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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

241. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

CM-534-65

Washington, April 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, JCS Memos, Vol. I. Top Secret. The source text bears the following handwritten marginal note: "Retd from President 4/9/65."

SUBJECT
Over-all Appraisal of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam 7 February 1965 to 4 April 1965/2/

/2/In an April 3 memorandum to Wheeler, McNamara wrote that the President wanted to receive by noon April 6 an appraisal of the current bombing program against North Vietnam, including "comments on the effects of the strikes on North Vietnam's military capability and its economy, and indications of the degree to which the attacks have affected the attitudes of the people and their political authorities." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Vietnam 381)

1. Since 7 February United States forces have conducted 34 air strikes and South Vietnamese forces have conducted 10 air strikes in North Vietnam. These strikes used conventional weapons including napalm with the heaviest bomb being 1000 pounds. The targets included one naval base, two army supply depots, three ammunition depots, two army barracks areas, one airfield, nine radar sites, and three highway/railroad bridges and associated routes.

2. Until 3 April when a MIG damaged a U.S. aircraft, and 4 April, when two North Vietnamese MIGs shot down two U.S. planes, enemy reaction had been limited to antiaircraft fire from weapons up to 57-mm caliber. The South Vietnamese have lost six planes with one pilot believed killed, and two missing. U.S. losses have been 25 planes with one pilot killed, two pilots captured, and nine missing.

3. The air strikes have not reduced in any major way the over-all military capabilities of the DRV. Damage inflicted on the Army supply depots and ammunition depots has, of course, reduced available supplies of certain military items, but these losses should not be critical to North Vietnamese military operations. Damage to the naval base, army barracks, the air fields and radar sites was not such as to hamper in a serious way DRV capabilities. We have no estimate of NVN casualties. I believe that the destruction of the railroad/highway bridges at Thanh Hoa and Dong Phuong and the Dong Hoi highway bridge is the most damaging military blow delivered to date. The loss of these bridges will slow down logistical support to the southern portion of the DRV. If we follow up as planned with additional strikes against railroad and highway bridges, railroad rolling stock trapped south of Thanh Hoa, and armed reconnaissance missions along the key highways south of the 20th parallel, we should be able to apply a serious stricture to DRV logistical support to the south, including that to Laos and to the VC in South Vietnam.

4. Prior to the recent strikes on the bridges, the economic effects of our attacks were minimal. No doubt the fishing industry has been harassed by maritime operations and armed reconnaissance flights along the coast. The line of communications strikes referred to above should apply increasing economic pressures as well as military logistic problems.

5. The air strikes have caused a build-up of AAA defenses and, coupled with the shore defenses including beach watcher units established by the North Vietnamese Government because of maritime operations, have the effect of increasing the number of regular military and para-military forces. In other words, manpower resources devoted to military activities have been increased at the expense of those available to the economy.

6. Any assessment of the impact of our air strikes on the attitudes of the North Vietnamese Government and people must be deduced from the small evidence available to the outside world from a closed Communist society. I believe that the following estimates are reasonable conclusions in the light of the evidence we have:

a. The military are keenly aware of the destructive potential of our forces. They are attempting to establish ground defenses to make us pay a good price for every target struck. The DRV Air Force exhibited considerable daring in its two clashes with our aircraft. The DRV Navy has dispersed and has issued instructions to its vessels not to open fire on hostile aircraft unless the aircraft actually initiate an attack against them.

b. There are indications that the North Vietnamese people are apprehensive of the future. One report highlights the difference in public attitude in Haiphong in January--described as "exultant"--and that in March described as "depressed and fearful."

c. Outwardly, the North Vietnamese Government appears to be uninfluenced by our air strikes. The degree to which this official attitude is based upon a desire to reassure its own people, to influence world attitudes against the United States and to discourage us from continuing offensive actions is imponderable. Moreover, the North Vietnamese Government may believe that, with the support of Communist China and the USSR, VC successes in South Vietnam and world opinion will eventually give them the victory. In other words, they are willing to pay a price for South Vietnam. On the other hand, intercepted messages reveal that certain population centers have been partially evacuated, air raid shelters have been prepared and air raid drills conducted, and the government has increased military defenses.

7. In summary, I think it fair to state that our strikes to date, while damaging, have not curtailed DRV military capabilities in any major way. The same is true as regards the North Vietnamese economy. The North Vietnamese people exhibit an understandable degree of apprehension for the future. The Hanoi Government continues to maintain, at least publicly, stoical determination.

8. At tabs A through F are more detailed discussions of specific areas./3/

/3/None printed.

Earle G. Wheeler

 

242. National Security Action Memorandum No. 328/1/

Washington, April 6, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAM's. Top Secret. Signed by Bundy. Printed also in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 702-703.

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

On Thursday, April 1,/2/ the President made the following decisions with respect to Vietnam:

/2/See Documents 229 and 230.

1. Subject to modifications in the light of experience, and to coordination and direction both in Saigon and in Washington, the President approved the 41-point program of non-military actions submitted by Ambassador Taylor in a memorandum dated March 31, 1965./3/

/3/See footnote 3, Document 228.

2. The President gave general approval to the recommendations submitted by Mr. Rowan in his report dated March 16,/4/ with the exception that the President withheld approval of any request for supplemental funds at this time--it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by the reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA.

/4/For a summary, see Document 203.

3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31./5/

/5/See the attachment to Document 222.

4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of March 14/6/ and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

/6/See Document 197.

5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian,/7/ and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

/7/The possibility of Australia sending combat troops to Vietnam was discussed by Rusk with Australian Ambassador Waller on April 2 and April 13. A memorandum of the former conversation is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, POL VIET. A memorandum of the latter conversation is in Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and other third countries, but also offers many advantages.

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.

11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

McGeorge Bundy

 

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 7, 1965, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

3246. For the President. The bombing of the Embassy on March 30 was the dominating event of the week. The local press, and many Vietnamese privately, expressed indignation and outrage at this act of terrorism. While the bombing brought home once again that the Viet Cong can strike in the heart of Saigon, it did not seem to dampen the improved morale of the Vietnamese. American community is entirely unshaken.

In the meantime, Quat and his colleagues have continued to move ahead with concrete constructive measures in the political field. The week witnessed:

A) An announcement by the National Legislative Council that a National Congress should be convened to take up the urgent task of drawing up a permanent constitution, and that the Congress should be based on direct universal suffrage organized in secure zones.

B) The opening of a press congress to develop a statute governing the conduct of the local press.

C) Indications from the government that it would hold elections early next month for city and municipal councils.

D) An announcement by the government that it is 1) establishing an Embassy in Addis Ababa, with an information center to serve all of Africa; 2) dispatching a delegation headed by Vice Premier Tuyen, to visit key African capitals; and 3) opening competition to fill 20 vacancies in the Vietnamese Diplomatic and Consular Service.

