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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

221. Editorial Note

At approximately 10 a.m. (Saigon time) on March 30, an automobile loaded with explosives blew up outside the U.S. Embassy in Saigon killing 2 Americans and 20 Vietnamese. Nearly 200 people were wounded. Charge d'Affaires U. Alexis Johnson, who was on the fifth floor of the building, received cuts above his eyes. Central Intelligence Agency Station Chief Peer de Silva was partially blinded. For their reminiscences of the event, see Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, pages 432-435, and de Silva, Sub Rosa, pages 265-268. For the recollections of General William Westmoreland, who was en route to the Embassy to meet with Johnson when the blast went off, see A Soldier Reports, page 130.

For President Johnson's statement of March 30 condemning the bombing, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, page 347. On April 1 President Johnson sent letters to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives requesting authorization of $1 million to build a new Embassy building in Saigon. (Ibid., page 357)

 

222. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 31, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, McCone's 12 Points. Secret.

Dear Mr. President:

Following the NSC meeting last Friday,/2/ you asked me for recommendations of any additional actions that might be taken in South Vietnam to improve the prospects of accomplishing United States purposes and objectives in that country. Attached is a list of 12 actions which can be taken and which I believe will help. All are designed to improve the viability of the government, to promote cohesion within the South Vietnamese military structure, and to encourage South Vietnamese people to support their government and to participate more actively in the defense of their country.

/2/See Document 217.

Some of the proposed actions are not dissimilar to current undertakings of the U.S. Mission. However it is my belief that additional effort in the proposed areas, performed by men who have had long backgrounds of experience in South Vietnam, would be very useful.

Respectfully yours,

John A. McCone

Attachment/3/

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Helms) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, March 31, 1965.

/3/Secret. A copy was sent to the Deputy Director for Intelligence.

SUBJECT
CIA Proposals for Limited Covert Civilian Political Action in Vietnam

Outlined below are twelve key points that we believe should be intensified or initiated in the general field of covert political action. Some of these actions are covert in the traditional sense of secrecy and non-attributable sponsorship. Others are on the overt side, but are properly undertaken by CIA because of our flexibility and capability to move into situations quickly, bypassing cumbersome governmental mechanisms on both the U.S. and South Vietnamese sides. All of these actions are, of course, essentially complementary to the large, overt activities of the U.S. mission in its large-scale collaboration with the South Vietnamese government. Based on our experience in Vietnam, however, we believe that the listed actions should and could be undertaken by CIA with proper approval and authority. We realize that the obstacles to success are substantial, but feel that the effort should be made, and promptly.

1. Extension of covert support to key Buddhist leaders, especially in the social, cultural and anti-communist political fields. Both Buddhist lay and religious leaders have requested help in the organization and training of cadre to work in the countryside on various anti-communist projects.

2. Covert subsidy of a political party in support of Quat. The training and placement of political organizers to evoke positive popular reactions to Quat's programs could contribute to the stability of his government.

3. Expansion of covert contacts at all levels of the military structure to influence them toward cohesion and collaboration with the Quat government. Considerable personal and non-official involvement with these personalities is necessary to provide a means through which advice, encouragement and admonition can be proffered on a non-official level.

4. Provision of covert support to the development of free labor unions to conduct social, civic and political action throughout the country at the provincial level. Through judicious subsidy of labor activities, organization of specific anti-Viet Cong labor projects and exhortation to protect the gains of free labor, this politically inert group could possibly develop into a significant anti-Viet Cong force.

5. Covert support and stimulation of non-governmental farmers cooperatives and agricultural extension organizations. Cooperative purchase and use of farm tools and fertilizers, cooperative harvesting and marketing, and increased knowledge and training in means to expand agricultural production would provide for many farmers a good reason to resist communist appeals.

6. Covert support to non-governmental responsible youth and student leaders and organizations. Emerging moderate student and youth leadership should be supported and encouraged, both financially and through training and participation in international youth activities, to provide an outlet and a channel for youth and student energy and expression.

7. Expansion of current political action and similar teams working in disputed areas. Some 3,300 indigenous personnel, operating in 28 provinces in teams ranging from seven to forty men, now engage in successful civic action, psychological warfare, intelligence and local defense activities.

8. Organization, training and supply of Montagnard development communities and self-defense units in a highly flexible manner. In the absence of a positive political approach to the Montagnards, a large Montagnard dissident group, with Cambodian and Viet Cong support, is growing throughout the high plateau. CIA has contacts among the Montagnard leadership dating back several years and has the flexibility, if augmented by United States Special Forces support, to undertake to reverse this trend.

9. Provide flexible assistance, in coordination with Province Chiefs, to local partisan groups indicating a will to defend their communities against the Viet Cong. In addition to the Montagnards, there are large numbers of ethnic Vietnamese who, given arms, organization, training and support, can and will defend their home areas against small-scale communist foraging, tax collection, conscription and political indoctrination.

10. Expansion of guerrilla and harassment teams working in Viet Cong-controlled areas. Small, well-trained and armed teams penetrate Viet Cong redoubts, heighten peasant dissatisfaction with Viet Cong controls and harass the Viet Cong through black propaganda, mining of trails, neutralization of unpopular officials, and ambush of Viet Cong patrols.

11. Develop small irregular elements to track down, infiltrate and capture Viet Cong communication centers. This entails creation of specially trained quick reaction forces who have the capability of investing Viet Cong communication centers rapidly, who know exactly what to look for in terms of important intelligence materiel and personnel and how to obtain quick exploitation of the information received.

12. Covertly initiate and support assistance by third country individuals and elements in support of the above programs, e.g.[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] etc. Third country personnel having necessary expertise should be utilized in the above programs. Beyond this value, they tend to dilute the sense of overwhelming American inspiration of these programs and encourage additional participation and commitment of their governments to the successful outcome of the Vietnam war.

rh

223. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, March 31, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Memos for the Record, 1 Mar-28 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office.

SUBJECT
Discussion with Ambassador Taylor--31 March 1965

1. In response to Taylor's request I summarized the current estimates of South Vietnamese, NVN, ChiCom and Russian reactions to the bombing, reporting along the lines of my report to the NSC on March 26th./2/

/2/See Document 217.

2. Advised Taylor of concern over paucity of photographic reconnaissance of South China. Advised him that if ChiNats would not agree to fly, I intended to send a special representative to see Chiang Ching Kuo, and in all probability request authority to fly American pilots over South China in U-2 planes.

3. Advised Amb. Taylor of the analysis of communications indicating that the NVN 325th Division Headquarters, now located in SVN, was in communication with 11 components in the area and also in direct communication with Hanoi and we thought this was probably associated with a plan for a concerted action against some point in the northern part of South Vietnam.

4. In answer to the Ambassador's questions, I stated that we could not interpret the low level of VC current activity to necessarily be attributable to the air operations or orders from Hanoi. It might be explained as a cyclical situation similar to those we have observed before. The Ambassador observed that the period of low level of activity was somewhat longer than experienced before and this apparently is true. I stated that there is no question but what the bombing in the north has interrupted, but not stopped, the flow of cadres and materiel into SVN. Likewise, the tighter coastal patrol and the successful interdiction of several supply ships has had its effect.

5. Then told the Ambassador we felt more must be done to encourage the people of SVN to support the government and its purposes. Taylor countered by saying that this could only be brought about by a successful military effort and as long as there was discouragement on the part of the people, they would either be apathetic or disinclined to actively support the government. I did not fully agree, and then explained that the President had asked me for recommendations as to what more we could do in South Vietnam to help the U.S. cause. I had Taylor read the attached March 31st memorandum to the President and DDP's memorandum to me./3/ Taylor said that he could not take exception to any of the points that we made. He felt all had possibilities but naturally wished any particular action to be spelled out in detail prior to his approval. He asked that we expand on one or all of the proposed actions, transmit the ideas to Peter de Silva (whom Taylor holds in the highest regard), and he then would consider any recommendations de Silva made.

/3/Document 222.

6. With respect to Item 7, Taylor said he had authorized substantial expansion of the program, mentioned 200 teams of 40 men for a total of 8,000 personnel to be trained and equipped and directed in this operation. Taylor said he was afraid that quality might erode away as the numbers grew and of course this is a possibility. He did not mention "regularizing" this activity by placing it under USOM, AID or MACV.

Action: I concurred that we would forward specifies to de Silva.

7. Throughout the discussion I said that CIA felt there was a need for a very considerable amount of covert political and civic action and work with organizations such as religious groups, labor groups, farm groups, etc., which would parallel the more overt and formal actions of the regular agencies. I expressed the opinion that CIA had very good civilian resources which were not being used and that the United States cause in South Vietnam was suffering on this account. At this point I said that the loss of Montagnard support, which was an outgrowth of Operation Switchback and MACV's handling of this entire area, was in my opinion unfortunate. Taylor countered by saying that the Generals, most particularly Khanh, were very suspicious and resentful of the training of the Montagnards. He felt they were traditional enemies of the South Vietnamese, were considered totally unreliable, and would turn on the government or the SVN people at any moment. For this reason the Montagnard program was abandoned at the insistence of the SVN government.

