics and weapons. Obviously it is a situation which should allow us to employ our airpower. Anything, therefore, which can be done to bolster the tactical air control system must be accomplished as a matter of urgency and I will support any new requirements in this area. Similarly I support with enthusiasm the requirement stated for additional experts for the targets research and analysis center and the allied equipment for DFing and IR recce. The target acquisition function is absolutely vital to proper employment of air. You know my strong feelings as to the requirement for the MEB(-) at Danang. In the light of Westmoreland's estimate I would put even a higher priority on its employment. Aside from all the other considerations which would argue in favor of this deployment we must give ourselves some insurance against a collapse of the ARVN will or ability to resist in the critical area of Danang where we have so much already committed. In this connection it may again be appropriate to consider establishment of a U.S. logistic base in this area.

4. In the matter of sea surveillance and patrol of coastal waters, we are, of course, in the midst of studying and preparing to deal with this problem. Certainly the U.S. Navy should be able to control shipping other than junk traffic off the coast of RVN.

 

186. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 7, 1965, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.

2879. General Johnson's party/2/ met with US Mission Council for about three hours on afternoon of March 5. Most of time was spent in discussing causes for retardation of pacification program and areas for possible additional effort to eliminate these causes.

/2/See Document 179.

I opened discussion by expressing view that our basic unresolved problem is provision of adequate security for population; that without security most of our other programs are rendered either impossible or of marginal effectiveness. Given security and reasonable time, all of our other problems will fall into place.

Failure to provide security results, I suggested, from three primary causes which, in turn, derive from many secondary and tertiary ones. These three are (1) lack of satisfactory progress in destroying VC insurgents in countryside, (2) continuing capability of VC to replace losses and increase in strength and (3) our inability to establish and maintain an effective government.

Lack of progress in suppressing insurgency is in large measure consequence of insufficient trained military, para-military and police manpower. In spite of build-up of forces in 1964, we have never been able to achieve numerical superiority over VC in excess of 5 to 1 whereas all historical examples in recent past suggest need of superiority of counterinsurgency forces on order of 10-20 to 1. It is essential to make maximum effort in 1965 to raise new forces and improve use of those already in being. Such an effort on part of GVN calls for an overall improvement, in use of manpower for pacification purposes, an efficient application of conscription law, practical measures to increase attractiveness of military and police service and removal of all bottlenecks which presently impede further increase in capacity of training organization.

Limited effectiveness in many provinces of pacification programs which must follow on heels of military clearing operations is another cause of lack of progress against insurgency. These represent, in general, provincial activities of ministries involved in pacification, such as Ministries of Interior, Health, Agriculture, Public Works and Rural Affairs. Throughout 1964 these ministries were weak and ineffective because of governmental instability in Saigon. As result, their programs have lacked continuity and personnel charged with their execution have been constantly rotating. Thus, military successes when they have occurred are frequently not exploited; areas cleared are not held; areas cleared and held are not developed and VC infrastructure remains in villages and hamlets ready to emerge when troops move on.

Throughout this period, counterinsurgency efforts have been plagued by popular apathy and dwindling morale, consequences of long war with no end in sight. There is no sense of dedication on our side comparable to that instilled into VC and no popular commitment to suceeding governments which, because of their constantly changing character, have tended to repel rather than to attract confidence and support.

Second primary cause of our lack of success, continuing growth of VC, I attributed to open frontiers of SVN, land and sea, which it has been impossible to close to infiltration, uninterrupted activities of DRV in reinforcing VC, and continued ability of VC to find recruits in SVN. Frontier problem is result of nature; there are 2500 miles of land and sea frontier to police and inadequate means to effect any thing like complete surveillance. Even with vast increases of manpower, ships and other equipment for mission, frontiers can never be hermetically sealed. Land and air incursions by GVN forces into Cambodia, Laos and DRV could assist in limiting infiltration but there are valid political arguments which impose restraints on such operations and there is a shortage of manpower which would limit them even if political objections did not exist. These facts do not argue against trying to do better job at closing frontiers but do suggest that there is an early point of diminishing returns for such efforts.

The continued support of VC from DRV is heart of infiltration problem. If frontiers cannot be closed from inside--and we are convinced that they cannot--then only way to stop infiltration is to get Hanoi to order it to stop. Such is fundamental justification for Barrel Roll and Rolling Thunder operations. In combination with 34-A activities, they constitute our principal hope of ending infiltration--and end it we must if in-country pacification is to succeed.

It is true that VC, even then, would be able to continue to recruit locally in SVN where lack of security against terrorism and absence of commitment to Saigon govt have favored VC recruiters. However, successful application of pressure on Hanoi offers hope of changing many unfavorable conditions which have worked against us in past; one of which has been this past willingness of many country boys to join VC. An improved national morale, consequence of offensive action against Hanoi, may provide at least partial antidote.