E) An announcement that Quat will reserve Thursday afternoons to meet with members of the public.

Another interesting development, but one on which we still have only tentative and fragmentary information, has been the emergence of signs of Buddhist protests against Viet Cong depredations against Buddhist monks and pagodas. We understand that the Buddhist Institute has instructed pagodas to pray for a Buddhist monk in Binh Dinh Province who reportedly burned himself to death in protest against such Viet Cong actions. The Buddhist Institute also held a memorial service for the American and Vietnamese victims of the Embassy bombing. These are heartening, if still isolated, signs of an improved attitude in Buddhist ranks.

In the military field, the Viet Cong continued to lie low, their activities reaching a level even lower than that recorded during the lunar festival period of early February. In spite of their inertia, they took heavy losses in engagements with the government forces in which the friendly total killed in action amounted to 189 against 795 Viet Cong dead. The enemy also lost 80 captured and over 200 weapons. While this is good news, we still have the uneasy feeling that the Viet Cong may be preparing unpleasant surprises for us. During the week, we acquired reasonably clear evidence that elements of the North Vietnamese 325th division have been in South Viet-Nam since February. The presence of one battalion is confirmed and it is possible all three regiments are operating in the central provinces. We are pressing all intelligence agencies to determine what the Viet Cong are up to.

Reports of improved morale are now coming in from the provinces, indicating that the rise in confidence noted in urban centers is beginning to spread to the countryside. While more indications will be needed to establish the extent of the trend, this is the first time in months that we have had such encouraging reports on provincial morale.

Taylor

 

244. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 7, 1965, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received in the Department of State at 12:58 a.m.

3248. Together with Alex Johnson, I saw Quat alone afternoon April 6 and briefly reviewed with him matters arising out of my Washington visit. At outset, I strongly stressed Washington view that no amount of bombardment of DRV is going to convince Hanoi to call off its action down here without real progress in SVN against VC. Hanoi must be convinced that VC cannot win here. Thus our strategy in 1965 calls for a balanced program as between action against DRV and in-country action. Quat entirely agreed.

With respect Rolling Thunder, I said that we planned to continue along presently projected lines without radical change either up or down. Quat agreed.

I then outlined our view of the manpower gap, showing Quat a chart indicating that, if VC strength maintains present upward trend and GVN accomplished presently projected force goals, ratio of strength will be even less favorable at end of year. I then outlined Washington discussions and decisions including 21 point General Johnson program to improve effectiveness of existing programs, the proposed additional Marine battalions, and the RB-66 task force./2/ I also mentioned the possibility of additional third country contributions, such as from Australia, New Zealand and Korea. I tied proposed Marine deployments to Quat's previous remarks to Alex Johnson on desirability of enlarging Danang perimeter./3/ I also referred to increased Navy surveillance program and the additional equipment for popular forces which has been approved.

/2/The RB-66 was a B-66 turbojet light bomber modified for reconnaissance.

/3/Quat's suggestion to Johnson was reported in telegram 3154 from Saigon, March 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

With respect to manpower gap, Quat said that he has asked Thieu urgently to study this problem with senior officers, particularly with respect to more effective "political mobilization" throughout country. In passing, he said that he felt that the regional and popular force figures on those present for duty were padded and he very much felt this needed looking into. He also felt that a more aggressive spirit was much needed among many of the ARVN officers and that morale in the Army could be improved by better administration of present provisions for troop welfare, veterans' benefits, etc. I gather that he has been discussing all these matters with Thieu.

He was entirely receptive to the addition of Marine deployments in the Danang area but wanted to discuss matter with Thieu and Minh before giving us a final answer or authorizing Westmoreland to undertake discussions at military level. With respect to these forces, as well as possible addition third country forces, he said that he was receptive and entirely understood and accepted our rationale but that he has a political problem of public presentation which required careful handling. He indicated that this involves what he termed a strongly nationalistic minority who could be expected to oppose introduction of foreign combat forces.

In discussing naval surveillance in the Gulf of Siam, he said he was anxious to find some way of improving relations with Cambodia and referred to a proposal that he had made when FonMin in Khanh's govt for the establishment of a "no man's land" or "free zone" some five kilometers in depth on the Vietnamese side of the border from which all friendly Vietnamese population would be removed. He said the numbers would not be very large. In the zone all civilians could be assumed to be hostile and subject to military or police action.

I also referred in broad terms to our plans for the construction of a new chancery, the "41 points", and the Rowan program on public information. On the "41 points", I sought to obtain from him the designation of a contact point within the govt. After some "thinking aloud" on the role of Tuyen, he finally came around to say that at this stage he wanted to handle it himself and that Killen and I should bring the matter to him.

In referring to our needs for office space here, particularly that of MACV, he said that he was considering the formation of some sort of a govt enterprise which would build space to our specifications, just as a private contractor or landlord, so that at such time as [US] no longer had need of the space, the govt would be in possession of some better buildings. I indicated our willingness to explore this with him further.

In response to my request, he agreed to look into the matter of trying to bring about a defector from the National Liberation Front who could be surfaced.

With respect to the Washington Embassy, he said they were considering Vu Van Thai as a replacement for Khiem and that they had a good man selected for Tokyo.

See septel/4/ for report on subsequent meeting evening April 6 with Quat, Do, Thieu, Minh, Tuyen, Hiep, and Bui Diem.

/4/Telegram 3249 from Saigon, April 7. (Ibid.)

Taylor

 

245. Editorial Note

On April 7 President Johnson delivered an address at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore in which, referring to the 17-nation appeal on Vietnam, he set forth U.S. policy regarding the Vietnam conflict. The United States would do "everything necessary" to ensure the independence of South Vietnam, the President stated, while remaining ready "for unconditional discussions." Johnson also announced that he would ask Congress to join in a billion-dollar U.S. investment program for economic development in Southeast Asia. For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pages 394-399.

U Thant's reaction to the speech was transmitted in an April 8 letter to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX) General reaction abroad was described in Acting U.S. Information Agency Director Donald Wilson's April 12 memorandum to Rusk. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, USIA 1965) U.S. Congressional reaction was summarized in McGeorge Bundy's April 10 memorandum to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Johns Hopkins Speech Reaction) A summary of foreign government reaction was included in an undated memorandum prepared in the Department of State and sent to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a brief memorandum of April 12 from Benjamin Read. (Ibid.) In a memorandum for the record dated April 13, Chester L. Cooper analyzed recent White House mail regarding Vietnam and reported that the Johns Hopkins speech had caused a sharp reversal in the flow of critical mail and telegrams. The volume had changed from 5 to 1 against U.S. policy to 4 to 1 in favor. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX)

On April 8 in a meeting with the Ambassadors of Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia and the Chargé d'Affaires of Ghana, Acting Secretary of State Ball delivered the U.S. Government's reply to the 17-nation appeal on Vietnam. The reply noted, among other things, that the moment North Vietnam ceased its aggression against the South, "American supporting military action will also come to an end." Later in the day the reply was released to the public. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1965, pages 610-611. Telegrams 2181 and 2182 to Saigon, April 3, and telegrams 3215, 3218, and 3221, April 4, among others, dealt with the wording of the reply and clearing it with the South Vietnamese Government. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) A revised draft of the reply was sent by McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson at Camp David under cover of a message of April 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Draft Appeal on Vietnam) Ambassador Taylor accepted a last-minute change in the wording in a telephone conversation on April 8 with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Unger, a memorandum of which is in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-69.

