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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATESVolume II, Vietnam January-June 1965
Washington, D.C. |
19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/Washington, January 7, 1965, 9:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted at the White House, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and McNamara, and approved by William Bundy and Rusk.
1419. For the Ambassador from the President.
1. First let me thank you for your 2052 and related messages./2/ It is an exceedingly helpful and thoughtful analysis of the situation, and it gives me the clearest understanding I have had of the situation as you see it and of the reasoning behind your recommendations. We have discussed the matter at length here, and we have a large measure of agreement with your analysis.
/2/Documents 9-13.
2. We agree with your implicit assessment that strength and clarity of U.S. commitment and determination are of major importance in political and even military balances in SVN.
3. We are inclined to adopt a policy of prompt and clear reprisal, together with a readiness to start joint planning and execution on future military operations both within South Vietnam and against the North, but without present commitment as to the timing and scale of Phase II.
4. We are convinced that it is better to remove dependents before reprisals begin, and we believe that by adoption and public indication of reprisal policy we can provide the necessary demonstration that this act represents firmness, not weakness.
5. In the light of these conclusions, we propose for your consideration and comment the following course of action in the coming weeks. Specific timing would depend on timing and character of political truce now in sight.
(1) Public indication in Saigon of US/GVN decision to adopt a policy of prompt and fitting reply to Viet Cong atrocities, whether against Vietnamese or Americans. We would prefer that this indication be given by inconspicuous background briefings rather than formal public statement, but request your judgment whether necessary indication of firmness to cover dependent withdrawal can be achieved in this way.
(2) After firmness of reprisal policy is clear, but before reprisals, prompt and orderly evacuation of all U.S. dependents.
(3) Establishment of joint planning for execution of reprisal policy. Subject to your comment, we suggest following guidelines for such planning:
(a) Reprisal planning should include provision for action by forces of both U.S. and GVN.
(b) Targets should be in southern section of DRV.
(c) Reprisal plans should be subject to review and approval, before any given execution, by two chief executives.
(d) Reprisal planning should be based on premise that reply should be made within 24 hours unless circumstances of atrocity sharply modify normal presumption of VC guilt.
(4) At the same time that reprisal planning is initiated, we should press for closer cooperation in planning and execution of major military actions in SVN. Binh Gia action raises question whether we should not have arrangements which could prevent classical error of piecemeal commitment described in your weekly report. More affirmatively, we are sure that a few solid military victories achieved by use of U.S. military command judgment and energy would be worth all the rest of this program put together.
(5) We would inform top GVN leadership of our readiness to begin joint contingency planning for Phase II actions, but would make it very clear that decisions in this area would depend:
(a) on experience in reprisal actions
(b) on joint efforts to achieve victories within South Vietnam, and
(c) on joint efforts to achieve political stability.
My decisions on Phase II will necessarily be affected by performance in earlier activities.
6. This program omits discussion of the enormous problem of political unity you will face even if truce is achieved. I have read your 2057/3/ with great interest, and I am considering whether to send someone for further discussions with you on this subject. This issue is connected in my mind with the related question whether our rules of assignment and rotation in all departments are bringing the best and most experienced Americans to Vietnam. I am asking State, Defense, CIA and AID to review this question in the light of prospective withdrawal of dependents and we will communicate further soon./4/
/3/Document 12.
/4/In telegram 2085 from Saigon, January 8, Taylor expressed thanks for the President's support of Embassy recommendations. Taylor added that he thought "we can accomplish much with the authority contained therein" and that the Embassy would forward its comments as soon as they were in order. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
20. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, January 7, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. III. No classification marking. Drafted by the President. Written in the bottom margin in McGeorge Bundy's hand is the following notation: "Chet Cooper: Keep an eye on this--it's LBJ's own baby. MB." Attached was a copy of an article entitled "Can U.S. Win in Vietnam?"; see footnote 2, Document 2.
I would hope that you could develop a new plan for volunteer fighting forces that would proceed with a minimum of overhead and a maximum of energy in direct contact with the Vietnamese at all levels.
I constantly hear, re Vietnam, we have too much staff, too much administration, too much clerical work, too much reporting, too much rotation and not enough action. Taylor and Westmoreland are probably the ablest regulation officers we have but that, apparently, is not all we need from the results we are getting. Much of the trouble may be here in Washington which sets the policy on rotation and reporting and other forms of paper work.
I expect you and Max are right in opposing larger U.S. Forces, but let's develop some alternatives.
LBJ/2/
/2/Johnson's initials appear in an unidentified hand, indicating Johnson signed the original.
21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 11, 1965, 9:35 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIETS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Cooper and William Bundy, cleared by Cooper and McNaughton, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to the White House and DOD.
1436. Following views are forwarded on the theory that it will be more useful for you to have tentative Washington thinking prior rather than subsequent to an "unpleasant surprise" in Saigon.
Thrust of Khanh's remarks to Johnson and to the CAS/2/ together with reports and rumors of a Khanh coup lead us to believe that chances that Khanh will take over control of the Government, directly or behind a transparent facade are sufficient to warrant our developing broad contingent guidelines to extent possible.
/2/U. Alexis Johnson's account of his January 9 meeting with Khanh was sent in telegram 2102 from Saigon, January 9. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S) Khanh's views as reported to the Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon on January 8 are in TDCS-314/00099-65, January 9. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXV)
We are very much aware that the eclipse of any form of meaningful civilian government in Saigon will create awkward and even serious problems for the Embassy, responsible officials in Washington and our Vietnam policy generally. We would be faced, as you have pointed out in your thoughtful Saigon 2010 of December 31,/3/ with two difficult and unpleasant choices: To work as best we can with Khanh, or virtually disengage from an in-country military and economic role.
/3/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 478.
Choice between these alternatives would obviously involve most serious issues and might hinge on judgment that could only be made over period of days as to whether new military government or present one effectively dominated by Khanh had some degree of popular support, would get on with war, and was ready to work genuinely with US. If so we might well have to swallow our pride and work with it. Hence our only short-term guidance would be to avoid to extent possible action that commits us one way or the other. This might well involve, for example, taking no early initiative to see Khanh, letting him come to us, but also doing nothing to change pattern of working relations at all levels until situation clarifies.
Realize above does not get us very far, and would appreciate your thinking on possible shape of events and additional measures we might take if it happens. So far as we can see here, you are doing all you can to prevent it.
Rusk
22. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 11, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; LOR. No time of transmission is given on the source text, but the telegram was received in the Department of State at 10:55 a.m.
2116. For the President. Ref. A. Deptel 1419./2/ B. Instructions to Ambassador Taylor December 3, 1964./3/ C. Position paper on SE Asia December 7, 1964./4/ D. Embtel 2055./5/
/2/Document 19.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 434.
/4/See ibid., Document 433.
/5/Document 10.
