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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

195. Editorial Note

On the evening of March 12, 1968, Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey dined informally at the Soviet Embassy with Soviet Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin. According to the memorandum of conversation prepared by the Vice President for President Johnson on March 15, Dobrynin expressed puzzlement at U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. "Why did the United States bomb Hanoi [on February 7] while our new Premier was there?" queried Dobrynin. Before Kosygin's visit the USSR was not committed to heavy support of North Vietnam, Dobrynin claimed, but it was now. Why was the U.S. testing the USSR? continued the Ambassador. As a socialist state, the USSR was "morally and ideologically bound to come to the assistance of a sister Socialist State. We can't be a leader and stand by and ignore the bombing of the North Vietnamese."

During the lengthy discussion that ensued, Humphrey explained and defended U.S. actions and asked why the USSR, in its capacity as co-chairman of the conference that negotiated the 1954 Geneva Accords, did not take some initiative and persuade North Vietnam to stop its infiltration of South Vietnam. "You can't police a jungle border," replied Dobrynin; nor should the United States expect the USSR to pressure North Vietnam while the bombing continued. For a considerable period of time, Dobrynin indicated, the USSR had not been disinterested in an international conference on the conflict but was not interested anymore. (Department of State, S/S White House Files: Lot 70 D 216, Vice Presidential Memoranda of Conversation)

Humphrey's memorandum is scheduled for publication in volume XIV.

 

196. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 13, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXI. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Communist Reactions to U.S. Air Attacks on North Vietnam

I have examined our recent Intelligence Community estimates on Communist reactions to sustained U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam and find no reason in the events of the past ten days to change the views therein. This judgment is supported by senior staff advisers/2/ and the Board of National Estimates.

/2/For one view, see Document 190.

We said the initial Communist reaction would be to try to make the United States desist by threats, propaganda, and diplomatic pressure, plus a continuation of Viet Cong attacks in South Vietnam. This is what has happened so far.

We also considered how this reaction would change if vigorous sustained air attacks damaged some important economic or military assets in North Vietnam, as would be likely if the strikes increase in frequency and hit north of the 19th parallel. The majority of the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in my view that in these circumstances the Communists might try to secure a respite from U.S. air attack by some political negotiation and a reduction of Viet Cong activity. We concluded that this reaction was more likely than a Communist decision to intensify the struggle, accepting the destructive consequences in North Vietnam in the expectation of early victory in the South. The State Department stated that the latter reaction seemed more likely than the first. I doubt that these views would change if formally reviewed today.

I have only one reservation in this regard. If Viet Cong military strength and capabilities are greater than we have supposed, as a review of the data now in process suggests, this factor might alter the general situation.

Of course, the danger of more extreme Communist military reactions increases as more vital parts of North Vietnam are damaged and as attacks come nearer to the border of Communist China. Conversely, if air attacks reached past the 19th parallel but did not damage important economic or military assets, the reaction would probably be the same as at present--neither Communist concessions nor large-scale Communist military actions.

John A. McCone

 

197. Johnson Report Outline/1/

Washington, March 14, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, General Johnson Report. Top Secret; Sensitive. Apparently prepared by McNaughton. McNaughton sent this summary to McGeorge Bundy on March 15 under a covering memorandum stating: "Here is a summary of Johnny's report. Bob [McNamara] asks that you not reproduce it or distribute it without giving him (or me) a call." See Document 179 regarding the background of the Johnson report.

I. Assessment.

Situation "has deteriorated rapidly and extensively in the past several months.... Time is running out swiftly in Vietnam and temporizing or expedient measures will not suffice. ...The United States possesses capabilities which, if applied with speed, vigor and imagination, can redress the present military imbalance without excessive risk of widening the conflict."

II. Recommended Actions.

A. Measures to arrest the deterioration. To strengthen the RVNAF, to dampen infiltration, to improve hamlet security, and to improve appeal of the pacification program.

1. Provide 3 additional Army helicopter companies to increase mobility of forces.

2. Provide more 0-1 aircraft to create a saturation surveillance capability.

3. Establish a Joint (US-RVNAF) Target Research and Analysis Center.

4. Evaluate payoff from MACV's use of jets in SVN. (Decide later if more needed.)

5. Increase the scope and tempo of US air strikes against DRV.

6. Remove restrictions on strikes against DRV (e.g., US-VNAF concurrency, denial of alternate targets, ban on classified ammos, narrow geographical limits, requirement to get Washington approval before striking alternates when weather bad).

7. Increase tempo and scope of SOG activities against the DRV. (This 34A operations.)

8. Increase air and naval reconnaissance and harassing operations against the DRV.

9. Re-orient Barrel Roll to increase military effectiveness against infiltration.

10. Use 7th Fleet to coastal patrol and to augment in-country recce and strike ability.

11. Give cash awards for capture of DRV junks.

12. Streamline procedures to give MACV quick release authority for construction funds.

13. Create a MACV-controlled stockpile of nearby construction materials and equipment.

14. Get Australia and New Zealand to run training-center phase of Reg. Forces' training.

15. Create US-GVN psychological operations organization.

16. Position the remaining subsector advisory teams to improve the Pop. & Reg. Forces.

17. Provide cash contingency fund to each subsector advisory group ($50-100 monthly limit at first) to be distributed thru District Chief to civilians and Pop. Force soldiers as a reward for exceptional performance or small civic action projects.