On April 8 North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, in an address before the United National Assembly in Hanoi, set forth his government's policy in the following four points:

"1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its 'military alliance' with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

"2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected; the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel in their respective territory.

"3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.

"4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference." (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, page 852) For an analysis of this statement, see Document 255.

 

246. National Security Action Memorandum No. 330/1/

Washington, April 9, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAM's. Secret.

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, U.S. Information Agency
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency

1. The President has given general approval to the recommendations submitted by Mr. Rowan in his report dated March 16/2/ for intensified and expanded psychological activities in the Vietnamese conflict. It is the President's decision that USIA is to re-program funds to the extent possible in order to carry out this larger program; in addition, he has directed all agencies and departments to provide funds and resources as available to the Director of USIA. Where appropriate, provisions of funds and other resources will be subject to procedures and amounts as determined in consultation with the Bureau of the Budget.

/2/For a summary, see Document 203.

2. The President has designated the Director of the U.S. Information Agency to execute and coordinate these expanded and intensified activities in keeping with USIA's official responsibilities abroad, subject to political guidance from the Secretary of State.

3. The Director, USIA, will continue to advise the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and others as appropriate on psychological and foreign public opinion aspects of the Vietnamese situation. Action addressees will continue to consult with the Director, USIA, regarding actions and public statements concerning Vietnam which may have psychological implications in Vietnam or elsewhere abroad.

4. The Director, USIA, will report on progress through the National Security Council or directly to the President, as appropriate.

5. The responsibility of the Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs, Saigon, for all psychological and informational programs in South Vietnam under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador is here reaffirmed.

McGeorge Bundy

 

247. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, April 10, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 328. Top Secret; Exdis. Also addressed to the Secretary of Defense. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that copies were sent to FE, U, and G and one other component in the Department of State whose acronym is illegible, and that a copy was shown to Greenfield.

The President has directed me to emphasize again his continuing concern for more careful control of military information on operations in Vietnam. The President continues to believe that it is very unhelpful to have detailed accounts of the size and strength of air operations against North Vietnam, and does not understand why it is not possible to avoid giving out accurate information on numbers of aircraft and the weight of bombs dropped.

The President is also dissatisfied with the rapidity of release of information respecting further troop reinforcements to/2/ Vietnam and does not understand why there should have been an announcement on this subject from Saigon./3/ This announcement seems to him inconsistent with the decisions reached on April 1 and reported in paragraph 11 of National Security Action Memorandum No. 328 dated April 6./4/

/2/The word "North" in the source text at this point was crossed out and "per White House" was handwritten in the margin.

/3/Not further identified.

/4/Document 242.

The President requests that the Department of State and the Department of Defense take further energetic action to improve our performance in these respects./5/

/5/A memorandum by Greenfield, in response to this memorandum, was sent to McGeorge Bundy under cover of an April 21 memorandum from Read. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) No response by the Department of Defense has been found.

McGeorge Bundy

 

248. Letter From President Johnson to Senator Mike Mansfield/1/

Washington, April 12, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX. No classification marking.

Dear Mike:

I have been slow in answering your memorandum of March 18/2/ and your letter of March 24./3/ They arrived just at the time when I was getting my thoughts in order for the speech on Vietnam which I delivered on April 7. Your memoranda were helpful in that process, just as your eloquent statement of support on the day after the speech was a great help./4/ I know how deeply troubled you have been about the situation in Vietnam, and for that reason your support is all the more welcome.

/2/Not printed. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Ex ND 19/CO 312, filed under April 12)

/3/Document 215.

/4/Regarding the President's speech on April 7 and Senator Mansfield's statement on April 8, see Document 245.

As I read your letter and memorandum, I think there is more agreement than difference between us. Let me comment on a few points where your letter seems to overstate any differences we may have.

We have no desire to exercise "a primacy" over what transpires in South Vietnam. Our purpose is rather to prevent the Communists from doing exactly that. Our present limited actions in North Vietnam are caused by the actions of the North Vietnamese and not by any aggressive purpose on our side, in any way, shape, or form.

I do not think that I have ever spoken of "unconditional capitulation" of anyone. The exact shape of a settlement that would allow the South Vietnamese to work out their own destiny is a matter which cannot be decided at this stage, but I do not think your second paragraph is a precisely accurate description of the terms and conditions set forth in my speech and in our answer to the 17-Nation declaration.

I think that the implied criticism of "targets of convenience" in your third paragraph is somewhat unfair. This military phrase is not a perfect one, but all that it means is that along certain carefully defined communication routes, pilots are authorized to attack whatever military targets they encounter.

Contrary to what is suggested in your fourth paragraph, we are not opposed to the kind of situation which exists in Burma and Cambodia. Our position is rather that the decision on alignment or non-alignment is one which individual countries should be free to make in the light of their own interests and needs.

Finally, I do not agree with the suggestion that the military authorities in Vietnam should have sought my personal approval before making the limited, specific use of riot-control gases which they authorized in an effort to save lives. These episodes have been blown up out of all proportion by critics who do not seem to be troubled by the killing of civilians in city streets by terrorist bombs.

You will agree that I should be careful in responding to your specific proposals for future action, simply because of my obligation to maintain freedom of choice as the situation develops. But I want you to know that I am fully alert to the importance of maintaining effective access to American troops in Vietnam, and that by my direction the terms and conditions for discussions leading toward an eventual settlement are under careful and continuous review.

For the rest, I will stand on what I said last Wednesday, and I thank you again for your prompt and effective support for that statement.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

 

249. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 13, 1965, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 9:23 a.m.

3359. For the President. We have just completed another quite favorable week in terms of losses inflicted upon the Viet Cong, 643 of whom were killed in action to 135 on the government side. Binh Dinh Province which was considered to be in critical condition two months ago has now been restored to what might be called normalcy; that is to say, the fear of the loss of major towns appears to be past although a large part of the province remains under Viet Cong control. The success in Binh Dinh is attributable to three factors: a new and aggressive division commander, the commitment of five general reserve battalions to the province, and the improved morale generated by the air actions in the North.