 

224. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 31, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Your meeting with Max Taylor at 5:15 this afternoon/2/

/2/The President met with Taylor at the White House at 5:34 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other record of their conversation has been found.

1. Max Taylor's visit this afternoon is the first of two. Today he comes privately. Tomorrow all the recommendations growing out of his visit will be available for formal presentation to you in the presence of the heads of the departments concerned. This will be quite a substantial meeting in numbers, but it is being kept off the record--and if it leaks it will be billed simply as one more effort to make sure that we are doing everything we can to make our program more efficient and effective.

2. The three problems on Max's mind are these:

(1) The timing and direction of attack on the North;

(2) The timing, size, and mission of any U.S. combat deployments to Vietnam; and

(3) The terms and conditions of a political resolution of the problem.

He has done more thinking on (1) and (2) than on (3)--and so have we.

3. I think that on (1) he is in reasonable agreement with our outline plans for the next 2 or 3 weeks. But he is prepared to go toward Hanoi faster than McNamara. You may wish to probe him on this because I sense that you are leaning a little ahead of Bob on this one.

4. On U.S. deployments, I think Taylor and McNamara are very close together in the notion of a coastal deployment of the remaining battalions of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the effort to get a Korean Battle Group (Ambassador Brown warns from Seoul that he is very wary of this proposal and that the ground would have to be very carefully laid).

5. Max's work is still continuing on the proposed actions to beef up our work inside South Vietnam. Max is somewhat resistant to our pressures on this since he feels that his own time and energy should go into the absolutely top priority problems. What he puts at the head of the list is overall troop strength in SouthVietnam--and I think he is probably right, at that. But the other matters also count, and that is one more reason for my conviction that in the long pull we need a McNaughton-type in Saigon. John does see this point.

6. Finally, you and Taylor will certainly wish to talk over the guidelines for his meetings with Congressional Committees tomorrow and any backgrounding he may do with the press.

McG. B.

 

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 1, 1965, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 8:42 a.m.

3177. For Ambassador Taylor only from Alex Johnson. Deptel 2121./2/ Regret delay in replying but other events have intervened (as matter of fact was working on reply when explosion came). With all due respect to drafter of memo, I frankly find it confusing, in places seemingly internally contradictory, and thus in short compass, I find it somewhat difficult to come to grips with it. Among problems I have are following:

/2/Telegram 2121, March 29, transmitted William Bundy's memorandum of March 19 to Rusk (Document 207) along with Taylor's request for Johnson's comments on the memorandum, which Taylor said had as yet no formal status. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

1. Implication that DRV is entitled to have voice in "future political organization in the South" (paras B-9; D-2) and that "fairly substantial international machinery" for which we "should possibly welcome and seek conference situation" would be involved in "an appropriate determination of the will of the people of SVN" (all the first portion of para III). It seems to me that all of this calls into question the legitimacy and mandate of this or any other GVN which may be in power at time of negotiation. I do not see how any GVN could accept this which is far different from a GVN itself unilaterally making future provision for a constitutional structure and general elections. As we both know, desirable though general elections may be at some future time, they are no remedy for the ills of SVN which for a long time is going to require a "strong, effective and stable" government as opposed to some theoretical "democratic" government. Much of the philosophy on this embodied in the memo tends, in my view, to move toward the DRV thesis with respect to the 1965 elections provided for under the 1954 Geneva Agreement, that is, that SVN should be subjected to the test of elections, but no similar tests should be applied to the DRV. It seems to me our position should continue to be that the DRV, which directs, controls and supports the VC movement, should get out of SVN in order to leave SVN free to determine its own future in its own way the same as any other country. I emphasize that we should do nothing that calls into question legitimacy of GVN.

2. Based on our past experience, I feel that it is misleading and pursuing a will of the wisp to speak of "reliable" international supervision and inspection of cessation of infiltration (para B-5 and latter part of para III). I am also not clear on how it is proposed that this concept be applied to Laos which will remain the principal problem. An attempt to negotiate this with respect to Laos will open up the entire 1962 Laos Accords and in fact I wonder whether we will be able to get anything better on paper than that accord with respect to Laos. The principal problem on inspection of cessation of infiltration through Laos is not the 1962 agreement but its implementation. I would think that we would do better by insisting on its effective implementation with respect to freedom of ICC movement rather than seeking to negotiate a new accord on Laos.

3. I have difficulty with the emphasis throughout the paper on "infiltrators" from the DRV as opposed to the VC in general. For example, para B-7 speaks only of withdrawal or de-militarization of the infiltrator and in the third paragraph of para III, "some procedure of regroupment and repatriation to the north of those who had come from there". Pursuing our thesis that the VC are an organization organized, controlled, supported, and directed by the DRV, the question is not where a VC happened in recent time to have come from, but for whom he works. What happens to him and in fact his own desires will presumably be heavily affected by this fact. That is, if the DRV calls off its VC dogs here, many who are now in the VC, even though locally recruited, will presumably desire to proceed to the DRV and it is in our interest to do the maximum to encourage this. Thus instead of laying stress on return to the DRV only of "infiltrators", I would lay the stress on free choice for the VC, that is, either acceptance of an amnesty here or a return to DRV. The mechanics of such an operation will obviously require negotiation and international supervision will be very desirable. It has been my own view that mechanics could be worked out at bilateral DRV/GVN "military level" negotiations and that international supervision readily provided by a simple request from both sides to the existing ICC (personnel of which could be augmented) thus obviating the necessity of a new international mechanism.

4. The cessation of our air attacks on the DRV is based on two very vague and difficult to establish conditions, first the stopping or dwindling to a trickle of infiltration and the "cessation of organized unit action of any significant size" (para II). As noted under para III, "this would leave enclaves of VC control scattered throughout the country." While the memo exhorts US "not to accept hardening of somewhat legalized VC control" and not to "let the VC dig in", as well as not to accept a "legalized role for the liberation front", it seems to me that these results will be inevitable under this sequence of events. If we accept that the DRV has carried out its obligations (cessation of infiltration and organized unit action of any significant size) and we have thus stopped our air attacks, the DRV will no longer be under any pressure to negotiate on behalf of the VC. We will have to negotiate with somebody and this inevitably leads back to negotiation of some kind with the Liberation Front. An international conference on the subject can go on indefinitely while the VC do in fact "dig in". It thus seems to me absolutely essential that in some way or other the original negotiation encompass in some form the cessation of VC attacks as well as VC regroupment and disposition, that is, a choice between acceptance of an amnesty or repatriation to the DRV.

I fully understand and am in sympathy with the effort in the paper to find some formula that will appear to be less than complete capitulation by the DRV and to leave the DRV a "golden door of retreat". However, I feel that the draft memo is on the one hand so vague and imprecise and on the other hand so full of pitfalls for the future that we should urge a fresh attack on the problem of finding a formula. Some of the suggestions Tran Van Do made to you could be considered./3/

/3/In telegram 3096 from Saigon, March 26, Taylor described his conversation the previous day with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, who said that the key problem was how to give Hanoi a face-saving way out of the war and at the same time to end the insurgency in the south on terms favorable to the South Vietnamese Government. One of Tran Van Do's suggestions was to have the Soviet Union or China urge Hanoi to end the Viet Cong insurgency. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive analysis and I have not attempted to repeat the recommendations we have already made to the Dept or the analysis that I made in the memo you took with you./4/ Thus if you feel that anything more from me would be helpful, please let me know. In any event, I do hope that while you are there you will be able to arrive at a meeting of the minds on this most important and fundamental subject.

/4/Presumably an undated paper entitled "Settlement," prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Vietnam. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 69 D 74, EA)

Johnson

 

226. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/

Washington, April 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Political Track Papers. Top Secret.

In constructing our political track leading to the ending of hostilities, we should first remind ourselves of the terminal situation which we wish to create. We would like to be assured that the DRV has ceased its support of the VC insurgency, that the main force VC units and all VC personnel so desiring, move back into North Viet-Nam, that the former VC remaining in South Viet-Nam are prepared to become law-abiding citizens, that the Communist commnications network between North and South Viet-Nam is dismantled and that some form of international inspection exists to verify the consummation of these actions. Likewise, there should be some arrangement subject to verification that Laotian territory will no longer be used as a channel of infiltration into South Viet-Nam.

To attain these objectives, we have three blue chips to offer Hanoi: cessation of our bombing attacks, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam and political and economic assistance for North Viet-Nam. The question is how best to play these chips in order to get in return the objectives indicated above.

