202. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 17, 1965, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2991. For the President. The past week was relatively quiet on the internal political front. Quat announced his government's short-term program on March 12, covering the five problem areas of security, foreign affairs, "building of democracy", economic and social development, and education and youth. Shrewdly enough, Quat has included some items in his program on which he can already show progress, such as the abolition of certain miscellaneous taxes affecting lower income groups and the convening in Saigon of a conference of Vietnamese diplomatic mission chiefs.
During the week, the government also announced that it was investigating one of the peace groups which appeared a week or so ago and that three of the leaders would be turned over to General Thi for "deportation beyond the 17th parallel." Shortly thereafter, Thi announced that he proposed to strap parachutes on them and drop them beyond the 17th parallel, but Quat quickly put a hold order on this proceeding. Indications now are that the culprits will be expelled by more prosaic means on the ground.
It is worth noting that Quat is deliberately keeping himself in the public view. In the period of a few days he has held a well-publicized reception for "out" politicians, met both with the National Legislative Council and the press on his government's program, has appeared with his diplomatic mission chiefs now convened in Saigon, has given a television interview to the three major U.S. networks, and has presided over the inauguration of a conference of province chiefs and other representatives. This is all to the good.
The Buddhist Institute continues to twist, turn and exhibit signs of uncertain direction. Shortly after Thich Quang Lien issued his peace proclamation last week, the Buddhist Institute issued a communiqué which seemed directed at pressuring Quang Lien into abandoning his peace movement. At about the same time, Quang Lien handed us his letter to you on which we have reported separately,/2/ an action indicating that he is not yet prepared to drop his peace plans. Clearly, the Buddhist Institute is not wholly together on the issue of peace activities and the serious Institute leaders are wrangling over them. Hence, we are withholding comment for the moment on how to respond to Lien--if at all.
/2/Not further identified.
I spent Tuesday, March 16, visiting key points in the II Corps where we have been particularly concerned over the declining military situation and the growing refugee problem. I would say that the military situation is looking up somewhat but that the refugee problem is very serious. General Co, commanding II Corps and his division commanders are regaining confidence after a week which included a number of local military successes over the Viet Cong. However, the Viet Cong pressure on the civil population of the I and II Corps over recent months has caused some 160,000 men, women and children to leave their homes in the hills and the piedmont to take refuge in the towns of the coastal plain. They are living huddled in temporary camps, not hungry but unhappy in the squalid dullness of their lives and the uncertainty of their future. The U.S. Mission and the government are fully alive to the problem and are formulating specific actions and recommendations.
With the growing pressure on North Viet-Nam, the psychological atmosphere continues to be favorable. What is still missing in this new atmosphere is the image of a Vietnamese Government giving direction and purpose to its people. As noted above, Quat is begining to pick up speed, but he can not yet be said to have established communication with the Vietnamese people. However, it is too early to say that he may not with time. We will keep pressing.
Taylor
203. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 17, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX. Secret.
Carl Rowan's report to you of his mission (Tab 2)/2/ is a good document and it is possible that you will want to read it all the way through. But here is a summary:
/2/A copy of the attachment, Rowan's memorandum to President Johnson, March 16, 1965, is ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Rowan Report.
1. We need unified control and direction of psychological warfare under USIA.
2. We need a substantially increased effort which can be supported largely by other agencies, but will need additional money within USIA.
3. There will be a difficult and continuing problem of getting the Vietnamese to do their minimum necessary part of the job.
Within this general framework Rowan makes a number of sensible administrative recommendations and proposes increased personnel and equipment for propaganda in the field.
He also asks for:
a high priority on loud-speaker-equipped aircraft and helicopters;
an increased administrative role for his people in the field (there is doubt in other departments about his particular solution, but none about the need to improve matters);
increased broadcasting, both radio and television;
increased training of Vietnamese broadcasters;
increased GVN propaganda abroad;
a greatly improved program to encourage and use defectors from the Viet Cong;
increased Pentagon efforts in training psychological warfare officers;
and a start on a new Embassy building to prove that we are in Saigon to stay (this is really not a USIA matter, but Taylor agrees with Rowan).
Rowan is going to send you a separate memorandum reporting on the stiffness of existing relations between the United States and Vietnamese Governments at the top level./3/ This is a problem which I think you already recognize.
/3/Not further identified.
I have checked with State and Defense and I find general support for Rowan's approach and a readiness to encourage USIA in going forward. Kermit Gordon agrees that these things will need more money, but he is not yet prepared to accept Rowan's suggestion of an FY-66 supplemental, since he thinks you may wish to have Rowan find the money elsewhere in his own budget. (That of course always dampens a man's enthusiasm.)
I have drafted a memorandum from you to Rowan at Tab 1/4/ which gives him a general order to get cracking on his program, while reserving the necessary rights and interests of yourself and others. In particular, I have reserved the question of control of the program for Viet Cong defectors because this extremely important and neglected matter may well be too big to go under Zorthian, good as he is.
/4/Not attached.
This is a first step in response to your general instruction at luncheon yesterday./5/ It is designed to be consistent with additional recommendations that will come next week, and I think you may not want to lose seven days in capitalizing on Rowan's good report and his readiness to act.
/5/See Document 200.
McG. B.
Memo to Rowan approved and signed______
Memo not approved and not signed______
Speak to me/6/______
/6/There is no indication which course of action the President approved.
204. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 18, 1965, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC and Defense. Forwarded by McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson on March 18 under a covering memorandum that called it a "thoughtful discussion of the pros and cons of bringing in a U.S. division. This one is being reviewed by State and Defense as well as in Saigon, but there is no clear recommendation in sight in the next few days." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX)
3003. MACV's 8250./2/ General Westmoreland has just sought my concurrence in his recommendation for the landing of the third BLT of the 9th MEB at Phu Bai for the purpose of protecting the 8th RRU and the air strip there. He intends to move helicopters from Danang to the strip and thereby reduce field congestion at Danang. Because of the military advantages of thus rounding out the MEB, I have no reluctance in agreeing to the merit of his recommendation which, of course, should receive the concurrence of the GVN after that of Washington.
/2/Not found.
This proposal for introducing the BLT is a reminder of the strong likelihood of additional requests for increases in U.S. ground combat forces in SVN. Such requests may come from the U.S. side, from the GVN side or from both. All of us here are keenly aware of the GVN trained military manpower shortage which will exist throughout 1965 and which probably can be rectified only in part by an accelerated mobilization. We will soon have to decide whether to try to get by with inadequate indigenous forces or to supplement them with third country troops, largely if not exclusively U.S. This matter was discussed with General Johnson during his recent visit who no doubt has raised it following his return to Washington. This message examines the pros and cons of such an action--specifically defined as the introduction of a U.S. division (appropriately modified) into SVN.
The purpose of introducing a division would be primarily to relieve the present shortage of ARVN units either by replacing ARVN in the defense of key installations or by engaging in active operations against the VC in conjunction with ARVN. Such a reinforcement would allow a strengthening of military efforts in the I and II Corps areas where the situation is deteriorating and would give a boost to GVN morale, military and civilian. Likewise, it should end any talk of a possible U.S. withdrawal and convince Hanoi of the depth of our resolve to see this thing through to a successful conclusion.
This statement of the purpose of introducing a U.S. division is, in effect, a tabulation of the arguments in favor of so doing. However, there are counter arguments on the other side of the case. The introduction of a U.S. division obviously increases U.S. involvement in the counterinsurgency, exposes greater forces and invites greater losses. It will raise sensitive command questions with our GVN allies and may encourage them to an attitude of "let the United States do it." It will increase our vulnerability to Communist propaganda and third country criticism as we appear to assume the old French role of alien colonizer and conqueror. Finally, there is considerable doubt that the number of GVN forces which our action would relieve would have any great significance in reducing the manpower gap.
It is impossible to reach a conclusion with regard to the overall merit of this action without first examining in some detail the possible missions which could be assigned a U.S. division. There are two obvious possibilities; the first, the assignment of the division to one or more of the provinces of the high plateau where the climate is good, the terrain relatively open, and the Montagnard population more readily distinguishable from the alien Viet Cong. Here, our forces could utilize their mobility and firepower effectively and make an important contribution in cutting off the growing infiltration into and through this area. For the most part, the Montagnards are friendly to the U.S. and our forces would thus be operating in a relatively friendly environment.
On the other hand, such a mission in the highlands would place our forces in an area with highly exposed lines of communication leading to the coast. Their location in this area would create serious logistic problems because of the difficulty of the movement of land transport through areas infested by the Viet Cong. There would be problems both of reinforcement and of withdrawal because of this precariousness of land communications. Finally, the GVN may question the introduction of sizeable U.S. forces into the Montagnard area where we have often been accused of favoring the Montagnards over the Vietnamese and of encouraging Montagnard separatism.
The other role which has been suggested for U.S. ground forces is the occupation and defense of key enclaves along the coast such as Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Such a disposition would have the advantage of placing our forces in areas of easy access and egress with minimum logistic problems associated with supply and maintenance. The presence of our troops would assure the defense of these important key areas and would relieve some GVN forces for employment elsewhere. The troops would not be called upon to engage in counterinsurgency operations except in their own local defense and hence would be exposed to minimum losses.
On the other hand, they would be engaged in a rather inglorious static defensive mission unappealing to them and unimpressive in the eyes of the Vietnamese. Operating in major population areas would maximize the points of contact with Vietnamese and hence maximize the possible points of friction. The division would be badly fragmented to the extent that its command, control and supervision would be awkward.
