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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

192. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, March 9, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Military Issues, Vietnam and Laos

1. Two decisions regarding the use of U.S. aircraft are up for immediate decision.

a. Restrictions on the Use of U.S. Aircraft. The JCS have requested that all restrictions be lifted on the use of U.S. aircraft in South Vietnam. At the present time they can be used only in emergency situations by special requests. CINCPAC and MACV have strongly recommended this action./2/ If implemented, it should permit the development of tactics which could greatly assist in defeating Viet Cong hit and run operations.

/2/In telegram MAC JOO 6127 to CINCPAC, February 27, Westmoreland requested that "authority now be delegated to me to use U.S. aircraft to reinforce VNAF or to support Vietnamese forces as I judge prudent." (Ibid., Westmoreland Papers, History Backup #13)

b. Restrictions on Farmgate Aircraft. Farmgate aircraft are A1H models which are used by U.S. pilots for training Vietnamese pilots. They are marked with Vietnamese insignia and can only be used if a Vietnamese pilot or observer is on board. The JCS recommend that markings on these aircraft be changed to U.S. insignia, and MACV reports the Vietnamese would prefer this. The JCS would also relax the requirement for VNAF personnel on these aircraft. Training of the RNVAF would remain the primary mission, however. Farmgate restrictions seem academic in the light of the present situation./3/

/3/See Document 184.

2. The Barrel Roll problem we discussed this morning has been resolved. DOD has agreed to State's restrictions on the frequency of flights (no more than one every four days) and the number and type of aircraft. I believe this will suit Sullivan and Souvanna.

3. Several issues are still pending, and you should be aware of them.

a. Rules of Engagement, SEA. The JCS have requested authorization for immediate pursuit into Communist China in response to any ChiCom attack on U.S. forces./4/ This issue broke into print this weekend as the result of an ISA press interview. The individual concerned was trying not to release anything, but the reporter came up with an article stating that our rules of engagement would not permit the sort of sanctuary for Chinese aircraft that was available in the Korean war. ISA is pushing hard for this policy, but State has delayed approval.

/4/This request was made in JCSM-118-65, February 19. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin File: FRC 70 A 1254, Vietnam 381)

b. Use of Napalm. The JCS have requested authority to use napalm against targets in North Vietnam,/5/ and have provided the attached paper/6/ which shows the increased effectiveness possible and reduced loss rate to be expected as a result of the low level attack pattern. Loss rate might be further reduced as a result of greater effectiveness in flak suppression. It is difficult to damage anti-aircraft weapons with high explosives, and the crews of the gun position under attack are able to take cover while adjacent guns continue firing. Napalm attacks would leave anti-aircraft guns in poor condition, and would follow the gun crews into their foxholes. A new strike proposal which should be coming over soon will probably call for use of napalm. While this seems desirable, it may be useful to append a note of caution such as "great care should be taken to confine napalm patterns to military areas".

/5/This request was made in JCSM-127-65, February 25. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, JCS Memos, Vol. I)

/6/Not attached.

c. 34A Air Strikes Against North Vietnam. The JCS propose to begin small scale VNAF air strikes against the DRV under 34A operations. This issue should receive very serious thought. If the North Vietnamese were subject to surprise air attack around the clock, they would be placed under much the same sort of harassment as our troops in South Vietnam. This should sap their zeal for the war by building anxiety and eliminating the world-wide publicity that follows a large scale attack. In this program we could use single ship or two ship sorties working at low level, thus guaranteeing surprise and few losses. They should use sophisticated armament such as the AGM12B guided bomb in order to assure high effectiveness. They should also take great care to avoid any damage to civilians. To achieve this sort of effectiveness and control, however, it might be better to use U.S. aircraft instead of the VNAF.

d. Hot Pursuit into Cambodia. In the case of Viet Cong forces employing hit and run tactics operating across the Cambodian border, the JCS recommend authorization for (1) return fire, (2) hot pursuit to recover prisoners, and (3) hot pursuit while actively engaged. Military factors strongly support this recommendation, but, of course, the political effects will be a critical consideration.