18. Permit subsector advisory groups to draw on USOM food and building stocks.

19. Dredge DaNang, QuiNhon and NhaTrang to permit berthing of ocean-going ships.

20. Provide 4 LSTs and 6 LSUs for logistic support missions.

21. Accelerate program for more jet-capable airfields and runways programmed by MACV.

B. Measures to free some ARVN forces for offensive operations. "[T]he GVN effort is now stretched to the limit...the time has come to decide how much the United States is willing to commit to the security of South Vietnam within South Vietnam."

either 1. Deploy US combat units (amounting to a tailored division force) to assume responsibility for the security of Bien Hoa/Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Qui Non and Pleiku. This would free 6 ARVN combat battalions and 25 existing Regional Force companies.

or 2. Deploy US combat units (amounting to a tailored division force) to assume responsibility for defense of the provinces of Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac in Corps II. This would free 11 ARVN combat battalions for Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Phu Bon.

C. Measures to contain infiltration by land. Deploy a 4-division ground force (US or international under the SEATO treaty) south of the 17th Parallel across northern Quang Tri province and the panhandle of Laos to the Mekong.

 

198. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-180-65

Washington, March 15, 1965.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 092.2. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
Proposals for a Settlement of the Southeast Asia Conflict

1. In three recent messages to the Department of State,/2/ the US Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) has made certain proposals concerning a settlement of the Southeast Asia (SEAsia) conflict. Basic to these proposals, which are set forth in detail in the Appendix,/3/ are the following:

/2/Apparent reference to telegrams 2889, 2888, and 2880; see Document 187 and footnotes 6 and 3 thereto.

/3/Attached, but not printed.

a. A program of graduated reprisals should be undertaken against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). This program, in response to DRV-inspired actions in the RVN, would be designed to persuade the DRV to stop its intervention in the RVN.

b. A broad outline of terms for cessation of the above reprisal attacks would be a strict return to the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962; i.e., the DRV would:

(1) In the RVN, stop infiltration and bring about a cessation of the Viet Cong armed insurgency.

(2) In Laos, withdraw all Viet Minh forces and personnel and recognize that the freedom of movement granted in that country by the 1962 Accords is not subject to veto or interference.

c. Probably the best procedure for attaining an agreement and for avoiding protracted negotiations would be to have military representatives of the RVN and the DRV meet in the Demilitarized Zone, under International Control Commission auspices and with US observers present. The Laotian Government would have to be associated with these negotiations at some point.

2. Subsequently, the US Ambassadors to the RVN, Laos, and Thailand agreed that:

a. Too much reference, especially publicly, to our willingness to negotiate causes confusion in the RVN, Laos, and Thailand. In these countries, "negotiations" means to negotiate a neutralist (coalition government) solution as opposed to seeing the war through to a satisfactory conclusion.

b. Our posture should be one in which we make clear that our purpose is to convince the DRV to cease its aggression.

c. Diplomatic activities of countries looking for a neutralist settlement will build up considerable pressures for some form of negotiated solution short of our objectives. We must divert these pressures to Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow as the instigators and supporters of aggression.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the graduated military pressures within the scope of subparagraph 1 a, above, are included in JCSM 967-64, dated 18 November 1964, subject: "Courses of Action in Southeast Asia,"/4/ which sets forth a program designed to destroy the will and capabilities of the DRV to support the insurgencies in the RVN and Laos. Clearly, the efficacy of a negotiated settlement will be largely influenced by the effectiveness of the program.

/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 420, footnote 6, and Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 639-640.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the above proposals (see Appendix). In summary, they conclude that:

a. It is vital that the United States/RVN enter into negotiations with the communists from a position of strength. As a minimum, there should be no attempt to negotiate a settlement until US/Government of Vietnam forces have achieved a strong position of military advantage.

b. The proposal by the US Ambassador to the RVN that the DRV cease its intervention in the RVN and Laos provides the minimum requisite basis for negotiating a settlement of the SEAsia conflict.

c. Once having achieved a negotiating threshold, the United States/RVN/Royal Laotian Government (RLG) must not lose it at the conference table. Unnecessarily protracted negotiations caused by communist stalling or intransigence would be a basis for increased military pressures against the DRV, Viet Cong, and the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh. Appropriate US/RVN/RLG military posture and actions must be maintained to assure that the communists are aware of the credibility of both the US/RVN/RLG power and resolve.

d. Basic to the ultimate settlement of the conflict in SEAsia is whether there can logically be a return to the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 or whether new international agreements must be developed. Recognizing that the RLG would have to be associated with the negotiations at some point, from the US/RVN point of view, bilateral negotiations between the RVN and the DRV would offer important advantages. Such an approach would enable a more controlled agenda; whereas another Geneva-type conference could be used as a propaganda forum for each participating country, as well as for providing leverage for the neutralization of SEAsia.

e. Having endorsed an international conference, the communists could be expected to resist bilateral talks. Should the international climate necessitate a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, the United States/RVN/RLG should delay the conference while dangling it before the communists to induce them to make concessions. Meanwhile, the program of graduated military pressures must be continued relentlessly.

f. Undue reliance should not be placed on the USSR as either a mediator or a sole channel of communications to Hanoi and Peking. The Soviets can be expected to seek to advance their own interests at our expense.

g. A central problem in the negotiations would be to develop a system of effective safeguards to ensure that the agreements are carried out faithfully. This matter is treated further in the Appendix.

5. In view of the military considerations involved in negotiating a settlement of the SEAsia conflict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The United States/RVN/RLG not enter into negotiations with the communists until a strong military position has been achieved, to include a reasonable indication that DRV intervention in the RVN and Laos has ceased.

b. This paper be considered in the development of a US position on a settlement of the SEAsia conflict.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

[end document]

Continue:
Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause,
March 8-May 8
Documents 199 through 201