The foregoing analysis leads me to the following tentative conclusions. First, it is desirable to introduce a U.S. division into South Viet Nam unless there are clear and tangible advantages outweighing the numerous disadvantages, many of which have been noted above. One must make a definite determination of the numbers and types of GVN forces relieved by the introduction of the U.S. unit and thus the effect of the increased U.S. presence in closing the manpower gap of 1965. Obviously, our division would make some contribution but it remains to be proved that it will be sufficient to reverse the downward trend and give such a lift to the GVN forces that they would perform better by the stimulation of the U.S. presence rather than worse in a mood of relaxation at passing the Viet Cong burden to the U.S.
If the evidence of the probable effectiveness of this U.S. contribution is convincing, then the matter of mission becomes the primary question. The inland mission in the highlands is clearly the more ambitious and, if well done, will make a greater contribution during the present critical period. On the other hand, it is the more exposed and even permits one to entertain the possibility of a kind of Dien Bien Phu if the coastal provinces should collapse and our forces were cut off from the coast except by air.
The coastal enclave mission is safer, simpler but less impressive and less productive than the inland mission. The contrast of the pros and cons of the two suggests the desirability of reexamining the question to see whether the advantages of the inland disposition could not be combined in some way with the retention of a base coastal area, linked with a position inland. In any case, considerable additional study is required before we are prepared to make a recommendation either for the introduction of a division or for the assignment of its mission. In the meantime, we should be giving much thought both in South Vietnam and in Washington as to the right course of action if and when this issue becomes pressing--as it shortly will.
Taylor
205. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 18, 1965, 8:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Memos for the Record, 1 Mar-29 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library.
SUBJECT
Discussion with Secretary Rusk at Breakfast Meeting--18 Mar 65
[Here follows material unrelated to Vietnam.]
7. South Vietnam: In answer to the Secretary's question as to our current appraisal of the situation in South Vietnam, I reviewed the highlights of the joint CIA/DIA/State memorandum on the strength of VC military forces in South Vietnam, dated 17 March,/2/ copy of which I left with him, and then stated that our estimates have been correct to date but it remained to be seen what the NVN and ChiCom reaction would be to a higher level of Rolling Thunder. I reiterated my view that while we felt overt Chinese Communist and NVN military reaction improbable, at the same time it was definitely a possibility and we must be always prepared to meet any possible enemy reaction. It is not enough merely to plan on the probable. The Secretary seemed depressed over the outlook and not at all sure the actions we were taking would bring about results. He expressed concern over the fragility of the political situation, lack of leadership, high level of Viet Cong strength, etc. He asked that we examine the weather situation over the next several months and its possible effect on both the SVN and the VC.
/2/"Strength of VC Military Forces in SVN." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXI)
Action: This study has been requested of Mr. Cline.
[Here follows material unrelated to Vietnam.]
Addendum.
9. Message from Archie Roosevelt,/3/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 6489 of 11 March, recounting a discussion between Rod MacLeish and Anatoliy Danilov of the Soviet Embassy in London--in this referenced cable Danilov had suggested that we in the United States ought to exchange intelligence information on this (meaning South Vietnam and North Vietnam). I told Rusk we were giving consideration to opening a channel, carefully cut out, and unattributable, to see if there was any pay dirt in this suggestion. Rusk indicated interest but no confirmation or endorsement of the idea.
/3/Not found. A handwritten note in the margin indicates that the telegram was destroyed in 1972.
206. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 18, 1965.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Memos for the Record, 1 Mar-20 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office.
SUBJECT
Discussion with Secretary McNamara--18 March 1965
Secretary McNamara and I exchanged views on several matters of mutual interest as follows:
1. South Vietnam: We agreed that the internal political situation was very fragile and neither of us could express much hope or enthusiasm for either the military or political leadership in SVN. I expressed particular concern over Gen. Thi in which McNamara concurred.
2. We both agreed that the military situation had degraded considerably since November-December, with the Viet Cong demonstrating an increasing capability and the South Vietnam military weakening by comparison.
3. McNamara stated that so far he felt the strikes in the north had had little effect. I said that results had been exactly as we had estimated, i.e., considerable propaganda and noise out of Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow (but really less than we expected) and some step-up in VC activities, but no overt moves by either Hanoi or Peiping and no attempt to topple the SVN government.
With respect to more intensified strikes, I said that when they reached the point of threatening the industrial base and hence the total economy of North Vietnam, the NVN would probably tamp down their guerrilla operations in SVN and wait for a sunny day, making some pretense at negotiations. This, I felt, was the most probable course of action by the NVN but there was a possibility that they might put on a "burst operation" in South Vietnam in an effort to defeat the SVN, topple the government, and force the removal of Americans. I pointed out that State leaned in the direction of the latter possibility; the balance of the intelligence community felt the former more probable.
4. I made reference to the March 17th CIA-DIA-State reappraisal of VC strength/2/ and, in response to McNamara's question, stated that we felt there was a strong possibility that the VC had 50,000 regulars and 100,000 irregulars and that this level had been reached because VC strength was under-estimated 18 months or 2 years ago and the amount of augmentation in recent months had been also under-estimated. This combination of circumstances led us to the opinion that VC strength may be 50% greater than reported. I pointed to the conservatism of MACV's estimates and the fact that information concerning new units did not get through the combined SVN-MACV bureaucracy and therefore show in the official estimates for almost 13 months after a prisoner or a document was captured.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 205.
McNamara expressed surprise at the figures and said if these were true, we were "simply outmanned." He expressed concern over the effectiveness of bombing, distress over the fact that many women and children would be killed, and the guerrilla wars could not be won from the air.
5. McNamara stated that he felt that the internal situation would continue to degrade and that it would not be long until we ran out of worthwhile targets in the north. Hence our position would become increasingly difficult.
6. With respect to the 21 suggested proposals of General Johnson,/3/ McNamara stated they were all being approved. A few of them are being coordinated with State because of AID's participation. These did not involve approval of Johnson's proposals in B. and C., which involve the deployment of divisions. McNamara seemed to feel we should make some moves indicating an intention for more dramatic action such as the movement of forces, possibility of call-up of reserves, etc. He thought these actions were useful in the Berlin crisis even though none of the forces were used or even deployed.
/3/See Document 197.
7. On other subjects, McNamara thought his budget talks were going along very well; expressed great concern over the military pay bill, which he felt was divisive, and seemed highly critical of the Congressmen who are introducing it.
207. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 19, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Political Track Papers. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Possible Sequence of Actions Toward a Settlement in South Viet-Nam
This memorandum attempts to lay out the major issues that would arise if Hanoi showed a disposition to move toward a settlement. Although we cannot see very far down the road on this at the present time, we obviously need to get our thoughts in order and to consider whether we should, in some subtle way, revise or amplify our present formula that Hanoi must simply cease its aggression. The British also tell us that Minister Stewart will want to discuss this topic./2/
/2/A reference to the planned visit to Washington later in the month of British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart; see Document 211.
Incidentally, I spent an hour with Alex Johnson on the matter in Baguio,/3/ and he feels that we should be consulting fairly soon with the GVN on our thinking.
/3/See Document 199.
I. Elements of the problem.
A. We assume that we are dealing with Hanoi, not with Peiping and not with the Liberation Front. Our "dealing" could be direct, indirect through third parties, or might in the early stages be through public signals and reciprocal actions only without any contact.
B. We can identify the principal bargaining elements as follows:
On the US side:
1. Cessation of our attacks against the DRV.
2. Cessation of overt US military action in some categories (e.g., air attacks) within South Viet-Nam.
3. Withdrawal of any major US military units from South Viet-Nam.
4. Withdrawal of our military presence from South Viet-Nam, at least down to Geneva levels.
On Hanoi's side:
5. Cessation of infiltration so that we are satisfied that it has stopped, or under a system of reliable supervision and inspection.
6. Cessation of organized unit military action by the Viet Cong in the south.
7. Withdrawal and/or demilitarization of infiltrators within SVN.
On both sides:
8. Complete cease-fire and regroupment in the south.
9. Measures to determine the future political organization in the south.
C. Our objective remains to remove all DRV interference in the south, so that SVN can determine its own future and so that its security will be assured. Since we cannot readily expect Hanoi simply to call the whole thing off at once, we should be thinking in terms of a sequence that would accomplish our objective but still leave them some "face" at each stage and that will be plausible to the world and consistent with the stated basis of our action, against aggression from the north. Such a graduated sequence also conforms to the practical way the cards might play.
D. The issues really divide into four:
1. Possible preconditions for the cessation of our attacks on the DRV.
2. The future political structure of SVN.
3. The future international status of SVN.
4. Policing and supervising machinery for any of the above.
II. The immediate problem: Preconditions for the cessation of our attacks on the DRV.
We believe that we must include a cessation of infiltration, at least to the point where we are satisfied that it has stopped or dwindled to a trickle, but that we cannot stop there. Whereas we might have thought nine months ago that, without further infiltration, the VC could be fairly readily handled over a period of time, VC strength is now such that, from a military standpoint alone, they might still be in a position to make dangerous gains.
Thus, we would have to insist, both for practical reasons and in logic, on a second condition concerning the degree of VC continued action in the south. Alex Johnson thought that we should insist that Hanoi direct the complete cessation of all VC activity. However, most of us think this is too much to expect, and that it would suffice to insist on a cessation of organized unit action of any significant size.