1. We have drawn much satisfaction from your message (Ref. A). With its indication of general agreement with our thesis that the deteriorating situation here requires prompt action to pull the government together, to stimulate pacification and to raise the public morale. Also, I hope I am correct in assuming agreement that the action required includes a prompt passage into Phase II operations against the DRV as soon as possible and the adoption of a policy of prompt and clear reprisals for what has variously been termed "an unusual hostile act" (Ref. B) of the VC or any major or spectacular VC action in SVN whether against U.S. personnel and installations or not (Ref. C). However, it is clear from your message that final approval of either of these courses of action, Phase II operations or reprisal bombing, is subject to certain conditions.
2. It is these conditions which I should like to discuss because, frankly, some of them seem to work against the broad thesis that it is to our interest to act rapidly along the two lines indicated above. I think that I can best set forth the issues by discussing the following problems which arise from analyzing Ref. A.
A. How to establish the firmness of a reprisal policy by public announcement so that the evacuation of our dependents will not appear to be running.
(1) The problem here is how we could get our dependents out before taking any retaliatory action without creating panic in SVN and creating misunderstanding of our motives in the U.S., in North Vietnam and in other interested foreign countries. Within SVN, there are the reactions of three groups which we shall have to consider, the government, the Vietnamese armed forces and the Vietnamese general public. The suggestion in Deptel 1419 is that we get across our intentions and motives by "inconspicuous background briefings rather than by formal public announcement". We are very doubtful here that any public statement without action will carry conviction to any of the audiences mentioned above. We are sure that background briefings are not an adequate vehicle for this kind of communication. While background briefings are a well understood and much [used] technique in the U.S., they are by no means as useful with the Vietnamese officialdom or public. The latter are so accustomed to ignoring, discounting or, according to their mood, being alarmed by rumors and half-truths published in the scores of little sheets which pass for their press, that we cannot expect to communicate an authentic, credible message by this technique to the Vietnamese whom we wish to reach. A formal public statement would be somewhat more effective but it runs counter to our conviction which is also strongly shared by Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane and by various Thai leaders in Bangkok that in dealing with the North we should act first, and, if necessary to talk at all, talk later.
(2) There are also certain dangers in making any advance statement on the subject of reprisals even if such a statement had a high order of credibility. We are not sure how the DRV would react to such a statement. But they might undertake to present us with a series of fuzzy and ambiguous provocations to which we would not wish to respond but to which we would be pressed to respond by public opinion aroused by our brave statement of intention. In particular, I am sure that we would be under constant pressure from the GVN to take actions in cases where we would not feel reprisal warranted. In short, I do not believe that a statement of reprisal policy in advance of initiation is the best way to cover the withdrawal of our dependents.
There is no good way to do so which will avoid creating serious difficulties but, if the decision is made to withdraw dependents, I personally would prefer to base our action upon the need to reduce the number of non-essential U.S. personnel to exposure to terrorist actions and on the need to clear the decks for the accelerated military activities which are expected to follow the termination of the recent political crisis.
(3) I am sorry if we seem to be belaboring the point of the timing and manner of the withdrawal of our dependents. We will, of course, cheerfully abide by whatever decision is made, but all of us here deeply feel that in the present situation this action, for whatever expressed reason taken, is fraught with serious adverse consequences. Even if prior withdrawal of our dependents had only a marginal effect on the totality of the situation here; our margins are already too thin to warrant paring them further. None of us feel that the program set forth in Embtel 2055 subjects our dependents to undue hazards and in the light of the practical difficulties of making an adequate explanation in advance of a reprisal, we feel that our former recommendation (Embtel 2055) remains the preferred course of action.
B. How to make a reprisal within 24-hours after the provocation.
(1) I doubt very much that this requirement can be met, although certain actions can be taken to reduce the required time between the provocation and the retaliatory strike. We can submit to you and Prime Minister Huong a number of possible targets associated with infiltration and located within the Southern DRV. Six such targets have already been identified and plans have been made to expedite their attack. With prior Presidential agreement before the fact to these plans for the strikes, we would then require only the final authorization for execution of one or several of these approved plans.
(2) General Westmoreland is of the opinion that he could assure execution within 24 hours of receipt of your authorization to strike but that it would be unwise to count on a shorter time. The Vietnamese aircraft which would participate in such a strike are normally involved in operations in areas often remote from the bases from which the reprisal strikes would be launched. Also, one must always take into account the need for crew rest and thorough briefing. Likewise, varying conditions depending on the time of day at which the order to execute may be received and the uncertain conditions of weather at the time make it unrealistic to be overly precise in fixing a mandatory time of reaction.
(3) While we recognize that generally speaking the faster we get off a retaliatory strike the better, it seems to us that there are strong arguments to avoid fixing a time of reaction which might become a self-imposed and unnecessary straight-jacket on our freedom of decision. A lapse of even several days will not prevent establishing a clear linkage between the VC action and our reprisal and under certain circumstances may be desirable to permit us to take action under the most favorable conditions. Let us not hurry ourselves if it is not necessary.
C. How to initiate Phase II actions as rapidly as possible and under as favorable conditions as possible.
(1) With regard to Phase II operations, you will recall that, based upon the authorizations contained in references B and C. I have already broached the matter of joint planning for Phase II with the GVN senior authorities in early December. At that time, General Westmoreland and General Khanh designated chief planners to represent each side and reached agreement on the general purpose of the planning. However, because of the subsequent political events, they agreed to defer further action. Khanh has tried recently to reopen the matter with General Westmoreland and has asked him whether he was now ready to proceed. At my instructions, General Westmoreland indicated that he could not give a final answer until the termination of the political crisis.
(2) In Embtel 2052, I asked for authority to go somewhat farther than my December instructions and, upon resumption of joint planning, to tell our Vietnamese counterparts that we definitely intended to initiate Phase II operations provided the new government reached the criteria which were communicated to them following my return from Washington. As I read Deptel 1419, I am not entirely sure whether the effect (paragraph 3 and paragraph 5) is to extend my authority in the way requested or, on the contrary, to increase the conditions precedent to initiation of Phase II. I would like to assume that I can [garble--indicate our?] intention to the GVN with regard to initiating Phase II but with the understanding that there is no present commitment as to timing and or as to scale. At the same time, I would like to interpret the language of paragraph 5 as adding nothing to the requirements previously transmitted to the GVN in December.
(3) In view of the nature of the recent political truce, in applying the criteria for governmental performance, I am sure we will have to use much common sense and great leniency if we are ever going to take action. The weakened civil government which has resulted from the political compromise with the generals is not going to make in the coming months much measurable progress toward real political stability and strength. If we are ever to get into Phase II and, as you know, we consider it essential do so, we may have to be satisfied with little more than the continued existence of a government in whose name we can act and to whose request for assistance we can respond. If, after giving about another month's run to our efforts in Laos, the Huong government is still in business, my feeling is that we should be ready to embark on Phase II operations, if only for the pulmotor effect upon the internal situation in SVN.