In exchange for the cessation of bombing we would like to get the cessation of DRV support for the VC and the withdrawal of main force VC units. While this demand might be our initial position, it seems highly unlikely that both of these concessions could be obtained. In lieu of the requirement to withdraw main force units, an acceptable modification might be an agreement that the major VC forces would "surface", identify themselves to the ICC and remain in place pending an arrangement for their evacuation to the North. Implicit in this procedure is the prior presence in South Viet-Nam of a strong ICC type mission capable of monitoring this entire procedure.

Also, we must be prepared to resume bombing if negotiations break down or if the DRV does not live up to its agreements.

Thus, under the foregoing concept, the first phase would consist of our cessation of bombing in exchange for the termination of aid and direction by Hanoi to the VC (to include the requirement that all Communist radio traffic be in the clear) and for the surfacing, identification, and immobilization of the main VC units in South Viet-Nam. VC incidents would have to cease and government forces would circulate freely except in the immediate vicinity of the areas occupied by the identified VC units. The second phase might consist of the actions necessary for the withdrawal of all main force units and supporting VC guerrillas to the North in exchange for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam. Such a withdrawal could be increments, possibly based on percentages of total strength. The VC units could depart honorably with their arms and colors flying.

Upon the completion of phase 2, there would be the pay-off whereby the United States would engage itself to provide political and economic support for both North and South Viet-Nam to assure the viability of both countries as independent, recognized states.

 

227. Draft Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/

Washington, April 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, SE Asia Regional Development. Secret. The source text was attached to Harriman's covering memorandum of April 1 to McGeorge Bundy, in which he explained that the draft paper contained suggestions for clearing up the confusion regarding U.S. policy toward Vietnam that Harriman believed existed abroad and in the United States.

I think it is important that the President make one or more statements amplifying Point V of his March 25 statement/2/ to capture world opinion as well as to give the enemy a political and economic carrot. Ambassador Taylor's return might be a suitable occasion.

/2/Point V of the President's statement of March 25 dealt with the need for further cooperative ventures by the United States and Southeast Asian nations in the economic and social realms. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, p. 319)

The statement should be couched in terms that would not disturb but strengthen the morale of SVN.

Its objective would be to make an impact on the following groups:

1. The people and governments of friendly countries, as well as groups in the US that are concerned over where we are going in Viet-Nam.

The statement should show that the President is thinking in terms of peace and the future welfare of the people of Indochina.

2. The leaders of North Viet-Nam.

The statement should imply that NVN could have a political and economic future free from fear of Chinese domination. It would also imply that NVN would be recognized as a state and would share in the development of the area, and specifically have a source of supply other than China for rice and other essential products.

3. The Soviet Government.

Statement should propose a non-aligned area for Indochina with its security guaranteed by the US, USSR, Red China, etc. This would assure the Soviets against ChiCom advance to the south.

4. Peiping.

By the non-aligned set-up, Peiping could have the security of a comfortable buffer area. They might be ready to accept such a buffer, as long as they were sure that there would be no attempt to make it a Western bastion. The ChiCom leadership is patient and it might be willing to put off for the time being its expansionist hopes.

To achieve these purposes, the statement should propose close economic relationship among the four Indochinese countries, with the opportunity for Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, and perhaps others to join if desired.

This economic relationship should include free exchange of products, common development planning, as well as mutual educational institutions, with emphasis on agriculture, engineering, and medicine. The US should offer material and technical assistance.

The Soviet Union and Red China should be invited to join as well as France, other industrial countries of Europe, and Japan. The US should indicate a willingness to be generous, but show no desire to control.

The statement should not attempt to be detailed, but should be sufficiently specific to have meaning.

 

228. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, April 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX. Top Secret. Printed in part in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 346-347. The source text was attached to a brief memorandum of April 1 from McGeorge Bundy to the President, in which Bundy wrote:

"If you have a chance to read this memorandum before our meeting today, I think it will save time. I have deliberately put the political problems up near the front because they are the harder ones. The military and non-military action programs summarized in later parts of the memo do not seem as controversial or difficult today.

When he was doing research in his files at the Department of State in the early 1970s, William Bundy typed a note to the effect that this memorandum was essentially the same as his March 31 memorandum entitled "Key Elements in Strategy for South Vietnam." This memorandum and Bundy's later note are in Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240. WPB Chron.

KEY ELEMENTS FOR DISCUSSION
THURSDAY, APRIL 1, at 5:30 PM

1. The Situation

Morale has improved in South Vietnam. The government has not really settled down, but seems to be hopeful both in its capacity and in its sense of political forces. The armed forces continue in reasonably good shape, though top leadership is not really effective and the ratio of armed forces to the VC buildup is not good enough.

The situation in many areas of the countryside continues to go in favor of the VC, although there is now a temporary lull. The threat is particularly serious in the central provinces, and the VC forces may be regrouping for major efforts there in the near future.

Hanoi has shown no signs of give, and Peiping has stiffened its position within the last week. We still believe that attacks near Hanoi might substantially raise the odds of Peiping coming in with air. Meanwhile, we expect Hanoi to continue and step up its infiltration both by land through Laos and by sea. There are clear indications of different viewpoints in Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow (and even in the so-called Liberation Front), and continued sharp friction between Moscow and Peiping. However, neither such frictions nor the pressure of our present slowly ascending pace of air attack on North Vietnam can be expected to produce a real change in Hanoi's position for some time, probably 2-3 months, at best.

A key question for Hanoi is whether they continue to make real headway in the south, or whether the conflict there starts to move against them or at least appear increasingly tough. If the former, even a major step-up in our air attacks would probably not cause them to become much more reasonable; if the latter, the situation might begin to move on a political track--but again in not less than 2-3 months, in our present judgment.

2. Immediate International Moves

There are two initiatives from third parties which require US decisions. U Thant has proposed a three-month period in which there would be "a temporary cessation of all hostile military activity, whether overt or covert, across the 17th parallel in Vietnam." The 17 "neutrals" which met in Belgrade have proposed negotiations "without preconditions."/2/

/2/For text of the appeal adopted at a meeting of 17 non-aligned nations meeting in Belgrade March 13-15, see Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1965, pp. 611-612. The appeal was given to Rusk on April 1 by a delegation of the Ambassadors of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Yugoslavia. A memorandum of the conversation on this occasion is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Secretary's Memcons: FRC 83-0057, April 1965.

We think the U Thant proposal should be turned off. (Bunche tells us U Thant will not float it publicly if we reject it privately.) It is not clear that the trade-off would be to our advantage, even if it could be arranged, and in any case, we prefer to use U Thant for private feelers rather than public proposals. We can tell U Thant that we have no objection on his sounding out Hanoi on this same point, however, and that if he gets a response, we would be glad to comment on it.

The 17-nation proposal is more attractive. We are inclined to propose to Quat that both South Vietnam and the US should accept it with a covering statement of our good, firm, clear objectives in any such negotiation. The President has already made it clear that he will go anywhere to talk with anyone, and we think the 17-nation proposal is one to which we can make a pretty clear response. Tactically, it will probably not lead to an early conference, because the position of Hanoi and Peking will be that they will not attend any meeting until our bombings stop. The Secretary of State will elaborate on these propositions.

3. More General Political Posture

The more general political question, which still needs refinement, is the order and content of the eventual tradeoff. We have three cards of some value: our bombing of North Vietnam, our military presence in South Vietnam, and the political and economic carrots that can be offered to Hanoi. We want to trade these cards for just as much as possible of the following: an end to infiltration of men and supplies, an end of Hanoi's direction, control, and encouragement of the Viet Cong, a removal of cadres under direct Hanoi control, and a dissolution of the organized Viet Cong military and political forces. We do not need to decide today just how we wish to mesh our high cards against Communist concessions. But we will need to be in such a position soon, if only to exchange views with Quat. On this more general point, we believe more exploratory conversation with the President is needed today.

4. Actions within South Vietnam

It remains crucial that the South Vietnamese and we put every possible useful resource into the effort in the South. Specifically, the promising elements of the following programs should be carried out energetically in accordance with appropriate priorities:

a. The 41-point program of non-military measures. (A separate first status report/3/ on these measures has been prepared.) The Mission, as well as all agencies in Washington, should develop additional points, and a major US program for the supply and distribution of food should be urgently considered. Mr. McCone's twelve suggestions for covert and other actions/4/ should be explored urgently.

/3/The 41-point program of non-military measures was transmitted to the President under cover of a memorandum of March 31 from Taylor. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Point Program) A status report on the program was sent to Rusk as an attachment to a memorandum of April 2 from Unger. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 328)

/4/See the attachment to Document 222.

b. The Rowan recommendations,/5/ with USIA in charge.

/5/See Document 203.

c. The 21-point Johnson program of military actions,/6/ expanded to include every possible measure and effective use of US resources against sea infiltration.

/6/See Document 197.

d. An 18,000-20,000-man increase in US military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

e. The GVN manpower increase programs, using increased pay scales or any other inducement regardless of monetary cost.