We still have the feeling that the Viet Cong are regrouping in the provinces in the northern half of the country and are probably preparing some kind of offensive action. However, there are a few indications that suggest that Viet Cong morale may be dropping. They have given up four major arms caches during the month without a sustained fight and the number of defectors during the week (129 Viet Cong military personnel and 23 political cadre) is the highest defection figure since weekly statistics were initiated in January, 1964.

On the manpower side, unaudited figures indicate that government military and paramilitary forces increased by some 10,000 during the month of March of whom two-thirds were volunteers. This rate exceeds the target of 8,000 accessions per month which we had considered the best the government could do with a maximum effort.

Quat continued his program of provincial visits, making a tour of the Delta area from which he returned full of new ideas and bubbling with enthusiasm. He was quite impressed with the senior officers whom he met in the IV Corps and, as always, enjoyed talking to the country people who assembled to greet him.

His principal concern remains the unruly generals and the continued evidence of lack of unity in the senior officers corps. You have probably noted the case of insubordination in the Navy wherein several senior naval officers petitioned the removal of Admiral Cang, the Chief of Naval Operations. Quat is handling this matter routinely by a board of inquiry but is disturbed by this new evidence of lack of discipline in the armed forces. In his campaign to bring the generals under some kind of control, he is about to take the step of abolishing the position of commander-in-chief, while increasing the functions of the Minister of National Defense. This is a move in the right direction but his troubles will not end as long as the military command structure is clouded by the presence of the Armed Forces Council. Quat is fully aware of this problem and intends to resolve it, but slowly and cautiously.

Your Johns Hopkins speech and the reply to the 17-nation overture/2/ attracted much attention in Saigon where the reaction was generally very favorable. As one might expect, the phrase "unconditional discussion" brought forth considerable editorial comment, but the conclusion was that the term suggested no real difference in aims between the Vietnamese and the United States Government. On two occasions, I have urged Quat to sit down with Alex Johnson and me to discuss various alternative courses of international political action which may require consideration during the coming weeks and months. He has not responded affirmatively to this suggestion apparently because his own thoughts are not yet in order.

/2/See Document 245.

The mission has been very busy since my return with all agencies reviewing their programs to see that they are aligned with the recent decisions taken in Washington. USOM Director Killen has discussed the 41 point non-military program with Quat who has expressed particular interest in such projects as rural electrification, agricultural development, water supply and school construction. The Acting CAS Chief, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], is giving priority attention to the 12 outline projects which Mr. McCone tabled during our Washington discussions/3/ and will soon have specific proposals for the mission council.

/3/See the attachment to Document 222.

Taylor

 

250. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, April 13, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos 1965. Secret. Drafted by Unger.

SUBJECT
Military Program in Viet-Nam

For more than two months there has been a steady growth in our military presence in South Viet-Nam and in our joint action against North Viet-Nam. These programs are now reaching critical points at which decisions are required about the rate and intensity of our actions in the future, i.e. should these increase, level off at least for a time, or diminish.

Pertinent to these decisions are the openings given for discussion by President Johnson's speech on April 7 and our April 8 reply to the 17 nation appeal/2/ and some apparent slowing down of Viet Cong initiatives in South Viet-Nam over the last three or four weeks. On the other hand there are the uniformly negative reactions of Hanoi, Peking and Moscow to those openings.

/2/See Document 245.

There are set forth below some of the questions which have come or are coming to the fore with regard to our future military actions and which should be reviewed on the basis of political as well as military considerations:

(1) In the present period how far North should strikes and air recce take place in North Viet-Nam?

Strikes on the Thanh Hoa and Dong Phuong (the latter at latitude 19# 58) Bridge involved us in our first MIG engagement and it may be assumed that strikes further north would increase the likelihood of additional engagements. If strikes proceeded to within about 20 miles of SAM sites (once these are in operation) there could be serious, sharp losses in US aircraft and lives.

(2) Should our target lists be expanded to go beyond the strictly military?

With the exception of the Thanh Hoa power plant we have confined ourselves to military targets thus far.

(3) How close should US aircraft fly to Hainan Island and other ChiCom territory?

It was the diversionary flight over the Gulf of Tomkin just off Hainan Island last week which resulted in an engagement with Chinese MIGS, the probable penetration of Chinese air space and, thus, the risk of serious escalation.

(4) Should support forces be deployed now to South Viet-Nam beyond the 18-20,000 increase specified in NASM 328?/3/

/3/Document 242.

Ambassador Taylor in a telegram received April 11/4/ refers to a proposal of MACV to increase forces in this category now by approximately 5000 over that agreed ceiling figure.

/4/Not further identified.

We have by our military action over the past two months certainly made clear to North and South Viet-Nam and the rest of the world our determination to stay the course. We have also given the North Vietnamese pause by demonstrating our ability almost at will to overfly their territory and destroy their facilities and installations. We have heartened the South Vietnamese and seen a modest stabilization of affairs there and some slight improvement in the military situation. Furthermore, since the President's April 7th speech, we have taken enough strong military action to make it clear that the stick will continue in action, even though the carrot has been offered, until there is some real indication of a desire for a satisfactory settlement on Hanoi's part.

Having accomplished the foregoing and bearing in mind that our intention has never been to bring unlimited destruction to North Viet-Nam, it seems to me we now should weigh carefully the choices for the future. Should there be a continuation of military operations by and large at their present level, a continued gradual intensification or a diminution?

Our prime objectives remain, I presume, to separate Peking and Hanoi, to avoid pressing the Soviets into significant military support of North Viet-Nam, to persuade Hanoi to open meaningful discussions and meanwhile to prevent any further deteriorating, at least, in the South. With these points in mind I would recommend a leveling off of military action for the present. Rolling Thunder II (for period April 16-22) incidentally, corresponds fairly closely with this concept.

 

251. Editorial Note

On April 13 from 1:50 to 3:10 p.m. a luncheon meeting was held at the White House to discuss Vietnam. Attending the meeting were the President, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff Johnson, Commandant of the Marine Corps Greene, Chief of Naval Operations McDonald, Air Force Chief of Staff McConnell, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Bundy, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

No memorandum of discussion at the luncheon meeting has been found. One of the decisions reached at the meeting, however, was to deploy immediately the 173d Airborne Brigade to the Bien Hoa-Vung Tau area for security and counterinsurgency combat operations, of which the Joint Chiefs notified CINCPAC in telegram 9012, April 13. In telegram 3373 from Saigon, April 14, Taylor expressed surprise at this decision in view of the understanding reached during his visit to Washington that "we would experiment with the Marines in a counterinsurgency role before bringing in other U.S. contingents." He recommended that the deployment be delayed until all matters relating to it could be sorted out. Both these messages are in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 51, Deployment--State Messages.