D. How to improve joint efforts to achieve victories within SVN.
(1) General Westmoreland would say that he feels that we have gone about as far forward in influencing the planning and execution of operations as the advisory concept will permit. Inherent in that concept is the fact that Vietnamese commanders make the final decisions and assume the ultimate responsibilities. It is estimated that a good advisor can influence his counterpart with respect to a decision about 80 percent of the time. Less effective advisors will, of course, have a lower batting average. A few Vietnamese officers are not disposed to take any advice--these we usually manage to have removed, but it takes time.
(2) The proof of the effectiveness of the system is the evidence of its results. A summary of actions and results in 1964 indicates that some 7,000 members of the armed forces of Viet-Nam were killed in action as against about 17,000 Viet-Cong. Out of some 2,400 large unit actions (those most influenced by U.S. advisors), about 60 percent made contact with the Viet-Cong. During the last four months (the period of keeping records in this form) 1,539 large and small actions which made contact were observed and rated by U.S. observers. Out of these engagements, the U.S. observers considered 1,377 or approximately 90 percent to have been successful.
(3) The Binh Gia battle has made recent headlines as I mentioned in my last week's report to you./6/ This unsuccessful action was not the fault of American advisors, but rather the result of their difficulty in getting to the senior commanders who were preoccupied with political matters. Unfortunately, commanders here will not delegate authority to their subordinates so that in their physical absence it is very difficult to get any decision. This was the case at Binh Gia where Khanh did not really get into the action until the battle was virtually over.
/6/Document 14.
(4) Now that there is a political truce, we will make every effort to get these commanders back to their primary business of fighting the war. I think most of them are pretty sick of political involvements and can be expected to turn in an improved military performance, at least for a while.
3. The foregoing represents the principal problems which we see arising from Deptel 1419 and our comments thereon. We are very glad to know that you are asking the concerned Departments and agencies to examine the situation with respect to the assignment and rotation of our personnel in the light of the prospective withdrawal of dependents.
Seen from here, we feel that our supporting agencies in Washington have done extremely well by us in terms of the quality of Americans sent here. There will, of course, have to be changes made in the rules of assignment and rotation if dependents are withdrawn.
4. As a summary to the discussion presented in the foregoing paragraphs, I would like to recommend for your approval the following policy statements to serve as guidance to all interested agencies of USG:
A. In case of any major or spectacular Viet-Cong action in SVN (Tab E, Ref. C) whether against U.S. personnel and installations or not, the GVN/U.S. forces will execute a reprisal air attack as quickly as possible against an appropriate DRV target upon approval of the U.S. President and GVN chief executive. Starting now, the number of U.S. dependents will be reduced by administrative measures as described in Reference D. The remainder will be withdrawn in an orderly manner following the first reprisal attack.
B. It is the intention of the USG to initiate Phase II operations as soon as the GVN meets or shows reasonable promise of meeting the criteria [of] being able to speak for and to its people; to maintain law and order in principal cities; and to make plans for the conduct of operations and to assure effective execution of such plans by military and police forces of SVN.
C. Phase II operations will be initiated and each specific strike thereunder executed by joint agreement of the President and the GVN chief executive. U.S. dependents will have been evacuated prior to initiation of Phase II operations.
D. The U.S. Ambassador is authorized to seek agreement of the GVN as necessary for those actions in subparagraphs A, B and C and to communicate to appropriate GVN officials U.S. intentions and reservations.
E. The U.S. Ambassador is authorized to communicate to appropriate GVN officials such information on the situation and our actions in Laos as may be helpful./7/
/7/The following telephone conversation took place between McGeorge Bundy and Rusk at 6:44 p.m. on January 11:"B asked if Sec had looked at the long message from Max; B's feeling was that it is a kind of oblique incomplete answer; he thought we might do well to get some staff thinking on it before pressing the President and B felt we would be within our rights if B were to let Cooper work on it, Sec give it to Bill, and Bob to Jack McNaughton. Sec agreed." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations)
Taylor
23. Editorial Note
On January 12 in response to a request from William Bundy, Robert H. Johnson of the Policy Planning Council sent to Bundy an 11-page paper entitled "The United Nations and the Vietnam Problem." In his covering memorandum, Johnson wrote that the paper had "the benefit of substantial oral contributions and review in two drafts by L, UNP, and INR," but that there had not been time for these offices to clear the final text. Johnson noted that the paper considered "at various places the manner in which the question of negotiations might arise in the UN consideration and also contains a very brief discussion in the first section on the possible positive values of the UN as a place for launching negotiations should these be desired." This subject was considered in detail by Johnson in a 4-page paper, which he transmitted separately to Bundy also on January 12.
Other papers touching on this question include a 5-page paper entitled "The Pros and Cons of Taking the Vietnam (or Southeast Asia) Problem to the United Nations," drafted by Robert H. Johnson on January 13, and a paper entitled "Limitations on UN Action with Respect to South Vietnam," drafted on January 13 by Evelyn S. Colbert of the Office of Research and Analysis for Far East, Southeast Asia Division. All four papers are in Department of State, FE Files: Lot 69 D 277, DRV.
24. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 12, 1965, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2132. For the President. Embtel 2059./2/ As you know, the signing and publication January 9 of the joint civilian-military communiqué put an official end to the political crisis which was ushered in by the Armed Forces Council's coup on December 20. Today the government issued a second communiqué to explain that Vietnamese-U.S. relations are, as always, intimate and cordial while tomorrow evening, Chief of State Suu is giving a "tea party" for the wrap-up conciliation of the principal participants, Vietnamese and U.S., in the recent coolness. Hopefully thereafter, we will make a new start forward.
/2/Document 14.
The Ministry of Interior announced Sunday/3/ evening that the detained HNC members had been released and permitted to return home. The Minister of Interior has informed us that March 21 is the current target date for the convocation of the National Assembly and that he now envisages a mixed procedure of elections in the cities and appointments in the countryside for choosing the Assembly's membership. Lower Interior officials have indicated privately to us that the Cabinet will consider a proposed election law this week.
/3/January 10.
Despite these indications of conciliation between the armed forces and the government, General Khanh, in talking with Alex Johnson on January 9/4/ just before the signing of the first communiqué, made it quite clear that he still considers the armed forces the only true guardian of the nation's anti-Communist spirit with the responsibility to intervene whenever they consider that there are undesirable elements working their way into the government. He intimated that he was seeking the Buddhists as colleagues in this monitorship of the government.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 21.