These two preconditions would in effect thus be reduced to practical and recognizable terms. We would not be insisting that adequate supervising machinery be in place on the infiltration issue--this would require major deployments by some international grouping, and simply could not be arranged readily. We would not be insisting on a complete "cease-fire". We would be establishing a practical and indeed somewhat elastic standard and saying in effect: "We will know if you go on with the infiltration and we will know if there are significant VC actions. If either of these happens, we are reserving the right to resume our attacks on any scale required."
The result could well be a sort of twilight zone period in which we might in fact be continuing occasional attacks, but in which the situation might be settling down at least to the point where more formal discussions could be held.
III. The next phase: Determining the future political structure of the south.
Here our basic position could well be that we favor an appropriate determination of the will of the people of SVN, provided that all external interference is removed. Once that interference is gone, we for our part would be prepared to withdraw our forces.
In practice, this position would almost certainly lead to a very long drawn-out process.
Perhaps the first crucial question would be the freedom of action of GVN forces. If they moved into areas now controlled by the VC, there would almost certainly be clashes which we would find it hard to justify as a basis for resuming attacks on the DRV. We need to explore just what the exact limits of nominal "government control" are and to see if a practical guideline would be freedom of GVN forces to operate in these areas.
But even this would leave enclaves of VC control scattered throughout the country. In theory, we could meet these by some procedure for regroupment and for repatriation to the north of those who had come from there. In practice, this would be a very difficult procedure to carry out. We might make an amnesty proposal, with the GVN then free to move into areas where the amnesty offer had been extended. But we almost certainly could not accept a hardening of somewhat legalized VC control over a period of time.
On the political side, Hanoi would almost certainly demand a legalized role for the Liberation Front. This we should resist, insisting on the removal of external interference or its equivalent, the disarming of the VC.
What is clear is that we cannot let the VC dig in, in the fashion of the Pathet Lao provinces of Laos, and that any explicit partitions of SVN, even if it were possible without looking like a case of measles, would likewise invite a resurrection of VC activity. We have to insist on the gradual elimination of VC control, but we may probably have to accept that this would have to be done in such a way that there could be a genuine determination of the will of the people.
For this reason alone, it is very difficult to see this stage taking place without there having been created a fairly substantial international machinery. And this in turn virtually requires a major multilateral negotiating process. In short, once we had obtained the preconditions for the cessation of our attacks on the DRV, we should not only not reject, but should positively welcome and seek a conference situation.
A second possible function for international machinery would be to verify and insure the permanent cessation of infiltration. In this connection, we could consider whether it would be wise to be prepared to withdraw our organized combat units in return for such machinery. This would have the rationale that these units had been the necessary insurance against a recurrence of infiltration.
In general, we should recognize that the presence of additional US organized combat units could become a valuable negotiating card either in this or some other way, and that such forces would in any event greatly help to stabilize the situation that might exist after the preconditions were satisfied but while major VC units were still in place within SVN.
In sum, a rough sequence in this phase might be:
1. A consolidation of government control in all areas even more or less now under government control, but leaving the VC unmolested in their areas.
2. A regroupment or amnesty progressively applied to the VC areas, under international supervision.
3. International supervision of the infiltration routes.
4. Withdrawal of US organized combat units.
5. Some procedure for "determining the will" of the people of South Vietnam. This again would appear to require international supervision, and might conceivably be done on the basis of layers of local elections (as in Pakistan), leading to a national convention. Any popular referendum would appear extraordinarily difficult to carry out, especially in terms of framing the propositions to be put.
IV. Future International Status of SVN, and of SEA Generally.
This point appears to be under much better control than any of the others, in that we have repeatedly indicated (as has Hanoi verbally) our support of the 1954 provisions--no adherence to an alliance, no military bases, limited external military personnel for training only.
We could also argue strongly that until a political structure was established within SVN, it was premature to seek any modification of the 1954 status, since the will of the new SVN Government itself should have great weight.
By the same token, any issues on the future status of the Indochina successor states as a whole, much less the rest of mainland Southeast Asia, could and should be deferred. Again, we already have a clear position--the 1962 Accords for Laos and neutrality for Cambodia.We certainly do not want to raise any question of Thailand's status, and we could well stick to the fundamental proposition that the nations of the area should determine their own future status, either on an individual basis or in some collective framework as they see fit.
V. Actions in the Near Future.
Here we have two questions--whether to amend our public posture, and what to discuss with the GVN.
On the first point, it is obvious that the cessation of infiltration (to our satisfaction) and the cessation of VC organized unit actions are not by any means a cessation of the whole aggression as we have been using the term. Hence, to announce this modification in our position publicly would almost certainly be regarded as a retreat, and a suggestion that we might retreat still further--e.g., to the early Canadian suggestion (to the Soviets and without our consent) that we might cease our attacks on the DRV merely in return for some reduction in the scale of VC activity.
This leaves the tactical question of when and to whom we should indicate our preconditions. They could certainly be discussed with the British without leaking, but equally without any chance of their reaching Hanoi. The Canadians could convey them to Hanoi more or less directly, but this too may be more eager than we now wish to appear.
On balance, we are inclined to think that the first hint of possible give in Hanoi's position will probably come to us through the Soviets on a private basis. This would then probably be the best time to indicate our position.
As to the GVN, we are inclined to think that we could safely discuss with them the whole of our thinking under II and the broad outlines of our positions under III and IV. Our position under II is sufficiently favorable so that we do not believe the GVN would see in it any signs of weakening. They could probably be persuaded also that any early true "cease-fire" might run into the question of GVN freedom of action, and is thus much less desirable than the sequence here discussed.
WPB
208. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-204-65
Washington, March 20, 1965.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 370. Top Secret. The source text indicates that it was seen by both Vance and McNamara.
SUBJECT
Deployment of US/Allied Combat Forces to Vietnam
1. This memorandum presents the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for deployment of US forces to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) for combat missions, as one among several measures required by the present grave situation in that area.
2. The basis for these recommendations is that during the past four to six months there has been a marked deterioration in the military situation in Vietnam in relation to that of the preceding period. In the period immediately following the removal of Diem, there were serious political problems in Saigon, but the armed forces remained relatively unaffected, and capable of substantial military accomplishments. The principal problems were political: how to achieve governmental stability, avoid disruptive coups, and extend governmental control throughout the provinces. More recently a major military problem has arisen. The Viet Cong have grown substantially stronger, and have achieved increasing military successes. Moreover, RVN military effectiveness appears to have declined as a result of the political involvements and maneuverings of key military figures. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the military situation has become critical, and that, if present trends are not reversed, the counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam will be lost. Also, it is their view that such a loss would be a US defeat, which we cannot afford and which would be recognized world-wide as such.
3. The needs of the military situation have become primary, and direct US military action appears to be imperative if defeat is to be avoided. The type of military action envisaged will open a new phase of combat and will require substantial shifts in the methods of conducting the war, including a change in the form and scope of US operations, and modifications to US policies and programs which have provided the basis for US support of the RVN.
4. Certain recommendations toward arresting the present trend have already been submitted to you, and further proposals in addition to those in this memorandum are being prepared on an urgent basis. They have included and will include proposed actions both within and outside the country. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that more forceful application of military pressures against both the Viet Cong and the DRV is necessary, including the deployment of forces to deter ChiCom aggression and to provide the capability to increase the intensity and severity of air attacks against the DRV. The recommendations herein for actions within the RVN are considered an essential component of the broader program.
5. It has become apparent that the RVN urgently needs substantial increases in effective combat forces in order to withstand the Viet Cong. The requirement is not simply to withstand the Viet Cong, however, but to gain effective operational superiority and assume the offensive. To turn the tide of the war requires an objective of destroying the Viet Cong, not merely trying to keep pace with them, or slow down the rate of their advance. Although measures are being taken which will ultimately result in the provision of increased RVN forces, the time required does not permit reliance upon these measures alone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that US land forces should be introduced in a combatant role, in such strengths as to achieve an effective margin of combat power, and provide a clear indication that the United States intends to support SouthVietnam and intends to achieve its objectives. Participation by forces of the Republic of Korea, and of other allies if subsequently offered, would provide valuable force increases in addition to a favorable psychological effect. Outline concepts for force introductions, including strengths and command arrangements, are set forth in the Annex/2/ to this memorandum. The forces thus provided would conduct active operations against the Viet Cong, provide security for important installations, free ARVN forces for offensive operations, and assist in containing infiltration.
/2/Attached, but not printed.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that US and allied forces be deployed for combat missions in South Vietnam as indicated (Additional details of concepts and force requirements are in the Annex.)
a. Expand mission of Marine elements at Da Nang to include counterinsurgency combat operations. Deploy remainder of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to the Da Nang area as requested by CINCPAC, with the same mission.
b. Deploy, as soon as proper logistic support is ensured, a US Army division with necessary supporting forces from the continental United States for employment in the central plateau, centered on the Pleiku area, for counterinsurgency combat operations.
c. Deploy, as soon as practicable, a Republic of Korea Army division force to South Vietnam for counterinsurgency and base security operations.
d. Deploy, as requested by CINCPAC, four of the nine Air Force squadrons previously recommended in JCSM-149-65./3/
/3/Not found.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
209. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 22, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX. Secret.
SUBJECT
Your meeting with Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart of Great Britain, Tuesday, March 23, 11:30 a.m./2/
/2/See Document 211.