Chester L. Cooper/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

193. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)/1/

Washington, March 10, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Negotiating Files: Lot 69 D 412, Project Mayflower. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Unger, McNamara, and Vance.

ACTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

1. US aims:

70%--To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).

20%--To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

10%--To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.

Also--To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.

Not--To "help a friend," although it would be hard to stay if asked out.

2. Deteriorating situation:

(a) Politically, 50% chance of coup within 3 weeks.

(b) Militarily, SVN has been cut in two with GVN control in north reduced to enclaves.

3. Prognosis:

(a) GVN officials will adjust their behavior to an eventual VC take-over.

(b) Defections of significant military forces will take place.

(c) Whole integrated regions of the country will be totally denied to GVN.

(d) Neutral and/or left-wing elements will enter the government.

(e) A popular-front regime will emerge which will invite the US out.

(f) Fundamental concessions will be made to the VC.

(g) Accommodations to the DRV will put SVN behind the Curtain.

4. Inside South Vietnam:

Progress inside SVN is important, but it depends more on GVN efforts and luck than on added US efforts. Nevertheless, whatever other actions might be taken, great efforts should be made within South Vietnam: (a) To help the ARVN defeat the VC, by giving advice and training, obtaining intelligence, providing air lift and strike support, and hampering VC infiltration; (b) to strengthen the government, its bureaucracy, and its civil-military coordination and planning; (c) to dampen ethnic, religious, urban and civil-military strife by a broad and positive program designed to enlist the support or dampen the opposition of important groups; and (d) to press the pacification program where conditions permit.

5. Courses of action:

(6) Progressively squeeze North Vietnam;

and/or (7) add massive US ground effort in South Vietnam;

and/or (8) downgrade the apparent stakes.

6. Program of progressive military pressure on North Vietnam:

a. Purposes:

(1) To reduce DRV/VC activities (reduction can be tacit).

(2) To improve US/GVN bargaining position.

(3) To show world lengths to which US will go to fulfill commitments.

b. Primary program:

Each week, two 100-plane high-damage strike days with two important targets each day--1 for US, 1 for VNAF--moving slowly northward.

c. Other actions:

(1) 34A MAROPS.

(2) DeSoto patrols in Gulf of Tonkin.

(3) Recce flights over Laos and DRV.

(4) T-38/Barrel Roll armed-recce and choke-point strikes in Laos.

(5) US/VNAF strikes against VC operations and bases in SVN.

d. Stated terms:

(1) We do not seek to destroy DRV or to acquire a base,

(2) We will arrange rice-barter deal between DRV and SVN, and

(3) We will stop squeeze on DRV (not withdraw from SVN),

but (4) DRV must stop training and sending personnel to SVN/Laos,

(5) DRV must stop sending arms and supplies into SVN/Laos,

(6) DRV must stop directing military actions in SVN/Laos,

(7) DRV must order the VC/PL to stop their insurgencies,

(8) DRV must stop propaganda broadcasts to South Vietnam, and

(9) DRV must remove VM forces and cadres from SVN and Laos.

e. Other risks:

(1) Strikes north of 20# are likely to attract MIGs out of Phuc Yen (Hanoi). (Unless MIG hazard becomes great, striking MIG base can be postponed until it fits our pressure schedule.)

(2) China may introduce MIGs from Hainan, raising question of hot pursuit into China and of taking out Chinese air bases.

(3) DRV (Chinese?) air may strike SVN bases or cities.

(4) Increased VC activities (take city, kill top leaders).

(5) DRV (China?) may launch ground forces into Laos and/or SVN.

(6) South Vietnamese may panic if threatened by land or air.

(7) GVN may disintegrate out from under us.

(8) World-wide revulsion against killing Vietnamese may develop.

f. Other Red moves:

(1) China/USSR may stir Laos, Thailand, Korea, Berlin, etc.

(2) More jets to NVN with NVN or ChiCom pilots.