On April 14 the Department of Defense drafted a telegram to Taylor summarizing the decisions reached at a luncheon meeting the previous day. According to a telephone conversation between Rusk and McNamara the morning of April 14:

"Sec wondered after he left the luncheon yesterday if it had become clear that all these things were execute orders; he asked if M had seen Max's telegrams. M said he thought that particular cable referred to related to actions before yesterday; it was not clear what the decisions were; they were execute orders subject to clearance with South Viet Nam Govt. Sec said we have some real consultation to do on the Hill, haven't we? M said he thought so but first we should get the clearances with the South Vietnamese Govt so it does not leak from here. M said he would try to pull the pieces together this morning." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

The cable referred to by McNamara was apparently telegram 3373 from Saigon. Rusk may also have been referring to telegram 3384 (Document 252) which, along with telegram 3373, was received in Washington early in the morning of April 14.

Later the morning of April 14, in a telephone conversation between Rusk and McGeorge Bundy:

"Sec asked as to what the decisions were yesterday. B said the JCS had confused matters by sending out their own cable. B said the document of serious consideration will be a cable to Max which Sec and President would review; the draft cable should be over by 2 pm. B hoped then that Sec and Bob and he could see President for a moment before the 6 pm. Sec said there was a serious question of consultation with the Leadership on this." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

The 6 p.m. meeting referred to was apparently a briefing for certain Senators at the White House that began at 6:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) As recorded in a telephone conversation between McNamara and Rusk at 4:55 p.m. on April 14:

"M said he had tried to put in the form of a cable the decisions the President made; it was sent to Bill Bundy; maybe Sec could look at it and we could get Sec's views tonight and M would see if the President is of the same mind. M said there was nothing we could get agreement on back here but M had put them on an experimental basis. Sec asked if we had left room for a full consultation with Max. M said no; it is directed to Max; he will not be in favor; a lot of people were not. Sec thought the President should be aware of that, that Max will not be in favor. M said someone has to make a decision. M said we are not doing enough here for them to give up the direction of the war." (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

For text of the Defense Department telegram as sent to Taylor, see Document 256.

 

252. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 14, 1965, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received in the Department of State at 7:57 a.m.

3384. Recent actions relating to the introduction of US ground forces have tended to create an impression of eagerness in some quarters to deploy forces into SVN which I find difficult to understand. I should think that for both military and political reasons we should all be most reluctant to tie down Army/Marine units in this country and would do so only after the presentation of the most convincing evidence of the necessity.

Before the Marines had been introduced in the Danang-Phu Bai area, there were at least four reasons for justifying the bringing in of US ground forces, among which was the need to assure the GVN and DRV of our determination to stay in SVN to the finish. Now that the Marines are ashore, that requirement is met and, in my opinion, no more US forces are needed to make that particular point.

There remain three arguments for further reinforcements: (1) the need to do essential military tasks which GVN forces are unable to do; (2) the need to do essential military tasks faster than the GVN forces, unassisted, are able to do; and (3) the desirability of making provision for possible future crises and contingencies. Singly or in combination, these arguments could be adduced to justify almost unlimited additional deployments of US forces if such deployments did not raise counter-arguments which sooner or later outweigh the three points for the affirmative. The mounting number of foreign troops may sap the GVN initiative and turn a defense of the GVN homeland into what appears a foreign war. The increasing presence of more Americans will give Peking grounds to press military reinforcements on Hanoi. Frictions will grow between the Vietnamese and their white allies; it will become increasingly difficult to steer US and GVN policy on parallel lines. The net effect may be not an expediting of victory but its retardation.

I mention these countervailing factors to make the point that it is far from an unmitigated advantage to bring in more US forces. A consideration of the disadvantages convinces me that, while logistic preparations should be made now to be able to receive additional forces, the forces themselves should be held outside of SVN just as long as possible and until their need is incontrovertible. From a purely military point of view, it is essentially wasteful of the specialized mobility of Marines and airborne troops to commit them prematurely to restricted land areas. Politically, it is undesirable to seek authority for their introduction until a clear and specific need exists which assures them an unreserved welcome from their GVN hosts.

Taylor

 

253. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 14, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX. Top Secret.

Bob McNamara may bring over a cable to Taylor this evening which will rack up a number of instructions to the field to carry out some of the things that were discussed at lunch yesterday. (The current draft is at Tab A.)/2/ My own judgment is that direct orders of this sort to Taylor would be very explosive right now because he will not agree with many of them and he will feel that he has not been consulted. He heard about the airborne brigade by a premature JCS message of yesterday and has already come in questioning it./3/

/2/At Tab A was a draft of Document 256.

/3/See Document 251.

At Tab B is another cable from Taylor in which he gravely questions the usefulness of immediate additional ground deployments:/4/

/4/At Tab B was a copy of Document 252.

I am sure we can turn him around if we give him just a little time to come aboard, but I am not sure that you yourself currently wish to make a firm decision to put another 10,000-15,000 combat troops in Vietnam today. As Taylor says, we were planning when he left to use the Marines already on the scene in combat roles and see how that worked. It is not clear that we now need all these additional forces.

Your own desire for mixing our Marines with theirs is quite a different matter, and I think that should be pressed sharply.

The net of this is that I would strongly recommend that you hold up on Bob's telegram tonight and take time to talk it over with Rusk, McNamara and me either after the meeting with the Senators or tomorrow morning./5/

/5/Bundy wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "I have made an appointment for us with you at 11:30--subject to your OK." No such meeting was held at 11:30 a.m. on April 15, but President Johnson did meet with McNamara and Rusk at 12:25 p.m. on April 15 for 4 minutes. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

McG. B.

 

254. Editorial Note

On April 14 British Prime Minister Wilson came to the United States for a 2-day visit. He spent most of April 14 in New York where he met with, among others, U.N. Secretary General Thant and Representative to the United Nations Stevenson. No record of Wilson's conversation with Stevenson has been found.

On April 15 Wilson flew to Washington where the President met with him at a formal luncheon at the White House. In a memorandum of April 14 to the President, Acting Secretary of State Ball wrote that Wilson had indicated he would want to discuss primarily two subjects: the British economic situation and Vietnam. In providing talking points for the President on Vietnam, Ball remarked:

"British Government support for U.S. policy in Vietnam has been stronger than that of our other major allies. It has been skillfully conducted and stoutly maintained by the Prime Minister. Criticism of this close identification with U.S. policy was begun by the left wing of the Labor Party but has broadened to include other elements fearful of the possible consequences in Vietnam.

"Your Johns Hopkins speech, which the British Government praised as being statesmanlike and imaginative, has relieved the pressure of the Prime Minister. His sending of Patrick Gordon Walker, former Foreign Secretary, on an exploratory mission to the Far East has served the same purpose as will his ability to meet with you directly.