1. Stewart's conversations with Dean Rusk so far have produced only one serious question--the political problem of the Wilson Government in holding to its present support for us in Vietnam. Dean is planning to talk some more with the British before Stewart comes in, and this memo may be outdated by tomorrow, though I doubt it.
2. The British tell us--and David Bruce agrees--that their present position is not tenable without some slight help from us. As David Bruce puts it, the Prime Minister is being strongly criticized, not only by his Left but by his Center. He is accused of uncritical support for a U.S. position about which he is uninformed. It is asserted that he has deserted his principles to curry favor with the President, who in return has allowed it to be known that the Prime Minister will be an unwelcome visitor in April. The cooler men in the Labor Party, as distinct from the Left Wing wild men, are said to be losing their patience.
3. All this of course is a wild misstatement of the existing situation. None of it takes account of the very great damage which Wilson did to himself by his outrageous phone call to you--a phone call which has never been publicized. But Bruce impresses it on me that the existing situation in the Labor Party is real.
4. In this situation one course might be to let the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Labor Party struggle with its own political problems, on the ground that Wilson's troubles are of his own making, not ours. The difficulty with this course is that since Wilson prefers his own survival to solidarity with us, he would be mortally tempted to begin to make critical noises about us, thus appealing both to his own party and to the natural nationalism of many independent Englishmen. This would not be helpful to Wilson in the long run, but it would not be helpful to us either, as the history of Dienfenbaker proves. (Wilson and Diefenbaker have about the same amount of internal sweetness.) When we fall out with Prime Ministers, it's usually painted as our fault.
5. The alternative is to see what is the least we can offer the British in return for continued solidarity in support of the essentials of our policy in Vietnam. David Bruce thinks this necessary minimum is simply that we should join them in saying publicly that there is a full and continuous exchange of views and of information at all levels between our two Governments on this important issue. Then we can put on some parsley about how glad we are to have Mr. Stewart and how much we look forward to the Prime Minister's visit. In return, the British should undertake not to advocate negotiations and not to go back on their existing announced approval of our present course of action. They should limit themselves to expressions of hope that a path to a peaceful settlement will come, plus expressions of alertness, as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, to any opportunities for peaceful settlement which may develop in the future. Bruce thinks that this position will not be easy for Wilson, but that he will find it distinctly preferable to a split with us at this time.
6. David and I have been up and down this problem for an hour this afternoon, and this is our joint recommendation. I will telephone and ask for your views in the morning, and on the basis of what you tell me, I will then do a one-page paper for your use with Stewart./3/ Bruce and I believe that you can be most candid and effective with him if you see him entirely alone, but the meeting can be of any size that you choose. It need not take more than 20 minutes, and the smaller it is the shorter it can be. Our talking paper will cover the stupid fuss over gas, which should not have occurred, as well as press reports of a far-out statement on "escalation without limit" by Max Taylor.
/3/Not found.
McG. B.
210. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 23, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
What we now know on gas (leaving aside the loose end on nausea gas)/2/
/2/On March 22 an Associated Press dispatch from Saigon charged that gas was being used against the Viet Cong. The factual basis for the charge was discussed by Rusk in telephone conversations with William Bundy at 12:55 p.m. and McGeorge Bundy at 5:11 p.m. on March 22. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) A sampling of the highly critical response in various countries of the world to the charge was included in Rowan's March 23 memorandum to the President. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Vietnam 000.7)
1. The riot-control gases used in Vietnam are standard issue for all U.S. troops with riot-control missions, and authority to use them has been delegated to subordinate commanders for many years.
2. These gases are also standard issue under Military Assistance Programs to friendly troops with riot-control missions.
3. These gases are non-lethal and their effects are temporary. They are totally different from the poison gases against which international conventions and humanitarian feeling are directed.
4. There are three known uses of these riot-control gases in Vietnam (two cases were in efforts by Vietnamese troops to rescue U.S. advisors--this is a good point at home, but not abroad).
5. There has been absolutely no NSC discussion of this problem precisely because riot-control gases are standard equipment. There has been no proposal at any time for the use of poison gas in this theater or elsewhere.
6. Finally, these gases are precisely analogous to those used by police forces all over the world.
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
211. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce)/1/
Washington, March 23, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327, January-March 1965. Secret. Bruce returned to Washington to take part in the discussions with Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, who visited the United States March 22-23. Also see Bruce's diary entry for March 22, which briefly describes a meeting with McGeorge Bundy on how the President should receive Stewart the following day. (Ibid.) For Stewart's recollection of the visit to Washington, see his Life and Labour: An Autobiography, pp. 152-153.
Meeting with the British delegation this morning./2/ Mac Bundy had seen the President earlier, and it was arranged that LBJ would receive the Foreign Secretary alone at 11:30. I rode over to the White House with the two Michael Stewarts. On our side, Bill Tyler, Tom Judd, Harry Shullaw and Lloyd Hand, Chief of Protocol, were present. We waited in the Cabinet Room with the British Minister. Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary talked to Mac Bundy, before being closeted with the President. To our surprise, after about fifteen minutes of this duet, we were all summoned into the oval office, where we were joined by Hadow (Foreign Office Press representative) and Bundy. Marvin Watson wandered in and out, trying to preserve the President's appointments schedule, whilst the British were concerned lest Stewart miss his engagement to lunch and speak at the National Press Club. This did not divert LBJ, who was in talkative form. It was great theatre; he fed us oratorical sandwiches, with layers of gravity and levity. At one time, after he had enumerated the variety of criticisms to which he was daily subjected over Vietnam, he remarked "Sometimes I just get all hunkered up like a jackass in a hailstorm."
/2/Rusk, Ball, and Bruce met with Stewart and other members of the British delegation at 10:30 a.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) The meeting apparently dealt exclusively with Southeast Asia and was described in two separate memoranda of conversation. One memorandum is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-10 VIET S. The other is ibid., POL 27 ASIA SE.
Stewart kept reverting to the uproar in Britain over the use of non-lethal gas by the South Vietnamese air force. The cable lines are hot with protests, petitions are pouring forth from MP's, Americans are being denounced for resorting to barbarous and horrible weapons. I thought the President dealt well with the attack, explaining that the gas was one in common use by our own police forces, was frequently employed for quelling riots, and was stocked by many countries. The chief trouble, I believe, is that no warning was given in advance from Saigon of its prospective utilization, nor until yesterday, did our top men in Washington seem to know anything about the occurrences. From a public relations viewpoint, the Saigon authorities, and secondarily our own, have behaved idiotically. "Gas" is widely regarded as a dirty word, and everywhere evokes images of World War I brutalities. The affair is further complicated by the allegation that supplies of this type were left behind by the French army, when they evacuated Indo-China, and that some of it was manufactured in the UK. We are now explaining that on the occasions it has been used in Vietnam, it was largely ineffective.
LBJ discoursed for more than an hour, explaining his objectives, hopes and fears. He is power sublimated, like Niagara Falls. He read us a long letter/3/ from an American soldier in Vietnam to his "Mom", strongly supporting American policy. I think he impressed his audience by his grasp of the issues involved, and his own mastery over decisions, but must have puzzled the British by the alternations of his manner. He told Stewart he had no objections whatever to negotiations if any one could offer a reasonable prospect of their succeeding.
/3/Not further identified.
There was a brief session for photography; the cameramen made their onslaught in two waves. Then the Foreign Minister was released, after ninety minutes of an experience he is never likely to forget./4/
/4/A formal memorandum of the conversation between the President and Stewart is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
Mac and I stayed behind for a while. The President said that Stewart had not offered a single practical or helpful suggestion, nor had General deGaulle, or any other foreigner. Then he repeated what he told Stewart about fierce domestic pressures on him. Some favored abandonment of all our commitments in the East, and retreat to Hawaii. Others wanted us to bomb the hell out of China. Others would kill all the civilians, as well as military, in the Hanoi district. He intended to continue to make measured responses to aggression from North Vietnam until it ceased. We had obligated ourselves under three Presidents to assist the South Vietnamese to preserve their liberties, and that commitment would be carried out. He thought it insulting for politicians to come chasing over to see him, to expound for home consumption their condemnatory statements from the White House steps, unless they had practicable solutions to offer for American problems.
[Here follows information unrelated to Vietnam.]
212. Editorial Note
On March 23 the President, Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy held their regular Tuesday luncheon meeting at the White House from 2:43 to 3:46 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A typewritten agenda for the meeting, apparently prepared by McGeorge Bundy, listed the following topics under Vietnam: the gas problem, the diplomatic program, Rolling Thunder for the upcoming week, the draft program of non-military actions, and the agenda for Ambassador Taylor's consultations in Washington at the end of the month. On the agenda Bundy wrote the following record of what was apparently said at the meeting:
"P. [President] on British.
"P. Where are we going?
"RSM [McNamara]--our message may be getting thru.--Hanoi--China (French)
"DR [Rusk]--some signs: but no door for them to go thru.
"LBJ: Do they know we're willin to talk.
"LBJ: You can revisit targets. I don't wanna run out of targets & I don't wanna go to Hanoi. I was a hell of a long time getting into this. But I like it." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with the Pres., Vol. I)
213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 23, 1965, 8:47 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved by Rusk.
2067. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Deptel 2052 and Embtel 3066./2/ Appreciate that context throws somewhat different light on your sentence about limits to escalation. Nonetheless you should be aware statement has already been picked up in damaging fashion by Communist propaganda and that Wilson has been hit hard on it in UK. Our whole feeling here is that our actions should speak for themselves and that we should not be seeking to change our signal in any way through verbal statements or speculation. President's Feb 17 statement/3/ remains basic and we believe all of us should decline to go beyond it.