The suggestion of an alliance of some sort between Khanh and the Buddhists, long predicted by Huong, finds some verification in the Buddhist encouraged strikes and demonstrations in the Hue-Danang area. Young Turk General Thi who is responsible for law and order in the region is doing little, if anything, to suppress the demonstrators. The Buddhist Institute will certainly raise the level of their anti-Huong activities if the word gets about that the army will not intervene. Fortunately, in the Saigon area, the local commander, General Dong, is a staunch character apparently loyal to Huong.
Thus, the basic unbalanced political equation remains with us: the civilian government, weak in prestige and authority, is caught between two forces whose objectives are not identical--the army and the Buddhist Institute--but both of which desire some degree of indirect control over the government without assuming corresponding responsibilities. An added element of instability is that both of these turbulent elements have their own internal lines of division.
Viet-Cong military activity declined during the week, following the major battle at Binh Gia the week before. The week was marked by Viet-Cong harassment of thirteen district capitals by mortar fire--mostly in the Delta. Similarly, on the government's side, although the number of ground operations increased, contact with the Viet-Cong was down.
The personnel strength of the armed forces has continued to rise slowly but steadily during recent weeks and will not fall much short of the year end goal. Furthermore, a conscription law is under revision and a new draft is expected to be completed this month. The proposed law specifies that deferment is a privilege and not a right, and may be voided.
While there have been some indications of public relief over the termination of the internal political tension, press censorship has prevented many of the facts from being generally known. The preparations for Tet, the lunar new year festival, have attracted far more popular interest than the political goings-on./5/
/5/In forwarding this telegram to the President, McGeorge Bundy, in a January 12 memorandum, wrote that Khanh's own ambition was the principal unknown in the political situation: "If he were really content to maintain a watchdog position, we could move forward with some confidence. But there is good reason to suspect him of a desire to return to full power in the manner of de Gaulle, and that is why we are dealing with an interim government. "Moreover, the recent telegrams make it fairly clear that serious communications between Khanh and the United States Government do not now exist. After a little time for cooling off, we may wish to raise with Max the question of real contact with Khanh. After all he exists." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, President/Taylor NODIS CLORES)
Taylor
25. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, January 13, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI, Memos. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Reply to Taylor's Telegram/2//2/Document 22.
Bill Bundy, McNaughton, Unger and I met late yesterday afternoon and agreed on the following.
With respect to Evacuation: We are inclined to feel that Taylor makes a great deal of sense on the undesirability of a prior announcement either through a background statement or directly. We are taking the following line:
1. Arrangements for evacuation should be re-examined so that the 7-10 day period referred to by Taylor can be telescoped into, say, 2 or 3 days. (There are, altogether, slightly more than 1600 U.S. dependents in South Vietnam, of whom only about 100 are outside Saigon. We think that, if necessary, we can move some ships from the Seventh Fleet into Saigon harbor and get everybody out in one fell swoop.)
2. We feel that there should be a direct relationship between evacuation and a major reprisal against a VC spectacular. Thus:
a. At the moment approval is given to Saigon to undertake reprisal, dependents should be alerted (if this is leaked, we should indicate in background briefings that ordinary prudence requires such preparation).
b. Actual evacuation should occur upon the initiation of reprisal action.
c. Immediately after the reprisal targets are hit, the President should issue a statement to the effect that we have responded to the latest VC atrocity, our planes have carried out their mission, are on the way back to their bases, and that U.S. dependents are in the process of being evacuated. The announcement should be put in terms of our readiness to respond to further VC provocations, and our desire to relieve both GVN and U.S. forces of diversionary efforts to protect dependents' schools, homes, etc.
With respect to Phase II: We are recommending that we inform Ambassador Taylor that we can provide no guidance beyond that given to him in early December. The decision on the timing and scale of Phase II operations will have to be made at the Presidential level.
Note: There are some sticky details on evacuation that have not been dealt with: What to do about working wives, older children, etc? What to do about British and other foreign dependents (for whom I think we have expressed some responsibility--they number about 1000)? Whether we evacuate them all directly back to the U.S.?
I have been brooding about another approach to evacuation. Briefly--Send mothers and school children under 12 home and not recruit any one with young children. Send older kids to boarding school in HK or elsewhere in SEA (there are some good ones) and permit mothers to stay on at own risk (parents can visit kids, but not vice versa). Raise medical and psychological requirements for all civilians. Comme ca.
Chester L. Cooper/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
26. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 14, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Our last exchange with TaylorTaylor came in on Monday with a long answer/2/ to your message of last Thursday./3/ We owe him an answer.
/2/See Document 22.
/3/See Document 19.
Taylor still resists the immediate withdrawal of dependents. He says that it would not be practicable to cover it with hints of a reprisal policy in Saigon, and he says that if we tie the GVN to reprisals in this way, they will feel a right to request reprisals after nearly any small act of provocation. So he goes back to his own recommendation that we wait on dependents until after the reprisal is ordered. Rusk, McNamara and I agree that we should go back to him with another proposal, but because we think this is a poor week to ask you for any major decisions, I suggest we send this one over Rusk's name without committing you at this stage. Our suggestion is that we stick to the notion of immediate withdrawal of dependents, by proposing to him that he sound out the Prime Minister on this matter and authorizing Max to propose to Huong that the withdrawal be covered and explained by a Presidential statement here. The object of this statement would be to indicate our firmness and determination without explicitly discussing reprisals. The experts think it might well do the job, but we need to give Max a chance to comment.
The statement/4/ we suggest is as follows:
/4/ The statement was sent to Saigon for comment; see Document 27.
"I have asked Ambassador Taylor to arrange for the evacuation of the dependents of all official American civil and military personnel in South Vietnam. In taking this action I recognize the personal hardships that will be imposed on these loyal Government servants who are already working in trying circumstances. Nevertheless, I feel a personal responsibility for the safety of the wives and children involved and consider that in view of the ever-present danger of indiscriminate attacks, and the irresponsibility of the Communist terrorists, they must depart. We continue to seek peace in South Vietnam as in all Southeast Asia, but as long as the Communists persist in their efforts to take over the country there will be danger to Americans as, of course, there also are to the long-suffering Vietnamese people themselves. I also regard it as essential that American officials and military personnel in South Vietnam be relieved of every duty or responsibility unrelated to the effective execution of aid to the GVN and also that that Government not be asked to bear any burdens of support or protection which are not absolutely essential to its own safety. This evacuation therefore will begin at once and will, of course, be carried out in a manner to minimize hardship and difficulty for all those concerned."
Max's incoming also tries to tighten your commitment to Phase 2 operations. (Air attacks against North Vietnam that are not specifically reprisals.) We would propose to answer by saying that you would not be ready at this stage to go beyond the position stated in your last message, namely, that you are willing to have joint planning but must make it very clear that any decisions by the President on Phase 2 will "necessarily be affected by performance" in reprisal actions, in military efforts within Vietnam, and in the struggle for political stability.
If the truce of the tea party holds and this line of action seems reasonable to you, we would try to keep Vietnam quiet until after Wednesday.