"You should indicate appreciation for the support the Prime Minister has given us on Vietnam. We have made known our willingness to discuss a peaceful solution but the first reactions from Hanoi and Peking are not encouraging." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX)

The White House luncheon began at 1:34 p.m. and also included various Cabinet members, Congressmen, Senators, and members of Wilson's party and the British Embassy. The President's Daily Diary does not indicate when the luncheon ended, but the President, along with Secretary of Defense McNamara, left Andrews Air Force Base at 3:17 p.m. for Texas where he was to spend the Easter weekend. (Johnson Library) No memorandum of the discussion at the luncheon meeting has been found, but for Wilson's reminiscences of his visit to the United States, including an account of the luncheon discussion with the President, see The Labour Government, pages 94-96.

 

255. Intelligence Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, April 15, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam--April 1, 1965. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem.

SUBJECT
Hanoi Lays Down "Basis" for Vietnam Talks

The recent flurry of North Vietnamese policy reflects a change in Hanoi's position on negotiations by allowing that talks are possible after certain principles have been "recognized" as the basis for a settlement. Actually the conditions for settlement enunciated are not new, but heretofore Hanoi has not conceded the possibility of a conference at any remotely reasonable point. For the most part, North Vietnamese spokesmen had simply ignored the subject. This change probably is primarily a reflection of North Vietnamese concern that their intransigence harmed their political position abroad, particularly after President Johnson offered "unconditional discussions." However, we cannot rule out that the North Vietnamese desired to test Washington's response in order to establish if there is any basis for negotiations in light of the President's speech. In commenting on that speech, Hanoi has not attacked negotiations per se or in fact directly turned down the offer for "unconditional discussion," suggesting anew that while the North Vietnamese are not anxious for talks they do not want to preclude possible talks in the future.

Recent Statements. On April 12 and 13 the Vietnamese News Agency (VNA) released the text of an address reportedly made on April 8 by Premier Pham Van Dong to the National Assembly. The final portions of this text contained an analysis of President Johnson's April 7 address and a formulation of North Vietnamese conditions which Dong said must be "recognized" before a Geneva-type conference could be considered./2/ (There is evidence to suggest that these portions were added later, perhaps on April 10, providing more time for study of the President's address.) Later on April 13, VNA released the text of a resolution of the Assembly formally approving Dong's formulation. Earlier, on April 9, VNA had released and the Hanoi press had front-paged the text of an April 5 interview given by Ho Chi Minh to the Japanese Communist Party organ, Akahata, in which Ho appeared to lay down more rigid preconditions for negotiations than did Dong three days later. And on April 12 Hanoi released the text of Ho's address on April 10 to the Assembly; it contained no mention of negotiations but rather basic conditions for a "solution," which though briefer were like Dong's points. This flurry of activity is confusing and contradictory but the more careful and authoritative formulations seem to us to be those of Dong and the Assembly, rather than that of Ho. The net effect seems to us to be to put Hanoi's stance on negotiations more clearly on record than ever before.

/2/See Document 245.

Terms for Settlement. Dong laid down his terms under four headings. The first heading includes both US withdrawal and cessation of the air attacks "in strict conformity with the Geneva Agreements" and calls for recognizing the unity of Vietnam; the second asks respect for the "military provisions" of the Geneva Agreements (which are defined only as no military alliances, foreign bases, troops, nor personnel); the third demands settlement of the affairs of South Vietnam "by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the Front"; and the fourth requires "peaceful reunification without foreign intervention." All of these terms for settlement have been set forth by Hanoi in recent years.

Terms for Negotiations. The new element in Dong's proposals is the acknowledgement that negotiations might be held once these principles were "recognized" as the basis for a settlement. There is no indication of what is meant by "recognized," of who must "recognize" them or of how rigidly Hanoi might insist on recognition in the form laid down. Though admitting that the two "zones" may remain separate for some time, Hanoi adamantly opposes any suggestion that the Geneva Agreement provided for an independent South Vietnam. It is unclear whether adherence to the military provisions of the 1954 accord is meant to be limited to the provisions mentioned. The military agreement also provided for a cease-fire and regroupment of forces (undoubtedly subsumed by Hanoi under "internal" South Vietnamese affairs) and for international supervision. On the latter point there may be more flexibility, and a few North Vietnamese spokesmen in the past have hinted strongly that a stronger control group might be considered.

Hanoi must be aware that at least one condition, acceptance of the program of the Front entailing establishment of a Front-approved coalition regime, would be quite impossible for any US or GVN negotiator. The North Vietnamese may feel, however, that in some other form, e.g. Front presence at the negotiating table or the acknowledgement of the possibility of a coalition government, it might eventually be acceptable to Washington and Saigon. The remaining three conditions, while couched in offensive language, are not so different from some US objectives in the area, and Hanoi probably does not feel that it is making it impossible for Washington to come to the conference table.

Objective: A More "Reasonable" Stance. We believe that Hanoi has been moved by the current flurry of diplomatic activity and particularly the President's speech and its favorable international reception. North Vietnam's leaders apparently felt compelled to appear more forthcoming toward negotiations.

Previously North Vietnamese spokesmen publicly had either ignored or had indicated opposition to talk about negotiations; privately, particularly after the sustained air strikes began, they showed sensitivity to the possibility that interest might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Hanoi permitted and even encouraged the erroneous impression that it insisted that no negotiations could begin before US withdrawal had been completed. In fact, in an interview released just after the President's address, Ho Chi Minh came very close to making withdrawal a precondition for talks. He laid down terms which if "carried out" would create conditions for a conference, but he did not state that negotiations were possible "only" if these terms were met.

Dong's speech and the National Assembly resolution represent a shift from Ho's stance and strongly suggest that Hanoi now feels that the 17-nation proposal,/3/ President Johnson's speech, and the world reaction have placed them on the defensive. They realize that if world and US domestic opinion is to exert any serious pressure on the US Government to halt the bombings, they must be more forthcoming on negotiations. Whether they will rely entirely on such pressure or would be willing to supplement it by private indications of greater flexibility cannot be determined from these public moves.

/3/See footnote 2, Document 228.

Hanoi Reaction to Other Proposals. Hanoi has not publicized nor apparently replied formally to other proposals which have been communicated to its officials. In most cases, such as with the 17-nation proposal, the North Vietnamese gave the bearers the standard lecture on US perfidy and then promised to study the plan and reply later. However, in one case, which fits in with the shift in Hanoi's public posture, the Foreign Ministry called in the British Consul-General on April 12 to soften the April 6 refusal to see the former British Foreign Secretary, making sure that the British understood that the door was open for future consultations.

Peiping Reaction. Peiping, in a People's Daily article, has picked up Hanoi's "terms for a settlement" aspect without mentioning negotiations, an interesting indication of possible uneasiness about Hanoi's firmness. Peiping did give extensive play to Ho's "harder" statement and to his Assembly speech, though it also printed the text of the Assembly resolution with its phrases about "political settlement" and convening an international conference.