5. US and Third Country Combat Forces in South Vietnam

In view of the inadequate ratio of government forces to the likely pace of VC buildup during 1965, consideration has been given to (and the JCS would recommend) the addition of 2 or 3 division forces to take on limited missions, to release government forces for wider use, and to deter large-scale DRV attacks on South Vietnam. Deployment of the forces would proceed in a series of steps, the first of which would require sixty days and would involve the deployment of 2 additional Marine battalions, one Marine air squadron, and the logistical forces referred to in d above.

Because the reaction of the GVN and the South Vietnamese people to any major US combat deployment is uncertain, as is the likely net effectiveness of US and third country combat forces in the Vietnamese environment, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense recommend that action at this time be limited to approval of the first step. The second and remaining steps could be reviewed approximately 60 days from now.

Major third country participation would be a big asset to the program. We may get some small Australian and New Zealand participation, with staff talks going on this week. However, major forces could come only from South Korea. The Secretary of Defense thinks we should seek deployment of Korean "offensive enclave/mobile combat reserve" forces (in the form of a 3500-man regimental combat team) concurrently with deployment of additional US Marines. The Secretary of State points out that the political situation in Korea is touchy, but he believes that we can quietly explore with the Korean Government the possibility of bringing in Korean combat troops on a quiet basis to reinforce and support the 2,000 Koreans now in South Vietnam.

We should defer any decision on any larger-scale program. However, detailed plans should be made for the logistics to support the possible later introduction of the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force (30,000 additional Marines), a US Army Division (30,000 men, including logistics), a possible Korean force bringing their total to a division, and at least one Commonwealth Brigade.

6. Actions Against North Vietnam and in Laos

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC action slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks, to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations with warning and propaganda themes should be initiated to add to the psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and certain third countries, but also offers many advantages.

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

7. A Regional Economic Initiative

If there is time, Mr. McGeorge Bundy will present briefly the current results of further steps on the President's Point 5 of last week./7/

/7/Regarding the planning for a regional development program for Southeast Asia, see Cooper's Talking Paper of April 1 for McGeorge Bundy (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, SE Asia Regional Development) and McGeorge Bundy's memorandum of April 1 to the President. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX)

 

229. Personal Notes of a Meeting With President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 1, 1965, 5:33-7:40 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking. The notes were handwritten by McGeorge Bundy for his personal use and were not an official record of the meeting. Bundy lists the following participants: The President, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Vance, Wheeler, McNaughton, Taylor, William Bundy, and McGeorge Bundy. The time is taken from the President's Daily Diary at the Johnson Library, which indicates that the President was out of the meeting room from 6:43 to 7 p.m. The President's Daily Diary mistakenly identifies the meeting as an official NSC meeting; the attendance list in the Daily Diary is actually a list of those who attended the NSC meeting on April 2. No other record of the discussion at this meeting has been found, but for records of the decisions, see Documents 230 and 242.

P[resident] discusses press conference (he held one at about 5 without advance notice to anyone)/2/ & off record meeting with them. No great decisions to be discussed.

/2/President Johnson went to the White House theater at 4:35 p.m. for the taped delivery of a speech on his message to Congress on education and then held an "impromptu unannounced press conference" until 5:20. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

Rusk spells out his view--which is 4 forms of Northern withdrawal 1 end of infil[tration] men--2 end of infil supplies--3 end of control--4 withdrawal of troops put in from North. Max needs to discuss w/Quat. How to make pressure w/o reaching flash point./3/

/3/The notes imply but do not indicate explicitly that the last two sentences were Rusk's.

LBJ: No harm in 3 Power talks but great harm if they tell anyone they are acting for us.

McG.B: We may find it hard to get--so how hard do we get tied on to it.

LBJ: We can't but we must ask for it.

MDT: A hardnosed position is very

DR: Not sure that Hanoi can deliver on cessation.

John McCone--neither is he--a substantial reduction is possible

P[resident]. If we can first get our feet on their neck. Rural electrification--Brotherhood Operation .

President full of determination--we have set our hand to wheel. Get plenty more targets--damn many planes trying to find 'em. Hold out promised land.

Payin' enough money--payin' enough information--we got to find em & kill em. Saturday report.

Wheeler: 12 week program keeps away from MIGs. Para 5,/4/ JCS do not agree. We are losing the war out there. JCS want one Marine division, one Army division, one ROK division. Lots of problems--foreign mainly white troops.

/4/Apparently a reference to paragraph 5 of Document 228.

LBJ: Have we exhausted all the possibilities with foreign/5/ Filipino forces?

/5/The word "foreign" is written above "Filipino."

Wheeler: 1 div[ision] ROKs--1 Bn Aussies--1 RCT Fil[ipino]s--Thais no. (helping in Laos)--no combat troops w/o U.S. combat troops.

We got a commitment there./6/

Are we liable to get Chinese? DRV?/6/

/6/The notes do not indicate who was speaking.

1. Effective margin. 2. proof of purpose. 3. deterrent to escalate. 4. power base if deterrent fails. 5. important negotiating point.

Wheeler asks tentative decision.

3 divi[sion]s--logistical, political & oper probs solved.

Decision--need and, be to prepare.

Reserves

--You do not need them for 3 div[ision] move./7/

/7/Presumably a reference to the three divisions requested by Wheeler.

--You do need them for strategic reserve.

McNamara--no decision today.

Rusk--no decision today.

They/6/ should be ready.

/6/The notes do not indicate who was speaking.

Change in Marine mission./8/

/8/See paragraph 7, Document 242.

53 Point./9/

/9/Presumably a reference to the 41- and 12-point programs discussed at the meeting. See paragraphs 1 and 3, Document 242.

Action NSC./10/

/10/The NSC met the next day and a National Security Action Memorandum was issued on April 6; see Documents 231 and 242.

 

230. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carter)/1/

Washington, April 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, DCI Memoranda, 1 Mar 65-30 Apr 65. Top Secret.

Today's meeting/2/ attended by the Principals with the President considered the final draft of the April 1st State paper on the key developments and strategy of South Vietnam./3/ I will dictate a more comprehensive memorandum, however, I would like to discuss and exchange views with you and our Vietnam experts on the effect of certain decisions outlined below and to take such actions as are appropriate.

/2/See Document 229.

/3/Document 228.

1. The 41 point program of non-military measures/4/ was approved, subject to priorities and detail development of each point by the Mission and the agencies in Washington, and the concurrence of the GVN.

/4/See footnote 3, Document 228, and vol. III, Document 25.

2. We were directed to develop each of the 12 covert actions proposal advanced by CIA,/5/ to work out specifics with the Ambassador and the Mission, and to take implementing action as is necessary to carry out each of the 12 points, and to carry out other points approved by the Ambassador and in the manner and to the extent agreed by the Ambassador and the Station. No estimate of manpower or cost or of implementing the program were presented. No objections were voiced to any of the CIA suggested programs.

/5/See the attachment to Document 222.

Action: DDP should implement, and a procedure should be established for a weekly report to you and me.

3. The Rowan recommendations/6/ were approved and presumably the draft NSAM implementing the Rowan report will be issued./7/

/6/For a summary, see Document 203.

/7/National Security Action Memorandum 330, implementing the Rowan Report, was issued April 9. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memoranda)

4. The 21 point General Johnson program/8/ was approved.

/8/For a summary, see Document 197.

5. The Ambassador was given authority to increase GVN manpower programs using increased pay scale and other inducements, regardless of monetary costs.

6. With regard to U.S. manpower the following actions were approved:

a. An 18,000-20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces to fill out existing units, and to supply needed logistic personnel.

b. Two additional Marine battalions totalling about 3500 men.

c. One additional Marine Air squadron of about 700 men.

7. The United States Mission in South Vietnam was modified and U.S. Ground Forces were authorized to "engage in counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam." Heretofore, the Ground Force Missions have been advisory and for static defense.

8. The JCS strongly recommended that we now reach a tentative decision to deploy three divisions--two U.S. Divisions and one ROK Division into SVN for counterinsurgency combat operations in that country. This recommendation was not approved and no decision was reached. However, some of the 20,000 man increase will be used in preparatory work to receive additional or third country forces for counterinsurgency operations. Preparatory work will involve dredging harbors, building roads, establishing POL and other supply depots, etc., etc.

9. Air operations against the North were approved on a continuing ascending tempo directed toward varying types of targets but remaining outside of the effectiveness of the GCI range of the MIGs.

10. I would like an examination made of the possible NVN and ChiCom reactions to the introduction of forces in:

a. The size mentioned above.

b. Plus the three divisions, U.S. and/or third country (recognizing this decision has not been made however). Also I would like an opinion from our experts as to the reaction of the SVN public, political leadership and the military leadership to the doubling of American presence in SVN.