McG. B./5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 14, 1965, 8:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; LOR. Drafted by Unger and cleared by William Bundy, in substance by McGeorge Bundy and McNamara, and in draft by Rusk, and approved by Unger.
1477. For the Ambassador from the Secretary.
1. Your 2116/2/ provides us with a further helpful analysis of your situation as it relates to the various proposals for action we have had under review between us over recent weeks.
/2/Document 22.
2. As a result of our study of your message here and after further discussion with the President I can provide you with the following guidance with respect to the five recommendations (A through E) at the close of your telegram.
A. Your arguments concerning the relation between reprisal action, the withdrawal of dependents and public handling of these questions have been thoroughly weighed. We continue to be of the view that it would be far preferable if dependents could be withdrawn in the near future and prior to initiation of possible reprisals. The continued presence of dependents entails serious risks for their safety which we should avoid if at all possible and their presence also can interfere with the carrying out of the military job at hand and imposes a burden on the US and Vietnamese authorities.
At the same time we agree that any action on dependents must be taken in such a way as to avoid serious risk of creating panic in South Viet-Nam, creating misunderstanding of our motives in the US and elsewhere in the world, or reducing the effectiveness of the US mission. Therefore, unless you see serious objection we would ask you to explore with Prime Minister Huong on a strictly personal and confidential basis the entire question of evacuation of US dependents and report his reaction and your recommendations for further action on this matter in the light of his views. After explaining why, from the US point of view, we consider it wise to take such action soon, you may tell Huong that simultaneous with evacuation the President would make a public statement which would remove any possibility of the evacuation being misinterpreted as a reduction or withdrawal of US support or commitment in any sense. We envisage a statement by the President along the following lines:
[Here follows text of the statement, with minor editorial changes, as contained in Document 26.]
With respect to reprisals we propose the following steps:
(1) Immediately following the occurrence of a spectacular enemy action you would propose to us what reprisal action you considered desirable.
(2) Following the President's decision and simultaneously with reprisal action he would carefully inform the American people and world of our actions and the underlying reasons.
(3) We continue to believe that reprisal must be undertaken as fast as possible following provocation and that this should not exceed 24 hours except when absolutely unavoidable.
B. It is not possible now for us to make any commitment on Phase II actions going beyond our guidance of December 3./3/ The criteria which you have set out are highly pertinent and relevant to the President's eventual decision but are not the only factors which must be considered.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 435.
C. We agree that when it is possible to authorize the initiation of Phase II operations, this will call for the agreement of the President and of the GVN Chief Executive, as will each specific strike thereunder.
D. You are authorized to seek agreement of the GVN as necessary for those actions in Subparagraph 4.A of your message 2116, in the light of the foregoing discussion of evacuation of dependents and reprisals. You are also authorized to seek agreement of the GVN as necessary on a contingency basis for Phase II actions on the basis specified in our previous message, paragraph 5(5)./4/
/4/See Document 19.
E. You are authorized to communicate to the appropriate GVN officials the pertinent information on Laos. However, before acting on this matter we would like to see a summary of the information you have in mind communicating and would like this summary also to be repeated to Vientiane; the message on this subject should not be in this highly restricted channel./5/
/5/In telegram 2159 from Saigon, January 15, Taylor indicated that on the basis of a previous instruction from the Department of State he had already briefed Huong, Khanh, and Vien on recent Barrell Roll operations. The briefing was described in telegram 2158 from Saigon, January 15. The previous instruction was telegram 1471 to Saigon, January 14, which was in response to Taylor's request in telegram 2146, January 14, for authorization to brief senior South Vietnamese officials on air operations in Laos. (All in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
28. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 18, 1965, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; LOR.
2186. For the Secretary. Reference: A) Deptel 1477./2/ B) Position paper on SE Asia December 7, 1964./3/
/2/Document 27.
/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 433.
1. I was pleased to receive the authority to discuss the matter of the evacuation of dependents with Huong and will seek an appointment as soon as I receive a reply to this cable which raises matters which need to be pretty well settled to permit response to questions he is likely to raise. Incidentally, because of Huong's limited perceptiveness in such matters as assessment of political and psychological reactions, Alex Johnson and I feel that Vien should be included in our discussions with Huong. We will do so unless you indicate an objection.
2. Our main problem remains how to explain our evacuation of dependents in way which will seem reasonable and straightforward and thus avoid alarming SVN, and third countries who have nationals here, or who are providing or may provide free world aid. In developing such statement of our case, VC have given us some assistance in the explosive charge found January 16 at the special services pool near Tan Son Nhut Airfield. Assuming it remains your view that dependents should be withdrawn, statement such as following appears to us about the best we can do:
"A. The finding of the explosive charge at the special services swimming pool on January 16 confirms previous indications that American personnel, including their wives and children, will henceforth be targets for VC terrorist actions. This conclusion has been reached at a time when USG has been reviewing its policy regarding dependents in SVN in light of developments of situation in that country and clear need to concentrate all US efforts on assisting people of Viet-Nam in their efforts to resist Communist subversion. Under such circumstances, it has been question for some time as to whether continued presence of dependents is consistent with desire of US to maintain a posture of maximum readiness to meet whatever contingencies may be forced upon US and Vietnamese people.
"B. The probability of further VC terrorist activities, added to these other considerations, has led to decision to adopt policy of removing wives and children from South Viet-Nam. Movement of dependents to SVN will cease at once and movement of dependents from SVN will begin at once on phased and orderly schedule. It is not possible at this time to estimate length of time required to complete this movement. Inevitable personal problems of affected households will be given sympathetic consideration in carrying out this policy."
3. Foregoing seems to me best argument we can make. You will note that we avoid suggesting that presence of dependents is cause for personal concern by heads of families or is significant burden on US and Vietnamese authorities. We do not believe these could be accepted as valid points here and their inclusion in US statement would weaken its credibility.
4. There are several additional questions related to evacuation upon which I need guidance as they are likely to arise in our discussions with Huong.
A. When and how do we propose to inform other friendly govts of our decision and what do we think they are likely to do about their dependents? (We presume initial notification would take place in Washington and we would chime in shortly thereafter. We have here no real estimate of governmental reactions as we have avoided any discussion of subject and recognize difficulty of Washington in making any such estimate.)
B. What action would we propose to take with regard tourist and other non-essential US travel to SVN? What advice will we give to private Americans and their families here? (It seems to us that, to be consistent, we should advise withdrawal of dependents of private Americans and discourage tourist travel which is still considerable to Saigon.)
C. What effect do we anticipate on airlines and their willingness to continue to fly into SVN? (As you know Pan American (which is only US commercial service here) pilots have long been threatening to refuse to fly into Saigon because of alleged dangers. Only because of strenuous Embassy and MACV efforts have they been willing nervously to continue. With announcement on dependents and the probable decline in tourist traffic resulting therefrom, Pan American may drop its commercial passenger service here.)