(3) AAA and radar gear to NVN.

(4) Increased air and ground forces in South China.

(5) Cause major military or civilian defections in SVN.

(6) PL land grabs in Laos.

(7) Other "defensive" DRV retaliation (shoot down U-2?).

(8) Political drive for "neutralization" of Indo-China.

(9) PL declaration of new government in Laos.

g. "Circuit-breakers." To avoid undesirable escalation, US has option to "plateau" US strikes against DRV and to shunt added action from more serious air strikes to the following:

(1) Massive increase in US presence south of 17# (minimum of 25,000 additional "combat support" personnel in SVN; maximum of 150,000 combat troops across Laos and in SVN).

(2) Aerial mining of DRV harbors and naval blockade of DRV.

(3) Division of US troops (from Korea?) into Thailand and perhaps with Thais into Mekong towns in Laos.

(4) Diplomatic negotiating offensive (via UK or GVN).

h. Important miscellany:

(1) Program should appear to be relentless (i.e., possibility of employing "circuit-breakers" should be secret).

(2) Enemy should be kept aware of our limited objectives.

(3) US should not appear to press for negotiations.

(4) Allies should be kept on board.

(5) USSR should be kept in passive role.

(6) Information program should preserve US public support.

7. Program of massive US ground effort in SVN & SEA:

a. Purposes:

(1) To defeat the VC on the ground.

(2) To improve US/GVN bargaining position.

(3) To show world lengths to which US will go to fulfill commitments.

b. Program:

(1) Continue a "plateau" of air strikes against DRV.

(2) Add Westmoreland's 25,000 additional US "combat support" personnel.

(3) Deploy 3-5 US divisions (with or without "international" elements) across Laos-SVN infiltration routes and at key SVN population centers.

(4) Deploy 1 division (from Korea?) with Thai in Lao Mekong towns.

c. Risks:

(1) China will move troops into DRV; DRV/China will deploy into Laos.

(2) US troops will be bogged down and attrited to VC.

(3) US will become "French colonialists" even to South Vietnamese.

(4) US public will not support the US moves.

d. "Circuit-breakers:" There are none. Once US troops are in, it will be impossible to withdraw them or to move them, say, to Thailand without admitting defeat.

8. Downgrade the apparent stakes:

If/when it is estimated that even the best US/GVN efforts mean failure (undesirable escalation or defeat), it will be important to act to minimize the damage to US effectiveness and image thereafter by steps such as these:

(a) Deliver ultimatum to coup-prone generals to "shape up or we ship out," and when they patently fail to shape up, we ship out.

(b) Publicize uniqueness and congenital impossibility of SVN case (e.g., Viet Minh held much of SVN in 1954, long uncontrollable borders, unfavorable terrain, absence of national tradition or administrators, mess left by French, competing factions, Communist LOC advantage, late US start, etc).

(c) Create diversionary "offensives" elsewhere in the world (e.g., to shore up Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, India, Australia; to launch an "anti-poverty" program for underdeveloped areas).

(d) Enter multi-nation negotiations calculated to shift opinions and values.

(e) Shift to Saigon focus of decision and of discussion.

9. Concurrent negotiating track:

The realistic objective is not a DRV/VC backdown nor necessarily an explicit agreement. Would we settle for a tacit piecemeal live-and-let-live Vietnamese deal including a "writing off" of indefensible portions of SVN? The US should:

(a) Maintain present posture of refusing formal negotiations.

(b) Maintain position that we ask only that DRV leave SVN alone.

(c) Keep quiet channels (via UK? France?!) open for hopeful signs.

(d) Keep eye on South Vietnamese, who may be dealing under the table.

(e) Be ready to shift to formal negotiations as a "circuit-breaker" (para 6g) or to help "downgrade the apparent stakes" (para 8d).