/2/In telegram 2052 to Saigon, eyes only for Taylor, March 22, Rusk stated that Washington press reports alleged that Taylor had given an interview in which he had said "there is no limit to our escalation." Rusk asked for further information on the interview and whether Taylor had been accurately quoted. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Taylor's reply, telegram 3066 from Saigon, has not been found.
/3/For text of the President's comments on Vietnam at the conclusion of his remarks to the National Industrial Conference Board on February 17, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 202-205.
In connection same problem, I note your background briefing reported Embtel 3060,/4/ especially remark that industry targets "not ruled out", statement that study has been made of cutting supply routes between China and DRV and last two paras concerning negotiation and "carrots". For example, your statement that we are prepared to talk "if DRV ceases infiltration" and we have clear evidence of this might be open to interpretation we would not go further and insist on major reduction VC activity. This is most difficult issue which we are currently considering and will discuss during your visit. "Carrots" are also a touchy subject, although we have nothing firm in our minds at this time.
/4/Telegram 3060, March 23, summarized the background briefing Taylor had given to U.S. press representatives in Saigon on March 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
I do not wish to be critical of your backgrounder but fact is that any remarks in these areas may emerge in unfavorable form in stories either from Saigon or from home offices here, perhaps with allegedly authoritative stamp as in case of Kleiman article./5/ For this reason, I continue to think it would be better if all of us refrained from speculation on future military or diplomatic possibilities beyond the limits of the President's statement and my own press conference of Feb 25,/6/ plus whatever future utterances we may work out here with the President./7/
/5/See footnote 6, Document 199.
/6/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1965, pp 362-374.
/7/In telegram 3073 from Saigon, March 24, Taylor replied that if he were to stay within the limits of Washington's public statements in his backgrounders, "it will require a fundamental revision not only of my press habits but that of most of the senior officials of the mission." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
214. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 24, 1965, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 1:21 a.m. Forwarded to the President by McGeorge Bundy on March 29 under a cover memorandum explaining that "the initial cable was garbled, and then when there was a correction I was slow in getting it up to you." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX)
3070. For the President. This has been a pleasantly quiet week both in a military and in a political sense. Viet Cong units country-wide appeared to be avoiding contact with government forces as their activity dropped to the lowest level since the lunar new year (early February). There were no large-scale Viet Cong attacks and only two district towns were fired on during the week. For the first time in my memory, during the last week all three of the principal indicators of military activity, killed in action, prisoners captured and weapons lost to the enemy have been favorable to the government.
Evidence of arms infiltration from Hanoi increased in this period. Thanks in one case to information given by a Viet Cong defector and in another case to timely intelligence, arms caches were uncovered in the Vung Ro area near the bay where the arms ship was found last month, and in a motorized wooden vessel carrying quantities of arms sunk by government forces at a point off Quang Tri.
Government operations were maintained at a high level, although contacts with the enemy were fewer than the week before. USAF B-57's attacked Viet Cong targets every day of the week with evidence of favorable results.
The pacification indicators also took a favorable turn. In II Corps area, there was a marked decrease in the number of Viet Cong incidents, attributable in part to U.S. and Vietnamese air operations. In Binh Dinh Province, visible progress was made in caring for the refugees. Work has started on eleven new refugee centers and the province chief has recruited several hundred refugees for the regional and popular forces. The units formed from these recruits will accompany the refugees when they are able to return to their villages or are resettled in new locations. Pacification progress elsewhere in South Vietnam was as uneven as usual.
In the political sphere, Quat continued to exhibit understanding of the importance of building up his public image. During the early part of the week, he spent a good deal of time meeting with and entertaining the provincial officials convened in Saigon for a "National Administrative Congress." While it is too early to assess the results of the Congress, it provided a unique opportunity for each province to air its problems and hopes before responsible Saigon authorities and thus to reestablish badly needed communication between Saigon and the provincial administrations. Also, Quat is spending two days in central Vietnam this week on a personal inspection of the refugee situation there and establishing political contact in Hue and Danang, the traditional center of political turbulence in South Vietnam. I expect to join him in Danang Wednesday/2/ for a visit to the aircraft carrier Coral Sea off the coast and to our Marines in Danang.
/2/Apparently March 24.
The Armed Forces Council met over the weekend to consider changes in the high command. Although Quat has told me that no decisions have been taken, the press and our informants have it that the Council confirmed General "Little" Minh as commander-in-chief (he holds this post now on an "acting" basis), selected General Huynh Van Cao as Chief of the Joint General Staff and is about to recommend several other changes. If these appointments materialize, they place Catholic generals in the three top military positions (the third being General Thieu, Deputy Prime Minister and Armed Forces Minister). This could stimulate a reaction from the Buddhist Institute, and we have reports that the Armed Forces Council have sent representatives to discuss the matter with Institute leaders. Except for Cao whose ability to fill the job of chief of staff is questionable, we would take no issue with the reported changes.
Despite the apparently improved Catholic position within the military establishment, we have begun to receive some indications that the militant northern refugee Catholics are becoming more and more restless at what they consider to be the growing alliance between the Buddhist Institute and Generals Thi and Ky, I Corps and Air Force commanders respectively. We will take more soundings among these Catholic groups in order to monitor their feelings and intentions as closely as we can.
If the Catholics are getting increasingly restless, it is perhaps understandable that the Buddhist Institute continues to be relatively tranquil. The Institute had a national conference last week and, as far as we can determine from talking to key leaders, they agreed that Quang Lien should cease his involvement in the peace movement he initiated (although Quang Lien reportedly believes the conference did not take such a hard and fast decision). Institute leaders also decided that they should concentrate on internal Buddhist organizational and program matters, avoiding politics unless "directly threatened." They seem reasonably satisfied with Quat for the time being and may be willing to stick to propagating the dharma. Time will tell.
I look forward to seeing you soon and going over the situation which has shifted significantly since I was home in December.
Taylor
215. Letter From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 24, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX ND 19/CO 312, filed under April 12. No classification marking.
Dear Mr. President:
Over the years, I have submitted both to your predecessor and to you a series of memorandums on the situation in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia./2/ Sometimes suggestions have been requested of me and sometimes they have been volunteered. In either case, they have been motivated solely by a desire to give such help as I might in the burdens of the decisions of the Presidency.
/2/For earlier memoranda from Mansfield to President Johnson, see Documents 92 and 101; Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. IV, pp. 691-692; and Foreign Relations, 1963-1968, vol. I, Document 2.
The main lines of thought in these memorandums over the years, as you may recall, are the following:
1. That the United States does not have interests on the Southeast Asian mainland to justify the costs in American lives and resources which would be required if we were to attempt to exercise, in effect, primacy over what transpires in that region; and that, insofar as South Viet Nam is concerned, we are there, not to take primary responsibility, but to provide whatever assistance is wanted and can be used effectively by the Vietnamese themselves.
2. That our national interest lies in reducing, rather than in increasing, the unilateral role which we have played in recent years, through the foreign aid program and excessive involvement of various United States agencies in the internal affairs of the weak nations of that region.
3. That our national security interests are best served in Southeast Asia by severely limiting our military involvement and, confining ourselves at most, to a very judicious use of air and sea power.
4. That the best prospects for a tolerable long-range situation in Southeast Asia lie in encouraging, through astute diplomacy and limited and preferably multilateral economic assistance, the emergence of truly independent governments with firm roots in their own people, which are as free as possible from great power involvement in their internal affairs. This situation, as I have noted, time and again, has prevailed in Cambodia at least until very recently when, in my judgment, a combination of years of inept diplomacy and the events in Viet Nam finally conspired to push this small and ably-led nation sharply towards China. It has prevailed to some extent in Burma and at one time, there was hope for it in South Viet Nam under the late Ngo Dinh Diem.
I am aware that the principles of policy outlined in the four points above are subject to the charge of "a return to isolationism." It should be noted, however, that there is no automatic virtue in an ubiquitous and indiscriminate internationalism, particularly when it leads to the kind of isolated internationalism in which we presently find ourselves in Viet Nam.
I think it is correct to say that the trend of our policies over the past few years has been in a direction opposite to the main lines of thought which are contained in my memorandums over the past few years. I say this, as you know, without rancor or criticism. I know that my thoughts have received your careful attention. I know that your assistants and the bureaucracy have studied them and occasionally even have concurred in an idea expressed in them.
Nevertheless, it is still a fact that present policy is on a course which contains the following diametric opposites of the suggestions which I have advanced over the years. Present policy, so far as I can determine, requires:
(1) That we make whatever expenditure of American lives and resources, on an ascending scale, is necessary in order for us to exercise, in effect, a primacy over what transpires in South Viet Nam. If this involves going into North Viet Nam and beyond, that, too, will be done.
(2) That in the absence of unconditional capitulation of the Viet Cong, our military involvement must continue and be increased as necessary (there is discussion even now of a Joint Command which can only be the prelude to United States command in fact if not in word).
(3) That our military involvement will not be restricted to a most judicious use of air and sea power, as evidenced by instructions to strike at "targets of convenience", but rather that it be extended, even to the infusion of a steadily increasing number of American combat forces on the ground.