Also I would like the views of our experts on the reaction of NVN and the ChiComs to the change in Mission from one of static defense to one of actual engagement in counterinsurgency operations in SVN.

 

231. Summary Notes of the 551st Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, April 2, 1965, 2:05-3:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret. Prepared by Cooper on April 5. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary at the Johnson Library. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

Secretary Rusk briefed the Council on the diplomatic and political aspects of the Vietnam situation. He noted that a group of 17 unaligned nations presented an appeal to the U.S. and other governments to undertake early negotiations without pre-conditions./2/ He recommended that our reply be serious, restrained and positive. If the other side makes a shrill and unyielding response we will achieve a major propaganda advantage; if they react in a positive way, we will get some clues as to what they may have in mind with respect to possible negotiations.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 228.

Mr. Rusk noted that the House of Commons debate on Vietnam went well and that the "gas" issue was overshadowed by the evidence that the UK had used it frequently in the Middle East.

The Secretary concluded by pointing out that the Government in Saigon appears to be stable and effective and that Washington agencies and our Embassy in Saigon were developing some proposals for non-military actions in Vietnam.

Secretary Vance reported that VC actions during the past week declined somewhat--except for the dramatic bombing of the Embassy. The Department of Defense is in process of following through on General Johnson's "21 points."/3/ In particular, early action is being taken in connection with additional helicopter companies, recce aircraft, more military support personnel, and more Marines.

/3/For a summary, see Document 197.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy referred to the pending Presidential speech/4/ and discussed the proposed plan for a Southeast Asia Development Association./5/ Mr. Gaud (AID) and Mr. Rusk both indicated their approval of the plan and their desire to move ahead in that direction.

/4/See Document 245.

/5/See footnote 7, Document 228.

Ambassador Taylor, who had spent the morning on Capitol Hill, indicated that he had no trouble in the House./6/ The mood of some Senators was one of concern, but not disapproval. Senator Fulbright was worried about reports that the U.S. might send as many as 3 or 4 divisions to Vietnam. The Senator also pointed out that the Joint Resolution might not cover the dispatch of large ground units to Vietnam. Senator Church was interested in the nature of our "carrot" and its relationship to negotiations and bombing. In general, there was considerable interest in the "diplomatic track". Secretary Rusk confirmed, on the basis of his recent experience, that there appeared to be general support for our policy, albeit some worry as well.

/6/A 99-page transcript of Taylor's briefing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at 10:30 a.m. is in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee files. No record has been found of Taylor's appearance before any committee of the House of Representatives.

The President indicated that he didn't think the sending of U.S. military forces to Vietnam would require a new Congressional Resolution. He felt that our sending troops to Europe in the early '50s was not a relevant analogy.

The President asked the group what Ambassador Taylor would be taking back to Vietnam.

Mr. Gaud stated that there were no new AID projects.

Mr. Rowan reported on the progress being made in staffing and training for the increased Psy War program.

General Wheeler stated that new logistical arrangements and support were being provided and that there would be an early deployment of two more Marine Battalions.

Ambassador Taylor stated that he had a helpful, useful week in Washington. He felt that he had everything he needed in terms of authority and resources. He indicated the line he would take with the Press: No dramatic change in strategy; we will try to do better what we are doing now.

Mr. Bundy suggested that until the Presidential speech (or next Presidential press statement) all present should be guided by the President's Press Conference of 1 April./7/ Under no circumstances should there be any reference to the movement of U.S. forces or other future courses of action.

/7/See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 364-372.

Mr. McCone expressed the view of CIA analysts that the Communist position was hardening rather than the reverse as a result of the air strikes. The U.S. should take this into account in future policy decisions, especially in connection with sending additional troops to South Vietnam.

The Press was then admitted to question both the President and Ambassador Taylor./8/

/8/No transcript of this session with the press has been found.

Following the Press Conference, Mr. Rusk, Mr. McCone and Mr. Vance expressed their appreciation of Mr. Vinson's services and contributions to peace and national security./9/

/9/Carl Vinson, former member (D.-Georgia) of the House of Representatives. Earlier in the day, with Vinson in attendance, the President had dedicated the Carl Vinson Hearing Room in the Rayburn House Office Building.

The President expressed his appreciation and pride to Ambassador Taylor for his leadership and performance in South Vietnam. He also commended Ambassador Johnson for the manner in which he handled the crisis in Ambassador Taylor's absence, as well as all the other U.S. personnel who serve in Vietnam.

Ambassador Taylor noted his own appreciation and admiration in the members of the U.S. team.

The meeting adjourned at 3:15.

Chester L. Cooper

 

232. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 2, 1965, 2:05-3:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret. Apparently dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting/2/ attended by the President, Vance, McNaughton, Wheeler, Rusk, McNamara, William Bundy, Gaud, Carl Rowan, Amb. Taylor, Fowler, McGeorge Bundy, and McCone

/2/For another record of this meeting, see Document 231.

The meeting was delayed for an hour because of a prior meeting between the President and representatives of ADA.

Bundy reported on the ADA meeting. The discussion was extended because they started out by opposing the bombing of North Vietnam and apparently had requested the meeting to protest U.S. actions. Bundy reported that the President converted them, and it is his impression that the group were unanimously in support of the U.S. policy and actions when they left the meeting.

Note: I would like press reports and also reports in Democratic journals to see what the actual expressions were after the meeting.

Rusk reported on the seventeen-nation appeal and stated that within two days he would have a carefully worded, serious and restrained reply which would be made public. Similar replies would be made from the Government of South Vietnam. Rusk expects replies from Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi, and stated that if their replies were antagonistic, belligerent, and uncompromising, our position in world opinion would improve. If on the other hand they were serious and restrained, it possibly might indicate an area was open for useful negotiations. Rusk commented that the House of Commons debate turned out favorably, there was no loss of UK support, the gas issue was quieting down, the South Vietnam internal political situation appeared somewhat more hopeful, although the Quat Government remained a new government totally untried--however, he was hopeful. Rusk then went on to review some of the non-military actions which had been approved.

Vance then reviewed roughly the military actions which had been approved, making a passing reference to the change in the mission assignment/3/ (there was no discussion of this point). He noted that Viet Cong actions had been down for the past four weeks, indicating that this might be the result of our bombing and other military measures.

/3/See paragraph 7 in Documents 230 and 242.

Bundy then discussed the plan that is being developed for regional, social, and economic actions. What is envisaged here is U.S. plan to create some sort of Asian organization for the economic and social development of Asia with Western support, but with Asian sponsorship. This is not a South Vietnam question nor is it a bait to North Vietnam, but what is involved is a plan which will improve the U.S. and for that matter all Western standing in Asia. (Cooper is working on this and I suggest that some of our people discuss the plan with him.)

Ambassador Taylor then reported on his appearances before the House and Senate committees. He said the House was friendly, sympathetic, and cooperative. The Senate on the other hand was inclined to be critical and dealt harshly with him on the questions:

a. How about the reports that we are going to send several divisions of ground troops to South Vietnam?

b. Do you think this permissible under existing legislation?

c. What about the carrot that we are reading about?

Taylor felt that he responded satisfactorily. He ran into no direct antagonism but no great friendly support.

Carl Rowan reviewed actions taken by USIA, which are quite extensive and should be reviewed by DDP as I believe he is undertaking a number of actions in which we have had considerable experience and can be helpful.

General Wheeler summarized the discussion at last night's meeting, the decisions taken,/4/ and again made a passing reference to the change in mission.

/4/See Documents 229 and 242. Wheeler informed Sharp and Westmoreland of the decisions in JCS telegram 1181-65, April 3. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)

In response to a request by the President for a comment from me, I stated that I could add nothing to the evaluation given last Friday; however, I wished to point out that the air strikes have not brought an indication that the DRV are softening in their attitude--if anything they have hardened their position. I stated that I felt we must consider this carefully in view of yesterday's decision to change the mission of the ground forces. (I feel the President did not "hoist this point aboard" and I, therefore, asked McBundy to place a copy of my letter to Secretary of State, et al. in the President's reading file tonight. This Bundy agreed to do.)

The meeting was held up by an exchange between the President and Ambassador Taylor in which Taylor said he had everything he wanted, complete cooperation, and was going home satisfied with his week here. The President was most complimentary of Taylor.

Following the meeting I told Taylor that of the twelve points we proposed,/5/ I thought it was essential to initiate a covert program of political action to strengthen Quat and also a covert program among the generals to promote cohesion. I said that DDP would have specifics of their plans either in his hands before he left on Saturday or by the time he reached Saigon. He said that he would be very glad to entertain our proposals.

/5/See the attachment to Document 222.

 

233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/

Washington, April 2, 1965, 10:54 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Rusk.

2380. Subject: U Thant and Vietnam. For Stevenson. U Thant has proposed through you that he might take public initiative to seek a three-month cessation of "all hostile military activity, whether overt or covert, across 17th parallel in Vietnam."