D. What is our estimate of the effect on the ability to obtain additional free world assistance (particularly non-military) and to retain that already committed? (Although we are not able to estimate its extent, it seems to us this kind of assistance is sure to decline.)
E. About how long do we estimate it will take to remove our dependents? (On the latter point, I would like to say at least month, perhaps longer. There should be no emergency air about this operation; it should be viewed as an administrative procedure and conducted accordingly. Any pell-mell atmosphere will completely destroy impression of calmness which we wish to convey. If during this period need for reprisal should arise, we should execute reprisal, then accelerate evacuation if necessary.)
5. Remainder of this cable deals with various aspects of retaliation--first, requirement to retaliate within twenty-four hours after event. We are assuming for purposes of this discussion that clock starts at time of verification of facts and nature of event and that occurrence of spectacular actions of kind listed in Tab E Ref B will be accepted as enemy acts without need for formal investigation or proof. These two assumptions are essential to any realistic reprisal policy which includes a twenty-four reaction requirement. It took us about 29 hours to learn full extent of casualties in Brink bombing and to get any confirmation of our immediate conviction that it was VC-conducted. If such an event had occurred in provinces, many more hours would have been required for these purposes.
6. We are making close analysis of feasibility of twenty-four hour reaction under foregoing assumptions. It is probable that following preliminary measures will have had to be taken in advance of incident to offer any likelihood of being able to retaliate in 24 hours:
A. Advance Washington approval of attack plans of six to ten possible reprisal targets.
B. Discussions with PriMin with regard to possible need for his concurrence in reprisal action on very short notice.
C. General discussions with restricted number of Vietnamese military of possible VNAF/USAF strikes against southern DRV targets with maximum effort to avoid any suggestion of commitment to ACL. It may be necessary to keep certain number of aircraft on alert at Danang with pilots briefed on number of DRV targets in order to meet reaction time requirement. Inevitably, this action would connote strong intention to strike which, if not carried out, would cause us serious difficulties with GVN.
D. Procedure for flash transmittal to Saigon of Washington authority to execute reprisal.
7. Even if foregoing preparatory measures are in effect, twenty-four hour requirement may be defeated by time of day or year of incident and by weather conditions at time. Weather is likely to be particularly troublesome and could entail delay of several days. Should wicked be allowed to escape by these fortuities? We will have shortly more specific comments on twenty-four hour problem when our current analysis is completed.
8. Final comment on retaliation relates to need of Presidential statement mentioned in subpara 2 Ref A. We think that there is much to commend in views of Thais and Souvanna that we should act and then not talk about our actions. More public the challenge we present to DRV more difficult becomes for them and their friends to back down or remain inactive. Without any statement, news will get around fast enough (witness overly rapid dissemination of word on Ban Ken)/4/ to serve purpose of bucking up our friends. I recognize there is US domestic problem but I would hope it could be met without involving President. If, nevertheless, some US statement is considered essential, I would think it important to preserve thesis that this is Vietnamese war in which we play supporting role and thus that first statement should be made by GVN. Such action would be consistent with operational concept which we prefer of having first bombs dropped by VNAF aircraft. In short, we feel that we should keep Vietnamese in front as we move into reprisals against the DRV and/or Phase II operations.
/4/The attack by U.S. aircraft on January 13 (designated Barrell Roll Nine) on a bridge near Ban Ken, North Vietnam, over which the North Vietnamese Government was supplying its own forces and the Pathet Lao in Laos.
9. In summary, we request (a) general approval of the substance of the proposed statement on evacuation, (b) guidance to answer questions of para 4 above, (c) approval of assumptions of para 5 above, and (d) any comments on our discussion of various aspects of the reprisal problem. We will not open discussions with Huong and Vien before receiving reply to (a) and (b).
Taylor
29. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 20, 1965, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2207. For the President. Embtel 2131./2/ By Saturday of last week,/3/ we thought that we might be entering an era of good will with the civilian and military leadership integrated amicably into the Huong government. On that day, a formal treaty of understanding was signed between Huong and Khanh covering the participation of military officers in the Cabinet. In our view the officers agreed upon were generally quite good.
/2/Presumably a reference to Taylor's previous weekly report in telegram 2132 (Document 24) rather than to telegram 2131.
/3/January 16.
General "Little" Minh as Armed Forces Minister seemed an excellent choice. General Thieu, as second Deputy Vice Prime Minister, is able and relatively experienced but, as a Catholic with Dai Viet political connections, is a sure target for Buddhist criticism. General Vien, the Minister of Information, is intelligent and cooperative but without experience in the information field. General Ky, the erratic Chief of the Air Force, had apparently accepted the post of Minister of Youth, Sports and Civil Defense but was known to be insisting upon retaining his military assignment concurrently. Prime Minister Huong had taken a position in opposition to any "double hatting" but was willing to leave the final decision on the matter to the military themselves. Events seemed to be moving smoothly just up to the time for the presentation of the new Cabinet to Chief of State Suu at Gia Long Palace on Tuesday afternoon./4/ Shortly before the hour fixed for the ceremony, General Khanh, speaking for the Armed Forces Council, called everything off and threw the entire matter into renegotiation.
/4/January 19.
We now know that the issue raised at this last minute was a complaint championed by General Ky that, while the military were contributing some of their best officers to the Cabinet, on the civilian side there had been no purging of undesirable ministers. I have just learned that Prime Minister Huong has acceded to this complaint and will replace the present Foreign Minister, Lam, and Minister of Health Dieu shortly after the Tet holiday, that is to say, about February 5. The principal count against Lam appears to be a past association with General "Big" Minh, a fact which suggests that General Khanh as well as Ky had a hand in tossing this last minute monkey wrench. The presentation of the Cabinet to the Chief of State has been rescheduled for 5:00 o'clock today, January 20, but we will keep our fingers crossed until the tea and cakes have been served.
While we have felt that the introduction of some military officers into the Cabinet is desirable in order to oblige them to share the responsibility, the foregoing events show how fragile is any agreement reached with General Khanh and his generals. As a group, they are basing their actions and decisions upon a "consensus of views" which thinly disguises a caucus procedure. Working in such an atmosphere, the generals have been unable to develop any basic unity of purpose and have displayed lack of responsibility in their actions and little reliability in fulfilling their undertakings. Khanh is in the middle of this turmoil pulling the strings and seeking to maneuver to his personal advantage. Thus far, he has got away with it by virtue of his agility of wit and foot, but one senses that this cannot last indefinitely. Needless to say, it is a sad way to conduct military business.