(4) That we will not try to encourage, through sustained diplomatic efforts, the emergence of the kind of situations which exist in Burma and Cambodia, but rather, so far as I can see, that we will stress those situations which can be maintained only by continuous infusions of American aid (i.e., Laos and Thailand, not to speak of South Viet Nam itself).
Those are the facts of our policy as it is being carried out, as I see it. It is possible that this direction may not be precisely the one you seek, a possibility suggested by your calling to my attention this morning your unawareness in advance of the usage of gas in Viet Nam./3/ It may be that you were also unaware in advance, understandably, of the usage of napalm and of the concept of "targets of convenience" which are likely to do at least as much damage to non-combatants as combatants in a situation such as Viet Nam or the countless other decisions which deepen our involvement and responsibility. May I say in connection with the gas that it is beyond my comprehension how any American in an office of responsibility would not realize the vast significance, beyond immediate military considerations, of this act and, therefore, seek the highest political authority before taking such a step.
/3/President Johnson phoned Mansfield at 9:12 a.m. on March 24. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
It is this possibility, that actions of the bureaucracy may have taken us in more deeply than desired, which leads me to write you once again, and most respectfully suggest certain changes at this time which may move us from the present direction of policy as it is expressed in action. In all frankness, I believe that the present direction is at variance with the extent and nature of our national interests on the Southeast Asian mainland and in the world. In the end, I fear that this course, at best, will win us only more widespread difficulties which will play havoc with the domestic program of the Administration, with the balance of payments situation, and with our interests and constructive influence elsewhere in the world.
I have no great hope that, at this late date, these suggestions will be useful to you. But for what they may be worth, I would suggest:
1. That we should concentrate any ground forces which are sent to Viet Nam to safeguard Americans already there in two or three key spots which either back up on the sea or are easily accessible from the sea (i.e., Saigon and Da Nang) and that all other Americans in Viet Nam should be drawn into these protected points as rapidly as possible. From the point of view of our diplomatic position, two or three accessible and more defensible bases will be of greater value than numerous installations in the interior which can become, one by one, the targets of massed Viet Cong attacks;
2. That we should seek, indirectly but forcefully, through all possible sources, a reconvening of the 1961 Geneva Conference group;
3. That we should insist upon, as the sole precondition for such a meeting, a total cease-fire and stand-fast throughout all of Viet Nam, north and south.
4. That we should be prepared for consultation between the Saigon government, the North Vietnamese and the opposition in the south on the conditions for maintaining the "cease-fire" and "stand-fast," and on subsequent relationships once a conference has been convened and, further, that we accept, if circumstances indicate the desirability of it, United Nations participation in this connection.
As you well know, it is very difficult to predict the evolution of a course of policy once it has been set in motion. There will be risks to our national interests in a conference, but certainly, in my opinion, risks which are far smaller than those which we now run. I think it should be pointed out that if there is a settlement it is possible that Chinese influence in Southeast Asia may increase, but that possibility is even greater if the present course is pursued further. A settlement would not necessarily mean, however, that China will automatically control the area in a military or even an economic sense. The historic counterforce to that domination is the general Southeast Asian fear and anxiety of the Chinese which is quite distinct and may be at least as strong as ideology. In present circumstances, this fear and anxiety would appear to be largely dormant but it could revive in the event of a Chinese attempt at subversion of subjugation, particularly after a settlement. The existing Sino-Soviet dispute is also likely to distract China from Southeast Asia to some degree, but not in the event of a deepening military confrontation in that area.
I have written frankly and at length out of a deep concern over the present trend of events in Viet Nam. We are in very deep already and in most unfavorable circumstances. In my judgment we were in too deep long before you assumed office. But you know the whole situation on a day-to-day basis and I most certainly respect the decisions which you have felt compelled to make in this connection.
I shall not trouble you further with memorandums on this situation and I do not expect an answer to this letter./4/ Your responsibilities are great and to what I have written, I know you must add the views of many others who see this situation in different terms. But I did want to put certain possibilities before you in the event you have not yet had an opportunity to explore them. And I want you to know that you have my support on a personal as well as an official basis. If there is anything I can do to help you in this as in any other matter you have only to ask and I will try to the best of my ability to do so.
/4/For the President's reply, see Document 248.
Respectfully yours,
Mike Mansfield
216. Editorial Note
Immediately following his meeting with the President on March 23 (see Document 211), Foreign Secretary Stewart spoke at the National Press Club and criticized the reported use by the United States of gas warfare in Vietnam. No text of his remarks has been found, but a summary appeared in The Washington Post, March 24, 1965, p. A2. On March 24 McGeorge Bundy telephoned Ambassador Bruce, who was still in Washington, and asked him to prepare a draft letter to Prime Minister Wilson "expressing the President's indignation over Michael Stewart having answered a question at the National Press Club by replying with a citation from the Declaration of Independence, coupling British objections to the use of gas with a quotation about the 'decent observance of the opinions of mankind.'" When Bruce met with the President at 1 p.m. March 24, the President decided not to send a rebuke to Wilson, a decision that Bruce welcomed since he considered it "undignified and unnecessary" to do so. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327, January-March 1965)
On March 23 six Republican members of the House of Representatives wrote to President Johnson deploring the use of gas warfare in Vietnam and requesting an immediate halt to its use. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX) The six included William S. Broomfield (Michigan), Frank J. Horton (New York), John V. Lindsay (New York), Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (Maryland), F. Bradford Morse (Massachusetts), and Stanley R. Tupper (Maine). On March 24, following a 50-minute meeting with Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, all except Tupper and Mathias agreed to say no more about the gas issue. Vance's meeting with the six representatives, along with other aspects of Congressional opinion on the controversy, are described in McGeorge Bundy's March 24 memorandum to the President. (Ibid.)
In view of the heated controversy over the reported gas warfare, the President decided that Secretary of State Rusk should issue a clarifying statement at a press conference on March 24. That morning U.S. Information Agency Director Rowan called the Secretary of State. A memorandum of their conversation reads:
"R said he had talked to the President about gas business and he asked R to talk to Sec before his noon statement; R felt we had to say that we were willing not to engage in military use of gas; and were we willing to say this. Sec said in gas warfare, but Sec was not willing to make a flat commitment that closes the door in the future. R said he felt the word tactical use was causing us trouble. Sec asked if R saw the second thoughts of the British newspapers. Sec told R what he was going to say. R said we are absolutely unsuccessful in selling something that goes under the name of gas; we have a significant eroding away of third country support for this effort; R told of Japanese reaction. Sec said he did not think he should say guilty but we will not do it again; we should not be in the dock like a criminal." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
For text of Rusk's remarks concerning the gas warfare charge at his news conference on March 24, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 845-846.
217. Summary Notes of the 550th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, March 26, 1965, 1:15-2:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. Helms also prepared a record of the discussion. (Memorandum for the record, March 26; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Memos for the Record, 1 Mar-28 Apr 65)
Vietnam/2/
/2/In a March 26 memorandum to the President, Bundy had recommended that the NSC meeting be devoted to Vietnam. "It would be helpful at this point for all present to take a deep breath and listen to each other for about a half hour in a review of the situation as it now stands." (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX)
CIA Director McCone summarized the Vietnam situation including reactions abroad to U.S. air strikes on North Vietnam:
a. In South Vietnam, the U.S. attacks greatly improved military morale and stabilized the government situation in Saigon.
b. Hanoi stated its determination to stand up to the air attacks. It has given no hint that it is ready to accept negotiations.
c. Communist China urged Hanoi to stand firm. Peking continues to provide military assistance to Hanoi. The Chinese Communists are not yet ready to get into the fight.
d. The Soviets have no choice but to support Hanoi. The Vietnam war has the effect of intensifying the Sino-Soviet split.
The intelligence community estimates that Hanoi remains unconvinced that they cannot win out militarily. They are not yet ready to negotiate. Sustained U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam may prompt Hanoi to offer negotiations on the condition that the air attacks are called off. The State intelligence representative thinks that the Chinese Communists will respond by sending combat troops before Hanoi reaches the point of being forced to accept negotiations. The rest of the intelligence community believes that the Chinese Communists will probably not attack U.S. planes or ships or send in their ground army.
There is no hard evidence that the Chinese Communists are blocking Soviet efforts to send aid to North Vietnam. There are some indications that this is being done, such as the refusal of overflight clearances for Soviet planes flying materiel to North Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk: Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called at his request at noon.
Ambassador Thompson--Dobrynin said:
a. The Soviets cannot disassociate themselves from the fate of a socialist country such as North Vietnam.
b. The Soviets are giving assistance to Hanoi.
c. The Soviets warned us in advance that we were following a dangerous path in escalating the war in Vietnam. We are jeopardizing US/USSR relations. The U.S. has assumed a grave responsibility by continuing its aggression against the North Vietnamese Government. The United States should withdraw its forces from all of Vietnam and strictly observe the Geneva Agreement of 1954.
d. The U.S. continues its bombing of Laos and has opposed the holding of a conference on Laos.
e. U.S. actions in Vietnam--as well as support of the MLF--create a poor atmosphere for disarmament talks.
f. The United States has underestimated the serious effect of the current crisis.
Secretary Rusk: It is a pity that the U.S. and the USSR are being dragged along by North Vietnam. There is a difference between one country attacking another and the USSR supporting another socialist country. The Soviets are paralyzed by U.S. bombing and, as long as it continues, they cannot take any political action without exposing themselves to the criticism that they are not defending a socialist country. We do not know what they will do, however, if the bombing is stopped.