 

256. Telegram From the Department of Defense to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, April 15, 1965, 6:39 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXII, Cables. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by McNaughton; concurred in by McGeorge Bundy, Rusk, and McNamara; and repeated to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. The message as received by Taylor was also identified by the date-time group, 152339Z. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 52, Folder D)

DEF 9164. This is a joint State-Defense message. Highest authority believes the situation in South Vietnam has been deteriorating and that, in addition to actions against the North, something new must be added in the South to achieve victory. As experimental steps to that end, we believe the following actions should be undertaken:

1. Experimental encadrement by US forces of South Vietnamese ground troops both to stiffen and increase their effectiveness and also to add to their fire power. Westmoreland will be responsible for developing a detailed plan and submitting through CINCPAC to JCS for final approval. It is suggested he develop two approaches to be carried out concurrently, one involving integration of a substantial number of US combat personnel (e.g., 50) in each of several ARVN battalions (e.g., 10) and the other involving the combined operation of approximately 3 additional Army/Marine battalions with 3 or more South Vietnamese battalions for use in combat operations. (It is recognized that if the South Vietnamese battalions used for this purpose are transferred from a general reserve assignment, it may be necessary to replace them.)

2. Introduction of a brigade force into the Bien Hoa-Vung Tau area, both to act as a security force for our installations and also to participate in counter-insurgency combat operations. Westmoreland will develop and submit to CINCPAC and the JCS a plan for the use of these troops in such operations.

3. Introduction of battalion or multi-battalion forces into 2 or 3 additional locations along the coast, e.g, Qui Nhon. Westmoreland will submit proposals as to number of troops required and location for assignment. The purpose of these deployments will be to experiment further with US forces in a counter-insurgency role, in addition to providing security for the Base.

Items 1, 2 and 3 above are designed as initial steps to increase the effectiveness of the counter-guerrilla campaign. If these moves are successful, they should be followed promptly by requests for additional US forces.

4. A substantial expansion of Vietnamese recruiting campaign utilizing US recruiting experts, techniques, and procedures. Westmoreland will work out with the South Vietnamese new recruiting goals and detailed plans for accomplishing them.

5. An experimental program providing expanded medical services to the countryside utilizing mobile dispensaries. The Surgeon General of the Army is being directed to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan to accomplish this objective.

6. An experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US Army Civil Affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel) to assist in the establishment of stable government in the provinces and to initiate and direct the necessary political, economic and security programs. Initially teams should be introduced into 1 or 2 provinces. General Peers is being sent to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan to accomplish this objective.

7. An experimental plan for distribution of food directly to regular and paramilitary personnel and/or their families. General Timmes is being sent to work with COMUSMACV to develop a detailed plan for this purpose.

Ambassador Taylor should discuss above program urgently with Quat, and assuming favorable reaction, State and Defense will inform Congressional leaders of proposed actions before they are undertaken. Westmoreland should be prepared to discuss his plans for items 1, 2 and 3 with General Wheeler during their discussions in Honolulu next week.

 

257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, April 15, 1965, 9:46 p.m.

/1//Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis.

2332. For Ambassador Taylor from McGeorge Bundy. The President has just approved an important cable to you on future military deployments,/2/ and I believe you may find these personal comments helpful.

/2/Document 256.

The President has repeatedly emphasized his personal desire for a strong experiment in the encadrement of U.S. troops with Vietnamese. He is also very eager to see prompt experiments in use of energetic teams of U.S. officials in support of provisional [provincial?] governments under unified U.S. leadership. These desires are the source of corresponding paragraphs in our message.

On further troop deployments, President's belief is that current situation requires use of all practicable means of strengthening position in South Vietnam and that additional U.S. troops are important if not decisive reinforcement. He has not seen evidence of negative result of deployments to date, and does not wish to wait any longer than is essential for genuine GVN agreement.

President always intended these plans be reviewed with you and approved by Quat before final execution, and we regret any contrary impression given by our messages in recent days.

Rusk

 

258. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 17, 1965, 3:33 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 3:10 a.m.

3421. For McGeorge Bundy from Ambassador Taylor--Eyes Only. Info Secretary Rusk--Eyes Only. Please deliver during opening business Saturday morning. Ref. Deptel 232 [2332]./2/ I am greatly troubled by DOD 152339Z April 15./3/ First, it shows no consideration for the fact that, as a result of decisions taken in Washington during my visit, this mission is charged with securing implementation by the two month old Quat govt of a 21-point military program, a 41-point non-military program, a 16-point Rowan USIS program and a 12-point CIA program. Now this new cable opens up new vistas of further points as if we can win here somehow on a point score. We are going to stall the machine of govt if we do not declare a moratorium on new programs for at least six months.

/2/Document 257.

/3/Document 256.

Next, it shows a far greater willingness to get into the ground war than I had discerned in Washington during my recent trip. Although some additional U.S. forces should probably be introduced after we see how the Marines do in counterinsurgency operations, my own attitude is reflected in Embtel 3384,/4/ which I hope was called to the attention of the President.

/4/Document 252.

My greatest concern arises over para 6 reftel which frankly bewilders me. What do the authors of this cable think the mission has been doing over the months and years? We have presumably the best qualified personnel the Washington agencies (State, AID, DOD, USIA and CIA) can find working in the provinces seven days a week at precisely the tasks described in para 6. Is it proposed to withdraw these people and replace them by Army civil affairs types operating on the pattern of military occupation? If this is the thought, I would regard such a change in policy (which will gain wide publicity) as disastrous in its likely effects upon pacification in general and on US/GVN relations in particular.

Mac, can't we be better protected from our friends? I know that everyone wants to help but there's such a thing as killing with kindness. In particular, we want to stay alive here because we think we're winning--and will continue to win unless helped to death.

Taylor

 

259. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 17, 1965, 3:17 p.m.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 52, Folder D. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also captioned "White House Attn. Mr. Bundy." Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 704-705.

3423. This message undertakes to summarize instructions which I have received over the last ten days with regard to the introduction of third country combat forces and to discuss the preferred way of presenting the subject to the GVN.

As a result of the meeting of the President and his advisors on April 1 and the NSC meeting on the following day,/2/ I left Washington and returned to Saigon with the understanding that the reinforcement of the Marines already ashore by two additional BLT's and a F-4 squadron and the progressive introduction of ground support forces were approved, but that decision on the several proposals for bringing in more US combat forces and their possible modes of employment was withheld in an offensive counterinsurgency role. State was to explore with the Korean, Australian and New Zealand Govts the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements in parallel with the Marine reinforcement.

/2/See Documents 229-231.

Since arriving home, I have received the following instructions and have taken the indicated actions with respect to third country combat forces.

April 6 and 8. Received GVN concurrence to introduction of the Marine reinforcements and to an expanded mission for all Marines in Danang-Phu Bai area.

April 8. Received Deptel 2229/3/ directing approach to GVN, suggesting request to Australian Govt for an infantry battalion for use in SVN. While awaiting a propitious moment to raise the matter, I received Deptel 2287/4/ directing approach be delayed until further orders. Nothing has been received since.