Tuesday, January 19 was a bad day not only because of the disappointment at Gia Long Palace but because of the renewed indications of new Buddhist difficulties. Several of the Buddhist Institute leaders told us yesterday/5/ that they are embarking on a hunger strike "to the death" if necessary in a desperate effort to bring down the Huong government. There are some indications that Khanh is equally a Buddhist target, but we have been misled on this point before. Last Saturday, Alex Johnson and I met for two hours with three of the Buddhist leaders trying to find some ground for accommodation./6/ All we got was another repetitious airing of grievances which ring true only in the ears of the leaders of the institute. They have no identifiable program other than getting Huong out of office in the hope of replacing him with another civilian cabinet filled with officials of their own choosing. They refuse to recognize that the overthrow of Huong is almost certain to bring about an all-military government, the last thing which they desire.
/5/This conversation is described in telegram 2193 from Saigon, January 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
/6/Taylor and U. Alexis Johnson's meeting with Tri Quang, Phap Tri, and Quang Lien on Saturday, January 16, is described in telegram 2169 from Saigon, January 16. (Ibid.)
The week was quite favorable to the government in a military sense. Viet Cong incidents were down in number and in intensity from those of the previous week. The Viet Cong lost 422 killed in action as against 146 for the government. However, pacification progress remained sluggish as during past weeks.
Taylor
30. Notes of President Johnson's Meeting With Congressional Leaders/1/
Washington, January 21, 1965, 10:07 a.m.-12:45 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings, Vol. I. Top Secret. The source text lists January 22 as the date of the meeting, but the President's Daily Diary (Johnson Library) indicates that the meeting was actually held from 10:07 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. on January 21. According to an attached list, the following attended the meeting: Senators Aiken, Dirksen, Kuchel, Long, Mansfield, Saltonstall, and Smathers; Representatives Albert, Arends, Boggs, Ford, Laird, and McCormack; Vice President Humphrey, Rusk, McNamara, and McCone. McGeorge Bundy and Lawrence O'Brien also attended. Horace Busby, Douglass Cater, Bill Moyers, George Reedy, and Jack Valenti attended part of the meeting.
The President opened the conference with Congressional leaders by explaining why it had been called. He said that at the very beginning of the Congressional session he wanted to develop procedures which would make it possible for the Administration to think and plan with Congressional leaders. He was ready to be frank and candid in all matters but to do so the discussions must not get into the public domain. Real damage is done to the national interest when information such as that which will be given during the course of the morning meeting, gets into the newspapers. The objective is to make possible an examination of our foreign policy and our defense structure by the Congressional leaders of both parties who are stewards of these policies. We do not separate Democrats and Republicans in Vietnam. He wanted to work with the legislative leaders in understanding, if not agreement, on both sides of the House and Senate. During the Eisenhower Administration the system of consulting Congressional leaders was the best he had ever known. The meetings were not many, perhaps 4 or 5, but President Eisenhower, who had been blunt and frank with Congressional leaders, had asked for their judgments on important problems.
The President said the Chairmen of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee had not been invited to this morning's meeting because he wished to limit this conference to very few persons. At a later date it will be possible to enlarge the number. Secretary Rusk had already briefed the Congressional committees on foreign policy. Secretary McNamara would be going to the Hill later to spell out our defense posture, part of which had already been made public in the Defense message sent to Congress.
The President said he was available for personal meetings with individual legislative leaders at any time.
Turning to substantive matters, the President said that since the last meeting with Congressional leaders in October/2/ the Administration had studied the situation in Vietnam intensively. He spoke of his conference with Ambassador Taylor in December./3/ Our worst problem continues to be Vietnam which he wrestles with all the time, day and night. The objective today is to put the problem out on the table for all those present. Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara would go into the details later but the basic fact is that we need to have in Saigon a stable government as a base for further actions.
/2/The President met with Congressional leaders on October 19, 1964, from 1:34 p.m. to 4:05 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No substantive record of the meeting has been found.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 432.
[Here follow comments about various European matters, the Congo situation, relations with Egypt and Indonesia, and Canadian Prime Minister Pearson's recent visit to the United States.]
Returning to the problem of Vietnam, the President said that he would ask Secretary McNamara to spell out the details of the increased military activity we are carrying on in Southeast Asia but first he wished to discuss the question of U.S. dependents in South Vietnam. He expressed concern that the Viet Cong might attack U.S. citizens in Saigon in the event we carry out air strikes in North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese might react by dropping bombs on Saigon. General Taylor and other U.S. military and civilian officials in South Vietnam are opposed to bringing home our dependents, however, he had thought we should do so for over 14 months.
The President said that because he does not have a "Lincoln Cabinet," (i.e., one which votes for an action unanimously, only to have the President decide against the action) the decision as to whether to withdraw dependents is still being explored. The President said he was concerned that the communists might take some irrational action which would result in the loss of many American women and children. If that happened, the American people would hold him responsible for not having ordered the dependents returned home earlier.
The President said he believed our relations with other nations should be dealt with on a non-political basis. President Kennedy was fortunate to have had in the Congress Republicans who supported his foreign policy. President Truman had Senator Vandenberg. The Administration has no mortgage on patriotism. The Republicans have ideas we want to know about. Republicans should be in on foreign policy take-offs rather than merely at the time of crash landings. The President said that the responsibility for foreign policy decisions was his but he wanted the views of all. These views would be studied and given full consideration. All of us want to do the right thing in respect to foreign policy and our defense posture. Never in recent history has there been greater willingness to consider these two subjects from the point of view of the national interest rather than party politics.
The President praised CIA Director McCone, adding that he was keeping the Director from leaving government. He praised Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, noting that the latter had lost over $4 million as a result of his having left industry to run the Department of Defense.
The President said his objective is to try to unite the United States so that in the eyes of the world it is a united country. In his relations with other nations, his objective is to seek to avoid a nuclear holocaust while ensuring the defense of the nation. He appealed to those present to give him their attention, the benefit of their wisdom and their judgment.
The President then asked Secretary Rusk to go into greater detail on major foreign policy problems.
Secretary Rusk said our greatest problem in South Vietnam is political instability. Our over-riding objective is to achieve political unity there. The President interrupted to point out that the leaders of allied and friendly states are hesitant to send aid to South Vietnam because of the political instability there. They fear that they might appear foolish if, after they send aid, the country goes to pieces politically.
Secretary Rusk continued by saying that Hanoi believes that if it can hold on a little longer it can win South Vietnam for communism because political instability is increasing. The Secretary spelled out the details of the current compromise between the South Vietnamese civilians and the military leaders which has resulted in the formation of a new cabinet. The Secretary made clear that we are keeping the political lines open so that, if there is any interest on the other side, a settlement based on either the 1954 or the 1962 agreement can be negotiated. If the communists will not negotiate with us on a return to the earlier agreements, we are in for a very difficult time in Southeast Asia.