At same time 17 "neutrals" have launched an appeal to all parties concerned, asking for peace talks without preconditions./2/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 228.

These two initiatives are not mutually exclusive. But public appeal by 17 nations does accomplish one part of what SYG would have accomplished by public appeal to NVN, SVN, and US. It creates need for each of three countries militarily engaged (and other addressees as well) to respond publicly and reveal their present attitudes about moving toward a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

Now that the 17 nations have made this appeal, this makes unnecessary a public initiative by SYG at this particular stage./3/ Indeed, at the level of public discourse 17-nation appeal is preferable to SYG action since SYG appeal might draw from Hanoi a statement denying UN's jurisdiction in the matter, thus making it difficult for SYG to conduct private explorations and play mediatory role at level of quiet diplomacy.

/3/For McGeorge Bundy's recommendation to President Johnson on this issue, see Document 228.

We believe that explorations by SYG with Hanoi may be important element in search for ways of defusing war in Vietnam. But we would suggest his delaying action, and even suspending judgment on exact form and content of his explorations, until Hanoi has answered 17-nation proposal, and he (and we) can judge from that reply whether there is any possible basis for fruitful talks.

For our part, we expect to make a quite forthcoming reply to the 17, and would hope that Saigon will do likewise. We will try to schedule our reply to 17 in such a way that we can make it available as a courtesy to SYG prior to its public release.

On the substance of SYG's proposal, he should be aware that we would want to see substantial changes in the arrangements proposed in his draft, before we would be able to agree with it. You have already mentioned to him two of the points that create difficulties here: the need to cover infiltration through Laos, and the need for some kind of enforcement or inspection machinery to make sure Hanoi would keep to its part of any deal, our part being self-enforcing. But beyond this, we see a more fundamental difficulty in trading a stoppage of the bombing in North Vietnam for a stoppage of the infiltration as such. For Hanoi to "leave its neighbor alone" means to call off organized Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam. Complexities this matter make it difficult, and inadvisable, to try to spell out at this stage with U Thant just what kind of mutual cessation of military activity might be acceptable. The main point to make to SYG at this stage is our judgment that military activity in South Vietnam must be somehow bracketed with stoppage of infiltration as price for diminution of our own military activity in support of Saigon.

In sum:

(a) We want to preserve SYG as useful channel for quiet diplomacy as this situation develops.

(b) 17-nation appeal provides basis for reformulation each of nations involved in Vietnam war, of their attitudes toward moving in direction of peaceful settlement.

(c) We strongly urge that SYG await replies to 17-nation appeal, especially from Hanoi, and then consult further about nature, content and timing of private explorations he might then undertake.

Rusk

 

234. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXII. Top Secret. The last paragraph of McCone's letter indicates that it was sent to President Johnson sometime after April 2.

Dear Mr. President:

I remain concerned, as I have said before to you, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, over the limited scale of air action against North Vietnam which we envision for the next few months.

Specifically I feel that we must conduct our bombing attacks in a manner that will begin to hurt North Vietnam badly enough to cause the Hanoi regime to seek a political way out through negotiation rather than expose their economy to increasingly serious levels of destruction. By limiting our attacks to targets like bridges, military installations and lines of communication, in effect we signal to the Communists that our determination to win is significantly modified by our fear of widening the war.

In these circumstances the Communists are likely to feel they can afford to accept a considerable amount of bomb damage while they improve their air defenses and step up their insurgency in South Vietnam. If they take this line of action, in the next few months they can present us with an ever-increasing guerrilla war against the reinforced Viet Cong in terrain and circumstances favorable to the Communists.

If this situation develops and lasts several months or more, I feel world opinion will turn against us, Communist propaganda will become increasingly effective, and indeed domestic support of our policy may erode.

I therefore urge that as we deploy additional troops, which I believe necessary, we concurrently hit the north harder and inflict greater damage. In my opinion, we should strike their petroleum supplies, electric power installations, and air defense installations (including the SAM sites which are now being built). I do not think we have to fear taking on the MIG's, which after all the ChiNats defeated in 1958 with F-86's and Sidewinders.

I am not talking about bombing centers of population or killing innocent people, though there will of course be some casualties. I am proposing to "tighten the tourniquet" on North Vietnam so as to make the Communists pause to weigh the losses they are taking against their prospects for gains. We should make it hard for the Viet Cong to win in the south and simultaneously hard for Hanoi to endure our attacks in the north.

I believe this course of action holds out the greatest promise we can hope for in our effort to attain our ultimate objective of finding a political solution to the Vietnam problem. This view follows logically, it seems to me, from our National Intelligence Estimate of 18 February 1965,/2/ which concludes that the Hanoi regime would be more likely than not to make an effort to "secure a respite" by some political move when and if, but not before, a sustained U.S. program of air attacks is damaging important economic or military assets in North Vietnam.

/2/Document 139.

I attach a copy of my memorandum of April 2nd, which may not have come to your attention, since it argues this case in a little more detail.

Respectfully yours,

John

Attachment/3/

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, April 2, 1965.

/3/Also addressed to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Taylor, and also printed in Pentagon Papers: The New York Times Edition, pp. 440-441.

I have been giving thought to the paper/4/ that we discussed in yesterday's meeting, which unfortunately I had little time to study, and also to the decision made to change the mission of our ground forces in South Vietnam from one of advice and static defense to one of active combat operations against the Viet Cong guerrillas.

/4/Apparently a reference to Document 228.

I feel that the latter decision is correct only if our air strikes against the North are sufficiently heavy and damaging really to hurt the North Vietnamese. The paper we examined yesterday does not anticipate the type of air operation against the North necessary to force the NVN to reappraise their policy. On the contrary, it states, "We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations--," and later, in outlining the types of targets, states "The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIG's," and these conditions indicate restraints which will not be persuasive to the NVN and would probably be read as evidence of a U.S. desire to temporize.

I have reported/5/ that the strikes to date have not caused a change in the North Vietnamese policy of directing Viet Cong insurgency, infiltrating cadres and supplying material. If anything, the strikes to date have hardened their attitude.

/5/See Document 196.

I have now had a chance to examine the 12-week program/6/ referred to by General Wheeler and it is my personal opinion that this program is not sufficiently severe or damaging to the North Vietnamese to cause them to compromise their present policy.

/6/The 12-week program of air strikes against North Vietnam was described in Wheeler's memorandum JCSM-221-65 to McNamara, March 27. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381)

On the other hand, we must look with care to our position under a program of slowly ascending tempo of air strikes. With the passage of each day and each week, we can expect increasing pressure to stop the bombing. This will come from various elements of the American public, from the press, the United Nations and world opinion. Therefore time will run against us in this operation and I think the North Vietnamese are counting on this.

Therefore I think what we are doing is starting on a track which involves ground force operations which, in all probability, will have limited effectiveness against guerrillas, although admittedly will restrain some VC advances. However, we can expect requirements for an ever-increasing commitment of U.S. personnel without materially improving the chances of victory. I support and agree with this decision but I must point out that in my judgment, forcing submission of the VC can only be brought about by a decision in Hanoi. Since the contemplated actions against the North are modest in scale, they will not impose unacceptable damage on it, nor will they threaten the DRV's vital interests. Hence, they will not present them with a situation with which they cannot live, though such actions will cause the DRV pain and inconvenience.

I believe our proposed track offers great danger of simply encouraging Chinese Communist and Soviet support of the DRV and VC cause if for no other reason than the risk for both will be minimal. I envision that the reaction of the NVN and Chinese Communists will be to deliberately, carefully, and probably gradually, build up the Viet Cong capabilities by covert infiltration of North Vietnamese and, possibly, Chinese cadres and thus bring an ever-increasing pressure on our forces. In effect, we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty in extracting ourselves.

Therefore it is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces, we must also change the ground rules of the strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage. Instead of avoiding the MIG's, we must go in and take them out. A bridge here and there will not do the job. We must strike their air fields, their petroleum resources, power stations and their military compounds. This, in my opinion, must be done promptly and with minimum restraint.

If we are unwilling to take this kind of a decision now, we must not take the actions concerning the mission of our ground forces for the reasons I have mentioned above.

John A. McCone/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

235. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (MacArthur)/1/

Washington, April 3, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Confidential. Drafted by William Bundy. Copies were sent to Unger and Green.

I spoke to the Secretary Friday night/2/ about the question of Senate concern on our sending 300,000 men, or 3-4 divisions, to South Viet-Nam under the Congressional Resolution. He tried to reach Bill Fulbright and Cliff Case without success, and finally got through only to Frank Church./3/ He told Church that no such operation was at all in contemplation and that we would naturally consult with appropriate Senate leaders before we seriously considered any such step.

/2/April 2.