10. Evaluation:

It is essential--however badly SEA may go over the next 2-4 years--that US emerge as a "good doctor." We must have kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the US will behave in future cases of particular interest to those nations--regarding US policy, power, resolve and competence to deal with their problems. The US should:

(a) Progressively squeeze North Vietnam (per para 6), without high confidence that it will improve the situation in SVN, with some confidence that it will improve the US/GVN bargaining position, and with confidence that it will demonstrate lengths to which US will go to fulfill commitments.

(b) Be prepared to shunt to "circuit-breakers" (per para 6g), either to deploy large numbers of US forces in South Vietnam or to Thailand and Laos.

(c) Pursue the negotiations track (per para 9).

(d) Have a contingency plan to downgrade the apparent stakes (per para 8) to be initiated when/if necessary to confuse the issue and diffuse the blame.

 

194. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, March 10, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol XXX. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Vietnam Revisited

A few quiet hours over the weekend and Ambassador Taylor's 2879, which came in on Sunday,/2/ stimulated me to put down my own conception of what we are trying to do in Vietnam, and how we might best do it. I had planned to pass this on to you early yesterday morning, but decided to wait until after the session with McNaughton. I have made a few modifications as a result of this session, and I share these private thoughts with you for whatever they are worth.

/2/Document 186, received in the Department of State on March 7.

What are we trying to do?

Our short-term objective in Vietnam is to restore sufficient security and stability there (whether by "victory" on the ground or by a favorable political outcome) so that we can withdraw the major part of U.S. forces in the confidence that South Vietnam can handle the problem pretty much on its own. At least as important is the need to demonstrate U.S. determination and capacity to assist a hard-pressed ally meet the threat of Communist subversion.

To accomplish these objectives, we are embarked on a three-pronged policy: (1) To assist the GVN by political, economic and military means to pacify the country; (2) To engage in a series of graduated strikes against North Vietnam to force it to stop its support and direction of the insurgency and/or to provide us with greater leverage in any future international negotiations; (3) To discourage any moves toward premature negotiations but, at the same time, keeping open diplomatic channels for satisfactorily resolving the Vietnamese problem.

Several assumptions underlie our present course. Among the most important are:

1. The regime in Hanoi, hopefully at some point short of massive bombing raids on industrial and population targets, will agree to halt their direction and support of the VC and/or will agree to reasonable negotiating terms. (Possible, but unlikely)

2. The effectiveness of the VC, when denied the support of Hanoi, will decrease to the point where the insurgency will become "manageable" for the U.S. and the GVN and, in time, by the GVN alone. (Probable)

3. During the course of our efforts, both against the North and in the South, we will manage to avoid direct confrontation with either Peiping or Soviet forces. (Almost certainly in the South, possibly in the North)

What are our prospects?

So far so good: our objectives are fairly realistic; our policy, given the situation, is probably the best that can be devised; and our underlying assumptions have some validity. But Ambassador Taylor has raised some fundamental questions at his recent meeting with the Washington visitors (Saigon 2879 limdis). Taylor pointed out that "the basic unresolved problem is provision of adequate security for the population.... Given security and reasonable time, all of our other problems will fall into place.... Failure to provide security results from three primary causes.... (1) Lack of satisfactory progress in destroying VC insurgents in the countryside, (2) continuing capability of the VC to replace losses and increase in strength, and (3) our inability to establish and maintain an effective government."

Ambassador Taylor's presentation points up the basic dilemma we face in Vietnam:

1. By putting the emphasis on "destroying the VC" and by thinking in terms of a "10-20 to 1" ratio of counterinsurgency forces to insurgents, we virtually eliminate the prospects of a solution. The fact is that we have killed 100,000 VC over the past few years. And the fact is that we are most unlikely to achieve the desired 10-20 ratio. Clearly our success will depend on something in addition to military factors.

2. We cannot count on eliminating the ability of the VC to replenish its manpower and supplies. We might slow down this support, we might make it more costly, but if we establish its elimination as a criterion for progress, we had better resign ourselves to defeat.

3. If, as a third criterion, we are going to insist on an "effective government", we also are in deep trouble. I don't see anything ahead that is better than we have now--and, indeed, we may have something worse.