Causes for our failure to establish and maintain an effective govt have been their roots in historical and racial factors difficult to define in precise terms. SVN has never been nation in spirit and, until recently, has never had govt which people could regard as their own. Even now their instinct is to consider any govt as intrinsically their enemy. They have always been divided by racial and religious differences, which over centuries their alien rulers have sought to perpetuate. As result, there seems to be no cement to bind together various elements of heterogeneous society, no instinctive herding together even under threat of war. Since the fall of Diem and sudden removal of restraints imposed by his dictatorial regime, natural tendency to disunity and factionalism has been allowed free play, both among civilian politicians and among generals. Resulting field day has been marked by series of demonstrations, bonze immolations and military coups which have produced political turbulence of last 15 months.

This governmental instability has contributed to most of deficiencies already described in our pacification efforts. Shortage in manpower, inadequate performance of ministries in provinces, popular apathy and poor morale, VC success in attracting recruits all are by-products of weak govt and cannot be completely corrected until some reasonably effective govt is established and maintained for prolonged period--for months at least, perhaps for years. Statement does not suggest that we cannot make significant progress even under present conditions but it does emphasize unlikelihood of quick results and inadequacy of US aid, no matter how massive, to effect sudden changes in national characteristics and inbred habits which lie at root of our difficulties.

Against background of general agreement in foregoing statement nature of our problem, we then considered areas where, if progress can be made, we will be striking at sources of our fundamental difficulties. In this spirit, it was agreed to explore possibility of increased activity in following areas:

A. Improvement in training and mobility of existing forces.

B. Priorities in use of existing forces.

C. Means to expand capacity of training establishment.

D. Ways to give greater attractiveness to military service.

E. Use of US manpower to offset present shortage in armed forces of GVN.

F. Use of US Navy resources to strengthen surveillance of coast and waterways.

G. Increased tempo for Barrel Roll and Rolling Thunder.

H. Expanded use of Peoples Action (Quang Ngai) Teams.

I. Increased US assistance in combatting economic blockage of central Vietnam.

J. Preparations to cope with mounting refugee problem in central Vietnam.

K. Improved procedures and equipment for resources control.

L. Vitalization of public info programs and provision of 250 kw transmitter for Saigon.

M. Prompt filling of all outstanding personnel requests supported by US Mission.

Meeting broke up with understanding that foregoing areas would be examined in subsequent discussions with Washington visitors and that all parties would be free to table any other suggestions as to actions which might benefit pacification program.

Taylor

 

187. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, March 8, 1965, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis.

2889. Deptel 1925./2/ I am concerned from standpoint our overall posture vis-a-vis Hanoi and Communist Bloc that current feverish diplomatic activity particularly by French and British tends to undercut our ability to convey any meaningful signal to Hanoi of USG determination to stick it out here and progressively turn the screws on DRV. Seaborn's estimate of mood of confidence characterizing DRV leadership despite our joint air strikes to date (Embtel 2880)/3/ almost identical our estimate contained Embtel 2861./4/ It appears to me evident that to date DRV leaders believe air strikes at present levels on their territory are meaningless and that we are more susceptible to international pressure for negotiations than are they. Their estimate may be based in part on activities of "our friends" to which we seem to be active party.

/2/In telegram 1925, March 6, the Department of State reported on its discussions with British Foreign Secretary Stewart regarding peace negotiations. (Ibid.)

/3/March 7. (Ibid., Vietnam Negotiating Files: Lot 69 D 412, Seaborn)

/4/March 5. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

In my view current developments strongly suggest that we follow simultaneously two courses of action: (1) attempt to apply brakes to British and others in their headlong dash to conference table and leave no doubt in their minds that we do not intend to go to conference table until there is clear evidence Hanoi (and Peking) prepared to leave neighbors alone; and (2) step up our air strikes in southern part of DRV in order convince Hanoi authorities they face prospect of progressively severe punishment. I fear that to date Rolling Thunder in their eyes has been merely a few isolated thunderclaps.

The same general considerations apply re our urging British to undertake further early soundings re Article 19 Laos Accords as Ambassador Martin so cogently states in his Exdis 2178 to Dept./5/ Many of problems which worry him are also applicable to Vietnamese here and I share his reasoning and concern.

/5/Apparently a reference to telegram 1278 from Bangkok, March 6. (Ibid., POL 27-14 LAOS)

It seems to me that we may be in for a tough period ahead but I would hope we will continue to do whatever is required and that we try to keep fundamental [omission in the source text] vis-à-vis Hanoi clear and simple. My specific recommendations concerning increasing tempo and intensity of our air strikes against DRV follows by separate telegram./6/

/6/In telegram 2888, March 8, Taylor stated that the pace of attacks proposed in telegram 1718 (Document 115) was reasonable, but he favored "a progression of U.S. strikes north of 19th parallel in a slow but steadily ascending movement." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Taylor

 

188. Editorial Note

At approximately 9 a.m. on March 8 (8 p.m. EST on March 7), two Marine Battalion Landing Teams, under the command of Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, landed at Danang. Welcoming ceremonies included a greeting by the mayor of Danang and the Commander of I Corps Tactical Zone, General Thi. A third BLT and a Marine helicopter unit were airlifted into Danang by March 12. For further details, see Jack Shulimson and Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, pages 6-15.

[end document]

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Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause, March 8-May 8
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