Referring to Laos, Secretary Rusk said that that country provided a thermometer registering what is politically possible in Southeast Asia. Current discussions among the three factions in Laos may possibly lead to a 14-nation conference. If we could settle the difficulties in Laos on the basis of the 1962 agreements, the effect in South Vietnam would be beneficial to us.
[Here follows discussion of Indonesia, West New Guinea, the Congo, Burundi, the Sudan, the Middle East, Germany, and the Alliance for Progress.]
The President then asked Secretary McNamara to discuss the military side of the Vietnamese problem.
Secretary McNamara began by stating that our estimates of Viet Cong strength in South Vietnam were up. In addition, we have evidence that the number of guerrillas being infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam has increased substantially. From 1959 to date, we estimate that between 19,000 and 34,000 North Vietnamese have crossed into South Vietnam to take part in guerrilla activity below the 17th parallel. The current annual rate of those infiltrating to South Vietnam may be in the neighborhood of 10,000.
At the same time that the Viet Cong strength is increasing, the military strength of South Vietnam is also rising. This is because the number of South Vietnamese recruits has increased even though the number of desertions remains high. Hopefully the South Vietnamese forces will be increased by 87,000 men in 1965.
In reply to a question by Senator Saltonstall, Secretary McNamara said that those who desert from the South Vietnamese army do not join the Viet Cong but simply go back home.
Senator Dirksen, addressing the President, said that a reliable correspondent, Mr. Keyes Beech, Correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, had made certain statements about Vietnam. The President interrupted to challenge Senator Dirksen's description of Mr. Beech as a reliable correspondent. The President said Mr. Beech had reported last December that General Taylor was returning to Washington threatening to resign unless the President ordered attacks on North Vietnam. The President said General Taylor had flatly denied any such intention and had telephoned the White House from Honolulu to explain that Beech's report was entirely without foundation.
Secretary McNamara resumed his presentation by saying that in 1964, 17,000 Viet Cong and 7,500 South Vietnamese were killed in the fighting. A total of 245 U.S. personnel had been killed in South Vietnam since 1954.
Senator Saltonstall asked why there was such a disparity between Viet Cong forces and the much larger South Vietnamese forces. Secretary McNamara replied that on the basis of extensive experience we had concluded that a numerical advantage of 10 to 1 is required to win a guerrilla war. We need currently more South Vietnamese troops but not more U.S. forces.
The President said we have decided that more U.S. forces are not needed in South Vietnam short of a decision to go to full-scale war. The ratio is now approximately 5 South Vietnamese to 1 Viet Cong. The war must be fought by the South Vietnamese. We cannot control everything that they do and we have to count on their fighting their war.
Senator Long asked why we do not push into North Vietnam in an attempt to overcome the existing disparity between the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong forces.
The President intervened to say that he had called the leaders together today not to discuss all the details of our programs but to inform them in general and to work out procedures under which such meetings could take place every few weeks. He again cautioned against leaking to the press information about today's discussion. He said if reporters learned of the information being made available to the leaders all would be lost.
Senator Long replied that perhaps he should not be told all of the details. He did not want to hear things that he should not know about but he did want some response to his question as to why we did not move against North Vietnam in some way.
Secretary McNamara responded by summarizing our covert operations in North Vietnam. During the past year we have been carrying out our program by building up the South Vietnamese forces necessary. Some of these forces, having completed their training, are now being used. All are non-U.S. personnel, but all have been trained by our forces. Infiltration teams are being dropped in North Vietnam and attacks from the sea are being launched against the coast of North Vietnam. Semi-covert operations consist of reconnaissance missions in Laos carried out at Souvanna's request. We have facilitated the carrying out of more than 450 reconnaissance missions over Laos in order to obtain needed information. We have discovered there has been a substantial movement of Pathet Lao forces into the Panhandle of Laos. We have so far lost 4 U.S. aircraft in these operations. The recent bombing of the bridge at Ban Ken in Laos, which we have not officially confirmed, was part of the U.S. armed reconnaissance program. This bombing was carried out by U.S. planes because the bridge was heavily defended by anti-aircraft guns. The Laos Air Force was not able to carry out this particular mission with their T-28 planes.
Senator Saltonstall asked whether the objective was to affect the situation in Laos or that in Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said we wanted to affect both situations. The armed reconnaissance affected the power situation in Laos but also affected the infiltration of Viet Cong to South Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara then turned to the problem of withdrawing U.S. dependents from South Vietnam. The U.S. political and military officers in Saigon do not want to send the dependents home. They are concerned about the effect which a withdrawal would have in Southeast Asia as well as the effect on personnel in South Vietnam. The number of U.S. dependents of government personnel totals 1700 plus the dependents of non-U.S. personnel and some other non-governmental U.S. personnel.
Senator Dirksen said he could not understand why we did not bring the dependents home. We are pampering our forces in South Vietnam. Why do we have to send all our civilization to war.
The President said that for 14 months he had agreed with those who want to bring our dependents home, but the officers in Saigon are still opposed.
Congressman Ford said he wanted to reassure the President that he shares the Vandenberg philosophy. His relations with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Director McCone are excellent. This meeting had been extremely helpful and he hoped there would be more such meetings. He believes the opposition party will cooperate with the Administration and will not take positions which are harmful to the national interest. Personally, he agrees with the course of action being followed in South Vietnam. We had to keep our commitment to the South Vietnamese. Referring to the 25,000 to 30,000 persons who had been infiltrated into South Vietnam since 1959, he asked how it would be possible to get a better ratio than 5 to 1 if this infiltration keeps increasing. Should military action be taken to cut down the infiltration? He concluded by repeating his view that the meeting had been wholesome and hoped that frequent and regular meetings of this kind would be held.
[Here follows discussion primarily on Germany, the U.S. defense posture, the Middle East, and China.]
Senator Smathers asked why the U.S. Navy was not being used to halt infiltration by sea from North to South Vietnam. Without associating himself with the information, he summarized the views of some Navy officers to the effect that there are many ways we have not used which could bring about an end of infiltration by sea. Secretary McNamara replied by saying that sea infiltration had almost been completely stopped because of a program we had initiated and were carrying out which makes possible the patrol of all sea area by South Vietnamese forces. All junks moving south are now stopped and searched by South Vietnamese ships. However, some of the land border is under water and although we have made extensive efforts to deal with this problem no solution so far has turned out to be feasible. The seacoasts have been taken care of but much infiltration is still taking place across the water borders.
[Here follows discussion of the Department of Defense research and development program, Soviet nuclear testing, the Kennedy Round tariff agreements, the question of nuclear proliferation, and the state of Sino-Soviet relations.]
The President read parts of a draft press statement which he said he wished to issue at the conclusion of the meeting. He asked whether there were any objections, and hearing none, he authorized the issuance of the statement. A copy of the statement is attached to this record./4/
/4/Not printed.
Bromley Smith
[end document]
Continue:
Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
Documents 31 through 45