What comes out of all of this? I have a queasy feeling that, whatever must be done, must be done in spite of the unlikelihood of our getting a favorable manpower ratio, our eliminating the support of Hanoi, our establishing and maintaining an effective government. These must not be regarded as conditions necessary for success, unless we are now ready to accept failure. This is not to say that we avoid recognizing impending disaster, if that is what we face; it is to say, if that is what we confront, we should get cracking to minimize its implications.

Some thoughts after Brooding.

This has been simple to write thus far. Now I must be wise, and this is a great deal more difficult. Here are a few ideas--some new (I think), some variants. In no particular order:

1. I would continue the bombing against the North, but I would hug the 19th parallel and I would concentrate on military, VC-associated targets. A critical point I would keep in mind is the maintenance of maximum flexibility; by pressing north too hard, too fast, we can quickly exhaust our options, we make it more difficult to turn the program off or slow it down, we make it more difficult for the Chinese and the Russians not to become engaged. We must avoid a situation in which the scale and weight of our attacks have vastly complicated our problem (i.e., "widened the war") and/or have raised the pressure for negotiations to an intolerable level (in the U.S. as well as abroad) before we have had time to improve our position in the South. And, finally, I am convinced that, short of pulverizing North Vietnam, Hanoi is not likely to call "uncle".

2. I would continue using U.S. air power against VC targets, but be constantly aware that this cannot substitute for ARVN ground action or for the much more difficult, but much more essential, matter of pacification.

3. I would introduce U.S. ground forces on the DMZ (1 Division), and seriously explore the usefulness of 2 Divisions emplaced from the Laos Border south of the 17th parallel cutting across Routes 9 and 12./3/

/3/Since writing this, I have learned that the JCS and State take a negative view toward making this kind of disposition. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. I would forthwith decentralize our pacification efforts so that their success or failure does not depend on how effective the government happens to be in Saigon. This obviously does not mean that we can cope with constantly changing province chiefs. But it is to say that we will be more free than we have been from the chaos and fecklessness of Saigon.

5. I would take an area like the Hop Tac (depending on the Johnson & Co. report on progress there) and create an Ad Hoc Hop Tac Task Force (AHHTTF), comprising elements of all the appropriate agencies under a Mr. Big who, in turn, would be responsible to a Mr. Pacification in Saigon. I would give Mr. Big a considerable amount of authority and latitude to move the programs necessary to secure and develop the area. (Incidentally, I've been talking to a bright American businessman who has been building homes for private ownership, for as little as $100 apiece, in all sorts of strange places. Maybe the Hop Tac area is worth a pilot project?)

6. I would re-examine our own (i.e., the GVN and the U.S.) ability to wage guerrilla warfare in the areas under tight VC control. Why can't we be the insurgents? Why can't we put the VC in a position, in the many parts of the country they control, of having to mount a "10-20 to 1" ratio?

7. I would take some initiative on negotiations, or at least be less negative. In this connection, I'd make a big production of Thich Quang Lien's proposal, made a day or two ago (attached)./4/ We could live with this, and it would have the advantage of avoiding a big international conference. While there are some compliance problems, and while Hanoi would almost certainly refuse, I'd put the onus on the North for refusing to acknowledge "the just aspirations of the Vietnamese people". (This needs more thought and is getting it.)/5/

/4/Not attached.

/5/Cooper added the sentence in the parentheses by hand.

8. I would begin planning on how we can get the GVN to continue to fight during a period of long drawn-out negotiations.

9. I would reactivate the Washington PsyWar Committee on a full-time basis to deal almost exclusively with the Vietnam situation (I'm in contact with State now on this.). (It's now moving.)/6/

/6/Cooper added the last sentence in parentheses by hand.

10. I would, shortly after the return of William Bundy and General Johnson, work up a crash pacification program. It might not be as good a program as we could get by continuing our studies, but a "B-" program that could get moving immediately is better than an "A" program that would take a few months to start.

C

[end document]

Continue:
Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause,
March 8-May 8
Documents 195 through 198