/3/Dated April 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

/4/Dated April 12. (Ibid.)

April 14. I learned by JCS 009012/5/ to CINCPAC of apparent decision to deploy 173rd airborne brigade immediately to Bien Hoa-Vung Tau. By Embtel 3373,/5/ delay in this deployment was urgently recommended but no reply has been received. However, para 2 of DOD 152339/6/ apparently makes reference to this project in terms which suggest that is something less than as an approved immediate action. In view of the uncertainty of its status, I have not broached the matter with Quat.

/5/See Document 251.

/6/Document 256.

April 15. Received Deptel 2314/7/ directing that Embassy Saigon discuss with GVN introduction of ROK regimental combat team and suggest GVN request such a force ASAP. Because of Quat's absence from Saigon, I have not been able to raise matter. As matter of fact, it should not be raised until we have a clear concept of employment.

/7/Dated April 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

April 16. I have just seen State-Defense message DOD 152339 cited above which indicates a favorable attitude toward several possible uses of US combat forces beyond the NSC decisions of April 2. I am told to discuss these and certain other non-military matters urgently with Quat. The substance of this cable will be addressed in a separate message./8/ I can not raise these matters with Quat without further guidance.

/8/See Document 260.

Faced with this rapidly changing picture of Washington desires and intentions with regard to the introduction of third country (as well as US) combat forces, I badly need a clarification of our purposes and objectives. Before I can present our case to GVN, I have to know what that case is and why. It is not going to be easy to get ready concurrence for the large scale introduction of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit.

Let me suggest the kind of instruction to the Amb which it would be most helpful to receive for use in presenting to GVN what I take to be a new policy of third country participation in ground combat.

"The USG has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat govt. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objective of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency can not be attained in an acceptable time frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the rough [South] before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

"The JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag into 1966 and even beyond, they consider it necessary to reinforce GVN ground forces with about 20 battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements can not be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from third country sources.

"The USC accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and offers its assistance to the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time. We are prepared to bring in additional US ground forces provided we can get a reasonable degree of participation from other third countries. If the GVN will make urgent representations to them, we believe it entirely possible to obtain the following contributions: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. If forces of the foregoing magnitude are forthcoming, the USG is prepared to provide the remainder of the combat reinforcements as well as the necessary logistic personnel to support the third country contingents. Also it will use its good offices as desired in assisting the GVN approach to these govts.

"You (the Ambassador) will seek the concurrence of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out subsequently."

Armed with an instruction such as the foregoing, I would feel adequately equipped to initiate what may be a sharp debate with the GVN. I need something like this before taking up the pending troop matters with Quat.

Taylor

 

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 17, 1965, 4:21 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

3424. Reference: DOD 152339Z April 15./2/

/2/Document 256.

1. The US Mission Council has reviewed reftel and submits the following comments.

2. As a general introductory observation, the Council would first call attention to the large number of programs which were approved for the consideration or implementation following Ambassador Taylor's visit to Washington in early April. They include the so-called Johnson military program of 21 points, the 41-point non-military program, the Rowan program of 16 points and the CIA program of 12 points. In the aggregate, they represent far more than the GVN can digest for months to come and thus have required a thoughtful phasing based upon a consideration of priorities. Any additional programs will have to be fitted into this elaborate framework of activities at the expense of some of low priority which have been previously approved.

3. With regard to the urgency of the matters raised in reftel, the Council does not feel that there is a present deterioration in SVN which warrants taking measures which are not clearly sound and necessary. Rather than a deterioration, we feel that matters are going considerably better since early February when air attacks in the DRV began. Morale is up; ARVN performance is up; and Quat continues to do quite well. This is not to say that victory is in sight and the VC may not be preparing a new offensive. But we have no feeling of great crisis arising from present developments that requires us to cast aside our present carefully thought-out programs in favor of crash projects of doubtful value. As to specifics, the Council has grave doubts about the individual encadrement proposal raised in paragraph 1, reftel. There are both military and political objections which appear overwhelming, not the least of which is the likely repugnance of the proposal to GVN. However, we will reserve final comment until Gen Westmoreland prepares a specific plan. The other suggestion in paragraph 1--that US and GVN combat battalions be brigaded for combat operations--may have merit and has been under intensive study by MACV in the context of an international force.

With regard to the military measures of paragraphs 2 and 3, assuming that it is the decision of the USG that it is necessary to take a major part in the ground combat, the Council concurs in the experiments suggested, provided GVN acquiesces and after MACV has organized the necessary logistical support.

The Vietnam recruiting program is going well as result of months of effort expended on it. Accessions in March amounted to about 10,000, exceeding the goal of 8,000 which we had believed to be the highest feasible figure the GVN could attain. All the necessary recruiting goals have been worked out as well as plans for accomplishing them. US experts have collaborated in developing them. No further assistance is needed at the moment.

The Council favors any practical program of expanded medical services and welcomes the collaboration of the Surgeon General of the Army in its development. In this connection, USOM several weeks ago enthusiastically accepted informal nomination Brigadier General Humphrey of USAF as Chief, USOM Public Health Division. In view priority assigned health effort, we request earliest arrival Humphrey.

We do not understand the proposal contained in para 6. We have in every province teams of US military and civilians who are the best qualified people the USG has been able to send and who are deeply engaged in "the establishment of stable govt in the provinces and the initiation and direction of necessary political, economic and security programs". This quoted language describes the pacification mission which is the main business of entire US Mission. The Council sees no need for a large Dept of the Army planning team to work with COMUSMACV, particularly since other agencies of the mission have important parts of this problem and our current plans are being [garble] to be adequate.

As to para 7, we are not aware of any special problem in the feeding of regular and paramilitary personnel; as a matter of fact, the sole program for distribution of subsistence in kind to dependents has recently been abandoned since it was administratively unmanageable and a monetary supplement substituted therefore. Hence, there is no requirement for sending General Timmes on a planning mission.

In general, the Council feels that there is no deficiency in our mission planning. The weakness is in field of execution which will never be better than the level of performance of GVN. New programs will not of necessity raise that level; unless carefully selected, they may have the opposite effect.

Council is deeply concerned that combination of measures proposed reftel will be regarded by Vietnamese as a sharp change in policy and basis for our joint effort with Vietnamese as indeed it appears to us. If we are to build a viable independent nation here, we must continue to press and pro [prod?] Vietnamese on all fronts but realize that in final analysis it is Vietnamese who must run their own affairs. Council foresees many adverse political and psychological repercussions from embarking on many of the actions outlined in reftel. When they become known, our behavior will be widely interpreted as a vote of no confidence in Quat govt and will confirm the fears sometimes voiced that the Americans want to take over and run the affairs of the country without reference to the Vietnamese.

Taylor

[end document]

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Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause,
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