/3/Rusk called Senator Church at 6:52 p.m. on April 2. According to a memorandum of the conversation prepared by Rusk's Personal Assistant, Carolyn J. Proctor:

"Sec said he was a little concerned that the Committee this morning got into with Taylor as an Ambassador questions of constitutional problems that the President and Sec should handle. Sec said if there was concern re fear of lack of prior consultation with Congress by President, he would be glad to talk to them about it. C said he was not concerned; it was the Chairman who raised it. Sec and C agreed it was not a question for that witness. Sec said there was no point of issue between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue on that point; there would be the fullest consultation with Congress. C said he appreciated the Sec's call." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

Since Church is a pretty weak reed, I think you should follow this up Monday either by asking George Ball to call Fulbright and others or by yourself calling them to convey an authoritative message to this effect, perhaps referring to the Secretary's personal attention to it.

William P. Bundy/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

236. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/

Washington, April 3, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. Drafted by William Bundy. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, McNaughton, Green, and Unger. April 3 was the last day of Taylor's Washington visit.

SUBJECT
Status of Political Track Discussions

I have prepared the attached compilation of the recent papers on this subject, including the excellent memorandum you brought from Saigon,/2/ my own memorandum of March 19,/3/ your paper of April 1,/4/ the short paper I did as a result of discussions during the week,/5/ and the exchange of cables with Saigon consisting of the March 19 memorandum and Alex' reply comments and criticisms./6/

/2/Reference is to an undated paper entitled "Settlement" prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Vietnam. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 69 D 74, EA)

/3/Document 207.

/4/Document 226.

/5/Regarding William Bundy's March 31 memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 228.

/6/Document 225 and footnote 2 thereto.

Between them, I think these papers at least highlight the status of thinking at the present time and the difficulties we face. I think we should be working on a more comprehensive revision of the March 19 memorandum, and Mr. Green and Mr. Unger will work on this as time permits during the week. I will come back at it after that.

As I see it, your opening discussions with Quat would be exploratory in nature and would be designed to bring out the stages of our present thinking and to elicit his comments particularly on the content of the early stages. The stages appear to be:

1. Conditions for cessation of attacks on the DRV.

On this point, papers 3 and 4 are really not far apart, that our asking price might include withdrawal of units from the South, but that we might settle for cessation of infiltration (de facto) plus a major reduction in VC activity in the South, plus a surfacing and groupment of the major forces in the South, together with a commitment to move rapidly to a stage of withdrawal/demilitarization. If Hanoi did not in fact move to this stage, we would reserve the right to resume attacks on the DRV.

2. Withdrawal/demilitarization stage.

We all agree that, whatever conditions we get for the cessation of attacks on the DRV, we cannot accept a condition in which the VC units were simply left intact in the South. My memorandum argued that the withdrawal/demilitarization phase required a lot of international supervision, and that we would have to move to some kind of multilateral discussion in order to get this. We need to do some more work on whether the multilateral method would have to be a reconvened Geneva Conference, or whether the effort might be made to bring in the UN at this stage.

3. Determination of the political structure within South Viet-Nam.

Alex' 3177/7/ takes this up at length. I certainly agree that we do not want to concede any DRV voice on this, and I think we all agree that we must stand firm against any legalized role for the Liberation Front. In so doing, however, we probably will want to say that South Viet-Nam should in due course find a way of expressing the popular will to "determine its own future" (the President's phrase of last week),/8/ and this forms a pretty good line of defense against legalizing the Liberation Front. I don't think this is singling out South Viet-Nam or need be phrased in any way that would undermine the standing of the GVN as of that time, points which Alex made. However, we don't cross this bridge for the time being in any case, and I don't think we need to be at all specific on it with Quat or the present GVN.

/7/Document 225.

/8/For text of the President's statement of March 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, p. 319.

4. International status of South Viet-Nam.

As stated in the March 19 memorandum, I think this is not too difficult.

5. Relations between North and South Viet-Nam.

Here we have one immediate question, whether we might foreshadow recognition of North Viet-Nam, as Tran Van Do has suggested./9/ We might also consider whether we should foreshadow the possibility of peaceful trade between the two Viet-Nams. My own feeling is that we could do both of these, and conceivably in a broad form as early as the reply to the 17 nations. It is in the present draft to be discussed.

/9/See footnote 3, Document 225.

The really tough problem is the question of eventual unification and "free elections" in all Viet-Nam. This is the main sticking point in our adhering to past formulations about "the essential elements of the 1954 agreement." I know that the Secretary is troubled about this problem; my own personal view is that we would not be badly off if we stuck to the old position that we were always prepared, in the case of divided countries, to see the will of the people determined by free elections under UN or other international supervision. We would have to worry about taking the position in Viet-Nam different from the strong positions we have taken in Germany and Korea. As a practical matter, I myself think that this formulation would move the issue so far down the road that we would not have to worry about it, although I would wholly agree that we should not accept the setting of a definite date for future elections in any reaffirmed Geneva Agreement, as the setting of such a date, in itself, would have a disruptive effect in the South. This too is an issue that I do not see us facing in the early stages of discussion, and I should think we could go on trying to play the card pretty close to our chest for the time being.

In a sense, all of this--but particularly point 1 and perhaps point 5--relate to the contents of the reply to the 17 nations. We will be discussing this today and perhaps cabling the draft to Alex,/10/ and you will be carrying it with you.

/10/Regarding the drafting of the U.S. Government's reply to the 17-nation appeal, see Document 245.

William P. Bundy/11/

/11/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

237. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 3, 1965, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cables 1965. Top Secret. The drafter is not indicated, but apparently Matthews drafted it on April 6. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office.

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Dean Rusk
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Ambassador Taylor
Assistant Secretary Bundy
Ambassador Unger
Mr. H.F. Matthews, Jr.

Secretary Rusk began by saying he thought Ambassador Taylor would now have an impression of the problem facing the political leadership in the United States on policy toward Viet-Nam. The President felt that he must not force the pace too fast or the Congress and public opinion, which had been held in line up to now through the President's strenuous efforts, would no longer support our actions in Viet-Nam. Ambassador Taylor agreed that he understood the situation in the United States. Secretary Rusk said he hoped Ambassador Taylor would therefore not be too specific in relating the Washington decisions to Prime Minister Quat and that he would inform the Vietnamese of specific events, such as the 21-point Johnson program, only just before they were about to take place.

Ambassador Taylor then showed Secretary Rusk the paper entitled "Subjects for Discussion with GVN" dated April 3 (attached). Ambassador Taylor said the additional Marine deployments would require clearance from Quat. There was discussion of the revised Marine mission, as summarized in the memorandum of April 3 prepared by Ambassador Unger./2/ Ambassador Taylor said an instruction to the Marines was necessary to encourage them to patrol deeply, in cooperation with ARVN units. There was agreement that the Marines should be used in 1) local counterinsurgency in a mobile posture and in 2) strike reaction, and that they should have an "active and aggressive posture". Secretary Rusk said later in the discussion that he did not yet want to give up the ability to describe their mission as defensive.

/2/Document 238.

Secretary Rusk said the Ambassador could mention the reinforcements (points A 2 and A 3) to Quat, but said the President has not yet cleared the idea of further offensive enclaves, so any discussions with the Vietnamese should be ambiguous and emphasize the logistic aspects of point A 5. The remaining points under overall heading A presented no particular problems, but implementing messages from Washington will be required for some of them.

The discussion then turned to the draft reply/3/ to the 17-nation proposal and the Secretary said the replies of the United States and the GVN should be consistent but different. The Vietnamese could be more shrill in their response. Various changes were made by the participants in the draft reply.

/3/See Document 245.

With regard to points B and C under overall point B, the Secretary said our and the GVN's actions toward the DRV concerning negotiations should be parallel and consistent; we should consult together but our responses need not be identical and we should not get tongue-tied.

The Secretary digressed to say he wanted Ambassador Taylor to make clear to Quat in the course of consultations about future actions that we realized that the war in SVN was one in which the GVN's responsibilities were paramount and in which they were taking the heavy casualties; however, the United States would bear 100% of the responsibility and repercussions in case the war "escalated". The Secretary emphasized that the GVN should understand this point clearly.

Ambassador Taylor asked whether the GVN should be the mouthpiece in any discussions with the DRV (point C) and the Secretary said not necessarily except perhaps with the NLF. In this connection, the Secretary said, and he returned once again later to this point, that we should explore with Quat whether there was any possibility of the GVN's talking to Front leaders and persuading a couple of them to defect. Such defectors, who would say publicly the whole Front was a fraud and a sham, would be worth a great deal--perhaps several mission [million?] dollars in Switzerland.

As to point D, it was agreed that it was not yet possible to determine how we would play our high cards in any negotiations and what we hoped to get for each card.

The discussion turned to the draft NSAM,/4/ which was accordingly revised. Ambassador Taylor reminded the group that clearance of the GVN was required on a number of the items included in it. Mr. McGeorge Bundy emphasized the need for very tight public information controls on these matters.