The effect of the U.S. air strikes was serious, but the attacks have not created a crisis. Our aim is to get Hanoi to realize that the North Vietnamese cannot win over South Vietnam without danger of our escalating the war.
We are still taking our lumps on the alleged use of gas/3/ in Vietnam. Ambassador Taylor will arrive Sunday for discussion of fresh efforts to be made in Vietnam. Recently, the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister said publicly that a separate North and South Vietnam is acceptable to Saigon.
/3/See footnote 2 Document 210.
USIA Director Rowan: The world press is still critical of our alleged use of gas in Vietnam but there has been some turn-around. No explanation of the facts, i.e., that the gas was the type used to control riots, will do much good because of the worldwide emotional reaction to the word "gas".
Secretary Rusk: Ambassador Kohler refused to accept and sent back to the Soviet Foreign Ministry the Soviet note on what they described as gas warfare in Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara: Since February 9, there have been 19 U.S. air raids in North Vietnam, 13 of these in the last week. The strikes were moderately successful from a military point of view. The North Vietnamese radar is very hard to destroy. Of the planes attacking North Vietnam, 80 percent are U.S. and 20 percent are South Vietnamese.
We now have 28,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam. Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland are asking for 10,000 more.
Viet Cong activity dropped off this week and has been lower than normal since February 9. We estimate that the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam total 40,000 regular troops plus 100,000 irregulars. We are planning to increase the ratio of free world troops to that of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese.
U.S. casualties have increased and the level of fatalities is high.
General Wheeler: General Johnson's program of 21 points is being implemented. More U.S. aircraft are being shipped. The proposal to introduce U.S. combat troops will be looked at when General Taylor arrives here next week. An extensive logistics program is being implemented, in addition to General Johnson's program. A second action program is being drawn up.
The President:/4/ Dates should be put behind each program. Next week the Joint Chiefs should meet with me to discuss their new military plans.
/4/According to Helms' record of the meeting, at this point the President "asked to have General Johnson's twenty-one points sent back to him with a statement beside each one as to the action taken."
It is unlikely that present political actions will meet the situation. We should plan for a bigger political effort to reverse the current trend. New political actions should be proposed for consideration./5/
/5/According to Helms' record of the meeting, the President "asked the Department of State to get to work on this and submit proposals to him as soon as possible."
An overall policy speech on Vietnam should be prepared. We should enlist new brain power in drafting the things which need to be said. One grows tired of reading only what the other side is saying. We should crank up our propaganda effort. Last week we did reasonably well to overcome the adverse reaction to our use of riot control gas.
A stabilizing effect on the press resulted from statements which were put out concerning our not talking about our military actions. We should quietly make clear the huge amount of time which we spend defending ourselves from our domestic opponents. More time should be spent on new initiatives. Perhaps we should have two Councils--one defensive and one offensive. New initiatives are required. We can only be pleased that the current Vietnam government hasn't fallen.
CIA Director McCone: Prime Minister Quat has made some progress in Saigon.
Secretary Rusk: None of the South Vietnamese leaders are good with crowds.
CIA Director McCone: The intelligence community agrees with the summary of worldwide reactions to our use of gas as given by Mr. Rowan.
The President: How did this whole gas incident happen? Was it a Communist plot?
USIA Director Rowan: Peter Arnett of the Associated Press didn't write his story out of the blue. We should find out about his background.
Secretary McNamara gave his account of how the gas story got started and, in reply to the President's question, explained our public information system in SouthVietnam.
Mr. Rowan: The public information situation was bad two years ago but improved when we increased our military activity. We now have new problems with over 200 reporters based in Saigon. New press guidelines are being sent to Saigon. New press criticism is increasing.
Secretary Rusk raised the question of briefing Senators. They should be briefed as soon as we have something new to say. The Senators are getting nervous. Weekly briefings in executive sessions of the appropriate Senate committees should be considered.
The President: We must think out this problem. We are spending most of our time defending our actions in Vietnam. What about the Stennis report on no equipment failures?/6/ Should not this report have gone first to the President and then to the press? Senators other than those on the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees should be called on and given briefings. Separate gatherings should be arranged which would be addressed by only Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. All questions raised at these sessions should be answered. We should then offer to go up to the Hill to testify on Vietnam every two weeks.
/6/Not further identified.
Bromley Smith
218. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, March 27, 1965, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to DOD, the White House, CIA, and CINCPAC. Received in the Department of State at 9:24 a.m.
3120. Embtel 3003./2/ Subj: Future requirements for US military manpower in SVN. The authorized US military strength in SVN is presently about 28,000. As individuals or as members of units, these men are providing the RVNAF with advice, air support, and logistic support or are reinforcing the security of selected military installations. MACV is recommending a further increase of about 18,000 US personnel to round out table of organization shortages, to improve local security at US billets and installations, to provide better air and communications support, and to create a much needed logistics command. Furthermore, MACV is recommending the introduction of the remainder of the 9th MEB to give greater strength to the security forces of the Danang-Phu Bai area. If all of these recommendations are approved, we are headed for a US military strength in SVN of approximately 50,000.
/2/Document 204.
In addition to these mounting requirements, there is a more significant one taking form which is discussed in Embtel 3003. It is quite clear that the existing operational units of the armed forces of Vietnam are insufficient to cope effectively with the internal Viet Cong threat. In recent weeks, we have seen a serious deterioration in the I and II Corps which has required the transfer of most of the RVNAF general reserve units to that area. Although there is an intensified build-up of ARVN forces in process, the full effect of this expanded mobilization will not be felt in terms of available operational units until toward the end of calendar 1965. Thus, we are faced with an immediate shortage of trained military and paramilitary units to offset the mounting strength of the Viet Cong. The basic question is whether we can accept this manpower shortage over the coming months and await the readiness of the new ARVN units, or whether some way must be found at once to compensate for the shortage during the intervening period.
Before attempting to answer this question, it is first necessary to decide what kind of strategy should be pursued during calendar year 1965. Strategy A might be to accept the present unsatisfactory progress in defeating the Viet Cong and base our hopes on the effect of the pressure of the current air attacks on Hanoi. Even if we make little progress in pacification during the coming months or even accept further retardation, this delay will be inconsequential if, in the end, Hanoi throws in the sponge and agrees to cease aid to the Viet Cong and to cooperate in their liquidation.
Strategy B might be to take the position that it is essential to reverse the downward trend in certain critical provinces, not only to avoid the danger of a debacle in these areas but also, through in-country successes, to give added weight to the effectiveness of the air campaign on the will of Hanoi. If the latter is losing both in SVN and suffering from repeated air attacks in NVN, this condition should accelerate the decision of the North Vietnamese leaders to mend their ways.
Strategy C might be to take the position that we must do everything possible to speed up the in-country campaign against the Viet Cong to prevent a possible collapse of national morale and to shorten the period of international tension which will exist throughout the duration of our military pressures on Hanoi. This means go for broke to win rapidly. To accept such a strategy is to support the need for the injection of all possible military strength into SVN which can be supported and be used effectively.
Without choosing between these three strategies at this point, let us assume that we are headed along the course of either Strategy B or C. Furthermore, let us make the assumption which I believe is correct that no introduction of US forces less than about 9-12 battalions will have any significant effect on the military situation in this country in the short term. So the immediate question is how to employ such a force if the decision is taken to introduce it.
In extension of the discussion on the same subject in Embtel 3003, I would say that such a US force could be used in three ways: (1) in a defensive or offensive enclave, (2) in territorial clear-and-hold operations or (3) as mobile reaction reserves. The defensive enclave is typified by the present employment of the two battalions of Marines in defense of the Danang airbase. They secure the immediate airbase but do not engage in military operations outside the defensive perimeter. This disposition could be changed into an offensive enclave if the Marines were allowed to sally forth and engage in operations either initiated by themselves or in support of operations conducted by ARVN. In any case, they would remain responsible for the security of Danang.
The use of US forces in territorial clear-and-hold operations amounts to giving them a mobile offensive role similar to that of the ARVN regular units. The plateau region in west central Vietnam has often been cited as a suitable region for this kind of employment. The advantages of this region and this mission are discussed in Embtel 3003.
The mobile reaction use amounts to assigning a mission to the US forces tantamount to that of the general reserve battalions of ARVN. Under this concept, the US forces would not go forth to find and fix the enemy but would wait until ARVN had found and fixed him, then as a striking force in reserve, they would enter action to finish the enemy who had been previously fixed by indigenous forces.
These three modes of employment all have their pros and cons. The enclave concept assures the security of an important installation or installations with minimum exposure of US personnel to casualties. It places our forces in locations on or near the coast where egress and ingress are easy to assure. However, if only a passive defensive role is assigned to them, they will have little effect upon the war against the Viet Cong and little influence in relieving ARVN forces for employment elsewhere. If the enclave is used offensively, the latter objection does not apply but, on the other hand, the exposure of US personnel to losses is increased.
The territorial clear-and-hold mission could have a significant effect in assisting the campaign against the Viet Cong--if successfully implemented. However, it runs into all of the longstanding objections to the use of US forces in anti-guerrilla operations in SE Asia. Our forces would inevitably suffer serious losses and at the outset would probably not do too well in operations in strange terrain for which they have not been specifically and intensively trained. There would be the inevitable problems of the identification of the enemy and of command relations with the ARVN and with the pacification representatives of the GVN ministries. There would be many legal questions raised relating to detention and arrest of Vietnamese citizens and to use and damage of Vietnamese property. There would be the difficulty of acquiring intelligence in a country where both the language and the environment are unfamiliar. Our forces would be operating under conditions in which the avoidance of ambush has never been solved by GVN forces operating for years in this environment; hence we would have to assume that the newly arrived US forces would have even greater difficulties in finding and fixing the enemy and in protecting themselves against surprise.
The use of our forces in a mobile reaction role has many advantages. To some extent, it minimizes the problem of finding and fixing the enemy. It assures that their employment would be in the climax of an important engagement where a significant element of the enemy could be destroyed. It would allow our forces to have their permanent stations more or less isolated from contacts with the local population in coastal areas easily supplied and supported by air and sea. In such locations, they would also avoid involvement [in] pacification operations which can only be carried out by representatives of the GVN. With air mobility, the employment in central reserve would allow the use of US forces over wide areas of the country and would assure a maximum return from the commitment of our manpower. This mode of employment would also give MACV an additional lever to influence tactical operations since the employment of our battalions could be made conditional upon the concurrence of the US advisors in the tactical plans of the ARVN commanders.
There are no particular disadvantages to the mobile reaction concept except the hard fact that we will take losses whenever our troops are plunged into the midst of an engagement in progress. Also they will necessarily be closely associated in action with ARVN and hence will have to work out appropriate command relationships for each operation.
It should be noted that there is nothing incompatible between a combination of the first and third concepts, that is, of placing US units in mobile reserve for reaction which would operate out of offensive enclaves. One could establish perhaps three such enclaves on or near the coast, each garrisoned by a brigade of three battalions. Under normal conditions, at least two of these battalions could be used on reaction operations leaving the third on the security mission. If the third battalion were required outside the enclave, it would be possible to reinforce the enclave either from another enclave or from a Marine or airborne unit brought in from the Fleet or from Okinawa. A first step toward effecting this disposition could be to organize the Marines in the Danang area into the first of these offensive enclaves. Thereafter, we could bring two Army brigades into areas such as Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Vung Tau-Bien Hoa. This could be an initial disposition capable of expansion after acquiring experience and gaining evidence as to the effectiveness of US forces in this new role. This conservative beginning would give us insight into the political and psychological effect of US combat participation on the GVN, on the armed forces of Vietnam and on the people.
With regard to the popular reaction, it is far from clear what the attitude of the GVN and the Vietnamese people would be toward the introduction of these forces. It could be that Vietnamese morale would be raised and their will to fight enhanced by the presence of US forces and their participation in combat on the ground. It is equally possible that the presence of these additional Americans would tend to sap the already flaccid purpose of the Vietnamese and would promote an attitude of "let the US do it". In any case, before introducing further US reinforcements into SVN it is essential to be sure that they will be enthusiastically welcomed by the government, by the armed forces and by the people.
Thus, we need an answer to the following questions before proceeding farther. (A) What strategy does the US propose to follow calendar year 1965? (B) To carry out that strategy, is it necessary to bring in additional US ground forces? (C) What will be the reaction of the Government and people of Vietnam to this proposal? If the answers to these proposals support the introduction of additional US ground forces, I would then favor their employment, initially at least, in accordance with the offensive enclave-mobile reaction concept.
Taylor
219. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 28, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXI, Memos. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to McNamara and McGeorge Bundy.
SUBJECT
Major Issues During Ambassador Taylor's Visit/2/
/2/Taylor left Saigon on March 27 and arrived in Washington the following day. Other members of his party included General De Puy and Lieutenant Colonel Montague of MACV, Leroy S. Wehrle of USOM, and H. Freeman Matthews, Jr., of the Embassy's Political Section. A proposed program for Taylor's visit, March 28-April 3, was attached to Unger's March 25 memorandum to William Bundy and others. (Ibid.)
I have gone over the principal papers that Ambassador Taylor has brought with him./3/ They raise a number of matters that can be dealt with, at least in the first instance, by his appointments in State, DoD, AID, and USIA. However, I thought it would be useful for you to have a preliminary indication of the major issues and the positions that have been recommended to the Ambassador by the Mission elements.
/3/Presumably a reference to some of the nearly 40 briefing papers prepared in Saigon in response to Mission Council Action Memorandum No. 80, March 22, to which was attached a list of the subjects to be covered in the briefing papers. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 69 D 74, EA)
1. Need for US Forces. MACV has not included third country forces, such as a ROK division, in its analysis. It has prepared a detailed "Commander's Estimate"/4/ which will be briefed to the DoD/JCS session Monday/5/ and which recommends the introduction of a US division and the filling out of the Marine units, for a total of approximately 33,000 combat personnel. I am not clear whether this includes all the supporting and logistics personnel incident to this additional deployment.
/4/"Commander's Estimate of the Situation in South Vietnam," March 26. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup)
>/5/March 29.
This combat deployment would be over and above recommended increases of approximately 18,000 in assorted units and logistics personnel separate from the combat deployment. The 18,000 figure breaks down into approximately 6,000 of increments to existing units, and 12,000 of new units, with the main element in the latter about 7,000 for the "logistics command."
Our present strength in SVN is given as 28,669 so that we are dealing with recommendations that would bring it to the level of 80,000 or higher under both headings.
2. "Negotiating" Policy and Tactics. The Embassy has supplied excellent papers on this subject, which we will have copied and distributed Monday. They focus on much the same issues that we are touching on in the present draft pronouncement,/6/ and that are analyzed in more detail in my memorandum of March 19./7/ I will inform the Ambassador Monday morning of the status of the pronouncement and give him a copy of our own analysis of March 19.
/6/Presumably a reference to the draft of the speech the President gave at Johns Hopkins University on April 7; see Document 245.
/7/Document 207.
3. Tempo of Operations against the DRV. The Embassy staff is recommending an increase in tempo, including additional strikes above the 20th parallel. They are also recommending immediate introduction of a leaflet operation as part of the program.
The Mission has also supplied useful papers on the question of blockade or aerial mining of the ports. The staff conclusion is that these steps should be further studied, but not carried out for the time being.
4. Non-military Measures. A very lengthy Mission cable has already given preliminary responses to the list of 41 points,/8/ and we will break out these and isolate the key issuses with Ambassador Taylor in our first State meeting Monday morning./9/
William P. Bundy/10/
/8/Telegram 3114 from Saigon, March 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/9/No record of Taylor's meeting at the Department of State on March 29 has been found. Blouin's memorandum for the record of Taylor's meeting at the Department of State at 10:30 a.m. on March 30 with representatives from various agencies to discuss non-military programs in South Vietnam is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 75-163, VN Chron.
/10Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 30, 1965, 8:31 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Taylor and approved by William Bundy.
2131. For Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland from Ambassador Taylor. Following informal memorandum of conversation is transmitted for your information. It has not been cleared by all participants. No action should be taken on decision items until confirmed through normal channels:
1. Ambassador Taylor met with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 29 March. After a general review of the military, political and pacification situation the discussion turned to: additional US and 3rd country force deployments and missions; Rolling Thunder targeting and reconnaissance; aerial mining and finally Popular Force equipment and funding.
2. Force deployments and missions:
a. The JCS has recommended to the Secretary of Defense the early deployment of a three division force with appropriate combat and logistic support. This force would include the entire MEF and I Corps area. An Army Division in the high plateau, and a Korean Division, location unspecified. The Chairman, JCS emphasized the urgent necessity to deploy a logistical command and the forward deployment of tactical fighter squadrons as well as the earliest possible construction of the airfield at Chu Lai and a runway at Da Nang.
b. Ambassador Taylor indicated that 3 divisions seemed high; that Quat was not persuaded that more troops were necessary; that anti-American sentiment lies just under the surface and that finally there are two very real limitations on the number and rate of introduction of US or 3rd country forces. First is the absorptive capacity of the country and second logistical limitations.
c. The Chairman, JCS outlined the importance of establishing a goal against which logistics planning could proceed.
d. The Secretary of Defense indicated that further US deployments must be accompanied by deployment of Koreans for reasons of domestic reaction.
e. After an exchange of views on the missions and operating methods of US forces the Secretary of Defense stated that he was impressed with the adverse force ratios and favored deployment of US forces conditioned by:
(1) political (psychological) absorption capacity
(2) logistical absorption capacity
(3) operational absorption--(that is operational requirements).
f. For consideration later in the week OSD and JCS are laying out the various force increases, force ratio implications, and deployment schedules.
3. Rolling Thunder
a. Strikes against lines of communication will be stepped up starting next week including the Thanh Hoa bridge. Subsequently and in due course the rail lines leading northeast and northwest of Hanoi will be struck. The limitations now being considered are to avoid the Haiphong area and the GCI range of MIGs around Hanoi.
b. The necessity for low level recce is recognized. A policy statement (formula) is being drafted to provide within over-all sortie limitations unescorted low level recce as required anywhere in NVN as long as it serves the purpose of building up a bank of required targeting information. The Haiphong area and MIG range of Hanoi would be excluded.
4. It was agreed to reexamine the question of aerial mining of the port of Haiphong as a more effective, less expensive equivalent of blockade. It was thought that this action might become necessary in the period 4 to 12 weeks out ahead.
5. Lastly Ambassador Taylor pointed up some equipment problems associated with the Popular Forces. At a cost of $28 per man a poncho, blanket, mosquito bar and ruck sack could be provided. The Secretary of Defense directed immediate funding for up to 200,000 Popular Forces.
Rusk
[end document]
Continue:
Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause,
March 8-May 8
Documents 221 through 240