/4/Apparently a draft of NSAM 328, Document 242.

Attachment/5/

Paper Prepared by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)

Washington, April 3, 1965.

/5/Top Secret. Drafted by Unger.

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH GVN

Upon his return to Saigon, Ambassador Taylor should initiate discussions with the GVN for the following purposes:

A. To explain recent USG decisions and obtain GVN concurrence and cooperation as required.

(A) Military Decisions

1. 21-point Johnson program
2. 18-20,000 U.S. personnel increase
3. Additional Marine deployments (2 battalions, 1 squadron)
4. Revised Marine Mission
5. Logistic development of certain coastal enclaves
6. Possible third-country contributors, Australia, New Zealand, Korea
7. Route-blocking activities in Laos
8. Increased naval surveillance

(B) Non-military decisions (41 points) New Chancery

(C) Rowan Program

(D) Leaflet Drops

B. To develop thinking of GVN with regard to possible political courses of action.

(A) 17 Nation proposal. Agreement of GVN should be obtained to a coordinated response.

(B) General attitude toward negotiations or communications with DRV.

(C) Possible procedures and timing of such communications.

(D) Possible elements of a negotiation package.

 

238. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 3, 1965.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cables 1965. Top Secret. Drafted by Unger.

In the course of their discussion this morning about the deployment to Da Nang and Hue of two additional Marine battalions, Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Taylor addressed themselves to the mission those Marines would play. They both departed from the premise that the intention was for the Marines to play a bigger and more active role than the Marines now deployed at Da Nang.

Secretary Rusk envisaged that in the first instance the Marines would carry on aggressive patrolling around the base areas moving more deeply into the surrounding areas than they do at the present time. They would always carry out this patrolling with some Vietnamese accompanying them. A second mission would be a mobile reserve to support ARVN operations as this appeared useful. The Secretary emphasized that in the initial period this kind of action should only be taken in the general area of Da Nang or Phu Bai and not too far afield. He stressed that this should relate to the rationale of this deployment of the Marines and their action should be what they would be in anticipation of a strike against Da Nang or Phu Bai.

As for the Marines already deployed in South Viet-Nam, the Secretary felt that their mission should remain as at present until the new Marines arrive, at which point they would also acquire the new missions as well.

Secretary Rusk also emphasized that in discussing with Prime Minister Quat the logistic development of certain coastal enclaves, this should be treated in very low key and stated in very general terms with nothing that would lead the Vietnamese to begin to think in terms of the deployment of U.S. divisions. He agreed with Ambassador Taylor's suggestion that we could discuss with the Vietnamese the actions we considered necessary in terms of normal repairs and improvements for current operations and to meet possible contingency needs.

 

239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, April 3, 1965, 9:37 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Cleland, cleared by Friedman (DOD), and approved by Unger. Repeated to Vientiane, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, Bangkok, and the Department of Defense.

2184. Deliver 9:00 a.m. Sunday./2/ Joint State-Defense message. High level decision made here to deploy following units to RVN. One Marine BLT to Hue-Phu Bai area, 1 Marine BLT to Danang, 1 RLT Headquarters and required elements of MEB Headquarters to Danang, 1 USMC F4 Squadron with required elements MAG Headquarters to Danang, 1 RB-66 Recce Task Force to Tan Son Nhut and 1 Army LOG Command and 1 Army Eng Const. Group. Ambassador Taylor participated in discussions leading up to decision and will take up matter deployment of these forces with GVN upon his return Saigon.

/2/April 4.

Mission of Marine elements expanded to include engagement in counterinsurgency combat operations. Concept for employment of MEB forces in Danang-Hue-Phu Bai area to be developed in field in accord with high level Washington discussions to be communicated by Ambassador Taylor. In view military and political implications request report on mission of Marine elements be furnished Washington as soon as talks with GVN completed.

Pacing of deployments is of critical import as we do not desire give impression rapid massive buildup but intent is to accomplish deployment of above Marine forces earliest feasible after Ambassador Taylor secures permission GVN. Desire indicate we continuing on course previously set and gradual buildup proceeding according to plan. In keeping this policy, deployments, other than Marines, will be spaced over period time with publicity re all deployments kept at lowest key possible.

Rusk

 

240. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Honolulu, April 4, 1965, 9 a.m.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 52, Folder D. Top Secret. Drafted by Matthews on April 6. The meeting was held at CINCPAC headquarters.

PARTICIPANTS
Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC
General Barnes, C/S--CINCPAC
General Milton, J-5--CINCPAC
Admiral Heintz, CINCPAC
Minister Norman Hannah, POLAD, CINCPAC
Ambassador Taylor
General DePuy
Mr. H.F. Matthews, Jr.

Ambassador Taylor showed Admiral Sharp and his officers a number of key papers dealing with his Washington consultations. The Ambassador emphasized that none of the material dealing with political matters (the Political Track) should be discussed with staff. Copies of the draft NSAM/2/ and Ambassador Unger's Memorandum for the Record of April 3/3/ were left with Admiral Sharp. The following topics were discussed:

/2/Apparently a draft of NSAM 328, Document 242.

/3/Document 238.

1) Leaflet Drops in NVN. The Ambassador reported that the concept had been approved and that a cable on the subject was in preparation,/4/ but Secretary McNamara wanted to approve each specific operational aspect. The Secretary of Defense was particularly dubious about the "warning" type of leaflet.

/4/Not further identified.

2) Expanded Mission for the Marines. Ambassador Taylor said he had expected a message from DOD giving language for the expanded mission. He sent a telegram on this subject to the Department and DOD./5/

/5/Taylor's request for clarification was sent as CINCPAC 042058Z to the Department of State, April 4, which replied in telegram 2197 to Saigon, April 5. Both telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. The Taylor party arrived back in Saigon on April 6.

3) The Tempo of Rolling Thunder. Admiral Sharp said he felt the attacks on radar sites were a waste of time and that we had lost a week trying to take them out. On the other hand, the armed road reconnaissance was worthwhile and should be very worrisome and damaging to the DRV. Ambassador Taylor said Secretary McNamara had directed the preparation of a three-month program which would cover targets in NVN except those in the Hanoi area. There was discussion of the opposing points of view represented by Mr. McCone that we were not really hurting NVN and should step up our attacks heavily if we are also taking the step of introducing U.S. combat forces, and that of Ambassador Thompson which favored a slowly rising tempo of attacks on the North and the introduction of as many troops in the South as we felt necessary. Ambassador Thompson felt troop additions would not bother the Soviets at all, while too fast an escalation of targets carried the danger of forcing the Soviets and Chinese together. Ambassador Taylor said the Washington talks had unfortunately not really focused on the opposing viewpoints. Admiral Sharp said he did not agree with Mr. McCone's view. Ambassador Taylor said Secretary McNamara expressed interest in an economic blockage and in the idea of mining NVN harbors and destroying railway bridges. Admiral Sharp said if we are going to do that, we should do it before the Soviet ships which are en route arrive, warning them in advance that we are doing so.

4) Ambassador Taylor then turned to the list of items emerging from his Washington consultations for discussion with Prime Minister Quat. He said he had already discussed with him in general terms the 21-point Johnson program. He said that Secretary McNamara was willing to see an increase in logistics and preparation of logistic enclaves to be ready for the introduction of combat forces. However, neither he nor any other civilian leaders, from the President down, were convinced of the need for divisions. There was fear that American troops might be trapped inland and would have to fight their way out to the sea through mutinous South Vietnamese troops in a civil war situation.

5) To sum up his Washington talks, the Ambassador said he had gone there hoping to clarify three chief problems: (1) the tempo of Rolling Thunder, (2) the introduction of U.S. combat forces to close the manpower gap, and (3) the Political Track or how do we end the war. On the first two, the Ambassador felt he had obtained relatively clear guidance; on the third, it was evident our thinking had not been refined. We had two top cards to play: 1) stop bombing the North and 2) withdraw our forces from the South. With them, we wanted to obtain 1) a cessation of infiltration of arms, men and direction from NVN; and 2) the end of VC attacks in the South and withdrawal or surfacing under amnesty of VC units in the South. There was some inclination to play the two cards separately in isolation against the Communist cards, but the Ambassador did not agree with this idea and thought the President also did not, from remarks he had made. We had also thought of ways to permit the Communists a way out without abject surrender; and we had considered such matters as political (recognition, admission to the UN, assurance of security) and economic (trade, SEA development programs) carrots.

6) Finally, there was brief discussion of command organizations. Ambassador Taylor said he thought there were two contingencies involved: (1) the counterinsurgency effort in its larger dimensions in VN and (2) general war with China. While we should be thinking about and prepared for the latter, we should not let our plans for such an eventuality hamper our best efforts in organizing ourselves to deal with the former. Admiral Sharp agreed.

[end document]

Continue:
Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause,
March 8-May 8
Documents 241 through 260